

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2014

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		48	
GEF Agency project ID		535	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		Wildlands Protection and Management	
Country/Countries		Republic of Congo	
Region		AFR	
Focal area		Biodiversity	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		OP-3: Forest Ecosystems	
Executing agencies involved		Ministry of Economy, Finance and Planning; Ministry of Water and Forests	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Secondary executing agencies	
Private sector involvement		Secondary executing agencies	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		01/05/1991	
Effectiveness date / project start		10/13/1993	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		12/31/1997	
Actual date of project completion		06/30/1999	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	0.100	0.111
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		10.097	9.41
Co-financing	IA own		
	Government	0.979	
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	2.607	
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs	0.219	
Total GEF funding		10.197	9.516
Total Co-financing		3.805	U/A
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		14.002	U/A
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		05/17/2000	
TE submission date		05/17/2000	
Author of TE		N/A	
TER completion date		10/31/2014	
TER prepared by		Sean Nelson	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Joshua Schneck	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	N/R	S	MSMS	
Sustainability of Outcomes	N/R	U	U	U
M&E Design	N/R	N/R	N/R	MU
M&E Implementation	N/R	N/R	N/R	S
Quality of Implementation	N/R	S	S	MS
Quality of Execution	N/R	S	S	MS
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	-	-	S	MS

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The GEO was to protect the globally significant biodiversity and ecosystems in the Republic of Congo (ROC). The country is divided into 65 percent forest cover and 35 percent savannah. The forest areas are made up of the Congo River Basin, the Chaillu region and the Mayombe region. The project area covered Nouabalé-Ndoki, Lake Tékélé-Likouala-aux-Herbes, Conkouati, Dimonika and Léfini, along with some survey work in Mt. Fouari and Mt. Nabemba-Garibenzam.

When the Project Document (PD) was written, the ROC government had planned to turn 11 areas into gazetted conservation areas, which covered about 4.4 percent of the country's land area. Only Odzala National Park and the Dimonika-MAB Reserve had "benefitted from a rational conservation program or management plan" (PD, p. 1). The Nouabalé-Ndoki and Lake Tékélé-Likouala-aux-Herbes sites in the country's north were not among these 11 sites, but were also of particular interest because they included primary closed forests and many large mammals. If the Nouabalé-Ndoki became a protected conservation site, the fact that it is contiguous with the Central African Republic's Dzanga-Sangha Reserve and Cameroon's Lake Lobéké would make it part of one of Africa's largest protected forest regions.

(Note: Multiple PDs exist for this project that are not entirely consistent, especially with regard to co-financing.)

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The DO was to enhance biodiversity protection capacity through creating a systematized approach in the ROC. The project area covered Nouabalé-Ndoki, Lake Tékélé-Likouala-aux-Herbes, Conkouati, Dimonika and Léfini, along with some survey work in Mt. Fouari and Mt. Nabemba-Garibenzam. These sites make up a mix of the following:

- 1) Areas representative of each ecosystem in the ROC
- 2) Large and intact northern ecosystems

- 3) Southern threatened ecosystems
- 4) Endangered species and other species under threat
- 5) Areas and species that are subject to current or potential international conventions
- 6) Pilot project areas where greater community involvement can be promoted

The project originally had these five main activities:

- 1) Project Committee Creation: Creation of the Project Management Unit (PMU), the Technical Steering Committee (TSC) and the Peer Review Committee (PRC). This component would also include writing regulatory and institutional frameworks to be adopted locally, local populations surveys, M&E, training, founding the Trust Fund and engaging in sub-regional programs for ecosystem protection
- 2) Improving capacity at the National Herbarium
- 3) Improving the Geographic Information System (GIS)
- 4) Gazetted Areas Protection and Management
- 5) Protected Areas Support

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

There were **no** changes to the DOs and the GEOs.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: Satisfactory
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This project was relevant to the GEF under OP-3: Forest Ecosystems, since this project aimed to improve capacity in globally-significant forest ecosystem protection. For the ROC government, the project built

off of the 1991 Environmental Law and the Forest Code. This project would allow the government to discover which logging activities to allow and which areas needed greater protection. According to the PD, “the project forms an integral part of the national environmental strategy” (PD, p. 1).

4.2 Effectiveness	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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Note: This document rates project effectiveness slightly below the TE's “Satisfactory” rating. This is due to the PMU's shortcomings, especially the failure to create a permanent administrative unit that would ensure that project work would be sustainable and ongoing. The TE is highly inconsistent in addressing the PMU's results, praising its work in certain sections (such as the section detailing project outcomes), while implying it was incompetent in others.

Summary: The project ran into numerous problems outside of its control due to the outbreak of 3 Civil Wars during the project life. The entire project has to be understood in that context. Despite this, the project achieved many of its goals. The project created most of its necessary committees and carried out committee work, improved capacity at the National Herbarium and the Geographic Research and Mapping Center (CERGEC), implemented a reserve management plan at Nouabale-Ndoki and engaged in protect area management activities.

1) Project Committee Creation Moderately Unsatisfactory

The PMU and TSC met its primary goals of guiding the project, including building partnerships, improving capacity and conducting M&E. This was conducted in conjunction with the Interministerial Monitoring Committee (IMC) and Local Site Committees (LSCs). According to the TE, “the four-tiered institutional arrangement... formally established after the Mid-Term-Review, was marginally satisfactory in involving the three ministries involved in the project and other stakeholders implicated in the establishment and management of protected areas” (TE, p. 4). Following the MTR, NGOs who had worked with the project to help protect local ecosystems gained seats on the Project Management Committee (PMC), which improved their cooperation with the government. With this said, the PMU and its associated consulting firm, TA, did not create a clear management strategy until it received criticism in the MTR. The PMU did not carry out all of its required studies, some of which had to be canceled.

The Peer Review Committee (PRC) could only meet once (in December 1998) due to the Civil War. The Trust Fund, which was supposed to raise additional funding, also had to be reduced in scope and was later canceled. A consultant's preliminary study to help establish the Trust Fund did not meet World Bank standards. The poor report, the Civil War, management problems and a lack of donor interest ensured the Trust Fund never got off the ground. Most importantly, the PMU failed to fulfill its post-MTR goal of creating a permanent autonomous management unit to carry on its work. This was due to the Civil War and an inability of the ROC government and the Trustee to agree on the implementation details.

(The TE fails to provide details on the training part of this component.)

2) Improving capacity at the National Herbarium Satisfactory

The project supported a partnership with the Missouri Botanical Gardens (MBG) that helped to identify previously unidentified plant species, improved the specimen database, and provided training for National Herbarium staff.

The National Herbarium suffered great damage during the project that included property destruction and a loss of specie samples, though the reason is not stated. Presumably, this was due to the Civil War. The project worked to replace the lost surveys through additional surveys, saved the remaining collections and rebuilt the destroyed infrastructure.

3) Improving the Geographic Information System (GIS) Moderately Satisfactory

Looters and the Civil War damaged CERGEC's facilities, which hurt their ability to create digital maps of the 5 reserve areas. Working with NGOs, CERGEC created maps of 3 out of the 5 project reserves. It is unclear from the TE whether or not survey work was carried out on the other 2 reserves for the purposes of this component. The project provided training for 2 staff members in advanced GIS techniques and interpreting satellite imagery.

4) Gazetted Areas Protection and Management Moderately Satisfactory

The Nouabale-Ndoki Reserve, the Lesio-Louna Sanctuary Reserve (Lefini-South) and the Community Reserve at Lake Tele/Likoula-aux-Herb were all gazette during the project. The latter was also designated a Ramsar site of international importance. Only one management plan, the one for Nouabale-Ndoki, was fully implemented during the project. This Reserve also entered in a buffer zone management partnership with a logging concessionaire that was not part of the original project design. The TE claims that this partnership "sets a standard for other forested protected areas worldwide" (TE, p. 5). The project presented management plans for Conkouati and Lake Tele to the government, but these were not yet implemented. It was uncertain if these plans ever would be.

The government performed illegal actions during the project that undermined this component. For instance, the ROC government "breached a legal covenant by issuing a gold mining exploration permit" for the Dimonika site and a logging concession for the Conkouati site (TE, p. 5).

The project had to withdraw from the Dominika site in 1998 due to civil strife, the long search for a local NGO to act as the executing agency and the fact researchers from UNDP's already-closed Project Mayombe continued using local research buildings. When the NGO Micro Corps Development (MDC), in its role as the local executing agency, tried to carry out project work, one of its vehicles and most of its equipment were stolen. The government's decision to allow gold mining also led to the decision to withdraw from Dominika.

The Lefini site was divided into northern and southern portions with different managers and executing agencies for each. Project outcomes in Lefini-South were carried out satisfactorily. This area became an

orphaned gorilla reserve. Lefini-North lacked an executing agency, which delayed and inhibited project outcomes here.

5) Protected Areas Support Satisfactory

The project reintroduced orphaned primates – chimpanzees in Conkouati and gorillas in Lefini-South (Lesio-Louna) – back into the wild. The project created a community co-management board proposal for Conkouati, but it was not yet implemented. It is unclear from the TE if similar boards were proposed or created at the other project sites. In addition, the project supported numerous biological and socioeconomic studies, built (or rebuilt) infrastructure on project sites and encouraged local community involvement in reserve management. However, the TE provides few details on these activities. NGOs worked in conjunction with the project to carry out this component.

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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Summary: The project experienced delays both inside and outside of its control, some due to the Civil War.. PMU displayed poor management skill before the MTR, including allowing the misspending project funds.

Delays: The project experienced numerous delays due to the Civil War and related political instability and civil unrest. The project started late due to the first Civil War. The project experienced numerous delays in carrying out work at the Dominika site, which helped lead the project to cancel future work at that site. These delays included a long search of a local executing agency, property theft and disputes with non-project researchers over access to local research buildings.

The project also experienced delays not directly attributable to the Civil War. Project work at Lefini-North also experienced severe delays due to a long search for an executing agency. Government staff turnover also created delays in executing project activities, though the TE fails to provide details on this point. Looting at CERGEC offices delayed their ability to create digital maps of the 5 project sites. The PMU and TA slowed down project execution by failing to properly disburse project funds.

Financial Management: The TE notes that the PMU and TA mismanaged project funds, but it provides few details on this problem beyond noting that “over \$150,000 was used for ineligible expenses” (TE, p. 7). After the MTR uncovered this problem, the project temporarily stopped disbursing funds.

4.4 Sustainability	Rating: Unlikely
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Summary: Despite the project team’s best efforts, project sustainability was unlikely. This was largely due to the ROC government’s inconsistent support for biodiversity conservation and ongoing political turmoil.

Environmental: **Unable to Assess**

The TE does not address environmental risks to project sustainability.

Sociopolitical: Unlikely

The ROC government became a Ramsar Convention member and signed the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Convention on Climate Change during the project. This improved the government's reputation on environmental issues, but the TE implies this was undeserved. For instance, the government illegally issued an exploration permit for gold mining at the Dimonika site and a logging concession at the Conkouati site. In addition, the country had just undergone a Civil War and was still experiencing domestic political instability.

Institutional: Unlikely

The project presented management plans for Conkouati and Lake Tele to the government, but these were not yet implemented. It was uncertain if these plans ever would be implemented. A permanent administrative unit that would take over PMU responsibilities was never created. Since the last World Bank supervisory mission had to be canceled due to security concerns, no agreement with the ROC government over transition arrangements was ever written.

Financial: Unlikely

There were no financing arrangements as of the TE's writing to implement the Conkouati and Lake Tele management plans. The executing agency for Nouabale-Ndoki, WCS, had secured some future funding. WCS was also in the process of creating a trust fund to continue project work there. Logging and oil companies near Conkouati had provided some funding to continue project activities there. The Dutch government had expressed interest in funding activities at Lake Tele, but these talks were shelved when fighting re-started in 1998. The Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) noted that the ROC government would likely be unable to finance project activities at the 5 sites, even in the short-term. This required securing international financing, but this was far from certain as of the TE's writing.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The TE notes that the project had no co-financiers, but fails to note that this was different from the original project design. Originally USAID, the Peace Corps, the ROC government and HPLF were to deliver a total of US\$3.805 in co-financing, but this does not appear to have been delivered. The TE thus does not provide enough information to assess the effect of co-financing on this project.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project’s outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project experienced numerous delays due to the Civil War and related political instability and civil unrest. The project started late due to the first Civil War. The project experienced numerous delays in carrying out work at the Dominika site, which helped lead the project to cancel future work at that site. These delays included a long search of a local executing agency, property theft and disputes with non-project researchers over access to local research buildings.

The project also experienced delays not directly attributable to the Civil War. Project work at Lefini-North also experienced severe delays due to a long search for an executing agency. Government staff turnover also created delays in executing project activities, though the TE fails to provide details on this point. Looting at CERGEC offices delayed their ability to create digital maps of the 5 project sites. The PMU and TA slowed down project execution by failing to properly disburse project funds.

Following the MTR, the project received a year-and-a-half extension from December 1997 to June 1999. Presumably this was to compensate for Civil War-related delays, but the TE does not state the reason for the extension directly.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

The ROC experienced much political turmoil during the project. However, it undermined the project by allowing illegal resource extraction at the Dominika site. The Planning Ministry ignored the project before the MTR. The ROC government also appears to have misspent project funds. These factors underscore a low level of country ownership.

6. Assessment of project’s Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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The PD assigned M&E responsibilities to the PMU, which would carry out M&E activities independently outside of reserves and jointly with executing agencies within the reserves. The M&E design is quite clear that baseline data had to be collected before the project started activities in the project areas to allow for a proper comparison. The PMU, the National Herbarium and the Geographic and Cartographic

Production Center (CERGEC) would jointly gather biological data. The Mid-Term Review (MTR) was scheduled for June 1995 during the project's third year.

The M&E design did not yet have clear indicators as of the PD's writing. Various indicators would be decided during the Project Launch Seminar in May 1993. Local indicators and strategies would be decided upon within 6 months of the project's start based on consultations between the PMU and local reserve staff. However, this contradicts the earlier focus on making sure to collect baseline data for the before project dataset. In addition, the PD does not include a dedicated M&E budget item.

6.2 M&E Implementation	Rating: Satisfactory
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The M&E process appears to have identified several problems that were within the project's control, which allowed these problems to be fixed. The MTR discovered several problems with the project, including TA's incompetence, PMU's poor management and financial management issues. The MTR suggested giving local NGOs seats on the PMC, which helped to promote greater coordination between NGOs and the government. The project collected baseline data at the project sites, but no mention is made regarding PIRs. 11 supervisory missions were carried out, but the 12th had to be canceled due to renewed political violence in the country.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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The PD's organization was often confusing and unclear regarding the main project components. In addition, while the ROC's forests faced relatively low pressure from logging and agriculture compared to other nations in the region, and the, PD established that hunting was a greater threat, hunting was not a focus of this project.

The World Bank carried out 11 out of its 12 supervisory missions during the project. The last had to be canceled due to political instability. The MTR discovered a number of concerning issues, which allowed for corrective action. The World Bank also expressed their displeasure over the gold exploration and

logging being illegally allowed on project reserves. In addition, the World Bank also was willing to suspend disbursements when necessary, sometimes finding innovative ways of directing funds directly to NGOs when government execution was lacking. Overall, the World Bank provided strong supervision.

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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The project reacted satisfactorily to the Civil War, such as repairing the National Herbarium after it was damaged. This is despite the fact that the project saw much of its equipment and infrastructure damaged. None of the staff (ROC citizens and international personnel) left the country due to the instability, even when staff at the Dimonika site had to be moved to another location. The project practiced adaptive management, including adding NGOs to the PMC, which increased cooperation between the NGOs and the government. Work was carried out on project components.

With this said, the TE criticizes PMU rather strongly, though inconsistently so. The PMU failed to carry out many project activities only after the MTR criticized it. Some of the studies PMU was expected to carry out had to be canceled due to PMU's poor performance. PMU's partner consulting firm, TA, "was deemed incompetent," (TE, p. 7) so their contract had to be cancelled after the MTR. The Planning Ministry had ignored the project during the first half of its life. Only once fund disbursement was put on hold following the MTR did the Planning Ministry take action. The numerous executing agencies often found themselves in conflict, which appears to have led to a lack of progress in creating management plans for all of the reserves.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The project re-introduced orphaned chimpanzees and gorillas into the wild at the Conkouati and Lefini-South sites respectively (TE, p. 6).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities

contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The management plan for Countaki included co-management with the local community, though the TE provides scarce details on this program (TE, p. 10).

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

While the project was successful in creating project institutions – the PMU, the TSC, the LSCs and the IMC – it failed to create a permanent administrative unit to carry on work past the project's end date. The project sponsored many PMU studies (both ecological and socioeconomic) that help to improve the local knowledge base, but not all planned studies were executed. The project helped to raise institutional capacity at the National Herbarium, including to create a partnership with the MBG, performing field surveys and replacing lost equipment and species. The project also raised CERGEC's institutional capacity through training, which led to the creation of digital maps for 3 of the project reserves. The management plan for Nouabale-Ndoki was implemented, while management plans were drawn up for Conkouati and Lake Tele that were under government review as of project closing (TE, pp. 4-5). The project also included international NGOs as executing agencies and partners of the government, which increased local capacity and also helped bring in new ideas (TE, p. 10).

b) Governance

The reserves Nouabale-Ndoki, the Lesio-Louna Sanctuary (Lefini-South) and the Lake Tele/Likoula-aux-Herbes were all gazetted during the project life. The latter was also named a Ramsar site of international importance. However, the ROC government also broke legal covenant during the project by giving away gold mining and logging licenses illegally on project sites (TE, p. 5).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The TE does not mention any unintended impacts due to the project.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end.

Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The TE does not mention GEF initiatives taken to scale.

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The following are taken from the TE's "Lessons Learned" section.

- **Cross-Sectorial Project:** Originally, the cross-sectorial nature of the project meant that nobody took ownership of the project. The various government ministries had never worked together on a project of this type. International NGO involvement originally exacerbated this issue. However, once the PMU and other project institutions improved their performance, this structure became an asset. It allowed for idea sharing. Having international NGOs in the field as partners helped to ensure that project work continued to be carried out even as the government became overwhelmed by the Civil Wars.
- **NGO Involvement:** According to the TE, "the Project was the first GEF project to extensively involve conservation NGOs in the identification, preparation, appraisal and execution of the project" (TE, p. 10). The NGOs brought expertise developed in neighboring countries. However, the quality of NGOs varied widely, though on balance the NGOs did much to improve project performance.
- **Innovative Partnerships:** The project created innovative partnerships that "helped diversify the stakeholder basis for conservation in Congo" (TE, p. 10). These included partnerships with the MBG, community co-management plans and partnerships with NGOs and industry.
- **Institutional Arrangements:** This project's complexity was balanced with its institutional arrangement. The interministerial oversight made sure the government took ownership of the committee. The TSC benefited from having representatives from across ministries and partner NGOs. The PRC also helped to increase project ownership. WCS, one of the partner NGOs, also demonstrated the benefit of flexible disbursement, involving NGOs in project design and preparation to ensure project ownership by the NGO and ensuring that NGOs have adequate capacity and training to make sure they can take on project responsibilities.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

When the TE was written, there was a great deal of uncertainty and instability in the host country, which limited future options. The following can be inferred from the body of the TE:

- Outside financing needs to be secured in order to ensure that partner NGOs can continue to conduct project work at the reserves.
- The management plans for Conkouati and Lake Tele should be implemented if the project is to be sustainable.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The evidence presented on project outcomes is convincing, but often lacks details. The TE will claim that local communities were engaged without saying the manner or extent of that engagement. The training programs were barely mentioned, if at all. This may reflect the difficulties involved in gathering information in the wake of the Civil Wars.	MS
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The description of PMU's performance, especially regarding the first project component, is radically inconsistent. The TE switches between praising the outcomes of this component in its dedicated section, then calling the PMU incompetent in carrying out the first component later in the TE. The overall tone of the TE switches drastically between sections, which is not reflected in its ratings for the project. These issues were not as big of a problem when addressing the other project components.	MU
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The TE properly assesses the project's sustainability, including noting that the World Bank was unable to create a project transition strategy with the ROC government at the time due to political instability.	S
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	While the Lessons Learned section includes sound critiques, it was not comprehensive. It should have addressed government mismanagement and the civil war directly, but failed to do so. Its assertions of government ownership of the project are not entirely consistent with the TE's body.	MU
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	While the TE does include tables with financial figures, it is inconsistent on project costs. The TE claims that there was no co-financing, but it does not explain why the promised co-financing from multiple sources was not delivered.	U
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	The TE gives several examples of how M&E implementation was instrumental in getting the project back on track. However, it does not address problems with the M&E design that were evident in the PD.	MS
Overall TE Rating		MS

Overall TE rating: $(0.3 * (4+3)) + (0.1 * (5+3+2+4)) = 2.1 + 1.4 = 3.5 = \text{Moderately Satisfactory}$

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

- PROGECAP/GEF-CONGOC, Comité Technique de Pilotage: Rapport d'achèvement du Projet de Gestion de Conservation des Aires Protégées (PROGECAP/GEF-CONGO) (Fin d'exécution)
- 68 reports and publications on Nouable-N'Doki
- 33 reports and publications on Conkouati
- 8 reports and publications on Lac Télé
- 3 reports and publications on Projet Protection de Gorilles
- Projet de Gestion et de Conservation des Aires Protégées- Mission d'Évaluation à Mi-Parcours Mars 1997.
- Statements of mission objectives, back-to-office reports, Supervision reports, and Aide-Mémoires. Congo
- Wildlands Conservation and management Project (GEF Grant 28622 COB)- 1993-1999.
- Disbursements Database and reports- Congo - Wildlands Conservation and Management Project (GEF Grant 28622 COB). World Bank's Integrated Controller's System 1993-1999.