

**GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form**

<b>1. PROJECT DATA</b>				
GEF Project ID: 2581		Review date: 03/04/2010		
		<u>at endorsement</u> (Million US\$)		<u>at completion</u> (Million US\$)
IA/EA Project ID:		<b>GEF financing:</b>	8.91	13.52
Project Name:	Add-on Project for "Building Capacity for Effective Participation in the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH)	IA/EA own:		
Country:	Global	Government:	0.62	
		Other*:	0.43	1.4
		<b>Total Cofinancing</b>	1.05	1.40
Operational Program:	Ops1-4, OP13 Focal Area- Biosafety/Biodiversity	<b>Total Project Cost:</b>	9.96	14.92
IA	UNEP	<u>Dates</u>		
Partners involved:		Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		March 2004
		Closing Date	Proposed: Mar 2007	Actual: Dec 2008
Prepared by: Pallavi Nuka	Reviewed by: Ines Angulo	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing (in months): 36	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing (in months): 57	Difference between original and actual closing (in months): 21 months
Author of TE:		TE completion date: June 2009	TE submission date to GEF EO: July 2009	Difference between TE completion and submission date (in months): 1 month

\* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

\*\*Total co-financing does not include in-kind contributions from countries.

**2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS AND KEY FINDINGS**

Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluation reviews for further definitions of the ratings.

Performance Dimension	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office evaluations or reviews	GEF EO
2.1a Project outcomes	N/A	S	S	S
2.1b Sustainability of Outcomes	N/A	U	U	U
2.1c Monitoring and evaluation	N/A	HS	HS	HS
2.1d Quality of implementation and Execution	N/A	S	S	HS
2.1e Quality of the evaluation report	N/A	N/A	HS	S

2.2 Should the terminal evaluation report for this project be considered a good practice? Why?

Yes, the TE report addressed all aspects of the TOR in a well-organized format. The report presented a comprehensive and detailed assessment of project performance against objectives and targeted outputs. The report also assessed project implementation and the project's M&E systems. Information on actual costs and total co-financing amounts was presented. The lessons and recommendations are well written.

2.3 Are there any evaluation findings that require follow-up, such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, mismanagement, etc.?

No such findings were noted in the report.

### 3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

#### 3.1 Project Objectives

**a. What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?**

As noted in the project document, the global environmental objective of this project was to support the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. More specifically the project aimed to “develop core human resources and establish an appropriate national infrastructure for the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH),” so as to enable all eligible countries to fully participate and benefit from the BCH as established in the Cartagena Protocol (p. 2).

There were no changes in global environmental objectives during implementation.

**b. What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation? (describe and insert tick in appropriate box below, if yes at what level was the change approved (GEFSEC, IA or EA)?)**

The project document specifies that the development objective of this project was “to assist eligible countries in building and strengthening the national capacity needed to enable access and use of the BCH in order to implement their obligations under the Protocol now that it has entered into force (p. 6).” The overall objective was to be achieved through following outcomes:

- (a) Strengthened capacity of eligible Parties achieved through support activities including training for key stakeholders in relevant national Ministries. Capacity support activities cover (i) data management; (ii) identification and access to information required for decision-making under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and (iii) access to, and registration of information in the BCH.
- (b) Creation of an enabling environment for Parties to meet the obligations for implementation of the Protocol by providing participating countries with appropriate physical infrastructure and resources, such as computer hardware and software, as well as means for the storage and exchange of data with the BCH through Internet connectivity.
- (c) Support for further capacity building activities through the development and dissemination of an interactive computer-based training package including the BCH toolkit. This training package was to be developed at the global level and used for training as well distributed in participating countries.

There were no changes in development objectives during implementation.

Overall Environmental Objectives	Project Development Objectives	Project Components	Any other (specify)	
<b>c. If yes, tick applicable reasons for the change (in global environmental objectives and/or development objectives)</b>				
Original objectives not sufficiently articulated	Exogenous conditions changed, due to which a change in objectives was needed	Project was restructured because original objectives were over ambitious	Project was restructured because of lack of progress	Any other (specify)

### 4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND SUSTAINABILITY

**4.1.1 Outcomes (Relevance can receive either a satisfactory rating or a unsatisfactory rating. For effectiveness and cost efficiency a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU will be used)**

**a. Relevance**

**Rating: S**

This project was proposed as an add-on project to extend the progress made under the UNEP-GEF Project on Development of National Biosafety Frameworks (NBF). The project was designed to support eligible nations in implementing the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and project objectives are fully complementary with the aims of the NBF project. Project outcomes are also relevant to the GEF Initial Strategy, which highlighted the need for activities “to enable countries to participate in the biosafety clearing-house, once the clearing-house terms of reference are agreed upon by the Parties.” Project outcomes have facilitated the ability of the eligible countries to readily access scientific, technical, environmental and legal information on living modified organisms (LMOs), and assisted implementation of the Protocol in ensuring an adequate level of protection for biodiversity in the field of safe transfer, handling and use of LMOs.

**b. Effectiveness**

**Rating: S**

The project has successfully achieved all targeted outputs, but actual outcomes are not entirely commensurate with expected outcomes. The project has enhanced the capacity of eligible countries to implement the Protocol through training and advisory networks and created an enabling environment for Parties to meet their obligations by ensuring access to the BCH. The project has also supported further capacity building through the dissemination of a computer-based training package and other training materials. But, national capacities for implementing the Protocol have not been uniformly enhanced. Factors such as the absence of national biosafety frameworks and legislation have dampened the effectiveness of project outcomes.

Activities addressing national capacities for implementing the Protocol (Outcome 1) have been largely successful. The creation of regionally-based advisor networks, combined with the use of interactive modules, case studies and simulations, have contributed to enhanced national capacities on the issue of biosafety. Expert regional advisors trained and worked closely with national level counterparts. The regional advisors conducted 400 national visits, 31 global missions, 142 national workshops, and trained over 2,000 national participants (p. 21). By focusing training resources on national workshops instead of regional events, the project was able to cover more ground by reaching wider audiences of national participants. The TE report notes that the set of training materials was “exceptional in its scope and pedagogic approach (p. 14).”

The aim of development an enabling environment for countries to meet their obligations under the Protocol (Outcome 2) has also been achieved. All countries are now connected and able to access the BCH Central Portal, with approximately 80% directly connected to the central portal, which is the simplest and more cost-effective method. The TE report notes that use of the BCH both by countries and by third party researchers is rising steadily. However, the purchase of computers specifically for biosafety purposes has had mixed results. Over half the GEF grant went to hardware purchases and this probably encouraged wide participation in the project. But, based on information in the TE report, following project closure “the use of computers for BCH or biosafety activities is negligible (p. 19).”

The third outcome concerning sustained capacity to use and access the BCH has had mixed effectiveness for reasons that are more closely linked to national mandates and enabling environment than project performance. The project’s training workshops and regional advisory support have raised country awareness and familiarized participants with the BCH, but greater continuity and follow-up are needed to make these capacities operational. The implementation of 6-8 training workshops over the course of a year or two is insufficient to achieve this outcome in many countries. The TE report notes that the project itself triggered renewed momentum and capacity building in the participating countries, but “in most cases this was not consolidated into a system or culture of practice that can be sustained without external support.” Countries lacking legal and institutional frameworks for biosafety, objectives of the NBF project, have not been able to effectively apply the capacity improvements or use the knowledge generated by the project.

**c. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness)**

**Rating: MS**

The original GEF grant amount of \$8.9 M was increased by over 50% to \$13.5 M to accommodate 112 countries rather than the original 50. The project was extended twice and slated to close in March 2009 after the second extension. The delays were generally attributable to slow country response and implementation rather than project performance. The project actually terminated operations in Dec. 2008, only 21 months behind its original schedule. All project activities were completed and MOUs closed in 95 countries; the remaining 17 countries were on track to finish within 6-months of the terminal evaluation.

Based on information in the TE report project funds were effectively applied and administered, and “the use of project resources was generally efficient (p. 3).” The investment in building a regional advisor network on biosafety issues was deemed particularly cost-effective as it proved very useful in this project and the network can be deployed in future projects relating to the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol. The only aspect of the project judged cost-ineffective is the purchase of computer hardware with GEF country grants. As mentioned earlier, over half the GEF grant was used for hardware purchases. The TE report notes that this was “unnecessary in many cases (p. 36), suggesting that half the project budget was not effectively used. The project’s cost-effectiveness is rated MS

accordingly.”

#### 4.1.2 Impacts: summarize the achieved intended or unintended impacts of the project.

The BCH was not intended as a “stand alone” project and aimed to extend the progress made under the NBF project, so project impacts should perhaps be viewed from a broader perspective in which the BCH project has contributed to and depends on the impacts of the NBF project. The BCH project has achieved intended impacts in delivering quality training and technical support to 112 countries effectively. The TE report notes that the project’s greatest contribution has been the “general awareness-raising,” and “demystifying” of biosafety issues relevant to the Cartagena Protocol and the BCH (p. 17). National participants are now better informed and have the opportunity to collaborate through the BCH. Project activities have also helped to advance biosafety policies and institutions in several countries. However, the TE report cautions that impacts have been quite short-lived in many other countries, stating, “the use of capacities acquired under the BCH project is declining in many if not most countries (p. 13).” Project impacts in many countries have been tempered by national realities such as the lack of legislative and institutional frameworks on biosafety, as well as (in some cases) the lack of an operational budget. Only a few countries participating in the project have engaged in activities such as biosafety risk assessments or issuing LMO decisions, indicating that project impacts are limited.

**4.2 Likelihood of sustainability.** Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four point scale (4= Likely (no or negligible risk); 3= Moderately Likely (low risk); 2= Moderately Unlikely (substantial risks) to 1= Unlikely (High risk)). The ratings should be given taking into account both the probability of a risk materializing and the anticipated magnitude of its effect on the continuance of project benefits.

<b>a. Financial resources</b>	<b>Rating: MU</b>
Many of participating countries have not committed sustained financing for biosafety or BCH related issues at the national level. Sustained national financing will depend on countries’ legislative and institutional frameworks for meeting obligations under the Cartagena Protocol.	
<b>b. Socio-political</b>	<b>Rating: MU</b>
There is no broad based support or awareness of the Cartagena Protocol, which makes it difficult to develop political support for biosafety legislation. The BCH project only implicated a few national experts or civil servants, and there was little involvement by political actors or NGOs. Dissemination of project documents, trainings, and workshops were limited to a small group and did not help to advance public or political understanding of the issue. As long as biosafety issues have low political priority relative to issues such as food security, there will be a high risk to the sustainability of project outcomes.	
<b>c. Institutional framework and governance</b>	<b>Rating: U</b>
Many countries lack the enabling biosafety legislation, policies, or institutional policies to sustain project outcomes or effectively implement the Protocol. Only one country has adopted biosafety legislation, three countries have bills under parliamentary review in three countries, and another three have secured cabinet approval for proposed laws.	
<b>d. Environmental</b>	<b>Rating: L</b>
No environmental risks to the sustainability of project outcomes were noted.	

#### 4.3 Catalytic role

<b>a. Production of a public good</b>
The training materials and packages developed by the project were of very high quality and have the potential to be adapted for use in future projects.
<b>b. Demonstration</b>
There were no catalytic results at the level of demonstration.
<b>c. Replication</b>
Based on information in the TE report, the project, or an aspect of the project, has not been replicated in external contexts.
<b>d. Scaling up</b>
There is evidence of scaling up based on the TE report.

#### 4.4 Assessment of processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

<b>a. Co-financing.</b> To what extent was the reported cofinancing (or proposed cofinancing) essential to achievement of GEF objectives? Were components supported by cofinancing well integrated into the project? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?
As the project was expanded to include 112 participating countries, co-financing and in-kind contributions increased



The M&E system provided extensive real time feedback and was used as an adaptive management tool. Workshops for regional advisors included participant analysis of project strengths and weaknesses, sustainability and “lessons learned” as part of the wider experience-sharing exercise. Such meetings provided important spaces for group reflection, enhancing adaptive management and learning. The learning derived from the project was distilled into a project publication. The large volume of reports and information generated by M&E activities was organized by ANUBIS, a management system data base that provided quick access to country documents, mission reports, workshop evaluations, project expenditures and regional advisor availability. ANUBIS and especially MOODLE, an open knowledge-sharing platform used by regional advisors, have facilitated knowledge management through communication and learning.

b.3 Can the project M&E system (or an aspect of the project M&E system) be considered a good practice? If so, explain why.  
 Yes, the M&E was very well implemented and it provided real time information on progress, which was fed back into the project. The information management system utilized by the project is a model for to monitor multi-country projects.

**4.6 Assessment of Quality of Implementation and Execution**

**a. Overall Quality of Implementation and Execution (on a six point scale): S**

**b. Overall Quality of Implementation – for IA (on a six point scale): S**

*Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as quality of the project design, focus on results, adequacy of supervision inputs and processes, quality of risk management, candor and realism in supervision reporting, and suitability of the chosen executing agencies for project execution.*

The implementing agency for this project was UNEP. The project design was based on a consultative process and used input from the earlier NBF project (p. 21). UNEP used an innovate approach to implementing this project by signing MOUs, rather than the standard project document, with all the participating countries. As a result, the project was relevant to individual country needs, even when enabling biosafety legislation or institutional mandates were lacking. UNEP also simplified grant disbursement to all the participating countries by providing funding in two tranches of 75% and 25% each.

Management and oversight by UNEP was adequate. The TE report notes that all countries were satisfied with the timeliness of grant disbursement by UNEP and the responsiveness of UNEP staff. However, because UNEP lacks country representation, UNDP was contracted to handle financial transactions in some countries. In the large majority of these countries, UNDP performance in procurement and disbursement of funds was judged to be poor (p. 30).

UNEP has maintained a strong focus on the achievement of targeted outputs and has managed risks well. For example, in situations where countries were slow in submitting MOUs or in terminating activities under the MOU, UNEP made efforts to adjust timelines and intervened to push national focal points to complete the MOU document. Project oversight and guidance were also provided by the *BCH Informal Advisory Committee*, composed of national focal points, technical experts and independent organizations including the *International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB)*, *Third World Network*, and the *Global Industry Coalition*.

**c. Quality of Execution – for Executing Agencies<sup>1</sup> (rating on a 6 point scale) HS**

*Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as focus on results, adequacy of management inputs and processes, quality of risk management, and candor and realism in reporting by the executive agency.*

The executing agency for the project was UNEP. The TE report judges project execution highly, commending the project’s “intelligent, well-planned implementation strategy (p. 21).” The core project team was based in UNEP, and relied on a network of regional advisors (biosafety experts) to deliver most of the project activities. Coordination of project activities in 112 countries was facilitated by two online data management systems (ANUBIS and MOODLE).

Based on information in the TE report, the project team was understaffed. The project’s initial staffing provisions did not include IT support staff, and the number of staff was inadequate when the project was increased to 112 countries. UNEP authorized reallocation of funds to hire regional coordinators to assist the Project Manager. Despite these adjustments staffing constraints persisted and each coordinator was responsible for a large number of countries, especially in the case of Africa. As funding for M&E was allocated by each outcome, travel by regional coordinators had to be authorized on a case-by-case basis, lowering the project team’s responsiveness to country requests for

<sup>1</sup> Executing Agencies for this section would mean those agencies that are executing the project in the field. For any given project this will exclude Executing Agencies that are implementing the project under expanded opportunities – for projects approved under the expanded opportunities procedure the respective executing agency will be treated as an implementing agency.

assistance. Despite these constraints, the project team has managed to achieve most of the targeted outputs and fully implement M&E activities.

The TE report notes that the project team has demonstrated “good adaptive management practices,” not just in reallocating staff, but in other areas as well. The project team has successfully resolved technical problems in BCH connectivity, translation inconsistencies in the training modules, and they have worked to mitigate the delays in completing MOUs as well as in other national level activities. The project team had good ties to the NBF project staff, and was able to build on the lessons learned in that earlier project in order to improve this project’s implementation performance.

## 5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assess the project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

### **a. Briefly describe the key lessons, good practice or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects**

1. In spite of initial delays and technical problems, project implementation was very effective and demonstrated good adaptive management practices. The project team took full advantage of the inception phase to build its implementation strategy through consultation, adjusting inputs and introducing new arrangements such as those described above. There were delays resulting from the slow pace of many countries in completing their MOUs. However, the time invested was critical to establish conditions for effective delivery. This has contributed to a consistent implementation process that didn’t face major disruption, subsequent delays or budget problems despite its global scale.
2. Administrative and financial arrangements were adjusted in innovative ways that departed from standard practice yet facilitated implementation considerably. Some have pilot value and could be replicated in future projects. Efficiency gains were realized from using Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) listing project activities and mutual obligations that were easier to approve and administer than project documents for each country. Using on-line management information systems – the ANUBIS data base and MOODLE knowledge sharing platform – enabled the project team and UNEP to process significant amounts of data and monitor resources effectively, while encouraging communication and learning among regional advisors.
3. The timing of the BCH project may have been premature in countries that lacked operational biosafety frameworks. In such cases, countries were unable to make full use of training, infrastructure support and advisory services. Capacity improvements are difficult to retain in these conditions and likely to fade over time, as is already happening in some of the visited countries. This raises questions on the level of country preparedness that should be considered for project eligibility – and the cost-effectiveness of investing in capacities that aren’t applied and cannot be sustained.
4. In most developing countries, the implementation of the Cartagena Protocol and related BCH obligations is project-driven and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Under present conditions, biosafety capacity development cannot be sustained without external support. Continued technical and financial assistance are required over the medium term. Unless capacity improvements are fed into a functional system, there is little point in spending more money, as these processes will remain project-driven with limited national ownership or sustainability. This needs to be considered as countries are encouraged to develop new proposals and expectations are raised.

### **b. Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation**

1. The regional advisor network should be continued. It retains biosafety and IT expertise in the region, knows how to move at the country level and understands the UNEP project cycle. The main stakeholders promoting the Cartagena Protocol – the CBD secretariat, UNEP-GEF biosafety focal points, signatory countries – should ensure that regional advisory teams participate in future biosafety initiatives when feasible. Aside from their demonstrated usefulness in training and technical assistance, further involvement is important to reap full benefit and justify the investment made in their recruitment and training.
2. The overriding need at present is to assist countries in generating the enabling conditions for biosafety practices to take hold. Future project support should help countries consolidate their national biosafety frameworks, addressing needs in legislation, policy and coordination in addition to technical capacity building. The NBF process needs to advance in many countries before technical capacity improvements can be internalized and put to use. This requires more than training or equipment. Project funds need to be earmarked for the legal and technical consultancies, lobbying and coordination efforts that are needed in many countries to move biosafety agendas forward. Many countries still lack the enabling conditions to fulfill their obligations to the Cartagena Protocol and

cannot apply the knowledge derived from the BCH project. These enabling conditions include approving and operationalizing biosafety laws; sensitizing decision-makers; exploring financing and cost-recuperation mechanisms; and practical training on LMO monitoring and risk analysis. The insertion of the BCH project within a broader capacity building approach makes sense and is closer to national realities.

3. Training and technical support need to be adjusted to different levels of national capacity and need, as done by the BCH project. A “one size fits all approach” is not useful to anyone at this stage. Three of the five countries visited were preparing project proposals for continued support on BCH and other biosafety needs. The proposals have been designed with the encouragement and guidance of regional coordinators and UNEP staff. In Guatemala, BCH training materials are used at project formulation workshops financed by GEF project development assistance. All countries are proposing medium-size projects that include “hands-on” BCH guidance within a wider menu of support needs.

4. The DGEF SPO responsible for biosafety should ensure that future projects consider “exit strategies” that will enable them to consolidate BCH and other biosafety capacities in countries and target future project resources. Countries that have ratified the Cartagena Protocol are automatically eligible to receive support regardless of actual commitment or enabling conditions. On the other hand, funding for global biosafety projects is not infinite. At some point UNEP may need to focus resources on developing countries with nascent frameworks that have created their own momentum and are “taking off”; or channel enabling support to lagging countries where opportunities to apply biosafety knowledge and capacities remain low. Contracting a wider range of support services to regional advisors (or involving area institutions) should also be considered to encourage regional dynamics and synergy.

5. Periodic “reality checks” of country biosafety preparedness need to be in place to make better use of project opportunities and resources. Data and links available from the BCH central portal could assist this endeavor. Improved country screening, for example, monitoring national progress on selected biosafety indicators, would help UNEP focus resources on countries that are moving forward, raising the catalytic effect of its assistance. The regional advisors can play a role in formulating the next round of projects according to specific country and regional needs; monitor country progress in developing biosafety frameworks; and assist in raising country preparedness.

**6. QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT**

**6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings based on other information sources such as GEF EO field visits, other evaluations, etc.**

The UNEP EOU assessment of project ratings and performance was consulted for the summary of project ratings. Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluations review for further definitions of the ratings. Please briefly explain each rating.

<b>6.2 Quality of the terminal evaluation report</b>	<b>Ratings</b>
<b>a. To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?</b> The report contains a comprehensive and detailed assessment of outcomes and impacts relative to the objectives stated in the project document.	HS
<b>b. To what extent the report is internally consistent, the evidence is complete/convincing and the IA ratings have been substantiated? Are there any major evidence gaps?</b> The report is internally consistent and substantiates IA ratings. There were no evidence gaps.	S
<b>c. To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy?</b> The report contains a balanced assessment of risks to sustainability.	S
<b>d. To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?</b> The lessons learned are insightful and well supported by the evidence presented on project performance.	S
<b>e. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?</b> The project includes data on actual co-financing from outside sources and actual project costs for the GEF grant amount. Further evidence on in-kind contributions from participating countries would have been useful.	S
<b>f. Assess the quality of the reports evaluation of project M&amp;E systems?</b>	S



The report's assessment of implementation of the M&E system is clear and detailed.	
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<b>7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRERATATION OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REVIEW REPORT EXCLUDING PIRs, TERMINAL EVALUATIONS, PAD.</b>
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No other documents were consulted.
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