Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Independent Evaluation Office, APR 2018

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		4368	
GEF Agency project ID		1312	
GEF Replenishment Phase		GEF-5	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		IFAD	
Project name		Promoting a Value Chain Approach to Climate Change Adaptation In Agriculture in Ghana (ProVACCA)	
Country/Countries		Ghana	
Region		Africa	
Focal area		Climate Change	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		CCA-1, CCA-2, CCA-3	
Executing agencies involved		Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA)	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Various national and local NGOs partner to implement activities	
Private sector involvement		Contractors from India and Brazil to provide roaster and gasification plant equipment	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		February 2012	
Effectiveness date / project start		November 12th, 2012	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		June 2016	
Actual date of project completion		June 2017	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US $M)	**At Completion (US $M)**
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	.1	.1
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		2.5	2.39
Co-financing	IA own	8.52	
	Government	.32	.07
	Beneficiaries	.15	
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		2.6	2.49
Total Co-financing		8.99	.07
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		11.59	2.56
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		November 4th, 2017	
Author of TE		Not identified	
TER completion date		October 25th, 2018	
TER prepared by		Cody Parker	
TER peer review by (if GEF IEO review)		Molly Sohn	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF IEO Review
Project Outcomes	MS[1]	MU[2]	-	MU
Sustainability of Outcomes		MU	-	MU
M&E Design		NR	-	S
M&E Implementation		NR	-	U
Quality of Implementation		NR	-	MU
Quality of Execution		NR	-	U
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report		-	-	MS

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The project's global environmental objective was "to reduce the vulnerability of the food supply system to the deleterious impacts of climate change" (PD, p. 10). Cassava is the most important staple crop in Ghana, but production has been plagued by low efficiency and the threat of climate change with lower rainfall and longer dry seasons in recent years.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The development objective of the project was "to reduce climate-induced risks in the cassava value chain to the achievement of food security and income generation for pilot rural communities in Ghana" (PD, p. 10). This was to be achieved through three project components:

1. Awareness-raising on climate change and capacity to address its impacts along the cassava value chain and other complementary food production;
2. Supporting adaptation to climate change of cassava production;
3. Promoting innovative adaptation solutions along the agriculture value chain.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

There were no changes in the Global Environmental Objective. However, due to various problems in planning and project management, the key activities of Component 3 were not implemented, most notably the biogas energy plant, which was to have provided the key environmental impacts of the project (TE, p. 7). The third component of the development objective was therefore abandoned.

[1] This reflects final PIR rating of "Implementation Progress" and "Development Progress" (Final PIR, p. 6)
[2] This is "Overall Project Achievement" (TE, p. 41)

4. GEF IEO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 **Relevance**	Rating: Satisfactory

The TE rates relevance as Satisfactory, and this TER also rates relevance as Satisfactory.

The project was aligned with the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) 2010-2013 in terms of the strategy to promote energy efficiency, sustainable forest management, mitigation measures in the agricultural sector including education, efficient management practices and improving waste management mechanisms (TE, p. 44).

The project is relevant to GEF's climate change focal area, particularly CC-1.2 Reduce vulnerability to climate change in the development sector, and CC-2.1 Increase knowledge and understanding of climate variability and change induced risks at country level and in targeted vulnerable areas.

4.2 **Effectiveness**	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

The TE rates project effectiveness as moderately unsatisfactory. This TER also rates effectiveness as moderately unsatisfactory. The project was successful in reducing the vulnerability of cassava production to climate change: 91% of beneficiaries surveyed reported a 100-200% increase in cassava yield per hectare with the introduction of new higher-yielding and drought/disease/pest-resistant cassava varieties, and 98% were engaged in at least one new climate-smart agricultural activity (TE, p. 2). However, due to the failure to implement Component 3 and part of Component 2, three of the six originally planned impacts will not be achieved, namely: reduced deforestation, reduced impact on climate, and improved environmental health (TE, pp. 36-37). This puts the overall environmental impact of the project in doubt, and the absence of any plans to scale up or replicate the successful outcomes means its socioeconomic benefits are likely to be limited.

The TE points out the project's success in meeting its goals in terms of training administrators, farmers, and other stakeholders in mainstreaming climate change adaptation in their work. Under Components 1 and 2, 10,527 beneficiaries were directly affected through activities such as climate sensitization training, tree planting and climate awareness training for schoolchildren, soil fertility testing, farmer-to-farmer knowledge exchange visits, and Farmer Field Fora in which farmers were trained in climate-smart agriculture practices (TE, p. 21) However, the media/awareness campaign was only partially completed, and one of the "pillars" of Component 1, the planned GIS-based vulnerability assessment of 21

communities, was never undertaken due to delays on the part of the University of Ghana, which was meant to partner in its implementation (TE, p. 7). In addition, the planned installation of 16 automatic weather stations was eventually scrapped due to budget constraints and concerns about the efficacy and sustainability of the model, which would require farmers to pay a subscription fee to use the service. Rain gauges were eventually installed in place of automatic weather stations, but because impact analysis was precluded by late implementation it remains unclear how utilized or effective they will be (TE, p. 7). Furthermore, the impact of the awareness-raising is questionable, given the already high level of climate change awareness among farmers revealed by the baseline study (92%, vs. 94% after the project). Awareness of the risk of drought from varying rainfall patterns actually dropped considerably (88% baseline, 44% after project) (TE, p. 11). Planned agro-forestry activities under Component 2, which aimed to combat soil erosion as well as diversify income, were not achieved due to hesitancy on the part of farmers (TE, p. 10). As a result, this part of the project was canceled and replaced by a much smaller-scale shade-tree planting activity.

The pilot cassava processing/gasification/biogas energy facility under Component 3 was to be a key outcome of the project, a lasting achievement which could demonstrate the effectiveness of harvesting agricultural waste and wastewater to produce both higher-quality agricultural products and cleaner energy (PD, p. 55). Yet by project close, no part of this proposed facility had been completed and the biogas energy plant, which would have been necessary for overall carbon neutrality, was abandoned. The reasons for this are discussed below. Due to the failure to complete Component 3, the major proposed environmental impacts of the project will not be realized.

4.3 **Efficiency**	Rating: Unsatisfactory

The TE rates efficiency as moderately unsatisfactory. This TER rates efficiency as unsatisfactory, mostly due to large delays and mismanagement causing a failure to accomplish some of the project's objectives.

The project was delayed by a year, largely due to a slow start to the implementation of Component 3 and problems with the procurement of its necessary equipment. Inadequate project management, a lack of diligence in completing administrative tasks in a timely manner and failure to follow up on recommendations are primarily responsible for the failure to implement most of Component 3 (TE, p. 21).

The project ended up slightly under budget overall. Yet while the TE reports the disbursement of 95.77% of funds by project close as a "remarkable achievement", the disbursement distribution was uneven, with a disbursement of 75%, 57%, and 122% for the three project components, respectively (TE, p. 7). The third component was the highest-budgeted, and overran despite not being complete by project close, even with the one-year extension (and, as mentioned above, the crucial biogas energy plant was abandoned altogether). The project management and M&E budget overran considerably at 162%, largely due to the extension of the project requiring additional staff, operation and maintenance costs

(TE, p. 16), but also reflecting the serious problems with effectiveness of project management and M&E staff.

4.4 **Sustainability**	Rating: Moderately Unlikely

The TE rates sustainability as "moderately unsatisfactory". This TER rates sustainability as moderately unlikely, mainly due to an absence of any plans to continue or scale up the project's successful components and as-yet-unresolved issues around post-project ownership and operation of the gasification facility.

Institutional Framework and Governance Sustainability: Most aspects of this project were intended as standalone activities, and there has been no indication on the part of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to scale up or continue any of the completed training and awareness activities carried out under Components 1 and 2, jeopardizing the sustainability of their impact (TE, p. 20). Although IFAD has committed to provide funding to ensure completion of the not-yet-operational gasification plant, its post-project ownership was still in question as of the time of the TE's completion in June 2017, and its long-term technical sustainability is doubtful due to the failure to train local staff in its maintenance and operation (TE, p. 19). These are issues that should have been settled in the planning phase.

Sociopolitical Sustainability: The new varieties of cassava introduced under Component 2, which have been shown to be more drought-, disease-, and pest-resistant and produce higher yields, have been largely accepted by beneficiaries who will likely continue to use them (Final PIR, p. 5; TE, p. 40). Although there are no plans to scale up the use of these superior cassava varieties, sustainability is likely among project beneficiaries.

Financial Resources Sustainability: The only outcome of the project that would require ongoing financing is the cassava processing/gasification facility under Component 3. A financial feasibility study concluded that the facility could well be profitable, but the study was for the full facility including the abandoned bioenergy plant and relied on the assumption that trained staff would be available to operate and maintain it (PD, p. 137). As mentioned, at project close the partial facility was not yet operational and the question of who will finance its operation was not settled. Financial resources are therefore likely to pose a risk to the sustainability of this outcome.

Environmental Sustainability: There are no apparent environmental risks to the sustainability of the project components actually completed.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Of the project's planned co-financing of $8,985,000, only $66,722 in tax breaks from the Government of Ghana was actually secured (TE, p. vi). The vast bulk of planned co-financing

($8,521,000) was to be from an IFAD grant/loan, which apparently never came through. This project was a component of the broader Roots and Tubers Improvement and Marketing Program, which was also implemented by IFAD and the Government of Ghana and closed in June 2015, yet the project completion report for that program shows no IFAD financing going to this project (RTIMP PCR, p. viii). In initial project documents the $8,521,000 was budgeted among the various project components, yet the TE fails to address in any way whether and how the absence of this financing impacted the project, and in fact makes no reference to it whatsoever.

The Government of Ghana, which had agreed to contribute $315,000 to the project, only met 21% of that commitment ($66,722 in tax exemptions). (TE, p. 18). However, this does not seem to have negatively impacted the project's outcomes or sustainability. Beneficiary financing proposed in the original project documents ($150,000) does not seem to have materialized, although once again the TE makes no mention of this.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project was extended by a year so that the planned gasification facility could be completed. This lead to overruns in project management and M&E costs, yet by project close it was still not up and running (TE, p. 16). Due to the delays caused by miscommunication, mismanagement, and disagreements over payment, the gasification plant and roasters were still not operational by project close, and the bioenergy plant and wastewater treatment facility were scrapped altogether, essentially eliminating the greatest potential environmental impact of the project (TE, p. 11).

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

The project was executed by a national agency (Ministry of Food and Agriculture). Country ownership is lacking in the sense that at the close of project the Ghanaian government had no plans to continue or scale up such training, putting the long-term sustainability of the project in doubt. Lack of country ownership was also reflected in the failure to authorize regional travel for participants in a planned regional climate training workshop for West and Central Africa; this activity was replaced by a series of exchange visits to successful test fields for farmers within Ghana (TE, p. 9).

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 **M&E Design at entry**	Rating: Satisfactory

This TER rates M&E design at entry as Satisfactory, due to its overall completeness. The project document designates responsible parties, establishes M&E budget, and includes a logframe with well-defined indicators as well as assumptions and risks (PD, pp. 99-113). It also includes a schedule of progress reports to be carried out periodically throughout the project.

6.2 **M&E Implementation**	Rating: Unsatisfactory

The TE does not rate M&E implementation on its own, instead describing it under Project Efficiency and Project Management which each receive a Moderately Unsatisfactory rating.

This TER rates M&E implementation as Unsatisfactory. While M&E was reportedly "adequate and responsive" for project components 1 and 2, it was far from adequate for component 3, and to a large extent the delays and cost overruns for that component can be attributed to insufficient investigation, management responsiveness, timeliness, and reporting. M&E was not carried out following a logframe of project implementation as required by GEF implementation standards (TE, p. 39). When implementation was transferred from the Roots and Tubers Improvement and Marketing Program to the Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Program, M&E virtually broke down, with M&E data being collected but not entered into a centralized system and therefore never acted upon, despite the repeated urging of IFAD. Eventually, regular project progress reporting was not even carried out under the Ghana Agricultural Sector Investment Program (TE, p. 17). It can be ascertained from the project completion report for the Roots and Tubers Improvement and Marketing Program that the program as a whole suffered from personnel problems in M&E, and that "most good staff left due to bad management" (RTIMP PCR, p. xiii).

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 **Quality of Project Implementation**	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

The project's implementing agency was IFAD.

The TE describes IFAD's support in terms of project design, supervisory missions, and country presence as "adequate". Supervision missions were carried out annually in cooperation with the Government of Ghana, there were no delays in fund transfers, and IFAD was determined to have "largely complied" with financial procedures (TE, p. 19). The TE points out the MTR's claim that the initial project length was too short for a successful implementation of the gasification and biogas plants under Component 3 even if there had been no delays (TE p. 3), although it largely lays the blame on the executing agency for poor project management and difficulties with suppliers (TE, p. 11). The project document includes a financial feasibility study of the cassava processing/bioenergy facility, but it does not include an assessment of the time required to build such a facility. It appears that particularly with regard to Component 3, more detailed planning was needed not only to ensure timely procurement of equipment but to establish post-project ownership and maintenance of the plant (RTIMP PCR, p. 30). The project design of Component 3 was not as detailed as it needed to have been, and although IFAD's supervision was adequate, it was unable to effect the changes that its supervision missions revealed to be necessary. Quality of project implementation is therefore rated as moderately unsatisfactory.

7.2 **Quality of Project Execution**	Rating: Unsatisfactory

The project's executing agency was the Ghanaian Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA), in partnership with various other government ministries and non-governmental programs.

As mentioned above, the main projects to be implemented under Component 3 were mechanized roasters to process cassava, to be powered by a gasification plant and a bioenergy plant, the latter of which would use wastewater from cassava peels to produce energy (PD, p. 78). Such a set-up would be innovative, and its success could influence the development of similar facilities throughout the region, providing higher-quality cassava products and energy. At project close, however, the roasters and gasification plant were still not operational due to insufficient planning, technical problems, miscommunication with suppliers, and delays in procurement, and the bioenergy plant had been scrapped altogether in order to ensure availability of funding for the gasification plant (TE, p. 11). The TE does not address these execution problems in great detail; the completion report for the broader Roots and Tubers Improvement and Marketing program reports that the procurement officer for ProVACCA was dismissed based on a "clear case of collusion" (RTIMP PCR, p. xiii), which is not explained but suggests that, as with M&E, there were severe problems on the part of MOFA to ensure effective project management staffing. The aforementioned IFAD supervision missions repeatedly raised concerns about failures to complete administrative tasks and deadlines in a timely manner and to follow up on recommendations, but these problems were apparently never remedied by the executing agency (TE, p. 17). Project execution is therefore rated as unsatisfactory.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The TE does not quantify specific changes to environmental status resulting from the project. However, the abandonment of the biogas energy plant means that the project, initially meant to be climate-neutral, will lead to a net increase in GHG emissions (TE, p. 13). Similarly, the abandonment of the wastewater treatment capacity means that byproducts from the cassava value chain will continue to pollute local water. It is therefore possible that the overall environmental impact of the project will be negative.

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

Because of problems with the baseline and follow-up surveys, it has been impossible to quantify direct changes in food security measures from the project (TE, p. 11). However, 91% of those surveyed reported a 100%-200% increase in crop yield per hectare, reflecting a successful implementation of higher-yielding cassava varieties; 2,832 farmers received training through 49 FFF's, and over 950 were trained by trainers in soil fertility testing (TE, p. 21). Furthermore, an estimated 10,000+ were exposed to educational radio broadcasts on climate-smart agricultural practices (TE, p. 21). This suggests that despite a missed opportunity on the part of MOFA to upscale the training and awareness programs, farmers in the region do enjoy an increased capacity in their cassava production and heightened knowledge on climate-smart agricultural practices that will positively impact their ability to adapt to climate change going forward, as well as directly improving their income.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. "Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project

activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

Capacity-building was a pillar of Component 1 and was largely achieved. 25 Roots and Tubers Improvement and Marketing Program, extension, and research staff were trained in participatory climate-risk assessment and vulnerability mapping; consultation sessions to help stakeholders mainstream climate adaptive practices into their livelihoods were carried out, reaching 163 communities and 5,515 farmers (TE, p. 25).

b) Governance

Over the course of 12 consultation sessions, 322 stakeholders including district administrators, planning officers, and agricultural officers in addition to cassava farmers were trained, but it is not clear what specific training these consultation sessions consisted of (TE, p. 25). Overall, the project is unlikely to have any substantial impacts on governance practices especially considering its one-off nature and the lack of plans to continue or scale up training.

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

Despite the failure of the program to accomplish its main environmental impacts, there do not appear to be any unintended negative ecological or social impacts of the program outside of its objectives.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

Despite the success of Components 1 and 2, none of the project's initiatives have been scaled up or continued in a way that would more broadly impact agriculture in the country or region at large.

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The "lessons learned" presented in the TE are not useful; it primarily points to the scientific knowledge gains regarding cassava cultivation, and then points out the flaws in project execution and M&E without actually extrapolating lessons from these (TE, p. 20).

One of the key lessons from the project, hinted at but not explicitly outlined in the TE, is the need to ensure that the executing agency employs effective and diligent project management personnel. The biogas energy plant was an ambitious goal but its delay and then abandonment was largely due to a failure to complete administrative tasks and implement recommended changes in a timely manner. IFAD's supervision was able to identify these problems but apparently unable to effect personnel change until it was too late.

Although not mentioned in the terminal evaluation, Technical Working Groups are indicated by the project implementation report as being "extensively useful" in project implementation (PIR 2015, p. 4). Although not unique to this project, Technical Working Groups are often used in only an advisory capacity, whereas in ProVACCA they played an instrumental and direct role in implementing many aspects of the project. Not only did this obviate the need for hiring costly consultants and help to speed up and focus implementation, the institutions that Technical Working Group members come from also benefit by being exposed to the project and the project benefits from the increased exposure (PIR 2015, p. 4). Using Technical Working Groups as an integral part of project implementation may therefore be an idea worth exploring for other GEF projects as well.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

- In addition to supporting the completion of the gasification plant, IFAD should extend funding to enable construction of the biogas energy plant and wastewater treatment capacity in order to address greenhouse gas emissions and water pollution impacts.

- The project's achievements in climate-smart agriculture training and higher-yield cassava production should be mainstreamed and upscaled to the wider cassava production sector. (TE, p. 22).

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF IEO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The assessment of project outcomes, impacts and achievement of objectives is adequate.	**S**
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The report is largely repetitive and avoids going into useful detail on many of the significant problems that the project faced.	**MU**
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The report addresses project sustainability mostly adequately but does not explain its reasoning sufficiently on all points.	**MS**
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons provided are supported by evidence given, but they are few and not very comprehensive.	**MU**
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	The report contains disbursement of the GEF grant per component and by category, yet it reports no co-financing whatsoever, which is inconsistent with the final PIR.	**MU**
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	The report evaluates M&E mostly adequately but could be more detailed, and its rating of MU seems inflated given the clearly disastrous M&E implementation.	**MS**
Overall TE Rating		**MS**

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

In addition to the TE, PIRs, and PD, this TER drew upon the Project Completion Report for the Roots and Tubers Improvement and Marketing Program, of which this project constituted one component.