# Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2015

## 1. Project Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summary project data</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEF project ID</td>
<td>1144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF Agency project ID</td>
<td>502468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF Replenishment Phase</td>
<td>GEF-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)</td>
<td>World Bank - IFC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project name</td>
<td>Komodo Collaborative Management Initiative (BDGEF Komodo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country/Countries</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focal area</td>
<td>Global Biodiversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives</td>
<td>OP2: Coastal, Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executing agencies involved</td>
<td>IFC – Komodo National Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs/CBOs involvement</td>
<td>The effective executing agency, the Komodo National Park, is a Joint Venture, of which The Nature Conservancy, a large international NGO, was an important partner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector involvement</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO Endorsement (FSP) / Approval date (MSP)</td>
<td>October 25th, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness date / project start</td>
<td>Nov. 24, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected date of project completion (at start)</td>
<td>Nov. 24, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual date of project completion</td>
<td>Oct. 1, 2010</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Financing</th>
<th>At Endorsement (US $M)</th>
<th>At Completion (US $M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Preparation Grant GEFS</td>
<td>GEF funding</td>
<td>0.375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Co-financing</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF Project Grant</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-financing IA own</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other multi-/bi-laterals</td>
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<td>Private sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NGOs/CSOs</td>
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<td>Total GEF funding</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Co-financing</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)</td>
<td>16.875</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Terminal evaluation/review information
- **TE completion date**: May 4th, 2011
- **Author of TE**: Juan Jose Dada, Catherine Cassagne
- **TER completion date**: January 5, 2016
- **TER prepared by**: Caroline Laroche
- **TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)**: Molly Watts
2. Summary of Project Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Final PIR*</th>
<th>IA Terminal Evaluation</th>
<th>IA Evaluation Office Review</th>
<th>GEF EO Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Outcomes</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability of Outcomes</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>UA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E Design</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E Implementation</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>UA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Implementation</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Execution</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>MU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>MU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The TE submitted was the final PIR. Scores for Final PIR and IA Terminal Evaluation are therefore the same.

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The GEO of this project is “to conserve and sustainably use the unique biodiversity assets of Komodo National Park (KNP)” (PD p.3).

The Komodo National Park is an important terrestrial and marine reserve unfortunately suffering from severe biodiversity depletion. There is therefore an important need to stop the destructive activities taking place in the park, and this is what this initiative aims to achieve. Other initiatives in the past have attempted to support conservation in the park, but GEF funding is needed to “set into motion a more effective and financially secure approach to the conservation of the park's globally significant biological resources” (PD p.5).

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The DO for this project is “to ensure effective long-term management of Komodo National Park (KNP) by:

(a) improving the effectiveness of park management through the adoption of a collaborative management approach, involving all key stakeholder groups, including the Park authority (PHKA), local government, a joint venture between an international NGO (The Nature Conservancy) and a local tourism company (JPU), and with additional input from local communities, government agencies and private sector organizations; 

(b) supporting the conservation of the marine and terrestrial resources of KNP, using an adaptive management approach to identify and respond to the changing threats facing these resources; 

(c) establishing structures and guidelines to promote environmentally sensitive tourism development in the region and developing a strategy for the appropriate use of tourism revenue
generated by KNP, to ensure long-term financial security for the park and sustainable benefits for the local communities; and (d) introducing a system of appropriate incentives to encourage conservation-enhancing livelihoods and stimulate the development of a local economy based on the sustainable use of the resources in and around the park.”

(PD p.3)

3.3 Were there any changes in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

There were no changes in the GEOs or DOs during implementation.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.1 Relevance</th>
<th>Rating: Satisfactory</th>
</tr>
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</table>

The TE rates relevance as satisfactory. This TER also rates relevance as satisfactory due to the project’s good alignment with both GEF and national priorities.

The project was consistent with the GEF Global Diversity focal area, directly addressing the joint objectives of conservation and sustainable use of biological resources of the GEF Operational Program for Coastal, Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems.

The project was also very well aligned with national priorities. Indonesia is experiencing biodiversity loss and habitat degradation. As a response, the Government of Indonesia has invested in protecting biodiversity-rich areas, and has shown commitment to conservation activities. However, the economic crisis of 1997 has seen environmental expenditures reduced, and conservation budgets were severely affected. Nonetheless, the Government of Indonesia is still implementing the 1993 Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, which “stresses the need for a sound analysis of the causes of biodiversity loss and the development of management regimes that are based on the sustainable use of biological resources. The BSAP listed 75 high-priority areas for the protection of biodiversity, several of which have subsequently been designed as conservation areas and many have received government and donor financing,
including major contributions from the GEF.” (PD p.8) In addition, in 1999, the Government established
the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. Progress in marine conservation is unfortunately behind
targets, but there remains a political will to improve biodiversity conservation. The Government of
Indonesia also confirmed its commitment at project approval by endorsing the GEF proposal and signing
the concession agreements.” (TE p.11)

| 4.2 Effectiveness | Rating: Moderately Satisfactory |

The TE rates output, outcome and impact achievement as satisfactory. This TE rates effectiveness as
moderately satisfactory due to the achievement of the global environmental objective, and the partial
achievement of the development objective for this project.

The GEO, “to conserve and sustainably use the unique biodiversity assets of Komodo National Park” has
been achieved. The target 173,000 hectares of land planned to be managed sustainably has been met.
As a result of the project, “there is little doubt that the status of the iconic species of the KNP, the
Komodo dragon, has improved in recent years, in part as the result of advances in scientific
understanding brought about by research supported by the initiative, and in part by better management
of tourism and land use within the park. This has also been confirmed by the on-going independent
evaluation and the regular monitoring reports and scientific publications supported by the project” (TT
pp.9-10). The project also allegedly had “significant positive impact on marine and terrestrial
conservation in Komodo, as witnessed by the major decrease in destructive fishing practices” (TE p.11).

The development objective “to ensure effective long-term management of Komodo National Park”, has
been partially achieved. A structure was created to manage the Komodo National Park, namely the
Komodo Collaborative Management Initiative (KCMI). “This is the structure designed to support the
Komodo National Park through a partnership between the Komodo National Park (KNP/PNK), the
National Park Authority (Ministry of Forestry), and the local District Government, with participation from
a community based advisory committee” .” (TE p.11). As a result, the management of the Komodo
National Park was improved, and an entrance fee was established as the main mechanism to support
operations going forward. While 9,300 tourists were expected, more than 19,000 actually went to the
Komodo National Park since the infrastructure was improved. To ensure long-term sustainability for this
project, a community development grant program and an alternative livelihoods and enterprise
development program were set up as a way to keep the local communities on board with the
conservation efforts. The grants benefited about 4,000 people and “paid for public facilities (water
supply, schools, village meeting halls and clinics) and services (medical, scholarship program). The
alternative livelihood and enterprise development initiatives provided by PNK trained community
members in sustainable fisheries, vegetable production, and handicrafts. The project also funded the
construction of an Agriculture Training Centre building, fully equipped.” (TE pp.10-11)

On the other hand, after 5 years, the entrance fee income collected had only reached a little over
US$1.5 million. The target was of US$6.7 million after 7 years. Due to the early closure of the project,
final income is not known, but it is expected that after 7 years, about US$3 million or 50% of the target
would have been collected. Finally, the number of jobs created target was only just above 50% of the expected number of jobs. (TE pp.12-13) Overall, it can be said that a lot was done to ensure effective long-term management of the Park, but not as much as was initially planned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.3 Efficiency</th>
<th>Rating: Moderately Satisfactory</th>
</tr>
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</table>

The TE rates efficiency as satisfactory. This TER rates it as moderately satisfactory given some of the failures regarding the achievement of financial sustainability, and taking into account that the project was forced to close early.

There was no cost benefit analysis done for this project, nor is there any clear indication of cost effectiveness. Indeed, “due to the pioneering nature of the project it is very difficult to compare the expenses and results with a similar project. The multi-stakeholders processes tend to be costly in the beginning and achieve greater efficiency once they are set up” (TE p.13). The TE reports that “the project was probably not as efficient as could be but its experimental nature compensate for that in part”. While it is true that this was in no way a ‘standard’ project, more could have been done to improve efficiency.

The project delivery has mostly been timely, but the financial sustainability aspects of the project have not been established as successfully. According to the TE, “a mechanism should have been put in place for assuring adaptive management of the finances and a separation between the company costs and the set-up costs of the collaborative management structure. These could have allowed PNK to revise its projections about the revenue. It is possible that the project funding made the company expend without the for-profit discipline that it should have had (TE p.13).

In addition, the project was closed two years early due to problems encountered, most of which were external to the project. For example, the government showed unwillingness to comply with the Collaborative Management Agreement, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mandated that The Nature Conservancy sell its shares, arguing that as an international NGO, it is illegal for it to own a for-profit company in Indonesia (TE p.3). The problems this caused were important, but a reasonable and sustainable way out was found. Indeed, “In light of these [problems], TNC decided to sell its shares in PNK to an Indonesian company with a strong commitment to conservation. Even though the sale has not yet occurred, considering that the objective is expected to be accomplished through a private entity, IFC agreed that this transfer is a viable and robust exit strategy for TNC and the project. In fact, this would almost exceed expectations and prove that conservation and a park management can make business sense. “ (TE p.3)

In summary, the project was probably not as efficient as it could have been due to a variety of internal and external factors, but it nonetheless managed to achieve its main conservation objectives, and to contribute to the sustainable management of the Komodo National Park.
4.4 Sustainability

Rating: Unable to Assess

Sustainability is not assessed or rated as part of the TE. This TER does not have enough information to make a sound assessment of sustainability and, apart from judging financial sustainability to be moderately likely, cannot assign a rating.

**Socio-political risks: Unable to Assess**

While this isn’t mentioned in the TE, this TER assesses there to be potential socio-political risks. For example, communities relying on fishing for their livelihood might stop supporting the project if the management of the Komodo National Park does not include them in the decision-making process, or the Government might withdraw support for the initiative.

**Financial risks: Moderately Likely**

The IFC exited the project early because the Government of Indonesia could no longer allow The Nature Conservancy to own a for-profit company in Indonesia. The IFC decided together with The Nature Conservancy to sell their shares in the Park “to an Indonesian company with a strong commitment to conservation” (TE p.3). A local business entrepreneur has demonstrated interest, which, according to the TE, signals that the project has a good potential for financial sustainability. That being said, at this point, the revenue of the Komodo National Park is far below target. Changes will need to be made in the future to ensure the financial sustainability of the Komodo National Park, including the reduction of management costs and an increase in the tourism fee charge to visitors.

**Institutional risks: Unable to Assess**

There could be institutional risks, for example related to changes in ownership structure of the Collaborative Management Initiative. Indeed, if ownership becomes private, the extent to which the participatory management style with which the Collaborative Management Initiative has operated might not be maintained. However, the TE provides too little information for this TER to be able to rate institutional risks.

**Environmental risks: Not Applicable**

Not applicable
5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Co-financing was mostly delivered as planned, except for the $6.8 million in revenue expected from park revenues, of which only $1.5 million materialized. Some of the project objectives were not realized, but not because of the lacking co-financing. Instead, it is the other way around, with the park revenue not being higher due to project inadequacies.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

No extensions or delays were experienced as part of this project. However, and as mentioned above, the project closed early due to problems encountered, most of which were external to the project. For example, the government showed unwillingness to comply with the Collaborative Management Agreement, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mandated that The Nature Conservancy sell its shares, arguing that as an international NGO, it is illegal for it to own a for-profit company in Indonesia (TE p.3).

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

The TE does not describe country ownership over the duration of the project, and this TER therefore cannot assess or describe country ownership.

6. Assessment of project’s Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

| 6.1 M&E Design at entry | Rating: Moderately Satisfactory |

The TE does not include a discussion of M&E design, nor does it assign M&E design a specific rating. This TER assigns M&E Design at entry a rating of Moderately Satisfactory due to the presence of basic but adequate M&E plans, but noting important gaps in the M&E plan at entry.
The project had a basic M&E plan in place. The Project Document mentions:

“The M&E Plan) will build on the preliminary scoping of a general monitoring and evaluation plan for KCMI that was undertaken during project preparation. This plan makes provision for an annual internal assessment process involving all key stakeholders, supplemented by an external independent assessment by a representative from IUCN’s regional network and the Jakarta UNESCO office every three years. “ (PD p.48)

Much of the planned monitoring for the program was for ‘Biological and Resource Use Monitoring ’ (US $1.3 million), and focused on monitoring marine species, terrestrial habitats and tourism impact. Key performance indicators were proposed, but without targets, baselines or assigned responsibility for monitoring. Many of these indicators do not meet the SMART requirements, and given the absence of a logical framework, are not clearly related to specific project outcomes.

6.2 M&E Implementation

Rating: Unable to Assess

The TE does not include a discussion of M&E implementation, nor does it assign M&E implementation a specific rating. The various PIRs also fail to describe M&E activities. According to the TE, independent evaluations of the project have been done, as well as ‘regular monitoring’. However, the evaluation documents have not been made available as part of this TER.

Overall, too little information is available for this TER to be able to assess M&E implementation.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

For this project, the project implementer was the IFC. The TE rates IFC role and contribution to this initiative as satisfactory. This TER rates project execution as moderately satisfactory due to early project
exit, but recognizing the significant contribution of project to the achievement of the planned objectives and the overall good steering and oversight the IFC has provided this project.

Due to several challenges encountered, IFC decided to exit the project before its planned completion. Those challenges came to light early during project implementation, and “the management audit and mid-term review arranged by IFC made recommendations to change PNK’s business plan but the other problems faced by the project did not allow PNK to change fast enough. And despite constant advice and reminders from IFC, many of the difficulties in executing the project had to do with PNK’s inability to separate clearly the conservation project and the business” (TE pp.5-6). This reveals good oversight from the IFC and sustained efforts in trying to bring the project back on track.

IFC also appears to have staffed the project well, apart from the task manager who “changed often, which disrupted project supervision” (TE p.7). Indeed, there was a dedicated consultant who supported the project from the very early stages all the way to project exit, as well as a Program Manager who also stayed for the whole duration of the project, both of which who “proved invaluable to maintain continuity” (TE p.7).

The IFC also succeeded at steering the project towards a for-profit model by being “very firm in the Grant Agreement by making it binding that the commercial revenue had to phase in sufficiently soon and in sufficient amounts or the model would not work” (TE p.13).

IFC “maintained excellent relationships with PNK and TNC (...) but should have consulted with the Government more often, from the start and made sure it was on board. This could have made a significant difference and perhaps prevented the IFC from having to exit the project early.

| 7.2 Quality of Project Execution | Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory |

For this project, the project executing agency was effectively the Komodo National Park (KNP/PNK). The TE does not rate the performance of the KNP in this project. This TER rates project execution as moderately unsatisfactory due to many challenges encountered and unsatisfactorily dealt with, but acknowledging the various successes achieved as part of the project.

The project encountered several issues, most of them external to the KNP. However, in light of those issues, “the management audit and mid-term review arranged by IFC made recommendations to change PNK’s business plan but the other problems faced by the project did not allow PNK to change fast enough.”

Another important project issue was the underachievement in the area of financial sustainability, with the Park profitability not improving as much as expected. According to the TE, “despite constant advice and reminders from IFC, many of the difficulties in executing the project had to do with PNK’s inability to
separate clearly the conservation project and the business” (TE pp.5-6), for example not taking enough remedial action to bring revenues up and costs down.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The project was successful in meeting its conservation objectives. The target 173,000 hectares of land planned to be managed sustainably has been achieved. As a result of the project, “there is little doubt that the status of the iconic species of the KNP, the Komodo dragon, has improved in recent years, in part as the result of advances in scientific understanding brought about by research supported by the initiative, and in part by better management of tourism and land use within the park. This has also been confirmed by the on-going independent evaluation and the regular monitoring reports and scientific publications supported by the project” (TT pp.9-10). The project also allegedly had “significant positive impact on marine and terrestrial conservation in Komodo, as witnessed by the major decrease in destructive fishing practices” (TE p.11).

Beyond local conservation outcomes, the project also was a success in terms of setting a precedent for Public Private Partnerships in conservation. While the Komodo National Park will become private, it started with an NGO and “opened a whole new territory for conservation financing, which can now be further chartered thanks to a wealth of information generated. The concept of the PPP remains fundamentally sound, as confirmed by the final evaluation. “ (TE p.4)

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

To ensure long-term sustainability for this project, a community development grant program and an alternative livelihoods and enterprise development program were set up as a way to keep the local communities on board with the conservation efforts. The grants benefited about 4,000 people and “paid for public facilities (water supply, schools, village meeting halls and clinics) and services (medical, scholarship program). The alternative livelihood and enterprise
development initiatives provided by PNK trained community members in sustainable fisheries, vegetable production, and handicrafts. The project also funded the construction of an Agriculture Training Centre building, fully equipped.” (TE pp.10-11)

The community development grants positively impacted the communities, improving medical care, support for school and the village infrastructure. The alternative livelihood and enterprise development program diversified income opportunities. Some of the new livelihoods supported include a group hatchery and the growing of fresh vegetables.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

There is no evidence of capacity changes having taken place as part of this project, nor was it a project goal.

b) Governance

There is no evidence of governance changes having taken place as part of this project, nor was it a project goal.

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

There is no evidence of unintended impacts having taken place as part of this project.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.
9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

Several lessons are described in the TE (pp.5-8). Here is a summary of the lessons put forward in the TE:

1. “IFC may have overestimated the Government’s support to the project and did not consider a possible change of opinion – this should be more carefully ascertained in the future and not left to the sponsor to do. IFC should monitor this constantly and should intervene.” (TE p.5)
2. “This permanent double task of having to run both a project and a business made it difficult for PNK to focus and consolidate its role. Although it was the only way to initiate the PPP, in the future we should insist to have a pure business play its business role, or have the change occur earlier in the implementation process.” (TE p.5)
3. “Despite the need –and the pressure-- to be comprehensive and integrative, it may have been better to structure the PPP with a more limited set of objectives in mind. Too many things to do took staff time and diverted from the main goal.” (TE p.5)
4. “The collaborative management of the Park has proven to be very positive and can be replicated. This lesson is learned again here, after being learned in all the projects of the IFC “business and biodiversity” portfolio.” (TE p.6)
5. “The necessary move from a pioneering project to a mainstream profit-making operation has not been easy. TNC should have let PNK be managed more as a business and less as a conservation entity, with clearly defined uses of revenues, and, over time, profits. PNK costs should have been reduced sooner and focused on priority issues. The conservation and set-up costs of the collaborative management structure that were paid by the project should not have been considered operational costs of the business entity.” (TE p.6)
6. “We learned that the government should be on board at all times. In that respect, over the course of the 5 years, IFC has left TNC and PNK doing all the contacts –they had a network of lobbyists in place—but we feel IFC should have been more active and use partners such as the WB and the GEF to obtain either the needed compliance with the agreements, or a concrete response. At a minimum, continuous dialogue with the government is key but, in addition, the approach should be diplomatic and inclusive, not antagonistic.” (TE p.6)
7. “Mechanisms should have been put in place for assuring adaptive management of the company finances. PNK should have revised its projections of expected profit excluding the set-up costs of the collaborative management agreement that the project covered.” (TE p.6)
8. “The alternative livelihoods and micro-finance programs were weak and should have been given more attention. In fact, we should learn that it is eventually the local populations that protect any park by their behavior. More attention, but a more focused one, should have been given to them for a much better development result.” (TE pp.6-7)

9. “A capable committed sponsor is key for project success. TNC was strongly committed to the project throughout. However, their effectiveness was hampered by the private sector expertise required and the difficult relationship with the JV partner (who eventually became an obstacle to restructuring the business). This contributed to the difficulties encountered in recruiting and retaining capable managers for PNK who could run it as a lean private entity.” (TE p.7).

10. “This project reinforces a lesson learned from other early-day projects that have been maturing now: client commitment is key. Here, this has played positively. Both TNC and PNK have been strongly committed to the project.” (TE p.7)

11. “Introducing an entrance fee structure has not appeared to lessen the tourism demand; in fact, as the Komodo National Park’s reputation has improved and become more well-known, high-end tourism has increased. This entrance fee has generated above US$1.5 million.” (TE p.7)

The TE states that a separate ‘lessons learned’ has been written. This document has not been made available for the purpose of this TER.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

There are no additional recommendations aside from those included in the ‘recommendations’ section above.
10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>GEF EO comments</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?</td>
<td>The TE is in fact the final PIR, and while outcomes and impact are assessed, no evidence is provided.</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?</td>
<td>The report is simply the final PIR. No evidence is presented and ratings are largely missing. There lacks assessments of key aspects of the project (execution, sustainability, M&amp;E).</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?</td>
<td>The report mentions sustainability issues, but focuses on financial sustainability and does not discuss other potential sustainability risks.</td>
<td>MU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?</td>
<td>Lessons learned appear to be comprehensive. As no evidence is provided in the TE, lessons cannot be said to be ‘supported by evidence’</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?</td>
<td>Yes, all project costs (total and per activity) are included in the TE appendix.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess the quality of the report’s evaluation of project M&amp;E systems:</td>
<td>The report does not mention M&amp;E systems.</td>
<td>HU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

No additional material was used in the preparation of this terminal evaluation report.