

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2013

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		1348	
GEF Agency project ID		75776 (P103189 TF55745, TF55763, TF57678, TF90543, TF57778, TF56693)	
GEF Replenishment Phase		GEF-3	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank, FAO	
Project name		Africa Stockpiles Program, P1	
Country/Countries		Ethiopia, Morocco, Mali, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia	
Region		Africa	
Focal area		Persistent Organic Pollutants	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		OP 14	
Executing agencies involved		FAO, WWF	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Secondary executing agency – WWF, CropLife International	
Private sector involvement		Consultations	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		08-Sep-2005	
Effectiveness date / project start		21-Nov-2005	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		30-Jun-2011	
Actual date of project completion		31-May-2013	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	0.7	0.3
	Co-financing	1.325	
GEF Project Grant		25	19.6
Co-financing	IA/EA own	2.8	2.7
	Government	3.8	2.7
	Other*	28.4	(N/A) 11.3 (Confirmed in TE)
Total GEF funding		25.7	19.6
Total Co-financing		36.325	16.7
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		62.025	36.6
Terminal evaluation/review information			

TE completion date	10-Oct-2013
TE submission date	
Author of TE	Dinesh Aryal
TER completion date	2/23/2013
TER prepared by	Pallavi Nuka
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)	Joshua Schneck

*Includes contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development, cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector, and beneficiaries.

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	MU	MU	Not rated	MU
Sustainability of Outcomes	NA	Moderate	Not rated	MU
M&E Design	NA	U	Not rated	MS
M&E Implementation	NA	MU	Not rated	MU
Quality of Implementation	MU	MU	Not rated	MU
Quality of Execution	NA	MS	Not rated	MU
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	NA		Not rated	HS

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The GEO of the project was to reduce the environmental and human health threats posed by stockpiles of obsolete pesticides across Africa. At the time of project preparation the quantity of publicly-held obsolete pesticides, including Persistent Organic Pollutants, was estimated at 50,000 tons. Although these chemicals are no longer effective for controlling pests, due to resistance buildup, they remain potent chemical toxins and thus still need to be managed and disposed properly.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

As noted in the original project brief (2002), the Development Objective (DO) of this first phase of the Africa Stockpiles Program, was to dispose of current stockpiles of obsolete pesticides in up to seven countries; to establish or strengthen as necessary prevention programs to help ensure that the problem does not recur; and to prepare an additional eight to ten countries for undertaking clean up and disposal operations under the second phase project. This DO was unchanged in the subsequent PADs for individual countries.

The original program design had 4 components:

- 1) Country Programs lasting 2-4 years each to cleanup and help prevent the re-emergence of stockpiles of obsolete pesticides;
- 2) Technical Support designed to drive the technical implementation and ensure consistency of the program across countries (FAO Component Project);
- 3) A series of cross-cutting activities designed to ensure the long term sustainability and ownership of the program across the continent; and
- 4) Overall program coordination.

National level projects typically had 4 components:

1. Disposal of obsolete stockpiles
2. Prevention of accumulation
3. Capacity building (except in Mali)
4. Project management

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

According to the WB ICR, program components were not formally revised through a World Bank-approved restructuring. However, the projects for four ASP-P1 country projects (Ethiopia, South Africa, Tanzania and Tunisia) underwent design adjustments, including revision of Development Objectives, to be more country specific.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: Satisfactory
----------------------	-----------------------------

The program is strongly tied to national and regional priorities regarding POPs management. Several African regional workshops, including the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS), the First Continental Conference (2001) on hazardous waste management, and the adoption of the Rabat Declaration by the African Conference of Environment Ministers (2002), have highlighted the need better manage obsolete pesticides. The seven countries initially participating in ASP-P1, i.e., Ethiopia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, have ratified the Stockholm Convention on POPs. Each participating country expressed the need for technical support on eliminating stockpiles.

Program activities supported implementation of the Stockholm Convention on POPs. The program was also directly linked to GEF OP14 to reduce the impact of POPs on the global food chain, pollution of transboundary waters, land and biodiversity.

4.2 Effectiveness	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
--------------------------	--

Both the FAO TE report and the WB ICR rate effectiveness or achievement of the development objective as moderately unsatisfactory. Based on the evidence presented in these reports, this TER also agrees with the moderately unsatisfactory rating. The program made some progress on disposal of pesticide stockpiles and was successful in raising public awareness on the health and environmental hazards of pesticides and encouraging safe pesticide handling through various outreach activities. However, the goal of not accumulating new obsolete pesticide stockpiles was not achieved, and the expected technical support was only partially delivered. The goal of launching a second phase of the Africa Stockpiles Program was also not achieved.

The WB ICR estimates that a total of 3,164 of the inventoried 8,949 tons of publicly held obsolete pesticides and associated waste were eliminated overseas in an environmentally and technically sound manner by contracted specialized companies and in-line with national and international regulations having significantly reduced risks to the environment and public health.

The program’s efforts eventually resulted in complete disposal of the inventoried and publicly held obsolete pesticides in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Tunisia. In South Africa, where obsolete pesticides were predominantly privately held, the project was able eliminating approximately 100 tons of obsolete pesticides in a pilot province.

Program and project activities did little to address the issue of preventing future build-ups. There was no work done on regulations, enforcement, or pesticide management practices. According to the WB ICR, the original target of not accumulating new obsolete pesticide stockpiles and associated waste was not measurable. At appraisal, the participating countries contained an estimated 4,750 tons of obsolete pesticides. During implementation another 800 tons were discovered. The WB ICR notes that it is difficult to assess whether further stockpiles were accumulated during program implementation or whether the difference resulted from inaccurate estimates at the time of appraisal.”

Based on information in the WB ICR and the FAO TE report, the communication and awareness raising activities coordinated by WWF were successful. The WWF established and maintained a website, trained national communications focal points, published newsletters and educational booklets, and developed radio and video shorts. National communication strategies were also developed but adopted in only 4 countries. NGO outreach included workshops, training sessions, and dissemination of manuals and handbooks on pesticide management and environmental monitoring.

The program’s technical support unit (TSU), hosted by FAO in Rome, was supposed to provide technical support and capacity building at the national and regional levels. There was a separate project brief submitted to GEF for this aspect of the program (see project documents in PMIS), but the TSU project document was not a stand-alone project document. The FAO TE report describes the TSU sub-project as a ‘qualified success’. The TSU was able to provide some technical expertise and training at both the country and regional levels, but only after severe delays, and not at the level to be expected from the project brief. The WB ICR also notes that the TSU was not as effective as expected, “particularly in the areas of M&E, and preparation of contracts (e.g., preparation of technical specification and carrying out technical evaluations for project consultants and contractors).” After 2010, the World Bank financed its own technical experts and international consultants to work with participating governments.

The planned Project Coordination Unit (PCU) did not become operational due to a lack of capacity within the African Union’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). As a result there was no enhancement of regional capacity to manage disposal initiatives.

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
-----------------------	--

The WB ICR rates efficiency as Moderately Unsatisfactory, because “while 75% of GEF resources were disbursed, only 37% of the targeted inventoried publicly held obsolete pesticides and associated waste were disposed of at closing.” This rating is supported based on the evidence presented on program implementation and results. The program closed 2-years later than expected, with few achievements and essentially no results (zero waste disposed) in 2 out of 6 countries.

Both the WB ICR and FAO TE report cite the poor management of the project. Moreover, the ICR points to the many difficulties in evaluating this program: “(i) No accurate quantitative data were available on the financial and human resources invested in the program’s preparation by any of the partners; (ii) with an envisaged PCU that never became operational, there was no M&E of the resources spent by FAO

available to the World Bank, and thus no accurate data available; and (iii) the World Bank budgeting system made it difficult to adequately capture allocated funds and associated expenditures of a regional program with sub-projects, ultimately causing high transaction costs and inaccurate reporting. In addition, efficiency of capacity building and prevention activities is difficult to quantify due to time disconnect between project support and actual results.”

The FAO TE report rates efficiency as Moderately Satisfactory based on the performance of the Technical Support Unit, but the evidence presented does not provide strong support for this rating. Given the limited achievement of outcomes and objectives, and the delays in implementation, the rating should be lower. The TSU operations also had very high costs for full-time staff and overhead (close to 70% of GEF grant funding) while most of the outputs (trainings, guidelines, preparation of disposal activities) appear to have been carried out by consultants. After 2010, the World Bank just hired consultants and independent experts to fill the TSU role at lower cost. The FAO TE report does not provide first-hand accounts of the quality of project management in the TSU, but does note the TSU’s “lack of success in improving communications and collaboration among ASP partners.”

4.4 Sustainability	Rating: Moderately Unlikely
---------------------------	------------------------------------

The FAO TE report rates sustainability as ‘Moderately Unsatisfactory’ without any assessment of risks. The WB ICR considers risks to development outcomes at the country level.

Financial (MU): A joint WB-FAO proposal submitted to GEF in 2010 for APS -2 was rejected due to lack of funds and the poor progress evidenced under this program. Ethiopia, Tanzania, Tunisia, and South Africa have mobilized resources (public and private) to continue some activities related to management and disposal of pesticide stockpiles. Morocco and Mali have no committed funding to continue activities to safeguard and dispose of pesticides.

Socio-political (ML): The project has been successful in raising awareness among the general public, policymakers, and the agricultural sector. CLI, the pesticide industry association, was an active project partner towards the end of project, indicating private sector interest in sustainably managing and preventing re-accumulation of pesticides. In Ethiopia, Tanzania, Tunisia, and South Africa, governments have expressed commitment to sustaining project outcomes. In Mali, the recent conflict in 2012-2013 and the government’s focus on agricultural intensification pose serious risks to the outcomes from this project.

Institutional (ML): The project has enhanced national technical capacity through training courses, workshops, and provision of manuals and handbooks. Regulatory and legal frameworks for pesticide management were improved in Ethiopia, Mali, Morocco, Tanzania, and Tunisia. Hazardous waste transportation practices were improved in Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Tunisia. All countries participated in developing social and environmental impact assessments and pesticide management plans.

Environmental (L): No environmental risks were noted in the WB ICR or FAO TE report.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Complete information on actual cofinancing was not available at the time of the WB ICR, but the available information is summarized here. The WB contributed 2.7 M in cash (as estimated at appraisal) through the Development Grant Facility (DGF). The Canada Trust Fund contributed 2.3 M in parallel financing as expected. The French Global Environment Facility contributed 1.7 M (expected 1.8M) and the Netherlands 1.0 M as expected. Parallel financing from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund was 4.2 M, about 60% of the 7.1 M estimated at appraisal. The African Development Bank was supposed to contribute 10.0 M, but dropped out of the project. CropLife International, provided 2.1 in parallel financing and in-kind assistance. The FAO contributed 0.762 M in-kind to the Technical Support Project.

Participating countries provided in-kind cofinancing. Based on information in the WB ICR, in-kind contributions from Mali (0.98 M), Tanzania (0.65 M), and Tunisia (0.67 M), all exceeded appraisal estimates. Ethiopia's in-kind contribution of 0.428 M matched the appraisal estimate. Cofinancing data for Morocco and South Africa was not available at the time of the TE report.

Cofinancing from the various donors was critical in supporting disposal activities across all the countries. Disposal of obsolete pesticides was the major program and project cost. Based on the information in the WB ICR, CropLife International (CLI) provided 'Technical Advisors for Disposal' who guided the disposal activities in all participating countries.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Based on information in the WB ICR and the FAO TE report, the program implementation was delayed by about two years largely due to poor project management:

- The project coordination unit (PCU) was never setup, because the host agency New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) did not have the capacity.
- The Program Steering Committee (SC), intended to serve as an advisory and monitoring structure, was never established.
- An Implementation Committee (ASPIC) was created as a forum for partners (i.e., FAO, CLI, PAN-UK, WWF, and the World Bank) to oversee program implementation, but was never formalized, making for unclear roles and responsibilities.
- Differences of opinion regarding applicable rules and procedures led to massive delays and sometimes stoppages of work at country level. For the FAO's Technical Support Unit (TSU), WB rules and procedures were burdensome and did not account for the varying capacities of participating countries. In 2010, as FAO had exhausted its GEF funds and significantly minimized its support to the participating countries, the World Bank essentially took sole lead, through technical and operational consultants funded by the MDTF.
- There were also delays in the recruitment of qualified technical advisers on disposal (TADs) via CLI, which consequently held up the start of disposal activities.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

Based on the information in the WB ICR and the FAO TE, all participating countries expressed a strong commitment to the goals of the program. Given the confusion and poor coordination of the program the ownership of governments in the project has varied. According to the FAO TE, “it is clear that disposal of obsolete pesticides has remained relatively high on government agendas: even if the original ambitious plans concerning disposal have not been met, activities are continuing and improvements are being made.”

The WB ICR assesses ‘Borrower Performance’ rather than country ownership.

6. Assessment of project’s Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
------------------------------------	--

The program’s PAD had a complex M&E system, including a results framework (including indicators for the DO), and an outline of responsibilities and means of verification. Country specific M&E plans and logical frameworks were not formulated, but some country-specific output indicators were identified. Full baseline information on stockpiles is not presented in the results framework. Inventories were expected to be done 6-months into the project.

There was considerable overlap in M&E responsibilities. At the program level, the TSU was responsible for technical M&E. The TSU was expected to exercise M&E via a series of programs missions to each ASP-1 country. The process of monitoring and oversight at the country level was supposed to assist the PCU in the successful implementation and execution of each of the country projects.

Project implementation monitoring was also under the purview of an ‘Independent Project Monitor’ to be hired by the PCU. Further program level monitoring and supervision was to be carried out by the WB’s ASP unit. At the country level, the national project management teams were responsible for overall project monitoring (technical results and implementation), and were required to submit data to the TSU and PCU.

6.2 M&E Implementation	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
-----------------------------------	--

Based on the information in the WB ICR and the FAO TE report, M&E implementation was very weak.

Initially the TSU and the WB assisted countries in setting up an M&E system for project implementation at country level. But the national M&E systems were not operational until 2009, 4 years into the project. According to the FAO TE report, “ultimately M&E requirements were defined by and data was gathered in the context of WB supervisory missions – no independent TSU reports detailing achievements, issues, outstanding actions, work-plan for the coming period and lessons learnt (as stipulated in the TSU project

document) were produced.” In 2011, modified results frameworks were introduced in 4 countries as part of restructuring. According to the WB ICR, this strengthened project M&E in those countries.

Furthermore, the failure to establish the PCU meant that there was no systematic monitoring or reporting at the program level throughout implementation, aside from a few WB financial reports and ad-hoc PIRs.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
--	--

Based on the information in the WB ICR and FAO TE report, project implementation was quite weak, due to a flawed design, failure to adapt to the reality of implementation, lack of coordination and cooperation between project partners, and absence of senior management intervention from the FAO and World Bank to push the project back on track. As the FAO TE report notes, this should have been a ‘flagship program for all concerned agencies.’

The project suffered from overly complicated arrangements for implementation with 3 different units (FAO-TSU, NEPAD-PCU, and WB-ASP team), which were affiliated with different organizations and agencies. The overlapping responsibilities and clear chain of accountability made it difficult to get the program off the ground. Furthermore, the lack of capacity in NEPAD that prevented the establishment of the PCU should have been identified at the project preparation stage. The WB ICR rates “World Bank performance in ensuring quality at entry” as Moderately Unsatisfactory due to lack of country-specific results frameworks, lengthy preparation, and insufficient attention to specifying and defining the collaboration including oversight, and roles and responsibilities of each partner involved.”

The WB ICR also rates quality of supervision and overall performance as Moderately Unsatisfactory. According to the ICR, the project was delayed by over three years because of the conflicting implementation arrangements and failure to establish the PCU. During those three years the Bank did not take any action to get the project back on track. It was only in 2008 that a joint FAO-WB memo clarified roles and responsibilities. The ICR also notes that the Bank was not administratively equipped this type of umbrella program. Even within the WB itself, there were conflicting and overlapping implementation and supervisory structures.

Nevertheless, the ICR finds that financial management was satisfactory. Disbursement was slow, due to slow implementation, but World Bank provided adequate oversight on the use of funds through missions, progress reviews, financial reports, and national project audits.

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
---	-----------------------------------

At the program level, execution was very weak due to confusion over roles and responsibilities. The WB ICR finds that the technical assistance countries were expected to receive from the TSU “was not

provided to the extent foreseen in the PAD, particularly in the areas of M&E, and preparation of contracts (e.g., preparation of technical specification and carrying out technical evaluations for project consultants and contractors). This lack of technical support was compensated with technical experts, temporarily funded by the World Bank, and the recruitment of TADs financed by CLI.” The TSU response to the ICR notes that they were “actively prevented” from assisting countries in developing tenders for disposal because they were “told by the WB that this would be a conflict of interest.” According to the FAO TE report, the TSU sometimes acted unilaterally “against the stated recommendations of World Bank staff or consultants to reduce high risks from obsolete pesticides that had been identified in ASP projects. In Tunisia, FAO undertook to safeguard 50 tons of DDT that had been found in the grounds of a hospital; in Mali the TSU removed and destroyed 70 tons of dieldrin that were found to be leaking in a store in Gao.”

8. Lessons and recommendations

8.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

WB ICR:

1. For multi-stakeholder projects, formalized and defined roles and responsibilities for all partners and their collaboration need to be agreed and operationalized prior to project effectiveness.
2. Concise time and budget bound Terms of Reference (TORs) for all partners, and a clearly defined oversight and coordination entity would have greatly improved project design and implementation.
3. ASP-P1 would have benefited from a design that (i) defined envisaged outcomes and PDOs at the program-level, and (ii) individually-tailored PDOs at the country-level. The uniform approach ASP-P1 applied to all participating countries caused significant delays and transactions costs, and is not desirable.
4. Project plans should recognize the complexity of project tasks. Project activities such as a national inventory and a CESA proved to be lengthy processes.
5. The participation of adequate technical experts is crucial during program preparation and implementation.
6. Knowledge exchange between participating countries of a regional project should be facilitated.
7. The PCU did not become operational due to a lack of capacity within NEPAD, the entity that had been selected to host the unit. Consequently, ASP-P1 was not successful in strengthening regional capacity for management of future program-related activities.

FAO TE Report:

1. The project design for the TSU support work to the ASP was deeply flawed. The TSU project document was not a stand-alone project document: core parts of the project logic were borrowed from the ASP program document – the performance indicator were taken from the overall ASP targets; the TSU was never meant to be a separate project in itself. This resulted in an inconsistent definition of the TSU role.

2. The governance and oversight mechanisms in the overall ASP program were not clearly defined, and TSU performance and effectiveness suffered as a result. The actual governance structures in ASP (ASPIC and the Stakeholder Forum) were apparently never formalized or adequately communicated either. The FAO and WB "components" of the ASP program went their separate ways and worked more or less in isolation from each other.
3. Opportunities to come to terms with an unsatisfactory situation (for example, the 2008 evaluation report) apparently went unheeded: a highly visible program such as ASP would have benefited from senior management intervention – but this unfortunately did not happen in the ASP.

8.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

FAO TE report:

1. Multi-agency projects are by definition more complex than single-donor, single-agency projects. During the design phase of future multi-agency activities, special care therefore needs to be given to the review and consultation process.
2. Likewise, design and implementation shortcomings can under normal circumstances be identified and rectified, for example through a competent M&E system, functioning governance arrangements, and stakeholder workshops. In ASP, although these elements existed, they were not enough to prevent the deterioration of the working relationships. Future projects, especially if they involve multi-agency collaboration, should make sure that the project approach and management set-up is validated not too long after project launch, and throughout implementation.
3. A potential flagship project – such as ASP – needs high-level attention. Although it appears that senior management in all involved institutions were at various stages aware of delays and coordination issues in ASP, there was not enough demonstrated commitment by senior management to keep the project on track. Future projects should design key events where senior management can be briefed on progress and exercise a certain amount of oversight.

9. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE report provides a detailed and comprehensive assessment of outcomes and impact relative to project objectives.	HS
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	No inconsistencies were noted in the report, and the ratings are substantiated by the evidence presented on implementation at the program and country levels.	S

To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The report considers risks to sustainability along various dimensions at both the program and country level.	HS
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons learned are comprehensive and well supported by the evidence.	HS
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	Actual total and per activity costs, and cofinancing amounts are presented. The report did not have access to some financial information such as the costs from the FAOs' TSU and some cofinancing information.	S
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	Both M&E at entry and M&E implementation are assessed at program and country levels.	S
Overall TE Rating		HS

10. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

WB: IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT FOR THE AFRICA STOCKPILES PROGRAM, PROJECT 1 (TF55745, TF55763, TF57678, TF90543, TF57778, TF56693) - Ethiopia, Mali, Morocco, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia. Report No: ICR00002682

WB: Project Document on a Proposed Grant from the GEF Trust Fund in the Amount of US\$13.5 million to the Republic of Mali, United Republic of Tanzania, and the Kingdom of Morocco in Support of the First Phase of the US\$21.7 million Africa Stockpile Program, Project 1. 2006. P103189

WB: Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant from the GEF Trust Fund in the Amount of US\$1.7 million and US\$4.0 million, respectively, to South Africa and Tunisia in Support of the First Phase of the US\$21.7 million Africa Stockpile Program, Project 1. 2005. Report No: 32232-MNA

WB: Project Brief for "Regional (Botswana, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia): Africa Stockpiles Program – 1st Phase." 2002.

FAO: Project Document on Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Program (ASP). GCP/INT/979/GFF

FAO: Terminal Evaluation of the Technical Support Unit to the Africa Stockpiles Program (ASP). GCP/INT/979/GFF