

GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form

1. PROJECT DATA				
			Review date:	02/01/2010
GEF Project ID:	1279		at endorsement (Million US\$)	at completion (Million US\$)
IA/EA Project ID:		GEF financing:	1.0	1.0
Project Name:	Gdańsk Cycling Infrastructure Project	IA/EA own:	0	0
Country:	Poland	Government:	1.56	3.77
		Other*:	0.03	0
		Total Cofinancing	1.59	3.77
Operational Program:	OP 11: Sustainable Transport/ Climate Change	Total Project Cost:	2.59	4.77
IA	UNDP	Dates		
Partners involved:	Municipality of Gdańsk, Polish Ecological Club	Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		July 2002
		Closing Date	Proposed: Aug 2004	Actual: Dec 2006
Prepared by:	Reviewed by:	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing (in months): 24	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing (in months): 52 months	Difference between original and actual closing (in months): 28 months
Pallavi Nuka	Ines Angulo			
Author of TE:		TE completion date:	TE submission date to GEF EO:	Difference between TE completion and submission date (in months): 1 month
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* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS AND KEY FINDINGS

Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluation reviews for further definitions of the ratings.

Performance Dimension	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office evaluations or reviews	GEF EO
2.1a Project outcomes	S	HS	N/A	S
2.1b Sustainability of Outcomes	N/A	N/A	N/A	ML
2.1c Monitoring and evaluation	N/A	MS	N/A	MU
2.1d Quality of implementation and Execution	N/A	S	N/A	S
2.1e Quality of the evaluation report	N/A	N/A	N/A	MS

2.2 Should the terminal evaluation report for this project be considered a good practice? Why?

No, while the terminal evaluation report is not well organized. It lacks information actual project costs and the assessment of the project's M&E system is not comprehensive.

2.3 Are there any evaluation findings that require follow-up, such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, mismanagement, etc.?

No such findings were noted in the terminal evaluation report.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

3.1 Project Objectives

a. What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

As stated in the project appraisal document the global environmental objective was to reduce “transport-derived greenhouse gas emissions by developing a model infrastructure facility program in Gdańsk to help individual citizens change their primary mode of transport from cars to bicycles (p. 1).”

There were no changes in this objective during implementation.

b. What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation? (Describe and insert tick in appropriate box below, if yes at what level was the change approved (GEFSEC, IA or EA)?)

The project had several development objectives as follows:

1. Promote cycling as an urban transport mode in order to avoid emissions from cars and to help a more efficient use of public transport.
2. Provide a working example with a one-time investment that will give people a chance to use a safer, less polluting, and more energy-efficient mode of transport.
3. Disseminate the experience and data collected in the project city of Gdańsk among other provinces, local governments, and financial institutions focusing on environment and development to help other local authorities develop similar, cost-efficient infrastructure measures and policies.
4. Remove institutional, legal, cultural, financial, and information/ awareness barriers to wider bicycle use as a means of urban transportation.

The project was broadly divided into two components, the first focusing on construction and the second on increasing public awareness and support for cycling. The *expected outcomes* of the project as stated in the project appraisal document were:

1. Gdańsk core network of cycle routes established.
2. Transport-derived carbon dioxide emissions growth controlled by integrated demand-side management resulting in modal shift towards non-motorized modes (traffic calming and cycling facilities)
3. Environmental awareness and acceptance of bicycles as an alternative means of transport
4. Methodology and management guidelines for cost-efficient modal shift in investment and public communications projects developed.
5. Human and institutional capacity developed to replicate the project throughout Poland and possibly other countries in the region by series of seminars and creation of a consulting and information centre for local governments, regional environmental funding agencies and other interested parties.

There were no changes in the project’s development objective during the course of implementation.

Overall Environmental Objectives	Project Development Objectives	Project Components	Any other (specify)

c. If yes, tick applicable reasons for the change (in global environmental objectives and/or development objectives)

Original objectives not sufficiently articulated	Exogenous conditions changed, due to which a change in objectives was needed	Project was restructured because original objectives were over ambitious	Project was restructured because of lack of progress	Any other (specify)

4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND SUSTAINABILITY

4.1.1 Outcomes (Relevance can receive either a satisfactory rating or a unsatisfactory rating. For effectiveness and cost efficiency a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU will be used)

a. Relevance	Rating: S
The project objectives of reducing barriers to cycling and promoting alternatives to automobile transport are relevant to both GEF and national priorities. The GEF/ Small Grants Program (SGP) has been operating in Poland since 1994 and the Country Strategy has placed a strong emphasis on operational programs that address barriers to sustainable energy	

use. The project outcomes are directly linked to sustainable transport strategies and CO2 emissions reductions.

This project supports the fulfillment of Poland's commitments under the UNFCCC. The Polish government is working with the UNDP to comply with international environmental conventions, particularly those relating to climate change and greenhouse gas mitigation. UNDP is assisting local governments in Poland with the formulation and implementation of Local Agenda 21 sustainable development strategies at the county and municipality levels. Poland's National Environmental Policy is promoting alternative transport as a path to reductions in total greenhouse gas emissions. Non-motorized transport promotion is also one of the priorities of the new National Transport Policy.

b. Effectiveness

Rating: S

The project has achieved all of the expected outcomes for the public awareness and capacity building components. The construction component has been less successful. Only 15 km of bike paths were built rather than the expected 30km, and traffic calming measures were installed on only 30 km of streets rather than 70km. There has been no monitoring of increased bike traffic (or decreased auto use), making it difficult to accurately assess to what extent the project has achieved a modal shift toward cycle transport. The project has made no attempts to measure CO2 reductions.

Based on information in the TE report and APRs, the project has successfully developed the "benchmark" standards for cycling infrastructure in Poland. The project's emphasis on high quality cycling facilities, safety, and innovative design (i.e. the use asphalt surfacing rather than the traditional concrete blocks) has made cycling a viable alternative to the automobile for daily trips through some of the busiest parts of the city. The TE report notes that based on anecdotal evidence the number of cycle trips in Gdańsk has increased by roughly 100% from about 2% to about 4%. The average length of cycle of trips is also estimated to have increased, but the project has not done the traffic counts to provide actual numbers. Traffic calming measures (i.e. one-ways, speed bumps, road narrowing, etc.) installed on 30km of streets have had "noticeable" effect in some areas. (TE, p. 22). Again though, the project has not collected the data to measure actual effects.

The public awareness and public participation component of the project has successfully met all its targets. The public participation and public awareness campaign carried out by OLE involved consulting the local communities and relevant industries. The cycling promotion campaign has reached 70% of city residents and the project initiated Great Bicycle Rides, an annual event, draws about 12,000 (2% of residents) participants. The information dissemination performed by PKE included the creation of knowledge-transfer instruments, workshops and co-operation with NGOs.

Dissemination and capacity building activities include 14 workshops across Poland for municipal agencies and NGOs to help other municipalities replicate this project, and a project Fact Book published in 2006, describing the experiences of the project, the benchmarks in cycling facilities and necessary changes in legal regulations to allow further improvements of conditions for cycling. Project results have also been disseminated internationally through several regional and global conferences on transport and urban design.

The development of a methodology and guidelines for future investments has been effective. The project actively worked with municipal agencies in Kraków and Wrocław, and with national ministries. The project helped these cities prepare similar project proposals and it has also drafted a National Cycling Policy for the Ministry of Transport. These activities have enhanced the human and institutional capacity to support project replication. The project team also proposed a new mechanism, Cycle Audit, implemented in Krakow, which helps promote cycling by requiring other infrastructure investments to be cycling friendly. The project's design standards for cycling infrastructure and the guidelines for planning, designing and implementing cycling infrastructure are documented in the Fact Book.

c. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness)

Rating: MS

The original project timeline was two years, and the budget was \$2.6 Million. The actual project implementation took over 4 years, and the actual costs were over \$4.7 Million. Several factors led to these increases. The original project appraisal document underestimated both the costs of construction in a built-up city center, and the time needed to prepare the construction documents and receive approvals. The ProDoc also did not consider the costs of related construction works required for cycling paths. This led to delays in construction and unstable flows of funding, which tended to compound each other as described below. Moreover, the financial context changed unfavorably during implementation. On May 1st 2004 the national VAT on construction works increased from 7% to 22%. The value of the US dollar dropped by more than 25% during the time of the project, sharply reducing the value of the GEF grant. These cost overruns cut by half the final output of cycling paths constructed.

Project efficiency is rated MS because the project was able to complete 15km of cycle paths with related infrastructure, and achieve most of the non-construction objectives. The project has also had strong impacts in terms of raising the national profile of cycling in urban transport and has helped develop a set of national guidelines for designing cycling

infrastructure.

4.1.2 Impacts: summarize the achieved intended or unintended impacts of the project.

The TE report describes this project a “breakthrough” in the development of urban cycling infrastructure and in cycling promotion at the local and national level. The project has raised the profile of cycling as an urban transport mode and has spurred efforts to replicate the project in other Polish cities. The Best Practices in cycling infrastructure created during the project continues to attract the interest of municipalities, NGOs and traffic engineers in Poland and in the region. The project has increased the technical and organizational capacity of the municipality of Gdańsk concerning the design and construction of cycling facilities. The consulting centre established under this project continues to offer workshops on planning and designing cycling infrastructure, and conducts feasibility studies for towns, cities and regions. As a result of this project, the Gdańsk Multi-year Investment Program for the years 2008-12 includes 130km of segregated cycling paths. Neighboring cities, Sopot, Gdynia, and Tczew, have created their own cycling plans, and in the case of Sopot and Gdynia – combined efforts to link networks of cycling paths. The Ministry of Transport has prepared a national cycling policy based on this project, which includes a number of proposals similar projects with sectoral and regional European Union funds.

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four point scale (4= Likely (no or negligible risk); 3= Moderately Likely (low risk); 2= Moderately Unlikely (substantial risks) to 1= Unlikely (High risk)). The ratings should be given taking into account both the probability of a risk materializing and the anticipated magnitude of its effect on the continuance of project benefits.

a. Financial resources	Rating: ML
There are some risks to the financial sustainability of the project. The municipality of Gdańsk has committed annual funding to completing the remainder of this project, but further expansion of the cycling network is necessary to guarantee the sustainability of the impacts of this project. The municipality of Gdańsk is therefore seeking funding from the national government and the EU to expand the city’s cycling infrastructure through a multi-year investment program. Similar project proposals in other cities have not received funding, so there is some risk that funds to expand the network may not materialize.	
b. Socio political	Rating: ML
Although public support for the project outcomes is very high in the Gdańsk region, it’s not clear to what extent project outcomes are supported by elected officials and the City Council. The NGOs involved in the project are trying to build up broad based political support to ensure the sustainability of project outcomes. The project has a spin-off, the Cities for Bicycles network, which is linking up NGOs and bicycle clubs across cities in order to build a base of political support for cycling infrastructure. Cities for Bicycles is also seeking public-private partnerships with municipalities to promote bicycle transport and design new facilities.	
c. Institutional framework and governance	Rating: ML
Project outcomes have not been sufficiently institutionalized and risks remain in this area. The municipality of Gdańsk has not created an office within the municipal government to consolidate the project outcomes and take the lead on issues related to bicycle transport. The Ministry of Transport commissioned a National Cycling Development Plan concept paper from the team who developed the Gdańsk project, but this plan has not been adopted as policy. Similarly, there are efforts, so far unsuccessful, to have the Cycle Audit Program adopted as part of standard construction practice by municipal and regional agencies.	
d. Environmental	Rating: L
There were no environmental risks to the sustainability of project outcomes noted in the TE report or in the APRs.	

4.3 Catalytic role

a. Production of a public good

In addition to the construction of the bicycle paths, the project has increased institutional and individual capacities in the area of bicycle transport and facility design. Prior to this project, there was little knowledge in Poland about the construction specifications for cycle paths and means for promoting cycling.

b. Demonstration

A Project Consulting Centre serves as an effective tool to disseminate best practices and case studies in traffic engineering generated by the project. The Project Manager and NGO’s involved in the project are working internationally with other interested organizations (cycling user groups, consulting on cycling engineering to municipalities). The project Fact Book and manual provide practical guidelines for municipalities seeking to invest in

cycling infrastructure.
<p>c. Replication There are several proposals seeking to replicate this project in other Polish cities. The project consulting center has already provided best practice examples to the city of Kraków, which introduced a bicycle traffic network in the city's new Master Plan.</p>
<p>d. Scaling up In Gdańsk, there is already some evidence of scaling up. All the new traffic road (street) infrastructure investments have to be considered in relation to cycle paths and the Gdańsk Cycling Project. At the national level, the Ministry of Transport is considering a national cycling policy.</p>

4.4 Assessment of processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

<p>a. Co-financing. To what extent was the reported cofinancing (or proposed cofinancing) essential to achievement of GEF objectives? Were components supported by cofinancing well integrated into the project? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?</p>
<p>The actual level of co-financing of \$3.7 Million by the municipal government far exceeded the proposed co-financing of \$1.6 Million. The main reason for this was the number of related infrastructure adjustments (in sewerage, utilities, sidewalks, curbs, roads, signage, lights, and landscaping) required that were not accounted for in the original project appraisal document budget. The co-financing helped make the bike paths usable and safe for riders and pedestrians, and thus was critical to achieving the project's overall objectives.</p>
<p>b. Delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?</p>
<p>The start of construction was delayed by over a year because the municipality and the executing agency did not have a construction plan and all the related legal approvals when they applied for GEF funding. It took over a year to develop the construction documents, resolve all the property rights questions, and check that the plans met all local codes. These matters might have been resolved earlier if the executing agencies had developed a more detailed construction plan in the project preparation stage. Additionally, some construction work can only be carried out seasonally, something which the project timeline did not account for.</p> <p>Other reasons for delayed project implementation include limited Municipal funds and the Municipal budgeting process. Municipal funds, if not spent by end of the fiscal year, went back to the national government coffers. This hindered the start of some construction activities. Because of the delay, the funds for related activities from UNDP/GEF were not spent in the planned time, hindering the flow of further funds for promotion and public awareness activities. This unstable flow of funds meant that the NGO partners had difficulties retaining project staff, and resuming activities once funds were restored.</p>
<p>c. Country Ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability highlighting the causal links.</p>
<p>Country ownership at the national level facilitated implementation, though this project was clearly a local-level initiative and not a national priority. The national Ministry of Environment (MoE) was officially listed as an EA and provided broad project oversight through the Steering Committee. In the face of numerous delays, the MoE helped to downsize project targets and it supported the year-long project extension.</p>

4.5 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

<p>a. M&E design at Entry Rating (six point scale): MS</p>
<p>The M&E system described in the ProDoc includes an implementation timeline and relevant indicators for each expected outcome. The M&E design clearly set out the roles and responsibilities of each executing agency, and the project manager, in monitoring the progress and impacts of different project activities. The drawbacks of the M&E system are the lack of a log-frame matrix and a set of overly broad indicators, where indicators are sometimes conflated with outputs or outcomes. The ProDoc M&E design does not include mechanisms for monitoring and measuring project impacts on traffic and emissions.</p>
<p>b. M&E plan Implementation Rating (six point scale): MU</p>
<p>The Project Manager was responsible for monitoring progress towards objectives. UNDP-Poland and the Ministry of</p>

<p>Environment provided broad project oversight. Based on information in the TE report, monitoring focused largely on the construction outputs. The progress of traffic calming component was monitored less strictly. There was no monitoring of bicycle trips in the city or the usage of bicycle paths, making it difficult to gauge the extent of project impacts.</p> <p>The TE report notes that during implementation there were modifications to the original logical framework, which were mostly left uncommented by the implementing agency, but this review did not find a logical framework in the project appraisal document.</p>
<p>b.1 Was sufficient funding provided for M&E in the budget included in the project document? No, the project appraisal document did not include specific funding for M&E mechanism or activities.</p>
<p>b.2a Was sufficient and timely funding provided for M&E during project implementation? Unable to assess.</p>
<p>b.2b To what extent did the project monitoring system provided real time feed back? Was the information that was provided used effectively? What factors affected the use of information provided by the project monitoring system?</p> <p>Monitoring of the construction component was effective and provided real time feedback that was used to extend the project timeline and also reduce the scope of outputs.</p>
<p>b.3 Can the project M&E system (or an aspect of the project M&E system) be considered a good practice? If so, explain why.</p> <p>The monitoring of the construction component can be considered a good practice as it provided real time feedback on the progress and quality of outputs.</p>

4.6 Assessment of Quality of Implementation and Execution

<p>a. Overall Quality of Implementation and Execution (on a six point scale): S</p>
<p>b. Overall Quality of Implementation – for IA (on a six point scale): MS</p> <p><i>Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as quality of the project design, focus on results, adequacy of supervision inputs and processes, quality of risk management, candor and realism in supervision reporting, and suitability of the chosen executing agencies for project execution.</i></p> <p>The IA for this project was UNDP-Poland. Based on information in the TE report, the IA provided thorough financial oversight, and adequate management supervision. Based on the APRs, reporting by the IA was candid and realistic. Additional training on UNDP administrative procedures might have been useful for the executing agencies. The TE report notes that the project staff was unclear on UNDP bookkeeping rules, policies on exchange rates, and VAT refunds (p. 13 and p.20). Also, the quality of risk management was poor with regard to the project’s delays and the flow of funds. Due to the delays in implementation, funding flows to the project team during the latter stages of the project were unstable, making it difficult for the NGO partners to pay their staff (p. 20).</p> <p>The strongest part of the project oversight system was the Steering Committee, which grouped national decision-makers and independent experts, with a representation from involved NGOs. The Steering Committee replicated and scaled up to the national level the best practices of the local executing agencies.</p> <p>There were several problems rooted in project design, which hampered the project throughout implementation. The implementing and executing agencies significantly underestimated both the time and resources needed for this project. The project appraisal document devotes just a few paragraphs to the ‘Facility design and construction’ without sufficiently operationalizing these activities. The project’s construction objectives, including preparation of construction documents, approval, and completion of all works, were not achievable in a 24-month period. Based on information in the TE report and the APRs, implementation was also hindered by the complicated management arrangements. The monitoring and evaluation responsibilities of UNDP -Poland, Ministry of Environment and Project Manager had significant overlap. The appointment of a Project Manager without the input of the NGO executing agencies also led to some tensions in the project team.</p>
<p>c. Quality of Execution – for Executing Agencies¹ (rating on a 6 point scale) S</p> <p><i>Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as focus on results, adequacy of management inputs and processes, quality of risk management, and candor and realism in reporting by the executive agency.</i></p>

¹ Executing Agencies for this section would mean those agencies that are executing the project in the field. For any given project this will exclude Executing Agencies that are implementing the project under expanded opportunities – for projects approved under the expanded opportunities procedure the respective executing agency will be treated as an implementing agency.

The EA for this project was the Ministry of Environment and but the project was largely handled by three local-level agencies: the Municipality of Gdańsk, the Civic Environmental League and the Polish Environmental Club. The project manager, selected by the Steering Committee, functioned as coordinator between these three agencies. The project team consisted of the Project Manager, representatives of various departments of the municipality, representatives of the local NGOs, designers, investment administrators and subcontractors.

The quality of execution for this project was satisfactory despite a complicated implementation arrangement and compounded delays. Based on information in the TE report, the two NGO agencies were the prime drivers of this project. They initially proposed the project, and maintained a strong focus on results, making sure that the construction work was of very high quality. They also did an excellent job publicizing the project, building up popular support for cycling, conducting the training workshops, and developing all guidelines. The quality of project outputs is rated highly in the TE report and in the APRs.

Based on information in the TE report, there was some friction, and possibly lack of cooperation, between the NGO executing partners and the first Project Manager selected by the Steering Committee. The NGOs were not consulted in the hiring of the Project Manager, disagreed with the final choice, and viewed the process as insufficiently participatory. This friction between the executing partners very likely contributed to some of the delays in project implementation, but the TE report does not provide evidence about the precise impacts on project execution (p. 15).

The project team has adapted to the challenge of coordinating activities across multiple agencies. Initially, the municipality and the NGOs also had different expectations regarding the quality of the designed infrastructure as well as cost eligibility of works commissioned by the municipality that did not relate directly to the project objectives. The municipality lagged behind in developing and approving construction documents for the project. The project team has managed these problems fairly well. In response to the delay in approving construction documents, the Project Manager provided technical assistance to the municipality on cycle path designs and proposed to the Municipality an alternative, streamlined planning approval process. These differences over eligible works were resolved through extensive coordination meetings and by hiring an independent auditor to verify the cost estimates provided by the municipality.

Management inputs included project management training and financial oversight. The Steering Committee and the IA afforded the NGOs significant latitude in designing the activities to achieve project objectives. The TE report notes that the PKE reported on its publicity activities on a regular basis to the Steering Committee. The reporting by OLE was less regular. The quality of reporting in the APRs is very detailed and internally consistent.

5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assess the project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

a. Briefly describe the key lessons, good practice or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects

1. The best practice combines good transportation analysis, a high level of public participation in technical design, attention to details of design and construction, as well as determination of all involved parties to combat arising challenges. This project benefited from a High level of public participation in project formulation and implementation, including the readiness of the municipality to accept this level of public participation in their investments.
2. Public events can serve to both promote the project, and also expand communication between municipal authorities and the final users of the infrastructure. The active participation of the president of the city in the event and the public debates accompanying the annual Great Bicycle Rides, particularly the ones in 2004 and 2006, with thousands of participants and good media coverage is a good example of such events.
3. NGOs and all project partners should be involved in the start-up phase of the Project, in particular recruitment of the PM and establishing his position. The weak position and poor performance of the Project Manager for this project can be tied to the lack of involvement of NGOs at the project's start.
4. The risk assessment in the project appraisal document took into account many possible threats, including for example cultural limitations and bicycle market. However, one important risk was not accounted for -- the shift of the supply-demand balance in the market for design and construction of roads. The shift could cause both delays and increase of the costs of planned works and threaten the final output. This is an important lesson for future GEF projects involving construction to consider possible price shifts in material, labor, and currency markets, and include allowances for such shifts in projected budgets and timelines.
5. In project design more attention should be paid to diverse kinds of cycling facilities. For example the Guidelines for Cycle Audit and Cycle Review, published by the United Kingdom Department for Transport, recommend a hierarchy of measures to select the appropriate design solution. Although in many cases segregated cycling

facilities may be the only appropriate solution, they should be treated as the last, not the first resort. As demonstrated in the case of the contraflow lane in Kraków, sometimes significant improvement in conditions for cycling can be attained by 10% of costs of building an off-road cycle path.

b. Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation

1. A project of this scope should be allotted more time. Given the current legal context, 24 months is a very tight schedule for just the design and construction of the infrastructure, and most of promotion and information dissemination should be done after the construction is completed. Even small-scale construction projects of this type should include two phases of funding. The first for a planning & design stage to resolve zoning and land acquisition issues and finalize construction plans. The second for the actual construction.
2. If similar projects are to be realized in the future, the problem of costs of related infrastructure works - such as reconstruction of pavement or modernization of traffic lights - should be addressed. On the one hand separating these works from the construction of cycle paths would lead to inefficient use of public money (from the point of view of the municipality) or decreasing the quality of the cycling path, on the other - expenses directly related to project goals should be given a clear priority. This could be for example by having the costs clearly separated and with different degrees of required co-financing.
3. Involvement of independent NGOs representing the final users' perspective, able to constructively criticize technical designs, should be a pre-requisite for transportation related projects, to ensure proper quality of the project.
4. GEF should consider encouraging more realistic formulation of project document and objectives. Projects can be either highly innovative and with synergistic effects or precise in output prediction. Meeting both criteria at the same time is more a matter of luck than careful planning.

6. QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings based on other information sources such as GEF EO field visits, other evaluations, etc.

No other sources were consulted.

Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluations review for further definitions of the ratings. Please briefly explain each rating.

6.2 Quality of the terminal evaluation report	Ratings
<p>a. To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives? The report contains a largely comprehensive, but poorly organized, assessment of the project outcomes and impacts relative to the objectives stated in the ProDoc.</p>	MS
<p>b. To what extent the report is internally consistent, the evidence is complete/convincing and the IA ratings have been substantiated? Are there any major evidence gaps? The report is internally consistent, with no significant gaps in evidence. The report substantiates the IA ratings in the last APR.</p>	S
<p>c. To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy? The report contains a general discussion of project sustainability, but does not an assessment of risks.</p>	MS
<p>d. To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive? The lessons learned are comprehensive and well supported by the evidence from the project experience.</p>	S
<p>e. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? The project includes actual co-financing used, but no information on actual project costs.</p>	MU
<p>f. Assess the quality of the reports evaluation of project M&E systems?</p>	MS

7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRERATATION OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REVIEW REPORT EXCLUDING PIRs, TERMINAL EVALUATIONS, PAD.

