1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		15	
GEF Agency project ID		2357	
GEF Replenishment Phase		GEF-2	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		UNDP, UNEP	
Project name		Programme for Phasing Out Ozone Depleting Substances	
Country/Countries		Tajikistan	
Region		ECA	
Focal area		Ozone Depleting Substances	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		n/a	
Executing agencies involved		Ministry for the Protection of Natural Resources	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Not involved.	
Private sector involvement		Pamir company: project beneficiary; others were cofinanciers	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		7/27/2000	
Effectiveness date / project start		8/30/2000	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		1/9/2003	
Actual date of project completion		12/2006	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US $M)	**At Completion (US $M)**
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	.17	0 according to Trustee
	Co-financing	0	0
GEF Project Grant		.90	.98
Co-financing	IA own	0	0
	Government	n/a	n/a
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	0	0
	Private sector	n/a	n/a
	NGOs/CSOs	0	0
Total GEF funding		1.07	.98
Total Co-financing		.19	.24
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		1.26	1.22
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		March 2010	
TE submission date			
Author of TE		Dr. Tom Batchelor and Mr. Valery Smirnov	
TER completion date		February 2015	
TER prepared by		Shanna Edberg	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Dania Trespalacios	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	S	n/a*	n/a	MS
Sustainability of Outcomes	ML	n/a*	n/a	MU
M&E Design	n/a	n/a*	n/a	MU
M&E Implementation	n/a	n/a*	n/a	UA
Quality of Implementation	n/a	n/a*	n/a	MU
Quality of Execution	n/a	n/a*	n/a	MS
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	n/a	n/a	n/a	S

*The TE only gives ratings for individual sub-projects and not the project as a whole.

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

This project is part of the international effort to phase out ozone depleting substances, which damage the earth's ozone layer and increase the amount of ultraviolet radiation exposure from the sun. The Montreal Protocol, ratified by Tajikistan in 1998, is the basis for phasing out ozone-depleting substances. While Tajikistan does not produce ozone-depleting substances, it imports them from Russia. This project would allow Tajikistan to transition to other materials and reduce demand for ozone-depleting substances before the production of such substances ends in Russia.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The project consisted of four sub-projects:

1. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building – Establishment of an Ozone Office (UNEP)
2. Training of trainers for use of ODS-free refrigerants, including training of custom officers (UNEP)
3. National program for recovery and recycling of ODS refrigerants (UNDP/UNOPS)
4. Complete phase out of CFCs in manufacturing of domestic refrigerators at Pamir(UNDP/UNOPS)

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

At the time of writing of the Project Document, log frames and performance indicators were not required. The midterm review of the project identified an absence of results-based management, so some of the project's outputs and outcomes were formulated retrospectively. The TE does not describe the changes that were made.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 **Relevance**	Rating: **Satisfactory**

The GEF Operational Strategy of 1995 defines the GEF's ozone depletion portfolio to "support activities to phase out ozone-depleting substances that are committed under the Montreal Protocol, with special emphasis on short-term commitments and enabling activities" (GEF/C.6/3, page 77). This project supports an economy in transition in meeting its Montreal Protocol obligations.

The project is also in line with Tajikistan's priorities for meeting its treaty obligations. Its stated priorities are: phasing out the consumption of ozone-depleting substances, converting to alternate technologies, developing a legal and regulatory framework for the phase-out process, developing monitoring and licensing systems for imports and exports of ozone-depleting substances, and supporting scientific research on the ozone layer.

4.2 **Effectiveness**	Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

This project was divided into four subprojects, detailed below. According to the Project Document, the project intended to phase out 24.11 ODP MT of ODS annually in Tajikistan. The TE does not report on whether this target was achieved. As described below under M&E Design, the project design did not include comprehensive indicators, targets, or a log frame. Where indicators and targets are present, they are noted below. In the absence of indicators and targets, the project is rated on the delivery of outputs weighted by the amount of funding that each subproject received, as described below. The overall project is rated moderately satisfactory because the first two subprojects (representing 43% of GEF funds) completed their objectives, while the third subproject (representing 38% of GEF funds) hit 75% of its target, and the fourth subproject received 21% of the GEF funding but resulted in the beneficiary company's bankruptcy and thus had no effect on ozone reduction. Therefore 79% of the GEF project funding went to subprojects that completed all or most of their objectives.

1. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building – Establishment of an Ozone Office (UNEP)

The TE rated this subproject as highly satisfactory. It received 27% of the project funding and its outputs were completed.

The project established a National Ozone Unit in the Tajikistan government and an Interagency Committee staffed by members of the relevant ministries for implementing the phase-out program. The Interagency Committee created a three year phase out action plan that was coordinated with the other subcomponents of this project. The National Ozone Unit launched the process to ratify the three amendments to the Montreal Protocol, and all three were ratified by parliament in 2009. The National Ozone Unit drafted legislation that was subsequently adopted on approving the phase out program, regulating imports of ozone depleting substances, banning CFCs and halon, and licensing of activities related to ozone depleting substances. The National Ozone Unit also aided enforcement by collaborating with Customs and creating an “Instruction on regulation of ODS and imports of ODS containing products" and an "Instruction for individuals and legal entities engaged in service of refrigeration equipment and import into the Republic of Tajikistan of ODS and ODS containing products". Customs officers and ecological inspectors were trained as well, as described below. The effects of the regulation caused a 140% increase in price in one ozone-depleting refrigerant, while its substitute dropped in price. About 85% of domestic CFC-based refrigerators were replaced between 2000 and 2010. The National Ozone Unit coordinated the Refrigerant Management Plan and established relationships with two major refrigeration companies to facilitate training of refrigeration technicians and establish a network for refrigerant recovery and recycling (subprojects described below).

An awareness campaign was conducted. The National Ozone Unit wrote and disseminated 22 booklets on ozone depleting substances and conducted seminars for inspectors and government officials. Ozone related workshops and other events were covered by the media.

This sub-project was extended at no additional cost from 2003 to 2005 in order to continue funding the National Ozone Unit, but this did not adversely affect the project.

2. Training of trainers for use of ODS-free refrigerants, including training of custom officers (UNEP)

The TE rated this subproject as moderately satisfactory. It received 15% of the project funding. The intended outputs were completed in that technicians and customs officers were trained and equipment and training materials were distributed, but the customs agency’s ability to block ODS imports remains weak.

In the refrigeration servicing sector, a manual on good refrigeration practices was adapted to Tajikistan. Nineteen refrigeration technicians were trained and certified as trainers. Two permanent training centers were established despite a delay in disbursement funds, and 15 seminars trained 334 technicians in refrigeration servicing. All participants in the training received certification as well as service kits. Training was also initiated for customs officers. Eighteen officials were trained and certified as trainers, and a customs operations manual was developed and distributed. 87 officers were trained and certified. 32 instruments for identifying ozone-depleting substances were procured and distributed. However, the TE reports that the illegal trade in CFCs is ongoing, and customs officers have only rarely been able to intercept them. Turnover of customs personnel and the frequent need to recalibrate detection equipment has caused some of this gap. Reporting on controlled substances to the National

Ozone Unit was initiated, and a common computer system is being developed for integration with the Eurasian Economic Community.

3. National program for recovery and recycling of ODS refrigerants (UNDP/UNOPS)

The TE rates this subproject as satisfactory. It received more funding than the other subprojects at 38% of the project budget. The subproject did not hit its target of 15.5 tons of CFCs recovered and recycled annually. Only 11.7 tons of CFCs were recovered in 2008, representing 75% of the target.

117 recovery machines and 50 manual recovery pumps and recovery bags were distributed to refrigeration servicing companies and technicians. Five sets of recycling equipment were distributed around Tajikistan, and four technical recycling centers were created. Six training workshops were conducted, training manuals were distributed, and 150 technicians were trained and certified as recovery and recycling operators. UNDP's target for 15.5 tons of CFCs recovered and recycled annually was not hit; 11.7 tons were recovered in 2008. The TE states that this target was overambitious based on the country's situation and availability of CFC replacements. A monitoring program was initiated, but it had gaps in 2003, when there was a disruption in funding. Monitoring showed a growth in the CFC recovery rate between 2001 and 2005, although it stabilized in the following years. 150,000 to 200,000 domestic appliances still rely on CFCs in low income households in Tajikistan due to the country's poor economic situation.

4. Complete phase out of CFCs in manufacturing of domestic refrigerators at Pamir(UNDP/UNOPS)

The TE rates this project as moderately unsatisfactory. It received 21% of project funding. The intended outputs were delivered but the beneficiary company went bankrupt shortly after the project intervention, thus wasting the GEF funds.

The project converted the refrigerant line at Pamir, a domestic refrigerator company, from using CFCs to a replacement by installing new equipment and training staff. A new evacuation and charging line based on isobutene refrigerant was installed, but the use of isobutene required a new refrigerator design and no such designs were developed. According to the TE, "UNDP did not conduct the verification of the financial and economic viability of company. It was anticipated that the management of the enterprise and the Government would take the necessary steps for further modernization of production lines," but "these expectations did not materialize" (TE, page 588). The products made by Pamir could not compete with imported refrigerators due to old equipment, high energy consumption, and outdated designs. Shortly after the project was completed, Pamir went bankrupt.

4.3 **Efficiency**	Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

According to the TE, the first subproject on institutional strengthening "was very cost-effective," although "the objectives of project could have been met faster had the UNEP overall and financial management would be more efficient" (TE, pages 554-555). The TE does not elaborate on the inefficiencies of UNEP's management. For the second subproject on training, there were several delays

in disbursing funds from UNDP, which caused delays in some of the training activities by three years. The TE reports that fewer ozone-depleting substances would have been emitted if this delay had not occurred. The TE considered the third subproject on recovery and recycling to be very cost-effective based on the value of avoided imports of new refrigerants and the quantity of ozone-depleting substances that was recovered by the project. The fourth project on upgrading the Pamir refrigeration company was efficient in terms of the timetable and process of procurement and installation (no delays or problems), but the company failed after the project ended and production of refrigerators stopped in 2006. The low level of production by the company caused the cost-effectiveness of this subproject to be very poor.

4.4 **Sustainability**	Rating: **Moderately Unlikely**

Financial: **Moderately unlikely**; the National Ozone Unit was primarily funded by the GEF during the lifetime of the project, although it also received funding from the private sector and Refrigeration Association. When the GEF funding ended, its workforce dropped from seven staff members to two and its scope of activities was reduced. The reliance of the Unit on GEF funding is a signal of poor sustainability for this component, although GEF support was renewed at a later date. For the training component, the training centers that were created have continued their activities after project funding ended. The Pamir subproject clearly demonstrates low sustainability, since the company failed after project closure.

Sociopolitical: **Moderately likely**; the adoption of new legislation, regulations, and amendments to the Montreal Protocol, which continued after the project's closure, is a positive signal of country commitment. The creation of the Refrigeration Association is also important to sociopolitical sustainability due to its role in enforcement of legislation. The price of CFCs is higher than its substitutes and the cost of recovery and recycling operations is low enough for economic sustainability. However, illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances remains due to a demand in CFCs for servicing old refrigeration equipment. Early replacement of old refrigeration equipment is not likely due to the state of the Tajikistan economy.

Institutional: **Likely**; in addition to the regulations mentioned above on approving the phase out program, regulating imports of ozone depleting substances, banning CFCs and halon, and licensing of activities related to ozone depleting substances, the government has also passed laws on the mandatory recovery and recycling of ozone-depleting substances and added qualification requirements for refrigeration servicing personnel. One concern for institutional sustainability is the reduction in trained customs officers due to the high level of rotation of personnel.

Environmental: **Unable to assess**; no environmental risks were reported in the TE.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The government contribution to the institutional strengthening subproject helped to keep the National Ozone Unit running when GEF support ended. Similarly, financial support from the National Ozone Unit and Refrigeration Association will ensure the sustainability of the training program that was created by the project. There was no cofinancing of the recovery and recycling subproject or of the Pamir subproject.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The TE noted several delays in the second subproject on training, caused by delays in disbursing funds from UNDP. This caused a three-year delay in some of the training activities. The TE reports that fewer ozone-depleting substances would have been emitted if this delay had not occurred. However, the delay did not affect the attainment of project outputs.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

The TE considers that Tajikistan's new international agreements and multiple new laws and regulations regarding ozone-depleting substances are a signal of substantial country ownership. The government's ongoing support to the National Ozone Unit and the Unit's involvement in multiple aspects of policy and activities, such as training, are another testament to strong country ownership.

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 **M&E Design at entry**	Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

According to the TE, the original M&E design lacked a results-based management and accountability framework. The design and performance indicators were "poor" (TE, page 556). The monitoring and

evaluation plan is described in only two sentences in the Project Document, stating that monitoring will be performed by UNEP and UNDP and "standard evaluation will be performed as stipulated in the elimination of CFC 12 in the manufacture of domestic refrigerators at Pamir and the recovery/recycling sub-projects documentation" (PD, page 7). The M&E plan is not explained further. There are no baselines in the Project Document. The overall M&E plan was budgeted, but there were no specific budget items for the individual subprojects.

The TE notes several flaws in the M&E plan for the training subproject: "The practical use of knowledge transmitted through training has not been monitored and documented. UNEP DTIE did not develop and apply the appropriate methodology to determine the baseline, performance indicators and progress achieved by this training component in terms of relevant reduction in ODS consumption. The monitoring and evaluation system does not appear to be adequate to measure the level of success of the training of custom officers. The monitoring was limited to the number of customs officers trained and certified, and the number of refrigerant identifiers delivered to border check points. The reporting of the number and quantity of intercepted illicitly traded ODSs was not a requirement, nor the frequency of use of identifiers by officers" (TE, page 570).

For the recovery and recycling subproject, the TE states that "there was no M&E plan as such… The timetable is the only monitoring tool to track progress towards achieving project outputs. The ODS reduction is the only measurable indicator that was incorporated in the project document" (TE, page 580). There was also a lack of quantitative performance indicators.

6.2 **M&E Implementation**	Rating: **Unable to Assess**

The lack of a results-based management, an accountability framework, and good quality performance indicators "meant that even with proper reporting under a standard M&E Plan…it was difficult to track the quality of the outputs, and ultimately their sustainability" (TE, page 556). According to the TE, the National Ozone Unit competently conducted monitoring of the institutional strengthening subproject and submitted reports on a regular basis. The TE notes a lack of information on M&E implementation: "The monitoring functions were part of working responsibilities of UNEP DTIE and DGEF staff. There is limited information on monitoring activities of UNEP DTIE and DGEF. The evaluation team had no access to internal documentation of these two organizations" (TE, page 570).

For the recovery and recycling subproject, a delay in provision of UNEP funds "had a negative impact on organizing R&R monitoring activities," but the TE does not explain further (TE, page 581).

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely

within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 **Quality of Project Implementation**	Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

On project design, the TE states that "risk analysis was also not a part of project design, and this further compounded the ability of both execution and implementing agencies to predict long term/post project problems" (TE, page 556). The TE states that the training subproject should have been designed with a tighter timetable in order to make use of momentum and available trainers. The Pamir subproject "contains no financial and economic analysis and investment appraisal. It appears that UNDP missed this important step in its financial planning of the Pamir conversion" (TE, page 592). The TE also states that UNDP did not consider the guidelines of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol: "If they had been followed, the grant would have been so low that the proposal would not have been approved and GEF resources could be used for much more efficient projects" (TE, page 592).

Regarding project supervision, the National Ozone Unit reported problems in receiving financial communications from UNDP at the end of each fiscal year, but these problems were later resolved. Frequent turnover of the supervisory staff at UNEP as well as a lack of Russian speakers exacerbated the communication problems. The TE notes that UNEP did not undertake any supervisory missions to the project. There was a delay in the disbursement of funds for the training subproject, so there was a delay in establishing the training center. Other than these issues, the TE considers project supervision to be adequate.

7.2 **Quality of Project Execution**	Rating: Moderately **Satisfactory**

The National Ozone Unit indicated that it had difficulty following the reporting and financial procedures for UNDP and UNEP. The requirements and formats were changed, which contributed to delays in funding and the need to reschedule some implementation activities. Other than this issue, the TE does not mention any problems with project execution. The coordination work of the National Ozone Unit was competent and critical to the project's success (TE, page 551). For example, the National Ozone Unit was able to overcome the delay in disbursement funds for the training program by organizing a temporary training center.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

Between 2001 and 2008, 115,008 kilograms of refrigerants were recovered and recycled as a result of the subproject on recovery and recycling (TE, page 577). About 85% of domestic CFC-based refrigerators were replaced between 2000 and 2010 (TE, page 553).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

No socioeconomic changes were mentioned in the TE.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

In the refrigeration servicing sector, a manual on good refrigeration practices was adapted to Tajikistan. Nineteen refrigeration technicians were trained and certified as trainers. Two permanent training centers were established despite a delay in disbursement funds, and 15 seminars trained 334 technicians in refrigeration servicing. All participants in the training received certification as well as service kits (TE, page 566). Training was also initiated for customs officers. Eighteen officials were trained and certified as trainers, and a customs operations manual was developed and distributed. 87 officers were trained and certified. 32 instruments for identifying ozone-depleting substances were procured and distributed (TE, pages 567-568). The National Ozone Unit aided enforcement of the regulations on ozone-depleting substances by collaborating with Customs and creating an “Instruction on regulation of ODS and imports of ODS containing products" and an "Instruction for individuals and legal

entities engaged in service of refrigeration equipment and import into the Republic of Tajikistan of ODS and ODS containing products" (TE, page 550). 117 recovery machines and 50 manual recovery pumps and recovery bags were distributed to refrigeration servicing companies and technicians. Five sets of recycling equipment were distributed around Tajikistan, and four technical recycling centers were created. Six training workshops were conducted, training manuals were distributed, and 150 technicians were trained and certified as recovery and recycling operators. A monitoring program was initiated to measure the recovery and recycling of ozone-depleting substances (TE, pages 576-577). No further information on capacity impacts is available in the TE.

b) Governance

The project established a National Ozone Unit in the Tajikistan government and an Interagency Committee staffed by members of the relevant ministries for implementing the phase-out program. The Interagency Committee created a three year phase out action plan of ozone-depleting substances (TE, page 548). All three amendments to the Montreal Protocol were ratified by parliament in 2009 as a result of the efforts of the National Ozone Unit. The National Ozone Unit also drafted legislation that was subsequently adopted on approving the phase out program, regulating imports of ozone depleting substances, banning CFCs and halon, and licensing of activities related to ozone depleting substances (TE, page 549-550).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

No unintended impacts were mentioned in the TE.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The project's approach was replicated in several Eurasian countries as part of the GEF's ozone-depleting substances program. Other than applying similar project designs to each country, no scaling up or mainstreaming was mentioned in the TE. The main market change effected by the project was the rise in prices of CFCs versus non-ozone-depleting substitutes, reflecting the lower availability of ozone-depleting substances in Tajikistan. There was a 140% increase in the price of one ozone-depleting refrigerant, while its substitute dropped in price (TE, page 550).

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

There are no lessons learned for the Tajikistan project, but the TE states several lessons from the overall ozone-depleting substances program:

Funding bodies should be much clearer on their expectations of governments to continue funding and staffing of work on ODS after the project finished. Governments should use the funds to enhance institutional capacity and to put in place justification for continued funding while the project is underway and the environmental benefits are becoming evident.

The success of the National Ozone Units depended on the qualifications and ability of the staff to undertake the work, and in having sufficient funds available for the work. Out-sourcing activities by the government is a modern approach which has been shown to operate so far in these projects, and might open up opportunities for other governments to consider the same as centralized budgets come under more pressure for reductions.

It is important that the National Ozone Units are staffed by some well qualified and senior people that can gain access to key government officials in order to ensure that programs and legislation on the phase out of ODS are progressed in a timely and effective manner.

Governments could consider establishing a centralized unit staffed by specialists that are knowledgeable in engaging with international funding organizations in environmental projects.

UNEP must improve delivery of finance to ensure that there are no gaps in time between projects.

Communications should be between UNEP and the National Ozone Units in the local language, which means that UNEP will need to employ staff with sufficient language skills to be able communicate effectively with project staff many countries, depending on the project.

Project and task managers must pay more attention to the M&E elements that are developed in the Project Document to ensure that appropriate baseline and performance indicators are carefully checked and are present from the beginning for the project.

Review the work that was undertaken in the past and design new projects that avoid the pitfalls of past projects.

Financial appraisals should be part of the risk assessment for deciding on which enterprises to fund within a sector.

Investment projects should be based on a realistic assessment of the baseline data as a basis for determining the extent of the funding that is required to promote the transition to ODS-free technology.

For refrigeration training, training programs need to be short (two days maximum, preferably one day); focused mainly on the practical aspects and alternatives and less on the theory; be delivered by or in collaboration with a Refrigeration Association so the training becomes self-funding; UNEP/UNDP need to ensure equipment is available before the training starts; and the government needs to have enabling legislation in place that ensures R&R activities are undertaken and enforced.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

There are no recommendations for the Tajikistan project, but the TE states several recommendations from the overall ozone-depleting substances program:

Countries should improve the implementation of legislation, policies and standards on all aspects of ozone layer protection.

Countries' existing efforts to prevent illegal trade need to be further strengthened.

Countries need to take further action to manage and bank halon.

UNEP/UNDP should consider further investment and capacity development to assist countries with economies in transition to address the remaining threats to the ozone layer.

UNEP/UNDP should learn from the positive private sector engagement in the reduction of Ozone Layer Depletion focal area and incorporate similar approaches into its efforts to engage the private sector in other focal areas.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE is very detailed in its assessment of outcomes and impacts. It would have been helpful to have an overall description of the project rather than just the assessments of the individual subprojects.	**S**
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The ratings only cover sub-projects and not the project as a whole. The report is repetitive, which made it difficult to discern which outcomes and outputs were original and which were a restatement from a previous section. It was not always clear which changes were a part of the project and which were independent or driven by different forces.	**MS**
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The sustainability of the entire project as a whole was not discussed, but the assessment of the sustainability of each individual subproject was adequate.	**MS**
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The TE does not contain lessons and recommendations related to the Tajikistan project. However, it does have lessons and recommendations pertaining to the entire ozone-depleting substances program. These lessons are detailed, comprehensive, and result from project experiences.	**S**
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	The TE includes project costs and cofinancing. It lists the funding for each subproject, but not per-activity.	**MS**
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	Adequate evaluation of project M&E, although it would have been helpful to have an overall evaluation of project M&E rather than an evaluation of the individual subprojects' M&E.	**S**
Overall TE Rating		**S**

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).