

GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form

1. PROJECT DATA				
GEF Project ID:	2		Review date:	
IA/EA Project ID:	877	GEF financing:	<u>at endorsement</u> (Million US\$)	<u>at completion</u> (Million US\$)
Project Name:	Samar Island Biodiversity Project: Conservation and Sustainable Use of the Biodiversity of a Forested Protected Area	IA/EA own:	6.11	5.76
Country:	Philippines	Government:		4.25
		Other*:		1.35
		Total Cofinancing	7.20	7.12
Operational Program:	OP3	Total Project Cost:	13.31	12.88
IA	UNDP	<u>Dates</u>		
Partners involved:	Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Samar Island Biodiversity Foundation (SIBF)	Work Program date		12/01/1999
		CEO Endorsement		07/12/2000
		Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		07/14/2000
		Closing Date	Proposed: 12/31/2006 (PMIS)	Actual: No closing date reported
Prepared by: Anna	Reviewed by: Neeraj Negi	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing: UA	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing: UA	Difference between original and actual closing: UA
Author of TE: Dr. Phillip Edwards Atty. Maria Paz Luna Prof. Eduardo Mangaoang		TE completion date: April 2006	TE submission date to GEF OE: July 2007	Difference between TE completion and submission date: 15 months

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

*US\$0.94 million Foundation for the Philippine Environment (FPE), US\$0.35 million USAID, and the US\$0.06 million NGOS/Church groups

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS

Please refer to document "GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for the verification and review of terminal evaluations" for further definitions of the ratings.

	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	Other IA evaluations if applicable (e.g. IEG)	GEF EO
2.1 Project outcomes	S	MS	N/A	MS
2.2 Project sustainability	N/A	MS	N/A	MU
2.3 Monitoring and evaluation	N/A	N/A	N/A	S
2.4 Quality of the evaluation report	N/A	N/A	N/A	S

Should this terminal evaluation report be considered a good practice? Why? No. The TE is comprehensive and provides good analysis, but the presentation is disorganized and hard to follow. Financial information is

not clear. The TE does not clearly outline the changes recommended by the Mid-Term Evaluation.
Is there a follow up issue mentioned in the TE such as corruption, reallocate on of GEF funds, etc.? No.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND ACTUAL OUTCOMES

3.1 Project Objectives

- **What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?**

According to the project brief the global environmental objective was to protect a representative sample of the forest biodiversity of the Philippine archipelago. According to the TE there were not changes during implementation.

- **What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?**

According to the project brief the development objective was to establish and manage the Samar Island Natural Park with broad-based stakeholder participation.

According to the TE the Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) undertaken in June 2004 was fairly heavily critical of project performance and made a number of recommendations that significantly changed the strategy of the Project. The MTE concluded that "a broader project purpose would be feasible and more appropriate" and, seizing upon the ambiguity in project design and the mismatch between the project purpose and the project goal, recommended "expanding the purpose of the SIBP towards development of a natural resource management system for conservation and ecologically sustainable development across the whole of Samar Island".

In October 2004, the Project Steering Committee (PSC) agreed to accept an expanded project purpose, requesting that the goal and project purpose be amended to reflect this but then, perversely, making no formal response to another MTE recommendation to "review the logical framework in the light of recommendations from the MTE"

In addition, there appears to have been significant support within the PSC, and from UNDP too, if not expand the geographic scope of the Project, certainly to increase support for economic livelihood activities. This is reflected in the minutes when accepting the MTE recommendation to increase support for economic /livelihood activities of "Accepted. Our battle cry since Day 1".

The logical framework was, however, not revised in line with the recommendations of the MTE.

3.2 Outcomes and Impacts

- **What major project outcomes and impacts are described in the TE?**

Output 1: Adaptive management framework for conservation management – The Samar Island National Park (SINAP), at c. 453,000 ha the largest terrestrial protected area in the Philippines – has been formed by Presidential proclamation. Its protection has been reinforced by three Provincial Ordinances banning logging and mining. The Congressional Act is still awaited. A protected Area Management Board and Executive Committee have been formed and are functioning. A PA Management Plan is due in April 2006, complete with zoning plans. A biological Resource Assessment has been completed.

Output 2: Conservation functions and infrastructure – Some Park staff members have been recruited by the DENR and several Project staff members are holding dual functions in the Project and the Park. Park infrastructure is being constructed and is expected to be complete by December 2006. Costs are greater than anticipated so signage has suffered as a result. The functions of the park staff and the DENR District offices have not yet been properly formulated. Park boundaries are delineated on a map, but await passage of the Congressional Act before they can be demarcated on the ground.

Output 3: Community-based conservation framework – A community outreach program (COP) is operating in 62 barangays, mostly in the buffer zone, in place of Community Forestry Program originally envisaged. Community profiles have been established for all barangays. The framework of Bufferzone Management Units with Village conservation Committees was replaced unsuccessfully by a watershed management approach. Forest guards have been partially identified but not yet appointed.

Output 4: Awareness of conservation values and threats – Communications strategy, awareness program and awareness materials has all been completed. In addition, significant awareness-raising and advocacy activities have unified the people of Samar and their civic and religious leaders like never before. A protest caravan with the theme of "Yes to SINP, No to mining" and involving over 15,000 people was held on 8th

August 2003 and five days later the SINP Proclamation was signed by the President. The Samar Island Council for Sustainable Development has been formed.

Output 5: Conservation objectives in LGU development planning – The results from the resource valuation study are not yet available. Provincial workshops on integrated conservation and development were merged with the workshops undertaken for the watershed management planning approach.

Output 6: Alternative conservation-enabling sustainable livelihoods promoted – The feasibility study for NTFP harvest was completed for some products, but provisional harvest quotas have still not been set. A community consensus has been reached for ecotourism priorities but no ecotourism management plan has yet been drafted, nor activities undertaken. The Farming Systems review failed but five demonstration farms were established and a market study into priority crops undertaken.

Output 7: Sustainable financing for recurrent costs of conservation activities – Few activities were planned under Phase one, but initial action have led to some finance being pledged, most notably with DENR paying 16 regular Park staff and 13 others on a contact basis.

4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT

4.1.1 Outcomes (use a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU)

A Relevance

Rating: 5

The TE does not discuss relevance per se, but the project's outcomes are consistent with OP3: Forest Ecosystems. According to the TE the project established the Samar Island National Park (SINAP) under the National Integrated Protected Area System (NIPAS). According to the project brief, the country's conservation strategy centers on the management of PAs under NIPAS, with the goal of capturing a representative sample of biodiversity within the conservation estate. Key problems identified by the TE was the low level of country ownership and external factors such as two Mineral Sharing Production Agreements overlapping the Park's boundaries were issued in December 2002. In addition, a Timber License Agreement including 95,000 ha of the Park, suspended under the moratorium on logging placed on the island in 1989 has been lifted.

B Effectiveness

Rating: 4

Overall, the TE evaluates the Samar Island Biodiversity Project to have been successful but with reservations. According to the TE It is important to understand that the relative weighting given by the TE to the various components is not equal and that the key deliverables under Outputs 1 and 4 – i.e. the establishment of a new protected area on land containing an estimated 21+ billion US dollars worth of bauxite and unmeasured timber resources, and consequently in the face of considerable powerful political opposition; and the creation of a vocal, supportive and active society, united at all levels and across the spectrum of its leaders in support of the Park and against the extractive industries – are considered to be absolutely central to the Project's success. Even the presence of some 200,000 people living within the proposed SINP boundaries was overcome and the vocal opposition commonly expressed by people to being included in a protected area was absent in this Project.

C Efficiency (cost-effectiveness)

Rating: 4

According to the TE, overall implementation on the ground was particularly successful – the strong link made between conservation objectives and development activities and the way they were implemented.

The concept of co-management of the Project by the Government and the NGOs had its roots in lessons learned from the World Bank-GEF Conservation of Priority Protected Areas Project where separate financial arrangements had been established for the Government and the NGOs, with Government being responsible for 33% of the funding and the NGOs for 67%. As a result of significant difficulties arising from a system whereby the NGOs, who were given complete autonomy with no monitoring or management input from the Government, failed to deliver on the livelihood components and had to return significant monies to the WB-GEF, but for which the Government was ultimately held accountable since it was the guarantor of the project, UNDP and DENR agreed to set up the co-management for the SIBP to be equal but with GOP being ultimately accountable.

In some ways this might have been expected to be somewhat ambitious for a new NGO comprising geographically separate functions and aims. In many ways this was the case. The "growing pains" of the SIBF clearly resulted in inefficiencies leading to delays and failure to achieve certain deliverables, most notably the Farming Systems Review. It appears that the NGOs thought "co-management" was to be completely equal in all respects, e.g. co-signing everything including, say, travel orders, and had apparently requested this, but in reality they found the levels of administration burdensome and two of the CPMs

interviewed complained that the amount of administration meant that they had too little time to be effective in leading on their allocated tasks of advocacy and livelihoods.

The key problem besetting the Project has been that of “strategic or project creep” (the project was extended by 20 months). A sequence of seemingly unrelated events has been allowed to transpire that has resulted in a change of strategic direction that has diluted the delivery of project resources to priority areas and produced outputs that are of dubious value. Unfortunately this has detracted from the Project’s considerable successes in other areas. In brief, there were considerable tensions within the Project between the NGOs whose focus was on providing a livelihood-based response to biodiversity conservation across the island, and the DENR management which was focused on the SINP as per the Project Brief. These tensions can be accorded to the fact that the NGOs, or their representatives, were never given the opportunity to sign off on the Project Brief submitted to GEF, even though they had been included as co-implementers.

These tensions and pressures permeated the Project to such an extent that they were picked up by the Mid-term Evaluation who assessed them as being valid and recommended “expanding the purpose of the SIBP towards development of a natural resource management system for conservation and ecologically sustainable development across the whole of Samar Island” without any further resources being made available. The PSC agreed. As a result, the PMO moved to attempt to extend its resources to provide a more island-wide approach. This appears to have focused on re-directing the PA management planning exercise in which there was a dearth of national expertise (including the CTA) to that of watershed management planning (in which the overly-influential CTA had experience) on the basis that such an exercise would provide an island-wide framework for livelihood interventions as well as providing sufficient basic material which could be stitched together easily to form the PA management plan. Unfortunately it did neither, and this decision represents the culmination of strategic creep with significant subsequent effects.

The TE also notes that the costs for the livelihood components of the Project were under-estimated, and this is one of the main factors leading to those outputs having being ineffective in a number of areas.

4.1.2 Impacts

The Project components largely concerned with facilitating operations within the Park and providing interventions to boost alternative livelihoods to reduce pressure on the forest can continue to be developed in time. Without the former, it is unlikely that there would be significant amounts of forest to conserve through livelihood interventions in ten years time. The reservations expressed arise mainly from the “strategic creep” that has developed to the detriment of the planning and community-based conservation framework, and to poor delivery of various products which has led to delays or cancellations and has particularly affected the livelihood aspects of the Project.

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four point scale (4= no or negligible risk to 1= High risk)

A Financial resources	Rating: 2
<p>The TE rated output 7, sustainable financing for recurrent costs of conservation activities, marginally successful. The original project design envisaged few activities for this output in Phase One of the Project, delaying most until Phase Two, but initial actions have led to some finance being pledged, most notably with DENR paying 16 regular Park staff and 13 others on a contact basis. Also a debt reduction agreement was signed between the Philippines and the US to set up a fund for tropical forest conservation in September 2002. Work towards setting up a Foundation to handle the fund commenced straight afterwards, but due to approvals needed from both governments to the incorporation papers, it was established officially as the Philippine Tropical Forest Conservation Foundation (PTFCF) only in April, 2005. The SIBP intends to access these funds for the SINP through a proposal to be filed when the PTFCF releases a call for proposals in 2006. A donor’s meeting, set to be conducted in December 2005 to collect pledges from different agencies and entities for the funding of specific areas of SINP operations, did not take place because of the delay in producing the PA Management Plan. It is now set as a priority activity for 2006, to be scheduled when the Work and Financial Plan section of the Management Plan will have been completed.</p>	
<p>The NIPAS Act provides that protected area funding derived from taxes, permits and other fees should all accrue to an Integrated Protected Area Fund (IPAF), 75% of which should be used for the protected area where they were collected (called a sub-fund) and 25% of which should go to a Central IPAF for use in other protected areas unable to generate revenues. The PAMB approved the establishment of the sub-fund on 29th April 2005, as well as adopted an interim fee schedule on 10th August 2005 which is still awaiting approval by the DENR Secretary prior to full implementation. Monies placed in the sub-IPAF are subject to release after a minimum of six months upon meeting a ream of bureaucratic requirements, chief amongst</p>	

which is a work plan approved by the Secretary of the DENR for the use of the funds.

The TE states that current estimates of Park revenue against costs suggests an 8-11 million peso annual deficit. The TE Team recommended unanimously and without ambiguity that the GEF supports the second phase of the SIBP to consolidate the considerable gains achieved by the first phase. Phase Two needs to incorporate innovative means of deriving finance for the Park. Issues to be looked at include disengaging the SINP from the National Integrated Protected Areas System as a pilot trial to operate as an independent business unit; reviewing a wide range of financial options, e.g. debt swaps, carbon offsets, foundations, watershed protection, and obtaining the proceeds from confiscated resources and equipment from illegal operations within the Park (e.g. timber and vehicles). Policy revisions, both of DENR rules and the proposed bill for SINP might be required to make some of these happen.

B Socio political

Rating: 3

The TE rates the following risk of insurgency as low. The New People's Army (NPA), a country-wide armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, remains a risk to project operations in the area since Samar is a known NPA stronghold. The Project has been operating successfully in Samar despite the Peace and Order situation, for six years. The Project now appears to be accepted as politically neutral and bringing benefits to poor forest communities. Providing Project personnel and strategy continue to remain neutral, no significant risk to staff is foreseen. Some delays to project activities can still be envisaged because of occasional confiscation of equipment and denied access to certain areas at certain times.

C Institutional framework and governance

Rating: 3

The TE rates the risk of weak management as low. According to the TE weak management has hampered project progress, strategy and direction during Phase One. If this is allowed to go unchecked, then similar problems will affect Phase Two, resulting in significant delays and missed delivery of products.

Many of the Project staff members are simultaneously holding dual roles within the Project and the embryonic Park Management Authority. The MTE criticized this recommending that a clear distinction be made the two on the basis that the "task of the former is to facilitate the establishment of the conservation system or PA for the latter to manage," but PSC rejected this because they believed it to be a good way of institutionalizing the Project. The TE agrees with this position but recognizes that it entails a lot of work for those people holding dual roles, and assumes that such staff members are both of high-caliber and dedicated to a successful project outcome – something that seems to be the case here. However, such a position should not be taken for granted and the TE would not recommend this approach as a general rule.

Phase Two will require clearer and closer supervision which needs the respective roles of the TPR and PSC to be better defined. The frequency with which these bodies, at least the PSC, needs to be increased, preferably to three per year, and the schedule kept to. This will need monitoring by the TPR. The co-management arrangements between DENR and SIBF should be maintained Careful definition and agreement of the scope of the second phase will be necessary to avoid a repeat of tensions between project partners. The selection procedures for the positions of PM and CPM need radical improvement on both sides. Careful definition of respective roles will also need to be undertaken and kept to. An "out-of-Visayas" national or international CTA needs to be hired to bring fresh insights to the second phase. The logframe needs to be adhered to more strongly to direct work programs. Monitoring of the effects of project interventions needs to become standard practice.

D Environmental

Rating: 2

The TE rates the following risks: i) mining – medium; and ii) logging – low.

One of the most significant issues directly affecting the SINP are two Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSAs), both of which overlap with the Park boundaries. The issue poses substantial but manageable risks to the Park, foremost among which is that it could deadlock the legislative action needed to fix the final boundaries. If and when the Project's proposed bill passes both Houses of Congress, insertions can still be made in the Bicameral Committee that would excise portions of the Park for mining. However, such manipulations will almost certainly meet with substantial public opposition. Furthermore, the character of the forests as old growth would still close the areas off to mining as provided for in the Mining Act, even in the event that they are excised from the Park.

Another extractive activity that may threaten the Park is commercial logging. The island has been under a logging moratorium since 1989 after flash floods devastated parts of Northern and Eastern Samar. Timber License Agreements (TLA), including 95,000 ha issued to the San Jose Timber Corporation (SJTC), operating prior to the floods were suspended by the moratorium. In August 2005, an order issued by the previous DENR Secretary lifted the suspension of the SJTC license and another 16 years were granted to SJTC to log the concession. If the SJTC is eventually allowed to operate within the SINP, road networks and increased settlements will inevitably follow opening areas to illegal hunting and settlement thereby

increasing park operational costs to impossible levels.

Small-scale illegal logging continues to pose a threat to the SINP. While residents estimate an 80% decline in the illicit trade since a sawmill was closed due to the absence of buyers, there seems to be a mass acceptance that small-scale illegal logging could not be stopped. This is alarming because nearly 200,000 people live in the Park and need firewood and houses, and hence still pose an enormous threat if no systematic approach is taken to ensure law enforcement coupled with the provision of alternatives.

4.3 Catalytic role

a. Production of a public good

According to the TE the Project has implemented effective strategies to raise awareness and concerns among the local constituents on matters and issues related to Samar Island's environment and biodiversity conservation, especially among the leaders in the provincial and municipal governments, and the church. The SIBF, who took the lead in this activity, have achieved considerable success in uniting people and their leaders across the island in support of the SINP and against the extractive industries which threatens it and their communities. Long years of experience on advocacy work in the island combined with high capacity in this area appear to have paid dividends. This success has contributed to building vigilance among the local populace in protecting the forest and its biodiversity, and in decisions by villagers to stop timber poaching and to engage in alternative livelihood opportunities.

b. Demonstration

According to the TE the demonstration farms established by the project were inappropriate and do not showcase improved technologies that link livelihoods to biodiversity conservation. The project established five demonstration farms showcasing vegetable farming, abaca production, pili production, establishment of fruit tree plantations, and coconut-based multiple cropping system. Unfortunately in the absence of the Farming Systems Review the demonstration farms have failed to capture the Project's aim of showcasing conservation-compatible farming systems.

c. Replication None

d. Scaling up None

4.4 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

A. M&E design at Entry Rating (six point scale): 5

According to the Project Brief, the Executing Agency will be required to prepare quarterly and annual work-plans and report to UNDP and DENR on progress in achieving targets enumerated in the plans. The Quarterly Progress Reports (QPRs) would provide a brief summary of the status of input procurement and output delivery, explain variances from the work plan, and present work-plans for each successive quarter for review and endorsement. Annual Progress Reports (APR's) would provide a more in-depth summary of work-in-progress, measuring performance against both implementation and impact indicators. APR's would inform decision-making by the Project Steering Committee, which would evaluate whether any adjustment in approach is required. The GEF Project Implementation Review (PIR) will be completed annually and would review implementation progress prospects of achieving global environmental objectives, and would serve to identify lessons learned from GEF experience and share them broadly within the GEF family and with other interested parties. Finally, a terminal report would be completed prior to the completion of each phase of the project detailing achievements and lessons.

Upon commencement of project implementation, the project office would develop analytical and sampling tools for field monitoring activities. The logical framework provides a set of performance indicators to measure the delivery of outputs, and impact indicators, measuring attainment of project objectives. These indicators will be further refined following in-depth biological and social assessments scheduled during year 1 of implementation under Output 1. The following impact indicators have been pre-selected: a] Presence of indicator forest dependent species in areas under threat of 'defaunation'; b] Changes in the size of habitat blocks, including critical biological corridors; and c] Changes in human settlement patterns.

Process monitoring will also be undertaken to assess changes in the magnitude of threats. Monitoring would involve several methods, including field surveys (transect plots), evaluation of aerial imagery, canopy cover assessments and targeted questionnaires. Monitoring will be conducted both independently, by trained biologists and social scientists who will conduct biennial biological and social assessments, and by trained local observers, including park rangers and designated community representatives, who would be trained in monitoring, record keeping and assessment methods. Part of the purpose of such exercises would be to build the capacity of local managers to sustain monitoring operations over the long-term.

The project will be subject to two mandatory independent evaluations. The first of these will be scheduled during the third quarter of year 3 to determine whether the pre requisites for graduation to phase 2 have been satisfied. Triggers are listed in the logical framework and include legislative clearance of PA designation, establishment of the permanent PAMB, and formal delimitation of PA boundaries. A second evaluation will be scheduled upon project termination and UNDP, may, at its discretion, schedule additional independent evaluations if deemed necessary.

The indicators and the means of verification presented in the project brief are appropriate and sufficient.

B. M&E plan Implementation Rating (six point scale): 5

According to the TE progress monitoring against the quarterly and annual work plans has been undertaken in both quarterly and annual reports since the project inception. These have been submitted to UNDP and the DENR-8, Foreign Assisted Special Project Office (FASPO) and PAWB offices of DENR. The reports presented a clear summary of work-in-progress in terms of measuring performance against both project implementation and the corresponding set of impact indicators. The reports also provided information on the problems and issues encountered by the project over time. The information therein has served as a guide in determining the successes and shortfalls, as well as the major variations made from the approved quarterly and annual work plans.

Internal activity monitoring was undertaken in 2005 to assess project implementation and accomplishments for the period 2000-2005 and to serve as guide for the project management team. However, the monitoring report has not been able to present clearly the problems incurred, the key issues and concerns identified, and the lessons learned from the implementation of the project.

Impact monitoring to assess the impacts of project activities on biodiversity conservation and sustainable livelihoods has not yet been introduced in the Project. Identification of simple and verifiable impact indicators to measure on-the-ground improvements realized due directly to project interventions is inherently an indispensable tool for managing any development project and should be employed as standard.

C.1 Was sufficient funding provided for M&E in the budget included in the project document? Yes.

Sub-contract for socio-economic assessment and monitoring (\$23,690), reporting (\$45,000), travel (\$67,020). M&E activities were also financed under other personnel and sub-contracting lines.

C.2 Was sufficient and timely funding provided for M&E during project implementation?

UA. There is no clear information in the TE on sufficiency and timeliness of the funding for M&E.

C.3 Can the project M&E system be considered a good practice?

Yes, but more details would be needed for knowledge sharing.

4.5 Lessons and Recommendations

Project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

What lessons mentioned in the TE that can be considered a good practice or approaches to avoid and could have application for other GEF projects?

Strategic

- All partners involved directly in the implementation of a project should be required to sign off on the Project Brief prior to its submission to GEF in the same way as the GEF Country Focal Point signs signifying the agreement of the Government.
- Projects under pressure to reach pre-planned targets have little freedom to adjust to changing needs, to allow for outcomes of necessary research to be incorporated into the implementation activities, and to co-operate meaningfully with other international partner organisations towards joint goals. Designers, particularly of ICDPs, should allow sufficient time to allow for flexibility and “organic” growth and development within a project.
- Experience in this and similar projects has been that nationals argue fiercely that knowing better about their environments and how their government and institutions operate, they are in a better position to implement projects than foreign consultants. That may be so but when this is assumed, consideration needs to be paid to the learning curve and how it affects the timeline and preparatory phase design of projects.
- To shorten the learning curve, project personnel should be encouraged, even required, to seek national and international exposure to broaden their knowledge base about Protected Area management experiences elsewhere. Local opportunities exist such as the annual Wildlife Conservation Society of the Philippines Conference and the Asean Regional Center for Biodiversity Conservation in Los Baños,

Laguna.

- Advantage should be taken of other initiatives happening within their own departments. For instance, the DENR has issued Criteria and Indicators for Sustainable Forest Management in the Philippines by which to gauge the success of community-based forest managers, and the DENR has likewise identified appropriate forest-based livelihoods under its Community Based Livelihood Assistance Project (CLASP) project.
- Many developing countries are struggling with Protected Area models that are not completely applicable to their situations, since the people concerned have had to learn their profession abroad. While the Development Academy of the Philippines has established a course on Protected Area Management and more and more professors are teaching courses on it, much can be done by a country-wide organization of protected area professionals exchanging experiences on the web or in an annual or biennial national conference. Many of the mistakes made and opportunities lost could have been avoided if such an interactive organization existed and was relied upon by project staff to test ideas on and seek experiences.
- Without denigrating the professionals concerned, a characteristic of most bureaucratic institutions is that innovation is generally not rewarded. As such, projects should start with this assumption and provide ample opportunities for rewarding innovation and independent thinking. For example, the idea that the bureaucracy itself is hindering the progress of a project may have been arrived at, but rather than imagining the possibility of an entirely new arrangement not necessarily prescribed by law but made possible by it, such problems tend to be treated as inevitable and merely tinkering with the bureaucracy is deemed satisfactory.
- Adaptive management, while successfully employed in this project, should also be rigorous and fully documented. While this Project produced satisfactory data, databases and generally accessible information, it did not have a revised logframe on which to base its innovations, nor did it make full use of success indicators that required little effort to put down (e.g. estimates of crowd numbers at the caravan, entries in the photo exhibit logbooks, or list of recipients of advocacy materials).
- The TET encountered many instances when the culture of Samareños was used as a reason for doing things a certain way. However, such culture and other local practices were more often used as an excuse instead of as opportunities for project enhancement. For example, while a baseline for the biodiversity was studied (BRA), a social baseline to determine what were the driving factors that led to forest migration and how could this feed into the COP design would have been useful.
- Many local languages are dying out and much local knowledge is passed on only by word of mouth in these languages. Many resource management methods and facts that are language-dependent will become lost. Greater emphasis should therefore be placed in projects to take better advantage of local knowledge, and wherever possible, this knowledge should be documented in a major language with the full nuances inherent in the local language taken account of. Despite emphasis in planning on local participation and broad stakeholdership, there is a danger that knowledge from the grassroots level may reach only as far as their community organizers. Protected area managers should take pains to gather local names of plants, animals and local appreciations of their relationships and uses to improve the management planning process.
- There is a paradox in forest projects which needs to be dealt with frontally – one that treats forest dwellers both as beneficiaries and as threats. Many have sidestepped this issue and operate on the assumption that because of the first, the second will be neutralized. When such assumption fails, there is no incentive to finding the reasons because one can easily use any of a number of factors to explain the failure.

Technical

- Implementation of development activities for livelihood and biodiversity conservation in communities necessitates a well-coordinated effort across provincial, municipal and barangay government units. This would ensure that the government units act together harmoniously towards the common goal for livelihood development and biodiversity conservation.
- Training and education on biodiversity conservation and livelihood is not a one-shot deal. It necessitates a well-tailored plan and careful step-wise implementation so that the project will know where to begin, what to do next and where to end. The project's training activity lacks clear direction to support its goal for livelihood development and biodiversity conservation.
- The livelihood alternatives introduced to communities have been almost solely agriculture-based designed to improve farm production and as a result lead people away from dependence on the forest. However, they will be doomed to failure unless alternatives are provided for all aspects of forest-dependence – energy, building materials, medicines. All alternatives should complement biodiversity conservation over and above reducing human pressure on the forest.
- Technical know-how among the project staff, NGO partners and service providers is wanting on forest

resource management, agro-forestry, and biodiversity conservation. Improvement in these will help bring about appropriate knowledge and skills to partner communities.

- The project's initiative to integrate biodiversity conservation and the SINP in the elementary and high school curricula in partnership with the DEd-8 is an excellent innovation in raising awareness and understanding about biodiversity conservation building on the experience of other countries in that raising awareness amongst children raises awareness amongst their parents as well.
- The failure of the project to accomplish the farming systems review which could have been the basis for identifying appropriate and biodiversity-friendly farming systems has created unfavorable effects to the kind of livelihood alternatives that have been introduced in the COP sites.
- Dissemination of IEC materials in communities is not a guarantee to improving awareness and understanding of communities especially on the technical aspects of the project. It should be supported with a face-to-face extension approach through seminars, trainings and focus group discussions.
- The approach of the project to the creation of development plans such as the FLUP has been complicated and costly. If plans are intended for adoption by the LGUs, they should have been made simpler and less costly to implement considering the limitations of LGUs in terms of technical capacity and funding.

List (or if detailed summarize) the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation

The TE makes the following recommendations:

Strategic

- The dedication of the staff holding dual roles should be recognized formally, if possible.
- Immediate steps be taken, within Phase one if possible, to ensure that no other permits over areas covered by the SINP be given without PAMB authorization. A rigorous system will have to be designed in order to ensure that the PAMB makes its decisions according to recent stock estimates and a system of collective approvals would ensure efficiency.
- The Project and the SIBF as project partner participate fully in the Scoping and any stage in the EIA process that is open to the public, particularly in providing technical details from the results of the BRA, on the biodiversity value and sensitivity of the proposed areas, and allowing the EIA Review Committee to use maps of old growth forest areas for determination of the legality and viability of the mines.
- The Project determines how critical the areas covered by the extractive activities are, and focuses advocacy on gaining consensus on the bounds of old growth forests.
- In order to reduce illegal tree-felling, activities need to be undertaken to a) improve appraisals of the extent of the problem by estimating the remaining timber stock against firewood and shelter needs of the current residents of the Park; b) provision within the livelihood focus of alternatives for firewood and building needs as well as food and economic improvements; and c) extending advocacy to make the link between small-scale logging and floods/landslides also prevalent in the public mind.
- The awareness raising program be extended to include the civil servants within the other Bureaus of the DENR at both national and Region 8, particularly those who have a decision-making function, in order to explain a) the global value of the SINP (endemics, globally-threatened species) and the interest and involvement of the international community; and b) the facts that the integrity of the forest as a whole is important to its survival and the areas of second growth have a vital function in buffering the key old growth areas from external influences.
- A staff position should be assigned with the sole function of ensuring comprehensive coordination of the Project with LGU's with the goal of seamless integration of purpose and resources to reach Park objectives.
- The Project simplifies its planning system and concentrates on producing plans that can be adopted easily and implemented realistically by the LGUs
- A summary version of the 10-year PA Management Plan be disseminated widely and integrated with other Plans, and that all necessary means are taken to ensure that activities therein are accomplished
- There is a pressing need to re-examine the mechanisms that are available to providing acceptable levels of representation to stakeholders in the decision-making process for the SINP while reducing significantly the number of persons involved in the executive body. Since it is clear that any such mechanism will lie outside of the provisions of the NIPAS Act, it will be important to ensure that the recommended approach can be supported through appropriate existing or new legislation.
- The SIBP takes the necessary legal steps to ensure that all the proceeds from timber and other products confiscated from the SINP, whether from sales of products confiscated in convictions over illegal use or forfeiture of abandoned products and equipment and vehicles, are used to establish a separate endowment for the SINP, interest from which can be used to sustain day-to-day park operations, including increased operations against the illegal timber and other trades.
- The obvious successes of the Project's advocacy program should be extended to encompass a second

stage of advocacy to generate material as well as political support for park operations and to focus on the dimensions of emerging threats.

- The selection of the PM for any second phase of the Project should be undertaken in a completely transparent fashion with, as far as is possible, one PM serving for the entire period.
- The roles of Project Manager and Project Superintendent are formalized within the management structure of DENR-8 prior to December 2006.
- Short of an event such as illness, resignation or incompetence, a single CPM is elected by the SIBF to the position for the entire period of any second phase of the Project.
- The co-management arrangements for the Project are maintained, and with the proviso that selection procedures for the PM and CPM are changed, that they should continue for any Phase Two of the Project.
- The CTA appointed for any second phase of the Project should be appointed by UNDP and DENR and have no previous connection with DENR-8 and either be a Philippine national from outside of the Visayas or be a foreign national.
- That a) UNDP should facilitate the Project quickly to access innovative ideas for linking livelihoods with biodiversity conservation that could be introduced before the end of the current phase; and b) this aspect requires addressing under any second phase of the Project.
- The GEF Secretariat should consider this point on evaluation criteria [paragraph 109c] and issue guidance through the Regional Technical Advisors to be included in evaluation teams' TORs.
- The GEF recognize that this sort of protected area-focused project still have an important role in conserving global biodiversity, and cautions that the current approaches championed by GEF may not always be the most appropriate and that a mixed portfolio may be more effective in achieving the aims of the CBD. Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater!
- The Project establishes a mechanism through which proper coordination among LGUs at various levels is ensured.
- The PSC takes on a more active role in coordinating the activities of the Project with those of other government agencies and donor groups working in the area.
- The Project Manager instigate a rigorous system of computer back up for each department to be undertaken at the end of each and every week, and that such back-ups are either stored safely but externally to the office, or within a fire-proof safe within the office. Similarly, back-up lists of passwords should be stored securely.

Technical

- The COP livelihood activities should be extended in areas or barangays located within the core zone of the SINP where communities are expected to have been highly dependent on forest resources for livelihood.
- Introduce and develop forest farming and tree-based agroforestry systems in existing kaingin farms and open areas to minimize human pressures on the forests brought about by continuing collection of wood and other forest products, and promote biodiversity-compatible farming systems within communities.
- Introduce rapid assessment and planning for the improvement of the established demonstration farms to showcase biodiversity-compatible farming systems. On-the-ground improvements in the established demonstration sites and even establishment of more appropriate demonstration farms in other locations should be considered for Phase Two.
- The Project needs to implement repeated and longer-term Information, Education, and Communication activities to ensure that communities are influenced to put the principles of community participation in biodiversity conservation and protection into action
- The Project has to coordinate with the LGUs and other existing support-agencies in the area to plan and implement a strategy that will ensure continuing visitation and provision of technical support to local communities

4.6 Quality of the evaluation report Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document "GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for the verification and review of terminal evaluations" for further definitions of the ratings.

4.6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings from other sources such as GEF EO field visits, etc.

None.

4.6.2 Quality of terminal evaluation report	Ratings
A. Does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of	5

the project and the achievement of the objectives?	
B. Is the report internally consistent, is the evidence complete/convincing and are the IA ratings substantiated? .	4
C. Does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy?	6
D. Are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	6
E. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? No. There are figures as of December 2005 by project components plus a confusing annex.	4
F. Does the report present an assessment of project M&E systems?	5

4.6.3 Assessment of processes affected attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

<p>Co-financing and Project Outcomes & Sustainability. If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability, and if it did affect outcomes and sustainability then in what ways and through what causal linkage did it affect it?</p> <p>There were no differences in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing. The TE reports that the funds from the Foundation for Philippine Environment (FPE), USAID and NGOs had been spent on activities significant to the Project. FPE funds were directly provided to KAPPAS (an NGO) operating in Samar Island. USAID funds were spent under SAMBIO (Samar Biodiversity Study) project undertaken in preparation for the SIBP. NGOs also made in-kind contributions.</p> <p>Delays and Project Outcomes & Sustainability. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons responsible for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability, and if it did affect outcomes and sustainability then in what ways and through what causal linkage did it affect it?</p> <p>According to the TE The project was designed as a two-phase project. Phase I was implemented from January 1999-December 2006 (no cost extension was granted for the period January 2004-December 2006) since the project operationally started on the ground in March 2001). Phase II is planned to be implemented from January 2007-December 2008. The timeframe was overly ambitious in attempting to establish the largest wholly terrestrial protected area in the Philippines. Although it was envisaged that the Project would be implemented in two phases, not enough credence was given to the difficulties that could have been foreseen given the number of local government units (including barangays) that would be involved and the complexity that that would engender, the physical difficulties that the terrain imparts on fieldwork, and the political instability on the island. As such, more time and budget should have been allocated to the preparatory phase – something that ultimately occurred through the 20-month extension granted to the project because of slow implementation, but with no increased budget.</p> <p>The extension term to the first phase of the Project has allowed the PMO to fulfill some activities which the logframe identified for Phase Two, specifically: the establishment of a PAMB Executive Committee, documentations of their experiences thus far and other support services for the PAMB; but it has done so without any additional budget for which it must be congratulated.</p> <p>The “growing pains” of the SIBF clearly resulted in inefficiencies leading to delays and failure to achieve certain deliverables, most notably the Farming Systems Review. It appears that the NGOs thought “co-management” was to be completely equal in all respects, e.g. co-signing everything including, say, travel orders, and had apparently requested this, but in reality they found the levels of administration burdensome and two of the CPMs interviewed complained that the amount of administration meant that they had too little time to be effective in leading on their allocated tasks of advocacy and livelihoods.</p> <p>Delay in the Biodiversity Resource Assessment (itself in part delayed by the New People's Army activity) has in part been responsible for delays in the PA Management Plan. A dearth of PA planning specialists has not helped. The idea to develop watershed management plans to break the task of planning for a big PA into smaller manageable areas has simply diverted resources away from the central task and proved given a false sense of progress.</p>

4.7 Is a technical assessment of the project impacts described in	Yes:	No: X
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the TE recommended? Please place an "X" in the appropriate box and explain below.

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Explain: The alternative livelihood activities have already been reviewed by UNDP.

4.8 Sources of information for the preparation of the TE review in addition to the TE (if any)

Project Brief, PIR06