

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2014

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		594	
GEF Agency project ID		2354	
GEF Replenishment Phase		GEF-2	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		UNDP, UNEP	
Project name		Programme for Phasing out Ozone Depleting Substances	
Country/Countries		Uzbekistan	
Region		ECA	
Focal area		Ozone Depleting Substances	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		n/a	
Executing agencies involved		UNOPS/UNEP	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Not involved.	
Private sector involvement		Sino refrigeration company: beneficiary; about 100 other companies received recovery and recycling equipment	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		1/7/1999	
Effectiveness date / project start		11/3/1999	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		1/31/2002	
Actual date of project completion		12/10/2008	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	0.12	0 according to Trustee
	Co-financing	0	0
GEF Project Grant		3.20	1.68 according to Trustee; 3.20 according to TE
Co-financing	IA own	0	0
	Government	0.03	0.03
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	0	0
	Private sector	0.12	0.12
	NGOs/CSOs	0	0
Total GEF funding		3.32	3.32
Total Co-financing		0.15	0.15
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		3.47	3.47
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		March 2010	
TE submission date			
Author of TE		Dr. Tom Batchelor and Mr. Valery Smirnov	
TER completion date		February 2015	
TER prepared by		Shanna Edberg	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Dania Trespalacios	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	S	n/a*	n/a	S
Sustainability of Outcomes	ML	n/a*	n/a	ML
M&E Design	n/a	n/a*	n/a	U
M&E Implementation	n/a	n/a*	n/a	MS
Quality of Implementation	n/a	n/a*	n/a	U
Quality of Execution	n/a	n/a*	n/a	MS
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	n/a	n/a	n/a	S

*The TE only gives ratings for individual sub-projects and not the project as a whole.

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

This project is part of the international effort to phase out ozone depleting substances, which damage the earth's ozone layer and increase the amount of ultraviolet radiation exposure from the sun. The Montreal Protocol, ratified by Uzbekistan in 1993, is the basis for phasing out ozone-depleting substances. While Uzbekistan does not produce ozone-depleting substances, it imports them from Russia. This project would allow Uzbekistan to transition to other materials and reduce demand for ozone-depleting substances before the production of such substances ends in Russia.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The project consisted of the following four subprojects:

1. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building, including Establishment of the Ozone Office
2. Training of trainers for use of ODS-free refrigerants, including training of custom officers
3. National programme for recovery and recycling of ODS refrigerants
4. Elimination of the use of CFCs in manufacturing of domestic refrigerators at Sino

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

No changes were mentioned in the TE.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: Satisfactory
----------------------	-----------------------------

The GEF Operational Strategy of 1995 defines the GEF’s ozone depletion portfolio to “support activities to phase out ozone-depleting substances that are committed under the Montreal Protocol, with special emphasis on short-term commitments and enabling activities” (GEF/C.6/3, page 77). This project supports an economy in transition in meeting its Montreal Protocol obligations.

The project is also in line with Uzbekistan’s priorities for meeting its treaty obligations. Uzbekistan’s stated priorities for the phase-out of ozone depleting substances is: phase out the consumption of ozone-depleting substances, halons, HCFCs, and methyl bromide; support the conversion of industry to ODS-free technology; develop the legal and regulatory framework to ensure phase-out; establish monitoring and licensing systems for imports and exports; and support scientific research on ozone layer depletion.

4.2 Effectiveness	Rating: Satisfactory
--------------------------	-----------------------------

The project was divided into four subprojects, detailed below. As described below under M&E Design, the project design did not include performance indicators, a log frame, or targets for certain subprojects. Where indicators and targets are present, they are noted. On the whole, the project is rated satisfactory because it met its target for reducing the consumption of 142 ODP-tons in Uzbekistan.

1. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building, including Establishment of the Ozone Office

The TE rated this subproject as highly satisfactory. The project established a National Ozone Unit under the State Committee for Nature Protection two years after the start of the project. The Unit drafted and passed a number of laws, including creating a licensing system, a ban on halon and some CFC imports, quotas and bans for other ozone-depleting substances, taxes on ozone-depleting substances, obligatory certification, qualification requirements, and mandatory importing reports.

The National Ozone Unit also undertook an awareness raising program. The Unit published 25 articles in the media; participated in 15 radios and 18 television shows; delivered 41 lectures that were attended by over a thousand people; distributed 14,000 calendars, a postage stamp, and 4,400 children’s books; staged a children’s play; hosted an ecological festival for 1,100 participants; and arranged other discussions, bulletins, and publications.

The National Ozone Unit prepared and submitted reports to the Montreal Protocol. Customs has intercepted 30 instances of illegal importation of ozone-depleting substances.

2. Training of trainers for use of ODS-free refrigerants, including training of custom officers

The TE rated this subproject as highly satisfactory. 26 refrigeration technicians were trained to become trainers, 6 of whom remained as trainers throughout the duration of the project. 35 courses were then

held to train 853 refrigeration personnel. Training was also offered to customs personnel. 17 customs officers and 13 other government employees were trained as trainers. In a subsequent phase, 331 customs officers and inspectors were trained in 10 courses. The project provided 19 refrigerant identifier machines to Uzbekistan.

3. National programme for recovery and recycling of ODS refrigerants

The TE rated this subproject as satisfactory. The project provided 300 vacuum pumps, 430 recovery units, 12 recovery and recycling machines, and other equipment to 100 companies in Uzbekistan. One of the companies that received the equipment stated that “the tools were not particularly suitable for the work, and the hand-pumps were inefficient and not used as much as the recovery machines. Spare parts were supposed to have been supplied but they did not receive them. Obtaining spare parts...has been impossible, so they cannibalized 16 of the recovery machines to keep the remaining 90 operational” (TE, page 670). The company also noted a lack of disposal facilities for ozone-depleting substances. Some companies reported an increase in business or profitability due to the new equipment. The project target was 92 tons of recovered CFCs per year, but only 83 tons were recovered during the entire duration of the project. No CFCs were recycled due to the aforementioned equipment problems.

4. Elimination of the use of CFCs in manufacturing of domestic refrigerators at Sino

The TE rated this subproject as satisfactory. The subproject eliminated 35 ODP-tons of CFCs by converting the production line to CFC-free technology.

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
----------------	--

The institutional strengthening subproject was delayed by 17 months due to funding issues. There was a lack of understanding between the National Ozone Unit, UNEP, and UNDP over the source of the operational funds and the procedure for transferring funds. Despite this, “a relatively small team in the NOU leveraged national resources to coordinate the reduction and phase out of ODS in a timely manner” (TE, page 656).

For the training subproject, the cost per technician trained was \$112, which “compares favorably with training costs in other countries” (TE, page 660). There was a lag of five years between the train-the-trainers program and the regular training program.

For the recovery and recycling subproject, the cost-effectiveness was determined to be \$88.53 per ODP-kg, or about nine times more expensive than the average for similar projects.

The refrigerator manufacture subproject was delayed by 15 months because of a “delay in signing the sub-project; the theft of the high pressure pipes; delays in local construction works; lack of project management personnel during key parts of the implementation phase” (TE, page 684). The actual cost-effectiveness was \$1011/ODP-kg due to the small number of ODP-free refrigerators produced, which is very poor.

4.4 Sustainability	Rating: Moderately Likely
--------------------	----------------------------------

*Financial: **Moderately likely***; the National Ozone Unit is funded from multiple sources, including the Uzbekistan government, licensing fees for ozone-depleting substances, and project funds. Additional GEF funds were approved for institutional strengthening in Uzbekistan. Training was discontinued after the project ended due to a lack of funding, but the Tashkent State Technical University added the project’s training model to its curriculum. The Uzbekistan government is looking to reduce its share in the SINO refrigeration company.

*Sociopolitical: **Moderately likely***; the TE reports that country commitment to phasing out ozone-depleting substances is very strong. Uzbekistan established an ambitious phase-out schedule, created a framework for coordinating action on ozone, and partnered with multiple public and private stakeholders to implement its ozone strategy. However, there is no current plan to promote alternatives to halon in firefighting activities. The government is currently attempting to form a refrigeration and air-conditioning association, which would assist with training efforts. According to the TE, “despite the high value placed on training of technicians by enterprise managers, there was no stakeholder ownership of the training infrastructure by enterprises that could encourage the delivery of courses for technicians” (TE, page 661).

*Institutional: **Moderately likely***; the National Ozone Unit is a permanent team in the government, and the necessary legislation was passed to reduce and control ozone-depleting substances. The National Ozone Unit passed several laws, including creating a licensing system, a ban on halon and some CFC imports, quotas and bans for other ozone-depleting substances, taxes on ozone-depleting substances, obligatory certification, qualification requirements, and mandatory importing reports. More regulations are currently being drafted. A network of recovery and recycling operations was established, although equipment problems are a significant issue and it is possible that the equipment is nearing the end of its operational life. The National Ozone Unit believes that the penalty for imports of ozone-depleting substances is too low to be a deterrent. There is a need for ODS destruction facilities and procedures. There is currently no system to prove that refrigeration technicians are trained and qualified, although there is legislation proposed to require technicians to be licensed. There remain 450-500 unregistered technicians in Uzbekistan.

*Environmental: **Moderately likely***; according to the TE, “illegal trade in ODS...has the potential to undermine this environmental gain, if it continues to increase. The NOU is seeking funding for additional customs staff to help counter such trade... and for an increase in penalties for illegal imports” (TE, page 645). Lack of ongoing training increases the risk of illegal trade, and interceptions of ozone-depleting substances have been increasing. In 2009, the black market price for CFCs was \$5/kg, which “would suggest that CFCs are still prevalent on the market in Uzbekistan” (TE, page 653).

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The institutional strengthening subproject received \$31,000 from the Uzbekistan government, including in-kind staff time and equipment purchases and upgrades. In addition to this, "the Government has undoubtedly allocated financial resources in support of ozone layer protection. This funding has been important for sustaining the outcome of the sub-projects" (TE, page 654). There was no cofinancing planned for the training subproject or the recovery and recycling subproject. The SINO refrigeration company contributed \$121,830 in kind for the refrigerator manufacture subproject, but the TE does not explain the target of the funds.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Delays were experienced in each of the subprojects. There was a delay of 17 months for the institutional strengthening subproject. According to the TE: "At the beginning of the Project, the NOU reported that there was not a clear understanding of the source of the operational funds in the discussions with UNDP/UNEP... There was a funding delay of 17 months from when the project was signed in November 2000 until payment in April 2001, which resulted in staff in the NOU working for this period with 15% of their salaries paid by the SNCP. The NOU contacted UNDP several times, as all transfers even from UNEP came to the NOU from UNDP, to try to establish the cause of the delay. The problem was only resolved when procedures for the transfer of funds had been agreed between UNDP and the Ministry of Finance. At that stage when the contracts were just beginning, the NOU did not know whether the delay should be considered normal operations for UNDP/UNEP, or whether they had a genuine reason for concern" (TE, page 654).

For the training subproject, there was a lag of five years between the train-the-trainers program and the regular training program. More ozone-depleting substance emissions would have been avoided if training had been completed earlier.

For the recovery and recycling subproject, "UNEP was reported by the NOU to be late delivering the Manuals for the training programmes, and late making payments for the training that had been undertaken. It was unfortunate that the training was late as this meant the 3R equipment had to be stored. Once the training was finished, the 3R equipment could be send to the companies that had trained technicians" (TE, page 665).

The subproject on refrigerator manufacture experienced a delay of 15 months. According to the TE, "The main difficulties experienced by SINO during the project were the delay in signing the sub-project; the theft of the high pressure pipes; delays in local construction works; lack of project management

personnel during key parts of the implementation phase, including changes in the chief executive” (TE, page 684).

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

The TE reports that country ownership is very high for phasing out ozone-depleting substances. Uzbekistan established an ambitious phase-out schedule, created a framework for coordinating action on ozone, and partnered with multiple public and private stakeholders to implement its ozone strategy. A wide variety of laws were passed to control ozone-depleting substances, and more regulations are being drafted. The National Ozone Unit is supported by the government and is “well-managed and expertly staffed” (TE, page 657). However, Uzbekistan has not supported training courses for the technicians that remain untrained after the project’s end, and there is no requirement for technicians to renew their training.

6. Assessment of project’s Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: Unsatisfactory
-------------------------	-------------------------------

The Project Document only contains three sentences regarding project M&E: “Project monitoring will be performed by UNEP/UNDP and the cost for it is included in the budgets that are indicated in Annex-1. Standard evaluation will be performed, except in the case that an in-depth evaluation is required by the GEF whereby independent consultants would have to be hired and fielded to the country concerned. If such would be the case, consultancy fees and travel costs would have to be obtained in addition to the amounts requested herewith to cover these costs” (PD, page 7). The individual subprojects did not contain baselines, performance indicators, or log frames, although the overall project contains a few very general indicators such as “availability of suitable methods to reduce ODS consumption” (PD, page 11). M&E is not specifically mentioned in the project budget, and the midterm evaluation reported a lack of results-based management and accountability frameworks as well as a lack of performance indicators.

6.2 M&E Implementation	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
------------------------	--

According to the TE, UNEP did not always follow up on areas where they deemed implementation to be at risk, and “there was no evidence of adaptive risk management” (TE, page 651). Project supervision relied on periodic reports and recommendations submitted by the National Ozone Unit. The National Ozone Unit was not trained in M&E, but “in the absence of strong leadership by UNEP, the NOU coordinator or sometimes the chair of SCNP met on a regular basis with other departments and the private sector to monitor and evaluate work on ozone-layer protection in Uzbekistan” (TE, page 651). The Unit made up for the poor M&E design by implementing its own objectives and targets. The National Ozone Unit submitted reports to UNEP “in an efficient, comprehensive, and timely manner” (TE, page 652).

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Unsatisfactory
--	-------------------------------

Regarding project design, the TE states that “Risk Analysis was...not a part of project design which made it difficult to predict the sustainability of projects after the funding ceased” (TE, page 662). Also, according to the National Ozone Unit and private companies, the target for the amount of recovered and recycled CFCs was too ambitious, due “to the fact that CFCs were not as prevalent as in 1995 and 1996” (TE, page 673). Lastly, “UNDP did not follow the MLF guidelines when formulating the SINO investment sub-project. If they had been followed, the grant would have been about \$135,000 based on a production of about 4,000 refrigerators per year. Instead, UNDP calculated the funding level on the basis of 250,000 refrigerators per year, which resulted in funding to SINO of more than \$1.5 million. The results showed that the refrigerator production since 2003 has averaged only 4,761 refrigerators per year...The assessment team considered that the financial planning for the sub-project by UNDP-UNOPS was unprofessional and inadequate” (TE, pages 683-684).

Project supervision relied on periodic reports and recommendations submitted by the National Ozone Unit rather than efforts by UNEP or UNDP. In addition, disputes and miscommunications over project financing delayed the implementation of the project. The TE explains: “At the beginning of the Project, the NOU reported that there was not a clear understanding of the source of the operational funds in the discussions with UNDP/UNEP. UNDP considered that the national co-finance provided the operational finance for the sub-project. However, GEF allocated finance to the IAs for operational costs for both

investment and non-investment activities. The NOU wanted the source of the operational funds to have been clarified at the beginning of the Project. There was a funding delay of 17 months from when the project was signed in November 2000 until payment in April 2001, which resulted in staff in the NOU working for this period with 15% of their salaries paid by the SNCP. The NOU contacted UNDP several times, as all transfers even from UNEP came to the NOU from UNDP, to try to establish the cause of the delay. The problem was only resolved when procedures for the transfer of funds had been agreed between UNDP and the Ministry of Finance. At that stage when the contracts were just beginning, the NOU did not know whether the delay should be considered normal operations for UNDP/UNEP, or whether they had a genuine reason for concern” (TE, page 654). Despite missing their salaries for several months, the staff of the National Ozone Unit continued to support ozone layer protection. A consultant hired by UNDP for the recovery and recycling subproject “was well received and provided valuable, well-timed advice” (TE, page 678). However, for the refrigerator manufacture project, “UNDP-UNOPS were not active in this project and did not provide any quality support to SINO. The NOU maintains that the project concluded in a reasonable timeframe due to their effort rather than the work of UNDP” (TE, page 684).

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
---	--

There were some problems noted with UNEP’s conduct. For one, “UNEP was reported by the NOU to be late delivering the Manuals for the training programmes, and late making payments for the training that had been undertaken” (TE, page 665). UNEP did not undertake any field visits to the training project. As noted above, the National Ozone Unit appears to have conducted the bulk of the work in project implementation and execution and is likely responsible for the positive project outcomes. Project execution is rated moderately unsatisfactory to reflect on UNEP’s lack of involvement with the project despite its designation as the project’s executing agency. The MU rating does not reflect on the National Ozone Unit, which appears to have salvaged the project.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

Uzbekistan phased out 142 ODP-tons as a result of the project (TE, page 649).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

No socioeconomic changes were reported.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. "Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

The project trained 26 refrigeration technicians to become trainers (TE, pages 658-659). 35 courses were later held to train 853 refrigeration personnel. Training was also offered to customs personnel (TE, pages 659-660). 17 customs officers and 13 other government employees were trained as trainers. In a subsequent phase, 331 customs officers and inspectors were trained in 10 courses. The project provided 19 refrigerant identifier machines to Uzbekistan. It also provided 300 vacuum pumps, 430 recovery units, 12 recovery and recycling machines, and other equipment to 100 companies in Uzbekistan (TE, pages 670-673). The project converted the production line of SINO refrigerator manufacturers to CFC-free technology (TE, page 679).

b) Governance

The project established a National Ozone Unit under the State Committee for Nature Protection. The Unit drafted and passed a number of laws, including creating a licensing system, a ban on halon and some CFC imports, quotas and bans for other ozone-depleting substances, taxes on ozone-depleting substances, obligatory certification, qualification requirements, and mandatory importing reports (TE, page 647).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

No unintended impacts were reported.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been

mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The project's approach was replicated in several Eurasian countries as part of the GEF's ozone-depleting substances program. Other than applying similar project designs to each country, no scaling up or mainstreaming was mentioned in the TE. Regarding market change, in 2009 the black market price for CFCs was \$5/kg, which "would suggest that CFCs are still prevalent on the market in Uzbekistan" (TE, page 653).

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

There are no lessons learned for the Uzbekistan project, but the TE states several lessons from the overall ozone-depleting substances program:

Funding bodies should be much clearer on their expectations of governments to continue funding and staffing of work on ODS after the project finished. Governments should use the funds to enhance institutional capacity and to put in place justification for continued funding while the project is underway and the environmental benefits are becoming evident.

The success of the National Ozone Units depended on the qualifications and ability of the staff to undertake the work, and in having sufficient funds available for the work. Out-sourcing activities by the government is a modern approach which has been shown to operate so far in these projects, and might open up opportunities for other governments to consider the same as centralized budgets come under more pressure for reductions.

It is important that the National Ozone Units are staffed by some well qualified and senior people that can gain access to key government officials in order to ensure that programs and legislation on the phase out of ODS are progressed in a timely and effective manner.

Governments could consider establishing a centralized unit staffed by specialists that are knowledgeable in engaging with international funding organizations in environmental projects.

UNEP must improve delivery of finance to ensure that there are no gaps in time between projects.

Communications should be between UNEP and the National Ozone Units in the local language, which means that UNEP will need to employ staff with sufficient language skills to be able communicate effectively with project staff many countries, depending on the project.

Project and task managers must pay more attention to the M&E elements that are developed in the Project Document to ensure that appropriate baseline and performance indicators are carefully checked and are present from the beginning for the project.

Review the work that was undertaken in the past and design new projects that avoid the pitfalls of past projects.

Financial appraisals should be part of the risk assessment for deciding on which enterprises to fund within a sector.

Investment projects should be based on a realistic assessment of the baseline data as a basis for determining the extent of the funding that is required to promote the transition to ODS-free technology.

For refrigeration training, training programs need to be short (two days maximum, preferably one day); focused mainly on the practical aspects and alternatives and less on the theory; be delivered by or in collaboration with a Refrigeration Association so the training becomes self-funding; UNEP/UNDP need to ensure equipment is available before the training starts; and the government needs to have enabling legislation in place that ensures R&R activities are undertaken and enforced.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

There are no recommendations for the Uzbekistan project, but the TE states several recommendations from the overall ozone-depleting substances program:

Countries should improve the implementation of legislation, policies and standards on all aspects of ozone layer protection.

Countries' existing efforts to prevent illegal trade need to be further strengthened.

Countries need to take further action to manage and bank halon.

UNEP/UNDP should consider further investment and capacity development to assist countries with economies in transition to address the remaining threats to the ozone layer.

UNEP/UNDP should learn from the positive private sector engagement in the reduction of Ozone Layer Depletion focal area and incorporate similar approaches into its efforts to engage the private sector in other focal areas.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE is detailed in its assessment of outcomes and impacts. It would have been helpful to have an overall description of the project rather than just the assessments of the individual subprojects.	S
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The ratings only cover sub-projects and not the project as a whole. The report is repetitive, which made it difficult to discern which outcomes and outputs were original and which were a restatement from a previous section. It was not always clear which changes were a part of the project and which were independent or driven by different forces.	MS
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The sustainability of the entire project as a whole was not discussed, but the assessment of the sustainability of each individual subproject was adequate. Sustainability ratings were not always well-supported.	MS
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The TE does not contain lessons and recommendations related to the Uzbekistan project. However, it does have lessons and recommendations pertaining to the entire ozone-depleting substances program. These lessons are detailed, comprehensive, and result from project experiences.	S
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	The TE includes project costs and cofinancing. It lists the funding for each subproject, but not per-activity.	MS
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	Adequate evaluation of project M&E, although it would have been helpful to have an overall evaluation of project M&E rather than an evaluation of the individual subprojects' M&E. M&E ratings were not always well substantiated.	S
Overall TE Rating		S

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).