Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2014

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		49	
GEF Agency project ID		833	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		Coastal Wetlands Management	
Country/Countries		Ghana	
Region		AFR	
Focal area		Biodiversity	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		OP2: Coastal, freshwater & marine ecosystems	
Executing agencies involved		Originally Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), then Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, Department of Game and Wildlife (DGW)	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Secondary executing agency	
Private sector involvement		As one of the partners/beneficiaries	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		12/01/91	
Effectiveness date / project start		03/12/93	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		12/31/97	
Actual date of project completion		12/31/99	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US $M)	**At Completion (US $M)**
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding		
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		7.200	6.065
Co-financing	IA own		
	Government	1.100	1.119
	Other multi- /bi-laterals		
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		7.200	6.065
Total Co-financing		1.100	1.119
Total project funding		8.300	7.184
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		06/30/00	
TE submission date		06/30/00	
Author of TE		N/A	
TER completion date		09/22/14	
TER prepared by		Sean Nelson	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Joshua Schneck	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	N/R	N/R	N/R	MS
Sustainability of Outcomes	N/R	N/R	N/R	ML
M&E Design	N/R	N/R	N/R	MS
M&E Implementation	N/R	N/R	N/R	UA
Quality of Implementation	N/R	N/R	N/R	MS
Quality of Execution	N/R	N/R	N/R	MS
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	-	-	N/R	S

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

According to the Project Document (PD), the "main objective of the project would be to maintain the ecological integrity of key coastal wetland area" in Ghana (PD, p. 2). These key coastal wetland areas are the "the Muni, Densu Delta, Sakumo, Songor and Anlo-Keta lagoons" (PD, p. 2). At the time of the PD, these 5 areas had been proposed for designation as Ramsar sites. The Sakumo Lagoon site was threatened by a proposed sewage treatment plant that was originally going to dump its waste into the Lagoon. The PD does not directly state other direct threats to these sites, although the Ghanaian government had not established local offices and staff with specialized training or mandates to protect wetlands for conservation before this project.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The project aimed to engage local stakeholders who depend on the wetlands for their livelihood to help maintain these 5 wetland areas. The PD states the "objective would be to identify and monitor the common resources that benefit human and avian populations, and manage them to maintain critical bird habitat, without unduly restricting the options of people to derive benefit from the resources" (PD, p. 2). In addition, "the project would aim to develop capabilities at both government and community level for the implementation of the proposed program, to provide for baseline and monitoring studies, and to undertake studies of options for development, that would be compatible with sustainable use of the environment" (PD, p. 2). The PD also states "the objectives of the coastal wetlands management program are to bring the five key coastal wetlands identified in the EAP and proposed for designation as "Ramsar" sites under an effective management regime, to ensure their long term ecological viability, to

encourage appropriate economic development that is consistent with these goals, and to promote public awareness of environmental issues and conservation values" (PD, p. 24).

The PD defines the following 4 expected outputs:

1) Site establishment and management

    1. Survey and demarcation: The project sites would be divided into "core zones" (critical habitat conservation) and "land management zones" (watershed protection), along with the project also defining the project areas' boundaries. Associated activities included "border planting and pillaring; establishment of firebreaks; erosion control and amenity planting; construction of trails and observation posts for monitoring bird populations and other wildlife" (PD, p. 24).

    2. Local site management: The project would fund Department of Game and Wildlife (DGW) staffing. The project would also support the DGW's management actions, including "maintenance of boundaries and trail systems, monitoring of wildlife populations, habitat management and erosion control planting" (PD, p. 24). In addition, the project would also finance wildlife conservation training, DGW office site and lodging construction and engineering studies for local public works. The project would also finance studying how to deal with the effluent from the proposed sewage treatment plant near Sakumo Lagoon, as well as implementing a solution.

2) Research and monitoring

    1. The project would support baseline studies of project areas and environmental impact assessments, as well as carrying out "regular monitoring of key hydrological, limnological and biological indicators" (PD, p. 25).

    2. The project would also support creating a National Wetlands Conservation Strategy.

3) Community-based development

    1. The project would support socioeconomic and technical studies of socioeconomic development plans that would not conflict with the GEOs.

    2. The project would also finance a local investment fund for pilot projects and infrastructure development.

4) Environmental public education and public awareness

    1. The project would help develop education centers at each of the project sites by funding the centers' construction and training its personnel. These centers would be staffed by DWG and Wildlife Club of Ghana (WCG) personnel, a local NGO focused on educating schoolchildren on wildlife conservation and environmental issues. (DWG would handle

event planning, curriculum and promotional material design and public education strategies.)

2. The project would also support the WCG through training and financial backing.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The GEOs and the DOs were not changed.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 **Relevance**	Rating: **Satisfactory**

This project is relevant to both the GEF and to Ghana. Project objectives are consistent with those of GEF Operational Program 2: Coastal, freshwater & marine ecosystems. The lagoons included in this project were important habitats for migratory birds. The Ramsar Convention defined the project areas as “sites of international importance,” (PD, p. 4) but there was no mechanism in place to protect their biodiversity before this project.

The project also fell under Ghana’s wider environmental protection strategy. This project was part of a broader project called the Ghana Environmental Resource Management Project (GERMP). GERMP sought to improve local capacity by reorganizing and strengthening both the Environmental Protection Council (EPC) and its Technical Secretariat (EPC/TS). The EPC is a Ghanaian government agency that helps coordinate relevant institutions within Ghana, as well as linking these local institutions to international institutions, including the World Bank. This project in particular would help improve the TS’s capacity and technical expertise in protecting the wetland areas, helping the TS to ensure local socioeconomic development was environmentally sustainable in project areas and to be able to discover when environmental degradation was starting occur in project lands.

4.2 **Effectiveness**	Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

Summary: According to the TE, this project "represented Ghana's first and most extensive experiment with true community-based, collaborative management of natural areas" (TE, p. 4). The project also helped to pass a law that provided for wetland protection and identification of coastal wetland ecosystems. The Ministry of Land and Forestry (MLF) also crafted and approved its national wetlands conservation strategy. The project appears to have led to improved water quality and higher bird populations at project sites, especially for waders and terns.

The project also collaborated with Panbros Salt, a private sector salt company that had been operating nearby. Panbros adopted sustainable practices to protect lands important to local bird and fish populations. In turn, "Panbros company expected to gain from this collaboration through legal protection of its property from encroachment under the Ramsar law" (TE, p. 7). In addition, the company's "security guards collaborate with the WD in monitoring the sites for encroachment, disturbances and resource over-exploitation" (TE, p. 7).

A description and rating for each of the Immediate Objectives is given below.

1) Site establishment and management: **Satisfactory**

1. Survey and demarcation: The project sites would be divided into "core zones" (critical habitat conservation) and "land management zones" (watershed protection), along with the project also defining the project areas' boundaries. Associated activities included "border planting and pillaring; establishment of firebreaks; erosion control and amenity planting; construction of trails and observation posts for monitoring bird populations and other wildlife" (PD, p. 24).

All five sites were surveyed and demarcated, though this occurred only after a long delay (the TE does not specify the cause of this particular delay). The above support activities subsequently took place, though the TE does not go into detail.

2. Local site management: The project would fund Department of Game and Wildlife (DGW) staffing. The project would also support the DGW's management actions, including "maintenance of boundaries and trail systems, monitoring of wildlife populations, habitat management and erosion control planting" (PD, p. 24). In addition, the project would also finance wildlife conservation training, DGW office site and lodging construction and engineering studies for local public works. The project would also finance studying how to deal with the effluent from the proposed sewage treatment plant near Sakumo Lagoon, as well as implementing a solution.

In order to integrate the project's training into its institutional memory, the Ministry of Lands and Forestry (MLF) set up a 5-year management plan at project sites based on this project's training.

Construction of personnel lodgings was originally completed at all locations except Keta. WD originally pulled the contract from the chosen construction company and then re-awarded the contract (it is not clear from the TE if this was to a new company). The Keta construction was then completed.

The project financed a study to determine the best way to dispose of the Sakumo Lagoon's nearby sewage plant. The study suggested building a pipeline. The project then built this pipeline, which appears to have been effectively, on time and under budget.

2) Research and monitoring: **Satisfactory**

1. The project would support baseline studies of project areas and environmental impact assessments, as well as carrying out "regular monitoring of key hydrological, limnological and biological indicators" (PD, p. 25).

Baseline studies were carried out, though the TE does not comment on their quality. 3 local research institutions have been contracted to conduct ongoing monitoring operations. The project carried out a Beneficiary and Social Impact Assessment Study in 2000.

Project personnel decided to create a computer database of project site monitoring data. This was created to increase the WD's technical capacity, as well as to ensure its staff were up-to-date on monitoring results.

2. The project would also support creating a National Wetlands Conservation Strategy.

The MLF created their national wetlands strategy in 1999. A World Bank review of an early version found that it was satisfactory and comparable to other countries' wetlands conservation strategies.

3) Community-based development: **Moderately Satisfactory**

1. The project would support socioeconomic and technical studies of socioeconomic development plans that would not conflict with the GEOs.

Most required studies were carried out. Among the exceptions were socioeconomic studies for the Songor and Keta sites, which were the 2 larger sites. The Development Options Study was completed too late for its results and recommendations to be used during the project. Since the Songor and Keta socioeconomic studies had been delayed so that they could integrate the Development Options Study into their approaches, these studies had to be canceled once it became apparent the Development Options Study was not going to be completed in time.

2. The project would also finance a local investment fund for pilot projects and infrastructure development.

The Community Investment Support Fund (CISF) fulfilled this output requirement. The CISF started in 1998, which was behind schedule. This was due to 2 reasons: 1) The PD did not provide guidance for writing the CISF's support manual, so the manual was completed late and 2) The Development Options Study was also finished late, so it was not used. Instead, "a substitute assessment was used in the interim to identify the target groups and the mechanisms for the fund" (TE, p. 5).

With this said, the CISF still managed to disperse all of its funding on local micro-enterprises. The CISF appears to have been popular locally. Overall, the CISF financed 72 enterprises employing 1,001 women

and 705 men, largely focused in farming and agro-processing. The repayment plan called for paying off the loan in 1 year at 20 percent interest. Repayment rates were only 41 percent as of March 2000, but this was partly due to poor synchronization between the CISF's lending schedule and local economic cycles (harvests, when raw materials were available, etc.) and a drought that affected agriculture.

The project helped to bring sanitation infrastructure to local communities. These initiatives helped to improve local health outcomes, water quality and local environmental conditions of the nearby wetland areas.

4) Environmental public education and public awareness: **Moderately Satisfactory**

1. The project would help develop education centers at each of the project sites by funding the centers' construction and training its personnel. These centers would be staffed by DWG and Wildlife Club of Ghana (WCG) personnel, a local NGO focused on educating schoolchildren on wildlife conservation and environmental issues. (DWG would handle event planning, curriculum and promotional material design and public education strategies.)

Construction of the education centers, visitors' centers and research centers was not completed at the majority of the sites "because of poor design and lack of consultation with stakeholders" (TE, p. 10) The MLF and the World Bank intervened and re-awarded the contract, but construction was canceled because it could not be completed within the project timeframe.

2. The project would also support the WCG through training and financial backing.

The project provided both financing and training to the WCG. In turn, the WCG conducted public education campaigns and engaged local communities to raise local environmental consciousness. The TE states that the WCG met its public education and community engagement goals, those these are not quantified in the TE. These initiatives appear to have been successful, as "indiscriminate harvesting of mangroves for fuelwood, trapping of birds and turtles… [and] encroachment on the sites" (TE, p. 4) have all gone down. (The TE does not provide numbers to quantify these results, but these were not goals in the original PD as the PD only called for supporting the WCG and improving its capacity.)

It should be noted that during periods when the project was not dispersing funds, such as in 1995, the WCG used outside funding to achieve project goals.

4.3 **Efficiency**	Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

Summary: The project experienced multiple delays, which necessitated pushing the project's closing date pushed forward twice. This extended the project for an additional 2 years. The Ghanaian government also experienced multiple administrative delays. However, the project was able to adapt to these challenges successfully while meeting most project goals under budget.

Delays: The project had difficulty recruiting personnel during its initial phase due to a Ghanaian governmental hiring freeze. This meant that the EPA could not hire an Executive Director during the project's early stages. Since the project relied on the EPA for guidance, coordination and personnel management support, this meant the project could not hire staff for the project's first 18 months. Once an EPA Executive Director was hired in October 1994, the project was able to start hiring project staff.

The project also ran into initial delays due to differing interpretations of roles and responsibilities between Ghanaian government departments and between staff members of the same departments. Recommendations and coordination with the World Bank helped the different stakeholders to come to a common understanding.

The project also experienced delays receiving allocated funding. The EPA's accounting department operated at low capacity, so it was slow to release funds even when the EPA had been informed this would negatively affect project performance. The EPA dispensed no project funds in 1995, forcing executing agencies (especially GWS) to look elsewhere for funding to achieve project goals. Once the GERMP closed in 1998, a year before this project closed, the project shifted from the EPA to the MLF. The project's implementation, site management and construction rate all increased under the MLF.

The project also ran into legislative delays. Project lands were to be gazetted under the Ramsar Convention to ensure their protection. Consultations with local stakeholders to ensure them that the government was not trying to take over their private lands were slow. In addition, the Attorney General's office and the WD often disagreed over the law's details. Parliament approved the legislation to gazette project lands in December 1999.

The project ran into issues with construction contractors. Ghanaian government institutions and the World Bank had to intervene, cancel contracts and re-award contracts. The visitors centers and the educational centers were canceled under the new contracts since they could not be completed in time. However, the fact that the executing agencies acted to correct the contractors' mistakes shows initiative.

Budgetary and Financial Issues: When factoring in the 2 extensions, the project came in under budget. In total, the project spent US$6.9 million, while initially the project was expected to cost US$8.30 million. In general, different initiatives cost less than expected. The Sakumo Effluent Disposal came out to 93 percent (US$370,000) of its expected cost (US$400,000), which was the highest percentage included in the section entitled "Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing."

Other Notes: The project appears to have adapted to new opportunities, such as collaborating with Panbros Salt and created a project site database, while still operating within the project budget and the extended timelines.

4.4 **Sustainability**	Rating: **Moderately Likely**

Summary: According to the TE, multiple stakeholders have expressed interest in maintaining various project activities financed and running. Plans were already underway for to put various parts of the project into a transitional phase until a more permanent state of affairs could be established.

Risks to the sustainability of project outcomes are further detailed along the following 4 dimensions:

Environmental: **Unable to Assess**

The TE does not directly address environmental risks to the project's sustainability.

Financial: **Moderately Likely**

As of the TE's writing, the Ghanaian government's most recent draft of its Medium-term Expenditure Framework included a cost center for wetlands protection. Conservation International and the Dutch government had expressed interest in supporting National Wetlands Conservation Strategy initiatives. Standard Chartered Bank Ghana Ltd. was funding sea turtle protection at project sites. Coca-Cola was supporting the Sakumo site's monitoring program. Panbros Salt was still fulfilling its part of the agreement to protect vulnerable lands near their company sites. The Natural Resources Management Project was also supporting activities that had originated under this project. Discussions were underway for transitional funding for monitoring, public education campaigns and WD site management.

The CISF was being transferred to the District Rural Infrastructure Fund (DRIF) with its own separate account. Local District Assemblies managed the DRIF as part of the World Bank's Village Investment Project (VIP) program.

Sociopolitical: **Moderately Likely**

The public education campaign appears to have helped make wetlands conservation a local priority. WCG campaigns were ongoing in local areas. The TE notes worries that slowed funding allocation during the project's earlier phases also underscore a possible lack of country interest. However, the government had paid to keep project staff employed at project locations for the time being. It had also included the project sites in its Coastal Zone Management Plan as part of its Environmental Action Plan. The government had also passed legislation protecting the project sites.

Institutional: **Moderately Likely**

The TE notes worries that the WD had depended on a command-and-control model for action, while the project had required a more consultative, community-oriented approach. However, the WD (under the MLF) had shown greater project interest and ownership than the EPA during its last year of project management. The Ghanaian government had also allocated funding for the WD to maintain the project lands, though this was under the level the TE would have liked.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The PD stated that the Ghanaian government would provide US$1.1 million in funding. However, this was broken down into US$1.0 million labelled as "Local" and a further US$100,000 labelled as "foreign," but attributed to the Ghanaian government, which the PD does not explain. The PD also does not break this down into central vs. local government co-financing.

The Ghanaian government had provided approximately US$200,000 as of May 31, 2000. Local communities and District Assemblies contributed US$919,000 as of the same date. This is slightly over the total governmental contribution outlined in the PD.

While the total amount of co-financing from the government was not an issue, the rate of disbursement was. The EPA was often slow and reluctant to release funds even when project members complained that failure to do so would inhibit project outcomes. The EPA accounting department's low capacity caused this slow disbursement. This led to delays in project execution, which in turn required 2 project deadline extensions. The MLF was quicker with fund disbursement.

It should be noted that the total amount left unspent that was going to be canceled (US$847,170) was just slightly under the amount of co-financing.

While the TE notes that the WCG received outside financing in those years when fund disbursement was slow or non-existent, it does not say what these sources were or how much they provided. These funds though appear to have been instrumental in allowing the WCG to carry out project activities.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project experienced numerous delays, as noted in Section 4.3 of this document. The project's closing date had to be pushed forward twice. This extended the project for an additional 2 years.

The project had difficulty recruiting personnel during its initial phase due to a Ghanaian governmental hiring freeze. This meant that the EPA could not hire an Executive Director during the project's early stages. Since the project relied on the EPA for guidance, coordination and personnel management support, this meant the project could not hire staff for the project's first 18 months. Once an EPA Executive Director was hired in October 1994, the project was able to start hiring project staff.

The project also ran into initial delays due to differing interpretations of roles and responsibilities between Ghanaian government departments and between staff members of the same departments. Recommendations and coordination with the World Bank helped the different stakeholders to come to a common understanding.

The project also experienced delays receiving allocated funding. The EPA's accounting department operated at low capacity, so it was slow to release funds even when the EPA had been informed this would negatively affect project performance. The EPA dispensed no project funds in 1995, forcing executing agencies (especially GWS) to look elsewhere for funding to achieve project goals. Once the GERMP closed in 1998, a year before this project closed, the project shifted from the EPA to the MLF. The project's implementation, site management and construction rate all increased under the MLF.

In addition, the project also ran into legislative delays. Project lands were to be gazetted under the Ramsar Convention to ensure their protection. Consultations with local stakeholders to ensure them that the government was not trying to take over their private lands were slow. In addition, the Attorney General's office and the WD often disagreed over the law's details. Parliament approved the legislation to gazette project lands in December 1999.

The project ran into issues with construction contractors. Ghanaian government institutions and the World Bank had to intervene, cancel contracts and re-award contracts. The visitors centers and the educational centers were canceled under the new contracts since they could not be completed in time. However, the fact that the executing agencies acted to correct the contractors' mistakes shows initiative.

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 **M&E Design at entry**	Rating: **Satisfactory**

Research and monitoring is one of the primary project outputs in the PD. According to the PD:

> Baseline and monitoring studies of key environmental indicators reflecting hydrological cycles, water quality, limnology and fisheries within the wetlands are an integral part of the project. The project includes financing for training, institutional development and improvement of research facilities to carry out long-term ecological monitoring studies of the coastal wetlands included in the project. The project would also finance pilot projects to test and evaluate feasibility of development options identified during the early phase of the project (PD, p. 4).

The M&E design is outlined in the PD's Annex 8. Although not a requirement at the time of project approval the indicators outlined are consistent with the GEF Evaluation Office's guidance on SMART indicators (Specific; Measurable; Achievable and Attributable; Relevant and Realistic; Time-bound, Timely, Trackable, and Targeted). Specific indicators ("fresh water inflow") are assigned specific

indicators ("water level/salinity") (PD Annex 8, p. 65). The PD requires baselines to be collected for these indicators during the project's first 15 months. This section spans 15 pages and is comprehensive in establishing the goals for establishing separate monitoring frameworks for several parts of the project, such as requiring ornithological studies, local socioeconomic conditions studies and soil erosion studies. While these indicators are quantifiable, the PD did not define what levels would be satisfactory or unsatisfactory.

Monitoring and research was estimated to take up 19 percent of the project's budgetary needs.

6.2 **M&E Implementation**	Rating: Unable to Assess

The TE includes insufficient information for assessing the quality of M&E implementation..

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 **Quality of Project Implementation**	Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

The PD is comprehensive, providing an in-depth overview of the current state of affairs of environmental protection in Ghana as of 1992, the project's plan and the M&E design. It is not clear from the TE if the Ghanaian civil service reform and associated hiring freeze that was ongoing during the project's first year could have been foreseen when the PD was written in 1992.

The World Bank was sometimes proactive (in tandem with the executing agencies) in reacting to several project setbacks, such as canceling construction contracts when contractors fell behind schedule and hiring consultants when key studies could not be completed in time. However, the TE notes that the Bank failed to implement some of the Mid-Term Review's recommendations, such as hiring legal, judicial and social supervisory specialists to help address persistent problems in those fields. The TE praises some parts of the supervisory mission, especially regarding internal financial oversight, such as requiring that both implementing agency directors and the controller to sign financial audits and financial statements. It also notes that supervision helped to result in better financial management in 1998 and 1999. However, the supervisory missions appear to have failed to address broader issues in a quick and

effective manner. The TE in particular points to the failure to address the EPA's slow release of funds through its supervisory missions. In addition, review by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) review was critical of some aspects of Bank supervision. It stated that “the Bank's proposal to convert the undisbursed balance of the grant into a trust fund to fund project activities over the long term was considered inappropriate because implementation was not progressing at a satisfactory pace at the time” (TE, p. 19).

7.2 **Quality of Project Execution**	Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

Project start-up was delayed 15 months due to the government hiring freeze, which meant the project could not hire staff during that period. This delay lead to other delays, such as the Development Options Study being written too late for its use in other project outputs. As a result, some project reports and documents were never written. The executing agencies attempted to correct for construction delays by canceling and re-awarding contracts. However, this meant that several construction projects called for in the PD were not completed in time and had to be canceled.

Besides the unfinished outputs mentioned above, the project met all other objective and output goals outlined in the PD. Project Execution is therefore rated as Moderately Satisfactory on balance.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate below that this is indeed the case. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

Most of the project’s objectives and outputs involved building up human, technical and institutional capacity instead of providing direct environmental benefits.

The Sakumo Lagoon was set to have a new sewage plant built that would discharge effluent into the lagoon. The project financed building a pipeline to discharge waste into the ocean instead, which helps to lower the amount of water pollution that would have entered the lagoon (TE, p. 10).

The TE summarizes the environmental effects as follows: “increased awareness of environmental protection by communities have reduced indiscriminate harvesting of mangroves for fuelwood, trapping of birds and turtles, reduced encroachment on the sites, cleared rivers and creeks, promoted biodiversity conservation activities, and monitored the over-harvesting of its lagoon resources” (TE, p. 4). Trees were being planted as of the TE’s writing on 10 acres at Songor, 8 acres at Akatsi, 2 acres at

Sakumo and 2 acres at Muni-Pomadze (TE, p. 10). A total of 10 km of blocked or disrupted river channels and creeks had been cleared (TE, p. 12).

Bird populations seem to have increased overall. The wader peak count increased from 31,400 in 1986 to 96,661 in 1998 at Keta. The tern peak count at Detsu increased from 4,900 in 1986 to 23,184 in 1998 (TE, p. 7).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The project's main mechanism for fostering local socioeconomic development was the CISF. It had provided loans to 72 micro-enterprises comprising 1,001 women and 705 men as of October 1999. CISF had disbursed US$397,000 of its total funding of US$400,000 as of that point. The repayment rate at that point averaged only 41 percent by March 2001 due to poor synchronization between the local economic cycles (harvests, when certain input goods were available) and the repayment period, in addition to a drought that caused lower crop yields (TE, pp. 12-13).

It should be noted that the TE states that "it is too early to assess its full impact on the communities over a longer term and to assess the loan repayment records given that most of the funds have only been available for a year" (TE, p. 11).

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. "Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities:

The project helped support multiple training events (TE, p. 13), such as a Stakeholder Workshop in 1999 (TE, p. 5). Involving Panbros Salt to protect local wetlands and roosting sites has also raised local conservation management capacity (TE, p. 7). The CISF has helped to fund numerous local environmental management and conservation community initiatives, such as the local sea turtle protection plans (TE, pp. 7-8, 12). The CISF will continue to operate the DRIF, which will allow local governments to support improving local capacity (TE, p. 18).

Project support for the GWS has helped it achieve its public education goals, which has helped mobilize local communities in support of local environmental and biodiversity goals. This included publishing a

children's wildlife magazine entitled *Nko*, forming wildlife clubs at local schools, organizing field trips and helping schools to carry out environmental protection activities with student involvement (TE, p. 8).

b) Governance:

The MLF has adopted a national wetlands conservation strategy through this project (TE, p. 6). The government gazetted project lands under the Ramsar Convention, though this only happened after numerous delays. The EPA was slow to release project funds due to low accounting department capacity, but this sped up after the project was transferred to the MLF (TE, p. 15). This reflects a mixed level of government ownership during the project' execution.

The government, in partnership with the World Ban's Forest Resource Management Project, has aimed to improve protected areas' management. 5 percent of Ghanaian land has been designated as protected areas, which includes this project's sites. The Environmental Action Plan now includes a Coastal Zone Management Plan to handle sustainable development and biodiversity protection (TE, p. 17).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The TE does not mention any unintended impacts.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The MLF has adopted a 5-year management plan which integrated the project sites and management initiatives into its regular activities (TE, p. 6). As of the TE's writing, there were discussions to transfer several project initiatives into wider transitional arrangements. The project appears to have mainstreamed wetlands conservation management into the MLF, while before the project wetlands management was a marginal concern. For instance, the government was planning on creating a cost center in its Medium-Term Expenditures Framework to promote wetlands conservation (TE, p. 16).

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

- There needs to be close collaboration between all relevant local stakeholders, government officials and project personnel throughout all stages and at all levels of a project to ensure broad support and project sustainability.
- The PD/implementation stage needs to include strong guidance when designing the project's socioeconomic development mechanisms, which would then allow for change and adaptation during the project's actual execution.
- Supervision mission schedules need to be flexible so that proper guidance and specialized oversight can be provided to deal with actual persistent problems in the field. For example, if a slow legislative or legal process is what is holding a project back, fielding legal/legislative supervisory specialists would better serve the project's goals than sticking blindly to the supervision schedule.
- The World Bank should focus on supporting dynamic NGOs directly when carrying out the type of field work projects like this one entailed, as opposed to slow-moving government agencies. NGOs can move and adapt quicker in the field, while also being able to carry out project goals on a smaller budget. These projects would be more modest in scope, but with a likely higher degree of success. The World Bank should limit project support for government agencies to those projects with primarily a legislative/policy focus.
- Environmental projects, included environmental management projects, need long time horizons (10-15 years) before they produce clear results. Core activities should therefore be financially supported for a long duration.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

The TE does not include a separate Recommendations section. However, the TE's Lessons Learned section does include some recommendations for the project's future:

- Funding should be provided to the Natural Resources Management Project to aid the project's wetlands management component to help ensure long-term successes.
- The GEF should continue to support GWS through small-scale project of no more than US$1 million in funding. The focus should be on projects that can easily be executed with a quick turnaround time.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE is thorough in its discussion of the objectives and outputs first discussed in the PD. These sections include summaries of results, as well as detailed discussion of the results.	**S**
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The report is highly consistent. In addition, it is rather transparent, including a section devoted to partner comments on the TE during its development. The ratings appear to be fair. However, the TE (and the PD as well) is unclear on the difference between having the project lands be registered under the Ramsar Convention and being gazetted under Ramsar, which makes these sections difficult to understand for readers who lack prior knowledge of Ramsar.	**S**
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The TE includes discussion of how project activities were in discussions to enter a transition phase before becoming regular MLF and GWS activities. The Sustainability section is thorough.	**S**
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons learned appear fair given the project experience. However, the recommendation of supporting NGOs instead of governments seem overly broad and far-reaching considering it is based on a single project's outcomes.	**MS**
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	The TE includes a section entitled “Project Costs and Finance” in Annex 2 that shows the projected vs. actual costs for several project initiatives. These are useful numbers to have, but it would have been helpful to have this information broken out into line items for greater detail to gain a better understanding why different parts of the project performed somewhat differently from a financial standpoint.	**MS**
Assess the quality of the report’s evaluation of project M&E systems:	The TE “Supervision” section is a bit unclear about the differences between the M&E missions (the Mid-Term Evaluation, etc.), the independent QAG reviews and World Bank adaptive management. The TE does not address if M&E design and support was adequate. In addition, the TE provides insufficient information on M&E implementation to assess if M&E implementation was adequate.	**MU**
Overall TE Rating		**S**

Overall TE rating: (0.3 * (5+5)) + (0.1 * (5+4+4+3)) = 3 + 1.6 = 4.6 = Satisfactory

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

Mid-Term Review Report, December 18, 1996.

Quality Assurance Group Review: Final Report, February 23, 1998.

Quality Assurance Group: Rapid Supervision Assessment, July 16, 1999.

Borrower's Contribution, full report, March 2000.

Beneficiary and Social Impact Assessment Studies, January 2000.

“Managing Ghana's Wetlands: A National Wetlands Conservation Strategy,” Ministry of Lands and Forests, 1999.

Official Notification from the Office of Parliament dated December 10, 1999, that the Wetland

Management (Ramsar Sites) Regulations, 1999, L.I. 1659, has been passed.

Comments on the ICR from the Wildlife Division (Forestry Commission), by letter dated June 26, 2000.

Comments on the ICR received from the Ghana Wildlife Society, by letter dated June 29, 2000.

Maps: Coastal Wetland Sites - IBRD 23746

Agro-ecological Zones - IBRD 23827R