

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2014

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		1063	
GEF Agency project ID		P073020	
GEF Replenishment Phase		GEF-3	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		Forest and Environment Development Program	
Country/Countries		Cameroon	
Region		Africa	
Focal area		Biodiversity	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		OP2: Coastal, marine and freshwater ecosystems; OP 3: Forest Ecosystems; OP4: Mountain ecosystems	
Executing agencies involved		Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection Ministry of Economy and Finance	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Not involved	
Private sector involvement		Not involved	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		02/28/2006	
Effectiveness date / project start		9/18/2006	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		12/31/2009	
Actual date of project completion		10/11/2011	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	.26715	.26715
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		10.00	3.8 (trustee)
Co-financing	IA own		
	Government		
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	25.00	9.8
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		10.26715	4.06715
Total Co-financing		25.00	9.8
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		35.00	13.867
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		2012	
TE submission date			
Author of TE		Ananie Cyrille Ekoumou and Salimata D. Folleá – ICR team leaders Salimata Diallo Folléa, Francois Wencelius and Julien Vallet (FAO) - Authors	
TER completion date		January 2015	
TER prepared by		Ritu Kanotra	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Joshua Schneck	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	N/A	U	N/R	U
Sustainability of Outcomes	N/A	Significant/Substantial risks (TE makes assessment on a 3-point scale from Low to Moderate to Significant/Substantial risks)	N/R	U
M&E Design	N/A	N/R	N/R	MS
M&E Implementation	N/A	N/R	N/R	MU
Quality of Implementation	N/A	MU	N/R	MU
Quality of Execution	N/A	MU	N/R	MU
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	N/A	-	N/R	S

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

As indicated in the Project Document (PD), the Global Environmental Objectives of the project is to promote sustainable forest management and biodiversity conservation in Cameroon. According to the PD, Cameroon is one of the most biodiverse countries in Africa, home to more than 800 species of bird, 409 species of mammal, 9000 vascular plants species and around 300 species of reptiles. According to PD, despite Cameroon's large areas of protected forests, and its contribution to the economy of the country, the sector's strong performance in recent years has not been matched by comparable improvements in sustainable forest management or protection of forest ecosystems. As a result, the rate of Cameroon's forest loss remains around 0.65% per year. Illegal logging by the forest industry, although reduced significantly, has still persisted and expanded within the informal sector along with the commercial trade of bushmeat and poaching of endangered species (PD, 4).

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

As stated in the PD, the development objective of Forest and Environment Policy Development Grant (FEDPG) is to strengthen public and private efforts to achieve socially-, economically-, and ecologically-sustainable use of national forest and wildlife resources. The FEDPG represents the IDA and GEF contribution to the implementation of the Forest and Environment Sector Development Program (FESP) - a national program that brings an array of existing sector development projects and ad-hoc donor-supported and donor-led efforts into a common framework. FEDPG was designed around the fulfillment of selected conditions that would trigger the release of funds in three phases. PD states that GEF OP 9.01 related to the procedures for Investment Operations was waived to follow Bank's relevant guidelines for Development Policy Operation (DPO) and allow disbursements in three tranches

The project covered the following five policy areas:

Component/Policy Area 1: Environmental regulations and information management. Strengthen capacity of the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP) to monitor the natural environment, environmental impact of the country's national forest and environment program, and

ensure Cameroon’s National Forest and Environment Sector Program (FESP’s) environmental management plan implemented successfully.

Component /Policy area 2: Management of production forests: Facilitate completion of forest estate zoning plan; ensure implementation of forest management policies/plans; promote value-addition in timber processing; ensure efficient monitoring of forest production field operations by industry, enforce the law/penalties; and exploit non-timber forest products.

Component/policy area 3: Management of protected areas and wildlife. Facilitate securing Cameroon’s protected area network by improving regulations, increasing human and organizational capacity, adopting a landscape approach to increase effectiveness of protected areas management.

Component/policy area 4: Management of community forest resources. Enhance understanding of communal forest issues/strategies, improve quality of ongoing community efforts in natural forests, improve/scale up community-based tree-planting schemes, help communities/local cooperatives manage woodlands, and reassign to communities or other managers state plantations formerly controlled by ONADEF (the National Office for the Development of Forests).

Component/policy area 5: Strengthening of institutions, training, and research. Support capacity building across forest institutions and to stimulate the Government to make investments in infrastructure and human resources, thereby enabling the MINEP and the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) to develop sufficient capacity to fulfill their mandates.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The Global Environmental objectives and Development Objectives remained unchanged during implementation. The indicators in the Implementation Support and Results (ISR) reports, however, are formulated differently to fit the ISR system but are broadly in line with the policy matrix defined in the Project Document (TE, 4).

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: Satisfactory
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According to the TE, project was overall highly relevant at the time of project preparation to the government’s global priorities of ensuring macroeconomic stability, reducing poverty, investing in social services, and making progress on privatization and reform of the forestry sector. The Forest and Economic

Development Program (FEDPG) represented the IDA and GEF contribution to implementation of a larger multi donor program - Forest and Environmental Sector Program (FESP). Given the importance of Forest and its linkages with other sectors, the Government of Cameroon initiated FESP in 2004 to bring range of existing sector development projects and other donor supported or donor led programs into a common framework. The project seeks to improve the institutional and organization capacity of MINEP and MINFOF to implement new policies and regulations for forest, wildlife and protected area management and timber industry development in partnership with communities and the private sector. The FEDPG also related strongly to two broader objectives set out in the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), 2003 for Cameroon. First, it built on Cameroon’s reform and poverty reduction gains of recent years through its treatment of governance issues. Second, it embodied the transition from project-specific investment to programmatic lending that the CAS prescribed for FY 04-06.

GEF contribution was directed to complement finances to secure sustainable conservation of globally and nationally significant habitats, species and genomes within eight underfunded integrated land management ecosystem units (called UTOs). As mentioned in the Project Document, without GEF contribution, the Government would be unable to use its own or borrowed funds for meeting all management requirements of these UTOs. Selected to be representative of Cameroon’s entire protected area network, the selected UTOs (total area 1,859,300 ha) are among the most important in Cameroon. In addition, the GEF’s contribution was to help create a new 176,000-ha protected area of highly intact mangrove’s forest in an area known to have the highest level of speciation in Cameroon. The project operation embodies GEF strategic priority 2- mainstreaming of biodiversity in production landscapes and project objectives are in line with GEF Operational Programs (OP) 3 and OP 4 supporting Forest and Mountain Ecosystems. According to the project document, without GEF support, the planned national forest zoning exercise would probably have focused primarily, if not exclusively, on direct production of timber and Non Timber Forest Produce (NTFP), without consideration for globally relevant values, and without functional links between production and conservation forests.

4.2 Effectiveness	Rating: Unsatisfactory
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TE rates project effectiveness as unsatisfactory and TER concurs with this rating, as one of the tranche 2 triggers was not achieved, and this outcome was the most important part of the operation with respect to long-term sustainability of the forest sector. Furthermore, failure to complete this trigger led to the closure of the project without further disbursement over the five-year duration of the operation. The project was designed around fulfillment of selected conditions and milestones under the five defined policy areas/components that would trigger release of funds in three phases. All conditions for the release of first tranche were met and funds disbursed. But project closed before disbursements of subsequent tranches, as last trigger for the second tranche was not achieved, and as a result, the project’s scope and scale was reduced.

According to TE, project achieved some positive results despite difficulties faced during implementation. All of the 18 prior actions of the first tranche were achieved, well before the original planned disbursement date of September 30, 2006. Despite the non-release of tranches 2 and 3, 8 of the 14 outcomes were either fully or partially achieved. But some of the unachieved indicators—for example, halting illegal logging, preparation of a draft land-use plan, enforcement of forest laws and regulations, participation of communities in the management of protected areas and hunting zones, implementation of biodiversity protection measures by forest-logging companies—have implications for the sustainable use of national forest and wildlife resources by public and private stakeholders and, thus, for achievement

of the overall objective of strengthening public and private efforts to achieve socially, economically, and ecologically sustainable use of national forest and wildlife resources.

The performance of the project under five policy areas is detailed below:

Component/Policy Area 1: Environmental regulations and information management.

According to the TE, the Government adopted general regulations on Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures and standards through a decree and an enforcement regulation spelling out the activities subject to an EIA. Three other *arrêtés* provided rules for EIAs, procedures allowing consulting firms to perform EIAs, and terms of reference specific to EIAs in production forests (plantations and reforestation) and communal forests. A team of adequately trained and fully equipped staff was assigned to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the project's environmental impact mitigation plan (EMP). The organizational chart of the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP) was approved with filling up of 482 (81 percent of the objective) out of total 596 approved positions. The MINEP also created an online (www.SIE-cameroun.com) environmental information system (EIS) made directly accessible to the public through the CIDE (Centre d'Information et de Documentation sur l'Environnement), located in the MINEP.

Component /Policy area 2: Management of production forests.

According to Ministry of Forests and Wildlife -MINFOF's assessment of the situation of all Forest Management Units (UFA) awarded in Cameroon since 1996, 83 out of total of 93 have an approved management plans that were reviewed during the project. This was also one of the conditions to be met prior to the release of the second tranche. According to the TE, various ministries (planning, land administration, forests and environment and agriculture) couldn't arrive on an agreement upon a common approach to land use planning for zones 6 and 7 and the Northern Provinces. At the time of the TE, the Government hadn't still validated some of the forests zoning plans prepared by MINFOF for Zone 5. TE notes that the national forest control strategy was being implemented, with the coverage rate of forests visited by the Central Control Unit (UCC) of the MINFOF and/or by regional control brigades increased between 2006 and 2011. Violations that were not published regularly and this issue was subject of much criticism from the civil society were now being published quarterly in official and private newspapers.

Component/policy area 3: Management of protected areas and wildlife.

Interventions under this component laid the foundation for modern and autonomous management of protected areas and wildlife management. According to the TE, the MINFOF and MINEP made regulatory, institutional, and financing adjustments to conform with the 2003 Wildlife and Protected Area Strategy. TE notes that existing regulations relevant to participatory development, approval, and implementation of management for protected areas clearly stipulate local people's rights and obligations with respect to modalities of access, types of activities allowed, conflict resolution mechanisms and application of sanctions. By the end of the project, 10 management plans for protected areas were prepared along these lines and approved. According to the TE, the management effectiveness scores of protected areas assessed by the WWF for the eight focus UTOs (Technical Operational Unit) in 2007 were rated above the target values to be reached for release of the two tranches, thus confirming that endangered species were reasonably well protected in the eight focus UTOs.

But the objective of forest logging companies implementing biodiversity protection measures in

concessions located near ecologically sensitive areas was only partially achieved. Despite the fact that all Forest Management Plans (FMPs) were reviewed and being implemented under regular control by the MINFOF's central and regional control units, various studies have shown that only about 40% of companies comply only partially or not at all with the requirements of FMPs (TE, 10).

Component/policy area 4: Management of community forest resources.

According to the TE, although 15 community-based management plans were successfully implemented but the MINFOF didn't enact regulations to stimulate the development of community woodland management or fuel wood master plans and tree planting schemes by communities, individuals, and investors. This was mainly due to the MINFOF's unwillingness to decentralize its power over forest management to the community level, which was a significant failure of the Program. Moreover, only 49 percent of the 17,306 hectares of previous ONADEF (the National Office for the Development of Forests) plantations were transferred to more appropriate management structures.

Component/policy area 5: Strengthening of institutions, training, and research.

All the MINFOF vacancies were filled both at the central and local levels. According to the TE, management of the MINFOF personnel had been improved through trainings on policy, law, and regulation. But, the system of incentives introduced to improve performance was not effective as they were only aimed at some staff and not performance based. This, according to the TE, was a significant failure of the program. The MINFOF and MINEP managers at the central level adopted new financial management software for financial management and control of public expenditures, a condition for second tranche release.

Results also show some progress made in law enforcement reflected by the ratio between the number of sanctions effectively applied to the number sanction decisions related to illegal exploitation. That ratio grew from 37 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2011, although TE states that several cases were never properly recorded and submitted as cases for judgment. Project also facilitated regular consultations with the private sector (at least six meetings a year) and multi partner consultations held at the regional level to prepare and monitor annual work plans.

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Unsatisfactory
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The TE does not assess a rating for project efficiency. Based on the evidence presented in the TE narrative, this TER assigns unsatisfactory rating to project efficiency.

According to TE, substantial delays and issues in achieving some of the outcomes, along with the cost to the Government and the Bank for running the program for five years and not achieving the desired outcomes or disbursing the full amount of the DPO, reflect shortcomings in efficiency. Project implementation was delayed due to **belated availability of funds** owing to lack of understanding of the DPO flow-of-funds mechanisms by the ministries of finance (MINFI), forests (MINFOF), and environment (MINEP), as the key staff involved in the design and preparation of the project were reassigned during implementation. Project also suffered from **poor cooperation and conflicts** over roles and responsibilities and distribution of financial resources between MINOF and MINEP. These conflicts persisted for four years and resulted in significant delays in achievement of environment related activities.

TE notes that **weak ministerial cooperation** hampered several activities of the program. For instance, completing the forest estate-zoning plan, a successful MINFOF-led process essential for sustained forest

management, was stalled soon after responsibility for the process was transferred to the MINEPAT. According to the TE, MINEPAT did not take the zoning of the forest estate as a priority and made no efforts to stimulate and organize the much-needed cooperation among ministries in the sectors most relevant to the zoning process (for example, agriculture, mining, and infrastructure) (TE, 12). Also, program objectives for the wood- processing industry in the South (Policy Area 2) and household energy in the North (Policy Area 4) were also not reached, in significant part due to weak cooperation between the MINFOF and the ministries of industry and energy.

According to TE, the institutional structure organized to plan, coordinate, facilitate, and monitor implementation of the project was **complex and did not perform in an efficient manner**. The structure included several committees did not meet regularly due to Government funding constraints, and therefore could not guide and closely monitor program implementation. The Forest and Environment Sector Program (FESP) facilitation committee, which was created to improve cooperation between the MINFOF, MINEP, and MINFI, but it lacked strong leadership and authority to influence government.

Despite efforts from the task team of World Bank at various occasions, an ordinance that would alter the relevant section of the law to allow concessions holders to obtain their final concession didn't materialize (TE 14), leading to closure of the project.

4.4 Sustainability	Rating: Unlikely
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The TE didn't provide an overall rating but has assessed four dimensions of sustainability separately on a three-point scale from low, moderate to significant risk. Based on the evidence in the terminal emulation, TER has assessed the likelihood of sustainability of project outcomes as unlikely, as explained in the section below:

According to the TE, sustainability of outcomes under the project are at risk for three main reasons: (i) the lack of predictable and adequate funding that may affect the sustainability of the protected areas network; (ii) increasing pressure from other sectors (commercial agriculture and mining) on forest resources; and (iii) the absence of coordination between line ministries (MINFOF, the MINEPAT, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the Ministry of Industry, Mines, and Technology Development [MINIMIDT]) to agree on land-allocation measures and use.

Details along four dimensions of sustainability are given below:

a) Financial Sustainability: Unlikely

TE didn't provide a rating but based on the narrative in the terminal evaluation, TER assess the possibility of financial sustainability as unlikely. According to TE, FEDPG significantly improved the management of wildlife and protected areas, promoting environmentally conscious management of production forests. But the sustainability of outcomes is at risk due to the lack of predictable and adequate funding affecting the sustainability of Cameroon's protected areas network.

b) Sociopolitical: Unlikely

TE assesses the rating of sociopolitical risks to sustainability of outcomes as moderate to significant. Based on the narrative in the TE, TER assesses the rating as unlikely. According to TE, project had high

ownership from government during project preparation that declined during project implementation period, mainly due to shifting national priorities from forestry to mining and industrial agriculture. TE attributes this as the root cause of the non-signature of the final concession agreements. According to the TE, development outcomes under the project run ‘significant’ risk due to lack of inter-ministerial coordination and vision on land use (TE, 26). However, some of the outcomes may be sustained since the Government signed the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with the EU under the auspices of the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) initiative in 2010 (TE, 26).

c) Institutional framework and governance: Moderately unlikely

According to the TE, institutional support risk to outcomes is moderate. Based on the narrative in TE, TER assesses the rating as moderately unlikely. TE notes that program (FESP as a whole) has demonstrated the results-based budget-allocation approach to sector programs, and has contributed to institutional strengthening (through improved financial transfer mechanisms between the Treasury and line ministries and preparation of annual work plans at the national and regional levels), empowerment, and capacity building. Although there are still some gaps (cumbersome and nontransparent procurement procedures), the MINFOF is considered as a positive example in Cameroon for implementing results-oriented programming, budgeting, and monitoring.

d) Environmental: Unlikely

According to TE, mining activities allowed in the permanent forest estate pose ‘significant’ risk given that the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Technology (MINIMIDT) grants operating permits to mining companies without consulting with the forest and environment ministries. Furthermore, the allowance of mining activities in the final concession agreement appears to be a highly significant risk for the sustained management of forest resources and protected areas. TE notes that there are many examples where mining exploration permits have been issued that overlap with Protected Areas and Forest Concessions.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

IDA disbursed funds as per schedule after conditions for the release of first tranche were met. Second and third phase of the project couldn’t be started, as all the conditions for release of second and third tranche were not met. TE also doesn’t comment on this aspect since project was closed and didn’t enter into second and third phase.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Project implementation was delayed due to delayed availability of funds. There was a lack of understanding by the MINFI, MINFOF, and MINEP of the budget-support mechanism and flow of funds procedures, mainly after the departure of key staff involved in the preparation of the project. Besides, conflict between the MINFOF and MINEP over their respective responsibilities on management of

protected areas and distribution of financial resources, which persisted for four years till government established a specific inter-ministerial committee to provide the facilitation role, significantly delayed environment related activities under components 3 and 5 of the project.

Project also suffered from weak ministerial cooperation that hampered several activities of the program. Completing the forest estate-zoning plan, a successful MINFOF-led process that is essential for sustained forest management, was stalled soon after responsibility for the process was transferred to the MINEPAT. The latter did not take the zoning of the forest estate as a priority and made no efforts to stimulate and organize the much-needed cooperation among ministries in the sectors most relevant to this zoning process (for example, agriculture, mining, and infrastructure). Program objectives for the wood-processing industry in the South (see Policy Area 2 in the Program Document) and household energy in the North (see Policy Area 4 in the Program Document) were not reached, in a significant part due to weak cooperation between the MINFOF and the ministries of industry and energy.

Extension was granted to enable the government to fulfill the last trigger of the second tranche, relating to the signing of final forest concession agreements and so make the transition to the third tranche. Despite the extension, that trigger was not achieved and hence project was closed at the request of the government on 11 October, 2011, before the scheduled closing date of December 31, 2011, with the second and third tranches left undisbursed.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

According to the TE, the Government ownership, which seemed strong during preparation, declined during project implementation period, mainly due to shifting national priorities from forestry to mining and industrial agriculture, the root cause of the nonsignature of the final concession agreements. It took project six and a half years to reach from concept stage to effectiveness; and five years passed from effectiveness to closing. These eleven years was a long time during which country faced many changes in its economic situation. As per analysis in the TE, there was general shift in the Government's focus and interest—from sustainable livelihoods and natural resources management at the time the project was prepared toward a greater emphasis on economic growth and employment in the latter years of its implementation. Although the forestry sector was still a key source of employment, it appeared to have been facing new competition from other sectors in the recent growth and employment strategy (*stratégie pour la croissance et l'emploi*).

This is also evident from the fact that project faced delays in implementation due to poor understanding, conflict and lack of cooperation between various government departments involved in the project. The final trigger related to forest concessions (also referred to as the UFA trigger) couldn't be met despite efforts from the task team of World Bank at various occasions to convince the Government to pass an ordinance, which would have removed the obstacle to the allocations and led to release of second tranche (TE 14). As TE notes, this could also be attributed to government perception that permanent allocation of land to timber companies would bring sufficient economic benefits to the State versus other land-use options.

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately

Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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TE didn't assess a rating for M&E design at entry. Based on the review of M&E plan in the project document and evidence in the TE, this TER assesses the M&E design at entry to be 'moderately satisfactory'.

The design of the M&E system was based on (i) the Policy Matrix of Key Actions and Indicators|| (annex 1 of the Program Document), which detail the baseline and expected outcomes for each component, the conditions for tranche release, and the key milestones of the program, and (ii) the —Monitoring and Evaluation Indicators and Baseline Values|| (annex 10 of the Program Document) described for each condition and milestone, the results indicators, their baseline and target values and the verification source. Overall, the indicators used to monitor and evaluate implementation of the program were relevant and well structured to measure the outcomes expected from the project. But M&E system had particular emphasis on indicators of results rather than process indicators. As also noted by the TE, the 0-or-1 rating system adopted for many indicators was not suitable for measuring the intermediate progress achieved by several aspects of the program (that is, key steps actually taken in upgrading/developing a system or a policy, with only few steps left to make the system or the policy operational).

M&E system detailed out in the project document provides an overall framework for various interventions streamlined under Cameroon's National Forest and Environment Program (FESP), with (Forest and Environment Development Policy Grant) FEDPG being a part of it. Overall, M&E system was fully integrated into the Cameroonian institutional environment with responsibilities assigned to different relevant departments of the Government and provisions to undertake specific thematic studies like monitoring progress of preservation of bio diversity and management of national parks and status of illegal logging through the involvement of independent experts. M&E plan also included timeframes, various kinds of documents/reports to be generated during the project and procedures for data collection. Project document includes a separate budget for baselines designed for the overall program of FESP. But whether a separate budget was earmarked for carrying out M&E couldn't be ascertained from the details in the project document. It seems that the Government was to fund and support the regular monitoring of the project but it failed to provide this support. This, as also evident from the details in the TE described in the next section, was a major drawback that hindered implementation of M&E in the field.

6.2 M&E Implementation	Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory
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TE did not assess a rating for M&E implementation. Based on the evidence in the TE, this TER assesses the quality of M&E implementation as moderately unsatisfactory.

The Government was overall in charge of implementing the M&E system, with core responsibility given to a monitoring unit (cellule de suivi) within the MINFOF. The MINFOF established a set of M&E procedures pursuant to a manual developed in a participatory manner and issued in early 2007. According to the TE, this manual fully integrated M&E in the planning and implementation process of the FESP as a whole. Government had made provisions for several committees (Regional planning committees,

component program committees, the COMREM, the monitoring committee, and the FESP facilitation committee) constituted for FESP as a whole to meet twice a year to plan and to feed the M&E system. According to the TE, planning/M&E process related meetings were not funded by any of the donors; meetings were held once in a year due to inadequate funding from government. As TE notes, due to time and funds constraints, such meetings were focused more on planning activities, resulting in incomplete data collection and ‘superficial evaluation of indicators’, with little verification in the field. Details of M&E system given in the project document also do not indicate a separate budget earmarked for specific M&E activities. It was perhaps expected that cost of monitoring and planning activities would be borne by the Government, that it failed to support.

According to the TE, project used CIDA matrix – developed with Canadian Bilateral Assistance- and designed to monitor and evaluate FESP at large, beyond the activities funded by the Bank. It is for this reason that M&E indicators were more in tune with needs of the government and other donors funding FESP, and it gradually deviated from matrix given in the project document. Project had only one independent external review, and that, according to TE, was more descriptive than analytical, again mainly highlighting the positive aspects of implementation of FESP. According to the TE, joint donor supervisions focused mostly on conditions for tranche release and often overlooked broader aspects of overall program implementation. Besides, these missions referred to CIDA matrix and ‘gradually abandoned’ indicators matrix given in the project document.

Hence, M&E system for the project mainly served as an instrument used to assess progress for tranche release. It helped only in partially assessing the overall outcomes and results achieved by the project, as its indicators were not quantified with the same level of reliability and accuracy.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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TE assesses the quality of supervision provided by Bank to be moderately unsatisfactory. This TER concurs with that rating. According to the TE, Bank made significant efforts to resolve UFA trigger impasse and senior management were involved in conducting policy dialogue at the highest political level. However, its involvement through supervision mission and implementation support provided simultaneously to FESP program and FEDPG project proved challenging for the Bank. Bank led the joint donor supervisions and produced joint aide-memoires for FESP, but it also had to comply with its own institutional requirements by developing additional aide- memoires specific to FEDPG. This, according to the TE, resulted in the transmittal to the Government of two different aide-memoires for the same mission, creating tension between a —unified partner approach and the Bank’s own requirements leading to conflicted opinions as Government received mixed signals from the donors. As per recommendation in

the TE, such issues and confirmation of understanding should have been obtained by the Bank up front and, if possible, included in the code of conduct before the start of the project.

The quality of Bank supervision was also hindered by the high turnover of task team leaders (TTLs), some of who were new to the Bank. The program had four successive TTLs between May 2009 until the project closed on October 11, 2011 and all of them had joined the Bank recently.

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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TE assesses rating of quality of project execution as moderately unsatisfactory and TER concurs with this rating. According to the TE, although the Government facilitated achievement of all 18 prior actions required by the Bank to release the first tranche of the grant, non-achievement of the UFA trigger that ultimately led to the failure of the project, was mainly due to changing priorities of the Government. TE also states that project didn't get enough support from other high level ministries. Ministry of Finance took considerable time to implement changes required by the new budget approach, resulting in significant delays in delivering Bank support. Moreover, despite MINEPAT having good relations with the Bank, it didn't play an essential role in stimulating inter-ministerial coordination required by the MINFOF and MINEP to implement the project.

FEDPG project also suffered from lack of strong leadership and weak inter-ministerial cooperation between the MINFOF and MINEP. Chairmanship of Facilitation Committee constituted to enhance coordination between two ministries was not at the appropriate level of authority.

Project was implemented in the field by MINEP and MINFOF. TE rates the performance of MINEP as satisfactory, since it achieved all outcomes of component one for which it was responsible and milestones for meeting the second tranche release conditions related to FEDPG Environmental Impact Mitigation Plan. Conversely, the TE rates the performance of the MINFOF as unsatisfactory. Inefficient processing of some of the concession dossiers by the MINFOF (including losing key documents, such as environmental assessments and even originals of the gazetting decrees —*decrets de classement*||) contributed to the UFA trigger deadlock. Furthermore, the MINFOF did not perform well in terms of improving community forest management, supporting the wood-processing industry, and promoting nonwood forest products, thus affecting the social dimension of the FEDPG. Overall, according to the TE, the MINFOF had leadership problems throughout the implementation of the FEDPG program.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate below that this is indeed the case. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented,

sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

According to the TE, the management effectiveness scores (MES) of protected areas assessed by the WWF for the eight focus UTOs (Technical Operational Unit) in 2007 were rated above the target values to be reached for release of the two tranches, indicating that endangered species were reasonably well protected in the eight focus UTOs.

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

Socio economic changes that resulted from the interventions through the project are listed below:

Poverty impacts - Although there was no specific indicator in this regard, the terminal evaluation states that components 2, 3, and 4 of the project had an impact on poverty reduction. This information is based on the discussions with stakeholders, including a Long Term Forest management Unit (UFA), one with a signed final concession that provided relevant evidence. Improved management of [the] UFA, as a result of interventions under the project, generated local employment to meet the demands of forest management plans, that involved work in the field (for example, forest inventories, organized felling and skidding, registration of stumps and logs) and administrative work (for example, recording field data, preparing the documentation required by the forest and customs administrations).

According to the TE, improved management of wildlife and protected areas is also bound to provide employment in relation to tourism and hunting. Direct income to neighboring communities is generated by activities, such as hunting, allowed in the protected areas or in their buffer zones. According to people engaged in community forest management consulted during the terminal evaluation, this activity has provided the community with income from wood sales, increased employment opportunities (for example, inventories, felling and processing of logs, manual transportation of sawn products, provision of food to field workers, and some administrative work), and also additional indirect benefits, such as improved access to and control over the forest land allocated to the community.

Although these impacts were not quantified during project implementation, but TE notes that the results can be quantified in future as a result of the Base d'information et d'évaluation permanente (GéobIEP), an impact-monitoring tool developed with German support now integrated in the Environmental Information Management System developed recently by the MINEP with the FEDPG support.

Social development- According to the TE, FEDPG policy areas 2 (Sustainable management of Production Forests) and 4 (community management of forest resources) affected social development in forest areas. Under the modern forest management plans (FMPs) of Long Term Forest Management Unit (UFAs), concessionaires are delivering various social services to the population, which is negotiated with village communities and stipulates the concessionaires' social obligations (for example, building schools and

health centers, maintaining roads and bridges, building sawmills to provide jobs locally, or creating facilities for poultry farming to replace bush meat). TE notes that in most successful communal forests, a significant part of the revenues generated by wood sales was used to fund schools and village health centers.

The project has also helped redistribution of the proceeds of the annual forest fee (redevance forestière annuelle, RFA) at the local level for development initiatives. It advocated for an improved culture of transparency through the regular publication of forest fees in newspapers, considered important due to prevalent corruption risks.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

According to the TE, all the MINFOF vacancies were filled, both at the central and local levels, and personnel were trained on policy, law and regulation. But overall, capacity of the MINFOF and MINEP improved to implement a results-based program budget allocation to sector programs, an approach that was introduced for the bigger FESP program, of which FEGP was a part. According to the TE, The MINFOF and MINEP are now recognized as vanguards in the field of the results-based program budgeting and serve as examples for other ministries. Under the Document de stratégie pour la croissance et l’emploi, this approach will be integrated gradually in all other sectoral ministries as part of the implementation of administrative reform in future.

b) Governance

Difficult to assess at this stage.

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

None.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

None.

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

1. Financing triggers are necessary to guarantee the achievement of results; [SEP] but assessments of those triggers must be flexible so that financing for an entire [SEP] project is not blocked because a single trigger is not reached. [SEP]

2. The implementation of a new financing mechanism [SEP] requires a substantial program of capacity building to strengthen the capacity of all ministries involved. Until the new financing mechanism is completely operational, it is important to [SEP] provide a back-up financing system to permit access to funds and avoid long delays in the initiation of project activities.

3. The change from programming based on institutional structures to results-based planning and budgeting constitutes a major reorientation of the culture of public agencies. That reorientation requires long-term training and assistance for responsible officials from advisers possessing the necessary expertise.

4. In future, facilitations committee – designed to improve coordination between ministries- should be chaired at the Prime Minister’s level to address issues beyond the control of sectoral ministries.

5. Project suffered due to transfer of key personnel involved during the design phase. A system ensuring trainings as well as motivation of incoming staff should be embedded in project design to facilitate ownership and continuity of skills.

6. High turnover of TTLs can be detrimental to the success of any program and project and should be avoided. Frequent TTL changes increase the chances that recommendations will not be followed from one aide-memoire to the other, leading to institutional memory losses.

7. Bank management and task teams should ensure that actions and recommendations in aide-memoires do not contradict with policy dialogue conducted by management and senior management. This has important implications for Bank participation in joint donor supervision missions of sectorwide programs, where the Bank may not have sole control over the content of aide-memoires.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

TE doesn't have a separate section on recommendations. Lesson learnt listed in the previous section includes some of the recommendations too.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	TE provides a complete analysis for achievement as well as non-achievement of objectives, and also assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts. TE provides in depth information on institutional, political and policy related issues responsible for closing of the project before completion, with important lessons for Bank and GEF for supporting such projects in similar context in future.	HS
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The ratings are substantiated with sufficient and convincing evidence; report is internally consistent with each section well written providing complete details.	S
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	TE assessed several risks to sustainability of a project outcomes on a three-point scale.	S
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	Lessons learned are drawn from evidence given in the main body of the report, are relevant to the project and presented in comprehensive manner	S
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	TE provides details about disbursement but doesn't include activity wise details of how funds from IDA and GEF were spent. Since GEF funds were fully blended with IDA funds, activity wise details of IDA and GEF funds are also not included in the project document and may not perhaps been made available at the time of TE.	MS
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	TE covers in detail aspects related to design and implementation of M&E system.	S
Overall TE Rating		S

Overall TE Rating = $(0.3 * (6+5)) + (0.1 * (5+5+3+5)) = 3.3 + 1.8 = 5.1 = S$

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).