GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form

1. PROJECT DATA				
			Review date:	March 2011
GEF Project ID:	1084 FSP		at endorsement (Million US$)	at completion (Million US$)
IA/EA Project ID:	P073389 (WB)	**GEF financing:**	5,000,000	4,860,000
Project Name:	Mainstreaming Adaptation To Climate Change Project (MACC)	IA/EA own:	3,150,000	3,100,000
Country:	Regional: Caribbean: Antigua & Barbuda; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Cooperative Republic of Guyana; Jamaica; St. Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; St. Vincent & the Grenadines; Trinidad & Tobago	Government:	0.0	0.0
		Other*:	2,800,000	2,400,000
		Total Cofinancing	5,950,000	5,500,000
Operational Program:	EA – Enabling Activity	**Total Project Cost:**	10,950,000	10,550,000
IA	World Bank	Dates		
Partners involved:	NOAA (US Govt.), CIDA (Canadian Govt.), DFID (British Govt.)	Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		April 2003
		Closing Date	Proposed: September 2007	Actual: March 2009
TER Prepared by: Oreste Maia-Andrade	TER peer reviewed by:	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing (in months): 53 months	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing (in months): 69 months	Difference between original and actual closing (in months): 16 months
Author of TE: Enos Esikuri		TE completion date: September 2009	TE submission date to GEF EO: August 2010	Difference between TE completion and submission date (in months): 11 months

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS AND KEY FINDINGS

Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluation reviews for further definitions of the ratings.

Performance Dimension	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office evaluations or reviews	GEF EO
2.1a Project outcomes	S	MS	MS	MS
2.1b Sustainability of Outcomes	N/A	Moderate	Moderate	ML
2.1c Monitoring and evaluation	S	Inadequate	Modest	MS
2.1d Quality of implementation and Execution	N/A	N/A	N/A	MS
2.1e Quality of the	N/A	N/A	S	S

evaluation report				

2.2 Should the terminal evaluation report for this project be considered a good practice? Why?

Yes, this Implementation Completion Report (ICR) should be considered a good practice.

- The ICR is a very comprehensive document and allows for an overall and detailed understanding of the case.
- Also, as the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Review already noted, "the technical quality of the evidence, the clarity of analysis, the logical layout and internal consistency, its results orientation, and the candor and conciseness with which the ICR was prepared were all excellent. It laid out the key issues in a useful manner. This allowed for a more accurate and constructive assessment of the project's strengths and weaknesses."

2.3 Are there any evaluation findings that require follow-up, such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, mismanagement, etc.?

No such findings were noted.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

3.1 Project Objectives

a. What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

According to the PAD submitted for CEO Endorsement:

- Project Development/Global Objective. *To facilitate* the creation of an enabling environment for climate change adaptation in CARICOM small island and coastal developing states (the participating countries are: Antigua & Barbuda; Bahamas; Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Cooperative Republic of Guyana; Jamaica; St. Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; St. Vincent & the Grenadines; Trinidad & Tobago).

No changes were noted in the TE.

b. What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation? (describe and insert tick in appropriate box below, if yes at what level was the change approved (GEFSEC, IA or EA)?)

According to the IEG, the five original project components were (subcomponents were synthesized from the PAD by the IEG):

- **Component 1**: **Build Capacity to Assess Vulnerability and Risks Associated with Climate Change** (Total appraised US$2.32 m: actual cost not provided in ICR); achieved through four activities: (a) strengthening the climate and coral reef monitoring network; (b) down-scaling global climate models in support of decision making for adaptation at the regional and country level; (c) generating climate change impact scenarios; and (d) developing a harmonized approach for assessing climate change vulnerability and risk, and adaptation policy decision making.
- **Component 2**: **Build Capacity to Reduce Vulnerability to Climate Change** (Total appraised US$0.73 m: actual cost not provided in ICR); achieved by conducting institutional analysis and defining action plans as key outputs included in the preparation of four national climate change sector strategies. The other three IOIs were dropped due to time limitations or restructuring at MTR: training programs to build capacity for adaptation plan preparation process, a technical study and guidelines for updating building codes, and a technical study to develop feasibility options for introducing risk reduction incentives, which was incorporated into a parallel Bank project, the *Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF).*
- **Component 3**: **Build Capacity to Effectively Access & Utilize Resources to Reduce Vulnerability to Climate Change** (Total US$0.18 m: actual cost not provided in ICR); achieved through a Regional Strategy for Climate Change that was adopted by the Heads of State of CARICOM in July of 2009 along with supporting regional position papers on various aspects of climate change impacts and responses, and a business plan outlining the region's fund-raising strategy over the next five years.
- **Component 4**: **Public Education & Outreach (PEO)** (Total US$0.59 m: actual cost not provided in ICR); this was achieved through the development and implementation of seven national PEO strategies, the revamping and maintenance of a dedicated website and information clearinghouse, and the development of course material developed for M.Sc. program at the Centre of Resource Management and Environmental Studies (CERMES) at UWI. A separate M & E system for the PEO component was never completed.

- **Component 5**: **Project Management** (Total US$1.05 m: actual cost not provided in ICR). A Project Implementation Unit (PUI) was first created at CARICOM, but later moved to Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) after MTR restructuring, where the component-specific M&E and fiduciary (accounting, procurement, and financial management) systems became fully operational.

Regarding changes, the TE mentions that some components were revised:

- A second-order restructuring was approved in 2007.
- **Component 2. Subcomponent 2.2**—Developing climate change adaptation approaches for selected sectors and upgrading EIAs—was modified to focus explicitly on a group of selected participating countries and sectors: agriculture in Guyana, tourism in Barbados, and water in Jamaica and Belize. The relevant outcome indicators were modified to reflect the scope of the activity in the four countries: Country-level Sector Adaptation Strategies prepared for only four countries and in specific sectors, namely Barbados (Tourism), Guyana (Agriculture), Jamaica and Belize (Water); Institutional analysis for implementation of the adaptation strategies in the countries and sectors specified above; Action Plan to support implementation of the Country level sector adaptation strategy in selected countries and sectors as specified above; Training programs conducted to build capacity for adaptation plan preparation process in Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Belize.
- **Sub-component 2.3** – to develop appropriate technical norms for infrastructure in response to climate change concerns, including incentives for risk reduction measures through insurance – was dropped from the project. Part of this activity was taken up by other Bank supported projects such as the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) Project which sought to reduce the participating country's financial vulnerability to natural disasters (earthquakes and hurricanes) by providing financing to allow participating countries to join the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility.
- Based on the above, the modified **Sub-component 2.2** under **Component 2**, read: Development of climate change adaptation approaches in the following sectors and Participating Countries: (i) tourism in Barbados; (ii) agriculture in Guyana; and (iii) water in Jamaica and Belize based on the activities described in Part A.6(a) of the Project; (b) provision of technical assistance to the governments of Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, and Guyana in developing sector-specific adaptation strategies identified in the foregoing clause (a) and based on the results of the activities under Part A.6(a) of the Project; and (c) dissemination of the results, through meetings and publications to all Participating Countries, national focal points (climate change and GEF), and key stakeholders.
- **Component 4** was also slightly modified to reflect the reduced role of MACC in implementing the national PEO strategies directly in the participating countries. Instead, the project would provide support to the countries in the implementation of their national PEO programs.

Overall Environmental Objectives	Project Development Objectives	Project Components	Any other (specify)
		X	

c. If yes, tick applicable reasons for the change (in global environmental objectives and/or development objectives)

Original objectives not sufficiently articulated	Exogenous conditions changed, due to which a change in objectives was needed	Project was restructured because original objectives were over ambitious	Project was restructured because of lack of progress	Any other (specify)
X				

4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND SUSTAINABILITY

4.1.1 Outcomes (Relevance can receive either a satisfactory rating or a unsatisfactory rating. For effectiveness and cost efficiency a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU will be used)

a. Relevance **Rating: 5**

Satisfactory:

- According to the TE, "the objective, design and implementation of the project are fully consistent with the region's development priorities, GEF priorities and Bank country assistance strategies. The project objective remained valid and more urgent throughout the project period. Indeed it is now well-established that the countries of the Caribbean are among the most vulnerable to global climate change (IPCC, 2007). While the severity of the impacts will vary from country to country, there is a suite of priority concerns directly linked to climate change that is virtually ubiquitous across the region."

- The reasons behind these climate-risks are sea level rise, tropical storms, the loss of protective coastal systems such as coral reefs, higher ocean surface temperatures, change in livelihoods dependent on tourism and fisheries, saline intrusion into coastal aquifers affecting the availability of freshwater, reduction in precipitation across most of the Caribbean, potential increase in hurricane intensity. Beyond that, sustainable development challenges, including limited natural and human resources, fragile ecosystems, proneness to natural hazards, high dependence on imports and a narrow range of economic activities, relatively high population densities and the effects of globalization.
- "The design and implementation of a regional approach is perhaps the most appropriate way to proceed in the Caribbean region given the similarities in the climate risks faced by CARICOM countries. While there are some differences, these countries are all highly vulnerable and generally share similar vulnerabilities to risks associated with climate variability and change."
- Considering the valuable importance of the Project both for the Bank and CARICOM countries, as well as with regard to climate change adaptation, its relevance is rated as satisfactory.

b. Effectiveness **Rating: 4**

Moderately Satisfactory:

- According to the TE, "the project achieved 95% of the outputs which contributed to strengthened regional knowledge base, enhanced capacity to assess vulnerability and risks, capacity to formulate adaptation policy options, sectorial specialists trained to incorporate climate change concerns into their work, and significant improvement in regional coordination on climate change issues. Also, the project successfully raised public awareness on climate change impacts. Thus, the project was successful in facilitating the creation of an enabling environment for climate change adaptation in CARICOM small islands and coastal developing states, and in advancing the region toward the incorporation of climate as a critical dimension in policy and decision making."
- Also according to the TE, the effectiveness per outcome was satisfactory: "Outcome 1: Regional knowledge base on climate change has been strengthened. Outcome 2: A large constituency of sectorial specialists equipped and trained to incorporate climate change concerns into their work (vulnerability and risk assessment, economic analysis, policy aspects, and adaptation strategies). Outcome 3: Awareness relating to climate change aspects and impacts enhanced for various stakeholder groups. Outcome 4: National Sectorial Adaptation Strategies and Implementation Action Plans prepared in a participatory manner, and under consideration at appropriate governmental levels. Outcome 5: Plans prepared for more effective enforcement of existing policies and regulations, especially where these have implications for addressing climate change concerns. Outcome 6: Regional coordination improved on climate change issues, and a regional strategy was prepared."
- To the TE, however, the overall effectiveness of project outcomes was not fully satisfactory. "Although the project achieved significant outcomes, the first half of the project faced significant shortcomings both in terms of design and implementation which led to the project restructuring with the result of some activities covering fewer countries than originally defined at design stage. Following the restructuring, project implementation improved significantly and achievements of the GEO are highly relevant for the development of the region in terms of creating an enabling environment for climate change adaptation regardless of the change in scope in some of the indicators. Climate change continues to be, even more so, a major threat to the sustainable development of the Caribbean region, and countries need to enhance their capacity (scientific knowledge base, institutional capacity, development of sound policies, and regional coordination) in order to reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change."
- Besides having remarked that significant shortcomings in design and implementation required a restructuring of project components, and considering that all components were fulfilled commensurately with restructured outcomes, effectiveness is rated as moderately satisfactory.

c. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness) **Rating: 5**

Satisfactory:

- In a detailed analysis, the TE explains that "the Caribbean Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have been identified as among the most vulnerable to the anticipated impacts of climate change. The expected sea level rise, increase in sea surface temperature, and altered patterns of precipitation are likely to hit these countries the hardest. The benefits associated with increasing resilience to climate change are enormous. In recent analysis, the World Bank estimated that the aggregate losses incurred by the Caribbean SIDS as a result of storms over the period 1979-2005 are US$613 million annually. While estimating the future climate scenario and the potential economic impacts on the Caribbean is difficult, a recent estimate15 of the economic consequence of the potential impacts of climate change on CARICOM countries concluded that the damage could be in the order of US$11.2 billion annually ca. 2080, that is equivalent to 11.3% of all CARICOM

countries total annual GDP (in 2007 US$ prices) (Toba, 2009). The same estimate for the 12 countries which participated in MACC is US$9.8 billion per year conservatively."

- Also according to the TE, "with the total project cost including co-financing of $10.55 million, the MACC project has contributed to the countries efforts to prepare proactive measures to strategically adapt to the impacts of climate change. The incremental cost analysis done at the time of design (with or without GEF funded interventions), indicated that the amount needed to move the agenda in the region toward mainstreaming climate change considerations into development planning was negligible given the significant risks the countries face individually and collectively. The conclusion at this time is not different. Moreover, models to predict impacts of climate change have improved and more data is available, reducing the uncertainty around the estimation of impacts."
- Since the project has been fully and efficiently implemented, with positive impact at the beneficiary level in terms of climate change adaptation, while experiencing important restructurings, efficiency is rated as satisfactory.

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four point scale (4= Likely (no or negligible risk); 3= Moderately Likely (low risk); 2= Moderately Unlikely (substantial risks) to 1= Unlikely (High risk)). The ratings should be given taking into account both the probability of a risk materializing and the anticipated magnitude of its effect on the continuance of project benefits.

a. Financial resources **Rating: 4**

Likely:

- Increased awareness on the impacts of climate change in small island sates and the consequent imperative need for adaptation has elevated the discussion on climate change in the regional agenda. Further, the consolidation of the CCCCC, officially opened in August 2005, provides the regional institutional mechanism to sustain the climate change agenda in the region in the long-term. The CCCCC had gained regional and international recognition as the voice of the CARICOM member states on climate change issues, validated by its increasing ability to attract donor contributions to promote adaptation and mitigation in the region. For example, the Government of Italy has pledged its support, as well as other EU nations.
- According to the IEG, "in evaluating the risk-to-development it is important to note the existence of an outstanding implementing agent (i.e., the CCCCC) to carry out these tasks on a sustainable basis after Bank funding ends, the increasing importance of the issue of climate change in the region, the mandate they have helped develop in the form of a highly participatory regional strategy (adopted by the heads of state of CARICOM in July of 2009), and the existence of two Bank-supported follow-on projects (i.e., SPACC and PPCR) and other donor-funded projects which are now being implemented and resourced."
- Therefore, considering the important institutional achievement through the CCCCC, which provides a significant financial security to the maintenance of project outcomes, as well as the remaining involvement of the World Bank in other projects in the region, which assures the continued flow of resources to the region, sustainability of financial resources is rated as likely.

b. Socio political **Rating: 3**

Moderately Likely:

- The TE notes a reasonable commitment of involved populations with the project outcomes. "During the course of the project, efforts were made to increase the sustainability of the enhanced knowledge base, adequacy of the monitoring equipment and systems, and the technical capacity to operate and maintain monitoring equipment, analyze data and utilize climate models. These included the focus of the project on building new and strengthening regional/local capacity, with the support of international expertise (e.g., NOAA and Hadley Center), and the formalization of several O&M agreements (e.g., CIMH, CMS, NOAA), aimed at providing the necessary support to continue with the generation and analysis of monitoring data. Further, the inclusion of climate change in the curriculum at the M. Sc. level at the UWI at Cavehill is expected to enhance the sustainability of these capacities."
- However, as remarked by the IEG, other concerns might be prioritized in the socio-political context of the countries involved. In the IEG words, "However, various factors such as the general weak/inadequate capacity existent in the region, the limited availability of local resources made worse by the current financial crisis, the imperative need of tackling the day to day challenges of small island economies, present challenges to the adaptation agenda that cannot be ignored."
- Therefore, considering the important involvement of local population and governments with project outcomes, but remarking that they might not be prioritized before other socio-political concerns, sustainability with that regard is rated as moderately likely.

c. Institutional framework and governance **Rating: 4**

Likely:

- Following the completion of sectorial adaptation strategies, adoption and implementation of the strategies is in progress in the respective countries (Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and Barbados).
- To the TE, "the adoption of the Regional Strategy by the Heads of Government, as a sign of country ownership, awareness and recognition of the relevance of the subject, combined with an institutionalized strengthened technical capacity, and the availability of increasing international resources to finance the implementation of the adaptation agenda in the Caribbean (e.g., donors' contribution to the CCCCC and other sources including the PPCR), are promising signs that the agenda will keep progressing. However, various factors such as the general weak/inadequate capacity existent in the region, the limited availability of local resources made worse by the current financial crisis, the imperative need of tackling the day to day challenges of small island economies, present challenges to the adaptation agenda that cannot be ignored."
- As mentioned above, according to the IEG, "in evaluating the risk-to-development it is important to note the existence of an outstanding implementing agent (i.e., the CCCCC) to carry out these tasks on a sustainable basis after Bank funding ends, the increasing importance of the issue of climate change in the region, the mandate they have helped develop in the form of a highly participatory regional strategy (adopted by the heads of state of CARICOM in July of 2009), and the existence of two Bank-supported follow-on projects (i.e., SPACC and PPCR) and other donor-funded projects which are now being implemented and resourced."
- Therefore, sustainability with regard to institutional framework and governance is rated as likely.

d. Environmental **Rating: 4**

Likely:

- As analyzed in the IEG, "the Regional Strategy for Achieving Development Resilience to Climate Change was prepared by CCCCC and adopted by the Heads of CARICOM States in July 2009. The strategy defines the main pillars on which the region's efforts will be focused, including mainstreaming climate change adaptation considerations into national and sectorial planning processes and infrastructure projects to reduce future vulnerability to climate change impacts. However, various factors such as the general weak/inadequate capacity existent in the region, the limited availability of local resources made worse by the current financial crisis, the imperative need of tackling the day to day challenges of small island economies, present challenges to the adaptation agenda that cannot be ignored."
- Considering the raising importance of climate change adaptation among national societies and governments of the Caribbean, as well as the important institutional framework developed, environmental sustainability is considered likely.

4.3 Assessment of processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

a. Co-financing. To what extent was the reported cofinancing (or proposed cofinancing) essential to achievement of GEF objectives? Were components supported by cofinancing well integrated into the project? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Cofinancing for this project requires a complex analysis and leads to partially inconclusive results:

- In the IEG's analysis of project cofinancing, "project was implemented by two different entities (i.e., CARICOM for the first 45 months, and then by the CCCCC in the last third of the project following the MTR). Thus, costs totaling $2.59m were not broken down by component under CARICOM's direction; this problem was later corrected during CCCCC's stewardship. Therefore, it is not possible to compare appraised vs. actual expenditures by component due to this enormous accountability gap during the first 45 months of implementation. CIDA funding should not have been considered direct co-financing given that it financed another parallel project bridging the Bank-supported CPACC and MACC projects, nor should the $600,000 be included as direct co-financing that DFID provided to apply tools developed by MACC in several of the CARICOM member countries. GEF financing reached $4.86m of the $5m appraised estimate, but this was broken down along different cost "categories" (e.g., goods, consultant services, etc), and not by component. The borrower contribution included $310,000 (out of an estimated $315,000) of in-kind and cash inputs. Due to CARICOM's inability to maintain proper fiduciary practices and make satisfactory progress against the IOIs in the first two-thirds of the project, the original closing date of 9/30/2007 was extended for 18 months to 3/30/2009."
- Considering IEG's analysis, highlighting the impossibility to compare appraised and actual expenditure due

to methodological differences, as well as CARICOM's improper fiduciary practices, cofinancing cannot be fully evaluated.

b. Delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Delays regarding disbursement, achievements, CARICOM Secretariat's inefficiency, execution of activities, M&E implementation and utilization, quality of supervision, among others, reflected directly in the project's conclusion significantly behind schedule:

- According to the TE, "the project was significantly behind schedule, as it was reflected in a slow disbursement rate and delay in achieving important results as measured by key indicators. The delays were caused mainly by (i) slow disbursement due to CARICOM Secretariat's internal processes and complex communication protocols; (ii) delay in filling the vacancy of Technical Coordinator up until the MTR; (iii) some services and equipment for monitoring provided by the co-financer were delayed beyond control of the project; (iv) difficult access to required baseline data to develop climate change scenarios, (v) underestimation of the time necessary for completion of the climate change model runs, and (vi) slow and difficult communication between, and participation of, key stakeholders executing the project."
- As the TE analyzes the second extension of closing date, "the transfer of Special Account from the CARICOM Secretariat to the CCCCC was delayed, consequently delaying the full execution of the activities by the latter. In the meantime, the CCCCC used their own funds to continue carrying out some of the activities until the transfer was completed and they started receiving funds from the Bank. However, this delay affected the rate of implementation, and a second extension of the closing date was required to complete the priority activities. A six-month extension until March 2009 was requested and granted. But it turned out that even this second extension was not adequate to allow the finalization of certain project activities that required more time to obtain results, such as the development of regional linkage of the national sector strategies and the implementation of national sector adaptation strategies."
- Considering M&E Plan Implementation, the IEG analyzes that "the M&E was not effectively implemented partly because the CARICOM Secretariat did not have a dedicated full-time project team, which delayed the identification of the major implementation problems in the first half of the project life." Considering quality of supervision, the IEG remarks that "the fact that the MTR was delayed for a year also contributed to the delay in addressing the critical issues." Considering M&E utilization by both the Recipient and the Bank in the first half of the project, the IEG evaluates that "it was at best weak. Consequently the implementation teams overlooked various opportunities to take corrective measures in project execution. The poor utilization of M&E in the first half of the project contributed to delayed identification of critical implementation problems in the first half of the project life." Still, the IEG mentions that "the delay in the development of the sector strategies resulted in limiting the scope of the activities to consultations with the National Focal Points. Using other sources of funding, the CCCCC is committed to finalizing the identification of no-regret adaptation measures."

c. Country Ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability highlighting the causal links.

Country ownership was significant in this particular project.

- As mentioned above, according to the TE, the adoption of the Regional Strategy by the Heads of Government constitutes, among other things, a significant "sign of country ownership, awareness and recognition of the relevance of the subject, combined with an institutionalized strengthened technical capacity, and the availability of increasing international resources to finance the implementation of the adaptation agenda in the Caribbean (e.g., donors' contribution to the CCCCC and other sources including the PPCR). They are promising signs that the agenda will keep progressing."

4.4 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

a. M&E design at Entry **Rating (six point scale): 4**

Moderately Satisfactory:

- According to the PAD submitted for CEO Endorsement, component 5 was dedicated, among other things, to M&E: "Component V: Project Management (Total US$1.38 m; GEF US$1.18 m): This component will provide support to CARICOM and the PIU for the efficient and timely execution of the project, including project administration as well as planning, monitoring, and evaluating project activities over the duration of the project. The component will finance the required consultancies, training, auditing, and operating costs."

- The PAD provides further explanations on M&E design: "This will be undertaken at three levels: regular monitoring and concurrent evaluation; mid-term review, and final assessment." **Regular monitoring** of project activities will be the responsibility of the PIU, which will prepare semi-annual reports on the implementation progress. This will cover reporting on the progress achieved vis-à-vis the Project Operations Manual timeline for project activities, the Procurement Plan and Schedule, and agreed Work Plan for the year, among other aspects. **An annual report** will also be prepared indicating project achievements, experiences, problems and lessons learned during the year to be discussed in March each year. Since the key outputs of the project relate to tailoring of climate projection and climate impacts models, vulnerability assessment and adaptation approach, regional and national level staff and institutional capacity building, formulation of adaptation strategies, there will be an assessment of the quality of the outputs by a range of external consultants (scientist, social experts, economist) as and when required, which will supplement the monitoring work done by PIU. The semi-annual reports from PIU should incorporate these qualitative assessments too. These consultants will be funded under the project. Finally, with regard to staff capacity building, the project will fund periodic "self-assessment" exercises through which the trained staff will do an internal assessment of the quality, usefulness, and "on-the-job" application of the training modules. The quality of capacity building will also be reflected in the quality of the outputs (vulnerability assessment, economic costs, adaptation policies, institutional analyses, etc.), which the trained staff will be assisted to self-prepare in teams. **Annual Reviews.** While the Bank will be reviewing the project through review missions, a full-scale review of the progress in project implementation will be undertaken around March of each year. An independent consultant(s) will be contracted to review general project execution and review the execution of specific components immediately preceding the second annual review. The outcomes of this review would be discussed at a workshop, where recommendations will be developed for the remaining project period. **Final Evaluation/Review of Project Execution**. It is a requirement that all projects funded by GEF undertake a final evaluation of the project and its execution, particularly to review success and lessons learnt. CARICOM and the PIU will carry out such a review with the assistance of an independent consultant acceptable to all parties. The project will support a review workshop or Implementation Completion Report stakeholder meeting, wherein all countries and agencies will participate to review and assess the findings of the study, and evolve a sustainability plan for project activities in the post-project period.
- According to the IEG, The **M&E design** selected the right types of tools and indicators (e.g., sea level monitoring stations, coral reef monitoring network, downscaled modeling of climate change and anticipated impacts, etc.) to measure the achievement of the PDO. However, it probably chose to track far too many indicators, some of which lacked clarity in terms of their measurability and meaningfulness, adding to the complexity and cost of project implementation. This problem was partially addressed at the MTR, but could have been more aggressive in terms of cutting back.
- Considering that M&E at entry contained an appropriate data analysis system to monitor results and track progress towards achieving project objectives, but also considering the IEG's remarks that the design "chose to track far too many indicators", M&E design is rated as moderately satisfactory.

b. M&E plan Implementation **Rating (six point scale): 3**

Moderately Unsatisfactory:

- According to the TE, "The M&E was not effectively implemented partly because the CARICOM Secretariat did not have a dedicated full-time project team, which delayed the identification of the major implementation problems in the first half of the project life. Following the restructuring, the CCCCC worked closely with the Bank to revise technical and fiduciary documentation, which consequently reduced the uncertainty about data quality in the PIU's progress reports and technical reports. Technical reports were further enhanced through a peer review process. The MTR proved to be a key step in the process of M&E. Both the MTR by an independent consultant and the one by the Bank reached similar conclusions and were crucial in determining the changes that were needed to bring the project back on track. Finally, an end-of-project independent review was conducted by a consultant. However, data collection during this exercise was limited because the consultant could not travel due to his passport situation. The consultant only managed to visit the CARICOM Secretariat in Guyana and also participated in the end-of-project symposium. The rest of the data collection was made through phone calls. Therefore, the quality of the report prepared by the consultant was deemed inadequate and of limited use."
- According to the IEG, "**M&E implementation** was far more problematic throughout the project given the poor implementation and coordination initially. The project had serious lapses in both implementation and supervision, and missed many opportunities early on to take corrective actions. This resulted in a situation where the PDO had to be achieved in one-third of the time and with half of the budget as originally programmed. Despite this, by the end of the project, the outputs and outcomes reported in the ICR were thorough and credible, providing adequate information to ascertain that key M&E data were collected of a reasonable quality."

- Underlining that outputs and outcomes reported were "thorough and credible", but also considering the ineffective, problematic M&E implementation, it is rated as moderately unsatisfactory.

4.6 Assessment of Quality of Implementation and Execution

a. Overall Quality of Implementation and Execution (on a six point scale): 4

b. Overall Quality of Implementation – for IA (on a six point scale): 4

Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as quality of the project design, focus on results, adequacy of supervision inputs and processes, quality of risk management, candor and realism in supervision reporting, and suitability of the chosen executing agencies for project execution.

Moderately Satisfactory:

- Although the project design could have benefitted from simplification (e.g., by condensing the number of subcomponents/activities in order to concentrate resources and efforts) and proper in-project sequencing of activities (e.g., the bulk of the PEO component should have been implemented in the second half of the project cycle; this would have ensured that PEO was driven by the content/data/knowledge generated from implementation of components 1, 2, and 3.), PEO was undertaken from the start of the project with minimal content and by the project MTR, the budget for PEO was almost fully expended.
- According to the IEG analysis, "MACC was a regional project targeting 12 countries that had uneven levels of readiness, different perspectives, and varying levels of country ownership (however, this has tremendously changed at the end of project). In such circumstances, implementation tends to take a long time and requires proactive involvement and engagement of many stakeholders (regional institutions, local governments, etc), as well as an empowered PIU at the regional level with strong management skills. Although the institutional arrangements defined at the time of project preparation appeared adequate, they were later proven inadequate and complex for effective project execution. In addition, the complexity of the project stemmed in part from the many collaborating partners namely […] There are inherent high transaction costs (time, money) associated multi-partner arrangements as was the case in MACC especially if most of the partners end up relying wholly/partially on project resources to execute activities. Fiduciary risks related to the capacity of CARICOM Secretariat and the PIU to implement Bank's financial management and procurement standards were correctly identified, however mitigation measures put in place proved inadequate as evidenced by the slow implementation of activities."
- Considering Quality of Supervision, the IEG evaluates that "the information provided by the Bank task team through the status reports was generally informative and constructive. The Bank team conducted field missions once a year on average, supplemented by frequent audio conferences. A total of 15 ISRs have been filed, reporting in detail the progress of the project implementation. However, it is clear that the Bank's supervision of the project during its first three years was very inadequate. For example, during the period 2004-2006, there was a gap of eight months between the fourth and fifth ISRs and a one-year gap between the fifth and sixth ISR. Furthermore, based on the archived ISRs, the Bank task team did not recognize until the third year, the two critical problems that affected the project implementation: the issue of CARICOM Secretariat's internal processes and complex communication procedures that had resulted in systemic delays and consequently, slow disbursement; and the delay in filling the Project's Technical Coordinator position (the original Coordinator had resigned). In addition, in the first half of the project, there was a disbursement ceiling of US$100,000.00, which hampered the ability of the Recipient to implement the agreed project work program. Also, the fact that the MTR was delayed for a year also contributed to the delay in addressing the critical issues."
- Considering the thorough analysis by the IEG, the initial appraisal, the project's readiness, and supervision during the first three years of the project were "weak and inadequate". To the IEG, "this demonstrated lack of pro-activity and realism on the part of the Bank up to 2006 contributed greatly to limiting the timely and effective implementation of the project. After the issue became too obvious and the MTR was conducted, the Bank effectively assisted the client in restructuring the project in order to achieve the project objectives within the limited timeframe that remained for the project. An extensive review by Legal, FM, Procurement, and Disbursement, and the Region's management contributed to constructing an improved implementation arrangement of the second half of this project. Hence, considering the positive turnaround from 2007 onwards following the Bank-assisted restructuring, and the supervision and achievements of the project after the restructuring, overall Bank performance can justifiably be given a borderline rating of Moderately Satisfactory."

c. Quality of Execution – for Executing Agencies[1] (rating on a 6 point scale): 4

[1] Executing Agencies for this section would mean those agencies that are executing the project in the field. For any given project this will exclude Executing Agencies that are implementing the project under expanded opportunities –

Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as focus on results, adequacy of management inputs and processes, quality of risk management, and candor and realism in reporting by the executive agency.

Moderately Satisfactory:

- Regarding government performance, the IEG analyzes that "CARICOM countries' participation at higher level has contributed to the adoption process of adaptation policy options, sectorial adaptation strategies and vulnerability and risk assessment studies. The governments have shown their commitment to addressing climate change adaptation. For example, Heads of Government of the Region have categorized climate change as second in importance only to the recent global financial crisis and will continue to address this issue at their meetings. The CARICOM Secretariat is fully supportive of and complements the mission and role of the CCCCC as the regional lead institution on climate change issues. This complementarity led the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to contribute US$1.0 million for the creation of a trust fund to enhance the sustainability of the activities undertaken by the CCCCC. This was a major recognition and contribution by CARICOM of the strategic value of the CCCCC."
- To the IEG, **"**although the project experienced major delays in the first half of the implementation period, the project was managed effectively towards the end of project. Therefore, the overall implementing agency performance is rated satisfactory but with the caveat that performance in the first 3 years of project execution was uneven and sub-optimal. While the **CARICOM Secretariat** provided substantial support for the preparation of the project, their role as the implementing agency was not fulfilled satisfactorily. As noted earlier in this report, the poor execution was mainly due to the internal processes and complex communication procedures at CARICOM Secretariat that resulted in systemic delays in responses and actions. This was compounded by the fact that CARICOM Secretariat had no technical staff conversant on climate issues. Also they were not able to develop fiduciary capacity (accounting, financial management & procurement) mainly because the deposit to the Special Account was extremely low and was not enough to hire full-time staff. The implementation of the MACC project improved significantly after the **CCCCC** took over the project as the implementation agency. But it should be pointed out that it took slightly over 6 months to actually transfer the project from CARICOM Secretariat to CCCCC. During the project transfer period (08/2006 – 04/2007) there was no disbursements made since CCCCC did not yet have a project account on one hand, and on the other hand CARICOM Secretariat had already closed the project account. This meant that project staff members were not paid during the transition period and the Center had to rely on their other resources to keep project activities moving. If one considers the fact that Center effectively took over the Project in May 2007, then the actual implementation period available for the CCCCC to execute the MACC Project was about 23 months (May 2007 – Mar 2009). […] Since government performance is rated satisfactory and the implementing agencies' performance is rated moderately satisfactory, the overall recipient performance is rated moderately satisfactory."
- Considering the thorough evaluation reasoning provided by the IEG, especially with regard to CARICOM Secretariat performance (which presented complex communication procedures and systemic delays) and to the CCCCC (which improved execution significantly), as well as by highlighting that CARICOM countries have endorsed the project goals, execution is rated as moderately satisfactory.

5. PROGRESS TOWARDS IMPACT

a. What is the *outlined* outcomes-to-impact pathway?

Briefly describe the logical sequence of means-to-end linkages underlying a project (Outcome to impact pathways are the means-ends relationships between project outcomes and the intended impacts – i.e. the logical results chain of activity, output, outcome and impact)

Activities	Outputs	Outcomes	Impacts / GEB

for projects approved under the expanded opportunities procedure the respective executing agency will be treated as an implementing agency.

To Build Capacity to Assess and Utilize Resources to Reduce Vulnerability and Risks Associated with Climate Change To Promote Public Education & Outreach (PEO) To Conduct Project Management	Global climate models in support of decision making were adapted in selected sectors Climate change impact scenarios were generated A harmonized approach for assessing climate change vulnerability and risk, and adaptation policy decision making was developed An institutional analysis was conducted and action plans were defined as key outputs in the preparation of four national climate change sector strategies Seven national PEO strategies were developed and implemented, a dedicated website and information clearinghouse were revamped are being maintained, and course material was developed for the Master Program at the Centre of Resource Management and Environmental Studies (CERMES) at UWI.	The climate and coral reef monitoring network was strengthened A Project Implementation Unit (PUI) was first created at CARICOM, but later moved to Caribbean Community Climate Change Center (CCCCC) after MTR restructuring, where the component-specific M&E and fiduciary (accounting, procurement, and financial management) systems became fully operational. A Regional Strategy for Climate Change was adopted by the Heads of State of CARICOM in July of 2009 along with supporting regional position papers on various aspects of climate change impacts and responses, as well as a business plan outlining the region's fund-raising strategy over the next five years.	The creation of an enabling environment for climate change adaptation in CARICOM small island and coastal developing states has been facilitated

b. What are the actual (*intended or unintended)* impacts of the project?

Based on the assessment of outcomes [4.1.1] explain to what extent the project contributed to or detracted from the path to project impacts and to *impact drivers* (Impact drivers are the ***significant factors*** that, if present, are expected to contribute to the ultimate realization of project impacts and that are within the ability of the project to influence

Considering the assessed outcomes and presented impacts, impact drivers were:

- **Institutional Change/Strengthening**: In the words of the ICR, "One of the most tangible and far-reaching results from the project is the growth of the CCCCC into a center of excellence on climate change issues in the region. The major impact of restructuring the MACC Project came from the role assigned to the CCCCC as executing agency of the project, the decision to emphasize activities in the field and engagement of local partners (champions). As a newly-established institution, the CCCCC benefitted from the MACC project in the following ways: 1) by dealing with all the 12 participating countries at the same time, the Center quickly gained experience and consolidated its role as a credible regional institution capable of executing regional/ large international projects, 2) the Center now has a very advanced technical computing and modeling capacity on climate changes issues that was directly financed by the project, and 3) internal fiduciary systems (accounting, financial management, and procurement) capacity was enhanced through training provided to the Center by Bank staff via project activities. In fact the project financed the hiring of 4 Center staff (accounting, financial management, procurement, administrative) that have now been fully absorbed as core staff of the Center following project closure. The Center is now recognized internationally as the lead institution of the Caribbean Community on matters related to climate change. The Center was formulated, as the technical institution of the region for climate issues, with Bank assistance in 2002. It was formally created in 2005 and undertook responsibility for the MACC project at the end of 2006. The project also had a great achievement in strengthening the regional capacity on collecting sound data and developing policy options based on those data. Long-term capacity is ensured through multiple agreements among partner institutions to maintain the knowledge base. It is also achieved through the sheer number of people trained through various workshops, the majority of whom use the knowledge in their various capacities."
- **Disasters as Resilience Building Drivers:** The Coral Reef Early Warning system (CREWS) at Discovery Bay in Jamaica was damaged by a hurricane. However, as explained in the ICR, "restoration measures are being undertaken by NOAA. The CMS is committed to bring it back into operational this year. A pilot to strengthen the resilience of Caribbean coral reefs to climate change impacts was successfully initiated in Belize. The work investigated *Acropora* corals to identify and propagate temperature tolerant genotypes, so

that second generation fragments will be available in future phases for out-planting to reef adaptation sites where severe bleaching, temperature related coral disease and/or hurricanes have been observed. Eleven nurseries were established and distributed throughout the northern, central and southern reef locations. Protocols have been established and local personnel trained in monitoring and management techniques to maintain the sites. The local coral reef researchers and other interested parties including fishermen and tour guides have been trained and included in the collaborative approach effort and they have volunteered to help keep the monitoring going. Further information is available in the project files. The tools (models, vulnerability assessments, etc) developed under MACC were used in the British Overseas Territories of Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands, using resources provided by the British Government (DFID)."

c. Drawing on the assessment of the likelihood of outcome sustainability[4.2], what are the apparent risks to achieved impacts being sustained and likely impacts being achieved?

Considering the assessed likelihood of outcome sustainability, it is inferable from this project that the apparent risks to impacts were:

- **Secondary importance in socio-political terms**: Even though the TE notes a reasonable commitment of involved populations with the project outcomes, the IEG remarks that other concerns might be prioritized in the socio-political context of the countries involved. In the IEG words, "However, various factors such as the general weak/inadequate capacity existent in the region, the limited availability of local resources made worse by the current financial crisis, the imperative need of tackling the day to day challenges of small island economies, present challenges to the adaptation agenda that cannot be ignored."
- **Weak or inexistent capacity in the region**: According to the TE, "the adoption of the Regional Strategy by the Heads of Government, as a sign of country ownership, awareness and recognition of the relevance of the subject, combined with an institutionalized strengthened technical capacity, and the availability of increasing international resources to finance the implementation of the adaptation agenda in the Caribbean (e.g., donors' contribution to the CCCCC and other sources including the PPCR), are promising signs that the agenda will keep progressing. However, various factors such as the general weak/inadequate capacity existent in the region, the limited availability of local resources made worse by the current financial crisis, the imperative need of tackling the day to day challenges of small island economies, present challenges to the adaptation agenda that cannot be ignored."

d. **Evidence of Impact**

Question	**Yes**	**No**	**UA**
i. Did the evaluation report on ***stress reduction***[2] at the local level (i.e. at the demonstration-pilot level, etc)?		X	
ii. If yes, describe the evidence that was provided whenever possible quoting quantitative evidence. Also discuss the scope[3] of such reductions given the range of concerns targeted by the project.			
iii. Did the evaluation report stress reduction at the broader systemic level?		X	
iv. If yes, describe the evidence that was provided whenever possible quoting quantitative evidence. Also discuss the scope of such reductions given the range of concerns targeted by the project.			
v. Did the evaluation report change in the ***environmental status*** at the local level (i.e. at the demonstration - pilot level, etc)		X	
vi. If yes, describe the evidence that was provided whenever possible quoting quantitative evidence. Also discuss the scope of change given the range of concerns targeted by the project.			
vii. Did the evaluation report change in the environmental status at the broader systemic level?		X	
viii. If yes, describe the evidence that was provided whenever possible quoting quantitative evidence. Also discuss the scope of such change given the range of concerns targeted by the project.			
ix. Did the evaluation report change in the socioeconomic status at the local level?		X	
x. If yes, describe the evidence that was provided whenever possible quoting quantitative evidence. Also discuss the scope of change given the range of concerns targeted by the project.			
xi. Did the evaluation report change in the socio-economic status at the systemic level?	X		
xii. If yes, describe the evidence that was provided whenever possible quoting quantitative evidence. Also discuss the scope of change given the range of concerns targeted by the project. Yes:			

[2] Stress = Pressure on the environment caused by human activities; Reduction=decrease of this pressure
[3] Scope refers to the broadness of results against original objectives,

- Regional knowledge base on climate change has been strengthened. "A large constituency of sectorial specialists equipped and trained to incorporate climate change concerns into their work (vulnerability and risk assessment, economic analysis, policy aspects, and adaptation strategies). Awareness relating to climate change aspects and impacts enhanced for various stakeholder groups. National Sectorial Adaptation Strategies and Implementation Action Plans prepared in a participatory manner, and under consideration at appropriate governmental levels. Plans prepared for more effective enforcement of existing policies and regulations, especially where these have implications for addressing climate change concerns. Regional coordination improved on climate change issues, and a regional strategy was prepared."

xiii. Did the evaluation provide evidence of any negative impacts (on drivers toward the projects intended impact, environmental status, socioeconomic status)? Describe the impacts that were documented and how severe were these impacts?

No negative impacts were reported.

e. Monitoring of impacts

i. Are arrangements/institutions in place to monitor stress reduction/improvement in the environment and/or socio-economic conditions at the local level after project completion?		X	
ii. Are arrangements/institutions in place to monitor stress reduction/improvement in the environment and/or socio-economic conditions at the systemic level after project completion?	X		

6. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assess the project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

a. Briefly describe the key lessons, good practice or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects

Lessons Learned
(both project-specific and of wide general application)

- The readiness and ability of countries to increase their resilience to climate change impacts greatly depends on the institutional capacity, knowledge of vulnerabilities and risks and their preparedness to reduce these vulnerabilities and risks. This task is more daunting for small economies with limited amount of resources, as CARICOM small islands and low-lying coastal states; hence the need for an effective regional coordination that reflects a harmonized vision and position.
- A regional program is likely to provide significant benefits over a single-country/country-by-country approach in cases where a single country lacks adequate level of resources, knowledge, and capacity and/or where opportunities for key adaptive measures may only be realized through regional or sub-regional cooperation on the management of transboundary climate hazards. Small Island Developing States (SIDS), such as those in the Caribbean, have urgent needs to address their special vulnerability to sea level rise and to the impacts of increased intensity of extreme climatic events, including impacts on water resources, natural resources and ecosystems, cities and ports. Yet, these SIDS face various barriers in addressing development and climate change related issues largely due to limited institutional and technical capacity, small size, and often isolated/remote location. Thus a regional adaptation program would provide an opportunity to overcome some of these barriers while also promoting the transfer of lessons, replication and scale-up of adaptation measures. However, **it is crucial that countries in a regional program have common climate risk and vulnerability profiles**.
- Wholesale implementation of regional climate change adaptation programs is a real challenge due to varying country ownership and contexts, capacities, institutional set-up, priorities, and political realities. Therefore, it is crucial to manage the tension between regional adaptation activities and national ones. Alternatively, the task team should undertake a rapid consultative exercise of delineating the types of activities that are best done regionally and those that are more suitable to be addressed on a national basis. **Regional adaptation programs can be implemented most effectively if they are driven by and anchored in specific national adaptation activities.** This will reduce the inherent inertia between regional goals and national interests. While generic activities such as awareness raising, modeling and sharing lessons learnt can be done across borders, specific and concrete sectoral/multi-sectoral adaptation activities must be executed at country level in order to ensure alignment with respective country capacities, institutions, policies and political processes. While it would at face value appear counter-productive, regional adaptation programs should consider

having/identifying/supporting 'champion country(ies)' or 'champion national activities' that can serve as examples for the other countries while also enhancing the quality and speed of implementation of regional adaptation measures. Indeed, **local ownership and champions** (be they individuals, institutions, etc) are crucial for the successful implementation of regional adaptation measures.

- **To enhance sustainability, regional climate change adaptation programs should build on existing collaboration on climate sensitive development issues and/or on prior involvement in regional programs**. Such regional programs should consider financing and implementing activities such as: identification of measures to reduce climate vulnerabilities and risks; exchange of lessons learned; regional technical assistance; development of tools and methodologies to assess vulnerability to and impacts of climate; provision of capacity building through targeted training; institutional strengthening; awareness raising on regional climate threats and likely impacts; regional climate monitoring and early warning systems; inclusion of climate change in regional planning strategies, policies and development programs; etc.
- Communication, both in terms of project design and project implementation, is key to success. In all the stages of a project, there must be more input from and participation/ involvement of the stakeholders. The flow of information must be maintained at all times in order to foster true partnership and create strong country ownership. Although the CCCCC satisfactorily executed the MACC Project, there is further challenge for the CCCCC to improve communications on its role as an implementing agency, a facilitating entity, a climate change negotiating institution, a technical and scientific resource organization to the member countries or any combination thereof. To this end, the CCCCC may need to develop a communication strategy or mechanism.
- The in-house accounting, financial and procurement capacity of the implementing agency is central to the smooth execution of project activities. Financial and procurement capacity assessments identified various aspects of implementation weakness. Although risk mitigation measures were designed and implemented, the project could not avoid serious disbursement delays. The capacity assessment may need to be expanded beyond financial and procurement capacity to look further at other aspects of the administrative arrangements such as division of responsibility between the PIU and the recipient organization (CARICOM Secretariat in this case), physical location of the PIU, communication protocols and internal procedures for administrative processes, etc. This is critical especially if the recipient has never implemented Bank-supported projects.
- Fiduciary Compliance: Implementation support, targeted training of PIU staff, and sustained supervision can greatly enhance fiduciary (financial, procurement) compliance. Given resource constraints which limited the extent of financial management supervision, the innovation of **reverse supervision**, whereby the PIU team visited Washington to review the status of project implementation greatly enhanced financial and procurement management in the project. This technique was used several times and pending (financial and procurement) issues were satisfactorily addressed. Future projects should focus on implementation support including availing PIU fiduciary staff with the training opportunities offered at the Bank for Caribbean PIUs. Also future operations, especially climate change adaptation programs, must have sufficient supervision budgets, to enable sustained fiduciary supervision in response to implementation issues as they arise.
- For projects in low/weak capacity environments, Bank efforts should emphasize implementation support rather than implementation supervision. Although it is not uncommon that a project experiences implementation problems in the initial stages of the project, close attention should be paid in the first years and the issues should be managed in a timely manner without waiting until the MTR is carried out.
- The institutional arrangements need to be simplified for effective project implementation. Separate and several layers of bureaucracy in project implementation should be avoided so as to reduce delays in execution. Such multiple layers appear too bureaucratic and daunting to some stakeholders. It is also not conducive to reducing time lags between decisions and actions.
- Proper in-project **sequencing** of activities is crucial for effective implementation and achievement of project objectives. Ideally the bulk of the PEO component should have been implemented in the second half of the project cycle; this would have ensured that, as intended, PEO was driven by the content/data/knowledge generated from implementation of components 1, 2, and 3.
- Clear project objectives should be matched by simple project design. While MACC had very clear objectives, its execution was hampered in part by a cumbersome project design. Project design should be carefully assessed so as not to be overly-ambitious for the existing capacity of the recipient and the government counterparts. Projects should avoid complicating execution by having too many activities, especially for regional projects that inherently tend to be complex in nature.
- Project executing and collaborating agreements (MOUs, etc) with key partner institutions should not be open-ended, rather they should be targeted and ring-fenced. Collaboration arrangements should be as clearer as possible in terms of specifying the terms of cooperation, defining the costs and outputs expected from each partner. Otherwise, other options should be considered, for example, by competitively procuring consultancy services in order to increase efficiencies in terms of time, costs, and control of outputs.

b. Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation

Recommendations were fused with lessons learned in the TE through what the so-called project-specific and wide general. See section above.

7. QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

7.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings based on other information sources such as GEF EO field visits, other evaluations, etc.

With regard to the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Review:

- The information gathered by is very thorough and objective, presenting the main findings with regard to the evaluation of whole project.
- The IEG agrees with all the ratings of the ICR Report.

Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluations review for further definitions of the ratings. Please briefly explain each rating.

7.2 Quality of the terminal evaluation report	**Ratings**
a. To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	5
b. To what extent the report is internally consistent, the evidence is complete/convincing and the IA ratings have been substantiated? Are there any major evidence gaps?	5
c. To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy?	5
d. To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	5
e. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? As pointed by the IEG, "the ICR could have been more forthcoming in its treatment of the lack of cost data on expenditures by components in the first 45 months of the project when the CARICOM Secretariat was the implementing agency. This is a flaw in project implementation and Bank supervision, and should have been addressed in a more straightforward fashion."	4
f. Assess the quality of the reports evaluation of project M&E systems?	5

8. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRERATATION OF THE TERMINAL EVALUTION REVIEW REPORT EXCLUDING PIRs, TERMINAL EVALUATIONS, PAD.

IEG Review