

# Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2014

## 1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		50	
GEF Agency project ID		1217	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		Tana River National Primate Reserve Conservation Project	
Country/Countries		Kenya	
Region		AFR	
Focal area		Biodiversity	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		GEF-3 OP1: Arid and semi-arid ecosystems	
Executing agencies involved		Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS)	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		None	
Private sector involvement		One of the beneficiaries	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		05/01/91	
Effectiveness date / project start		01/07/97	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		02/25/01	
Actual date of project completion		12/31/01	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	0.545	0.400
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant			
Co-financing	IA own	6.200	1.763
	Government	0.942	0.190
	Other multi- /bi-laterals		
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		6.745	2.163
Total Co-financing		0.942	0.190
Total project funding		7.687	2.353
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		06/30/02	
TE submission date		07/10/03	
Author of TE		N/A	
TER completion date		09/24/14	
TER prepared by		Sean Nelson	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Joshua Schneck	

## 2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	N/R	U	U	MU
Sustainability of Outcomes	N/R	U	U	U
M&E Design	N/R	N/R	N/R	MU
M&E Implementation	N/R	N/R	N/R	MS
Quality of Implementation	N/R	U	U	U
Quality of Execution	N/R	U	U	U
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	-	-	S	S

## 3. Project Objectives

### 3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

According to the Project Document (PD), the project's GEO was to strengthen biodiversity protection at the Tana River Primate Natural Reserve (TRPNR) in Kenya. Following widespread local deforestation in the 1960's, the Reserve had been set up as a County Council Game Reserve in 1976. As of the PD's writing, the majority of the remaining habitats for the Tana River Red Colobus (*Colobus badius rufomitatus*) and the Tana River Crested Mangabey (*Cercocebus galeritus galeritus*) were in the Reserve. Both of these primates were endangered. The Reserve also includes habitats for at least 5 additional primate species, 262 bird species and 57 other mammalian species.

### 3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

As stated in the Project Document, the Development Objectives of the project were to increase the management capacity of the Kenya Wildlife Service's (KWS), which is charged with protection of biodiversity at the Reserve. In addition, the project sought to engage the local community in protecting the Reserve's biodiversity as these communities relied on the Reserve for its resources. The project would also support research to determine threats to local biodiversity, while also putting forward solutions "including improved management, ecological restoration and rehabilitation, community awareness-building, benefit-sharing and development, etc." (PD, p. 3). An ecological monitoring component would also allow for flexible reserve management to adapt to new information.

The outputs for the 3 main project components are as follows:

- 1) Research and Monitoring Component: To better understand the local ecosystem and the threats to its ecological balance, the project would support research in 5 main areas:
  1. Primate population, genetic and habitat monitoring

2. Creating baseline surveys for local flora and fauna populations, along with subsequent monitoring
  3. Tana River hydrological system studies and monitoring, including studying its effects on the local ecosystem
  4. Local community forest resource use to promote sustainable resource use practices
  5. Prospects for “community-based conservation of remaining forest patches outside the Reserve boundaries” (PD, p. 4)
- 2) Reserve Management Component: This component will be devoted to creating a KWS adaptive management system
1. Funding during the first 2 years will be devoted to developing the Adaptive Management Plan (AMP) based on the Research and Monitoring components findings, improving Reserve security and (possibly with remaining funds)
- 3) Community Conservation and Development Component (CCDC)
1. The Community Conservation Program will support local sustainable forest resource use. This will build on the pre-existing Community Wildlife Program (CWP), which has also received prior GEF support.
  2. The pace of implementation will be based on community consultation and outreach

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

There were no changes to the GEOs or the DOs.

#### 4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: <b>Satisfactory</b>
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Project objectives are in-line with those of GEF Operation Program 1: Biodiversity: Arid and semi-arid ecosystems. The Kenyan government had already made protecting local biodiversity at the Reserve a

priority through its prior GEF project to limit local poaching and deforestation. This led to the creation of the Joint Management Reserve Committee (JMRC), which aims to limit agricultural practices and wood resources use that threaten forest cover. However, there were also some signs noted in the PD that the project's focus was not highly relevant to the government of Kenya. The government has supported 5 upstream hydroelectric dams whose effect on the Reserve were unknown at the time. In addition, the Reserve was seen as a low prestige post that did not generate revenue for the KWS, unlike other reserves.

4.2 Effectiveness	Rating: <b>Moderately Unsatisfactory</b>
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Note: Since the Research and Monitoring Component and the Reserve Management Component have received “Moderately Satisfactory” ratings here, this document gives the project's effectiveness a “Moderately Unsatisfactory” rating instead of an “Unsatisfactory” rating like in the TE.

**Summary:**

While the populations of the 2 endangered primate species have stabilized, their habitats have continued to shrink within the Reserve. The total habitat range had shrunk by 5 percent since the project's start. The rate of habitat loss may have slowed during the project time frame, especially on Reserve lands, but this is not statistically clear as of the TE's writing. The red colobus became more vulnerable since the project started. Unsustainable human activities have actually increased since the project's start. While both the primate population and their habitats within the reserve remain viable, their survival was not significantly helped by the project.

The project reached some of its goals in the Research and Monitoring Component and the Reserve Management Component, including creating the Adaptive Management Plan (AMP). However, AMP was created under the assumption that voluntary relocation would take place. This was the most popular part of the Community Conservation and Development Component (CCDC) with local communities, but voluntary relocation was eventually canceled. Voluntary relocation was necessary for achieving project environmental goals in order to allow for reforestation. Since the 3 project components were interlocked, shortcomings in one component helped to undermine other components, helping to lead to an unsuccessful project overall. The project was canceled after 4-and-a-half years of implementation.

The TE sums up the project's effects as “the primary stakeholders (residents of the project zone) will be no better and more likely worse off than when they began to interact and participate in the project. The principal project objective of increased sustainability or ecological viability of a globally significant biological community will have failed and the vulnerability of the natural community to extirpation will have measurably increased” (TE, p. 49).

1) Research and Monitoring Component:): **Moderately Satisfactory**

The research component was contracted out to the National Museums of Kenya (NMK). Nearly all of the studies mentioned in the PD were carried out (10 of 13), but the hydrological study and the forest

regeneration study were not carried out. Without a better understanding of the local hydrological system, appropriate and effective forest regeneration measures cannot be taken. Forest regeneration will likely be necessary to ensure that the two endangered primates covered by this project do not go extinct.

In addition, there are issues regarding the studies that were completed. The land use and land cover studies are in conflict and not fully complete. Both the World Bank and KWS were dissatisfied with the original Department of Remote Sensing and Resource Surveys (DRSRS) study, so they hired a private sector company to conduct an additional land use study. However, the company had not yet completed this study as of the TE's writing. As a result, "the rates and causes of changes in forest cover and habitat quality, both inside and outside of the reserve, are still not well understood" (TE, p. 5).

The studies on the primate populations are contradictory over the 2 species' level of vulnerability. Additionally, the project lacks the necessary data on human forest resource use that are needed to set sustainable resource use limits. The Reserve Management Component and the Research and Monitoring Component were linked, yet there was weak coordination between the teams. Much needed baseline data was missing. Considering that among the main reasons this project component was created was to collect baseline data and to support the creation of the Adaptive Management Plan, this component fell short of its goals.

## 2) Reserve Management Component. **Moderately Satisfactory**

The project helped to increase local Reserve security. This helped to improve relations with the local community. However, since residents now had less fear of kidnapping and robbery, they were able to use forest resources with greater ease. This appears to have increased the total level of forest degradation. The project also added and upgraded Reserve infrastructure.

The AMP was crafted based on project research and in collaboration with several local organizations: the NMK, the DRSRS and the Institute of Primate Research (IPR). The TE claims that the AMP provides a reasonably effective framework for future action. However, AMP also depended on assumptions that were no longer valid as of the TE's writing. In particular, AMP depended on going through with a resettlement plan. Originally families living off of 60 percent of the Reserve's farmland were expected to move. However, the program was likely going to be canceled at the time of the TE because of a lack of funding. As a result, less land would be available for reforestation.

## 3) Community Conservation and Development Component (CCDC): **Unsatisfactory**

The CCDC had planned 2 goodwill projects, but only 1 was implemented, which was building a school administrative building. As a result, goodwill towards the project remained low. This low level of goodwill among local communities was also linked to high levels of resentment against the Reserve. In addition, the 2 community-based endowment funds that had been planned were never implemented. These were supposed to be an educational scholarship and a micro-enterprise fund.

Community Action Plans (CAPs) were also never carried out. These were to be based on Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs), but the PRAs were started late in 1999 and only included 5 out of the 9 villages near the Reserve. The only village within the Reserve, Baomo, did not participate. After the Mid-Term Review, the project shifted from the CAPs towards voluntary relocation because 1) the CAPs were not making headway and 2) the project needed to reduce population pressure on the Reserve. Some local residents also sought relocation because they were unable to gain land titles to their lands within the Reserve, but would be able to do so if they relocated.

In December 1999, the World Bank and the KWS decided that all CCDC efforts would focus on the voluntary relocation program. However, the voluntary relocation plan also has run into delays and has not been fully implemented. Resettlement had to be delayed in mid-2001 while the project team had to wait to see if the project would be extended and how funding would be allocated. These measures were not approved. Instead, the project received a six month extension until the end of 2001, during which the CCDC only received funding for the administrative costs for creating letters of allotment (LOAs) for 247 interested families. It was hoped that these would eventually lead to actual land titles. However, these developments also meant that the project did not meet its support goals for ensuring a large-scale voluntary out-migration from the Reserve as of the TE's writing. It is unclear if the associated construction at the Witu II resettlement site (family homes, etc.) ever actually broke ground. According to the TE, "there was widespread agreement that, for any transfer to Witu It to proceed humanely and successfully, some additional investment is required" (TE, p. 8). The resettlement program was eventually canceled. This in turn has only increased local resentment against the project and the Reserve.

4.3 <b>Efficiency</b>	Rating: <b>Moderately Unsatisfactory</b>
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The project experienced multiple delays that affected project performance, as well as management problems. The project thus did not use its time and manpower efficiently. While the project was well under budget, this reflects the fact that multiple project initiatives were canceled to focus on the voluntary resettlement program.

**Delays:** The Research and Monitoring component was delayed due to the extended amount of time it took to finalize an agreement with NMK, as well as a slow accounting process. In addition, KWS also took longer than expected to purchase support equipment. Flooding in 1997-1998 also delayed progress.

The CCDC also experienced long delays before it was started. This was due to a number of factors: "the late recruitment of all key staff, inaccessibility of some areas, following the El Nino floods, and hostility among some communities" (TE, p. 7). The PRAs to support the CAPs were also delayed until late 1999. The voluntary relocation program fell behind schedule and was eventually canceled.

The project also experienced delays in hiring key staff. A senior warden was only hired in August 1998, which was roughly a year after the Project Coordinator and the Senior Research Scientist were hired. There were also delays in hiring key community outreach staff. The Agroforester was never hired.

**Management Problems:** The project saw a high rate of turnover, including seeing “three PCs, two field activities' coordinators, two forestry officers, three accountants and, at the highest level, five DDRPs and four Directors of KWS” throughout the life of the project (TE, p. 9). The dual reporting lines to both the Project Coordinator and the KWS also created delays and confusion. Resentment between the project team and the KWS also led to coordination and decision-making problems.

4.4 Sustainability	Rating: <b>Unlikely</b>
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**Summary:** The project was terminated early. It also faced a lack of ongoing financial and KWS personnel support. The AMP was too out of date to be implemented, and there was no funding to update it. Local opposition to the Reserve and the project remained high and may have gotten worse.

Risks to the sustainability of project outcomes is further assessed along the following 4 risk dimensions:

Environmental: **Unable to Assess**

The TE does not address environmental risks to sustainability, including whether or not El Nino-related flooding would continue to be a problem.

Financial: **Unlikely**

The project had not secured funding for future activities. As of the TE's writing, the transfer of equipment to KWS for ongoing activities on the Reserve were in a state of limbo. Even if this transfer went through, KWS was likely to have to cut its budget, which would create further risks to project sustainability. The micro-enterprise fund which was supposed to finance ongoing community development was never created.

Institutional: **Moderately Unlikely**

The project did increase KWS institutional capacity. However, the AMP no longer was relevant to the current situation, and it was not clear if the KWS had the resources to update it. Most KWS personnel had left the project and the project area, thus leaving it unclear who was actually supposed to execute the project's transitional phase and exit strategy. KWS was also under pressure to cut its budget.

Sociopolitical: **Unlikely**

The KWS had attempted to create positive relationships with local NGOs, but in the end most relevant NGOs remained hostile to the project and local KWS activities. Canceling the resettlement project killed what little local goodwill remained towards the project and the Reserve. The KWS also faced a court case regarding the Reserve (and possibly concerning the project), but the TE is not clear about the details. The TE also notes that cancellation of the resettlement program after some families had already made plans to relocate had the potential to create problems as these families tried to reclaim their old land located within the Reserve.

## **5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes**

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The PD originally called for KWS to provide US\$850k and for local communities to provide US\$90k. The actual total amount the government provided was US\$190k. The total spent on the budget was US\$1.91 million, which is only 27 percent of the original US\$7.14 million budget. Most of the project components came in well under budget. This may be due to slow KWS financial accounting capacity and the fact several project components were started late or never implemented. While the TE does not directly address how low co-financing affected the project, it does blame KWS slow accounting procedures and an unrealistic original accounting disbursement timeline for the failure to achieve project goals due to multiple delays.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The Research and Monitoring component was delayed due to the extended amount of time it took to finalize an agreement with NMK, as well as a slow accounting process. In addition, KWS took longer than expected to purchase support equipment. Flooding in 1997-1998 also delayed progress.

The CCDC also experienced long delays before it was started. This was due to a number of factors: "the late recruitment of all key staff, inaccessibility of some areas, following the El Nino floods, and hostility among some communities" (TE, p. 7). The PRAs to support the CAPs were also delayed until late 1999. The voluntary relocation program fell behind schedule and was eventually canceled.

The project also experienced delays in hiring key staff. A senior warden was only hired in August 1998, which was roughly a year after the Project Coordinator and the Senior Research Scientist were hired. There were also delays in hiring key community outreach staff. The Agroforester was never hired.

The project team requested extensions, including a 6-month extension near the project's end to finish up project work and a 2-year extension that involved reallocating funding towards the resettlement program. The GEF did not approve either of these extensions. The project was only granted a 6-month extension to finish writing and distributing LOAs. The project was canceled early after 4-and-a-half years into the project..

## **6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system**

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.



Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

<b>6.1 M&amp;E Design at entry</b>	Rating: <b>Moderately Unsatisfactory</b>
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The PD had a well-defined reporting schedule, but the details of the M&E design had not yet been finalized as of the TE's writing. According to the TE:

An overall project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan was not prepared until May 2001 and was never implemented. However, certain technical indicators, such as primate populations, were monitored throughout project implementation, and Terms of Reference for independent M&E of the planned resettlement activities were prepared (TE, p. 9).

It is not clear why the M&E plan was finished at such a late date. The PD allocated a total of US\$105,000 to M&E, which was equal to about 1.7 percent of the project's total US\$6.2 million initial budget. The PD provided SMART indicators and targets for the infrastructure component of the Reserve Management Component, but provided few indicators for any other parts of the project. While the PD states that Technical Annex 4 in the PD (which outlined the CCDC component) would have the CCDC's M&E design, this section was missing from the PD at the time of TE review.

<b>6.2 M&amp;E Implementation</b>	Rating: <b>Moderately Satisfactory</b>
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The TE states that the overall M&E plan was never implemented. The project still performed a MTR. The MTR identified several problems with the project, especially a lack of progress in the Research and Monitoring and the Reserve Management Component, which eventually led to project management canceling under-performing initiatives and focusing largely on the voluntary resettlement plan. The TE does note, however, that the MTR may have been carried out earlier than it should have (18 months into a 4-year project that had experienced delays) because the project started a year behind schedule. .

## **7. Assessment of project implementation and execution**

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

<b>7.1 Quality of Project Implementation</b>	Rating: <b>Unsatisfactory</b>
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The Terminal Evaluation and IEG review both rate the quality of Implementation as Unsatisfactory, and this TER concurs with that assessment. The KWS was undergoing several internal problems during the project's early stages (including a high rate of turnover, even at the top levels) that slowed down project execution. In addition, there were institutional conflicts between the KWS and the project team (at least until the KWS took over project management late into the project's life), which were due to a lack of coordination and processes between the two groups, as well as institutional resentment. This suggests that choosing another executing agency during the planning stage may have been a better idea. The decision to locate much of the project staff in Nairobi instead of in the field may have also delayed project execution. The project called for a phased approach, and required that the executing agency undertake actions (such as resettlement) with which it lacked experience. The TE states that the project's 4-year time horizon was likely unrealistic.

The PD's goals written in a way that ensured socioeconomic development would be secondary to the environmental goals. Preserving Reserve land was the main priority. Socioeconomic development was part of the project to serve this overall goal, as opposed to being there for the direct benefit of local communities. In addition, the project's focus on finding ways to stop local communities from using Reserve land at a time when resentment against the Reserve was high ensured that the project and the local community would come into conflict. In practice, the resettlement plan had to be written according to the World Bank's involuntary resettlement guidelines since "the resettlement could be regarded as having an element of coercion" (TE, p. 8).

The project assumed that the KWS accounting department capacity was higher than it actually was. There were also problems with the project personnel salary design. The project called for high salaries (higher than KWS salaries) to attract high-quality staff, as the Reserve was seen as an unattractive station. A payment schedule between the original salary designs and the KWS own salary schedule ended up being implemented. This appears to have caused personnel problems that affected project outcomes (though the TE does not elaborate on this point). In addition, the M&E design process took too long to actually be implemented.

Both the Project Steering Committee (PSC) and the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) were not set up prior to commencement of project activities, as called for in the PD. The CAC only met once late in the project life. This meeting ended up involving only KWS staff, even though a NGO representative had been invited. The PSC had only one recorded meeting in 1998. It did not operate during most of the project's life. With this said, World Bank pressure did help to induce the KWS to make decisions faster following delays during the project's early years.

<b>7.2 Quality of Project Execution</b>	Rating: <b>Unsatisfactory</b>
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During project execution, a dual track management system between the Project Coordinator and the KWS was introduced that in practice became unwieldy and difficult for project personnel to navigate. This caused multiple delays. The project was subject to major swings in management style and priorities because KWS went through 4 different Directors and 5 different Deputy Directors of Research and Planning. KWS could have called for additional PSC meetings to help overcome internal divides, but chose not to do so.

In addition, several of the required studies, including the hydrological systems study, were never completed. A number of CCDC initiatives, including one of the goodwill projects and the CAPs, were never carried out. Initiatives were canceled to focus on the voluntary resettlement program, but this was canceled as well. An early project termination meant that much project work was left incomplete.

## **8. Assessment of Project Impacts**

***Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate below that this is indeed the case. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.***

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The 2 target primate species have stable population levels, though it is unclear if this is due to the project. Their habitat's continue to shrink, but the rate of degradation (especially within the Reserve) may have decreased due to the project, but the actual numbers are uncertain. The red colobus's vulnerability level has actually increased since the project's start (TE, p. 4).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

Increased security at the reserve allowed for greater local economic activity, as residents had less reason to fear kidnapping and robbery (TE, p. 4). The voluntary resettlement plan was started and then canceled, which appears to have caused some local economic actors (especially farmers) to be in a state of limbo (TE, p. 8). This also meant these farmers underwent a reduction in their food security, which forced them to turn to public assistance (TE, p. 49).

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. "Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems,

including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities:

The project helped to increase KWS's experience engaging the local community. The project also hired some quality people who are now KWS employees (TE, p. 9). The project also built up some infrastructure on the reserve that will help increase local KWS capacity, including building a new administrative headquarters for the Reserve (TE, p. 6, 10).

b) Governance:

The project allowed KWS to create links with local authorities (TE, p. 9). The project also led to AMP's creation, but this document is now out of date (TE, p. 10). The project also produced several studies that can be built on for future actions, such as establishing baselines for monitoring local primate populations, biological systems and forest resource use by local economic actors (TE, p. 5).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The poor performance of the CCDC component seems to have increased resentment against the Reserve among the local communities. Promised local projects to promote socioeconomic development were never adopted or were canceled before completion, which served to increase local resentment. Canceling the voluntary resettlement program after families had already made plans to move also further increased local resentment. There is currently a court case challenging the Reserve's right to exist was pending as of the TE's writing, though it is unclear if this project was a catalyst for the case (TE, pp. 7-9, 46).

Increased Reserve security may have actually increased the rate of environmental degradation since local economic actors were now free to harvest resources from areas where they were previously too scared to venture (TE, p. 6).

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

There have been no GEF initiatives taken to scale due to this project.

## 9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

### **Project Design:**

- Local communities will not support projects that do not take their interests to heart, especially when their socioeconomic development concerns are secondary to the environmental concerns. To put it bluntly, treating people like they are the impediment to achieving environmental goals will make them into adversaries.
- 4 years is insufficient time for a project based on a phased approach, especially when that phased approach requires a high degree of community consultation and consent. In addition, 4 years is an insufficient amount of time to carry out a project where the executing agency has no experience with some of its more complicated aspects, such as resettlement.
- Realistic socioeconomic development initiatives need to be agreed upon before the project's approval. Cost estimates must be realistic and included in the PD.

### **Institutional Experience and Capacity:**

- Institutions can still create and maintain lines of dialogue with local communities even when trust is low.
- Reporting lines must be clear and complementary. When reporting structures are conflicting and confusing, project personnel are unable to make decisions or take action, which delays project execution and hurts project outcomes.
- Project disbursement schedules need to account for executing agencies' actual institutional capacities, including the strength of their accounting departments.
- Shifting the project's focus almost entirely onto an expensive resettlement plan may have set a bad precedent, especially given the amount of compensation initially offered. The amount of compensation would offered would likely be too much for local government agencies to pay. However, once the precedent had been established, local residents who had been asked to be resettled would likely expect that same amount of compensation.

### **Inter-Institutional Coordination:**

- If the World Bank or the executing agency contracts out critical project tasks to a third party (such as Research and Monitoring being contracted out to the NMK), then the lines of communication and collaboration need to be clear and realistic ahead of time. The Project Steering Committee needs to be functional throughout the project's life to overcome any related bottlenecks.

**Bank-GEF Coordination:**

- According to the TE, “Conflict can arise when the Bank (as implementing agency) must follow its internal operational policies and procedures when it comes to issues like resettlement, and GEF (as the source of funding) chooses to not finance the implementation activities necessary for compliance with Bank policies” (TE, p. 15).

**9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.**

The TE does not include a separate “Recommendations” section, perhaps due to the fact the project was terminated before completion, so little to no work would be carried out relevant to this project. The TE was pessimistic over KWS's ability to carry out even its modest transitional activities. However, the following recommendations can be inferred from the “Lessons Learned” section and the TE's body:

- The AMP must be updated to deal with the current reality on the ground, including accounting for the fact that the resettlement program had been canceled.
- KWS will need additional financing to make sure that they can support those families who receive a LOA and still want to relocate are able to do so.
- KWS will need to develop an effective communications strategy to explain the steps and implications of the project's end to relevant stakeholders. This was supposed to be part of the project's exit strategy, but this was not accomplished.

## 10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE is thorough in its assessment of the project's components' outcomes and impacts. In particular, the TE does a good job of showing how shortcomings in one component caused problems in the other components.	<b>S</b>
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The TE is largely consistent. The only slight drawbacks are that the TE could have been clearer on 1) what parts of the M&E design process were inadequate and which parts were completed (considering that the MTR was carried out) and 2) the explicit differences between the original timeline, the proposed timeline with all of the proposed extensions included and the actual timeline, including the project's early termination.	<b>MS</b>
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The TE thoroughly shows that the project sustainability was low across several dimensions and that required exit strategy tasks had been left incomplete.	<b>S</b>
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons learned are consistent with the body of the TE. This section could have included an analysis of how to overcome the problem of attracting high-quality personnel to a low-prestige post without undermining the executing agency's salary schedule, but the TE states earlier that this contradiction may not be able to be fixed satisfactorily.	<b>S</b>
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	Annex 2 is "Project Costs and Financing." It shows the difference between expected and actual expenditures on different project components, as well as spending on different parts of the project (such as equipment, relocation, etc.). This second part could have gone into more detail since a number of categories have vague titles like "Civil Works" and "Operating Costs."	<b>MS</b>
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	The TE shows that the M&E design was inadequate. However, this section is still somewhat confusing as it is not clear which particular parts of the M&E process had been designed and approved on time (possibly the MTR design) and which had not.	<b>MS</b>
<b>Overall TE Rating</b>		<b>S</b>

Overall TE rating:  $(0.3 * (5+4)) + (0.1 * (5+5+4+4)) = 2.7 + 1.8 = 4.5 = \text{Satisfactory}$

**11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).**

Project Document (PD)

Mid-Term Review (MTR)

(The TE's "Annex 7: List of Supporting Documents" is mislabeled, as this section is actually the Aide Memoire.)