

GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form

1. PROJECT DATA				
			Review date:	23-Oct-06
GEF Project ID:	55		<u>at endorsement</u> (Million US\$)	<u>at completion</u> (Million US\$)
IA/EA Project ID:		GEF financing:	7.0 (additional \$0.9M as PRIF support)	5.66
Project Name:	West Africa Pilot Community-Based Natural resource Management project (GEPRENAF)	IA/EA own:		
Country:	Republic of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso	Government:		
		Other*:		
		Total Cofinancing	6.19	3.83
Operational Program:	1	Total Project Cost:	14.09	9.49
IA	World Bank	<u>Dates</u>		
Partners involved:	Belgium	Work Program date		12/01/1992
		CEO Endorsement		09/14/1995
		Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		05/06/1996
		Closing Date	Proposed: 12/31/2003	Actual: 06/30/2004
Prepared by: Divya Nair	Reviewed by: Neeraj Negi	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing: 91 months	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing: 97 months	Difference between original and actual closing: 6 months
Author of TE: Tanya Yudelman		TE completion date: 06/30/05	TE submission date to GEF OME: 9/21/2005	Difference between TE completion and submission date: 3 months

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS

GEF EO Ratings for project impacts (if applicable), outcomes, project monitoring and evaluation, and quality of the terminal evaluation: Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S), Moderately Satisfactory (MS), Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU), Unsatisfactory (U), Highly Unsatisfactory (HU), not applicable (N/A) and unable to assess (U/A). GEF EO Ratings for the project sustainability: Highly likely (HL), likely (L), moderately likely (ML), moderately unlikely (MU), unlikely (U), highly unlikely (HU), not applicable (N/A), and unable to assess (U/A).

Please refer to document "Ratings for the achievement of objectives, sustainability of outcomes and impacts, quality of terminal evaluation reports and project M&E systems" for further definitions of the ratings.

	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	Other IA evaluations if applicable (e.g.	GEF EO

			IEG)	
2.1 Project outcomes		U	U	MU
2.2 Project sustainability	N/A	U	U	U
2.3 Monitoring and evaluation				MU
2.4 Quality of the evaluation report	N/A	N/A	S	S

Should this terminal evaluation report be considered a good practice? Why?

The TE is clear and candid.

Is there a follow up issue mentioned in the TE such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, etc.?

No.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES, EXPECTED AND ACTUAL OUTCOMES

3.1 Project Objectives

- **What are the Global Environmental Objectives? Any changes during implementation?**

The stated objective, as per the PAD is “to introduce a new approach to biodiversity conservation in West Africa which aims to find a common solution to both development and conservation concerns by involving local communities in the sustainable, profitable exploitation of wild resources and assisting them to manage their wildland areas for their own economic benefit and for the benefit of biodiversity.” (PAD)

- **What are the Development Objectives? Any changes during implementation?**

- **The Objective:**

According to the TE: The Project’s development objective (PDO) was: “to introduce a new approach to biodiversity conservation in West Africa which aims to find a common solution to both development and conservation concerns by involving local communities in the sustainable, profitable exploitation of wild resources and assisting them to manage their wild land areas for their own economic benefit and for the benefit of biodiversity.”

The TE also records four specific objectives that are indicated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD):

(i) to strengthen capacity of the local communities, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Government to manage wild plant and animal resources in a sustainable manner; (ii) to improve the management and use of habitat and wildlife populations at each site; (iii) to improve local land management practices and infrastructure; and (iv) to establish a durable system for monitoring and evaluating project implementation and impact. (TE, pp2)

- **Confusion on the objectives** of this project is reported in the TE and the *IEG TE-Review* report (TE, pp3):

The PDO is a composite of biodiversity conservation, local development, participatory method, and economic objectives, which raise question as to its core objective. This ambiguity is compounded by the use of two different PDO wordings within the PAD. The PDO was rephrased during a logframe workshop held soon after project effectiveness in 1996, as follows: “to establish the basis for the sustainable and participatory management of the land and its natural resources in the project area”. The new PDO thus reduced expectations in terms of biodiversity conservation, and placed greater emphasis on the broader aspects of land and natural resources management. Although used by the implementing teams, this reformulated PDO was never formally adopted by the World Bank.

3.2 Outcomes and Impacts

- **What were the major project outcomes and impacts, as described in the TE?**

As described in the TE and IEG TE-Review major outcomes include:

Overall achievement of the PDO and its four specific objectives, assessed jointly for Burkina Faso and Cote

d'Ivoire include:

- 1) *Introducing a new approach to biodiversity conservation in West Africa.* The project introduced a new approach and this approach was spread into the strategies of the two countries and elsewhere. The IEG TE-Review rated it as substantial, though it raised concerns over the sustainability of this objective.
- 2) *Local level capacity:* The project succeeded in establishing local inter-village institutional mechanisms that involve communities in the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Local level capacity building, through training and participatory planning, has made communities increasingly aware of their rights and responsibilities to manage local resources in a different way, and has helped them understand the *modern* legal and economic values of natural resources. The project built on and strengthened existing community institutions. AGEREFs and inter-village development committees complement village level capacity by providing a framework for neighboring villages to work together, and a nascent capacity to manage protected areas and local development activities. This progress is noted in the light of “extremely low initial community capacity” as per the TE (pp 11)
- 3) While the project has put in place a framework at the local and national level that increases the likelihood of biodiversity conservation in the future. Yet, as reported in the TE, capacity building is insufficient to ensure sustainability and the game ranching model has not worked. The economic returns from wildlife management at Project completion did not provide an ongoing incentive structure to support these conservation efforts in the future, nor to independently sustain the socio-economic infrastructures established by the Project. (TE, 15)

4. GEF OFFICE OF M&E ASSESSMENT

4.1 Outcomes

A Relevance	Rating: S
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In retrospect, were the project’s outcomes consistent with the focal areas/operational program strategies? Explain 	
<p>The project targeted the Comoé ecosystem, which straddles Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire and is one of West Africa's most diverse and threatened ecosystems. The timing of the intervention was highly relevant because river blindness disease (<i>Onchocerciasis</i>) had recently been eradicated from the Comoé ecosystem, putting it at risk of in-migration and uncontrolled development leading to land conflicts. The project intervened in three sites of global importance for their biodiversity: Diéfoula in southern Burkina Faso, and Warigué and Monts Tingui in northern Cote d'Ivoire. Diéfoula and Warigué are contiguous. (TE, pp2)</p> <p>The northern Comoe is one of the largest and most biologically diverse ecosystems in West Africa. The project aims to contribute to the conservation of a rich West African ecosystem by developing a profitable and sustainable model for community-based natural resources utilization. It falls under OP1.</p>	
B Effectiveness	Rating: MU
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are the project outcomes as described in the TE commensurable with the expected outcomes (as described in the project document) and the problems the project was intended to address (i.e. original or modified project objectives)? 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Institutional development:</i> the project built on and strengthened existing community institutions. AGEREFs and inter-village development committees complement village level capacity by providing a framework for neighboring villages to work together, and a nascent capacity to manage protected areas and local development activities. The project has also significantly influenced trends in institutional management of protected areas at the national level. In both countries, emerging national policies and legislation now clearly recognize and support the development of community institutions for the management of wildlife areas (TE, pp11). However, the effectiveness in Burkina faso for example, was constrained since though commitment was clear at the policy level, ‘buy-in’ and pro-active implementation support at the operational level was more limited (TE, pp18). 	

- Both the human and institutional technical “*capacity to manage wild plant and animal resources in a sustainable manner*” has been considerably strengthened. However, the project did not succeed in establishing the financial revenue streams necessary to sustain these management activities, or in demonstrating that such a potential exists (TE, pp7). The expectation was that management and sustainable use of wild resources would generate substantial income, which in turn would provide a strong incentive for communities to commit to conservation; this was “clearly not met.”(TE, pp6)
- “*Improved management of the habitat and wildlife populations at each site*” is likely if judged by the project’s creation of and implementation of management activities in three biodiversity and sustainable use zones. Unfortunately, the true impact of these activities cannot be judged due to the poor selection and execution of the ecological impact indicators. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that threats from poaching in and livestock encroachment on the wildlife zones may have been increasing prior to Project closure (TE, pp7).
- “*Improved local land management practices and infrastructure*” is difficult to assess. Alternative production technologies were piloted and their dissemination was initiated; new social infrastructure was constructed. However, the rate of uptake of the new technologies, and the impact of the social infrastructure were not documented by the Project (TE, pp7).
- “*Establish a durable monitoring and evaluation system for implementation and impact.*” Overall project reporting was effective. Financial management and procurement tracking systems functioned well, and project implementation and institutional impact monitoring, albeit not in line with the target formats defined in the PAD, was clear. In contrast, monitoring and evaluation of socioeconomic and ecological impacts was weak. (TE, pp7)

C Efficiency (cost-effectiveness)**Rating: U**

- 4) Include an assessment of outcomes and impacts in relation to inputs, costs, and implementation times based on the following questions: Was the project cost – effective? How does the cost-time Vs. outcomes compare to other similar projects? Was the project implementation delayed due to any bureaucratic, administrative or political problems and did that affect cost-effectiveness?**

According to both the TE and IEG TE-Review :

- Originally planned as a six year project, the project took eight years due to an **over-optimistic ambitious time frame**, implementation problems mainly in the institutional area, and civil strife in Cote d'Ivoire. Also, the expectations of revenue to communities generated by wildlife utilization were highly optimistic, and not realized. (TE, pp16)
- Management efficiency was very poor, the ICR shows (p14) that the Project Coordination Unit used an **inordinate amount of resources** to the detriment of field activities. Project management costs jumped from being an already quite high 31% of total costs at appraisal to being a huge 77% of actual total costs at closing. As a result, the rate of expenditures on Component 4, Project Management, was 250% greater than expected, while the rate of expenditures Component 2, Wildlife and Habitat Management, was only 20% of the amount expected.
- **No economic analysis was carried out**, but the fact that a central objective was to seek the profitable exploitation of wildland resources for beneficiaries and that this did not occur, suggests also an unsatisfactory efficiency performance. In a pilot project some allowance must be made on efficiency since experiments cannot all succeed. However, in this case, the stand-alone economics of wildlife for communities seems to have been questionable from the outset which weakens any experiment argument on efficiency. The TE raises methodological issues regarding the reliability and relevance of the biodiversity data collected, most particularly the type of survey used, its seasonal timing, the capacity of the persons involved in the surveys, the high standard deviation of the data, and the possibility of seasonal movements of wildlife.
- **Institutional capacity and commitment:** Frequent ministerial reorganizations, and the concomitant changes in staffing were detrimental to the project. During its 7.5 years, the project in Cote d'Ivoire was headed by no less than 5 different ministries. Similarly, the National Steering

Committee representatives kept changing, and did not provide the expected project leadership role. Forest and protected area management functions were also eventually split between two ministries, with a negative impact on the collaborative surveillance arrangements between the Comoé National Park and the Forest Rangers from the *Cantonnement de Ferkessedougou*. The government's lack of commitment to implement the 1994 repeal of the ban on hunting prevented exploring of one of the main hoped for sources of wildlife revenue flows. (TE, pp12)

- **Project preparation was inefficient:** The TE also notes that an enormous quantity of information and analysis was produced during project preparation. While this provided the background to the approval of the GEF and Belgium government finance, there was an over-abundance of technical information and little was subsequently used. (TE, pp16)

Impacts

5) Has the project achieved impacts or is it likely that outcomes will lead to the expected impacts?

The project has put in place a framework at the local and national level that increases the likelihood of biodiversity conservation in the future. Yet, as reported in the TE, capacity building is insufficient to ensure sustainability and the game ranching model work. The economic returns from wildlife management at Project completion did not provide an ongoing incentive structure to support these conservation efforts in the future, nor to independently sustain the socio-economic infrastructures established by the Project. (TE, 15)

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE.

A Financial resources	Rating: ML
<p>As per the TE “external support will be required if Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and the international community wish to see the continued existence of project conservation areas and their biodiversity.” As per the TE, there are good indications that this commitment exists.</p> <p>In parallel with GEPRENAF, both countries have pursued policy, legislative and institutional measures to improve biodiversity conservation efforts. There has also been specific support for community involvement in conservation with national level programs being developed that build on the lessons learned from GEPRENAF (rather than simply replicating it) and extending the community-based wildlife management approach more broadly. In Burkina Faso, the PAGEN and CBRDP are already under implementation, providing a mechanism for the consolidation of GEPRENAF achievements. In Cote d’Ivoire, adoption of the NEAP in 1996, preparation of a National Park and Reserve Management Strategy in 1995, the Declaration of Forest Policy Year, and the adoption of the Park and Reserve Financing Law in 2002, all served as the foundation for a national program, the PCGAP, which would put in place the institutional, legal and policy framework needed to support community-based biodiversity management efforts in the country. Unfortunately advances in these areas were interrupted by the resumption of the conflict in November 2004. (TE, pp15)</p> <p>Also, the TE reports that while less concern is reported over Burkina Faso, for Cote d’Ivoire, lack of community-level procurement and financial management guidelines (with the civil war) are concerns for future financial sustainability, along with systematically late approval of the state budget and related delays in counterpart funding, and centralization of project financial management under SIGFIP in 1998. (TE, pp14)</p>	
B Socio political	Rating: MU
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of commitment: Despite the civil conflict, in Cote d’Ivoire, the TE notes strong commitment and a proactive attitude by the Project Coordination team based in the Department for Nature Protection, in Abidjan, as well as by project staff in the field, and often by the communities themselves. This enabled the project to confront, mitigate and overcome several of the problems that arose during implementation, including those beyond their direct control such as the civil 	

<p>conflict. (TE, pp13)</p> <p>This willingness of national governments to be proactive significantly contributed to the project's progress. In Burkina Faso, the central government – led by the Ministry of Environment and Water - supported the implementation of a number of innovative institutional and legal measures, which enabled the status of protected areas to be changed so that a local communities' institution, in this case the AGEREF, can become the concessionaire of the area. (TE, pp12)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A transboundary agreement between Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire on GEPRENAF was drafted and agreed in principle in 1994. It would have covered cooperation on anti-poaching activities, bushfire management, and ecological monitoring. In spite of regular technical meetings between the Cote d'Ivoire and the Burkina GEPRENAF teams during project implementation, the agreement was not signed. It now has been postponed indefinitely because of the civil conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. (TE, pp11) <p>However,</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PAD (pp18) identifies numerous risks related to socio-political factors, the TE is weak on clarifying to what extent these were directly addressed. The first is uncontrolled migration. Second, are risks associated with the lack of incentives to manage the wildlife zones, which the project was unable to mitigate to the extent anticipated in the PAD. These include the monopolization of project benefits by groups or individuals and lack of inter-community cooperation, and the risk of waning local interest if the communities do not get immediate benefits from project operations. (IEG_TE Review) 	
C Institutional framework and governance	Rating: U
<p>The TE rates both overall government performance and implementing agency performance as unsatisfactory, indicating that the institutional framework poses a risk to sustainability of outcomes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National and local support and changes: A fundamental divergence is noted between the overall, highly positive support given to GEPRENAF by the Directorate General for Water and Forestry (DGEF) in terms of policy and strategy, and the unhelpful, at times obstructive, behavior of its regional and provincial directorates. Their negative reaction was due, in part, to the nature of the project, which aimed to delegate part of their responsibilities to communities and to private sector operators. The DGEF should have corrected the situation, since Regional or Provincial Directorate of Water and Forestry (DREEF and DPEEF) are under its direct control. (TE, pp13) • The future of the inter-village development committees and the AGEREFs within the broader national decentralization processes is deemed as questionable by the TE. Decentralization is still debated in both Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, and the outcome will likely be subjected to political priorities. (TE, pp11) • In <u>Cote d'Ivoire</u>, the central government undertook a number of policy, institutional and legal actions, as well as its future extension as part of PCGAP. These included: approval of the NEAP and its related Nature Protection Strategy (1996); adoption of the Declaration of Forest Policy (1999); and most critically the adoption of the Park and Reserve Management and Financing Law (2002). New laws on decentralization (1995) and land tenure (1998) were also voted. (TE, pp12). In <u>Burkina Faso</u>, the core project activities have been actively taken over by two new national projects; the Partnership for Natural Ecosystem Management Project (PAGEN) and the follow-on project for the community-based land management project (PNGT). These two substantial GEF and IDA-supported national operations provide the financial and institutional basis for the continuation of the work in the Comoé-Léraba reserve and surrounding villages. The design of PAGEN draws heavily on the experience of GEPRENAF. In Cote d'Ivoire, however, civil conflict puts the sustainability in jeopardy. (TE, pp16) 	
D Environmental	Rating: MU
<p>It seems clear that the project has put in place a framework at the local and national level that greatly</p>	

increases the likelihood of biodiversity conservation in the future. Nevertheless, two underlying risks as per the TE (pp15) are (1) Capacity building is insufficient to ensure sustainability and (2) The game ranching model might not work.

Provide only ratings for the sustainability of outcomes based on the information in the TE:

A	Financial resources	Rating: U
B	Socio political	Rating: MU
C	Institutional framework and governance	Rating: U
D	Environmental	Rating: MU

4.3 Catalytic role

1. Production of a public good

According to TE

- The **social infrastructure** that was built will serve as public good – includes 2 dispensaries and nurses' houses, 8 schools and teachers' houses, 2 adult literacy centers, and 4 wells with pumps etc.
- Knowledge gained about **alternative production techniques** for honey, yam and improved stoves etc.
- The establishment of **the bio-monitoring system**, and wildlife surveys may continue in Cote d'Ivoire, where the GIS database was protected and hidden by the communities during the conflict, later to be transferred to the *Centre National de Télédétection et d'Information Géographique*. Continued development of the database is included under the PCGAP. However in Burkina Faso, the GIS database was transferred to the provincial forestry service where it is unlikely to be adequately maintained.(TE, pp9)

2. Demonstration The project has already had and will most likely continue to have a strong positive and **long-lasting effect on how biodiversity is managed in both countries**. It seems clear that the project has put in place a framework at the local and national level that greatly increases the likelihood of biodiversity conservation in the future. Both countries have pursued policy, legislative and institutional measures to improve biodiversity conservation efforts. There has also been specific support for community involvement in conservation with national level programs being developed that build on the lessons learned from GEPRENAF (rather than simply replicating it) and extending the community-based wildlife management approach more broadly. TE (pp15)

3. Replication

4. Scaling up

4.4 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

A. In retrospect, was the M&E plan at entry practicable and sufficient? (Sufficient and practical indicators were identified, timely baseline, targets were created, effective use of data collection, analysis systems including studies and reports, and practical organization and logistics in terms of what, who, when for the M&E activities)

Rating: U

The importance of a good M&E system for this Pilot project was emphasized from the inception, in the PAD (PAD, pp 15)

Yet, the indicators were unclear: These concerns start from lack of clarity in the PDO, which led to its informal reformulation after effectiveness in which the emphasis on biodiversity conservation was much reduced. This lack of clarity was reinforced by a second, related weakness at appraisal, the failure to agree upon a set of quantified key performance indicators (KPIs) for measuring project impact; this despite an extremely detailed analysis of the monitoring and evaluation needs of the project, including identification of an indicative list of unquantified baseline indicators. Although these were subsequently developed during the 1996 logframe workshop, their definition varies between sites

<p>and over time, the results were poorly adapted to measuring biodiversity conservation impact and the improvements in quality of life, and undermine evaluation of the project's achievements.(TE, pp5)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Further, The PAD did not provide baselines or targets for indicators.
<p>B. Did the project M&E system operate throughout the project? How was M&E information used during the project? Did it allow for tracking of progress towards projects objectives? Did the project provide proper training for parties responsible for M&E activities to ensure data will continue to be collected and used after project closure?</p> <p>Rating: MU</p> <p>Monitoring and evaluation of implementation was relatively well performed, however, the original selection of indicators was weak and did not do justice to the project. A decision taken to dispense with aerial surveys as part of the ecological monitoring greatly weakened the evaluation of project impact vis-à-vis biodiversity (TE, pp13)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indicators were not consistently tracked during implementation, making it very difficult to objectively evaluate project performance and impact. • Failure to analyze the data in an ecosystem context renders it hard to draw conclusions from the data gathered. Although the PAD recognizes that sites are part of the greater Comoé ecosystem and explicitly indicates that monitoring and evaluation of population dynamics should be coordinated with that of the adjacent Comoé National Park, its design did not ensure that this coordination took place. In consequence, the large ungulates observed in the three pilot sites were treated as separate and distinct populations for ecological monitoring and thus for determining hunting quotas. These sites are buffer zones to the Comoé National Park. It is highly likely that large ungulates observed in the project sites: (i) move seasonally over a much larger area, and (ii) disperse from the Comoé National Park outwards. Any conclusion regarding population dynamics should have been based on an assessment of the entire Comoé ecosystem, rather than limited to the project areas. (TE p5) • As per the TE itself, the project did not monitor in either country the impact of investments on school enrolment, health, food security or income. Nevertheless, the Beneficiary Assessment conducted in Cote d'Ivoire found that 80% of communities and individuals who benefited from project interventions perceived project activities as having improved their well being and their prospects for a better quality of life. (TE, p 14) Full feasibility studies and business plan exercises to assess the true income generating potential of ecotourism and safari hunting as well as for other potential activities such as shea nut exploitation, were not conducted during project implementation. (TE, pp19) • The selected indicators do not do full justice to the project. Although local capacity for monitoring wildlife has improved, the project did not provide a sound basis for tracking ecological change over time, nor for setting hunting quotas as had been intended. Similarly, socioeconomic output and impact monitoring was beset with problems. The PAD stated that the Project was to track trends in family income in project and non-project areas. This target was reduced during implementation due to cost concerns, and limited to tracking the revenues from sustainable use activities promoted under the project. Even so, failure to agree on a methodology and poor supervision of consultants by IUCN meant that three years into project the baseline socioeconomic data had not yet been collected. (TE, pp7)
<p>C. Was M&E sufficiently budgeted and was it properly funded during implementation?</p> <p>Rating: U/A</p>
<p>Can the project M&E system be considered a good practice?</p> <p>No.</p>

4.5 Lessons

Project lessons as described in the TE

What lessons mentioned in the TE that can be considered a good practice or approaches to avoid and could have application for other GEF projects?

As summarized in the IEG TER-Review, the TE contains lessons, including the following (summarized by IEG):

1. The **importance of realism** about natural resource management and biodiversity benefit streams. There are high risks in a local population not seeing tangible benefits soon enough from natural resource management. An aspect of this is the need to understand the potential development/biodiversity conflicts and that “rural development does not necessarily provide a healthy or sustainable incentive for conservation”.
2. The **importance of partnership with government**, NGOs, and the private sector given the low capacity at community level in the challenging task of protected area management. This project substantially by-passed important government and other actors in its single-minded pursuit of community involvement. Moreover, the private sector is usually most proficient at assessing and managing revenue generating activities.
3. The **importance of wildlife management skills** and the injection of the accumulated experience and associated technologies (e.g. radio/GPS, population counting), including understanding the skills and challenge of poaching control. Modern wildlife management is a complex and highly technical operation calling for experienced professionals.
4. One additional lesson, as per IEG. The need for **formal adoption by the Bank/GEF of any proposed new Project Development Objectives and a reassessment**, at that time, of the implications of that change for project design. Simply changing the focus of an objectives statement over the top of a set design risks a disconnect which is likely to become increasingly apparent as the project unfolds.

4.6 Quality of the evaluation report Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to the “Criteria for the assessment of the quality of terminal evaluation reports” in the document “Ratings for the achievement of objectives, sustainability of outcomes and impacts, quality of terminal evaluation reports and project M&E systems” for further definitions of the ratings.

4.6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings

In some cases the GEF Evaluation Office may have independent information collected for example, through a field visit or independent evaluators working for the Office. If additional relevant independent information has been collected that affect the ratings of this project, included in this section. This can include information that may affect the assessment and ratings of sustainability, outcomes, project M&E systems, etc.

4.6.2 Quality of terminal evaluation report : The TE is clear and well-argued though constrained by lack of data. As also noted by IEG, given the model of community based land management and game ranching for this project the TE lacks a “discussion of the strengths and weaknesses in the participatory processes themselves, including their poverty focus, interaction with local government, elite capture, and exit strategies weakens the learning contribution.” . Also, the PAD raises concern over a number of risks, particularly in-migration due to the eradication of River-blindness in the region, that are not addressed in the TE.	Ratings
A. Does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	S
B. Is the report internally consistent, is the evidence complete/convincing and are the IA ratings substantiated?	S
C. Does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy?	S

D. Are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	S
E. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	MS
F. Does the report present an assessment of project M&E systems?	MS

4.7 Is a technical assessment of the project impacts described in the TE recommended? Please place an "X" in the appropriate box and explain below.

Yes:	No:X
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Explain:

4.8 Sources of information for the preparation of the TE-Review in addition to the TE (if any)

PAD, 1995; PIR, 2004
