

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Independent Evaluation Office, APR 2015

1. Project Data

| Summary project data | | | |
|--|---------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|
| GEF project ID | | 2720 | |
| GEF Agency project ID | | GF/RAF/07/024 | |
| GEF Replenishment Phase | | GEF-3 | |
| Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects) | | UNIDO | |
| Project name | | Regional Project to Develop Appropriate Strategies for Identifying Sites Contaminated by Chemicals Listed in Annexes A, B and/or C of the Stockholm Convention | |
| Country/Countries | | Ghana and Nigeria | |
| Region | | Africa | |
| Focal area | | Persistent Organic Pollutants | |
| Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives | | OP 14; POP SO 4; POP 2 | |
| Executing agencies involved | | Ministry of Environment and Science (Ghana); Federal Ministry of Environment (Nigeria) | |
| NGOs/CBOs involvement | | | |
| Private sector involvement | | | |
| CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP) | | October 30, 2007 | |
| Effectiveness date / project start | | January 3, 2008 | |
| Expected date of project completion (at start) | | December 31, 2012 | |
| Actual date of project completion | | December 31, 2012 | |
| Project Financing | | | |
| | | At Endorsement (US \$M) | At Completion (US \$M) ¹ |
| Project Preparation Grant | GEF funding | .65 | .65 |
| | Co-financing | | |
| GEF Project Grant | | 2 | 1.92 |
| Co-financing | IA own | .3 | .3 |
| | Government | 1.4 | .95 |
| | Other multi- /bi-laterals | .4 | .3 |
| | Private sector | | |
| | NGOs/CSOs | | |
| Total GEF funding | | 2.65 | 2.57 |
| Total Co-financing | | 2.1 | 1.55 |
| Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing) | | 4.75 | 4.12 |
| Terminal evaluation/review information | | | |
| TE completion date | | June 2015 | |
| Author of TE | | Cristóbal Vignal | |
| TER completion date | | 12/18/2015 | |
| TER prepared by | | Laura Nissley | |

¹ The TE does not provide detailed project financing information at completion. These figures are taken from the 2013 Completion Report.

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| TER peer review by (if GEF IEO review) | Molly Watts |
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2. Summary of Project Ratings

| Criteria | Final PIR | IA Terminal Evaluation | IA Evaluation Office Review | GEF IEO Review |
|---|-----------|------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------|
| Project Outcomes | NR | MU | NR | U |
| Sustainability of Outcomes | NR | MU | NR | MU |
| M&E Design | NR | U | NR | MU |
| M&E Implementation | NR | HU | NR | HU |
| Quality of Implementation | NR | MS | NR | U |
| Quality of Execution | NR | NR | NR | MU |
| Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report | -- | -- | S ² | MU |

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The Global Environmental Objective is not stated in the project documents or the Terminal Evaluation (TE).

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The Development Objectives are not stated explicitly as such in the project documents or the TE. The objective of the project, as stated in the TE, is “to build capacity in Ghana and Nigeria to develop strategies to identify land/sites contaminated with persistent organic pollutants (POPs) as implicated in the Stockholm Convention” (pg. 7).

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

There were no changes in the development objectives during implementation.

² The IA Evaluation Office review does not provide a rating for the overall quality of the TE report, however the IA Evaluation Office uses the same sub-criteria and rating scale as the GEFIEO so I was able to assess the overall quality using the same formula.

4. GEF IEO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

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|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| 4.1 Relevance | Rating: Satisfactory |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|

The TE provides a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory** for project relevance. This TER, which uses a different scale, adjusts this rating to **Satisfactory**. As a result of the project, Ghana and Nigeria were expected to have greater capacity to identify and prioritize Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) and develop suitable technologies for land remediation (TE pg. 13). These objectives are consistent with the expected outcomes under the GEF-3 Operational Program 14 on POPs, particularly that *the institutional and human resource capacity for the management of POPs is strengthened*.

Both Ghana and Nigeria are signatories to the Stockholm Convention (SC), under which parties are obligated to “develop appropriate strategies for identifying stockpiles, products and articles in use, and wastes covered by the treaty, after which they must manage the stockpiles in a safe, efficient, and environmentally sound manner” (PD pg. 7). Both countries prepared National Implementation Plans (NIPs) for the SC, and subsequently approached UNIDO and the GEF to assist with developing plans and regulations for the rehabilitation of contaminated sites (TE pg. 12). At the time of the project design, the policies for managing potentially bio-accumulative and toxic substances in both countries were inadequate, however there were already laws in place which were relevant to the project outcomes (PD pg. 9). However, the TE does note that the project was seemingly more relevant for Nigeria, which had a strong presence in the SC and was experienced a significant rise in pollution from POPs. Ghana on the other hand, was included due to its proximity and shared language with Nigeria (TE pg. 19).

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| 4.2 Effectiveness | Rating: Unsatisfactory |
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The TE provides a rating of **Moderately Unsatisfactory** for project effectiveness, which this TER downgrades to **Unsatisfactory**. The project’s achievements were significantly lower than expected. There is no evidence that Nigeria and Ghana have increased their capacity to identify Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) contaminated sites or have the appropriate tools or institutions to select and implement technologies. There has been some progress made in drafting policies and legal frameworks

for controlling POPs and establishing an environmental information management system, however these results are still well below expectations.

It should be noted here that the design for this project is flawed. The TE assessed project effectiveness based on progress made toward expected outcomes, which are briefly outlined in the PD. However, the expected outcomes are not accounted for in the project's logical framework, and do not appear to have been tracked by the project. Limited evidence is therefore available to assess project effectiveness.

The project's achievements, by programmatic outcome, are summarized below:

- **Outcome 1: Nigeria and Ghana would have developed capacity to systematically identify POPs contaminated lands and sites and would have evolved and endorsed regional policy and national legal frameworks for proper management of POPs contaminated sites:**

The Midterm Evaluation (MTE) conducted in March 2011 found that a number of trainings were held for government officials in Nigeria and Ghana, however the TE found no evidence that either country had increased their capacity to systematically identify POPs contaminated sites. Nigeria and Ghana have however made progress in institutionalizing legal frameworks. A policy/legal framework for control of POPs was drafted in Ghana before the end of the project (and passed by the Parliament in 2013) and a draft policy was forwarded to the Nigerian Federal Executive National Council on Environment in 2011 for approval. Additionally, a regional policy/legal framework was finalized and waiting for consideration by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (TE pgs. 21-22).

- **Outcome 2: The countries would have achieved preparing a toolkit for the selection of appropriate technologies for the countries to adopt a stepwise manner using risk assessment/management approach:**

Expected results under this outcome included (1) development of the toolkit for technology selection and (2) trained personnel in its use. The TE notes that the toolkit was developed, however it was deemed to be too sophisticated by key stakeholders in Nigeria and Ghana, and more appropriate in developed country contexts. 150 people were trained on the toolkit in Ghana and Nigeria, although evidence on the quality of the trainings was not available (TE pg. 22).

- **Outcome 3: Full participation of all stakeholders in the two countries and greater understanding of the public in awareness and environmental education related to POPs contaminated lands/sites:**

The PD does not elaborate on the expected results under this outcome. However, the TE notes that there was no evidence of a coordinated and integrated approach to increase the awareness of stakeholders and the public. As mentioned above, key stakeholders were invited to attend the toolkit trainings and a newsletter on POPs was disseminated to policy-level decision makers. The TE notes that the project did not reach out to the companies and communities exposed to or using POPs (TE pg. 23).

- Outcome 4: Two local geo-environmental centers established in Ghana and Nigeria would have trained staff and facilities to identify/analyze contaminated land/sites, carryout full-risk assessment according to national/international standards, carryout experimental scale land remediation techniques and select appropriate technologies for implementation:**

Expected results under this outcome included (1) two geo-environmental centers capable of identifying and analyzing POPs contaminated land, and (2) experimental scale tests carried out at 4 sites contaminated with POPs. The TE notes that the geo-environmental research centers (GRCs) and transfer labs were established in Ghana and Nigeria, however they were not fully operational at the time of the evaluation. In addition, the TE notes that testing was limited due to the fact that the toolkit is not cost-effective and not easy to deploy (TE pgs. 23-25).
- Outcome 5: The countries will have the capability to assess socio-economic impact of POPs contaminated lands/sites:**

Expected results under this outcome included establishing a socio-economic assessment and indicators for POPs exposure likely to emanate from contaminated sites. However, the TE found there to be no evidence of increased capability to assess the socio-economic impact of POPs in either Ghana or Nigeria. Moreover, the respective ministries of health which were supposed to be involved in developing indicators had little knowledge of the project (TE pg. 25).
- Outcome 6: The countries would have established regional/national information management system for POPs and other toxic contaminants, which would be updated periodically and made accessible to all interested parties:**

Expected results under this outcome included: (1) national databases for potentially contaminated sites, (2) an environmental Informational Management System (IMS), and (3) strengthened IMS capabilities in equipment and personnel. The TE reports that there was some progress in setting up the IMS infrastructure and websites. In Ghana and Nigeria, IMS laboratories were established, and the Nigeria laboratory has begun to input some contaminated sites into the IMS. However, the TE notes that the success of the IMS depends on the GRCs and the effectiveness of the toolkit to identify sites, which hadn't emerged by the end of the project. Furthermore, stakeholders reported requiring additional training on the IMS (TE pgs. 25-26).

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| 4.3 Efficiency | Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory |
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The TE provides a rating of **Unsatisfactory** for efficiency, which this TER adjusts to **Moderately Unsatisfactory**. The TE notes that the project experienced significant delays in implementation due to lags in the signature of documents and transfer of cash distributions, which the TE notes impeded the achievement of outcomes (TE pg. 15; 33). In Nigeria in particular, project staff consistently had difficulty accessing funds due to government rules and regulations (TE pg. 27). The project timeline was also

affected by the car bombing at the UN building in Nigeria in August 2011 (TE pg. 28). Despite these delays, the project timeline was not extended. The TE does not assess the cost-effectiveness of the project.

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| 4.4 Sustainability | Rating: Moderately Unlikely |
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The TE provides a rating of **Moderately Unlikely** for project sustainability, and this TER concurs.

Financial Resources

This TER finds the sustainability of financial resources to be **Moderately Unlikely**. The TE notes that financial sustainability is partly dependent on the “polluter-pays” principle, where the private sector plays a significant role in the remediation of contaminated sites. However, the project failed to engage the private sector in the project. In addition, the TE notes that the toolkit is not cost-effective, and it is therefore possible that the governments will be unable to use it. On the other hand, the TE indicates that the business plans for the geo-environmental centers have been finalized and approved which should contribute to the project’s sustainability (TE pgs. 28-29).

Sociopolitical

This TER assesses sociopolitical sustainability as **Moderately Unlikely**. Effectively addressing POPs contaminated sites appears to be a priority for the both the Nigerian and Ghanaian governments. However, the project did not raise the awareness of the public in regard to POPs contamination, which threatens the long-term objectives of the project. As the TE notes, this was a significant missed opportunity (TE pg. 29).

Institutional Framework and Governance

This TER assess the sustainability of the institutional frameworks and governance to be **Moderately Likely**. As noted in the effectiveness section, the project made some progress in institutionalizing legal frameworks. Draft policies/legal frameworks were awaiting approval by the Nigerian and Ghanaian governments at the end of the project, and a regional legal framework was awaiting consideration by ECOWAS.

Environmental

This TER assesses the environmental sustainability of the project to be **Unlikely**. As the TE notes, the project did little to reduce environmental risks, and Polychlorinated Biphenyl (PCBs) continue to be released into the environment (TE pg. 29).

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The TE does not provide detailed co-financing information. However, the 2013 completion report indicates that actual co-financing was lower than expected (\$1.55 million of the expected \$2.1 million). It's unclear whether the lack of the materialization of co-financing directly affected the project's outcomes and/or sustainability.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The TE notes that there were delays in project implementation due to administrative issues, such as lags in the signature of documents and transfer of cash distributions, as well as tenuous political situations such as the car bombing at the UN building in Nigeria in 2011. The TE notes that these delays contributed to the non-achievement of key outcomes, such as the socio-economic assessment and testing at the GRCs (TE pg. 15; 33).

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

The TE assesses country ownership as Satisfactory, noting that this is limited to the governments (particularly the Nigerian government) and institutions directly involved in the project. It is clear that the project didn't make efforts to engage the broader public, which the TE notes threatens the sustainability of the project (TE pg. 32).

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

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| 6.1 M&E Design at entry | Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory |
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The TE provides a rating of **Unsatisfactory** for M&E design at entry, which this TER upgrades to **Moderately Unsatisfactory**. As the TE notes, the project design was not results-oriented. Although the project design narrative briefly described the expected outcomes (PD pgs. 22-23), these were not included in the project’s logical framework. The logical framework simply outlined the expected outputs and corresponding output indicators without any clear links to the project’s expected outcomes (TE pg. 19). Furthermore, the indicators provided were not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and timely). Examples include: “Experimental scale testing on site remediation carried out and results analyzed, public/NGO knowledge enhanced,” and “Organization of regional seminars on policies and capacity building in cooperation with ECOWAS” (PD Annexes pgs. 8-15). The targets that were set were also vague, such as “coordination established,” and “trained personnel” (PD Annexes pgs. 25-26).

The PD does provide a dedicated budget of \$95,000 for M&E, along with a work plan that outlines the specific M&E activities, responsible parties, and timeframe. A baseline study was scheduled to take place within three months of project start-up, and a mid-term review was planned for two years into the project. In addition, the M&E plan called for two committees, the Regional Ministerial Committee (RMC) and the Regional Steering Committee (RSC), to regularly monitor the project and prepare progress reports every three months (PD Annex pg. 24). Although these areas of the M&E plan were adequate, overall the M&E plan is inappropriate for the project.

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| 6.2 M&E Implementation | Rating: Highly Unsatisfactory |
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The TE provides a rating of **Highly Unsatisfactory** for M&E implementation, and this TER concurs. The TE found no evidence that an M&E system was in place over the life of the project, and it appears that very limited resources were used for M&E activities (TE pg. 26). A midterm evaluation was conducted and the results were shared with key stakeholders, however the project did not implement any of the changes recommended in the midterm evaluation (TE pg. 29). Overall, it is highly unlikely that the project collected or analyzed any monitoring data over the life of the project.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

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| 7.1 Quality of Project Implementation | Rating: Unsatisfactory |
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The TE provides a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory** for “UNIDO Supervision and Backstopping.” This TER downgrades this rating to **Unsatisfactory** for Quality of Project Implementation. As described in the effectiveness and M&E sections of this TER, the project design was not results-oriented. This likely affected the ability of the project to track project performance. Additionally, the TE notes that the linear design of the project contributed to delays in implementation, and that pursuing multiple components of the project at once would have yielded greater results (TE pg. 15).

As the implementing agency, UNIDO was responsible for developing and managing the project, including overseeing funding. The project design called for UNIDO to recruit a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) to support the Regional Coordination Unit (RCU) in Abuja (PD pg. 23). At the time of the Midterm Evaluation (March 2011), a CTA had not been recruited. A CTA was ultimately hired on a part-time basis for the last year of the project, however the CTA only spent 14 days in the field. As the TE notes, “this was insufficient to lead the project to its successful completion” (pg. 21). The TE also notes that UNIDO could have facilitated broader stakeholder participation, particularly with the private sector, and made an effort to coordinate with organizations implementing similar projects in the region (TE pg. 39). The TE does note however, that UNIDO provided assistance at “key phases of the project implementation,” however it does not provide evidence to substantiate this claim (TE pg. 30).

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| 7.2 Quality of Project Execution | Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory |
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The TE does not provide a rating for Quality of Project Execution. The project was executed by National Coordination Units (NCUs) in Ghana and Nigeria, and day-to-day operations were supervised by the Regional Coordination Unit (RCU) in the UNIDO Regional Office in Abuja, Nigeria. The project experienced numerous delays, in part due to issues with cash disbursements. The TE also notes that the RCU had limited time allotted for the project (approximately 20%) (pg. 34).

A Project Steering Committee (PSC) was responsible for supervising the overall execution of the project, including any changes in activities or budget provisions. A Regional Ministerial Committee (RMC) was also established to provide oversight to the project, particularly regarding the policy and legal objectives (TE pg. 15). The TE notes that these supervisory institutions were limited in functionality. The PSC only met five times throughout the life of the project, and the RMC only met once (TE pg. 30).

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The TE does not cite any environmental changes that occurred by the end of the project.

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The TE does not cite any socioeconomic changes that occurred by the end of the project.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. "Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

The TE notes very limited changes in capacities by the end of the project. 150 people were trained on the toolkit in Ghana and Nigeria, although it's unclear if the trainings resulted in a change in capacity (TE pg. 22). In addition, stakeholders were trained on IMS in Ghana and Nigeria, however again, it is unclear what resulted from those trainings (TE pg. 26).

b) Governance

By project end, policy/legal frameworks for controlling POPs had not been institutionalized, but drafts were up for approval in Ghana and Nigeria, as well as in front of ECOWAS (TE pgs. 21-22).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The TE did not cite any unintended impacts.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The TE did not cite any GEF initiatives that had been adopted by the end of the project.

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The following lessons learned are stated in the TE (pg. 39):

- Implementation of an M&E system should not be considered an optional requirement. In its absence, the methodical and structured implementation, the close tracking of progress - redressing as necessary – and, the successful achievement of all expected outputs are unlikely to take place. This in turn compromises the expected outcomes and the longer term impacts envisioned during the design and inception phases;
- Sequencing of implementation of the different components could have led to a more coherent set of outputs and eventually to a series of near-simultaneous outcomes;
- Rapid implementation of key components (such as the IMS, awareness raising, etc.) would have helped to build awareness and support changes in behavior among the public and workers exposed to and/or using POPs;
- Presence of a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) is essential not only to provide technical backstopping, but also in support of the role played by the RCU on the ground;

- Absence or limited presence and guidance from a CTA - a key figure for successful implementation of projects - can significantly contribute to the quality of the final results;
- Continuity planning is essential in order to avoid delays at the national level, when project figureheads retire;
- Not having a decentralized task manager in the region (Managing from Vienna) can contribute to delays in implementation.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

The TE provides the following recommendations (pg. 39):

- In future projects of this type, UNIDO should ensure that mechanisms are in place to guarantee broad and representative stakeholder participation, in support of government's efforts to build financial and economic sustainability of projects components, as well as to raise awareness.
- UNIDO should consider, when developing projects of this type, establishing coordination mechanisms with other agencies implementing similar projects, to explore potential collaborative opportunities and the creation of synergies.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

| Criteria | GEF IEO comments | Rating |
|---|---|-----------|
| To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives? | The TE was limited in what it could assess given the flaws in the project design and the lack of available data. That being said, the analysis was largely anecdotal. | MU |
| To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated? | The report was inconsistent at times (conflicting project start-up dates for example) and the evidence presented was weak. | U |
| To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy? | The report assessed institutional, financial, socio-political sustainability adequately. More attention could have been given to environmental sustainability. | MS |
| To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive? | The lessons learned and recommendations are supported by the TE's analysis, however they are limited and relatively superficial. | MU |
| Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? | The co-financing information presented is incomplete (no indication of the co-financer or activity) and presented in a confusing manner. | U |
| Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems: | The assessment of the M&E design at entry is limited but accurate. There was no M&E system implemented to assess. | MS |
| Overall TE Rating | | MU |

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

2013 Completion Report