

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2013

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		394	
GEF Agency project ID		72	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		UNDP	
Project name		Protection of Marine Ecosystems of the Red Sea Coast	
Country/Countries		Yemen	
Region		Asia	
Focal area		International Waters	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		OP-9: Integrated Land and Water Multiple Focal Area Operational Program	
Executing agencies involved		Ministry of Fishwealht MSRC, UNOPS	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Not involved.	
Private sector involvement		Not involved.	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		May 1, 1992	
Effectiveness date / project start		July 2, 1997	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		March 1, 1996	
Actual date of project completion		May 26, 1999	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	0	0
	Co-financing	0	0
GEF Project Grant		2.80	2.72
Co-financing	IA own	0	UA
	Government	0.21	UA
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	0	UA
	Private sector	0	UA
	NGOs/CSOs	0	UA
Total GEF funding		2.80	2.72
Total Co-financing		0.21	UA
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		3.01	UA
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		2001	
TE submission date			
Author of TE		Mark Infield, Paul Nichols, and Ibrahim Sharaf Al Deen	
TER completion date		September 2014	
TER prepared by		Shanna Edberg	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Joshua Schneck	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	n/a	n/a	n/a	U
Sustainability of Outcomes	n/a	n/a	n/a	MU
M&E Design	n/a	n/a	n/a	U
M&E Implementation	n/a	n/a	n/a	HU
Quality of Implementation	n/a	n/a	n/a	MU
Quality of Execution	n/a	n/a	n/a	U
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	n/a	n/a	n/a	MS

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

According to the project document (PD), the global environmental objective of the project is to protect the globally significant marine ecosystems of the Yemen Red Sea coast. The waters are threatened by oil pollution, habitat destruction from development, and unsustainable fishing. The project will address “the vulnerability of the waters to pollution, the inadequate understanding of the links between land and sea, and the need for protection and management of resources” (project document, page 10).

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The project’s development objectives, as stated in the PD, are as follows:

1. Resource inventory and assessment carried out and monitoring system established.
2. National capacity to manage the marine environment improved.
3. Red Sea environment and resources sustainably used.
4. Regional cooperation for sustainable management of the Red Sea environment enhanced.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The project document was revised after the project start was delayed for years by the civil war in Yemen and problems with the tendering and contracting process. The budget and timetables were revised, but the objectives were not changed.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: Satisfactory
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The project is relevant for both the GEF and Yemen. For the GEF, the project falls under GEF Operational Program 9: Integrated Land and Water Multiple Focal Area Operational Program. The project includes “preventative measures to address threats” by gathering information on important habitats and developing capacity for monitoring and management (OP-9, page 2).

This project also aligns with Yemen’s priorities. The country has identified environmental protection as one of its four principal priorities, and is party to several international agreements on marine pollution. There are a number of laws aiming to protect marine ecosystems and manage fisheries sustainably, but monitoring capacity is weak and needs to be strengthened, which the project intends to ameliorate.

4.2 Effectiveness	Rating: Unsatisfactory
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Overall, only two out of the ten outputs were considered to be fully achieved by the TE. Regarding the four development objectives, only two were achieved to any degree: improving capacity for marine environmental management and regional cooperation for Red Sea management. The monitoring system was not established, nor did the project contribute to the sustainable use of Red Sea resources. Project effectiveness is rated unsatisfactory for the multiple failures to complete project outputs and objectives.

Achievement of project objectives is further detailed below along each expected output:

Output 1.1 was to gather baseline data and identify pressures on the Red Sea ecosystem. The TE determined that this was partially achieved. 57 sites were surveyed, but they were disproportionately located in one region, no trend analysis was undertaken, and there was little work done on mangrove and seagrass habitats or on environmental pressure and human use. A technical report was supposed to be produced as part of output 1.1, but was not. Output 1.2 intended to establish an environmental monitoring system for the Red Sea, but the TE reports that this was not achieved because the Ministry of Fish Wealth failed to provide funding and support. Output 1.3 to develop a database was “well achieved” (TE, page 36). A GIS was installed, training was conducted for its use, and computer hardware was supplied. No technical report on this output was produced, although it was called for in the project document.

Output 2.1 was to train specialists in environmental monitoring and management, and the TE rated it as partly achieved. Reports conflict on the number of people trained, and the types of training were “ad hoc in nature” rather than designed to fit the goals of the project and the needs of personnel (TE, page 37). For example, there was no training in cartography. Output 2.2 on training in environmental impact assessment and monitoring was not achieved; no instruction was given regarding laboratory equipment or monitoring or environmental impact assessment, but there was training in field survey gear. Output 2.3 on training for public awareness enhancement was determined to be partly achieved by the TE. 30 participants were trained on the Red Sea environment and how to increase public awareness, and the media was enlisted to raise environmental awareness via newspapers, radios, posters, leaflets, and public events. However, the TE believes that “the degree of training...was insufficient to materially improve national capacity in public awareness” (TE, page 38).

Output 3.1 was to identify sites for Marine Protected Area management, as well as to develop guidelines for marine management and to provide training. The TE considered the output to be partly achieved. Training was provided to four people, but no sites were suggested for consideration as marine protected areas and no guidelines for their management were developed. Output 3.2 to increase public and private sector awareness of marine sustainability was determined to be partly achieved. Programs were designed for schools, radio media, leaflets, posters, and a video. However, the TE believes that the six-month campaign period “was too short to have a significant or sustainable impact on public awareness” (TE, page 39). Output 3.3 was to identify financing options for post-project activities, but the output was not achieved: a report was produced, but it “was of little value” and there was no follow-up search for funding (TE, page 39).

Output 4.1 was for the coordination of the project with other activities in the region, and the TE considered the output to be achieved. The project successfully coordinated with the Red Sea Strategic Action Program to achieve benefits in training and collaboration.

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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Project efficiency was low, according to the TE. While “financial control of the project appears to have been rigorous...it would be difficult to say that this work represented an adequate or meaningful return on the investment” since most of the project activities were incomplete and the outcomes largely unachieved (TE, pages 33, 45). The TE states that the “single largest factor resulting in poor efficiency” was the failure of the technical and steering committees to meet and do their jobs (TE, page 33).

4.4 Sustainability	Rating: Moderately Unlikely
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Financial: Moderately unlikely; although one of the project activities was to obtain sources of financing to sustain the project’s benefits, this did not occur. The TE states that “in order to ensure a real return

on the investment made to date, further investment is needed” (TE, page 46). In addition, the project did not make plans for maintenance of the equipment that was purchased.

Sociopolitical: Moderately likely; the most viable mechanism for sociopolitical sustainability is Yemeni participation in the Red Sea Strategic Action Program. A number of Yemeni institutions, such as the Ministry of Fish Wealth, the Environment Protection Council, and the Marine Sciences and Resources Research Center are actively involved in implementation of the Red Sea Strategic Action Program, which is a positive signal of country ownership for the goal of protecting the Red Sea (if not a signal of country ownership for this project specifically).

Institutional: Moderately unlikely; although the project was modestly successful in training personnel and providing equipment for capacity building, the gains are not sustainable. The GIS database, which was a major project contribution, “remains largely unused” and became out of date due to the lack of an ongoing monitoring program (TE, page 46). Skills in using the GIS have eroded from lack of use, and no guides were written to train newcomers. In addition, the environmental survey data has no guide or legend defining the codes used in the data entry fields, so the data will be difficult to use in the future. The failure of the project to provide evaluations or technical reports for each project component will also make it difficult for Yemen to build on the project’s results. Finally, Yemeni institutions remain weak: “the evaluation team...found little evidence that the project has enhanced the ability of the government to avoid or reconcile coastal conflicts or to identify future opportunities for sustainable resource use” (TE, page 41). According to the TE, the Yemen Environment Protection Council “is not sufficiently strong to achieve its mandate” (TE, page 46).

Environmental: Not applicable.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Unable to assess; there is no financial information in the TE.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project started several years after its planned date. Security issues resulting from the Yemen civil war and problems in recruiting and procurement caused the delays. The delay did not affect the project’s outcomes; the problems the project faced in achieving project objectives and sustainability were primarily due to a weak design, poor performance on the part of the Ministry of Fish Wealth, and the failure of the steering and technical committees to meet or take any action on the project.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

Country ownership was low for this project. The executing agency, the Yemen Ministry of Fish Wealth, obstructed the project and prevented some of the project’s functions from being carried out, while other government agencies did not participate as planned (see Project Execution below). According to the TE, Yemen is not making use of its conservation resources, such as the staff of the Marine Sciences and Resources Research Center.

6. Assessment of project’s Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: Unsatisfactory
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According to the TE, the project did not develop measurable and verifiable indicators to measure progress. There were no indicators available in the project design that were “specific with respect to timing, location, quantity or quality” (TE, page 22). This rendered the TE unable to make objective and quantitative judgments about the project’s achievements. The project document describes a yearly tripartite review process and a midterm and final evaluation, but does not describe an internal monitoring process. M&E is not provided for in the budget of the PD.

6.2 M&E Implementation	Rating: Highly Unsatisfactory
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The weaknesses in M&E design were not corrected in implementation: “the contractual requirement for the preparation of six monthly work plans was not met” and no indicators or milestones were established (TE, page 22). In addition, each of the project’s ten outputs were designed to have evaluation and technical reports prepared as a concluding action, but “no such reports worth the name were prepared,” although some technical material from the outputs was written for progress reports (TE, page 24). The progress reports that were written by international consultants “concealed many of the problems being encountered by the project rather than revealing them to open scrutiny and comment,” so problems were not always recognized (TE, page 29). There was no list of reports and publications produced by the project, so it was difficult to locate project materials. The TE also reports that the project reports were “uninformative and difficult to read” and follow-up actions were not taken even when problems were apparent (TE, page 32).

Furthermore, “the primary tool for the regular monitoring of the project was removed” because of the failure of the project steering committee to meet or take any action (TE, page 31). The final M&E tool, the tripartite reviews, met three times to review the project. The TE reports that the first one discussed the problems faced by the project, but it is not clear if follow-up action was taken. The second review “seems to have accomplished nothing,” and the final review “failed to note that the project had stopped operations a year and a half earlier” (TE, page 31). In sum, all of the monitoring and evaluation tools failed to function as planned.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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The TE notes several flaws in project design. First of all, the stakeholder analysis was weak: “it is apparent...that no formal design process to ensure adequate participation of beneficiaries in the design of the project was carried out” (TE, page 11). This led to an institutional framework that “could neither adequately deliver results nor ensure the sustainability of those that were achieved” (TE, page 50). The general approach to the project was also flawed. For one, “the general assumption made by the project that protecting the coastal environment would protect Yemen’s Red Sea fisheries was not adequately tested” and that there is evidence that the threat to Yemen’s fisheries was unregulated fishing rather than threats to the coastal environment (TE, page 16). Therefore the project was operating from a flawed premise. The problem to be addressed by the project was not clearly identified and the project’s activities were not logically linked to the desired end result. Confusion over project results “made it possible for the Ministry of Fish Wealth to divert what was intended to be an environmental project into a fisheries production project” (TE, page 50). See below for more information on the conduct of the Ministry of Fish Wealth. Also, there was no logical framework to connect the project activities to the project’s goals. The design did not adequately address national capacity-building or policy changes, and “insufficient consideration was paid during the project’s design phase to post-project sustainability and effectiveness of monitoring the marine environment” (TE, page 16). Project design “included the replication of existing work” and “was over-ambitious both in terms of its expected impact and in the work to be undertaken” (TE, page 50).

Project supervision was also unsatisfactory. The TE states that the GEF never attempted to address the weaknesses of project design or implementation, and that the GEF never visited the project in the field. In addition, “there was inadequate vetting of the quality of technical reports and that there were several examples where reports were of such poor quality that it is difficult to see how the payment of contractors was agreed to” (TE, page 31). UNDP was closely involved in project operations and took steps to address some of the problems in the operating environment, but the TE states that the project’s problems and failures “should have met with a stronger response at the highest levels within UNDP” (TE, page 31).

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: Unsatisfactory
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There were multiple failures in project execution; the Ministry of Fish Wealth “failed spectacularly in the role expected of the national executing agency” (TE, page 29). The TE states that the Ministry of Fish Wealth attempted to prevent the involvement of national organizations that were intended to participate in the project, and wanted to change the project from an environmental project to a fisheries project. In the view of the TE, the Ministry of Fish Wealth successfully prevented the Yemen Environment Protection Council from becoming involved in the project: the Environment Protection Council “was not institutionally or politically strong enough to meet its coordinating role or to influence the role of the Ministry of Fish Wealth” (TE, page 14). The Ministry of Fish Wealth’s active obstruction was partially responsible for shutting down the project’s steering committee and preventing the implementation of the monitoring program. The Yemeni Ministry of Planning and Development was responsible for chairing the project steering committee, but it never met or took any action. UNOPS later took control of project execution, but “the hoped-for improvements in coordination did not...materialize” (TE, page 15). UNOPS had its own execution problems: “the Evaluation Team believes that the international contractors failed to meet a number of their contractual obligations in terms of the deliverables specified in the Project Document that formed a part of the contract. UNOPS failed to identify these contractual failures or respond to them” (TE, page 30). Many of the project activities were not carried out, but there is no documentation available to explain why.

There were also a number of problems that affected the survey work and prevented its completion: “Only a very substandard boat could be hired, the working budget was insufficient and the terms and conditions under which the vessel was chartered did not allow it to steam to all the areas where surveys were planned...Many sites were not visited and on at least one occasion the national counterparts refused to continue with the survey work due to the poor working conditions” (TE, pages 21-22).

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented,

sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

No changes were reported.

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

No changes were reported.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

The project provided some equipment for environmental surveys and information systems, and there was non-comprehensive training in some aspects of environmental monitoring and public awareness-raising. It is unknown how many people were trained.

b) Governance

A GIS on the Red Sea was developed, but it was never updated and only provides a snapshot of the past.

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

No unintended impacts were reported.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to

these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening

No adoption or replication was reported.

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The relationship between economics, social systems, and ecosystems must be clearly understood through problem identification.

Activities should clearly identify the primary threats to the environment and target those specific threats, rather than attempt a general activity such as awareness-raising.

The structure of the project’s design, budget, and selection of counterparts and consultants should clearly reflect the project’s priorities.

The failure to develop a project with a single and clearly defined purpose increased the likelihood of problems with implementation. A single purpose would provide the guidance needed for the project’s activities. Strategic planning should be undertaken at an early stage of project implementation, although changes should not be avoided if necessary (and enough flexibility should be built into project design to accommodate changes).

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

Project donors and proponents must have the courage to suspend project activities when it is clear that the executing agency is deficient and obstructive.

Closer monitoring of progress is necessary to ensure that the project remains on track.

Over-dependence on reports as a monitoring tool can be counterproductive as it leads to “report fatigue”.

9. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE’s assessment of the project is detailed and substantive, clearly enumerating the project’s successes and failures.	S
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence	The TE does not contain ratings, but it is internally consistent, complete, and convincing. It is well organized	MS

presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	and easy to understand.	
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	Sustainability is adequately assessed.	S
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons learned were comprehensive and stemmed directly from the project's experience.	S
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	No financial information is presented in the TE.	U
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	Complete and detailed.	S
Overall TE Rating		MS

10. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).