Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2014

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		376	
GEF Agency project ID		392	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		UNDP	
Project name		Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions through Energy Efficient Building Technology in West Africa	
Country/Countries		Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal	
Region		AFR	
Focal area		Climate Change	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		GEF-3 OP5: Removal of Barriers to energy efficiency and energy conservation	
Executing agencies involved		UNOPS	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		None	
Private sector involvement		One of the beneficiaries	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		10/01/94	
Effectiveness date / project start		01/25/95	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		09/01/00	
Actual date of project completion		09/01/00	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US $M)	**At Completion (US $M)**
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding		
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		3.500	3.500
Co-financing	IA own		
	Government	2.258	2.258
	Other multi- /bi-laterals		
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		3.500	3.500
Total Co-financing		2.258	2.258
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		5.758	5.758
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		April 2001	

TE submission date	April 2001
Author of TE	Dr. Samir Amous, Arona Diallo, Bénié Adou
TER completion date	09/16/14
TER prepared by	Sean Nelson
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)	Joshua Schneck

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	N/R	N/R	N/R	U
Sustainability of Outcomes	N/R	N/R	N/R	U
M&E Design	N/R	N/R	N/R	MS
M&E Implementation	N/R	N/R	N/R	MS
Quality of Implementation	N/R	N/R	N/R	MU
Quality of Execution	N/R	N/R	N/R	U
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	-	-	N/R	MU

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

As stated in the Project Document (PD), the GEO was to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by promoting energy efficiency practices in buildings in Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, principally improved air conditioning systems. Large buildings accounted for 25 to 30 percent of West African electricity consumption. Thermal power plants utilizing fossil fuels generated most of this electricity. Making buildings more energy efficient in the region could potentially reduce a major consumption source for thermal energy, thus reducing the region's carbon emissions.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The Developmental Objectives, as stated in the PD, were to enhance local building energy efficiency technical capacity. This process could also potentially yield the following benefits:

- Macroeconomic effects: Both the public and private sector would see their electricity bills decrease. Private and semi-public companies would be able to re-allocate these savings into productive investments. Governments would also reduce their spending on electricity for public buildings. In the aggregate, these effects would benefit the economy as a whole.
- Institutional effects: Success can help breed further success. Local governments have an incentive to see energy efficiency projects succeed to improve their fiscal situation. If governments and the financial sector work together, these practices could become widespread and transform the West African building sector.

- Social effects: Energy efficiency measures to improve building air conditioning systems consist of both active and passive techniques. The passive techniques that work in a local context could also be applied to buildings that do not use air conditioning, thus expanding the number of buildings and people who can benefit from building energy efficiency. Living standards will rise as a result.

The PD defines the following Immediate Objectives:

1) To increase local technical capacity. This will include carrying out building energy audits, training local stakeholders, finalizing the Ivorian Energy Efficiency Code and drafting a regional Energy Efficiency Code, as well as creating a Thermal Comfort Code for both countries.

2) To increase local institutional capacity. This will include carrying out market studies, as well as training for Demand Side Management (DSM) and Least Cost Planning (LCP).

3) To retrofit project buildings: one hotel in Senegal and one government building in Cote d'Ivoire. (According to the TE, "actual retrofitting operations will be a post-project activity" (PD, p. 43) New buildings should also be designed according to Energy Efficiency Code and the Thermal Comfort Code.

4) To raise funding to implement energy efficiency techniques in buildings across West Africa once the project produces sufficient results to attract potential donors. This will include investment portfolios for about 125 buildings (75 public buildings and 50 private buildings) between the 2 countries. [Note that this objective was important for setting up the post-project scenario where the project's mechanisms and goals would be scaled-up.]

5) To publish project results and promote these publications across West Africa

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

No. The TE does not mention any changes to the GEOs or the DOs.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 **Relevance**	Rating: **Satisfactory**

The project is relevant to both the GEF and to the Governments of Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire. For the GEF, the project's objectives are in-line with Operational Program 5: Removal of Barriers to energy efficiency and energy conservation. Buildings are a major consumer of energy and electricity resources. Since gas-powered plants supply the largest part of the energy mix in both country, reducing buildings' electricity use could theoretically achieve worthwhile energy savings.

Cote d'Ivoire instituted its National Energy Savings Programme in 1986. This plan explicitly calls for "reducing electricity expenses for public buildings," "standardizing construction and ambient conditions in air-conditioned buildings" and "improving the use of energy in buildings" (PD, p. 5). The Energy Redeployment Programme of Senegal (RENES) calls for lowering energy "consumption by fostering energy savings" (PD, p. 6). ESMAP has called for Senegal to replicate Cote d'Ivoire's strategy for energy efficiency. Energy efficiency thus was already a priority in both countries, but especially in Cote d'Ivoire.

4.2 **Effectiveness**	Rating: **Unsatisfactory**

Summary: The project fell well short of its principle goals, namely creating portfolios for 125 buildings across the 2 countries that would be used to secure financing for actually retrofitting those buildings. No actual funding had been secured as of the TE's writing. This means the project had not yet adequately set the groundwork for the post-project situation to push forward the project's means and goals. Two buildings had their air conditioning equipment retrofitted. The project also saw noticeably more progress in Cote d'Ivoire than in Senegal, though no explanation for why is provided in the TE. [TE does alludes to the idea that the political situation in Cote d'Ivoire was more volatile than in Senegal]..The TE claims that if the recommended energy efficiency techniques were used at 122 project buildings audited, this would correspond to a 50 GWh reduction in electricity consumption, resulting in about 60,000 fewer tons of CO_2 released a year (1,200 tons of CO_2 for each 1 Gwh not consumed). However, this would require making portfolios, carrying out feasibility studies, securing financing for implementing energy efficiency measures and actually carrying these measures. Considering the project's modest successes as of the TE's writing, this is highly ambitious at best. In addition, the consultant's report on GHG mitigation was apparently inaccurate. The consultant's model did not account for the local electricity sector's actual energy mix, as well as local building use patterns. This makes estimating the project's actual and potential environmental impact difficult.

Immediate Objective 1: To increase local technical capacity. This will include carrying out building energy audits, training local stakeholders, finalizing the Ivorian Energy Efficiency Code and drafting a regional Energy Efficiency Code, as well as creating a Thermal Comfort Code for both countries: **Moderately Satisfactory**

- The project team carried out a total of 122 building audits that examined these buildings' "energy characteristics, the potential energy savings, the investment needs and the pay-back period" (TE, p. 18). The TE claims that 120 of these 122 audits were performed properly. 73 audits were conducted in Cote d'Ivoire and 49 in Senegal.

- A related energy audit training program was only partially completed. 20 engineers were trained, but trainers and instructors who were supposed to be part of the Energy Operating Committees (CCEE) were not trained.

- 25 people were trained in Cote d'Ivoire to use the Energy Exploitation Consultative Committees (EECC) guidebook. No such training occurred in Senegal. (The PD did not provide a target number of trainees across the various training programs, though each training program was expected to be carried out in both countries.)

- An Ivorian legal expert created a framework for contract incentives for energy efficiency in Cote d'Ivoire, but the TE states that this incentives framework was likely inadequate. No such work was carried out in Senegal.

- Energy efficiency codes were created for both countries. However, stakeholder training on these codes was often inadequately performed, with numerous stakeholder groups overlooked. The governments of both countries also did not adhere to these codes when constructing new buildings or retrofitting public buildings. Regional comfort codes for non-air conditioned buildings were created alongside the energy efficiency codes.

Immediate Objective 2: To increase local institutional capacity. This will include carrying out market studies, as well as training for Demand Side Management (DSM) and Least Cost Planning (LCP): **Unsatisfactory**

- The project team conducted market studies on local conditions with improvement suggestions, but the TE provides few details on what these suggestions were.

- The project failed to carry out training to improve Demand Side Management (DSM) and Least Cost Planning (LCP) due to budgetary constraints.

- One relevant document on DSM was written in Cote d'Ivoire.

- Immediate Objective 3: To retrofit project buildings: one hotel in Senegal and one government building in Cote d'Ivoire. New buildings should also be designed according to Energy Efficiency Code and the Thermal Comfort Code.: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

- No new buildings were designed according to the new energy efficiency codes. The TE states that the project ran into issues dealing with time management, a lack of third party funding and building management decision making processes.

- Air conditioning equipment was retrofitted at the Hotel Meridien in Senegal and the POSTEL 2001 in Cote d'Ivoire. As of the TE's writing, retrofitting work was planned for the Assemblée Nationale Parliament in Senegal, but there were "great delays so that there was neither room left for setting novel financing schemes, nor monitoring and evaluation activities or media coverage. The result was that their impact as demonstrative operations were curtailed" (TE, p. 21).

Immediate Objective 4: To raise funding to implement energy efficiency techniques in buildings across West Africa once the project produces sufficient results to attract potential donors. This will include investment portfolios for about 125 buildings (75 public buildings and 50 private buildings) between the 2 countries.: **Unsatisfactory**

- 3 portfolios were created for individual buildings in each country, coming to 6 in all. This was under the PD goal of creating portfolios for 75 public buildings and 50 private buildings across the 2 countries.

- The TE claims that the Netherlands AIJ program had shown interest in funding projects in 5 Senegalese buildings "as a demonstrative operation" (TE, p. 21).

- According to the TE, the PD "judiciously states that this objective is the **reason for which the project exists**. It even insists that the project would not reach its goals if post-project investments were not raised. In that respect, the present project results are substantially below the expectations" (TE, p. 22, emphasis in original).

Immediate Objective 5: To publish project results and promote these publications across West Africa: **Moderately Satisfactory**

- The TE claims that the project met its goals of publishing information in both internal and external publications, but the TE fails to elaborate on this point.

- The project was supposed to publish 2 Bulletin de Liaison Energie-Construction-Environnement (BLECE) reports a year, but this was only published 4 times in total.

- Project members engaged in local conferences involving potential partners of countries besides Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire.

- The project helped to train professionals from outside the 2 project countries and supported the writing of a doctoral thesis.

- However, "other African countries were to be associated to the project on bilateral complementary financial schemes. This output was only partially carried out because of the lacking funds" (TE, p. 22).

4.3 **Efficiency**	Rating: **Unsatisfactory**

UNOPS had checked financial disbursements and concluded that "the great number of approved but not yet achieved operations added to undone disbursements do not allow an accurate balance" (TE, p. 29). Some project work was still being carried out as of the TE's writing.

The project appears to have practiced insufficient oversight of consultants in the field despite the Mid-Term Evaluation calling for greater consultant oversight. Project members appear to have "failed to bring the consultants to abide by the terms of reference" (TE, p. 12). The TE goes on to say "the consultants used to consider that their report's first version is systematically sound, particularly in its substance, and that only the form can be commented and revised by the project. So, the consultants generally made little effort to revise their reports to the NTCs or the RTC requirements" (TE, p. 12). (The TE fails to define NTC or RTC for readers unfamiliar with those acronyms.) The TE claims that these failures were due in part to low consultant pay, as the project was unable to afford high quality international consultants.

A fluid political situation in both countries caused numerous delays. According to the TE:

> It is important to notice that the political changes that occurred in both countries resulted in a great mobility among leading decision makers and employees of the concerned ministries. This mobility somehow affected the execution of the mentioned recommendations. Other unpredictable events, like the political problems faced by Côte d'Ivoire, also contributed to this failure (TE, p. 16).

The project also encountered delays due to communication problems and complying with complex administrative procedures. The TE mentions numerous delays to various parts of the project, but does not always specify a cause for each delay.

4.4 **Sustainability**	Rating: **Unlikely**

Considering the limited amount of success the project achieved and the limited groundwork that had been laid to support continuation of project outcomes and supporting activities, project outcomes are unlikely to be sustainable. In addition, the volatile political situation in both countries also represented a major challenge. The TE notes that "the process perpetuation may have been hindered by factors that are external to the project, particularly those related to the political changes, even political turmoil in Côte d'Ivoire. Nevertheless, the evaluation mission stress the point, because the failure in ensuring the process sustainability may jeopardize the project outcome and get its benefits lost" (TE, p. 6). However, the TE does not go on to further elaborate on political situation to give the reader a better understanding of how the political context affected current and future project outcomes.

Risks to the sustainability of project outcomes are further assessed along the following 4 dimensions:

Environmental: **Unable to Assess**

The TE provides no information on environmental risks.

Financial: **Unlikely**

The project was unable to secure forward financing for energy efficient measures for any of the 122 buildings audited. The only exceptions were the pilot project buildings that were already a part of this project. The project also saw financial irregularities, which could possibly continue in the future.

Sociopolitical: **Unlikely**

The volatile political situations in Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire had contributed to low project successes, including forcing stakeholders to become mobile. However, the TE does not define exactly what this mobility entailed beyond stating "that the political changes that occurred in both countries resulted in a great mobility among leading decision makers and employees of the concerned ministries. This mobility somehow affected the execution of the mentioned recommendations" (TE, p. 16). The TE does not say these political difficulties had been resolved as of the TE writing.

During the project, both countries' Energy Departments were scarcely involved. Both governments also failed to abide by the project's energy efficiency recommendations when constructing new public buildings. These factors show a lack of interest in both governments for sustaining this project going forward.

Institutional: **Moderately Unlikely**

Training had taken place, but the training carried out so far was insufficient was making the project sustainable. While "teachers, researchers [and] code writers" received training, the project failed to train a sufficient number of "administration officers who control the code observance, promoters, architects, consultants, supervision bureaus, entrepreneurs, material suppliers, etc." (TE, p. 19)

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Unable to assess. The PD states that the Ivorian and Senegalese governments were to provide US$509,038 and US$749,150 in co-financing. The TE gives no indication this was not delivered, but the political situations in both countries were volatile at the time. The Mid-Term Evaluation called for estimating government funding "in order to integrate them into the resources allocated to the project" (TE, p. 13). However, this was never accomplished, so the TE does not state what the actual co-financing was.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project encountered numerous delays. The most widespread problem was that the volatile political situation in both countries forced project members to have to become mobile. There were also delays implementing the Mid-Term Evaluation's recommendations because of communication problems between the UNOPS offices in New York and Abidjan. Retrofitting activities also were delayed because of "administrative obstacles and procedural obstructions" (TE, p. 16).

In particular, the retrofitting of the Assemblée Nationale Parliament building "started with great delays so that there was neither room left for setting novel financing schemes, nor monitoring and evaluation activities or media coverage" (TE, p. 21). Considering this was a high-profile project, media coverage would have been helpful in promoting the project's energy efficiency measures throughout the region. The TE explicitly states that "owing to the delays suffered at the start of the retrofitting program, the results related to this objective were not satisfactory" (TE, p. 27).

The project's implementation period was extended due to a Mid-Term Evaluation recommendation, but the TE does not specify how long this extension was.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

The project saw a low level of country ownership, likely due to the volatile political situation in both countries at the time. The TE explicitly said that the Energy Departments in both countries failed to become adequately involved in the project. Both governments also failed to abide by the project's energy efficiency recommendations when constructing new public buildings, which shows a lack of country ownership.

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 **M&E Design at entry**	Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

The design of M&E processes had a well-developed schedule in the PD, including a Mid-Term Evaluation 18 months after the project started. PD provides some benchmarks for success under each Immediate Objectives, such as the number of pilot projects required and the number of building portfolios to be compiled. However, benchmarks are not always provided in the PD, such as for training. The PD tends to say that training certain sectors of stakeholders should happen, but then doesn't quantify what success looks like (number of trainees, number of training events, etc.). As a result, the M&E design at times meets the SMART criteria (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Attributable, Relevant, Realist, Time-Bound, Timely, Trackable, Targeted), but inconsistently so. While the M&E design was inconsistent on the Measurable metric, the other SMART indicators are present in the design, though these were inconsistent as well.

The retrofitting operations at the Assemblée Nationale Parliament started late, which meant there was no time to create a M&E process for overseeing that initiative's progress. The PD had called for monitoring and evaluating this project, but did not define the criteria or when this criteria would be crafted.

The TE does not address if the M&E design was adequate in practice. The PD budgeted US$88,000 for M&E, which is about 1.5 percent of the total estimated budget of US$5.758 million.

6.2 **M&E Implementation**	Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

The TE provides limited information on quality of M&E Implementation.

The M&E team made a host of recommendations across a number of project issues, including raising inadequate consultant pay, increasing the frequency of BLECE publication, extending the project and holding an energy modeling workshop to train stakeholders. The TE and the PD are unclear over whether or not the M&E team were a separate unit from the project management.

However, the TE says that the retrofitting activities at the Assemblée Nationale Parliament were not monitored due to this initiative starting late. The TE is also vague over whether the other pilot retrofitting projects were ever monitored, instead saying they need to be monitored. In addition, no additional M&E appears to have taken place after the Mid-Term Evaluation. The TE makes no mention of PIRs.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 **Quality of Project Implementation**	Rating: **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

In retrospect, the project design may have been overly ambitious. Expecting the team to put together portfolios for 120 buildings for international energy efficiency financing may have been unrealistic. A bigger issue is that potential political instability in Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal was not taken into account when designing the project, but this may be a case of hindsight bias. The PD did not directly address potential political instability. The PD section on institutional risks instead focused on potential "bureaucratic constraints" (PD, p. 51) that would slow down project implementation.

The TE claims that the original PD project timeline was too short given the project design. The TE is vague on how well UNDP carried out its oversight role. Neither the PD nor the TE distinguish between retrofitting buildings and retrofitting building equipment, which are overlapping tasks, but not exactly the same thing. The PD equates retrofitting a building with retrofitting its air conditioning equipment.

That said, the project was well-financed and did not require that the each of the 120 buildings actually be retrofitted.

7.2 **Quality of Project Execution**	Rating: **Unsatisfactory**

The project only created 6 portfolios to show to international financiers, which was well short of the 125 the project needed to be successful. Project activities were often only partially executed or not executed at all, such as the training programs for DSM and LCP. Project initiatives launched in Cote d'Ivoire were often not started in Senegal.

The project team failed to implement several Mid-Term Evaluation recommendations, often citing a lack of funding., This included failing to establish an active communications team in both countries, an important omission, This lack of a proper communications strategy ensured that the project's energy efficiency recommendations were not broadly disseminated, making it difficult to actually implement these strategies. Without a proper communications strategy (and thus a lack of media coverage), the project was unable to get the Senegalese and Ivorian governments to adopt the project's recommendations. This also meant that other regional governments and the local private sectors did not adopt these recommendations..Many of the TE's recommended future actions were activities, explicitly called for in the PD, that should have taken place during the project, such as training architects and performing M&E on retrofitted buildings projects. The PD called for engaging major multilateral lenders and national aid agencies, but this was not accomplished.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate below that this is indeed the case. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The project's current (due to the 2 pilot equipment retrofitting initiatives) and future environmental benefits are difficult to assess. Consultants in both countries tried to estimate the total GHG savings that could be captured by following project recommendations, but "the reports produced insufficient and unreliable results" (TE, p. 15). These reports did not account for each countries actual energy mix for electricity production, as well as the "dynamics of their building sector development," (TE, p. 15) though this latter point is vague. The TE features on pages 24 to 27 an analysis of GHG savings from following the project's energy efficiency guidelines, but it is not clear if these numbers are based on the faulty reports mentioned above. Following these recommendations across 122 audited buildings would yield 60,000 tons CO2 mitigated annually, based on saving a total of 50 GWh across all buildings each year (TE, p. 25).

In addition, the Mid-Term Evaluation called for carrying out "an assessment of the economic, social and environmental impacts of a long term building energy efficiency program," (TE, p. 15) but this was never performed.

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The TE lacks any discussion of direct socioeconomic changes due to the project.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. "Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities:

The project involved training a number of relevant personnel, as well as promoting some technical materials (TE, p. 27). A total of 25 training reports were written. The project also helped support 25 graduate students, as well as 2 postgraduates students (TE, p. 5). Senegalese stakeholders also received training in using DO2 software (TE, p. 13). However, only a limited number of architects, building managers, consultants, entrepreneurs and other stakeholders received training (TE, p. 14).

b) Governance:

Some regulation documents called for in the PD were never written (TE, p. 21). The TE mentions new energy efficiency regulations, but it is unclear if these were due to project outcomes (TE, p. 24). The TE asserts that "numerous regulation texts" were written as part of the project, but the number and contents of these texts are never specified (TE, p. 27).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The project makes no mention of unintended impacts.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The project failed to scale-up the project's approach as of the TE's writing. The PD mentions that the project would seek to foster "association of other African countries with the project," (PD, p. 45) but the TE gives no evidence this came to pass. The PD also called for "designing buildings according to the Energy Efficiency Code and the Thermal Comfort Code" (PD, p. 42) developed by this project, but training of architects was inadequate during the project (TE, p. 14, 19).

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The TE mentions the following lessons when setting up similar projects in West Africa:

- A longer project timeline should be used. 3 years is too short. 5 years would be more reasonable.

- Audits should start right away once the project is started.
- Once the first audits are complete, immediately start pilot retrofitting operations.
- Select only those buildings for retrofitting where the building managers will remain engaged throughout the process and are willing to contribute co-financing.
- "Setting from the beginning a financial system almost similar to that of the [Energy Services Company] ESCO," (TE, p. 12). (The TE makes no mention of why this is a good idea and makes little mention of ESCO throughout the TE.)
- Thoroughly prepare a process for local authorities to eventually take over the project.
- Create a comprehensive and effective communications strategy.
- Implement a training program that engages all of the necessary stakeholders.
- Create funding plans that will adequately fund project activities (especially building retrofitting) and will get the financial support of international donors.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

- The TE recommends extending the project end date until June 2001 to allow ongoing activities to be completed.
- Small-Action Committees should be set up in both countries that would be comprised of 1) a representative of each President's office, 2) representatives from the Environment Ministry, Energy Ministry, Building Ministry and Finance Ministry, 3) the National Monitoring Committee (CNS) President and 4) the National Technical Adviser. These committees would set up a process by which the projects would come under government control. They would also lead a communications and media campaign.
- Training programs should be expanded to include "engineers, consultants, promoters, entrepreneurs, material importers and distributors" (TE, p. 8).
- Support further technical research and PhD theses.
- Create a reliable process to check on retrofitted buildings and fundraising operations.
- The governments of both countries should enforce energy efficiency requirements when constructing public buildings, which would set a good example for the private sector.
- The project teams in the field should edit and improve the consultant documents regarding the project's impacts in terms of GHG mitigation so that they are accurate.

- To actually follow through with audits' recommendations. The TE notes that “there is a tendency to think that the audits, once done, result by themselves spontaneously in concrete actions” (TE, p. 10).
- Building portfolios will need to be updated and made more professional in order to secure international financing.
- A meeting should be held to convince multilateral lenders and aid agencies to support actual retrofitting projects.
- Architects and administration officials in charge of overseeing energy efficiency projects should be trained in both countries.
- A final issue of BLECE should be published.
- The Assemblée Nationale retrofitting project should begin immediately.
- 2 years after the project's completion, UNDP should field a M&E mission to check on the project's results.
- UNDP and UNOPS should commit to “permanent support” of project operations (TE, p. 11). GEF and UNDP should analyze the M&E reports to inform future projects. In addition, GEF and UNDP should either support project attempts at securing financing for retrofitting operations or finance these projects themselves. Similar projects should be started across West Africa that build on this project's experience.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE goes through each of the Immediate Objective and states what action and progress were taken on each project task. However, the descriptions are often vague and poorly written.	**MS**
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The TE often overstates the project's outcomes and its potential to be replicated elsewhere. It also first notes that there were major holes in the training program, but then goes on to praise the training program. The TE states that the project had positive environmental impacts and was financially cost-efficient, but does not clarify whether this assessment is based on the faulty consultants' reports on GHG mitigation.	**U**
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The TE overstates the project's sustainability, in part because it appears to rely on faulty GHG studies for estimating potential mitigation. It brings up local political volatility, but does not explicitly outline what this situation entailed and how this would affect project sustainability. The TE also lacks an exit strategy.	**U**
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	While the lessons learned do address some issues brought up throughout the TE, such as insufficient training, other issues brought up throughout the TE get ignored. These lessons fail to note if funds were poorly spent considering the project's poor outcomes. They also do not examine if the project members made the correct decisions when examining trade-offs. Many project tasks were only partially completed. The recommendations do not state if it would have better to devote the resources to executing fewer tasks properly as opposed to many tasks poorly. The lessons learned also ignore why Cote d'Ivoire was more successful in achieving project goals than Senegal.	**MU**
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	The TE does not have a financial break-down of actual costs and co-financing. This was partly due to the fact actual project accounting appears to have been poor at the time, so the project's actual finances appear vague. This brings up questions of financial mismanagement, but the TE fails to directly address this problem.	**U**
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	The TE does not adequately assess the M&E system. While it does mention the Mid-Term Evaluation's recommendations, it does not state if the M&E process was well-organized or well-designed.	**U**
Overall TE Rating		**MU**

Overall TE rating: (0.3 * (4+2)) + (0.1 * (2+3+2+2)) = 1.8 + 0.9 = 2.7 = Moderately Unsatisfactory

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

Mid-Term Evaluation