Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Independent Evaluation Office, APR 2018

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		3831	
GEF Agency project ID		BO-X1001	
GEF Replenishment Phase		GEF-4	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		IDB	
Project name		Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity and Land in the Andean Vertical Ecosystems	
Country/Countries		Bolivia	
Region		LAC	
Focal area		Biodiversity and Land Degradation	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		BD-SP4, LD-SP1	
Executing agencies involved		Ministry of Environment and Water	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		N/A	
Private sector involvement		N/A	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		8/2/2010	
Effectiveness date / project start		12/2010	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		12/2015	
Actual date of project completion		12/2017	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US $M)	**At Completion (US $M)**
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	.1	.1
	Co-financing	.1	.1
GEF Project Grant		6.0	
Co-financing	IA own	7.57	0
	Government	0.48	
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	-	-
	Private sector	-	-
	NGOs/CSOs	-	-
Total GEF funding		6.0	
Total Co-financing		8.05	
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		14.05	6.14[1]
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		7/2018	
Author of TE		Rosa Isela Meneses	
TER completion date		1/9/2019	
TER prepared by		Cody Parker	
TER peer review by (if GEF IEO review)		Molly Sohn	

[1] This reflects final project expenditures. The exact breakdown of this sum between GEF grant and government in-kind co-financing is not related in the TE and therefore not reported here. The expected $7.57M in IDB co-financing did not materialize (see section 5.1).

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF IEO Review
Project Outcomes	S	NR	-	UA
Sustainability of Outcomes		NR	-	UA
M&E Design		NR	-	UA
M&E Implementation		NR	-	UA
Quality of Implementation		NR	-	MU
Quality of Execution		NR	-	U
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report			-	U

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

No Global Environmental Objective is outlined in project documents but it is presumed to be the same as the Development Objective (see below.)

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The project's objective was to promote the conservation of agro-biodiversity and sustainable land and water management to restore the productive capacity and sustainability of Andean Vertical Ecosystems containing habitats of native plants and endangered species and sustaining the food security of the population of *Ayllus* (indigenous Andean territorial organizations) through their traditional socio-political structures (ER, p. 1).

This was to be achieved through three project components:

1. Systematization of information and monitoring of soil, water, agro-biodiversity resources and impact of climatic variation;
2. Policies for strengthening the regulatory framework and local capacities for management of Andean Vertical Ecosystems;
3. Rescue and promotion of best practices and technologies for the conservation of agro-biodiversity and for the restoration of the productive capacity of the Andean Vertical Ecosystems.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

There were no changes to the Objective. One unplanned activity, a pay-by-results contest called "Protecting Mother Earth", was undertaken in 2016 to increase awareness and motivation among project beneficiaries (more detail below).

4. GEF IEO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 **Relevance**	Rating: Satisfactory

The project was in line with several related Bolivian government programs and policies including the National Plan for Development, the Communities in Action Program, the Plan for Eradication of Extreme Poverty, the Program of National Action of Fight against Desertification, the National Mechanism of Adaptation to Climate Change, and the Plan for Environmental Action in the Department of Potosí (ER, p. 15). On the GEF side, the project was well-aligned with SP-4, "Strengthening the policy and regulatory framework mainstreaming biodiversity in production landscapes", through its aim to establish mechanisms for coordination and harmonization of approaches between various ministries and Andean prefectures to incorporate principles of agrobiodiversity and sustainable land and water management in sector plans and policies, and to strengthen local capacities for monitoring and sustainable use of the genetic diversity of native crops. It was also relevant to SP-1, "Supporting sustainable agricultural and rangeland management", through technical assistance and investments in sustainable management of the Andean mountain ecosystems (ER, p. 16). Relevance is rated as Satisfactory.

4.2 **Effectiveness**	Rating: Unable to Assess

The TE gives no rating for effectiveness. Evaluation of project effectiveness is limited by the TE, which provides no meaningful or organized assessment of project achievements against targets. Appendix A is the only part of the report which attempts to measure achievements against targets, but many of the indicators it refers to do not correspond to the logframes in the Project Document or the Endorsement Request. Given the lack of indicator-based achievement reporting in the TE and PIRs, project effectiveness must be rated as Unable to Assess.

The final PIR (2017) reports that "14 of 15 outputs were fulfilled" (without specifying which one went unfulfilled), while the previous PIR (2016) boasts of components 2 and 3 "reaching, and even significantly exceeding their final goals". However, without any numbers or more specific details attached to these reported results, their validity cannot be confirmed. Information scattered throughout the TE does seem to support the conclusion that many project outputs were accomplished; for example, affirming that six Municipal Land Use Plans were elaborated, which matches one of the targets in the

GEF outcome logframe (TE, p. 86). However, the results as reported in scattered form throughout the TE cannot be measured against project targets. Some results do not seem to have any corresponding targets in the initial logframe, some (e.g., increase in traded goods) are given as an absolute quantity with no baseline as opposed to the percent targeted in the logframe, and some indicators included in the logframe are not addressed at all.

4.3 **Efficiency**	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

The TE gives no rating for efficiency. However, it does provide a brief financial overview of the project's implementation, noting that the "unencouraging [financial] scenario … should attract attention and be taken as a 'lesson learned'" (TE, p. 80).

Administrative costs ran 27% over budget, meaning more was spent on administration than on either Component 1 or Component 2. The reason is not explained in the TE but is likely related to the project's first two years, in which no progress whatsoever was being made yet administrative costs were being incurred as the project struggled to assemble a capable management structure (TE, p. 80). In fact, spending on administrative costs remained far greater than spending on any individual component in every year up to 2015.

Nonetheless, the project did finish within budget (95% spent), and without the expected co-financing support of a $7.5M loan (see section 5.1), albeit two years delayed. Although, as noted above, the lack of indicator-based results reporting in the TE precludes evaluation of project outcomes against targets, it is apparent from the TE's narrative that the project managed to achieve at least some positive impact using this budget. Project efficiency is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory.

4.4 **Sustainability**	Rating: Unable to Assess

Apart from two brief sentences indicating continuing low capacity among beneficiaries as jeopardizing the sustainability of the project's biodiversity management initiatives (TE, p. 88), the TE does not assess project sustainability. Therefore, it is unclear what risks (apart from insufficient capacity of beneficiaries) threaten the sustainability of project outcomes, and project sustainability is rated as Unable to Assess.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project's co-financing of $8M was to be composed of about $500,000 of in-kind contributions from the Ministry of Environment and Water and a $7.5M loan from IDB. The loan was allocated entirely to Component 3, and was to be made up of resources from a larger IDB loan to the related "Rural Food Initiatives Creation Project", reflecting the close planned collaboration between the two initiatives

(mutual sharing of information, experiences, good practices, etc.) (ER, p. 13). This collaboration, which would have required mechanisms of cooperation between the executing agencies of the two projects to be established early on, did not materialize, and Component 3 ended up essentially being financed by GEF funds alone with nominal in-kind contributions from the Ministry (TE, p. 79, p. 81). As early as the first PIR (2012), it was noted vaguely that there "could be limitations" to accessing the $7.5M and that the project team was attempting to identify "other Bank or government projects that can serve as an acceptable counterpart" to the project; none seem to have been found. However, beyond the missed opportunities for synergy and knowledge exchange with the Rural Food Initiatives project, no direct impacts of this lack of co-financing on project outcomes are noted in the TE or PIRs.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

There were significant issues with project start-up, leading to a two-year delay in the start of activities and project extensions totaling two years (the project, initially slated to close in December 2015, ended activities in December 2017.) (TE, p. 5). Fulfilling preconditions for the first disbursement of funds took 11 months, requiring two deadline extensions to avoid project cancellation (PIR 2012). According to the PD, there were four conditions for the first disbursement:

1. The Project Operations Manual being approved by the Ministry of Environment and Water (the executing agency) with non-objection by the IDB;
2. The formal establishment of the Steering Committee and appointment of its members by means of a Ministerial Resolution;
3. Project Participation Agreements signed by at least three *Ayllus* according to a model developed by the Ministry and IDB;
4. Evidence of the establishment of the Project Execution Unit and of the contracting of a Technical Coordinator, Procurement Specialist and Accounting/Financial Specialist hired following Bank procedures (PD, pp. 11-13).

It is not clear which of these were not satisfied nor why they could not be in a timely fashion. Furthermore, there was a protracted back-and-forth between the Ministry and IDB regarding the nature of project execution. Originally, per the first PIR, a specialized firm was to be contracted to carry out "project execution" (later PIRs seem to clarify that this refers to the execution of Component 3 only; this arrangement is not mentioned in the ER). Subsequently, for unknown reasons, the Ministry and IDB agreed that the firm would be replaced by experts hired directly by the Project Execution Unit. When the terms of reference drawn up by the Execution Unit proved unacceptable by IDB's standards, the original arrangement was reinstated, and by 2012, almost two years after project start, the process of contracting an outside firm was in progress (PIR 2012).

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

Country ownership was low, especially for the first few years of the project, with a lack of support from the higher levels of the Ministry of Environment and Water (the executing agency) listed as a serious or moderate risk in every PIR except the last. This issue only seems to have been finally addressed when the "Protecting Mother Earth" contest proved wildly popular with beneficiaries (cf. section 9.1), turning the project around and prompting the Minister to visit project areas and promise a second round of the contest (PIR 2017). It is unclear whether this initial lack of Ministerial support directly impacted project implementation or outcomes. However, it seems likely that the second precondition for disbursement funding listed above in section 5.2 may have been neglected due to a lack of attention or will on the part of the Minister, and the very least, the difficulties in project management and coordination that plagued the first years of the project suggest more top-down support would have been beneficial in general.

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 **M&E Design at entry**	Rating: Unable to Assess

The results framework as outlined in the Endorsement Request is fairly robust, with indicators and targets at the outcome level as well as annual targets at the output level. Indicators are mostly, though not completely, SMART.

There is a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan linked to in the Project Document, but the author of this TER was unable to gain access to it. As described in the Endorsement Request, this plan "summarizes the Outcome indicators at the Project Goal and Purpose level, indicating: (a) definition of the Outcome indicator, (b) indication of the type of indicator, (c) baseline value and target, (d) method/means of verification, (e) periodicity, (f) responsible party, (g) an indication of the expenditure category (component # or administrative costs), and (h) the estimated costs associated with the monitoring of each indicator" (ER, p. 6). Without being able to verify the thoroughness of the plan, however, this TER is Unable to Assess the quality of M&E design at entry.

6.2 **M&E Implementation**	Rating: Unable to Assess

Very little information is available on M&E implementation in the PIRs, and none in the TE. All that can be ascertained is that PIRs were released annually, and that the planned Midterm Evaluation did not take place due to the long delays in project implementation (PIR 2017). PIR 2017 notes that "the only product that was and will not be performed is the monitoring and evaluation system", although from context it seems likely that this is an error and that "monitoring and evaluation system" here refers specifically to the Midterm Evaluation.

Given the dearth of substantive information available, M&E implementation is rated as Unable to Assess.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 **Quality of Project Implementation**	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

As mentioned above, minimal information on project implementation is given in the TE. However, from the information in the project documents and PIRs it is possible to assess the quality of project design and IDB's level of support as implementing agency.

For the most part, project design as related in the Endorsement Request was sensible and thoughtful, including an analysis of several relevant risks and steps to mitigate them. However, risk analysis was not comprehensive. While the project foresaw mining activity in the region as a risk due to migration of community members for work on mining projects, it did not adequately account for the general hostility of locals to foreign technicians and consultants resulting from decades of sometimes violent tension between indigenous communities and mining companies, a risk identified in the PIRs. It also did not predict the low level of commitment on the part of the executing agency, which seems to have impacted project administration especially in the early years.

On the other hand, IDB did provide considerable support to the project during its lifespan, hiring consultants and specialists with its own (non-project) funds to strengthen the capacity of the Project Execution Unit when it became clear that the Unit was not functioning to the required level (PIR 2012, 2013, 2014). IDB also promoted the holding of meetings between the Minister and Execution Unit to improve coordination (PIR 2012).

Nonetheless, given IDB's prior experience with projects of this nature, issues with beneficiary acceptance of the program and institutional commitment should have been predictable and mitigation measures included in project design. Project implementation is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory.

7.2 **Quality of Project Execution**	Rating: Unsatisfactory

As with Project Implementation, virtually no information on project execution is given in the TE. However, the PIRs provide a narrative from which it is possible to assess, to some degree, the quality of project execution.

The project's executing agency was the Ministry of Environment and Water. As noted above in section 5.3, the Minister does not seem to have taken any interest in or provided support to the project until its last two years. Whether or not this was the cause of the project's inability to form an effective execution structure in its first two years is not clear.

PIR 2012 reports that the Project Execution Unit "has not yet developed a sufficient technical, administrative management, and coordination capacity" to successfully implement the project. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the Project Execution Unit was restructured repeatedly, with new coordinators being appointed and new specialists being hired in 2013 and 2014, in addition to a consultant with local expertise being hired with IDB's own funding in 2012 and another to aid in administration in 2014 (PIR 2014).

Progress appears to have finally picked up in 2015-2016, with disbursement rising and many outputs reported as having been achieved, which PIR 2016 attributes to: "i) the development of sufficient capabilities in the execution unit, ii) the Bank's monitoring and supporting efforts (twice a week meetings with the execution unit, by phone and in person), iii) the requirement of a strong performance as a prerequisite to extend the disbursement expiration date, iv) their commitment with the project (e.g. the technical coordinator of the executing unit was from the region and spoke the native local languages) and v) the project's dissemination to its beneficiaries on its purpose and main goals, as to increase awareness amongst the community about its relevance." Most of these factors should have been achievable long before the project's third and fourth year.

Overall, it was a lack of capacity in the Project Execution Unit, likely exacerbated by a lack of priority given to the project by the Executing Agency and despite apparently strong support from IDB, which caused many of the project's largest problems and delays. Project execution is rated as Unsatisfactory.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

Several positive environmental impacts are noted. 41 protected "reserve areas" were formally established, promoting the conservation of resident flora and fauna (TE, p. 86). Different types of terraces were introduced, yielding visible improvements in the construction of terraces and an increase in arable land; this is reflected in the perceptions of beneficiaries who report the terraces as being helpful in good soil management and raising crop yields (TE, p. 87). At least 10 micro-irrigation systems were improved or implemented by the project and are currently operational. These systems conserve water and reduce erosion by gently spraying water onto the land as opposed to dumping it, as residents were accustomed to doing. Afforestation activities were undertaken as well, and although in some cases the trees had high mortality rates (20-50%) due to a drought and late delivery of seeds, some afforestation has certainly been achieved (TE, p. 87).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

2,740 families benefited from Demonstration Plots of Integrated Management implemented in several communities. These Demonstration Plots were meant to showcase and engender sustainable soil and water practices in order to prevent erosion, etc. A significant increase in soil fertility was recorded in demonstration plots compared to control plots, indicating that the land management techniques applied were effective in this regard (TE, p. 44). This activity was generally well-appreciated by beneficiaries, with 62% rating it as “good” or “excellent” and 38% as “normal”. The benefits of the Demonstration Plots were greatly expanded beyond the initial project scope, with at least an additional 1,900 families implementing similar practices on their own land as part of the aforementioned Contest (TE, p. 48). Crop yields were perceived as improving, with 68% reporting a slight improvement, 20% a large improvement, and 13% none at all (TE, p. 52).

Additionally, an annual increase of 152,822 kg of traded or exchanged products is reported (TE, p. 42), although absent a baseline it is not possible to measure this against the 20% target set out in the logframe. This project outcome appears to have been one of the least impactful, with 76% and 63% of beneficiaries reporting no increase whatsoever in the bartering or marketing of goods, respectively (TE, p. 54).

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems,

including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

Capacity building exercises were a significant part of the project. The TE states that 5,264 people attended 18 training events in traditional practices of integral Andean Vertical Ecosystem management and agrobiodiversity conservation (TE, Appendix A, p. 16). However, only 31% of beneficiaries surveyed reported using the knowledge they gained from the project often, while 64% use it seldom and 5% not at all (TE, p. 51). In at least one area, project staff pointed out a fundamental flaw in the way trainings were carried out, with too much of a disconnect between theoretical and didactic classroom training and on-the-ground implementation of techniques leading to low adoption by beneficiaries (TE, p. 68). Overall, the TE observes a continuing "deficiency in the capacities and technical and institutional conditions of the actors involved", especially given the dispersed nature of training activities, which may negatively affect the sustained impact of the biodiversity practices imparted by the project (TE, p. 88).

b) Governance

Six Municipal Plans of Territorial Organization incorporating criteria for the recovery and revaluation of agrobiodiversity were developed, as well as 13 bylaws and regulations for the *Ayllus* in the project area and an Organic Charter for one project area, the Indigenous Chuquihuta Municipality (TE, p. 45). What impact these governance changes will bring in real terms remains to be seen.

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

No significant unintended impacts are reported affecting ecological or social aspects.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The extent to which this project's initiatives have been replicated or scaled up, if at all, is not made clear in the TE. However, attention to agrobiodiversity and sustainable land and water practices have been mainstreamed to some degree, at the very least in the bylaws and regulations influenced by the project (cf. Section 8.3b.)

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

- Judging from the narrative elaborated by the PIRs and corroborated by the TE, a key factor in the project's success was the "Protecting Mother Earth" contest, which aimed to motivate and raise interest among beneficiaries by offering incentives (e.g., farm tools) to implement techniques promoted by the project. While the details of this scheme are not provided, it seems clear that it succeeded in expanding the project's reach and impact. On the other hand, it caused conflicts between and within communities due to "disagreements regarding the awards received", i.e., envy on the part of those who did not win anything (TE, p. 48, p. 68). Overall, though, 63% of surveyed beneficiaries rated this activity as "good" and none rated it as "bad" or worse (TE, p. 49). Given the apparently low uptake of project activities prior to the contest, the power of such reward schemes should be considered in future projects of this nature, although care must be taken to mitigate attendant negative social effects. For example, authorities and project staff in one area suggested that in the future awards should be given for participation so that no one is left out (TE, p. 68).

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

- The information gained by the project should be shared with related government programs under other ministries, such as the Single National Land Information System and the Plurinational System of Information and Integral Monitoring of the Mother Earth and Climate Change.
- The project determined that the traditional *Ayllu* organizational structure is "positively important for the development of any project"; thus, *Ayllus* should be respected and strengthened and the project's strategy of allying with them (for example, hiring local technicians and guides) should be highlighted and replicated in other projects (TE, p. 86).
- As mentioned above, the pay-by-results "Protecting Mother Earth" contest was a highly effective way of raising awareness and motivation among beneficiaries. In future projects, this type of activity should be a starting point (TE, p. 49).
- Training, especially in agricultural techniques, must be accompanied by doing. Didactic and theoretical trainings often failed to be put into practice later by beneficiaries (TE, p. 68).
- Further training activities in land and water management are recommended, given the continuing low level of capacity observed among beneficiaries (TE, p. 88).

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF IEO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE reports some project impacts, but never measures them against the targets set out in the initial logframe, of which it also ignores many. Assessment of effectiveness is thus rendered impossible.	**HU**
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	While much information is conveyed in the report, little of it is of use in evaluating the design, implementation, and actual vs. expected impact of the project. There are no ratings.	**HU**
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The report does not meaningfully assess project sustainability.	**HU**
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons learned appear to be mostly valid, but with a strong focus on the technical aspects of the project. The few that address project design/execution are generally surface-level (e.g., "The collaboration of community members … is important")	**MU**
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	Actual project costs are reported by component and by year (not by activity.) Actual project costs are not disaggregated by GEF/co-financing, making it impossible to determine the exact amount of GEF grant disbursed. Co-financing is discussed, but more detail would be welcomed.	**MU**
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	The report does not evaluate or mention M&E systems.	**HU**
Overall TE Rating	The report is more of an impact evaluation than a TE. It is largely technical in nature, outlining the project's results in granular scientific detail without measuring outputs or outcomes against the indicators and targets set out in the PD and ER. Rather than assess implementation and execution of the project, it provides the detailed results of a post-project socioeconomic survey of beneficiaries. It also devotes tens of pages to a detailed ethno- and eco-historical background of the project area and case studies of specific project beneficiaries that do not belong in a GEF TE. Appendix A provides some semblance of attempting to measure achievements against targets for the first time in the report. Unfortunately, the indicators do not match those in the ER's logframe; achievements are often paired with completely unrelated indicators; apparent formatting issues gravely impact the legibility of several pages (text seemingly cut off at random, etc.); and no comment or analysis is made on any indicator or achievement. For future GEF projects, IDB should ensure that its evaluators are provided with GEF TE guidelines.	**U**

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

No additional sources of information were used in the preparation of this TER.