

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Independent Evaluation Office, APR 2015

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		57	
GEF Agency project ID		6108	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		Biodiversity Conservation	
Country/Countries		Bolivia	
Region		LAC	
Focal area		Biodiversity	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		NA	
Executing agencies involved		National Directorate for Conservation of Biodiversity (later known as the National Areas Protected Service- SERNAP) and the National Environment Fund (FONAMA)	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Not specified	
Private sector involvement		Not specified	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		December 10, 1992	
Effectiveness date / project start		July 13, 1993	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		June 30, 1998 ¹	
Actual date of project completion		December 31, 1998	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	.04	.04
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		4.5	4.39
Co-financing	IA own		
	Government		
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	3.85	3.85
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		4.54	4.43
Total Co-financing		3.85	3.85
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		8.39	8.28
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		June 29, 2001	
Author of TE		Elizabeth Monosowski (Team Leader)	
TER completion date		May 12, 2016	
TER prepared by		Laura Nissley	
TER peer review by (if GEF IEO review)		Molly Watts	

¹ Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review, pg. 1.

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF IEO Review
Project Outcomes	UA	S	MS	MS
Sustainability of Outcomes		L	UA	ML
M&E Design		NR	NR	MS
M&E Implementation		NR	NR	UA
Quality of Implementation		S	S	MS
Quality of Execution		S	S	MS
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report		---	U	MU

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The Project Document does not directly state the Global Environmental Objectives of the project. However, the objective of the project was to “help ensure the protection of representative samples of some of Bolivia’s most diverse and threatened ecosystems” (PD pg. 3). This would be achieved by helping to convert Bolivia’s “paper parks” into “real ones.” At the time of the project design, nearly 10% of the Bolivia’s surface area had been set aside in 31 National Parks, Wildlife Reserves or Biological Reserves, however not all of these protected areas were operational (PD pg. 1).

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The Project Document does not directly state the Development Objectives of the project. However, the Project Document does indicate that the project would strengthen the Government of Bolivia’s institutional capability to protect biodiversity. The integrated protected areas system would involve local and indigenous communities and institutions, with the intention of increasing local responsibility for the management of buffer zones and protected areas (PD pg. 3).

The Project Document noted three major project components²:

- **Component 1:** Support for the organization, implementation, and follow-up of the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP);
- **Component 2:** Support to existing protected areas and establishment of new priority protected areas; and
- **Component 3:** Alternative management systems of natural resources in buffer zones

Although not included as a “Major Component,” the Project Document also indicated that a strategy for long-term funding of protected areas would be developed (pg. 8).

² The Project Document also outlines two non-project components: (1) monitoring and evaluation; and (2) administrative support to the project coordinating unit.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The Terminal Evaluation (TE)³ elaborates “revised” objectives and components in addition to the “original” objectives and components (pgs. 1-2). This is misleading, as there is no indication in the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review⁴ or the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR)⁵ that the original objectives or components were revised. The “revised objective” is the same objective that is indicated in the Project Document. The “revised components” appear to be what was actually achieved, versus what was expected.

4. GEF IEO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: Satisfactory
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This TER provides a rating of **Satisfactory** for project relevance.⁶ The project was designed during the pilot phase of the GEF Partnership, and therefore, the GEF Operational Programs were not yet applicable. However, the project objectives were consistent with the GEF biodiversity focal area, as conceived under the pilot phase. The project sought to protect areas with globally-important biodiversity and emphasized community participation in the management and protection of these areas, which was consistent with the GEF biodiversity focal area as conceived under the pilot phase (PD pg. 13). Additionally, the project objectives were consistent with Bolivia’s environmental policies, including the Environmental Action Plan and the Forestry Action Plan, both of which highlight biodiversity conservation (PD pg. 2). The project objectives also built upon the Environmental Law which set the broad guidelines and institutional responsibilities for the protection of Bolivia’s threatened ecosystems (PD pg. 2).

³ The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is referenced as the Terminal Evaluation for the purposes of this TER.

⁴ The ICR Review, also known as the Evaluation Summary, is an intermediate World Bank Independent Evaluation Group product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

⁵ The PPAR, prepared by the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank to ensure the integrity of the Bank’s self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank’s work is producing the expected results. The PPAR for this project was prepared in 2002.

⁶ The TE does not provide individual ratings for project relevance, effectiveness, or efficiency.

This TER provides a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory** for project effectiveness. Key outcomes, such as consolidating and strengthening the management of the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP) and establishing new protected areas, were satisfactorily achieved by project end. Other key results, such as enforcement provisions and environmental education and outreach, were not achieved. The piloting of alternative management systems of natural resources in buffer zones also produced mixed results.

In addition to the major components outlined in the Project Document, it was expected that a trust fund would be established to finance the ongoing operating costs of the SNAP. Although the project was not able to establish a viable trust fund by project end, donors did commit \$30 million over ten years to support operating costs.

A summary of the project's achievements, by project component, is provided below:

- **Component 1: Support for the organization, implementation, and follow-up of the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP)**

Expected results under this component included: (1) institutional support provided for managing the SNAP; (2) development of an information system for the SNAP; (3) consolidation of the system of protected areas; (4) training of protected areas personnel; and (5) a program of control and enforcement for the SNAP. By project end, institutional arrangements for managing the SNAP were consolidated under the National Protected Areas Service (SERNAP).⁷ The PPAR notes that by project end the central office had developed the capacity to supervise and coordinate activities across protected areas (pg. 3). A Biodiversity and Parks Management Information System was also developed, connecting 54 computers in 13 protected areas (TE pg. 4; PPAR pg. 4). Additionally, 160 park wardens and 13 directors were trained, exceeding project targets (i.e. 40 mid to high-level park wardens and 60 low-level park wardens) (TE pg. 4). Despite having adequate systems and infrastructure in place, the park wardens did not have a clear legal mandate for enforcement. Provisions for enforcement were included in the draft Biodiversity Conservation Law, however this law had stalled by project end (PPAR pg. 4).

- **Component 2: Support to existing protected areas and establishment of new priority protected areas**

Expected results under this component included: (1) support for coordinating the development of management plans; (2) support to six key existing protected areas (i.e. hire personnel, purchase equipment, and develop infrastructure); (3) establishment of two new areas; and (4) environmental education and extension in and around protected areas. By project end, long-term management plans were finalized for five protected areas and four more were in the final

⁷ The institutional predecessor of SERNAP was the National Directorate for the Conservation of Biodiversity (DNCB) (1993-1998). The Directorate of Biodiversity (DGB) was also created in 1998 to address biodiversity-related issues outside of protected areas (PPAR pg. 2).

stages of completion. Additionally, the project financed the salaries of park guards, provided vehicles, as well as developed a radio communications network and basic infrastructure for park guard stations. As expected, two new protected areas were also established and staffed, covering a total of 5.3 million hectares (TE pg. 4). There is no evidence, however, that environmental education and outreach programs were undertaken.

- Component 3: Alternative management systems of natural resources in buffer zones**
 Expected results under this component included: (1) evaluation of the economic importance of natural resources in the protected areas, and recompilation of traditional knowledge; and (2) development of proposals for pilot projects of species management and in situ conservation of germplasm. The TE is vague regarding the achievement of results under this component. The TE indicates that policies and scientific studies regarding the census, management, and use of wildlife (i.e. crocodiles and vicuña) were developed and pilot management programs were piloted (pg. 6). Additionally, the project made efforts to include local communities in the management of the protected areas, with mixed results. The TE notes that community ownership, perceived and actual benefits, and participation varied by area (pg. 3).

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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This TER provides a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory** for project efficiency. As the PPAR notes, the project resulted in significant improvements to Bolivia’s capacities to protect biodiversity at a relatively low cost (pg. 8). Additionally, the TE notes that the project was flexible in responding to unpredictable events, such as the invasion of areas by commercial forest harvesters; organized union protests over land rights; spontaneous illegal colonization; coca production; and illegal mining in protected areas (pg. 7). However, the TE notes that the project failed to anticipate the institutional weaknesses and instability of National Environment Fund (FONAMA), which was responsible for the financial administration of the project. FONAMA did not have a clear mandate or adequate political support. Over the life of the project, FONAMA was headed by 15 different directors and underwent four significant institutional reorganizations (TE pg. 14). The TE notes that this instability had the “single most debilitating effect on the project rate of execution,” and particularly affected the timely disbursement of grant funds and procurement of goods and services (pg. 8). Other factors affecting project efficiency included the lengthy consultation process with local communities and the excessive cost of the project’s monitoring system (TE pg. 9; PPAR pg. 9).

The TE provides a rating of **Likely** for project sustainability, which this TER downgrades to **Moderately Likely**.

Financial Resources

This TER provides a rating of **Moderately Likely** for the sustainability of financial resources. The Bolivian government's annual budget for the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP) was reduced from \$6 million (1997) to \$4 million (1998), and the project was unable to establish a viable trust fund to sustain the operating costs of the SNAP. By project end, the fund had secured \$6.3 million, significantly short of the targeted \$35 million. Several donors chose not to contribute until the fund established its credibility (TE pg. 11). However, the TE does indicate that donors committed at least \$30 million⁸ in parallel financing to cover future operating costs (pg. 3). Additionally, the TE notes that the Government of Bolivia prepared a GEF proposal for follow-up activities, which was approved in 2001 (pg. 11).

Sociopolitical

This TER provides a rating of **Moderately Likely** for sociopolitical sustainability. The project was able to garner sufficient political support from the Executive Branch and Congress to establish new protected areas (TE pg. 7). On the other hand, political considerations significantly undermined the effectiveness of the National Environment Fund (FONAMA) throughout the life of the project. The PPAR does note that the National Directorate for the Conservation of Biodiversity (DNCB), and its successor, the National Protected Areas Service (SERNAP), were in a better position politically by the end of the project (pg. 10). Additionally, the involvement of local communities in the management of protected areas contributed toward sociopolitical sustainability, although this model was less successful in some areas (TE pg. 3).

Institutional Frameworks and Governance

This TER provides a rating of **Moderately Likely** for institutional frameworks and governance. By project end, the institutional frameworks were in place for a viable SNAP. Moderate risks included the lack of a legal framework for enforcement. Provisions for enforcement were included under the draft Biodiversity Law, however this law had stalled by project end (PPAR pg. 4).

Environmental

The TE does not provide enough information to adequately assess environmental sustainability.

⁸ The TE presents conflicting donor commitments (see page 3 and page 11).

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Actual co-financing materialized at the level expected at project design. The Swiss Development Corporation provided \$3.85 million in co-financing which contributed to the establishment and operation of the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP) for five years (PPAR pg. 7).

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project experienced delays during implementation due to the inefficiencies of the National Environment Fund (FONAMA), which was responsible for the financial administration of the project. In particular, the timely disbursement of grant funds and the procurement of goods and services were affected (TE pg. 8). The project completion date was extended six months, until December 31, 1998. The TE does not indicate the reason for this extension.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

The TE does not directly assess country ownership over the project. The TE does note that although some protected areas were entirely owned by local communities, their acceptance and support for the project varied. The TE attributes this variance to the differences in benefits the local communities had realized by project end (pg. 7). The PPAR also notes that the Government of Bolivia (1993-1997) perceived FONAMA as a "donor's creation that had little relevance to the policy priorities of the administration," which contributed to its inefficiencies and lack of credibility (pg. 9).

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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The TE does not provide a rating for M&E design at entry, while this TER provides a rating of **Moderately Satisfactory**. The Project Document includes a basic results framework outlining the expected objectives, outputs, and activities. The Project Document also provides a separate table of “implementation indicators” for monitoring and evaluating project performance. However, these indicators are activities, rather than SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and timely) indicators. For example, the indicators for the *Consolidation of Protected Area System* are (1) evaluate system, (2) conduct field studies, and (3) consolidate system. The Project Document does note that qualitative indicators will also be used to measure biodiversity conservation, institutional strengthening, community participation, etc., however these are not specified. The Project Document also outlines basic M&E activities, such as ongoing monitoring of indicators, progress reports, supervision visits, and annual evaluations, as well as the responsible parties. A dedicated M&E budget of \$.1 million, or 2.2% of the GEF allocation, is also provided. The Project Document also notes that the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) will provide an additional \$.6 million in co-financing for supervising the M&E process (pg. 10).

6.2 M&E Implementation	Rating: Unable to Assess
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This TER is **Unable to Assess** the quality of M&E implementation over the project’s lifetime. The TE does not provide any information regarding M&E implementation. The PPAR does indicate that an M&E system was in place for at least part of the project’s lifetime. In addition to monitoring project activities, the M&E system was also designed to monitor biodiversity in the protected areas, compliance with international agreements signed by Bolivia, and economic activities in and around the protected areas. The system contained a number of flaws (i.e. incompatibility with other systems, complex software, and untrained staff), and by September 1998 it was no longer operational. However, this TER does not have enough information to assess the quality of *project-specific* M&E while the system was operational.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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The TE provides a rating of **Satisfactory** for World Bank Performance, which this TER adjusts to **Moderately Satisfactory** for quality of project implementation. The project design was comprehensive and accurately anticipated the need for legal reform, strengthened citizen participation, increased management capacity, and long-term financial sustainability. The PPAR does notes moderate weaknesses in the project’s design, including (1) underestimating the time required to establish and develop the National System of Protected Areas (SNAP); (2) failure to budget for travel costs of local participants; and (3) underestimating the complexities and costs associated with legal reform (pg. 10). The TE also notes that World Bank did not fully anticipate the technical expertise and costs associated with establishing and managing a trust fun. On the other hand, both the PPAR and the TE note the high quality of Work Bank supervision throughout the project’s lifetime. The TE notes that World Bank assisted with resolving budget and financial issues, in addition to identifying appropriate technical assistance (pg. 13). The PPAR also notes that the World Bank used its influence to prevent the politicization of the National Directorate for the Conservation of Biodiversity (DNCB), which helped to ensure its credibility with the donor community (pg. 11).

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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The TE provides a rating of **Satisfactory** for Borrower Performance, which this TER adjusts to **Moderately Satisfactory** for quality of project execution. The executing agency for the project was the National Directorate for Conservation Biodiversity (DNCB). In 1998, the new Bolivian government transformed the DNCB into the National Protected Areas Service (SERNAP). The National Environmental Fund (FONAMA) was responsible for the financial administration of the project. As noted above, FONAMA was highly unstable and underwent numerous changes in leadership throughout the life of the project. The TE notes that this affected the timely disbursement of grant funds and procurement of goods and services (pg. 8). Additionally, donors halted donations to the trust fund due to skepticism over FONAMA’s ability to raise money and manage the fund (TE pg. 12). On the other hand, the same team remained in charge of the project for the first five years of implementation (1993-1997) and there was very little staff turnover among the directors of the protected areas. The PPAR notes that as a result, a decentralized administration capacity was developed, including a cadre of well-trained staff capable of addressing complex issues in the protected areas (pg. 11).

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

By project end, two new protected areas were established, covering a total of 5.3 million hectares (TE pg. 4).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The TE does not cite any socioeconomic changes that occurred by the end of the project.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

By project end, 160 park wardens and 13 directors were trained, equipped, and assigned to 12 protected areas. A Biodiversity and Parks Management Information System was also developed, connecting 54 computers in 13 protected areas (TE pg. 4; PPAR pg. 4). The PPAR also notes that the National Directorate for the Conservation of Biodiversity (DNCB)’s central office had developed the capacity to supervise and coordinate activities in protected areas by project end (pg. 3).

b) Governance

The TE notes the following policies and regulations developed under the project: (1) policies and procedures regarding community involvement in decision making on issues relating to the parks; (2) specifications for buildings and infrastructure for protected areas; (3) hiring and promotion guidelines for protected areas staff; (4) guidelines and procedures for financial management; (5) policies on genetic resources and wildlife; and (6) classification of protected areas (pg. 4).

Additionally, the PPAR notes that the project financed the formation and strengthening of 12 protected areas management committees that include the participation of local communities living in the parks or surrounding areas. The committees review the implementation of the protected areas' annual operational plan and monitor park management, as well as participate in the selection of park guards (pg. 5).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The TE does not cite any unintended impacts that occurred by the end of the project.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The TE notes that a follow-up project, Sustainability of the National System of Protected Areas, was approved in 2001. The TE notes that the project will focus on "consolidating the core functions of the NSPA, including appropriate policies, regulations, incentive structures, adequate funding and institutional strengthening" (pg. 11).

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The TE provides the following lessons learned (pgs. 14-15):

- **Expansion of a NSPA:** Before fostering the expansion of a national system of protected areas, a core of well run, adequately functioning areas should be in place. Moreover, expansion should be based in the context of a national biodiversity policy and strategy, recognizing the limitation of available financial resources and the capacity to enforce protection in the existing areas.

- **Institutional Framework:** A project's design should allow a margin of flexibility to adapt project execution to a new institutional framework as speedily as possible without compromising the original project's objectives. A "politically solvent" institutional framework (meaning one that is not bound to be changed by political interests) is imperative for a project to be successful. This is not easy to have in developing countries with fragile public sector entities subject to be replaced or reorganized whenever there is a change in government authorities. Moreover, when the reshaping of the public sector is as broad as the one that took place in Bolivia in 1993 a covenant in a project legal document requiring prior consultation with the Bank has limited enforcement effect. When a government commits financial resources and designates a technical person with a high political profile to manage a project, the probability of success is high. Lacking any of these elements, prospects are reduced considerably. A corresponding commitment to the renewing of the contracts of technical personnel is also important. Signing authority should ideally be confined to the project accountant and the National Director of Protected Areas. The latter should be selected via open competition. Higher authorities should focus on broad policy issues, and approval of the annual operating plans. In its initial stages the project suffered from having up to 20 authorizations required for simple disbursements.
- **Permanent Staffing:** Successful implementation requires a core of qualified permanent staff by the time the operation is approved or at least the existence of a minimum number authorized positions that can be filled by the time execution starts. While the use of consultants may be a temporary measure to fill staffing gaps or to provide expertise not available in the institution, it should not be utilized as a way to fill line positions on the long term. Similarly, "commitment" to a course of action should be continuous over the course of changes in government. When an incoming government reestablished priorities and strategies without building on the success of previous experience, problems can quickly result and valuable time, efforts and resources are lost.
- **Public Participation:** While public participation is a legal requirement in Bolivia, the difficulty and complexity of dealing with indigenous communities in remote protected areas is often underestimated. Two approaches successfully adopted by the project were: (1) to select the park wardens by and from local communities; and (2) establish PA management committees where some of their members represent the local communities.
- **Sustainability:** Fiduciary Funds require more detailed preparation work and the involvement of qualified experts. Financial sustainability was to have been assured by a fiduciary fund established and managed by FONAMA. However, the project's design failed to identify and anticipate the complexity of such initiative in an institutional environment highly influenced by politics, without expertise in international investments and without the means to pay for such expertise if it became available. In planning for sustainability via a fiduciary fund, more attention should be paid to: (1) the institutional strength and expertise of the executing agency; (2)

constraints of existing laws on the types of investments which can be realized locally and abroad; (3) foreign tax issues for external investments; and (4) the composition of the board that would manage the fund.

- **Management of Protected Areas by NGOs/Communities:** The Project gave credence to the fact that protected areas run by qualified local NGOs and/or indigenous groups were more effectively managed. It was also evident that this is only possible while there is external financing available. When monetary resources become scarce, it is very difficult for these groups to provide their own funds and to maintain any meaningful presence in the area. Additionally, unless the NGO or indigenous group has a member technically qualified and experienced to act as park administrator and unless the group has had some previous experience in managing a protected area, the chances for success would be minimal.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

The TE does not provide recommendations.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF IEO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE does not address the relevant outcomes as laid out in the results framework. The analysis is limited and largely unsupported by evidence.	MU
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	Very little evidence is provided to substantiate ratings. This TER had to rely heavily on the PPAR for its analysis.	U
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The TE provides an adequate assessment of financial and institutional sustainability. Information regarding sociopolitical sustainability can be found elsewhere in the report. More information was needed on environmental sustainability.	MS
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons learned are consistent with the analysis provided in the TE. Recommendations are not provided.	MS
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	Actual project costs and co-financing are provided.	S
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	The TE does not provide any information regarding the project M&E systems.	HU
Overall TE Rating		MU

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review (OEDST, 2001)

Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) (OEDST, 2002)