

## 1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		4908	
GEF Agency project ID		P126576	
GEF Replenishment Phase		GEF-5	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		GGW: Agriculture Production Support Project (with Sustainable Land and Water Management)	
Country/Countries		Chad	
Region		Africa	
Focal area		Multi-focal	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		LD-3, BD-2, SFM-1, CCA-1. SFM-REDD-1	
Executing agencies involved		Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Delivery of training by NGOs under component 1. Producer, women and community organizations beneficiaries of project.	
Private sector involvement		Delivery of training by private service providers under component 1.	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		17 May 2012	
Effectiveness date / project start		10 January 2013	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		31 December 2016	
Actual date of project completion		30 June 2017	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	-	-
	Co-financing	-	-
GEF Project Grant		9.2	5.35
Co-financing	IA own	50	18.7
	Government	50	
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	2.25	
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		9.25	5.3
Total Co-financing		102.25	18.7
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		115.5	24
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		21 December 2017	
Author of TE		Daniel P. Gerber (main contributor)	
TER completion date		May 7 <sup>th</sup> 2020	

TER prepared by	Mourad Shalaby
TER peer review by (if GEF IEO review)	Molly Watts Sohn

## 2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF IEO Review
Project Outcomes	MS (progress towards achievement of PDO)	MU	U	S
Sustainability of Outcomes		-	-	ML
M&E Design		Substantial	Negligible	MU
M&E Implementation		Substantial	Negligible	MU
Quality of Implementation		U	U	MU
Quality of Execution		-	-	MU
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report		-	Substantial	S

## 3. Project Objectives

### 3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The project aimed to safeguard the ecosystem services provided by natural production systems generating intertwined global and local environmental benefits. Global benefits would result in (i) a reduction in the negative trends in land degradation through adoption of better Sustainable Land Management (SLM) practices in the targeted zones; (ii) an increase in biodiversity conservation through mainstreaming in targeted landscapes; and (iii) an increase in carbon stocks, over time, in vegetation as a result of better managed forest and improved soil conservation and avoided deforestation in the project area (CEO endorsement document p.20).

### 3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The stated project objective is to support rural communities and producer organizations in increasing production of selected food crops and livestock in targeted zones while increasing the use of sustainable land and water management practices in climate vulnerable ecosystems (CEO endorsement document p2).

The project aimed to achieve these objectives by implementing the following 5 components:

- Component 1: Provision of agricultural inputs.
- Component 2: Support to food production.
- Component 3: Sustainable land and ecosystem management.
- Component 4: Capacity building and institutional support to public services.
- Component 5: Project coordination and management.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The project was formally restructured 3 times (ICR p9). The first time was on July 14, 2014 at the request of the government to help manage an emerging crisis caused by the migration of Chadian refugees fleeing from violent conflicts in neighboring Central African Republic, compounded by a severe drought that adversely affected pastoralists. The changes consisted of: (i) reducing component 2 and component 5 to reallocate US\$3.5 million in international development assistance resources to component 1 and (ii) outsourcing the implementation of emergency activities to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) under a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the government. The project was seen as an effective first step to mitigate the crisis before more comprehensive measures would be in place.

The Project Development Objectives indicators were not revised with this restructuring.

#### 4. GEF IEO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 <b>Relevance</b>	Rating: Highly satisfactory
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The relevance of the project development objective is rated “High” by the ICR. This TER rates relevance as highly satisfactory, given that the project addressed crucially important issues for Chad, namely Sustainable Land and Water Management (SLWM) and expansion and increased resilience of agricultural production as a source of rural economic growth and poverty reduction in a climate change and climate variability context.

The ICR points out that there was some confusion at the inception of the project as to what the nature of the operation was expected to be. The World Bank produced a new Country Partnership Framework (CPF) in November 03, 2015 that identified three main themes of engagement as follows: strengthening management of public resources; improving returns to agriculture and building value chains; and building human capital and reducing vulnerability. In July 2017, the Government introduced a new National Development Plan that generally coincides with the objectives of the Bank’s CPF of 2015. In this sense the relevance of the Project Development Objectives is deemed high by the ICR and remains fully in line with policy priorities of the government and the World Bank.

Project activities focused on reducing vulnerabilities caused by drought, food insecurity and instability caused from refugee movements and degrading landscapes, which are “very relevant” to the government’s current agriculture and poverty reduction strategy as they were at appraisal (ICR p11).

The GEF CEO Endorsement document indicates that the project has been developed as a multi-focal area operation combining several of the GEF strategic goals, namely:

- To contribute to arresting and reversing current global trends in land degradation, specifically desertification and deforestation (LD-3).
- To support Chad to become climate resilient by promoting both immediate and longer-term adaptation measures in development policies, plans, programs, projects and actions (CCA-1).
- To contribute to conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and the maintenance of ecosystem goods and services (BD-2).
- To achieve multiple environmental benefits from the improved management of all types of forests (SFM/REDD-1).

<b>4.2 Effectiveness</b>	Rating: Satisfactory
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The ICR rates the project’s efficacy as “Modest”, largely because the achievement of some of these outcomes cannot be disaggregated between the project’s contribution and the emergency response (see sections 3.3 and 6.1 TER). This TER rates effectiveness as satisfactory, given that the project achieved most its development outcomes, as measured by its indicators to increase the production of selected crops and livestock in the target regions while increasing the use of Sustainable Land and Water Management (SLWM) practices. These objectives were achieved within a challenging in-country environment and in spite of implementation delays due to a steep learning curve for the adoption of the project’s decentralized implementation approach and general weaknesses in implementation capacity by its stakeholders. Ultimately, these issues hindered implementation coordination, the sustainability of investments in micro-and sub-projects and the delivery of technical assistance and training (ICR p12-13).

The ICR examines the achievement of each of the outcome indicators rather than the components:

- The achievement of increased production of targeted food crops by direct beneficiaries in the targeted regions (metric ton) is rated “Moderately Satisfactory” by the ICR. The targeted production rise was achieved at 97% of the original estimate, the ICR noting that this increase is the result of a considerably larger emergency component that supplied seeds and inputs to farmers and positively affected the outcome.
- The achievement of increased production of targeted animal species by direct beneficiaries in the targeted regions (number) is rated “Moderately Satisfactory” by the ICR. Livestock numbers except for poultry have increased quite dramatically. As such the outcome target of this

indicator has been 100 percent achieved at project end with livestock numbers increased from 12.39 to 12.73 million or about 330,000 additional animals. The expansion in both the number of cattle and direct beneficiaries, resulting from the restructuring undertaken in 2014 to provide emergency support to address the migrant crisis involving about 150,000 Chadians and their herds fleeing the conflict in neighboring Central African Republic, substantially contributed to this result.

- The achievement of the direct project beneficiaries (number) is rated “Satisfactory” by the ICR. At the end of the project, the total number of direct beneficiaries was 289,689.0, representing a 254.5 percent achievement rate. This includes beneficiaries of emergency support resulting from the migration crisis, agricultural producers, female beneficiaries that were specifically targeted and livestock owners.
- The achievement of the GEF/LDCF objective indicator-additional area under sustainable land and water management (SLWM) practices (hectare) - is rated “Moderately Satisfactory”. The actual area brought under SLWM practices, meant to enhance the capacity of the beneficiaries to cope with climate change and make agricultural production resilient to the effects of climate change, is estimated at some 235,520 ha compared to 95,000 ha estimated at project inception. That is more than 2.5 times higher than appraisal estimates.

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Satisfactory
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The ICR rates the project’s efficiency as “Modest”, and this TER rates efficiency as satisfactory, given that project resources were efficiently and practically used, as explained below (ICR p14).

The ICR’s economic analysis of the project’s impact estimates *ex-post* Economic Rate of Return (ERR) for the Project was 15.9 percent, which shows satisfactory efficiency in the use of project resources, although lower than the *ex-ante* estimate of 19 percent. The *ex-post* Net Present Value (NPV) was \$2.635 million compared to the *ex-ante* NPV of \$11.65 million. The lower efficiency performance rating *ex-post* is attributable to the 3-year delay before the execution of the micro- and productive sub-projects and the generation of benefit streams from these investments by the beneficiary communities. With an ERR still well above the opportunity cost of capital, which was 12 percent, the project remains a positive investment for the government of Chad.

In terms of cost-effectiveness, all procurement was performed in line with the contracting procedure, according to the ICR. Legally-recognized Community Organizations (LACs) solicited three bids for the subproject and chose the least-cost bid compared to subprojects of similar quality financed by the central government to ensure costs were contained.

In terms of technical efficiency, standardized designs were developed for most of the subproject demanded by the communities. Field evidence demonstrates that these simple, practical standards enhanced subproject quality, sustainability and cost-effectiveness.

4.4 <b>Sustainability</b>	Rating: Moderately likely
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The ICR does not rate sustainability (risk to development outcome). This TER rates sustainability as moderately likely, given that the project positively impacted financial, environmental, social and institutional sustainability, although government support for decentralized and community-based organizations remains uncertain (ICR p9, 15, 25, 41)

#### Financial sustainability

By rapidly promoting access to assets, the project successfully facilitated adoption of productive capital by smallholder farmers and microenterprises in the poor rural areas of the country. Through sub-component 3 - support for access to Income Generating Assets (AGR) for women -, the project targeted an especially vulnerable segment of the population whose members had fewer reserves of food or cash to fall back on, and who disposed of fewer options for generating additional income. Women's groups, many of which were actively involved in post-harvest activities, were given priority when sub-projects were selected. This gender-targeted production support enabled women groups to add value to their products, increase their incomes, enhance their capacity to cope with recurrent droughts and reduce their vulnerability to post-harvest losses and food shortages.

The subprojects are enhanced by a sense of community buy-in and ownership and by the responsibility of the communities for operation and maintenance of the investment. The Legally-recognized Community Organizations (LAC) are charging user fees, thus ensuring the sustainability of these investments. The reported feedback from the beneficiaries was that the returns to the investments in these subprojects completely transformed their lives, in terms of the impact on their household incomes, the overall welfare of their families and the quality of life in their communities.

#### Sociopolitical sustainability

As mentioned above, community organizations are operating and maintaining the subprojects, such as the investments in small-scale agro-processing equipment. The project experience shows that by assigning greater responsibility and influence to local level organizations, including Departmental Action Committees (DACs) and local government councils, the project can successfully support decentralized resource allocation and creation of social capital in rural areas. Beneficiary participation at all stages of the subproject cycle, as well as significant levels of community contribution (cash/in-kind), are likely to help ensure that projects are sustained. Furthermore, the democratic process intrinsic in the DACs, the local government councils and the LACs should ensure better selection and prioritization of subprojects by beneficiaries, enhancing long-term sustainability. To increase sustainability even further, the ICR

proposes to include performance incentives for proper operation and maintenance in project design in a possible follow-on project.

#### Institutional sustainability

The ICR explains that the project's most outstanding contribution to institution building was the successful introduction of Community-Driven Development (CDD) in Chad. Local development planning was promoted by the project. This concept organized all users of the scarce land and water resources in a given community/geographic location into legally recognized common Economic Interest Groups (EIGs) to follow an inclusive and participatory process to prepare local development plans (LDPs) and associated budgets. These plans serve as the basis for the financing of community sub-projects. The LDP process also serves as an instrument for social cohesion and for managing conflicts arising from competition to access scarce water and land resources, such as the recurring farmer-pastoralist conflicts.

However, the ICR explains that there remains considerable skepticism by the government towards decentralized and community driven project implementation, and that government behavior and actions during implementation hampered rather than aided the successful adoption of the Community Driven Development (CDD) approach. The regional technical services charged with the implementation coordination function on the ground were denied much of the budgetary allocations from the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) by their supervising technical departments at the Ministry of Agriculture. As such, the ICR suggests that the necessary technical support that newly-formed community-based ventures require for the sustainability of micro-projects is not likely to materialize.

#### Environmental sustainability

The project implemented a climate-resilient agricultural production strategy, recognizing climate change risks and in line with the priority actions identified by the government for the improvement of land and water management. As such, the project improved the efficiency, sustainability, and climate resilience of agricultural investments carried out under component 2, by financing activities that promote better management of the natural resource base upon which agriculture depends. This bodes well for future environmental sustainability, as healthier and better-managed natural resources, namely land and water sources, increase food security and provide adaptation to climate change impacts.

## **5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes**

**5.1 Co-financing.** To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Co-financing from the World Bank was essential to the achievement of the project's objectives, the implementing agency providing \$18.7 million out of a total of \$24 million. The rest of the financing was provided by the GEF, with no other external financing. These numbers are in stark contract with the

figures provided by the GEF CEO Endorsement document, which indicates \$50 million in co-financing from the national government. This contribution did not materialize, and the ICR does not explain why, although it is important to note that after appraisal and approval of the project, the Government of Chad faced a serious and potentially destabilizing emergency crisis, with hundreds of thousands of Chadians fleeing from the outbreak of a violent conflict in neighboring Central Africa Republic, compounded by a climatic shock with a devastating drought, especially for the livestock sector.

**5.2 Project extensions and/or delays.** If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Long implementation delays adversely affected much of the project. Delivery of goods under the emergency component was substantially delayed and seeds and inputs were only received the following sowing/planting season. There were also long delays in the sub-projects processing and approval process. This was mostly due to poor implementation capacity and a lack of commitment at all levels of government, and recurrent problems in management of the fiduciary issue (ICR p13).

The mid-term review mission's key recommendation was that the World Bank should approve a request submitted by the government for an extension of the closing date by 18 months which would allow the achievement of all the project's development objectives. World Bank Management did not agree to grant the request for extension of the loan closing date because as an emergency operation it was estimated that it should have delivered its outcomes within four years and because of the ongoing challenges related to the administration of the project (ICR p19).

**5.3 Country ownership.** Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

There were two levels of country ownership of the project: at the government level, where commitment and engagement were weak; and at the local level, where local communities successfully owned the subprojects.

The sustainability of the subprojects was found to be enhanced by a sense of community buy-in and ownership and by the responsibility of the communities for operations and maintenance of the investment. The project demonstrated the viability of assigning greater responsibility and influence on local level organizations, including Departmental Action Committees (DACs) and local government councils, to successfully support decentralized resource allocation and creation of social capital in rural areas. Participation of beneficiaries in the selection, financing, execution and operation & maintenance of subprojects ensured that investments meet genuine community needs, lead to cost savings, and increase community ownership, leading to improved sustainability of investments. The ICR criticized the lack of government commitment to the project and the deficient supervisory and oversight functions for the project, which undermined the implementation success of the project while, conversely, local commitment and ownership created optimal conditions for the successful implementation of the project and the sustainability of the development outcomes (ICR p25-27).



## 6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

<b>6.1 M&amp;E Design at entry</b>	Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory
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The ICR contradicts itself in providing an overall M&E rating in the ICR of “Substantial” and stating the justification of overall rating of Quality of M&E that “the M&E system can only be qualified as moderately unsatisfactory.” Based on a reading of the ICR section describing M&E, it can be surmised that the rating of “substantial” was perhaps an error, and that the intended rating was lower. This TER rates M&E design as moderately unsatisfactory because of the various shortcomings explained below (ICR p20).

The ICR states that overall M&E design was quite sound, however it omitted, importantly, a measurement by which the emergency activities could be segregated from the longer-term development objectives. The lack of proper segregation of project impacts provides for an overwhelmingly positive picture in terms of project achievement, without nuancing the difference in extent of project impacts under either emergency, Sustainable Land and Water Management (SLWM), or productivity-enhancing activities.

The project was designed as a participative process involving all the stakeholders for data collection, storage and diffusion of M&E information to be used for decision-making and to facilitate a robust monitoring and evaluation of project activities. This system should have undergone a systematic review to ensure each stakeholder in the system was adequately performing its role. Process monitoring typical for decentralized implementation with communities could have allowed the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) to assess the extent to which the disadvantaged groups were included in the process of project selection, design and implementation.

The ICR explains that the project development objectives (PDO) did not include a clear variable or indicator that would define the project's success as an emergency operation responding to a crisis in a timely fashion. Rather, the project measured basic numbers of population reached and food production as a consequence of the provision of inputs and measures that would reduce vulnerabilities stemming from degraded land as project indicators. For an emergency intervention, an intermediate indicator reflecting the timeliness of the interventions would have been useful, the ICR points out.

<b>6.2 M&amp;E Implementation</b>	Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory
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As explained above, the overall M&E system is rated both “Substantial” and “Moderately Satisfactory” by the ICR. This TER rates M&E implementation as moderately unsatisfactory, due to negligence on behalf of the executing agencies and delays that hindered the proper functioning of the system (ICR p20).

The early project implementation period was executed without the benefit of a functioning M&E system. The implementation manual only became available half-way through the project at which time the M&E system became more robust and user-friendly.

In spite of M&E weaknesses and the lack of an operational M&E Manual, sufficient M&E data was collected which allowed the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) to address certain implementation weaknesses. The concerned stakeholders at the central and sub-national levels participated in a workshop devoted to M&E during the project launch workshop in November 2013. Further sessions were held to train M&E staff at PCU, the Regional Coordination Units (RCUs) and partnering service providers on methodology, data collection for indicators and data treatment/processing.

However, the Project Manual of Procedures (PIM) was not operationalized until the Mid-term Review (MTR) mission in 2016. Consequently, there was no baseline data in usable form to monitor systematically the physical and financial results of the project, and M&E activities related to the implementation of components 2, 3 and 4 had been largely neglected until that point. To collect data despite a lack of adequate methodology and processes, consultants collected data directly from beneficiaries and the regional technical departments.

Overall, the supervision of the project by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI) was evidently inadequate, as the Ministry neglected to conduct regular field visits to verify implementation on the ground, and its lack of involvement denied the project of professional extension services support.

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## 7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory
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The ICR rates the World Bank's performance as "Unsatisfactory", both in terms of quality at entry and of supervision. This TER rates the World Bank's performance as moderately unsatisfactory, agreeing with the ICR's assessment while recognizing the project's achievement nonetheless (ICR p24)

The ICR provides 3 mains reasons for the negative assessment of the Bank's performance at entry:

- The project was "overdesigned" relative to in-country capacity. Weaknesses in implementation capacity at both the central and local levels of government became major constraints on the project's implementation performance and successful achievement of the project development objectives. Mitigation measures were simplistic, reflecting an underestimation of the magnitude of this problem and the associated risk. A lack of support from the technical departments in the central government compounded these issues.
- There was a lack of implementation preparedness. A head-start on the indispensable social mobilization and training work for both the beneficiary organizations and participating stakeholders during the project preparation phase would have been beneficial.
- Fiduciary aspects did not receive sufficient attention at the entry point of the project. The overall risk ranking of financial management in the project was high, but the mitigation measures fell short of achieving the stated objectives

In terms of supervision, the ICR criticizes several aspects of the Bank's performance:

- In the life of the project, the Bank undertook only 4 full supervision missions including the mid-term review (MTR). The ICR states that the norm is 2 full supervision missions per year, excluding the MTR. The 5-year duration of the project should thus have entailed 10 supervision missions according to this norm.
- The Bank failed to take appropriate measures to address the long implementation delays, and was generally lacking in proactivity.
- The Bank failed to ensure that the project implementation coordination function at the local level was adequately funded.
- The M&E and project implementation manuals should have been available before or soon after project start, or the Bank should have at least made it a disbursement condition.
- The project had 5 different task managers which resulted in insufficient and unstable supervision.

<b>7.2 Quality of Project Execution</b>	Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory
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The ICR does not rate the quality of project execution. This TER rates the executing agency's performance as moderately unsatisfactory, given that the government hindered the project's progress and demonstrated a lack of commitment and faith in it, although it is important to note that it was dealing with the previously-mentioned migration crisis.

The ICR highlights a lack of commitment and leadership from the supervising Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI) and from the government in general, as both were not favorable to the decentralized execution of the project, as previously mentioned in the "Sustainability" section. Cumbersome procurement procedures and the inability of the government to fix this problem plagued the project. This lack of commitment resulted in implementation delays of more than 2 years.

## 8. Assessment of Project Impacts

***Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.***

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

As explained in the "Sustainability" section, the project implemented a climate-resilient agricultural production strategy, recognizing the climate change risks as well as those caused by unsustainable land and water management. As such, the project financed activities that promote better management of the natural resource base upon which agriculture depends, namely land and water sources, thus increasing food security and providing adaptation to climate change impacts.

Examples of activities supported by the project include promotion of water harvesting and water conservation technologies in dryland farming zones, introduction of improved water management practices in small-scale irrigation systems (irrigation and drainage), protection of vegetation on hillsides surrounding irrigated lowlands, and adoption of integrated watershed management approaches to maximize returns to scarce water resources in the face of competing demands (ICR p31).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

As mentioned previously, the project empowered community organizations by assigning greater responsibility and influence on local level organizations, including Departmental Action Committees (DACs) and local government councils, who operated and maintained the subprojects, such as the investments in small-scale agro-processing equipment. The project successfully supported decentralized resource allocation and creation of social capital in rural areas. Beneficiary participation at all stages of the subproject cycle, as well as significant levels of community contribution (cash/in-kind), are likely to help ensure that projects are sustained and that communities are further empowered. Furthermore, the project's decentralized structure empowered the democratic processes intrinsic to these community-based organizations.

Food insecure populations, including farmers and community groups, received training and extension services delivered by public agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and private service providers. This activity was very popular, and the training sessions were always oversubscribed, the ICR reports. The actual achievement on this indicator at the end of the project was 99, 774 trainees/attendants, while the indicator target was 23,300 by project end.

The project also financed sub-projects for women's organizations, such as investments in small-scale agro-processing equipment, although this targeted support for women groups experienced a disappointing performance. At the project end date, only 74 sub-projects for women's organizations were financed against a target of 200 by the end of the project. This represents an achievement rate of only 34 percent. Nonetheless, this gender-targeted production support enabled women groups to add value to their products and increase their incomes, enhanced their capacity to cope with recurrent droughts and other weather-induced shocks as well as helped to reduce their vulnerability to post-harvest losses and food shortages. Furthermore, women beneficiaries benefited from the capacity building support and training in the successful adoption of Sustainable Land and Water Management (SLWM) practices (ICR p15, 24-25, 29).

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change.

"Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

#### a) Capacities

Agricultural growth in Chad was constrained by many factors, notably the country's agro-climatic conditions, and compounded by the weak capacity of producer organizations, among other challenges. The project increased agricultural productivity in a sustainable manner, contributing to more climate-resilient agricultural production and enhanced food security.

Project activities strengthened the capacity of local communities and producer organizations, and facilitated their investment in sustainable land management and in the production, processing, and marketing of selected food crops and livestock species. Interventions boosted agricultural production by increasing cultivated areas and inputs to improve animal health and maintain livestock, and protected the landscape to secure agricultural production, thus building capacity at the level of government services to secure the food chain and improve access to food by a rapidly growing population.

The Project Coordination Unit (PCU) administered training programs for service providers and facilitators and enhanced community capacity to prepare, implement, operate and maintain subprojects. Women beneficiaries, in particular, benefited from the capacity building support and training in the successful adoption of Sustainable Land and Water Management (SLWM) practices. The targeted assistance provided by the project to women enhanced their capacity to cope with recurrent droughts and other weather-induced shocks and helped reduce their vulnerability to post-harvest losses and food shortages.

Overall, the project significantly enhanced the government's capacity to cope with the severe food insecurity crisis in the country compared to when the project was being prepared. The production of selected food crops and livestock increased substantially. The area devoted to SLWM practices also increased significantly relative to the baseline scenario, and the number of direct beneficiaries increased by about 300 percent compared to the baseline data. However, as mentioned previously, there are considerable attribution issues with the achievement of some of these outcomes (ICR p11, 14-15).

#### b) Governance

Chad is a least developed country (LDC) characterized by extremely weak institutional capacity at both the central and regional levels and a heavy top down and centralized approach to the management of development projects and rural development in general. The Government of Chad seems to have hindered the project's progress and demonstrated a lack of commitment and faith in its decentralized approach, although it is important to note that it was dealing with the previously-mentioned migration crisis. The ICR highlights a lack of commitment and leadership from the supervising Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI) and from the Government in general, as both were not favorable to the decentralized execution of the project. Cumbersome procurement procedures and the inability of the government to fix this problem resulted in implementation delays of more than 2 years. As such, no progress in terms of national or regional governance was achieved in this project, although one could argue that the governance of community-based organizations was certainly enhanced, as evidenced in previous sections of this TER.

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

There were no documented unintended impacts of the project (ICR p16).

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

There is no mention of mainstreaming or replication of the project in the ICR. In fact, one could argue that the government's reticence to accept decentralization and empowerment of community-based organizations prevents any mainstreaming of these processes.

In terms of scaling-up, this seems to have happened during the project, although seemingly inadvertently. The actual area brought under sustainable land and water management (SLWM) practices, meant to enhance the capacity of beneficiaries and the resilience of agricultural production to cope with climate change, is estimated at some 235,520 ha compared to 95,000 ha estimated at project inception. That is more than 2.5 times higher than appraisal estimates because SLWM measures were disseminated and adopted on a wider scale along the entire transhumance corridor of Chad (ICR p13).

## **9. Lessons and recommendations**

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

The ICR blends lessons learned and recommendations for the World Bank, in the sense that the key lessons learned from the project lead to related recommendations:

- In a country such as Chad that is particularly vulnerable to climate change, food insecurity and conflict-led migration, there is a need to have a very strong mechanism for emergency response financing. In this context, building the client capacity in disaster and crisis management is a key factor of success.
- It is advantageous to focus on emergency aspects, such as the immediate restoration of productive assets for food-insecure rural households, rather than on building complex Community-Driven Development (CDD) systems, which require lengthy capacity building, social mobilization and communications and information dissemination campaigns.
- A project with a simple design is easier to implement than one with a complex design, and democratic and local community decision-making is more advantageous for beneficiaries than a top-down approach, in terms of sustainability, accountability and more accurate targeting of community needs.
- Gender/Poverty-targeting mechanisms should be simple, verifiable and based on objective criteria.

- Training M&E staff during the project preparation phase is essential for the smooth take off of the M&E system.
- Supervision of CDD projects needs to be reinforced and strengthened through (i) adequate funding, (ii) improvements in technical quality, scope and frequency; (iii) coverage of the key relevant competencies; and proactivity in following up on mission-findings and recommendations. Capacity building and technical support through training and technical assistance is essential.



## 10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF IEO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The report documents outcomes, impacts and achievements with relevant quantitative data, and also describes the project's shortcomings.	<b>HS</b>
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The report provides several negative assessments of the implementing and executing agencies, backed-up quite convincingly by relevant explanations, although the fact that a major migration crisis happened in the first few years of the project should have alleviated these negative ratings.	<b>S</b>
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The "Risk to Development Outcome" mostly focuses on institutional sustainability and the somewhat challenging role of the government. That section should have included more information about environmental sustainability, which can found in other sections of the report.	<b>MS</b>
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons learned are addressed to the World Bank and are directly derived from project experience.	<b>HS</b>
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	Project financing, by source of co-financing and by activity, is documented, although there are major differences with the CEO Endorsement document figures and no explanation for this gap.	<b>MS</b>
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	The report is critical of M&E design and implementation, and provides sufficient explanations, which are later summarized in the "Lessons Learned" section.	<b>S</b>
<b>Overall TE Rating</b>		<b>S</b>

## 11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).