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## INTERACTION BETWEEN EVALUATION OFFICES AND GOVERNING BODIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

**(Prepared for the GEF Office of Monitoring and Evaluation)**

# Board Governance and Independent Evaluation: Lessons and Implications for GEF from Modes of Interaction between Boards and Evaluation Units of International Organizations<sup>1</sup>

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DRAFT for Discussion ONLY

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was commissioned by the GEF Office of Monitoring and Evaluation (GEF OME) as an input following the GEF Council request to the Office to explore possible interactions between this Office and the Council. This paper will be presented to Council, as an information document, at the Council's meeting on November 8, 2005. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of GEF OME, the GEF Council, or the Governments they represent. The paper is a work in progress and any deficiencies that remain are the responsibility of the authors. Due to the limited time in which it was prepared, the paper is being shared concurrently with the GEF Council and the organizations from which the material was drawn. It will be finalized after taking into account discussions at the GEF Council, and comments from the organizations consulted. Comments should be sent to Robert van den Berg, Director of GEF OME and to Uma Lele at [uma@umalele.org](mailto:uma@umalele.org)

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## Table of Contents

1.	Introduction .....	1
2.	Purpose and Analytical Method .....	3
3.	Outline and Overarching Theme of the Paper .....	5
4.	Diversity in Evaluation Structures and Modalities of Interactions .....	5
5.	The Evolution of Offices of Independent Evaluation .....	6
6.	The Choice of and the Reasons for Bench Marks .....	9
7.	The World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department as the de facto Multilateral Development Bank Evaluation Model .....	9
	(a) Role of CODE .....	10
	(b) Interactions Between the World Bank’s Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) and the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) .....	11
	(c) Known Outcomes and Impacts of World Bank and Other Multilateral Development Bank OEDs on Organizational Policies and Strategies .....	12
	(d) Lessons from the World Bank and Other International Financial Institutions .....	13
8.	International Fund For Agricultural Development (IFAD) as Second Benchmark .....	14
	(a) Role of the IFAD Evaluation Committee .....	15
	(b) Interactions Between the IFAD Evaluation Committee and the Office of Evaluation .....	16
	(c) Known Outcomes and Impacts of IFAD Evaluations on IFAD Policies and Strategies .....	16
	(d) Lessons from the IFAD Experience .....	17
9.	Some Outstanding Issues Needing Further Analysis .....	18
	Annex 1: Comparison of Mandates and Missions of Reviewed Organizations And Their Evaluation Units .....	19
	Annex 2: Comparative Modes Board – Evaluation Unit Interactions in International Organizations .....	21
	Annex 3: List of Officials Interviewed .....	29
	Annex 4: Questionnaire for Review .....	30

## List of Acronyms

ACP	Agreement at Completion Point
ADF	African Development Fund
AfDB	African Development Bank
ADB	Asian Development Bank
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CLP	Core Learning Partnership
CODE	Committee for Development Effectiveness
DEC	Development Effectiveness Committee
DGO	Director General Operations
EC	Evaluation Committee
ECG	Evaluation Cooperation Group
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
GAO	General Accounting Office
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEFOME	Global Environment Facility Office of Monitoring and Evaluation
GEFSEC	Global Environment Facility Secretariat
IDB	Inter American Development Bank
IEO	Independent Evaluation Office
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture and Development
IFC	International Financial Corporation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOE	Independent Office of Evaluation
MAR	Management Action Record
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
OE	Office of Evaluation
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNOIOS	United Nations Office for Internal Oversight Services
WB	World Bank

## **Board Governance and Independent Evaluation: Lessons and Implications for GEF from Modes of Interaction in International Organizations**

Uma Lele and Rema N. Balasundaram

### **1. Introduction**

The need for credible high quality independent evaluations has increased as donors and external constituencies increasingly demand evidence on development effectiveness. Governors of international organizations have responded to the challenge in a variety of ways, e.g., by giving greater independence to the evaluation units in their organizations, strengthening reporting arrangements to the boards, establishing new evaluation units where they were absent, and strengthening monitoring and quality assurance mechanisms linked to results. The GEF Office of Monitoring and Evaluation, (hereafter referred to as GEF OME), was established in 1996 and was declared independent by the GEF Council in 2003. Independent reporting to the Council commenced in 2004 when the Director of GEF OME was hired. Other examples include the establishment of the independent office of evaluation by the International Monetary Fund in 2001, and IFAD whose evaluation unit was established in 1978, and began to report to the board in 2003.

The World Bank has had the longest standing independent Operations Evaluation Department (OED). Established in 1973, it began reporting to the Board as an independent unit in 1975. It has evolved substantially over the years. The multifaceted evaluation system of the World Bank now consists of several units dealing with monitoring and control—together with increased self-evaluation that is reviewed, validated, and complemented by independent evaluation crucial for the overall system's credibility, quality, and comprehensiveness. In response to the criticism that the World Bank was not following its own policies and safeguards in 1993, the incoming President James Wolfensohn established an external, independent inspection panel reporting to the World Bank's Board to address legitimate concerns of stakeholders affected by World Bank operations. A Quality Assurance Group reporting to Bank management was set up in 1994 in response to the evidence of deteriorating portfolio quality. The Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) was established in 1994 to allow more in-depth consideration of evaluation studies and approach papers, and of management responses to OED recommendations.<sup>4</sup> Responsibility for oversight of OED's work was shifted to the new Committee on Development Effectiveness. CODE has provided a platform for extensive and fruitful discussions of Bank policies, programs and processes.<sup>5</sup> The recent change of the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department to the Independent Evaluation Group, (including the three Evaluation Units of the World Bank Group, namely, the World Bank, IFC and MIGA) is

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<sup>4</sup> The Annual Report on Operations Evaluation in FY 95, World Bank, 1995.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

intended to further improve coherence and efficiency of the evaluation function in the World Bank Group as a whole.

The most recent example is that of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in the United States. It established a monitoring unit to satisfy its Board that, monitoring systems, including performance indicators and data collection systems *would be* in place *at the approval stage of program investments*; and that implementation would yield information in a timely manner in order to provide input into further decision making.

It is clear that to varying degrees, donor organizations have been actively moving to improve the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of individual interventions. By better reflecting the evaluation findings in organizational policies, practices and procedures they are also trying to improve overall organizational performance.<sup>6</sup> Changes over time in the scope of operations of the organizations from projects to program, sector, thematic, corporate, regional and global level activities have in turn led to changes in the mandates for and scope of evaluations. Yet a debate has also ensued in recent years about the degree and meaning of independence (Box 1) and the merits of internal and external evaluations of organizational performance (Box 2). These trends have placed considerable pressure on independent evaluation units and the boards of international organizations to be at the cutting edge of methodology, scope and impacts.

**Box 1: Independence Is Now Better Defined But In Reality There Are Many Shades of Independence Among the Organizations**

Following the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG), independence in this paper is considered in terms of:

1. **Organizational independence.** Recruitment of evaluation leader and staff, reporting arrangements, work programs and budgets, performance evaluation and incentives
2. **Behavioral independence.** Ability and willingness to issue strong and uncompromising reports, and transparency in the reporting of evaluation findings
3. **Protection from outside interference.** The extent to which the evaluation unit is able to determine the design, scope, timing, and conduct of evaluations without Management interference, the extent to which the evaluation unit has control over staff hiring, promotion, and firing, within a merit system, etc.
4. **Avoidance of conflict of interest.** The extent to which policies and procedures are in place to identify and ameliorate any impairment from evaluator relationships, the extent to which rules or staffing procedures are present and enforced that prevent staff from evaluating programs., activities or entities for which they have, or had decision making or financial management roles, or with which they are seeking employment, etc).

Source: ECG Template for Assessing the Independence of Evaluation Organizations.  
<http://www.ecgnet.org/docs.html>.

GEF OME has also been wrestling with these evolutionary challenges, including the issues of clarity and accountability in the governance, management and effectiveness of its own monitoring and evaluation operations. It has faced an increasing demand for M&E related inputs

<sup>6</sup> World Bank OED methodology for example explicitly seeks ratings on World Bank and borrower performance.

to GEF policies, programs, and projects by the Council, and realized the need for a clear mandate for the GEF OME in view of the formulation of the proposed GEF M&E Policy.

GEF OME is also looking to clarify and define the Council's oversight M&E function in a number of ways and include steps to increase the results of GEF supported activities: by making the feedback loops between lessons learned and decision making more transparent and efficient, increasing the effectiveness and impact of the products generated by OME; and strengthening the Council's strategic function by increasing its absorptive capacity on M&E issues as well as on findings and lessons coming from GEF M&E activities. The new GEF M&E Policy<sup>7</sup> states that the GEF OME expects the Council: (1) to provide an enabling environment for monitoring and evaluation activities in line with internationally accepted standards; (2) to ensure accountability and oversight of GEF performance; (3) to ensure active use of M&E products for decision making and management, together with the CEO and OME's Director; and (4) to review, approve and ensure implementation of the GEF policy for M&E.

## **2. Purpose and Analytical Method**

The purpose of this comparative review is to identify lessons from the experience on the modalities of board-evaluation unit interactions and to explore their implications for optimal modalities of interactions between the GEFOME and the GEF Council.<sup>8</sup> The cases were selected based on their potential for learning.<sup>9</sup> The organizations include the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Global Environment Facility, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Office for Internal Oversight Services—Organization (UNOIOS), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the World Bank (WB).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The GEF M&E Policy is under discussion for approval at this Council meeting.

<sup>8</sup> At the June 2005 meeting of the GEF Council, several Council members requested the GEF OME to develop options for interaction between the Office and the Council.

<sup>9</sup> Three GEF partner institutions not included in the review are the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Financial Corporation (IFC).

<sup>10</sup> In the context of the World Bank Group, the study limited its work to the Operations Evaluation Department.

## Box 2. Growing Demands On Evaluation Units and Boards

High quality self evaluations are increasingly considered essential as a foundation for good independent evaluations. Participatory evaluations involving consultations with and even participation of key stakeholders in evaluations are becoming part of the new trend. As evaluations have moved to the higher plane boards are increasingly seeking greater consistency among results from project and sector, country and global outcomes or reasons for lack thereof. They are looking for assessment of the *contribution* of their organization's activities to the overall country or global outcomes from the activities financed by their organizations. The roles of external shocks (wars, floods, droughts, international markets) vis-à-vis internal factors affecting performance have begun to come into play.<sup>1</sup> The need to address "the counterfactual", i.e., activities the donors could or should have been financing or policies or actions they should have been advocating rather than simply evaluating the activities donors finance has become an issue.<sup>2</sup> Other methodological debates include the merit of assessing outcomes and impacts "with and without" donor interventions, rather than by using the "before and after" approach.<sup>3</sup> Even board governance of organizations has come under evaluative scrutiny leading to identifying the need to improve the quality and the composition of boards that set strategic directions and ensure quality.<sup>4,5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pitman, George K., Osvaldo N. Feinstein and Gregory K. Ingram (eds.), *Evaluating Development Effectiveness*, World Bank Series on Evaluation and Development 7, Transaction (New Brunswick NJ, 2005).

<sup>2</sup> See The Meltzer Commission, Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, (Washington DC, 2000), and Einhorn, Jessica, *The World Bank's Mission Creep*, in Foreign Affairs Sep./Oct. 2001.

<sup>3</sup> The World Bank's OED recently strengthened its impact assessment work in response to the academic literature on the insufficient use of randomized experiments in the evaluations of donor programs. But also see Robert. D. Van Den Berg, "Results Evaluation and Impact Assessment in Development Cooperation", in *A Visit to the World of Practice*, Sage Publications, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi) DOI. Vol 11(1), 27-36.

<sup>4</sup> Center for Global Development, *The Hardest Job in the World: Five Crucial Tasks for the New President of the World Bank*, (Center for Global Development; Washington DC, 2005) calls for greater voice of developing countries in the governance of the World Bank.

<sup>5</sup> World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, *Addressing the Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Approach to Global Programs*, The World Bank (Washington DC, 2004) points out the limited role developing countries play in the selection and the governance structures of global programs see page 60-61.

Being the first comparative study of its kind, there was no established methodology to conduct such an analysis. Information was far more limited on some organizations than on others either due to their being established more recently, and/or small volume of outputs of the evaluation units, or because such information that exists is not in the public domain. Additionally, the team had limited time in which to conduct the study. The team's approach included a desk study of web based and published information on the selected institutions, and included aspects related to the structures of their evaluation units, governance arrangements, and on the compositions and interaction modalities of interactions between the boards and evaluation units. This was followed by administration of a formal questionnaire to the organizations, and interviews of senior managers including particularly those in charge of evaluation units (see Annex). Questions explored through interviews fell into four categories: (1) those related to formal governance arrangements and how they work in practice (i.e., hiring, reporting and performance assessment arrangements of the heads of the evaluation units); (2) the nature, breadth and volumes of

evaluation products produced by the evaluation units; (3) the extent and the nature of interactions between the governing boards and the evaluation units; and (4) their impacts on the boards, the organizations and on development outcomes and lessons learned. These questions led to the issues of interactions of the boards and evaluation units, each with the management of the organizations. In cases where the organizations work through implementing agencies such as the GEF and IFAD, interactions with the implementing agencies with regard to evaluation arrangements were also explored.

### **3. Outline and Overarching Theme of the Paper**

The first part of the paper reviews the diversity and evolution of evaluation structures and modalities of interaction among organizations. Then the choice of and the reasons behind the selection of the two organizations, namely, the World Bank and IFAD, as benchmarks, are briefly outlined in a comparative perspective with other organizations and from the perspective of the GEF. The experience of the two benchmark institutions is then discussed relative to the structures and processes of other international organizations to draw lessons and implications for GEF. The paper ends by outlining areas needing further exploration.

The overarching finding of the study is that when evaluation units begin to report directly to the boards rather than to or through management, the profile and the role of the evaluation function in the organization increases. Boards begin to take greater interest in evaluations as a tool to improve oversight processes of the institution, as well as to enhance their own, and management performance and accountability. While such independent reporting to the boards is necessary, it is not sufficient. The formation of an evaluation committee to which the evaluation unit reports increases the quantity and the quality of the interactions between evaluation departments and boards and legitimizes the evaluation function of the board. The selected members who form the committee increase their understanding of the evaluation issues as they pertain to the strategic management and performance of the organization. By legitimizing the evaluation function, the explicit responsibility and accountability of the evaluation committee to the board thus increases impacts of evaluation units on board strategies and on management practices. Two caveats are needed to substantiate this finding. First, the establishment of strong monitoring and self evaluation systems is a necessary foundation for independent evaluations to serve the learning function and create an evaluation culture in the organization. This finding suggests that whereas GEF would be well served by having an evaluation committee of the Council, there may be implications for GEF management regarding supervision, monitoring and self evaluation functions, and processes, as well as their relationship to the independent evaluation function. Second, the terms of reference of the evaluation unit determines the extent to which it can evaluate “out of the box” strategic issues facing the organization. Strengthening the evaluation function may not achieve the second objective without the necessary mandate to the evaluation units. These issues may well need to be explored further to draw lessons and implications for the GEF.

### **4. Diversity in Evaluation Structures and Modalities of Interactions**

The diverse mandates of the evaluation units, their mission statements where available, and the stated missions of the organizations are presented in Annex 1. The initial rationale for a

comparative analysis of the objectives and modus operandi of committees and Boards of independent evaluation units was the apparent similarity among the multilateral financial institutions: AfDB, ADB, IDB, the World Bank and the IMF in terms of their offices of evaluation. They are independent from management, and report directly to resident Boards. But the team's investigations found considerable variation among organizations on evaluation arrangements. Besides the evolving degree of their independence has affected the manner in which they function.

Whereas the IADB and the IMF's Independent Evaluation Office each have evaluation related Sub Committees, both address these issues to their full Executive Boards. At the IMF the Evaluation Committee does not play as much of a role as it did prior to the full establishment of the Independent Evaluation Office, when the committee initiated and essentially managed some evaluation functions now carried out by the evaluation department. The Evaluation Department of the AfDB is structurally linked to the Board of Directors through a Development Effectiveness Committee, but is linked to the President administratively. The EBRD has dual reporting lines and reports to an Audit Committee, as well as to the Board of Directors. The World Bank's Director General of IEG (often referred to here by its previous name, the Operations Evaluation Department) reports to the Executive Board through its Committee On Development Effectiveness.

Comparison across other multilateral organizations from the UN system suggests weaker linkages of UN evaluation units with their executive boards than is the case in the international financial institutions, and the reasons seem to vary. For example, the Evaluation Office of the UNOIOS reports to a Committee for Program and Coordination,<sup>11</sup> but the Head reports to the Director of the Division of Monitoring, Evaluation and Consulting. The declining budgetary support to the evaluation office has limited its effectiveness although it has carried out a number of independent evaluations. The UNDP Evaluation Office reports to a Joint Board of UNDP and UNFPA, through its Administrator. The Evaluation Office has been an independent unit within UNDP since inception in 1983, its independence being defined as reporting *directly* to the Executive Board *through* the Administrator, not having line management to operations, setting its own evaluation agenda, managing its own budget, and conducting evaluations with no external interference. But UNDP does not have a Board sub committee for evaluation and the absence of such an evaluation committee appears to have limited the impact of evaluations on the board or management. This is notwithstanding the fact that evaluation results are reported, to have been frequently communicated to the board through informal seminars. They do not get followed up by the Executive Board in concrete terms.

## **5. The Evolution of Offices of Independent Evaluation**

More detailed information on differences across organizations and key changes in evaluation arrangements over time are presented in Annex 2; and include: the date of establishment of the evaluation units, size, governance, the resident and non-resident nature of governing boards, reporting arrangements, the clarity and the public disclosure of the arrangements and the frequency, intensity and effectiveness of board/evaluation unit (and board/management)

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<sup>11</sup> The UN Committee on Programme and Coordination (CPC) is a Committee which reports to the General Assembly through the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

interactions. The Boards of the ADB and the AfDB were set up in 2000 and 2002 respectively following the World Bank's CODE as a model, and is discussed in greater detail below. How the IFAD Office of Evaluation began to converge with those of the multilateral banks over time is also discussed.

The boards have managed the issues of regional balance, representativeness and voice of developing countries in varied ways, and with different degrees of transparency as information presented on the membership and the size of the Executive Boards and the Sub Committees on evaluation in Table 1 illustrates. IFAD is the most transparent in revealing the nature of the balance and responsibility for chairmanship as discussed in the following section. Apart from ensuring regional representation on its Development Effectiveness Committee the ADB also mandates that the Chair of the Development Effectiveness Committee be a member from a developing country.

Multiple committees enable all board members to actively participate in some function of the board. Apart from promoting participation and a sense of ownership of the organization among board members, the committees have served to strengthen accountability and the oversight role of the Board. The Executive Boards of the AfDB, ADB, IADB, IFAD, the UN OIOS, and the World Bank, have more than one Committee. The World Bank, for example, has six Committees: An Audit Committee, Budget Committee, Committee on Governance and Executive Directors Administrative Matters (COGAM), Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE), an Informal Sub Committee on Development Effectiveness, and a Personnel Committee (PC). IFAD has two Committees, an Evaluation Committee and an Audit Committee. ADB has four Committees, the IADB has six Committees, and the UNOIOS has three Committees. The lack of any committees in GEF by contrast is said to lead to a perceived sense of exclusion and exclusivity by the inclusion of some board members into ad hoc, informal committees, for example, the delegation by the GEF Council to a subgroup of the task of the development of terms of reference for the Third Overall Performance Study of the GEF (OPS3), and the friends of the chairs" subgroup by GEF management in the context of the Resource Allocation discussion.

Administration of the Boards and their Committees is handled by a Secretariat, who reports to management, in the case of the AfDB, ADB, EBRD, IDB, and WB, as well as the UN. The Secretariats handle preparation of agendas, summary minutes and statements, reports to be discussed, and in some organizations, communication between Committees, evaluation units, and management. Some Secretariats also handle orientation for Executive Board members including among other things, the functioning of independent evaluation. Because the Secretariats are administratively managed by managements of these institutions some organizations that do not have such secretariats, such as IFAD, have considered that functioning of the board committees is constrained by the secretariats. This study did not look into this issue.

**Table 1. Boards and Evaluation Committees of Institutions Under Review**

	AfDB	ADB	EBRD	GEF	OED/ IBRD	IFAD	IEO/ IMF	IDB	UNDP	UNIDO <sup>1</sup>	UNOIOS
Size of Board/Evaluation Committee	Board: DEC <sup>2</sup> : 6	Board: DEC: 6	Board: 27 AC <sup>3</sup> : 7	Council: 32	Board: CODE: 8	EB <sup>4</sup> : 36 EC: 9	Board: 24 EC <sup>5</sup> : 8	EB: 28 PEC <sup>6</sup> : 7	EB: 36	EB: 4	CPC <sup>7</sup> : 34
Resident/Non Resident Board	Resident	Resident	Resident	Non Resident	Resident	Non resident	Resident	Resident	Non resident	Resident	Resident
Developed and Developing Country Representation on Board/ Committee	Strike a balance between regional and non regional	Chair of DEC always a Developing country member, strikes a balance between regional and non regional	Strike a balance between constituencies	16 developing, 14 developed, 2 transition	Strike a balance, 4 developing country, 4 developed country	4 OECD countries; 2 OPEC 3 developing countries	Strike a balance	Strike a balance	8 Africa 7 Asia & Pacific 4 EE 5 LAC 12 western Europe and others	Not applicable	9 Africa 7 Asia 4 EE 7 LAC 7 Western Europe and others
Number of Committees	4	4	3		6	2	1	6			3

<sup>1</sup> In the case of UNIDO the Executive Board is comprised of a Director General and 4 members who are heads of divisions of UNIDO.

<sup>2</sup> Development Effectiveness Committee

<sup>3</sup> Audit Committee

<sup>4</sup> Executive Board

<sup>5</sup> Evaluation Committee

<sup>6</sup> Program Evaluation Committee

<sup>7</sup> Committee for Program and Coordination

## **6. The Choice of and the Reasons for Benchmarks**

The World Bank and IFAD were chosen as benchmarks. As indicated earlier the World Bank's large and well established evaluation unit has de facto served as a model and a standard for the development of evaluation units and practices in regional banks and the IMF, even though these institutions have diverged from some of the procedures and practices of the Bank often purposefully to better suit their own particular situations. Therefore, the case of the World Bank provides insights into the evaluation operations of a number of international financial institutions.

IFAD on the other hand, like GEF, has much smaller evaluation capacity than the World Bank's. Its independence status is relatively new, and a board status is in between the World Bank's fully resident board and the GEF's non-resident Council. Like the GEF, IFAD relies on implementing agencies to implement its projects, yet unlike the GEF, IFAD conducts the evaluation (and increasingly supervision or implementation assistance) of its own projects. In contrast to UNDP, IFAD has gone further in increasing the board- evaluation unit interactions with some solid albeit early evidence of increased impacts of evaluations. This increased convergence adapted to IFAD's particular circumstances offers relevant lessons for the GEF because organizations with non resident boards face special challenges in developing a shared board vision of the mission and strategy of the organization. Non-resident boards lack the time and the benefits of physical proximity to provide adequate time for oversight of the organization's management and that of the evaluation unit. Developing the necessary team work needed in the board, including for translating evaluation findings into improving organizational strategy and management practices is a challenge, because non-resident boards also lack the compliment of advisors in residence who have greater familiarity with the day to day functioning of the organization than those resident in their home countries. However, with well defined responsibilities and provision of support, they can play the necessary role in supporting the function of independent evaluation. This is discussed further in the case of IFAD.

## **7. The World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department as the de facto Multilateral Development Bank Evaluation Model**

The World Bank's CODE is comprised of eight members including the chair. It was created to achieve several different objectives: to establish processes connected to the issues of development effectiveness, to operationalize the relationship between the Board and independent evaluation, and by so doing, to establish the board's direct and systematic link to the results of the World Bank activities on the ground.<sup>12</sup> CODE, together with other Board committees, has helped the Board to carry out its oversight function of World Bank management and OED. With the increase in the number of evaluation issues being brought up for Board discussion in 1995, an informal Sub Committee of the Board composed of 12 members including a Chair, and a Secretary was also established.

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<sup>12</sup> OED History, Panel Discussion, Perspectives on Evaluation in the Bank Today, Jan Piercy, page 100, World Bank, 2003.

## **(a) The Role of CODE**

The role of the Board in the recruitment and retention of the Director General in the World Bank has increased considerably over time.<sup>13,14</sup> The Director General reports to the chair of CODE. CODE reviews “the work program and the reports produced by the Operations Evaluation Department, IFC's Operations Evaluation Group and that of MIGA, and management responses thereon. It identifies policy issues for consideration by the Executive Directors and satisfies itself that the World Bank Group's operations evaluation and self-evaluation activities are adequate and efficient. CODE prepares for Board review decisions on selected operations evaluation and on high priority development effectiveness issues, including operational policy and business process issues that have bearing on the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of the World Bank Group operations. It also monitors the implementation of such decisions with a view to ensuring that the overall purpose of poverty reduction is being served. The full Board discusses OED’s work plan and budget, and the Annual Reviews of Development Effectiveness.

The CODE Chair carries out the performance evaluation of the Director General. In the cases of the IMF and IADB, the performance evaluations, salary increments, and renewal details of the Director’s of the evaluation units are built into their hiring procedures established by their respective Boards and are not carried out on a year to year basis.<sup>15</sup>

The OED renewal in 1999 articulated five strategic objectives:

- Move evaluation to a higher plane;
- Shorten the feedback loop and fill evaluation gaps;
- Build evaluation capacity;
- Invest in knowledge and partnerships and
- Manage for results.

It is unclear how CODE assesses OED performance in relation to these five objectives. Evidence cited below indicates that items 3 and 4 may receive less weight from CODE than the remaining three. The deliberations of CODE and its sub committee of evaluations presented by OED and the other evaluation groups in the World Bank have become more articulated in recent years going beyond discussing evaluation findings to questioning methodologies, timing, scope and

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<sup>13</sup> The first OED Director General reported to the Board and the President concurrently. He was selected by the Executive Directors from a short list of candidates provided by the then World Bank President, Mr. Robert McNamara, was removable only by the Executive Directors, and was ineligible for reappointment to the World Bank Group. Initially, even the Director of OED, who reports to the DGO, was chosen by the President (OED History, 2003, Mervyn Wiener, page 22). The DGOs have since been selected with a growing role for the Board in the search, selection and retention. The DGOs report only to the Board and the recently appointed DGO is at the level of a Senior Vice President. The Director of OED continues to be chosen by the DGO in consultation with Bank management. All World Bank DGOs have been internal Bank managers.

<sup>14</sup> The IMF’s Director of Evaluation is recruited exclusively by the IMF’s Executive Board. The current Director was a former IMF Board member who helped design the evaluation unit. The Directors of IADB and ADB’s evaluation units are also recruited by their Executive Boards, recruitment for the EBRD Head will now be handled by the Executive Board, and the Head of AfDB’s evaluation unit is nominated by the President after consultation with the Board. The Head of IFAD is also nominated by the President and endorsed by the Board.

<sup>15</sup> The only option the IMF board retains is one of removing the director in case of non-performance. The IMF also relies on external experts to manage evaluations to a greater extent than the World Bank. It considers that these differences from the Bank give it greater freedom in evaluations.

consistency across various evaluations. Furthermore, the sub committee for example assesses the adequacy of the World Bank's independent and self-evaluation methods and processes, by focusing in-depth on the utilization of a sample of evaluations and other products related to country assistance strategies, and comments on selected Sector Strategy Papers. The Subcommittee work program is identified in consultation with CODE, and the Sub-committee reports to CODE on its findings.

The discussions at CODE's subcommittee of the country assistance evaluations (CAE) have contributed substantially to OED's evaluation methodology, ensuring timetables of CAEs, providing inputs into the Board discussion and in the management preparation of Country Assistance Strategies, in moving towards greater coherence and consistency between OED's evaluation results at the country and project levels, and in assessing the role of the Bank's various instruments in achieving overall country program objectives rather than simply assessing the outcomes of World Bank supported activities.<sup>16</sup> Issues about choice of methodologies and evaluation scope have also come up in the context of CODE discussion of recent OED evaluations.<sup>17</sup> CODE (and the Sub Committee) has a Bank internal website page that provides information on its Terms of Reference and mandate.<sup>18</sup> CODE's Annual Report is not disclosed to the public.

The Criteria for the selection of CODE members are less transparent than in the case of IFAD's evaluation committee outlined below. Given that the Executive Board has several committees, at the beginning of the year the membership preferences of Executive Directors are reviewed by the Dean of the Board along with the Secretariat. Effort is made to ensure that there is representation by regions in each committee and sub-committee.

#### **(b) Interactions Between the World Bank's Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) and the Operations Evaluation Department**

CODE-OED interactions have an important qualitative as well as a quantitative dimension. The former is less easily captured and evaluated than the latter. The best indicator of this relationship is that membership for CODE is the most sought after by Executive Directors. The joint CODE-OED influence on World Bank policies and management practices is well documented below although how this impact has translated into increased development effectiveness by the World Bank in a rapidly changing global environment for external assistance is less clear.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> For a more detailed discussion see Country Evaluations Retrospective, OED, 2005.

<sup>17</sup> The CODE Chairman's summary of the Effectiveness of World Bank Support for Community based and driven development An OED Evaluation, World Bank, 2005.

<sup>18</sup> The ADB's Committee on Development Effectiveness has a webpage dedicated to its Mandate, Terms of Reference and Annual Reports which is publicly disclosed. The IMF and IFAD also have publicly disclosed information on their respective Committees and mandates.

<sup>19</sup> Recent OED evaluations have observed that the World Bank has expanded its global partnerships to deal with the changing environment but lacks a global strategy. It may have overemphasized country level investments in the social sectors (e.g. Health and education) relative to those in the productive sectors (e.g. agriculture and infrastructure) sacrificing overall economic growth. (2004 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness, The Bank's Contributions to Poverty Reduction). The World Bank's declining role in the middle income countries has come under increasing scrutiny and criticism.

CODE meets twice a month formally. Formal meetings include the presentation and discussion of an OED evaluation with a detailed agenda, and management response. Informal meetings are held when OED approach papers, evaluations findings, or technical briefings by OED's DGO and staff are presented before a formal meeting of CODE. Informal meetings are held as needed. OED also provides technical and informal briefings to the entire Board, and the Sub Committee as needed and requested. Board members who are not CODE members also request meetings with the DGO or the Directors of the other World Bank Group's independent evaluation units<sup>20</sup> on topics of particular interest. The DGO and the Directors may also opt to meet with the CODE Chair in the event that a briefing on a particular evaluation or topic is needed. OED provides an orientation to CODE members annually which increases their awareness of the role of evaluation.

### **(c) Known Outcomes and Impacts of World Bank and Other MDB OEDs on Policies and Strategies**

OED's evaluations have had a number of well documented impacts on World Bank policies and strategies, including the reassessment of the World Bank's private sector driven approach to infrastructure, revision of the World Bank's largely externally driven 1993 forest strategy, streamlining of the World Bank's approach to global programs, improvement in the country assistance strategies of individual countries, reforms in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper staff assessments, improvement in the debt sustainability analysis and in the design of individual education projects. All of these are intended to improve the quality of the Bank performance and results on the ground. Apart from some limited evidence on training and capacity building there is however little evidence of the impact of evaluations *directly* on improved outcomes in developing countries (see discussion below on how IFAD is attempting to get clients involved in following up on the recommendations of evaluations).<sup>21</sup> These impacts on Board practices and on the ground in developing countries appear to be less well tracked in other regional banks that have similar structures, although there are some examples of changes in policies of the regional banks. For example, the microfinance evaluation (2000) led to a drastic change of AfDB microfinance strategy and policy by streamlining of microfinance into the AfDB operations and the creation of a microfinance policy division; the evaluation of the African Development Fund (2003-4) led to an increase of the replenishment by 40 percent in favor of the poorest countries in Africa, and an improvement of the operational policy and guidelines of African Development Fund lending and non-lending operations, the evaluation of the Water Supply contributed to a new AfDB policy and strategy.

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<sup>20</sup> The DGO oversees the work of Directors of OED, the Operations Evaluation Group of IFC, and the Operations Evaluation Unit of MIGA.

<sup>21</sup> An exception is a recent study by OED on Influential Evaluations, which states that the OED Forestry study on China contributed to: (1) helping legitimize debate among senior officials, researchers and others on forest policy and the government's recently imposed logging ban, (2) engendering broad agreement by the Chinese on the need for improved M&E, (3) fostering participation by the Chinese research community and beneficiary farmers in forest programs, and fostering collaboration among key Chinese stakeholders who had previously not interacted. The China evaluation also contributed significantly to the creation of the Taskforce on Forests and Grasslands (TFG) of the China Council on Environment and Development, in the context of China's own internal reassessment of its logging ban policy and its emphasis on policy analysis and research. The OED study provided other examples of improvements in the World Bank work in Uganda, Bulgaria, India and Pakistan albeit in areas where the Bank's role has been less prominent.

#### **(d) Lessons from the Experience of the World Bank and other International Financial Institutions**

The resident nature of the World Bank's Board and the relative homogeneity in the backgrounds of Board members, who largely come from a finance background, has helped in the frequency and the quality of interactions. Equally important has been the leadership of some CODE chairs and of some Directors General at critical stages when OED's future role remained in balance. According to a past US Executive Director to the World Bank Board, Jan Piercy, who served as CODE chair (November 1998-October 2000), the creation of CODE gave the Board a nexus and a point at which (to) engage with the evaluation function (and)..... increased the Board's own accountability. The practice of discussing in detail the formation of the OED work plan for the year led the Board to confront very tough tradeoffs and focus on the outcomes of earlier operations to today's decision making. CODE increased ..... engagement and strengthened Executive Directors' awareness of their accountability (leading to) lively debates among Directors and with management about .....steps that management will now take to implement these recommendations?".....some of the progress the World Bank achieved in operational quality owes a lot to the iterative, if messy, process of deciding, "What to do, how to sequence it, and though tradeoffs are needed, how .....to improve as a result of what we're learning through evaluation."<sup>22</sup> The current CODE Chair, Mr. Vasudev, stressed that CODE's focus on substantive issues that are central to achieving the World Bank's poverty mission has helped the Board to evolve from one that largely represents the views of the constituencies it represents to one of a shared view of the mission and objectives of the organization. He observed that the impacts of the evaluation units on organizational management come from interactions with the Board committees and from the interaction of the board and evaluation units with the management. From this perspective, like the World Bank, GEF is a complex organization, but it has a non resident Council. Council members come from more diverse backgrounds, and the Council oversight of the management and the evaluation function is smaller than in the case of the international and regional financial institutions that have resident boards and/or active evaluation committees.

**A resident board enhances the possibility of increased interaction between the Board and the evaluation unit but does not guarantee it.** While both the World Bank and the IMF have resident boards, the impact of the evaluation unit has been greater in the World Bank than in the IMF. This may be partly the result of the different stages of evolution between the two organizations. The objectives of the evaluation unit of the IMF have been more focused at the initial stage on learning lessons for future evaluations. As the IMF evaluation experience is maturing the IMF Board is asking for more systematic ways of influencing IMF management and is pointing to the World Bank's so-called Management Action Record (MAR) approach. The merit of resident boards is however controversial. Critics argue that the costs may outweigh the benefits.<sup>23</sup> Hence the challenge for organizations such as the GEF is to achieve a balance between financial costs and possible benefits and impacts, e.g., maintaining arm's length from

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<sup>22</sup> The First Thirty Years, Perspectives on Evaluation in the Bank Today, page 101: World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department, 2003.

<sup>23</sup> Mallaby argues that the World Bank Board tends to be too closely involved in the management of the organization leading to too much meddling, and the Board can also become insular from outside perspectives (Mallaby, Sebastian, Saving the World Bank, in Foreign Affairs May/June 2005).

management, while at the same time developing a shared Council vision of the organizational mission and strategy needed to provide a strategic direction to the institution.

**The presence of a committee focused on evaluations legitimizes the process of systematically reflecting evaluation findings into the institution's strategies, increases objective information on the content of the institution's operations to members, and increases the impact of evaluations on the organization's policies and programs.** OED's influence on World Bank policies and practices is explained first and foremost by the quantity and quality of its evaluations but also by the frequency and the intensity of interactions between the World Bank's Board and OED, leading to greater Board focus on the substance of issues related to the World Bank's core mission. Board committees of the IADB and ADB responsible for evaluation are also tracking the evaluation recommendations and monitoring their translation into management actions. However, the impacts of evaluations of the relatively younger evaluation units on Board and management are more limited. The mandates of some evaluation units and interactions with their boards may also have been less proactive.

**Leadership of the evaluation unit and the role of individual Board members** serving on CODE have helped to bring the evaluation function in the mainstream of Board deliberations.

## **8. International Fund for Agricultural Development as a Second Benchmark**

Does the non resident nature of the GEF Council combined with the absence of Council committees serve the GEF less well than is the case of Boards that are closer to organizations and have committees with specific responsibilities, although they are not fully resident? To address this question IFAD was selected as a second benchmark institution because it is more similar to the GEF in some respects and has a greater potential to be a relevant model for GEF although information available to the team on IFAD was far more limited.

### **Box 3: Reporting to Boards at Large**

In contrast to IFAD and the World Bank, evaluation units of UNDP, UNIDO and IMF have used a variety of tools including informal seminars to reach the Board members with relevant findings. But these organizations have noted that Board members who attend these meetings lack the officially designated responsibility, accountability and legitimacy, which being member of an evaluation committee confers on the board members, to effectively follow up on the evaluation findings with boards at large and with management. The size of the UNDP Board also (36 members) precludes in-depth discussion of the evaluations. The Board has not been sufficiently engaged in the discussions of evaluations. Interviews with senior management at these organizations suggest that in some cases Board members were not familiar with the differences between Research and Evaluation.

IFAD's transparent selection process for the Evaluation Committee is also of relevance to the GEF Council. The criteria for the selection of the IFAD evaluation committee are clearly defined to achieve a regional balance.<sup>24</sup> Composed of nine out of the 36 Members on the

<sup>24</sup> In the case of some of the other organizations like the EBRD, the members of the Audit Committee are chosen by a secret ballot, and confidentiality is maintained.

Executive Board at IFAD, four Members are selected from List A, (primarily OECD members), two Members from List B, (primarily OPEC members), and three Members from List C (developing countries). List C is further divided into sub-list C1 (countries in Africa); sub-list C2 (countries in Europe, Asia and the Pacific); and sub-list C3 (countries in Latin America and the Caribbean). The Chairmanship of the Evaluation Committee rests permanently between Lists B and C. As with the Audit Committee, the Evaluation Committee Members are elected by the Executive Board for a three-year term of office. The Evaluation Committee meets formally three times a year; the first time in conjunction with IFAD's Governing Council, and then just before the September and December Board sessions. The committee may also hold informal meetings if and when required.

### **(a) Role of the IFAD Evaluation Committee**

A Sub Committee on Evaluation created by its Executive Board in 1987 began to be governed by organizational principles adopted at its first session in 1988. In 1999, after more than 11 years of operation of the Evaluation Committee, several Executive Board Directors suggested that the Committee be revitalized and take a more proactive role. In response, the IFAD Executive Board approved the Committee's Terms of Reference in December, 1999 at its Executive Session. In the case of IFAD, 8 of the 9 evaluation committee members reside in Rome. The chair of the evaluation is not the IFAD board member (who is the Finance Minister of the Country), but is a senior official in the country's embassy and represents the board member, reportedly effectively carrying out all duties of the Evaluation chair in a delegated authority. He also attends all IFAD board meetings, at times together with the Finance Minister. Representatives from embassies in Rome and other UN agencies either serve on the IFAD board or serve as back ups to country representatives in an interactive manner throughout the year rather than only attending meetings.<sup>25</sup>

The Evaluation Committee's<sup>26</sup> terms of reference *inter alia* include to:

- enhance the ability of the Executive Board to assess the overall quality and impact of IFAD programs and projects and strengthen the board's knowledge of evaluation insights and enable member states to better assess IFAD's role in the pursuit of a global development strategy
- discuss with the Office of Evaluation (OE) its annual work program and budget
- satisfy itself that IFAD has an effective and efficient evaluation function
- report to the Executive Board and make recommendations and seek guidance on evaluation issues of policy and strategic importance
- undertake field visits and participate in evaluation missions, workshops, roundtable meetings and related activities

The Committee conveys its findings, and provides a summary of the key issues and recommendations to the Board for its consideration. Since the changes introduced in 1999 the

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<sup>25</sup> Some members have representatives in Rome with other duties who also serve as representatives on the IFAD board, whereas others do not have a representation in Rome and typically fly in three times a year for Board meetings. This is similar to the case of the GEF: five Council members are World Bank Board members who are resident in Washington. Others come in for meetings.

<sup>26</sup> The Evaluation committee had a Terms of Reference only in 1999.

Committee reviews the strategic directions and methodology of the OE. It discusses the scope and contents of OE's annual work program, which, so far, is formally approved by IFAD's management. It also makes suggestions for including evaluations of particular interest to it in the OE work program. Based on the OE work program, it decides the agenda for the coming year in each of its three sessions. The Committee can request the chairperson of IFAD's Board to include evaluation issues in the Board agenda. In order to discuss special issues, provision has been made for ad hoc sessions of the Committee in addition to the three formal ones each year. In principle, once a year, Committee members participate in field trips during evaluation missions in order to see IFAD's work on the ground and participate in round table workshops to discuss evaluation recommendations and the agreement arising from the evaluation process among relevant stakeholders. The decisions taken at each Evaluation Committee meeting are summarized in official minutes which are then consolidated in a separate chapter of the annual report on evaluation that is submitted to the Board. This document is disclosed through the IFAD website.

### **(b) Interactions between the IFAD Evaluation Committee and the Office of Evaluation**

The Evaluation Committee holds three formal sessions in each calendar year (these have recently been increased to four). The first meeting takes place the day before or after IFAD's annual Governing Council session, and two sessions on the day preceding September and December Executive Board sessions, respectively. Additional informal meetings in the same calendar year may also be called on an ad hoc basis by the chairperson of the Evaluation Committee.

OE organizes an annual field visit of the Executive Committee to a IFAD program or project. Communication between Executive Committee members (who are not resident in Rome) and the Evaluation Head is carried out in an ongoing manner throughout the year<sup>27</sup>, and the frequency is enhanced before the formal meetings. Meetings between the Chair of the EC (Executive Board member currently resident in Rome), and the Evaluation Head are also held in an ongoing manner as needed. Communication between Executive Board members and the Evaluation Head is also carried out frequently and on an as needed basis. A good example would be that of the US member a non resident Executive Board member, who is not a member of the Evaluation Committee but who plays an important role for evaluation issues at the level of the Executive Board, and therefore is actively engaged with the Evaluation Head.

### **(c) Known Outcomes and Impacts of IFAD Evaluations on IFAD Policies and Strategies**

OE's strategic impacts through the Board are fewer than the World Bank's because it takes fewer evaluations to the committee and as an independent unit it has been in existence for a short time. Furthermore, OE does not track the impact of its work on management because the Executive Board considers implementation of its recommendations to be the management responsibility, although OE comments on the President's annual report on implementation to the board. OE has moved to more strategic levels of evaluation recently with more regional and thematic evaluations rather than project level evaluations. Its annual review of the portfolio performance raises several strategic issues for the organization. While rating the project portfolio, IFAD evaluations have suggested that IFAD should define its poverty objectives more clearly, with a

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<sup>27</sup> Through emails, phone calls and direct interaction as the case maybe.

more coherent and common understanding of the prime beneficiaries of IFAD assistance. It further recommended that IFAD operate more actively as a strategic partner at the national level. Evaluation findings of the recently conducted Evaluation of supervision modalities of IFAD supported projects reported that there was a preference by countries receiving IFAD grants for IFAD direct supervision, and noted many positive features in the performance of these projects. As a result, IFAD is working towards taking on an enhanced role in direct supervision of its projects henceforth.

OE has adopted an innovative learning approach in the evaluation process that seems to be unique. It includes the recipients of IFAD grants. While preparing the approach paper, the OE identifies members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) which consists of the main users of evaluation including the recipients of IFAD grants. The CLP helps flag issues and information sources for the evaluation. After completion of the independent evaluation, the CLP discusses the evaluation findings, deepens the understanding of the findings and recommendations, and eventually works out the operational implications of evaluation recommendations and the division of labor and responsibilities for their implementation among the various stakeholders involved. The CLP is assigned this role because evaluation reports by their very nature often cannot make clear-cut recommendations that can immediately be adopted and implemented. The CLP's output is recorded in an understanding or agreement at completion point (ACP) among the stakeholders involved. The ACP is the end point of a process that aims to determine how well evaluation users understand the recommendations proposed in the independent evaluation, and how they propose to make them operational. Interaction among the stakeholders working through the Core Learning Partnership is expected to help deepen the understanding of evaluation findings and recommendations contained in the independent evaluation report, and elicits ownership for implementing the recommendations. The ACP illustrates the stakeholders' understanding of the evaluation, findings and recommendations, their proposal to implement them and their commitment to act upon them. OE participates in this process to ensure a full understanding of its findings and recommendations.

Evaluation Committee members may participate in an evaluation mission to observe IFAD's work on the ground and participate in round table workshops to discuss evaluation recommendations and the agreement arising from the evaluation process among relevant stakeholders, or the ACP.

#### **(d) Tentative Lessons from the IFAD experience**

**Non resident boards can be mobilized to channel evaluation findings into board deliberations.** IFAD seems to have developed innovative approaches to getting its board members or their representatives in Rome to be actively involved in the Evaluation committee work, thereby enhancing the impacts of evaluation findings.

**Transparency in selection of committees and clear terms of reference help to increase the legitimacy and credibility of the selection process.** IFAD's formula based approach may be very useful for GEF where the lack of a resident board requires greater transparency in the rules of the game.

**Systematic Work Programming of Evaluation Committees helps to use their inputs effectively.** Building work program details in a more formal manner for evaluation committees who are non residential is necessary. Greater stakeholder participation in the implementation of evaluation findings may well be a lesson for the World Bank and regional banks.

## **9. Some Outstanding Issues Needing Further Analysis**

The issues that need further exploration to draw lessons and implications for the GEF include the following.

1. A better understanding is needed of the dynamics in other organizations that have built up the oversight and evaluation functions in terms of the manner in which they have achieved the triangulation of the board, the evaluation units and the management of the organizations. Strong self evaluation as a necessary foundation of independent evaluations requires that the board, the evaluation unit and management work together on the results objective. In the case of GEF which has implementing agencies, this also means the need to better understand the relationship between the roles of the implementing agencies vis-à-vis the GEF Secretariat and the GEFOME in much the same way as IFAD has reportedly done. The team did not have sufficient information on IFAD and other organizations to fully explore this issue, which was flagged in interviews.
2. IFAD's transparent selection process for the Evaluation Committee is potentially of relevance to the GEF Council and its effectiveness should be further explored.
3. Several institutions opt for presenting evaluation results prepared by independent evaluation offices to entire Executive Boards, even if they have evaluation committees. This seems to undermine the presence of evaluation committees but further research could shade more light on the reasons. A better understanding of the informal processes in place in other organizations and the GEF would also be useful.
4. Evolution of mandates of Committees dealing with Independent Evaluation Offices, and revisions of these mandates over time would help understand how to get from "here and now" to "there and then."

**Annex 1(a). Comparison of Mandates and Missions of Reviewed Organizations and Their Evaluation Units**

	<b>AfDB</b>	<b>ADB</b>	<b>EBRD</b>	<b>GEF</b>	<b>OED/ IBRD</b>
Year evaluation unit established	1980	1978	1991	1996	1973
Mandate of evaluation unit	Conduct independent evaluations, develop and harmonize evaluation practices and standards, support ECD <sup>28</sup> with partners	Evaluation of completed projects, programs and TA, monitoring and reporting on actions taken, ECD in member countries. Emphasizes Integrity, Impartiality, Independence.	a) To discover what were the results, both intended and otherwise, of the Bank's portfolio of projects and programs (accountability function); b) To determine whether there were significant lessons to be learned from past experience to make future operations better, thereby contributing to the "institutional memory" of the Bank (lessons learned or quality management orientation);	Assess global dimensions of environmental and development policies and promote accountability, provide a basis for decision making on amendments of policies, procedures etc, and provide feedback:	Assess the relevance, efficacy and efficiency of World Bank group operational programs and activities and their contribution to development effectiveness
Mission of Evaluation Unit	Enhancing development effectiveness through an independent evaluation.			Enhancing global environmental benefits through excellence, independence and partnership in monitoring and evaluation	Enhancing Development Effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation
Mission of institution	Dedicated to combating poverty and improving the lives of people of the continent and engaged in the task of mobilizing resources towards the economic and social progress of its Regional Member Countries. The Bank's s mission is to promote economic and social development through loans, equity investments, and technical assistance	Reduce poverty in Asia and the Pacific	Invests to build a market economy and democracy in countries that were once communist	Mechanism for international cooperation for the purpose of providing new, and additional, grant and concessional funding to meet the agreed incremental costs of measures to achieve agreed global environmental benefits in the areas of biological diversity, climate change, international waters, and ozone layer depletion	Reduce global poverty and improve living standards.

<sup>28</sup> Evaluation Capacity Development

	IFAD	IMF/IEO	IDB	UNDP	UNIDO	UNIOS
Year evaluation unit established	1978	2001	1999	1983	2003	1973
Mandate of evaluation unit	Promote accountability and learning and to improve the performance of the Fund's operations and policies	Systematically conduct objective and independent evaluations on issues relevant to the mandate of the Fund. Improve the Fund's ability to draw lessons from its experience and more quickly integrate improvements into its future work.	OVE is mandated to conduct Country Program Evaluations (CPE); policy, strategy, thematic and instrument valuations; ex post project evaluations, and oversee the Bank's internal monitoring and evaluation system, processes and instruments.	Refocus EO's policy, strategy and priorities to help in the repositioning of UNDP and enhance its relevance as a knowledge-driven global advisor and catalyst in the context of rapidly changing global development conditions. Support improving UNDP's development effectiveness through introduction of methodological innovations and application of Results-Based Management. Support implementation of the organization's change initiatives through mainstreaming the culture of measurement, monitoring and evaluation.	Provides analytical and objective feedback to the organization and its stakeholders on the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of UNIDO projects and programs for improving the quality of current and future UNIDO services as well as for accountability and organizational learning purposes	Conduct in depth evaluations that assist the intergovernmental bodies in assessing the relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness of impact of outputs and activities against the objectives of a program
Mission of Evaluation Unit				To enhance the development effectiveness of UNDP to help men and women build a better life. It strengthens accountability and learning through evaluation and partnership		
Mission of institution	Enable the rural poor to overcome poverty	Promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements; to foster economic growth and high levels of employment; and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease balance of payments adjustment	"contribute to the acceleration of the process of economic and social development of the regional developing member countries, individually and collectively."	Help countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable human development by assisting them to build their capacity to design and carry out development programs in poverty eradication, employment creation and sustainable livelihoods, the empowerment of women and the protection and regeneration of the environment, giving first priority to poverty eradication.	Improve the living conditions of people and promote global prosperity through offering tailor-made solutions for the sustainable industrial development of developing countries and countries with economies in transition.	Provide internal oversight for the UN that adds value to the Organization through independent, professional and timely internal audit, monitoring and inspection, evaluation, management consulting and investigation activities, and to be an agent of change that promotes responsible administration of resources, a culture of accountability and transparency and improved program performance

**Annex 1(b): Comparative Modes Board – Evaluation Unit Interactions in International Organizations  
Based on Survey Results  
Governance Issues**

	<b>AfDB</b>	<b>ADB</b>	<b>EBRD</b>	<b>GEF</b>	<b>OED/ IBRD</b>
Evaluation unit reports to Board/Evaluation Committee	DEC <sup>29</sup>	DEC	Executive Board and AC <sup>30</sup>	Council	CODE
Mandate of Evaluation /DEC/CODE Committee	Review reports of the Operations Evaluation Department of the Bank, as well as the responses of Management to such reports, to identify or review general policies for consideration by the Board, to submit to the Board selected operation evaluations on development effectiveness, and to monitor implementation of Board decisions on matters within its mandate	Assist the Board in ensuring that ADB's programs and activities are achieving desired development objectives and making efficient use of ADB resources. DEC focuses its attention on ADB's operations evaluation programs and results.			Monitor and assess the Bank Groups' effectiveness in fulfilling its mission of reducing poverty
Size of Board/Evaluation Committee	DEC: 6	DEC: 6	EB: 27 AC: 7	EC: 32	CODE: 8
Resident/Non Resident Board	Resident	Resident	Resident	Non Resident	Resident
Reporting of Evaluation unit and Head to Board/Evaluation Committee	Reports to CODE Chair for Evaluation matters	Board of Directors through the Development Effectiveness Committee.	Board, and AC	Council	CODE
Role of Board /Evaluation Committee/ Responsibility of Work Program and Budget	Reviews reports of OED, work program, budget, management responses, monitors implementation of Board decisions on matters within its mandate.	Work plan, budget, reviews evaluations,	Reviews Work plan, budget, evaluations	Reviews Work plan, budget, evaluations	Reviews Work plan, budget, evaluations, operational policies
Developed and Developing Country Representation on Board/ Committee	Strike a balance between regional and non regional	Chair of DEC always a Developing country member, strikes a balance between regional and non regional	Strike a balance between constituencies.	16 developing country, 14 developed country, 2 central and eastern Europe and former Soviet Union	4: developing country:(1 each: AFR, Asia, LAC, and Eastern Europe) and 4: developed country rep.
Interaction frequency of meetings	As needed. Committee meets twice a month. Formal and informal meetings	As needed	As needed, frequent	Twice a year	Twice per month, As needed

<sup>29</sup> Development Effectiveness Committee

<sup>30</sup> Audit Committee

	<b>AfDB</b>	<b>ADB</b>	<b>EBRD</b>	<b>GEF</b>	<b>OED/ IBRD</b>
Number of Board Committees	4	4	3		6
Responsibility for Hiring of Evaluation Head	Nominated by Pres. after consultation with Board.	Board of Directors upon recommendation of DEC and Resident Chairman of Board.	Executive Board	Council	Chair of CODE and CODE
Performance Evaluation of Evaluation Head	President	DEC	Executive Board		Chair of CODE
Reporting arrangement of Evaluation Head	Reports to Chair of CODE for evaluation and to President for administrative matters	Reports to DEC	Executive Board	None	Reports to Chair of CODE and to CODE
Number of evaluations discussed	19	25	28-32		10-12
Number of staff in evaluation unit	11 <sup>31</sup>	36-40	15	9-11	85-90
Review Processes for evaluations Within M and E Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Internal Working Group or Quality Control Working Group</li> <li>- Reports sent for comments to Operat. Depts. + Borrowers + Co-financiers-</li> <li>- Formal Management Response provided by Operations Vice Presidency and Evaluation Reports discussed by the Boards Committee (CODE) on sectoral or thematic basis</li> </ul>	<p>Discussed with peers; then forwarded to operational departments and governments (executing agencies) for comments. Final draft cleared by Director General OED, and circulated to the Board.</p>	<p>Evaluation head signs-off on all evaluation reports that can be distributed to the Board of Directors and Management. Draft OPER reports and special studies are reviewed/ commented on by relevant operation team &amp; support units. The preface of these reports refers to the consultation process of the Corporate Director for Evaluation with the Secretary General of the EBRD. No clearance is required from management before eligible reports are dispatched to the Board and the President. PED seeks comments from a peer group within the EBRD on a draft of the "Annual Evaluation Overview Report" (peer review). The AEOR is reviewed by the Audit Committee of the Board before a review of the document in the full Board of Directors. The AEOR is sent to the Bank's 'Board of Governors after the review process between Management and the Board of Directors has taken place. Selected reports are reviewed</p>		<p>Discussed with appropriate operations staff. Rigorous quality control within OED; OED reports are issued under DGO signature and approval. Reports are then forwarded to the Board.</p>

<sup>31</sup> As of 09/2004 taken from retrospective of evaluation function.

	AfDB	ADB	EBRD	GEF	OED/ IBRD
Review and Clearance Process for Disclosure by Board	Reports available for wide distribution after discussion by the Board/Committee. Reports' Abstracts are Distributed internally. Evaluation reports posted on Website.	All evaluation reports are fully disclosed through the President to the Board of Directors, respective governments, executing agencies, and the general public. Reports circulated since 1995 are available online.	by the AC. The evaluation documents that can be disclosed to the Board of Directors are signed off by the Corporate Director for Evaluation and send to the President and the Board of Directors at the same time. He consults the respective project team and the Secretary General before distribution of project-related evaluation reports and special		OED Reports are submitted directly by the DGO to the Committee on Development Effectiveness, and are disclosed to the public in line with its disclosure policy . Reports are posted on OED's website
Extent to which and How Evaluation Findings Influence Board Inputs into Organizational Policy/Strategy	Microfinance policy and strategy mid-term evaluation (2000) undertaken by our department led to a drastic change of Bank microfinance strategy and policy (streamlining of microfinance into the Bank operations and the creation of a microfinance policy division) 2) Water Supply Evaluation Study in 2001 contributed to a new Bank policy and strategy leading to a set up of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Initiative African Water Facility (a program of 1.2 billion US) promoted by the Bank and the establishment of the African Water Facility (an Initiative of the Africa Ministers Council on Water (AMCOW) and is a major outcome of the effort of implementing the African Water Vision and Framework for Action in Africa). 3) Evaluation of the African Development Fund (2003-4) has led to an increase of the replenishment by 40% in favor of the poorest countries in Africa and an improvement of the operational policy and guidelines of ADF lending and non-lending operations.	DEC used OED's annual reports to identify lessons for sustaining successful performance and for improving development effectiveness. Recommended that management develop a concrete action plan for improving oversight of the technical assistance portfolio, and adopt a results based approach to resource allocation.	Evaluations have contributed to strengthening of the monitoring function of the Bank as a whole		Evaluation of Forestry Policy led to changes in the Bank Forestry Strategy, evaluation of PRSP led to changes in Joint Staff Assessment processes, evaluation of Private sector development led to changes in infrastructure, evaluation of global programs led to streamlining of Bank

Lessons learned	External independent evaluation recommended strengthening of evaluation unit, African Dev. Fund evaluation led to adoption of an action plan.	DEC prefers corporate and strategic evaluations, enhanced role by DEC in identification of topics for evaluation. Some time lag in functioning and interaction between OED/DEC and ADB management given the new governance structure.	Importance of Authority of Head, utilization of eval, impact on oper. Evaluations must be read by Board/Committees and management so that they can make their own assessment of the quality, rigor and relevance of the evaluations.	Findings from evaluations have been more reliable and useful to feed into Council decisions.	Independence and quality crucial for credibility of evaluation, working towards better integration of evaluation findings between project and country level assessments, linkages between sectoral, global and country level impacts.
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	<b>IFAD</b>	<b>IEO/ IMF</b>	<b>IDB</b>	<b>UNDP</b>	<b>UNIDO</b>	<b>UNOIOS</b>
Evaluation unit reports to Board/Evaluation Committee	Executive Board <sup>32</sup> and Evaluation Committee	EC <sup>33</sup> /Board	2 Com and Board.	Joint Executive Board <sup>34</sup> through Administrator	Through Comptroller Gen to Board.	Committee for Prog. & Coord. <sup>35</sup>
Mandate of Evaluation /DEC/CODE Committee	Studying and reporting on the evaluation activities of the Fund aimed at drawing, from completed projects, lessons which may be relevant to the improvement of the design, implementation or evaluation of future projects.	Monitoring the evaluation function in the Fund and advising the Executive Board				Decides on the work programme for the Evaluation Section, endorses general evaluation findings and recommendations and may also endorse specific recommendations to enhance the evaluation function
Size of Board/Evaluation Committee	EC: 9 EB: 36	EC: 8 Board: 24	EB: 28 PEC: 7	EB: 36	EB: 4	CPC: 34
Resident/Non Resident Board	Non resident	Resident	Resident	Non resident	Resident	Resident
Reporting of Evaluation unit and Head to Board/Evaluation Committee	Executive Board	Executive Board	Executive Board	Administrator	Comptroller Gen.	Director
Role of Board /Evaluation Committee/ Responsibility of Work Program and Budget	Reviews Work plan, budget, evaluations	Reviews <sup>36</sup> Work plan, budget, evaluations	Reviews Work plan, budget, reviews evaluations	Reviews Work plan, budget, evaluations	Reviews Work plan, budget, reviews evaluations	Reviews Work plan, budget, reviews evaluations
Developed and Developing Country Representation on Board/ Committee	4: OECD countries; 2 : OPEC 3: developing countries (1: Africa, 1: Europe, Asia and Pacific 1: LAC).	Strike a balance but all attend	Strike a balance, but all attend	8 AFR 7 Asia and Pacific 4 EE 5 LAC 12 Western Europe and others	Not applicable	Strike a balance between regions 9 AFR 7 Asia 4 EE 7 LAC 7 western Europe and others
Interaction frequency of	3-5 per year	As needed with Board	2-3 times a week and as needed	Twice a year	Twice a year	Twice a year

<sup>32</sup> IFAD has an Evaluation Committee

<sup>33</sup> The Role of the EC has diminished with the setting up of the IEO, there is now more interaction with the Board.

<sup>34</sup> Reports to Joint Executive Board of UNFPA and UNDP

<sup>35</sup> Committee for Program and coordination

<sup>36</sup> The Executive Board reviews the IEO Work program but does not approve it.

	IFAD	IEO/ IMF	IDB	UNDP	UNIDO	UNOIOS
meetings						
Number of Board Committees	2	1	6			3
Responsibility for Hiring of Evaluation Head	Nominated by President and endorsed by Executive Board	Executive Board	Executive Board	Administrator	Comptrol. Gen	Director
Performance Evaluation of Evaluation Head	Executive Board	None	None	Administrator	Comptrol. Gen	Director
Reporting arrangement of Evaluation Head	Executive Board	Executive Board	Executive Board	Reports to Admin.	Reports to Comptrol. Gen	Director
Number of evaluations discussed		5-6 per annum				
Number of staff in evaluation unit	5-7	12	28-30	23-25	6	5-7
Review Processes for evaluations Within M and E Unit	OE uses peer review to ensure quality standards, it may also use advisory panels in a complex evaluation. OE will share it with IFAD management and, whenever applicable, with the concerned borrowing country's authorities, the implementing agencies and the cooperating institution in order to check facts and accuracy and obtain comments. IFAD Director issues the report to President and Executive Board simultaneously along with ACP.	Evaluation reports are presented to the Exec Board after internal review by Unit. IEO reports submitted to Management and to the relevant country authorities for comments (not clearance). Comments of Management and the country authorities will be appended to the IEO report along with comments of IEO, and transmitted to the Board for consideration.	Internal OVE peer review, discussion with relevant Bank technical and operational staff, and the Audit and Evaluation Committee of senior Management (chaired by Exec. V.P.). Management does not clear or approve the report. Report submitted to the Policy and Evaluation Committee of the Board (Country Program Evaluations go instead to the Programming Committee of the Board), and then to entire Board of Executive Directors.			
Review and Clearance Process for Disclosure by Board	OE disseminates completed evaluation reports, Profiles, Insights and the Agreement at Completion Point, to	IEO reports are circulated simultaneously to IMF Management and the Evaluation Committee of the	OVE reports are submitted by the Director directly to the Board's Policy and Evaluation Committee and, for	All reports are posted after discussion by the Board	All non restricted evaluation reports are posted	All reports are posted after discussion by the Committee and the Executive Board

	<b>IFAD</b>	<b>IEO/ IMF</b>	<b>IDB</b>	<b>UNDP</b>	<b>UNIDO</b>	<b>UNOIOS</b>
	the Board, IFAD President and all stakeholders at the time of completion of the evaluation.	Executive Board but are not changed in light of comments received (except for factual corrections). IEO may submit its own comments on management's comments for consideration by the Board. With Board approval, reports are published along with comments of management, staff and – where appropriate – the relevant country authorities. , IEO's comments on management comments, and the Chairman's summary of Board discussions are also published.	Country Program Evaluations, to the Board's Programming Committee. Committee Chairs summaries are posted on the website.			
Extent to which and How Evaluation Findings Influence Board Inputs into Organizational Policy/Strategy	The performance of IFAD-supported projects was found to be systematically strong in the area of people's empowerment and social capital, whereas project impact has been modest in combating environmental degradation and strengthening institutions and policies. In 60% of evaluated projects, impact has been rated as substantial in terms of increasing access to financial services and markets. Recent evaluation on supervision found that projects with IFAD direct supervision had	An independent evaluation is underway. Board already requesting information on follow up of recommendations. PRSP review being used by Board members to question procedures.	Greater articulation of importance of results, evaluation, monitoring etc in operations.	PRSP evaluation led the Board to request for a revised management response on actions to be taken. Several management responses to evaluations have been rejected by the Board.		

	<b>IFAD</b>	<b>IEO/ IMF</b>	<b>IDB</b>	<b>UNDP</b>	<b>UNIDO</b>	<b>UNOIOS</b>
	higher outcomes, so IFAD taking decision to use more direct supervision of its projects.					
Lessons learned	Evaluation Committee plays a role in Board oversight. Learning coalitions, and Agreement at completion point, (ACP) in evaluation process useful to the EO.	No MAR, as yet, too early for lessons, Ongoing ext. eval. A mix of staff hired external and internal to the Fund. Only 3-4 evaluations are carried out in a year.	Working towards formulating a MAR, recommendations need to be more actionable and followed up within a reasonable time. Responsibilities of PEC have expanded over time, operational policies must be designed on the basis of lessons learned from the institutions own evaluations.	Agenda for discussion by evaluation units must be inclusive and consultative, adequate resources must be ensured, evaluation norms must be adhered to, clarity in roles and responsibilities to ensure integrity and independence of the evaluation function is essential.	Introduction of Results Based Management (RBM) in UNIDO has been strongly backed and in some areas spearheaded by EVG. This led to increased receptiveness and demand for evaluation services from the Governing Bodies. Location of EVG independent from line management but within the office of the Comptroller General who reports directly to the Director General facilitates use of evaluation results within the organization.	Resources allocated to evaluation have shrunk, external evaluation recommended strengthening of the evaluation function .Complexity of RBM and performance measurement systems must be managed in a timely manner.

**Annex 1(c): List of Officials Interviewed**

<b>Organization</b>	<b>Official</b>	<b>Title</b>
African Development Bank	Mohammed Manai	Chief Evaluation Officer
EBRD	Fredrik Korfker	Director, Evaluation
GEFSEC	Patricia Bliss	Deputy CEO
IADB	Steven Quick	Director, Evaluation
IFAD	Lucianno Lavizzari Mark Keating	Director, Evaluation Evaluation Officer
IEO office of IMF	Thomas Bernes Marcelo Selowsky	Director Evaluation Consultant
OED	Ajay Chhibber	Director, Evaluation
UNDP	Nurul Alam David Smith Juha Quito	Deputy Director, Evaluation Evaluation Specialist Senior Evaluation Officer
UNIDO	Johannes Dobinger	Evaluation Officer
UNIOS	Eddie Go Arild Hauge	Chief, Evaluation Chief, Monitoring
World Bank	Mr. Vasudev	CODE Chair and GEF Council Member

## Annex 1(d): Questionnaire

### Global Environment Facility Office of Monitoring and Evaluation

#### Interaction of Independent Evaluation Units with respective

##### 1. Institutional governing structure

- a) How is the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) unit organizationally placed in the institution?
- b) How does it function organizationally with HR and with senior management?
- c) When was the IOE established?
- d) Which body (or person/manager of the board and/or management) or who does the IOE report to?
- e) How many and what kinds of committees does the Board/Council have as a whole?

#### Governing Bodies

##### 2. Composition of the Committee/Board on Evaluation

- a) What is the composition of the Board/Committee to which the evaluation unit reports? Who are the members of the committee?
- b) How many members does it comprise of?
- c) How often per week/per month/per year do they meet, where and how (person, video/teleconference)? Are the meetings formal/informal?
- d) How is information and communication handled between the Board/Committee and the IOE unit?
- e) What are the administrative arrangements for the Board/Committee? For eg. At the IBRD, Secretariat (SECBO) handles administrative arrangements for CODE.
- f) How often are the Committee members selected and who selects them? Are new members oriented to the functioning of the evaluation unit, if so how often is this carried out? (for eg. CODE members of IBRD's OED are oriented once a year).
- g) What is the criteria for their selection?

## 2. Composition of the Committee/Board on Evaluation

- h) What is the mode of representation is it by region, country, and sectoral expertise?
- i) What is the length of term of each member on the Committee/Board?
- j) What are the renewal and rotation policies?
- k) Is there a TOR and Mandate for the Committee? Provide an overview of this.
- l) Is it revisited, when and by whom?
- m) Does the Committee produce an annual report, and is this disclosed to the public? Does the Committee/council have its own website?
- n) Is there more than one Committee that deals with the evaluation issues and functions? (For example IBRD has a CODE and an Informal Sub committee of CODE)
- o) In the event that the IOE reports to an entire Board/Council, has a smaller committee been selected to handle special aspects of the evaluation function? If so, what are these special aspects of the evaluation function, when and how were these members selected and for what period of time? (for eg. FAO chose an Inter Sessional Working Group/ core group of regional and coordinating members to handle matters related to an independent external evaluation of FAO).

## 3. Independent Office of Evaluation description :

- a) Degree of independence: does the IOE have TORs? How long has it been independent? How is independence defined in the context of the following?
  - a. -Organizational independence
  - b. -Behavioral independence
  - c. -Protection from outside interference
  - d. -Avoidance of conflict of interest
- b) Where is it structurally located within the organization (ie, independent or within another department, administratively?)
- c) Is there any additional completely external institution charged with evaluating development assistance (other than an auditor-general, or a Chairperson like the Inspection Panel –IBRD/ ASDB)?

#### 4. Reporting lines (head of evaluation unit):

- a) To whom does the head of evaluation report regarding evaluations functions?
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- b) How is the head of M and E hired, and by whom, Who conducts the performance evaluation of the director/head of M and E?
- c) What is the relationship of the head of the evaluation unit to the organization's HR?
- d) Is she/he governed by the organization's Human Resource rules? and how is this defined? ( Board/Committee, Council, chief executive or line management)? (In the case of the IMF/IEO they follow their own procedures in the context of hiring staff for IEO with some guidelines give by the IMF's HR unit)

#### 5. Interaction between IOE and governing bodies/Board/Council:

- a) What type of interaction exists between the IOE and the governing bodies?
1. Performance evaluation of M and E director?
  2. Definition of work program
  3. Hiring of staff/consultants for studies, and budget allocations
  4. Oversight,
  5. Review of products on Monitoring and comments on evaluations\
  6. Other studies or ad hoc briefs \_\_\_\_\_
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- b) How often does it take place?

#### 6. Costs:

- a) What is the cost of the interactions between IOE and governing body(ies)?
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- b) Who pays for this interaction?
- c) Is the cost part of IOE's budget or covered under the corporate budget?
- d) Who approves the cost for the interaction?

## 7. Evaluation function:

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- a) Is the role of the Committee/Council primarily advisory or also one which is more engaged in strengthening the evaluation function or management (what level of approval: work program, budget, TORs for specific studies, approach papers?)

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- b) Do the members of the committee also play a role in operational decisions of the organization? (the same question should be asked of the independent evaluation unit as well?)
- c) How is the budget of the Independent Evaluation Unit determined and by whom?

## 8. Evaluation processes:

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- a) What kinds and forms of evaluation reports, annual reviews, strategy and workplan documents, and briefs are presented to the Committee/Board?

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- b) How many products did the committee review during the last completed budget year?
- c) How is this determined and by whom? For eg. Approach paper , (discussed or on a no objection basis), final evaluation, evaluation updates, mid term updates, etc?
- d) Does the committee prepare an annual report on the IOE function as a whole for presentation to the Board? (For example both IBRD and ADB committees on development effectiveness prepare annual reports for the Board.) Are these reports disclosed? (ABD's report is disclosed, IBRD's report is not disclosed).
- e) Are there any rules formulated by the committee for disclosure of documents, and if so when and on what grounds are they enforced?

**9. Functioning of IOE with reference to Committee/Board:**

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a) How has the functioning of the IOE progressed so far, are there instances of successes, not so successful areas?

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b) What impact have evaluations had on policy decisions made by the Council/Board?

c) What lessons have evaluations offered in the context of the evaluation function that you would like to share with us?

d) What lessons can you share with us in the context of the interaction of the IOE with the governing body, (maybe specific to any of the above areas) that are important for us to keep in mind as we propose models for interaction with our Council?