

GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form

1. PROJECT DATA				
		Review date:		02/03/2010
GEF Project ID:	1446		at endorsement (Million US\$)	at completion (Million US\$)
IA/EA Project ID:	PIMS 1869	GEF financing:	1	0.92
Project Name:	Conservation and Sustainable Use of Peruvian Amazonian Biodiversity by the Ashaninka Indigenous Population.	IA/EA own:	0.0	0.01
Country:	Peru	Government:	0.00	0.00
		Other*:	0.56	0.3
		Total Cofinancing	0.56	0.31
Operational Program:	OP3 Forest ecosystems	Total Project Cost:	1.56	1.23
IA	UNDP	Dates		
Partners involved:	PROCAM (Amazonian Promotion and Training Team),	Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		October 2004
		Closing Date	Proposed: 10/2008	Actual: 10/2008
Prepared by: Ines Angulo	Reviewed by: Neeraj Negi	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing (in months): 48	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing (in months): 48	Difference between original and actual closing (in months): 0
Author of TE: Jorge Malleux Heinrich Helberg		TE completion date: November 2008	TE submission date to GEF EO: November 2009	Difference between TE completion and submission date (in months): 12

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS AND KEY FINDINGS

Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluation reviews for further definitions of the ratings.

Performance Dimension	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office evaluations or reviews	GEF EO
2.1a Project outcomes	MS	MS	-	MS
2.1b Sustainability of Outcomes	N/A	MU	-	MU
2.1c Monitoring and evaluation	N/A	N/A	-	U
2.1d Quality of implementation and Execution	NA	NA	NA	MS
2.1e Quality of the evaluation report	N/A	N/A	-	MS

2.2 Should the terminal evaluation report for this project be considered a good practice? Why?

No. Although the TE includes a comprehensive analysis of project implementation it has weak points. For example there is confusion between effectiveness and efficiency when evaluating project outcomes, and there isn't a cost-benefit analysis at activity level.
The document itself is very lengthy and not very "user-friendly" as it does not include an index table and it's not easy to go thru all the information it contains. .

2.3 Are there any evaluation findings that require follow-up, such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, mismanagement, etc.?

No.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

3.1 Project Objectives

a. What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

According to the project appraisal document, the project GEO is to “conserve globally significant biodiversity within Asháninka territories and surrounding state forestlands under community management”.

There were no changes to the GEO.

b. What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

According to the project appraisal document, the DO is to provide alternative livelihood opportunities that benefit local inhabitants and reduce pressure on natural resources.

There were no changes to the DO. However, some changes approved by the implementing agency (UNDP) were made in the expected outcomes during implementation. Outcome 3 “Establishment of systems for conservation and management of biodiversity within existing state forestlands and protected areas” was changed to “Ashaninka organizations and the State apply models for adequate management of the Ashaninka Communal Reservations (ACR) and for Otishi National Park (ONP).” The PRODOC was changed because it took a long time to be approved (five years) and the Protected Natural Areas - Otishi National Park and the Ashaninka Communal Reservation- had already being created.

A substantial difference between the Logical Framework from the PRODOC, and the 2005 Logical Framework is that the last one does not consider the colonist (migrant farmers) population as participants and project beneficiaries. The reason is that the colonists (migrant farmers) only work on small pieces of lands with no forest linked with agrarian activities.

Outputs: Originally, interventions were projected in 110 Native Communities but this number was reduced to 64 (with different degrees of intervention) because the PRODOC had been overambitious considering the time and funds available.

(describe and insert tick in appropriate box below, if yes at what level was the change approved (GEFSEC, IA or EA)?)

Overall Environmental Objectives	Project Development Objectives	Project Components		Any other (specify)
		X (Outcomes)		X (Outputs)
c. If yes, tick applicable reasons for the change (in global environmental objectives and/or development objectives)				
Original objectives not sufficiently articulated	Exogenous conditions changed, due to which a change in objectives was needed	Project was restructured because original objectives were over ambitious	Project was restructured because of lack of progress	Any other (specify)
	X	X		

4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND SUSTAINABILITY

4.1.1 Outcomes (Relevance can receive either a satisfactory rating or a unsatisfactory rating. For effectiveness and cost efficiency a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU will be used)

a. Relevance

Rating: S

Project outcomes are relevant to the GEF OP3 – Forest Ecosystems:

- Protected areas: Forest community reserves have been demarcated through a participatory process

<p>inside the Ashaninka communities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Threat removal: Alternative sources of income (cacao cultivation) reduces their incentive to sell timber (one of the few sources of income) inside Ashaninka territory. - Sectoral integration: The improvement of traditional agroforestry systems has improved basic food availability for Ashaninka families. - Institutional strengthening: (i) the project supported the capacity building of Eco Ashaninka which has signed an agreement with INRENA to be the Administration Contract Executor of the Ashaninka Communal Reservation, (ii) local indigenous facilitators have been trained, (iii) Ashaninka producers organizations and Forest Committees have been set up. <p>Project outcomes are relevant to Peru because the project has been implemented in an area (Region of Junín and Pasco) where:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the advance of the agricultural frontier is very active, but at the same time important national parks and indigenous territories in good conservation status exist; - Ashaninka communities were seriously affected (loss of lives and livelihoods) by the terrorism violence between 1980 and 1995; this project intended to help them in managing their resources better to positively affect their livelihoods. 	
b. Effectiveness	Rating: MS
<p>The project technical team reported that the project was able to successfully implement 77% of its planned activities (mentioned in the final PIR), but the TE concludes that the project was less effective in achieving its expected outcomes.</p> <p>This is partly due to the uneven progress in the project's expected results, some of which have surpassed the proposed goals (such as the establishment of agroforestry systems, and awareness raising) and others, on the contrary, which have had little or no progress (creation of the Master Plan for the indigenous lands). To have met the objective it would have been necessary to address those results related to improving the management of protected areas and management of indigenous forest areas. To achieve this it would have been necessary to coordinate and establish agreements with INRENA, something which the project team was unable to achieve before project closure.</p> <p>As follow up to the midterm evaluation there was a Logical Framework review. The project's implementation strategy and focus was revised for the time remaining for the project at a tripartite meeting in July 2007; an implementation strategy to address this issue was developed. However, despite all technical advice the project continued with a slow pace of achievement for a number of the results of the agreed strategy.</p>	
c. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness)	Rating: MS
<p>The TE presents a cost-benefit analysis at outcome level, and concludes that the project efficiency was "medium" but does not provide an explanation on the considerations taken/methodology used for this rating. A more exhaustive assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the project outputs and activities isn't possible due to the lack of a detailed implementation budget.</p>	

4.1.2 Impacts: summarize the achieved intended or unintended impacts of the project.

<p>Due to the magnitude of the environmental and socioeconomic challenges of the Peruvian Amazon, the project's duration and budget were insufficient to achieve a significant impact on its rationale and objective: 1) conservation of biodiversity, and 2) alternative income opportunities to improve local inhabitants' livelihoods and reduce pressure on natural resources.</p> <p>Nevertheless the project achieved socioeconomic impacts such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The establishment of cacao cultivation in agroforestry systems (which led to the abandonment of slash-and-burn and contour-slope cultivation), and the creation of community producers associations organized under the Producers Association of the Tambo River. This is expected to increase income availability among Ashaninka families reducing pressure on natural resources, mostly timber, which at the moment is one of the few sources of income. - Changes in perception among Ashaninka communities on the importance of setting aside territory for conservation: (i) approximately 20,000 ha in 17 communities were set aside as Community Reserves, and (ii) community management committees have been set up.

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four

point scale (4= Likely (no or negligible risk); 3= Moderately Likely (low risk); 2= Moderately Unlikely (substantial risks) to 1= Unlikely (High risk)). The ratings should be given taking into account both the probability of a risk materializing and the anticipated magnitude of its effect on the continuance of project benefits.

a. Financial resources	Rating: L
<p>Various stakeholders have shown interest in continuing related activities in the area after project completion:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Agrarian Agency of Satipo, the Municipality of the District of Río Tambo (Province of Satipo) and the Producers Association of Río Tambo (Central de Productores del Río Tambo) plan to sign an agreement to strengthen the sustainability of agroforestry plantations among the communities of Río Tambo. However, the technical assistance previously provided by the Municipality of Río Tambo has been inadequate. District Municipalities have available funds to support productive activities. - PROCAM has the possibility to obtain additional donor funds, such as from the organization Agro Acción Alemana, which already contributed US\$ 300,000 to this project. - INRENA and PROFONANPE (through the WB/GEF project “Strengthening of Biodiversity Conservation Through the National Protected Areas Program - PRONANP”) and the IANP (through the WB/GEF project “Indigenous Management of Protected Areas – PIMA”) have funds to support the management of the Ashaninka Communal Reservation and the Otishi National Park by indigenous Administration Contract Executors such as Eco Ashaninka. 	
b. Socio political	Rating: ML
<p>The project has set up community producers associations, community forest reserves committees, and the Producers Association of Río Tambo. However, these organizations have minimum negotiation skills and the evaluators consider that their consolidation could take as long as ten years.</p> <p>20 local indigenous facilitators – which were welcomed and respected among the Ashaninka communities – were trained by the project. These facilitators have received a formal certification and can be potentially hired by the Municipalities to continue their work with the support of the Agrarian Agency. These facilitators have been trained on the establishment and management of cacao plantations, but further training on pest control, harvest, post-harvest and commercialization is needed.</p> <p>Through the programs broadcasted by Radio Amazónica and the group Ashaninkas Creando, the project has generated a positive public opinion towards biodiversity conservation and the Ashaninka culture. This is crucial so that governmental authorities have a positive and open attitude towards Ashaninka indigenous organizations. However, the impact of the Radio Amazónica and Ashaninkas Creando is threatened due to their lack of financial sustainability.</p> <p>A weakness of the project has been the non-establishment of a Consultative Technical Committee (Steering Committee) that should have comprised representatives of APCI, PROFONANPE, CONAM, IANP and Second-Tier Ashaninka Organizations. Even if those organizations wouldn't have play a role in the management of the project, they could have provided technical advice and could have taken on the continuation of some of the project's activities regarding biodiversity conservation (creation of community forest reserves as integral part of the Vilcabamba-Amboró Biological Corridor and strengthening of Eco Ashaninka).</p>	
c. Institutional framework and governance	Rating: ML
<p>In 2008 indigenous people rights in Peru deteriorated due to a series of Decrees:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Decree 1064: (i) the definition of “idle and unproductive lands”—legally state-owned—is expanded in further eroding the ability of indigenous peoples to maintain control of traditional lands and resources; (ii) eliminates the requirement that extractive industry companies must gain informed consent from local communities before entering their territories; (iii) reduces the legal requirements to sell indigenous land. - Decree 1090, the new Forestry Law, removes deforested areas from the inalienable patrimony of the state, enabling their sale to private parties. Already, illegal deforestation to make way for the sale of lands in indigenous territories has been reported. - Decree 1089, art 1: the titling of lands with agricultural potential is declared to be in the national interest taking priority over indigenous titling. <p>In June 2009, after serious protests and demonstrations by the indigenous communities, the legislature narrowly approved Law 29376—a law that suspends the application of Decrees 1064 and 1090. Approval of this law indeed reduced the risk related to governance, but capacity of government institutions to enforce it still needs to be strengthened.</p>	

d. Environmental	Rating: MU
Based on the TE the environmental benefits that represent structural changes (creation of protected areas and community forest reserves) are sustainable, while other environmental benefits such as the agroforestry systems depend on their future management.	
Risks that can affect the Ashaninka Communal Reservation and the Otishi National Park are (i) the construction of the Pakitzapango hydroelectric dam on the Efe River, and (ii) oil concessions.	

4.3 Catalytic role

<p>a. Production of a public good (production of knowledge, a new technology or a new approach) Since this project constituted the first experience in Peru of working with indigenous communities to support them in managing their protected areas, many of the activities taken up by the project required the introduction of new approaches and resulted in the creation of new knowledge. The following experiences produced knowledge that could be replicated by future projects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adaptation of regular protected areas operation manuals and annual plans to be used for the management of Communal Reserves. - Elaboration of a methodology for the participatory zoning of conservation and productive land within indigenous communities. - Introduction of new approaches to diversify the Ashaninka agricultural units with commercial products (adoption of innovations by indigenous communities). - Organization of the first producers associations in Ashaninka communities as a new approach to increase access to markets. - Radio programs broadcasted by Radio Amazonía which have helped reach indigenous populations outside the scope of this project and incite their interest in protected areas.
<p>b. Demonstration (a public good – new knowledge, technology or approach – takes steps to promote its propagation) No mention of demonstration of public goods produced by the project</p>
<p>c. Replication (a public good – new knowledge, technology or approach – is repeated in another project) No mention of replication of public goods produced by the project</p>
<p>d. Scaling up (a public good – new knowledge, technology or approach – influences law or policies) No mention of scaling up for this project</p>

4.4 Assessment of processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

<p>a. Co-financing. To what extent was the reported cofinancing (or proposed cofinancing) essential to achievement of GEF objectives? Were components supported by cofinancing well integrated into the project? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?</p>
<p>Most of the agroforestry activities were co-financed by the NGO Agro Acción Alemana. These activities were essential to the achievement of the project's development objective (provision of alternative livelihoods) and were well integrated into the project. Co-financing by GTZ (USD 50,000), DED (USD 150,000), WWF (USD 40,000) and CI (USD 16,980) didn't materialize; the TE and PIR don't provide an explanation for it and which project's outcomes were affected.</p>
<p>b. Delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?</p>
<p>PROCAM was unable to comply with UNDP's operational procedures and norms for procurement of goods and services. This situation, and other similar ones, was documented in the audit reports for years 2005, 2006 and 2007. This led to delays in disbursements and the freezing of funding in 2007. PROCAM also showed very weak capacity to produce acceptable Annual Workplans and progress reports. UNDP co-invested its own resources to hire consultants to support PROCAM in the preparation of these plans.</p>
<p>c. Country Ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability highlighting the causal links.</p>
<p>The Ashaninka communities and Second-Tier organizations were consulted but didn't participate in the design of the project. This has led to misunderstandings on the project's expected benefits by the communities and a lack of co-responsibility by the Ashaninka organizations which hinder the project outcomes sustainability. No Project Steering Committee with governmental representatives was set up.</p>

4.5 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

a. M&E design at Entry	Rating (six point scale): MS
The Project Document (Annex 4) presents a logical framework with indicators, and the PIR 2008 (Chapter: Progress towards achieving objectives) presents indicators with their baseline and targets/goals. However, no M&E Plan (including the practical organization and logistics for M&E activities) is detailed on the Project Document or in any further document.	
b. M&E plan Implementation	Rating (six point scale): U
The project had a logical framework (modified three times during the length of the project), presented the financial and technical reports, and was subject of independent external reviews (midterm review, annual auditing, substantive revision). However, the project didn't implement a monitoring system to follow up on the execution of activities. Therefore, the TE hasn't been able to assess the efficiency of the project at output level (there is no information on the activities implemented - and related costs - to achieve each output). The Substantive Revision recommended the hiring of an expert to monitor the implementation of activities. The expert would have been paid by UNDP. Apparently nobody was hired because PROCAM signed an agreement with the Regional Government of Junin, which should have been responsible to monitor the project.	
b.1 Was sufficient funding provided for M&E in the budget included in the project document?	
No funds were assigned in the original project appraisal document for M&E.	
b.2a Was sufficient and timely funding provided for M&E during project implementation?	
In a later version (2005) the Outcome 7 was added: "The project has the capacity and the ability for adaptive management and to foster best practices." Indicators included the systematization of good practices and the efficient use of resources." The budget assigned was 82,728 USD. The terminal evaluation does not provide information on how this allocation was used.	
b.2b To what extent did the project monitoring system provided real time feed back? Was the information that was provided used effectively? What factors affected the use of information provided by the project monitoring system?	
The project did not have a systematic monitoring system in place therefore it was difficult to have adaptive management (based on real time feedback). As a matter of fact, the changes made on the logical framework were more a readjustment of goals.	
b.3 Can the project M&E system (or an aspect of the project M&E system) be considered a good practice? If so, explain why.	
No. An effective M&E system was not implemented.	

4.6 Assessment of Quality of Implementation and Execution

a. Overall Quality of Implementation and Execution (on a six point scale): MS
b. Overall Quality of Implementation – for IA (on a six point scale): MS
The conceptual design of the project was correct. However, the initial targets (Project Document) were too ambitious considering the time and budget available. Also, the implementing capability of the PROMAC (EA) (capability of complying with the procurement and report requirement procedures) wasn't properly assessed by UNDP. UNDP provided its own fund to support the EA in the compliance of project reports and other requirements. There is evidence of a close project supervision (reports, audits, evaluations, etc), but it did not lead to substantial improvement of project implementation since, for example. M&E system was not effective, and no Steering Committee was convoked or set up.
c. Quality of Execution – for Executing Agencies¹ (rating on a 6 point scale): MU

¹ Executing Agencies for this section would mean those agencies that are executing the project in the field. For any given project this will exclude Executing Agencies that are implementing the project under expanded opportunities – for projects approved under the expanded opportunities procedure the respective executing agency will be treated as an implementing agency.

PROMAC (EA) had good expertise on the implementation of agroforestry systems, and had excellent relations with the indigenous communities which was a crucial factor the adoption of project innovations by them.

On the other hand, it lacked expertise to comply with monitoring, procurement and reporting requirements and with the aspects related to biodiversity. PROCAM's lack of capacity to present documentation in support of project expenses, combined with 2007 audit findings, led to delays in disbursements and the freezing of funding in 2007. The relationship between UNDP and PROCAM was characterized by a permanent lack of trust, and important recommendations provided by UNDP were never taken into account by the project implementation team.

5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assess the project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

a. Briefly describe the key lessons, good practice or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects

Adoption of innovations by indigenous people: the employment of trained **indigenous facilitators** – which belonged to the communities themselves and were respected by them – and the introduction of commercial species such as cacao, coffee and timber in the **traditional Ashaninka agroforestry system** (chacra) is a decisive factor to ensure the adoption of innovations by the Ashaninka people.

Planning of field activities together with the beneficiaries: To generate capacity building among the indigenous communities, field activities (such as agroforestry and the monitoring of the community forest reserves) should have been managed as projects with a detailed timeline, budget, and clear responsibilities from both sides (indigenous communities and NGO personnel).

Establishment of the Producers Association of Río Tambo: is a fundamental step for the Ashaninka communities to be able to organize their cacao supply based on the volume and quality requirements of the market.

Training activities: It is essential to have good knowledge of your target audience in order to plan relevant and useful training activities. Workshops, classes, and printed material had almost no impact among Ashaninka people. Being an oral culture, Ashaninkas are mostly interested in field practices and visiting established plantations (learn from example and practical demonstration).

b. Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation

UNDP should carry out an integral evaluation of the Executing Agency and its management capabilities before starting the design of the project.

UNDP should contemplate the consultation and participation of the beneficiaries in the design of the project. Beneficiary participation in project design and implementation strengthen their ability to negotiate and builds their management capacity.

UNDP should prepare a project proposal to consolidate the project's results, in particular to ensure the continuity of the technical assistance to the agro forestry activities and the producers association.

An outreach program should be implemented to disseminate the project's results. This project lacked of a communication strategy to inform stakeholders regarding the start (objectives) and the end (result) of the project.

The control of the timber extraction contracts signed by the communities need to be improved.

The following experiences should be systematized for their replication:

- the creation and management of an indigenous organization in responsible to manage protected areas (Communal Reserve) such as Eco-Ashaninka, including its status, operating manual, and elaboration of the annual operating plan.
- Methodology for the zoning of conservation and productive land with indigenous communities.
- Strengthening and rescue of the cultural values of the Ashaninka people through the cultural group Ashaninka Creando.

- Diversification of the Ashaninka agricultural units
- Organization of producers associations in Ashaninka communities.

6. QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings based on other information sources such as GEF EO field visits, other evaluations, etc.

NA.

Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluations review for further definitions of the ratings. Please briefly explain each rating.

6.2 Quality of the terminal evaluation report	Ratings
<p>a. To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?</p> <p>Each outcome has been analysed in detail and for each one the evaluators have consider its impact, sustainability and replicability, and effectiveness.</p>	S
<p>b. To what extent the report is internally consistent, the evidence is complete/convincing and the IA ratings have been substantiated? Are there any major evidence gaps?</p> <p>The TE is consistent but some weaknesses. The relation between the ratings given at output level (called "indicators" in the TE) and the final rating given at outcome level isn't clear.</p> <p>There is no explanation on the considerations taken/methodology used to rate the project efficiency at outcome level</p>	MS
<p>c. To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy?</p> <p>Detailed explanation on the aspects that can ensure project sustainability. Good analysis of stakeholders participation. Sustainability is also analyzed for each output.</p>	S
<p>d. To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?</p> <p>Many of the "lessons" included in the TE were actually just descriptions of project implementation issues and did not provide a lesson per se. On the other hand, lessons that were correctly included were easily comprehensible and are relevant to other GEF projects. The TE did not always specify who should be responsible to put its recommendations into action.</p>	MU
<p>e. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?</p> <p>It provides total costs per project component, but it does not separate co-finance.</p>	MU
<p>f. Assess the quality of the reports evaluation of project M&E systems?</p> <p>The TE refers to the recommendations exposed in the midterm evaluation and the substantive revision, but there is no analysis regarding the quality of these reports.</p>	MU

7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRERATATION OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REVIEW REPORT EXCLUDING PIRs, TERMINAL EVALUATIONS, PAD.