

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Independent Evaluation Office, APR 2015

## 1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		2111	
GEF Agency project ID		537484	
GEF Replenishment Phase		GEF-3	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank/ International Finance Corporation (IFC)	
Project name		Russia Sustainable Energy Finance Program	
Country/Countries		Russia	
Region		Europe and Central Asia	
Focal area		Climate Change	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		CC-2	
Executing agencies involved		Not given	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		None Reported	
Private sector involvement		A number of financial institutions were partners in the project: MDM Bank; Agropromcredit; Credit Bank Moscow; Prime Finance; Tatfondbank; SME Bank; VEB; NBD; URSA Bank; Indep Leasing; TransCapital Bank; Absolut Bank; Center-Invest; and Locko.	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		March 17, 2005	
Effectiveness date / project start		Not given	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		June 2010	
Actual date of project completion		December 2012	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M) <sup>1</sup>	At Completion (US \$M) <sup>2</sup>
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding		
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		7	4.64
Co-financing	IA own	.15	
	Government		
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	1	
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		7	4.64
Total Co-financing		1.15	
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		8.15	
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		August 21, 2013	
Author of TE		Not given	
TER completion date		1/4/2016	

<sup>1</sup> The project documents do not provide final project financing information at endorsement. These figures are taken from the TE narrative on page 8.

<sup>2</sup> Unable to decipher co-financing at completion from the table provided in the TE (pg. 11).

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## 2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF IEO Review
Project Outcomes	NR	S	--	S
Sustainability of Outcomes	NR	NR	--	ML
M&E Design	NR	NR	--	S
M&E Implementation	NR	NR	--	UA
Quality of Implementation	NR	NR	--	UA
Quality of Execution	NR	NR	--	UA
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	NR	--	--	MU

## 3. Project Objectives

### 3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The Global Environmental Objective is not directly stated as such in the project document (PD) or Terminal Evaluation (TE). However, the goal of the project is to “establish a sustainable market capacity in Russia to develop and finance commercial investments which increase the efficient use of energy or enable the use of new energy resources (renewable and other) which emit a reduced level of greenhouse gases” (Revised 2009 PD, pg. 1).

### 3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The Development Objective is “to create a sustainable commercial lending market for energy efficiency, which continues in the absence of IFC credit lines and GEF guarantees” (Revised 2009 PD, pg. 4).

### 3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The project was originally approved in 2005 under the title *Russian Federation: Financing Energy Efficiency in the Russian Federation*. The initial program had a three-pronged approach for addressing barriers to financing energy efficiency (EE) or renewable energy (RE) projects in Russia: (1) targeted credit lines, which can only be used for financing EE/RE projects, (2) partial credit guarantees for financial institutions, and (3) a technical assistance package to financial institutions (FIs) to help them build an EE loan portfolio and to project developers to ensure that the FIs see adequate, well-prepared deal flow. Three years into implementation however, the partial guarantee instrument had not been taken up by any bank. An external midterm review recommended that project funds allocated for the partial guarantee instrument be rededicated to the technical assistance package. In 2009, the project was amended to meet the demand for advisory services/technical assistance and retitled *Russia Sustainable Energy Finance Program* (Revised 2009 PD, pg. 2; 31). The original global environmental and development objectives remained the same.

#### 4. GEF IEO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

<b>4.1 Relevance</b>	Rating: <b>Satisfactory</b>
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The TE provides a rating of “excellent” for strategic relevance. This TER, which uses a different scale, adjusts this rating to Satisfactory. The project aims to increase the flow of capital from Russian financial institutions to energy efficiency projects, which is consistent with GEF-3 Strategic Priority Climate Change 2, *Increased Access to Local Sources of Financing for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency* (Revised 2009 PD, pg. 1). The project is also consistent with Russian policies and laws governing energy conservation and energy sector development. The Energy Conservation Law (1996) provides basic financial and economic mechanisms and benefits for promoting energy efficiency investments. The “Main Provisions of the Energy Strategy to 2020” also promotes administrative and economic measures for promoting energy efficiency measures such as tax benefits for energy efficiency investments and accelerated depreciation of energy saving equipment. Additionally, the “Main Provisions of Energy Policy and Structural Reforming the Fuel-Energy Sector to 2010” prioritizes a sustainable energy supply, improving energy efficiency, and creating conditions for the transfer of the economy to energy savings development. At the regional level, local governments have also developed legal and regulatory frameworks for energy efficiency (Revised 2009 PD, pgs. 9-11).

<b>4.2 Effectiveness</b>	Rating: <b>Satisfactory</b>
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The TE provides a rating of “successful” for development effectiveness. This TER, which uses a different scale, provides a rating of Satisfactory. Although the project had to adjust its strategy three years into implementation, it largely achieved the expected key outcomes and targets. In particular, the project strengthened the capacity of financial institutions to develop credit lines for energy efficiency projects. Clients also demonstrated an increased capacity to develop energy efficient projects, and the supporting policies and legal frameworks were strengthened.

A summary of the project’s achievements, by objective, is provided below:

- **Objective 1: Establish and monitor the operations of IFC-GEF investment facility:**  
 Expected results under this objective included (1) the establishment of the investment facility, and (2) increased capacity of individual financial institutions to create business strategies for developing an EE lending business (Revised 2009 PD, pg. 32). The key indicator for this objective was the number of financial institutions using portfolio guarantees. As noted above, financial institutions did not pursue the partial guarantee instrument, and as a result the project moved away from this strategy three years into implementation. However, an investment facility was established and by project end seven financial institutions (out of a targeted seven) had received funding through credit lines. The total value of the disbursed credit lines was \$148.2 million, out of a targeted \$180 million (TE pg. 6). In addition, the project developed a toolkit for energy efficiency lending for participating financial institutions (2009 Q2 PIR, pg. 1). Moreover, the TE notes that “banks are equipped with methodology for identification, development, and financing of EE [energy efficiency] loans and are capable to offer new banking products on the market (TE pg. 7).
- **Objective 2: Support development of EE projects by participating FIs and their clients:**  
 Expected results under this objective included increased capacity of financial institutions and project developers to appraise and structure individual transactions (Revised 2009 PD, pg. 36). By project end, 29 out of a targeted 30 financial institution employees knew how to assess, structure and monitor loans to energy efficiency transactions. In addition, 16 out of the targeted 17 financial institutions received tailored support in this area (TE pg. 5). This resulted in the disbursement of 342 loans, out of a targeted 255. The total value of loans disbursed was \$222.25 million, surpassing the targeted \$170 million (TE pg. 6).
- **Objective 3: Improve market awareness and understanding of energy efficiency:**  
 Expected results under this objective included increased awareness of energy efficiency opportunities within targeted sectors and the dissemination of best practices/lessons learned (Revised 2009 PD, pg. 40). By project end, 84 public information events were held and 201 workshops and training events were held. The project also undertook study tours for bank officers and a press tour for journalists covering energy efficiency topics. Additionally, the project produced a number of studies on energy efficiency potential and technologies. By project end, 75% of project clients reported using project materials in their work (out of a targeted 80%) (TE pg. 6).
- **Objective 4: Strengthen capacity of emerging local project developers:**  
 Expected results under this objective included increased capacity of energy efficiency product/service providers to develop strategies for growing an energy efficient business, such as undertaking energy audits, energy efficiency project design, and managing the effective implementation of energy efficiency investments (Revised 2009 PD, pg. 40). By project end, 19 out of a targeted 18 project developers received tailored support, with a total of 2,464 hours of

advisory services (TE pg. 5). This support resulted in the financing of 342 energy efficiency projects (TE pg. 3).

- **Objective 5: Provide policy and legal support to EE investment projects given the evolving legislative landscape:**

Expected results under this objective included increased awareness of financial institutions on the rules and regulations of the Russian energy sector, and the dissemination of pilot experiences and lessons learned (Revised 2009 PD, pg. 41). The project supported the development of a legal framework for deploying energy efficiency for the Russian industrial sector. The project conducted market research on the challenges of energy promotion and presented the report, “Energy Efficiency in Russia: Untapped Reserves,” to the Russian president, which led to the adoption of Federal Law #261 on Energy Savings and Energy Efficiency in 2009 (TE pg. 4). Overall, by project end, 25 new laws, regulations, amendments, codes, and government policies were drafted (TE pg. 5).

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: <b>Moderately Satisfactory</b>
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The TE provides a rating of “excellent” for project efficiency. This TER, which uses a different scale, provides a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory**. The project experienced moderate shortcomings, largely due to the Russian financial crisis which delayed the implementation of key activities. The partner financial institutions temporarily decreased their lending for energy efficiency projects and the IFC also made no new commitments for energy efficiency lending (2009 Q2 PIR pg. 2). However, the project supported existing clients during this time by advising them on low-cost energy saving measures and lending eventually resumed (2009 Q4 PIR pg. 2).

The project’s completion date was also extended twice, first from June 2010 to June 2012, and then for a second time to December 2012. The 2010 PIR indicated that the first extension was due to (1) increased demand for project services supporting IFC climate change related investments, (2) growing interest from the public sector for sustainable energy finance capacity building, (3) continued need for regulatory reform work, and (4) heightened momentum for new financial products supporting sustainable energy finance and knowledge management across IFC regions (pg. 2). The second extension allowed the project to complete its outcomes.

The TE does not provide a full cost-benefit analysis, however the TE estimated that for each \$1 spent, the project facilitated \$33 of investment in sustainable energy finance projects. The project also estimated that for every \$1.25 spent, one ton of greenhouse emissions were avoided (TE pg. 8).

The TE does not provide a rating for project sustainability. This TER provides a rating of **Moderately Likely** based on an assessment of the following financial, sociopolitical, and institutional risks in the operating environment.

#### **Financial Resources**

This TER rates the sustainability of financial resources as **Moderately Likely**. The project signed a memorandum of understanding with the Russian Development Bank to assist them with rolling out sustainable energy finance lending to their 190 partner banks. In addition, a follow-up project, Europe and Central Asia Sustainable Energy Financing (ECASEF), was also launched in Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Serbia (TE pg. 10). However, the TE notes that the macroeconomic environment continues to present risks to energy efficiency lending as banks are susceptible to liquidity issues, volatile exchange rates, and the regulation of domestic currencies by central banks (TE pg. 9).

#### **Sociopolitical**

This TER rates sociopolitical sustainability as **Likely**. Partner financial institutions have continued to demonstrate support for the long-term objectives of the project, as evidenced by the seven banks which continue to offer sustainable energy finance as a banking product. The TE does not note any significant social or political risks that could undermine the outcomes of the project.

#### **Institutional Framework and Governance**

This TER rates institutional framework and governance as **Moderately Likely**. Although there is still progress to be made, the project has contributed to improving the legal framework for deploying energy efficiency for the Russian industrial sector. The TE notes that the execution of Federal Law #261 has resulted in setting energy efficiency targets in regional government budgets and creating regional funds to incentivize energy efficiency approaches. In addition, the Russian Energy Agency was established to coordinate regional and federal efforts (TE pg. 7).

#### **Environmental**

The TE and project documents do not provide enough information to assess environmental sustainability.

## 5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

It is unclear from the information provided in the TE whether or not co-financing materialized at the expected levels.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project experienced minor delays in implementing lending activities due to the Russian financial crisis in 2009. The project was granted two no-cost extensions, pushing the completion date back from June 2010 to December 2012. These extensions allowed the project to fully achieve its expected outcomes.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

The TE does not provide enough information to adequately assess country ownership. The Russian government did not provide co-financing for the project. However, the project worked closely with the Russian government to develop a legal framework for energy efficiency (Federal Law #261) (TE pg. 14).

## 6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: <b>Satisfactory</b>
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The TE does not provide a rating for M&E design at entry. The results framework included in the project documents outlines the expected objectives but does not include the expected outputs. This omission makes it difficult to decipher the lower level results that are expected to contribute toward the achievement of the project's objectives. The results framework does include SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and timely) indicators, data collection methods, timeframe, staff person responsible, and targets. The M&E plan also indicates key monitoring and evaluation activities,

including establishing a baseline, regular data collection and verification, training local partners in monitoring energy savings data, regular reporting, and external evaluations. The M&E plan outlines a team responsible for executing these M&E activities, including a staff person responsible for tracking data on a regular basis and maintaining the files necessary for data verification and analysis; an independent contractor responsible for the midterm and final evaluations; engineering contractors responsible for confirming GHG emission levels; and financial institutions responsible for reporting on their loan portfolios (Revised 2009 PD, pgs. 66-73). A \$200,000 budget is also provided to cover M&E costs. Overall, the M&E design is appropriate for the project.

<b>6.2 M&amp;E Implementation</b>	Rating: <b>Unable to Assess</b>
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The TE does not provide a rating for M&E implementation, nor does it provide sufficient information for this TER to assess this component. It appears from the PIRs and TE that output and outcome level data was regularly reported on. The project also provided partner financial institutions with “Sustainable Energy Calculators” for collecting impact level data regarding energy savings, energy cost reductions, and GHG emission reductions. Additionally, a midterm review and final evaluation were conducted in 2008 and 2013, respectively.

**7. Assessment of project implementation and execution**

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

<b>7.1 Quality of Project Implementation</b>	Rating: <b>Unable to Assess</b>
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This TER is unable to objectively assess the quality of project implementation, as the sole evidence provided comes from the implementing agency itself, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). It should be noted however that there were few delays in implementation. The IFC appears to have effectively changed its strategy when it became evident that the partial guarantee instrument was not working. The project was extended twice in order to fully achieve its outcomes, however this is not out of the norm for GEF projects. The IFC self-reports in the TE that it is was able to (1) help and guide client banks through the full cycle of SEF product development and implementation, (2) assisted client



financial institutions to attract new clients, (3) strengthened client banks' portfolios by identifying new clients with a strategic vision, (4) helped diversify the banks' portfolios with new clients/products, and (5) improved the banks' images as socially responsible banks (TE pg. 8)

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: <b>Unable to Assess</b>
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The TE does not provide any information on the executing agency.

## 8. Assessment of Project Impacts

***Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.***

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

Through the financing of energy efficiency projects, the TE estimates that the project contributed to 2.1 million megawatt-hours saved; 558,532 tons of CO<sub>2</sub> avoided annually; and \$46 million of energy costs saved (TE pg. 7).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The TE does not cite any evidence of socioeconomic change that occurred by the end of the project.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. "Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project

activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

The TE notes changes in the capacity of financial institutions to identify, develop, and finance energy efficiency loans. Seven financial institutions have continued to disburse sustainable energy finance loans after the agreements had ended. The TE cites one bank in particular, the Center Invest Bank, who received a \$4 million credit line in 2006 and financed 12 projects. The Center Invest Bank was then able to finance 156 projects totaling \$70 million in sustainable energy finance loans from other multilateral development banks (TE pg. 7).

b) Governance

The project established a group to advise the Ministry of Economic Development on the drafting of a new federal law on energy efficiency. By project end, Federal Law #261 had been implemented, resulting in new energy efficiency targets in regional government budgets and regional funds to incentivize energy efficiency approaches. In addition, the Russian Energy Agency was established to coordinate regional and federal efforts (TE pg. 7). The TE also reports that 25 new laws, regulations, amendments, codes, and government policies were drafted (TE pg. 5).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The TE does not cite any evidence of unintended impacts that occurred by the end of the project.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The TE notes that a follow-up project was launched based on the knowledge and experience gained from the Russia project. The follow-up project will target energy efficiency markets in Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Serbia. In addition, the project signed a memorandum of understanding with the Russian Development Bank to roll out sustainable energy finance lending to an additional 190 partner banks in Russia (TE pg. 10).

## 9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The TE states the following lessons learned (TE pgs. 13-15):

- ESCOs [Energy Service Companies] should not be overestimated as "one-fits-all" solution at underdeveloped markets. More complex transactions are possible to realize at a more mature markets.
- When a program considers charging a client the following considerations should be taken into account: 1) ready market; 2) value-added Sustainable Energy Finance (SEF) product; 3) capacity of IFC to deliver, 4) volume of business the client can generate.
- Design of new SEF [sustainable energy finance] programs should always include evaluation of legal and policy environment. In case of identified barriers, the public policy component should be enhanced by cooperation within the WB [World Bank].
- A very good link with investment provides for an offer that meets clients' needs best. On those markets where liquidity is of demand the package of IFC offering that includes both IS [investment services] and AS [advisory services] works best. It allows IFC to be flexible in pricing and be faster in responding to changing market demands. When IFC can offer IS+AS package the bank has to take a decision once, not twice. And when bank management can consider IS+AS costs together, that makes all decision making process more straightforward.
- Success of SEF [sustainable energy finance] in a bank depends on a demonstrated systemic approach and includes the following key factors: commitment of the senior management, accentuated EE [energy efficiency] as a specialized banking product, and fine-tuning of internal bank procedures including introducing KPIs [key performance indicators] and incentives. When all those factors are in place and the strategy of a particular bank is clear SEF could be adapted to any specific client segment: micro, SME [small and medium enterprises], corporate etc.
- SEF [sustainable energy finance] methodology developed by RSEFP [the project] is flexible enough to be adapted to local client FI [financial institution] needs and market specific. However the overall approach for any client FI is always the same: i) get senior management buy-in, ii) brand and market the new SEF lending separately from other products and iii) help the client to build the pipeline by training for sales staff and client visits.

## 9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

The Project Completion Report, or TE as it is referred to in this TER, does not provide any separate recommendations. However, the executive summary of the Terminal Evaluation conducted in 2013 was available online and provided the following lessons learned/recommendations (pgs. 4-6):

**Lesson Learned 1:** Continuing financial market uncertainties limit the short-term outlook for SEF [sustainable energy finance] products without credit facility support.

**Recommendation 1:** At least in the short term, IFC should continue to offer credit facilities to support greater SEF penetration in the Russian market.

**Lesson Learned 2:** A holistic strategy of de-risking policy, lowering financial barriers, and raising awareness has helped transform the Russian EE [energy efficiency] market, but significant EE market penetration is still years away.

**Recommendation 2:** A suitable organization should be identified to ensure continued EE outreach and dissemination of SEF knowledge after RSEFP [the project] closes.

**Lesson Learned 3:** A “One IFC” approach to SEF is crucial to ensuring the successful adoption of SEF by partner FIs [financial institutions].

**Recommendation 3:** A protocol should be developed to detail coordination/reporting requirements between AS [advisory services] and IS [investment services]. This should be undertaken at the start of the program to ensure key responsibilities and lines of communication are defined, and internal capacity is sufficiently built.

**Lesson Learned 4:** Charging fees for Advisory Services (AS) has been successful although some FIs have noted it a barrier to participation.

**Recommendation 4:** AS should continue to be provided on a fee basis; although, the transparency in AS costs per client might need to be strengthened.

**Lesson Learned 5:** A comprehensive process for reporting on program activities and performance was established; however, there are still areas for improvement.

**Recommendation 5:** RSEFP should encourage FIs to provide more robust and detailed project data, including actual energy savings achieved by projects.

**Lesson Learned 6:** RSEFP has been successful in developing SE [sustainable energy] projects, in particular, those with longer payback periods.

**Recommendation 6:** Program targets should be clearly prioritized in order to ensure that activities support the principle aims of the program

**Lesson Learned 7:** AS proved to be an effective, flexible tool to engage with private and state FIs to extend the reach of the program.

**Recommendation 7:** Since the overall objective of SEF is to facilitate investment in EE and RE [renewable energy], IFC should consider making exceptions to enable AS to work with state banks in future programs, if relevant to the market.

## 10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF IEO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The report provides a brief overview of the outputs, outcomes, and impacts of the project but does not compare them to the expected results outlined in the project design. This makes it difficult to assess the achievement of the objectives.	<b>MU</b>
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The report provides tables which include the indicator data for the project. However, evidence is missing for key sections such as relevance, efficiency, country ownership, project implementation and project execution.	<b>U</b>
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The report does not directly assess project sustainability. This TER was able to extrapolate some evidence of sustainability from different sections of the narrative, however there were a lot of gaps.	<b>MU</b>
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons learned are specific to the investment facility component of the project and supported by the evidence. Greater attention should have been paid to other components of the project, such as improving market awareness and strengthening the capacity of project developers.	<b>MS</b>
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	The report provides some financial information, however it is difficult to ascertain the source of the funding making the information largely unusable.	<b>HU</b>
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	The project does not assess M&E design at entry and provides very little information for M&E implementation.	<b>U</b>
<b>Overall TE Rating</b>		<b>MU</b>

## 11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

[The executive summary of the Terminal Evaluation \(2013\)](#)