Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2015

# 1. Project Data

| Summary project data | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **GEF project ID** | | 3430 | |
| **GEF Agency project ID** | | 3925 / 00057783 | |
| **GEF Replenishment Phase** | | GEF-4 | |
| **Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)** | | UNDP | |
| **Project name** | | Implementing NAPA Priority Interventions to Build Resilience in the Agriculture and Water Sectors to the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change in Sudan | |
| **Country/Countries** | | Sudan | |
| **Region** | | Africa | |
| **Focal area** | | Climate Change | |
| **Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives** | | LCDF | |
| **Executing agencies involved** | | Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources | |
| **NGOs/CBOs involvement** | | NA | |
| **Private sector involvement** | | NA | |
| **CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)** | | September 2009 | |
| **Effectiveness date / project start** | | December 2009 | |
| **Expected date of project completion (at start)** | | December 2013 | |
| **Actual date of project completion** | | April 2015 | |
| **Project Financing** | | | |
| | | **At Endorsement (US $M)** | **At Completion (US $M)** |
| **Project Preparation Grant** | GEF funding | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| | Co-financing | 0.06 | 0.06 |
| **GEF Project Grant** | | 3.3 | 3.27 |
| **Co-financing** | IA own | 0.5 | 0.52 |
| | Government | 3.0 | 1.1 |
| | Other multi- /bi-laterals | 0 | 0 |
| | Private sector | 0 | 0 |
| | NGOs/CSOs | 0 | 0 |
| **Total GEF funding** | | 3.4 | 3.37 |
| **Total Co-financing** | | 3.56 | 1.68 |
| **Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)** | | 6.96 | 5.05 |
| **Terminal evaluation/review information** | | | |
| **TE completion date** | | April 2015 | |
| **Author of TE** | | Dennis Fenton | |
| **TER completion date** | | January 9, 2016 | |
| **TER prepared by** | | Caroline Laroche | |
| **TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)** | | Molly Watts | |

## 2. Summary of Project Ratings

| Criteria | Final PIR | IA Terminal Evaluation | IA Evaluation Office Review | GEF EO Review |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Project Outcomes** | S | NR | -- | MU |
| **Sustainability of Outcomes** | NR | NR | -- | MU |
| **M&E Design** | NR | NR | -- | MU |
| **M&E Implementation** | NR | NR | -- | U |
| **Quality of Implementation** | NR | NR | -- | MS |
| **Quality of Execution** | NR | NR | -- | U |
| **Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report** | -- | -- | -- | S |

## 3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The environmental objective of the project is to enhance Sudan' s resilience and reduce its vulnerability to climate change impacts.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The development objective for this project was "to implement an urgent set of adaptation-focused measures that will minimize and reverse the food insecurity of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, thereby reducing vulnerability of rural communities from increasing climatic variability and climate change" (PD p.4). The overarching goal of the project is to enhance Sudan' s resilience and reduce its vulnerability to climate change impacts.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The project design had to be changed following the secession of South Sudan. The initial project design covered five States in Sudan: Central Equatorial, Gedarif, North Kordofan, River Nile and South Darfur. Following the secession, Central Equatorial State is now in South Sudan so project activities in that area had to be stopped. (TE p.7)

## 4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

| 4.1 **Relevance** | Rating: **Satisfactory** |
|---|---|

The TE does not rate project relevance, but describes it as being very high. This TER assesses relevance to be satisfactory due to its good alignment with both GEF and national priorities.

As part of the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) a fund managed by the GEF that finances the preparation and implementation of National Adaption Programs of Action (NAPAS), this project was naturally well aligned with GEF priorities. Part of the climate change focal area and the LCDF operational program, this project came out of the submission in July 2007 by the Sudanese Government of the National Adaptation Programme of Action, which identified 32 urgent priority project profiles related to climate change adaptation.

In Sudan, efforts were already underway to address climate change and improve adaptation activities. The "5-year Plan (2007-2011) developed by the Sudanese National Council for Strategic Planning, the Strategic Goals of the 25-year Vision, as well as ongoing national policy processes" also had "parallel aims to climate change adaptation (i.e., Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and rural development initiatives)" (PD p.5).

| 4.2 **Effectiveness** | Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory** |
|---|---|

The TE does not rate effectiveness for the project. This TER rates effectiveness as moderately unsatisfactory due to the fact that the main outcome has only been partially achieved and that one of the other two outcomes was not achieved. The TER also notes that there were some shortcomings in project evaluation and monitoring and that figures have not been independently verified. There is not enough evidence in the TE about the impact of the project to assign a score in the satisfactory range.

Below, realizations under each of the three planned outcomes for the project will be discussed, followed by a short summary of overall project effectiveness.

1. **Resilience of food-production systems and food-insecure communities enhanced in the face of climate change.**

The central pillar of the project, this outcome was expected to be achieved through the implementation of pilot adaptation measures. According to the TE, "a large number of people in diverse socio-economic and ecological conditions have been helped by the Project, and now have improved lives and food security. New technologies, practices and approaches were introduced and generally adopted in all the Project target villages. In most villages this typically included a complex package of forestry, traditional agricultural crops, new horticultural crops, water management and harvesting, livestock management, sustainable energy and training. Both men and women benefited in large numbers. Numerous local

community organizations have been strengthened and established, and there is evidence that, at the village level, there is increased capacity with regards to both natural resources management and organizational capacity" (TE p.9). Indeed, according to the TE, all six planned outputs planned under this outcome have been achieved in all four states where the project operated. This evidence is self-reported and has not been independently verified.

Despite having been delivered, the outputs might not be having the intended impact. Visits have shown that "the beneficiaries faced many technical challenges with some of the new practices and technologies" (TE p.38) due to the quantity or quality of the technical support provided not having been sufficient. Overall, despite the outputs having been fully delivered, this TER considers this outcome to have only been partially achieved as, due to the shortcomings in technical support, the outputs did not always have the intended impact.

2. **Institutional and individual capacities to implement climate risk management responses in the agriculture sector strengthened**

This outcome was expected to be achieved through capacity building activities at village and local levels to incorporate climate change risks into ongoing and future national development planning. The project supported the same villages under this outcome as under outcome 1. The main activities under this outcome were visits from technical experts to villages. As part of those activities, "seven VDC were strengthened, 31 were created, and a total of 53 sub-committees were created. The concerned Committees now provide support to a total population of 21,861 in the concerned villages. In addition, 28 revolving funds were established, which may provide a service for approximately 4,311 vulnerable people in rural areas. In River Nile, North Kordofan and Gedarif States these institutions are considered to be well established, whereas in South Darfur they were only recently established and can be considered fledgling" (TE p.40). There evidence points to increased capacity with regards to natural resources management and organizational capacity in villages, and all outputs have been delivered. Again, the evidence is self-reported and has not been independently verified. Nonetheless, this TER considers this outcome to have been achieved.

3. **A better understanding of lessons learned and emerging best practices, captured and up-scaled at the national level**

This outcome was expected to be achieved by synthesizing a systematic understanding of lessons learned and emerging best practices. Two of the outputs for this outcome were partially achieved, and two were not achieved. For example, a draft National Food Security Policy was not delivered, nor was a system put in place for capturing lessons and disseminating them. This outcome was overall not achieved.

Overall, the development objective, "to implement an urgent set of adaptation-focused measures that will minimize and reverse the food insecurity of small-scale farmers and pastoralists, thereby reducing vulnerability of rural communities from increasing climatic variability and climate change" appears to have been partially achieved as some measures were implemented and are reducing the food insecurity

of farmers and pastoralists. However, in addition to implementing measures supporting climate change adaptation, the project was expected to capture lessons and lead to be scaled up at the national level. This aspect of the project has not been achieved. With one outcome achieved, one outcome partially achieved and one outcome not achieved, effectiveness is rated as moderately unsatisfactory.

| 4.3 **Efficiency** | Rating: **Unable to Assess** |
|---|---|

The TE does not rate efficiency, and does not provide much information on the topic. This TER chooses not to rate efficiency due to a lack of information.

According to the TE, an estimated 17,819 persons benefitted from the Project, for a total expenditure of US$3.5 million. This means that, on average, the Project expenditure per beneficiary was $213 (including both GEF/LDCF and UNDP funds, excluding other sources of finance). " (TE p.32)

The project isn't compared to other similar projects, nor is there any additional information regarding the efficiency in the use of funds. For this reason, this TER is unable to assess project efficiency.

| 4.4 **Sustainability** | Rating: **Moderately Unlikely** |
|---|---|

The TE does not provide a sustainability rating for the project, but discusses various risks to sustainability for this project. Overall, according to the TE, sustainability at site level has some chances of being attained, but at State level, "unless decision-makers in the States are convinced, and either policy or financial allocations are changed, there is a danger that the State level impacts will ultimately fade" (TE p.45). Overall, this TER evaluates project sustainability to be moderately unlikely. The key risks to sustainability are discussed below.

**Financial Risks – Sustainability Likely**

Towards the end of the project, two related projects started and followed up on some of the project activities. First, the project "Implementing Priority Adaptation Measures to Build Resilience of rainfed farmer and pastoral communities of Sudan, especially women headed households to the adverse impacts of Climate Change" was signed in 2013 and is supported by CIDA. "It will support similar technologies and practices in villages with similar vulnerability and similar farming systems in three of the States (North Kordofan, Gadaref and South Darfur)" (TE p.46). Second, the project "Climate Risk Finance for Sustainable and Climate Resilient Rain-fed Farming and Pastoral Systems" is, like this project, supported by the LDCF. "It will continue to provide support to the TCs in the four states. Together with the CIDA project it should facilitate sustainability of the TCs and State level capacity at least for the coming three years. This Project will also implement activities at the village level related to finance, early

warning systems and insurance, and this may build on the work done in the present Project, and this may contribute to sustainability" (TE p.46).

Outside of those two additional projects, no additional financing has been obtained for the continuation of the project, nor has the government committed additional funds going forward. However, it appears that, at least as part of the LDCF, there should continue to be funds for projects supporting the Sudanese NAPA. For this reason, financial sustainability is rated as likely.

**Socio-Political Risks - Sustainability Moderately Unlikely**

According to the TE, "site level sustainability depends very much on the practice and technology. Most aspects of the packages introduced to the village are now being used. In some cases, for some technologies, the investment costs are low and the benefits are high. And there is already signs of adoption by other villages. Based on previous experience, Project reports and rapid site analysis, it is considered likely that some technologies/practices will be sustained (livestock, gas cylinders, improved crop variety). However, other technologies require significant funds to continue or to expand. Also, there are implementation problems, which the communities would not be able to overcome without sustained support. This applies to some of the introduced horticulture practices, the solar panels and pumps, and to the fish pond. It is considered unlikely that these technologies/practices would be sustained without additional help. " (TE p.44) Overall, it is unclear that target communities will be able to sustain project benefits.

At the political level, there appears to be little real support for the project, and little sustainable change has been achieved. "Unless decision-makers in the States are convinced, and either policy or financial allocations are changed, there is a danger that the State level impacts will ultimately fade" (TE p.45). Finally, the secession of South Sudan, which has perturbed the project, has not ended conflict in the region. The ongoing conflict is expensive, drains government resources and undermines the ability of the state to prioritize and allocate resources to poverty reduction and climate change adaptation.

Overall, socio-political risks are fairly severe and already impacting the project. Due to those risks, but acknowledging that some of the project benefits might be sustained at site level, this TER rates socio-political sustainability as moderately unlikely.

**Institutional Risks – Sustainability Moderately Unlikely**

As part of the project, rotating funds and Village Development Committees were created. However, and despite their necessity, "experience shows that without an overall improvement in the village socio-economic condition, sooner or later an external shock will undermine the functioning of these." (TE p.44) The project has not been able to strengthen the institutional basis of those institutions, nor did it sufficiently strengthen the capacity of communities to support and manage them.

Institutional sustainability is therefore rated is moderately unlikely.

**Environmental Risks - Sustainability Likely**

No environmental risks were identified as part of this project

## 5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

> The co-financing provided was less than expected. The Government of Sudan only contributed $US 1.1 million out of the $US 3 million committed. However, it does not appear that the lack of funds was the reason for the poor project performance. Other factors, including conflict in Sudan, lack of commitment from the Government and unclear project design appear to be most likely factors for the project performance.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

> The project was extended for 18 months. Reasons for the over-run include instability in the country and the secession of South Sudan, which necessitated the adjustment to the project. In addition, there were internal delays in advancing funds and making payments (TE p.32). Project outcomes were not negatively affected. In fact, the extension of the project allowed for more of the project outputs to be delivered, and positively influenced outcomes.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

> Country ownership is not clearly discussed in the TE. However, as seen by the lower than expected co-financing and the lack of support for the project during implementation, ownership appears to have been fairly low, and has certainly affected outcomes, in particular outcome 3 "a better understanding of lessons learned and emerging best practices, captured and up-scaled at the national level", which was highly contingent on the cooperation of the national government.

## 6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

| 6.1 **M&E Design at entry** | Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory** |
|---|---|

The TE does not describe M&E design at entry, but does describe some of the issues with the project's M&E framework. This TER assesses M&E design at entry to be moderately unsatisfactory due to important weaknesses in the logical framework and its associated indicators.

The Project Document (p.35) describes the planned M&E framework for the project. This includes an M&E budget, mid- and end-term evaluations, a monitoring system led by UNDP, as well as performance and impact indicators together with means of verification. "The Project document also clearly and thoroughly describes the approach to monitoring. The key monitoring events and activities are elaborated: for example the inception workshop, the quarterly and annual reporting and planning, the tri-partite process, learning and knowledge management etc." (TE p.23). Overall, all the building blocks of a good M&E framework were present.

However, much of the fine-tuning of the M&E framework was left to the Inception Report, and the M&E framework was at entry in a rather incomplete state. First, the indicators were incomplete. While the project document does provide indicators, baseline values and target values, indicators seem poorly selected and "bear little relation to the result they are supposed to indicate. Moreover, there is confusion across the indicators, baseline values and targets in many cases" (TE p.30). As a result, these indicators could be used to assess progress. Even though new indicators were adopted during the Inception phase, they do not appear to have been used throughout the project.

Second, the strategic approach of the project was weak. The initial project documents were incomplete, the logical framework was too vaguely formulated and the project objectives were ambiguous. As a result of under-specified project objectives, the M&E framework developed ended up with severe weaknesses (TE p.8).

Finally, there was no dedicated M&E Staff, which has hindered the development and implementation of an adequate M&E plan.

| 6.2 **M&E Implementation** | Rating: **Unsatisfactory** |
|---|---|

The TE does not rate M&E implementation, but mentions that "monitoring was a particular challenge". This TE rates monitoring as unsatisfactory due to the lack of consistent monitoring and the lack of integration of M&E feedback into the project decision-making process.

During implementation, project staff actually undertook a great deal of technical monitoring and, as a result, "had a very good knowledge of the individual activities on the ground and of the beneficiaries" (TE p.9). However, the weaknesses in M&E design meant that there is little consolidated data about

overall project progress, despite there being a wealth of data on project activities at the site level. Indeed, there are numbers "available for the beneficiaries supported by each individual technology or practice" (TE p.30). Unfortunately, very little of this data could be used for overall project monitoring as the templates prepared during the Inception phase were not used, and much of it was "collected anecdotally by the State Coordinators and has not been subject to independent verification" (TE p.30), making it unreliable for evaluation purposes. Following a recommendation from the MTR, a consultant was hired to review baseline data and suggest improvements in monitoring. Unfortunately, this did not end up strengthening the M&E framework.

Formal reporting as part of the PIRs did take place, but the documents appear to have been "prepared as a requirement, rather than as a useful management mechanism" (TE p.31). Indeed, there have been few links between the PIRs and project decision-making, and the reports are more descriptive than analytical. Overall, there have few, if any, instances were feedback from the M&E systems has influenced project decisions, and the project does not appear to have benefited from its M&E system.

# 7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

| 7.1 **Quality of Project Implementation** | Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory** |
|---|---|

The implementation agency for this project was UNDP. The TE does not specifically rate UNDP, but provides useful information about its contribution to the project. This TER rates the quality of project implementation by UNDP as moderately satisfactory due to the important weaknesses in project design, but recognizing the adequate project management provided during implementation.

One of the main problems with the project has been its weak design and strategy. The project document "does not define what should be considered a successful intervention at the state or site level, nor does it clarify what should be considered a desirable end-point for the Project. The strategic links between Outputs and Outcomes, and across sites, are not elaborated. The documents are unclear as to whether the Project is about *implementing* climate change adaptation or *piloting/demonstrating* climate adaptation activities. And, to the extent that it is about piloting, the approach to piloting is not elaborated or defined. With regards to gender, the Project document does describe how, at the site level, women were to make up a large number of the beneficiaries." (TE P.8)

Overall, the PD fails to clarify the theory of change, and instead simply describes important activities that are to take place as part of the project. According to the TE, "the articulation of the Project strategy has to be considered inadequate. This should not be considered a major weakness as it could have been addressed during the Project inception. " (TE p.22)

However, according to the TE, UNDP has provided adequate support during project implementation. Until mid-2013, "the incoming HCENR leadership considered UNDP to be too active in the Project management. UNDP's response to this was that it was necessary to ensure the Project did not lose momentum." (TE p.35) UNDP Sudan took the lead on project supervision and technical back-up, provided direct support to the project activities, held the project funds, facilitated linkages with international development partners and supported the process to mobilize follow-up funding.

Overall, UNDP could have better prepared and designed the project, but adequately managed it during implementation.

| 7.2 **Quality of Project Execution** | Rating: **Unsatisfactory** |
|---|---|

The Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources (HCENR), the technical arm of Sudan's Ministry of Environment and Physical Development, was the main executing agency for this project. The TE does not rate the quality of project execution. This TER rates it as unsatisfactory due to the several difficulties encountered, the overall inadequate execution structure and the overall inability of the execution team to deliver planned project activities.

HCENR experienced some difficulties with project execution. First, for national level outcomes, HCENR appears to have faced challenges mainstreaming the project. It does not appear to have been able to cooperate with other national agencies to conduct project activities.

Second, "the HCENR leadership changed in late 2013 and hence the Government guidance to the Project changed. This reportedly led to a period of delays and uncertainty, during which it was difficult to take management decisions, mobilize inputs and implement activities. The PCU reported difficulties in organizing activities and it experienced instability for approximately six months. However, most site level activities were able to continue" (TE p.34). This slowed down project implementation, but does not appear to have affected project outcomes.

The Project Coordination Unit (PCU), which was effectively tasked with implementation, appears to have tried its best to implement the project as planned The TE describes them "active and highly supportive" (PD p.9). However, the PCU was severely understaffed and could only achieved so much. "The PCU's had two full-time technical staff. The PCU's administrative tasks probably accounted for the time of more than one technical officer. Hence, the PCU probably had less than the equivalent of one technical officer to provide support to the four States and almost 20 villages. This Evaluation finds that the PCU was greatly overstretched and understaffed. The PCU did mobilize some short term inputs,

particularly during the second half of 2013, but this was not on the whole sufficient to cover for the weaknesses observed." (TE P.34)

However, neither the HCENR nor the PCU had the means to provide a highly effective execution. As a result, the project ran over schedule, insufficient support advice and capacity building was provided to the project sites, and the M&E framework was largely left unimplemented. That being said, the project did have some level of success, especially at site level, and this was largely due to the PCU.

# 8. Assessment of Project Impacts

***Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.***

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

Not applicable

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

According to the TE, "a large number of people in diverse socio-economic and ecological conditions have been helped by the Project, and now have improved lives and food security. New technologies, practices and approaches were introduced and generally adopted in all the Project target villages. In most villages this typically included a complex package of forestry, traditional agricultural crops, new horticultural crops, water management and harvesting, livestock management, sustainable energy and training. Both men and women benefited in large numbers. Numerous local community organizations have been strengthened and established, and there is evidence that, at the village level, there is increased capacity with regards to both natural resources management and organizational capacity" (TE p.9). Again, this TER notes that the evidence is self-reported and has not been independently verified.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change.

"Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

Despite capacity-building being one of the main outcomes for this project, it did not take place. As described in the TE,"there has been no transferring of knowledge from outside Sudan to the Sudanese experts at either national or state level through this Project. This is exceptional for an international Project and again can be considered a missed opportunity" (TE p.46).

b) Governance

Not applicable

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

No unintended impacts were recorded as part of this project.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

None of the initiatives have been mainstreamed or adopted at scale.

# 9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The TE notes that the following lessons have been learnt as part of this project:

- It is possible and desirable to deliver quality support *directly* to communities in Sudan. Doing this builds trust, increases efficiency, and improves the relevance of the activities designed;

- It is essential to *build trust* with communities when working on natural resource management in poor and remote areas. This is challenging and takes time, but does deliver benefits;
- It is also essential to invest in *developing partnerships* between project staff, experts, government agencies and communities;
- *Sustainability is challenging*, and requires successful efforts in a diverse range of issues. Notably, if attention is not given to financial sustainability, sustainability will never be achieved. Further, if practices or technologies are to be sustained, *the associated costs and benefits must be precisely measured, documented and communicated* – it is not sufficient to simply show examples of farmers generating income based on inputs provided by a project;
- It is *possible to work with women* in communities in Sudan, even in the more socially conservative areas. This requires patience and high levels of effort; and,
- High level of efforts are needed to provide sufficient technical support to remote communities in Sudan, and therefore *it is better to avoid spreading resources* across too many sites in too many distinct geographical areas.

(TE pp.10-11)

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

The TE makes the following recommendations.

**1. Extension systems**

According to the TE, "Extension systems must be financially sustainable or they will stop functioning. Possible ways to create financial sustainability include:

- Increased use of information technology. Following initial contacts in person, the extension workers can then provide extension using smart phones and visual imagery to remote areas, and this will greatly reduce transportation costs;
- Use of farmer-centred extension approaches. The approach would be to develop 'lead' or 'pioneer' farmers in villages, who can then be the mechanism to extend to other villages and villagers. This may be more cost-effective. This is the farmer field school approach;
- Clearly demonstrate the financial benefits from extension and use this to advocate to decision-makers for larger government budgets. This will require the accurate measuring of costs and benefits, and then communicating this information to decision-makers;
- Farmers contribute to the costs of extension. If the farmer appreciates the extension service, and the extension service helps the farmer integrate into the national economy, the farmer will

ultimately be willing to pay for it. This helps financial sustainability. It is recognised that this would be very innovative for Sudan, particularly because the farmers are often very poor, and so progress would only be incremental initially."

(TE p.11)

As a result, the TE recommends to UNDP and HCENR for future projects to experiment and innovate "with measures to create extension systems that are financially sustainable in poor and remote areas" (TE P.11).

**2. Project strategy**

The TE describes how "the project suffered from a lack of strategy, from having no clear starting point nor end point, and from not having a definition of what was meant by 'piloting' or 'demonstration'. This Project is decentralized and so the strategies must be State specific, and they must encompass details of the approach to activities" (TE p.11).

As a result, the TE recommends to "prepare strategies for each of the participating States for the follow-up projects, with separate state-level logframes, meaningful targets and sustainability strategies" (TE p.11).

**3. Lesson learning**

According to the TE, "there is confusion around the term 'lesson learning'. Globally, UNDP promotes lesson learning and links this to replication and upscaling. However, at the country and project level, many staff confuse lesson learning with creating publicity around a project." (TE p.12)

As a result, the TE recommends to UNDP globally "to prepare a document clarifying what is meant by lesson learning, and what the aims of lesson learning are, and how to measure success" (TE p.12).

**4. Sand dune shifting**

"The Project has supported sand dune fixing at several sites. However, these efforts are very small and isolated compared to the problem, and so the net effects on the sand dunes is only minimal. Sand dune shifting can only be addressed by a large, government funded, national effort. This cannot be done through micro-scale, community based initiatives. " (TE p.12)

As a result, the TE recommends to UNDP and HCENR to "advocate for a national programme to address the problem of sand dune shifting. " (TE p.12).

**5. Project Boards**

"The Project Board was well intentioned and was helpful when it met. However, some of the members were high level and it was often challenging to create a quorum. Further, some of the members were too busy to become familiar with the technical aspects of the Project. Hence meetings were irregular, and some of the guidance given was not the most technically appropriate. " (TE p.12)

As a result, the TE recommends to UNDP for future projects "to establish Project Boards that are of a technical nature, able to fully master the technical aspects, but sufficiently high level to make decisions and follow them through" (TE p.12).

## 10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

| Criteria | **GEF EO comments** | Rating |
|---|---|---|
| To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives? | The report contains a good assessment of all three relevant outcomes, and project impact is discussed and well substantiated. The extent to which the project has achieved its objectives is clear. | **S** |
| To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated? | No ratings are provided, but the report is internally consistent. Little evidence is provided, but this is due to the lack of evidence collected as part of the project M&E. | **MS** |
| To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy? | The project provides a useful and thorough discussion of project sustainability, including financial, socio-political and institutional sustainability. | **S** |
| To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive? | The lessons learned are supported by evidence and appear comprehensive. | **S** |
| Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? | The report includes total actual project costs and actual co-financing, but costs are provided per outcome only, and not per activity. | **MS** |
| Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems: | The report provides a complete and insightful assessment of the M&E systems, although no specific rating is provided. | **S** |
| **Overall TE Rating** | | **S** |

## 11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

No additional sources were used in the preparation of this terminal evaluation report.