

GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form

1. PROJECT DATA				
		Review date:		Dec 24, 2009
GEF Project ID:	621		at endorsement (Million US\$)	at completion (Million US\$)
IA/EA Project ID:	P052006	GEF financing:	2.75	2.74
Project Name:	Cambodia: Biodiversity and Protected Area Management Project	IA/EA own:	International Development Association loan 1.91	2.00
Country:	Cambodia	Government:	0.25	0.39
		Other*:		
		Total Cofinancing	2.16	2.39
Operational Program:	OP 3: Forest Ecosystems	Total Project Cost:	4.91	5.13
IA	World Bank	<u>Dates</u>		
Partners involved:	Cambodia's Ministry of Environment (Executing Agency)	Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		05/03/2000
		Closing Date	Proposed: 12/31/2003	Actual: 12/31/2007
Prepared by:	Reviewed by:	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing (in months): 44 months	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing (in months): 92 months	Difference between original and actual closing (in months): 48 months
Luisa Lema	Neeraj Negi			
Author of TE: Martin Fodor, ICR Team Leader and Primary Author		TE completion date: 10/15/2008	TE submission date to GEF EO: 05/04/2009	Difference between TE completion and submission date (in months): 7 months

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS AND KEY FINDINGS

Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluation reviews for further definitions of the ratings.

Performance Dimension	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office evaluations or reviews	GEF EO
2.1a Project outcomes	S	MS	U	MU
2.1b Sustainability of Outcomes	N/A	Significant Risk	High Risk	U
2.1c Monitoring and evaluation	N/A	N/A	Modest	MU
2.1d Quality of implementation and Execution	NA	MS	U	MS
2.1e Quality of the evaluation report	N/A	N/A	S	S

2.2 Should the terminal evaluation report for this project be considered a good practice? Why?

No. Although the TE is comprehensive, well-written, and easy to follow, the World Bank Independent Evaluation Group and this office find that the ratings on the performance of the project were optimistic given the presented evidence.

2.3 Are there any evaluation findings that require follow-up, such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, mismanagement, etc.?

The TE reports corruption, patronage and falsification in the project area. The Park Director and the Provincial Governor were linked to large-scale logging inside Virachey National Park. The TE does not give any evidence on the

use of project resources in this event, but it does say that it affected the credibility of the project. Also, extensive falsification of patrol data by rangers who filed field reports without spending time in the field was discovered in July 2005. The falsified data was corrected or removed from the project's Management Information System. Both situations were addressed during the project, thus no follow-up is required.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

3.1 Project Objectives

a. What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

The Brief gave different versions of the overall objective of the project throughout the text. These inconsistencies were noted in the TE and in a GEF Secretariat managed project review (SMPR) to assess the progress of this project. The document presented the following versions:

- To help the Government of Cambodia achieve sustainable management of its system of national protected areas
- To support proactive measures, to minimize illegal exploitation or degradation of the relatively intact biodiversity of national and global significance in Virachey National Park.

The first PIR and all subsequent reviews and evaluations adopted the following version, which remained unchanged until the end of the project:

- To assist the government to achieve sustainable long-term utilization of its natural resources, especially its mountain forest ecosystems of regional and global significance. In particular, the project aimed at developing an effective National Protected Area system based on a consistent and well articulated set of management, financial and institutional procedures within a well functioning legal and regulatory framework. The project was to contribute to higher order global environmental goals of biodiversity protection in one of the most important remaining forest areas of South-East Asia, widely recognized for its conservation importance.

b. What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation? (describe and insert tick in appropriate box below, if yes at what level was the change approved (GEFSEC, IA or EA)?)

As with the global objective, the development objectives are not presented consistently throughout the Brief text. There are different versions presented in the narrative, in the Project Design Summary, and –as per TE- in the Results Framework. The version presented in the narrative is the one used in PIRs, TE and other reviews, and remained unchanged during the project:

The development objective of this project is to improve the capacity of the Ministry of Environment to plan, implement and monitor an effective system of National Protected Areas. Toward that end, this project has two related immediate objectives.

- First, to develop and test proactive measures to minimize unsustainable exploitation and degradation of the biodiversity of national and global significance in the Virachey National Park.
- Second, to use the experiences gained from Virachey National Park to formulate institutional models for the development of the National Protected Areas system of Cambodia.

The project has four closely integrated components: (i) a National Policy and Capacity Development Component; (ii) a Park Protection and Management Component; (iii) a Community Development Component; and (iv) a project management component.

The project also includes overall project management activities including annual budgeting, financial management, work program planning, performance monitoring, and procurement.

Overall Environmental Objectives	Project Development Objectives	Project Components	Any other (specify)
X The project appraisal document presents different versions; one single version was adopted after first PIR	X There are different versions in the project appraisal document; only one version adopted after first PIR.		

c. If yes, tick applicable reasons for the change (in global environmental objectives and/or development objectives)

Original objectives	Exogenous conditions changed,	Project was restructured	Project was restructured	Any other (specify)

not sufficiently articulated	due to which a change in objectives was needed	because original objectives were over ambitious	because of lack of progress	
				Lack of consistency in reporting of objectives in the project appraisal documents. This was later corrected during implementation. The reporting through the PIR process was consistent.

4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND SUSTAINABILITY

4.1.1 Outcomes (Relevance can receive either a satisfactory rating or a unsatisfactory rating. For effectiveness and cost efficiency a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU will be used)

a. Relevance	Rating: S
<p>The expected outcomes of the project were consistent with the GEF Operational Program 3, i.e. conservation and sustainable use of the biological resources in forest ecosystems. They were also consistent with the 1997 World Bank Country Assistance Strategy, which identified the sustainable use and management of natural resources as one of its key objectives, and specifically the need to support implementation of the 1997 National Environmental Action Plan, which identified protected areas management as an immediate priority. The TE also informed that the appraisal was written in a country context when resource conservation was mostly donor-executed, uncoordinated, unaccountable to the Ministry of Environment, and often implemented with the Ministry playing only minor supporting role; there was an urgent need to create capacity within the Ministry to manage protected areas.</p>	
b. Effectiveness	Rating: MU
<p>Many of the project outcomes were met. However, performance was considerably lower than expectation in several areas related to national capacity building, including financial management, government staff leadership, and monitoring systems.</p> <p>The capacity of the Ministry of Environment to manage a National Protected Area System was improved, amongst others, through: organizational and management studies that together outline the strategic vision for the National Protected Area system; a cadre of dedicated conservation professionals at the Ministry of Environment; a ranger-training curriculum with modules on basic skills, law enforcement, and tourism; a Protected Area law approved in January 2008; a Manual for Participatory Development of Management Plans for Protected Areas; and monitoring and evaluation systems.</p> <p>The management of Virachey National Park was improved through measures adopted as part of this project. A 2003-2007 management plan for the park was successfully developed and implemented. The plan was built based on community and stakeholder participation, integrating 21 communities and local governments. Other supporting plans, including the Park Protection Plan 2006-2008 and five consecutive Annual Operating Plans were also developed. Four socio-economic surveys were conducted by the project, including the Study on Settlement and Agriculture. A patrolling system was put in place and boundary demarcation was completed. Four Community Protected Areas were formally established, and two livelihood programs (a Small Grants Program and an Ecotourism Program) worth nearly US\$100,000 were implemented.</p> <p>The TE noted that the incidence of illegal activities in Virachey National Park was difficult to assess because of a poor base-line, short time series, and uncertain accuracy of data before 2005 (see falsification issues in section 2.3). The available data suggests that there was a decrease in some illegal activities (e.g., logging, fishing, fire, and gold mining) but an increase in others (e.g., poaching, roads, and trespassing).</p> <p>Failures of the project include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The establishment of an adequate financial management and accounting system –a condition of effectiveness as per the project document– was not reached. This compromises not only project performance, but also the sustainability of the project outcomes. - The National Leadership Program, one of the key outputs of the project, was not developed. - In spite of the quality of the monitoring and evaluation system for protected area management developed by the project (MIST), it was not well used and there is inadequate staff to facilitate continued use of the system 	

- once the project is over.
- Due to high staff turnover, most of the rangers active at the time of project completion had not received training.
- There was falsification of patrolling data.

It is also worth to mention some issues found by the TE regarding the IDA funding. This project was a combined GEF grant/IDA Learning and Innovation Loan. The TE and later review by the WB Independent Evaluation Group seriously questioned the granting of the loan and concluded that the project “did not succeed in adequately testing the hypotheses which it was intended to test¹”. The documents describe how the simplified processing for Learning and Innovation Loans led to failures in the discussion of sustainability and alternatives. Both reviews conclude that the loan was not suitable for this case because of the complex, high-risk setting of the project.

c. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness)

Rating: MU

The TE did a rough assessment of cost-effectiveness on the basis of comparing protected area management cost per unit area with other countries. It found that the cost-effectiveness of Virachey National Park management under the project (~\$132/km per year) was comparable with that elsewhere in the region.

There were serious delays in the implementation of the project, which demanded three extensions that added up to four years. Initial progress was slow and implementation was affected by a number of factors. Given the initial lack of local capacity, the project should have ensured sufficient international technical assistance input during the early stages. Complicated transactions between ministries and inexperience with procurement caused severe delays in procurement of goods and services. Other situations including the long distance between the two project offices, and the weak legislative framework also affected the efficiency. This will be further explained in section 4.4.b.

4.1.2 Impacts: summarize the achieved intended or unintended impacts of the project.

The TE considered that the project had positive institutional impacts at both the Virachey National Park and the national levels. The project promoted a new vision of natural protected areas as a comprehensively managed system, contributed to the passage of the new protected area law, supported prosecution of forest crimes, and demonstrated for the first time in Cambodia a government-led protected area management model. The TE was unable to assess impact on livelihoods.

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four point scale (4= Likely (no or negligible risk); 3= Moderately Likely (low risk); 2= Moderately Unlikely (substantial risks) to 1= Unlikely (High risk)). The ratings should be given taking into account both the probability of a risk materializing and the anticipated magnitude of its effect on the continuance of project benefits.

a. Financial resources

Rating: U

The TE reported that efforts towards the formulation of a financing strategy (a project output) only began in 2003; this and the subsequent attempts to obtain the necessary baseline information were unsuccessful. Only a concept with preliminary analysis and recommendations was finalized. The TE considers the failure to prepare the financing strategy a major project shortcoming, both against its stated target and for practical sustainability reasons. The TE recommended addressing this failure in an IDA-financed follow-on operation, Cambodia Environment and Protected Areas Management Project; yet, this project was dropped (see [WB website](#)²). The Independent Evaluation of the project had noted as well that there was inadequate funding available to sustain project benefits after its completion and limited government resources to cover operating expenses for Virachey National Park’s protection program.

Had the strategy been in place and had the government not relied exclusively on continued financing from the World Bank, the project could have guaranteed the self-sustainability of some level of park management for Virachey National Park and the National Protected Area System. Beyond the ability to maintain the management capacity of the National Protected Area system, it is even uncertain that important outputs of the project, such as the Monitoring and Information System, will have enough resources to continue implementation.

Lastly, the TE adds that no civil servant was assigned to work with the financial management consultants during

¹ These hypothesis were: (a) increased participation by MOE in national and provincial land and natural resource use decision processes can reduce the pressure of illegal logging and other major land allocation decisions affecting national parks; (b) a sustainable financing system for protected areas is realistic and achievable; (c) community participation in protected areas management provides sufficient incentive to reduce the current pressure agricultural practices and illegal hunting; and (d) a decentralized approach to protected areas and conservation management programs is replicable in other parts of Cambodia.

² <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?Projectid=P105397&theSitePK=40941&piPK=64290415&pagePK=64283627&menuPK=64282134&Type=Overview>

project implementation, thus limited financial management capacity was built within the Ministry.	
b. Socio political	Rating: MU
The extensive work with the local communities, in terms of consultation and alternative livelihoods, gives the project a good chance to conserve the support of locals.	
On the other hand, in 2007 the government issued mining exploration licenses over Virachey National Park, showing the lack of commitment of the national government to guarantee the continuation of the outcomes of the project. The mining exploration licenses cover approximately 60% of Virachey National Park, including some core conservation zones. Exploration licenses were issued without adequate inter-ministerial consultation and concessionaire obligations with respect to relinquishment are not known. Without access to this information, the Ministry of Environment cannot effectively implement regulatory oversight.	
c. Institutional framework and governance	Rating: MU
The project put in place several regulations and policies, including the law on Protected Areas, and different manuals on management and training. In spite of this, and in the light of the recent imposition of mining exploration licenses, it is unclear if these policies will be enough to guarantee the sustainability of the achievements of the project.	
d. Environmental	Rating: MU
The initiation of mining exploration activities in VPN puts in jeopardy the achievements of the project related to the improved planning and management. It is uncertain if this will lead to exploitation agreements. It is worth noting that at the time when the TE was finalized, the impacts of exploration activities on biodiversity conservation had been minimal.	

4.3 Catalytic role

a.. Production of a public good
The project provided VPN headquarters at Banlung, other facilities for vigilance and training, communications and transportation equipment. It also developed the MIST Monitoring and Information System for monitoring protected area management effectiveness. A Protected Area law drafted by the project and was approved in January 2008.
b.. Demonstration
The project was set up to use Virachey National Park as a test site for protected area management. The achievements of the project already include a ranger-training course, a Manual for Participatory Development of Management Plans for Protected Areas, and a Monitoring Information System. All these products were developed based on the experience in Virachey National Park, and later on extended to the national framework.
c.. Replication
It is expected that some of the experience in Virachey National Park is replicated in other protected areas in the country, either by the Ministry of Environment or by NGOs. The TE presents evidence that MIST, the Monitoring Information System, had been used in Bokor National Park in 2004, but stopped functioning in 2005 after project funding ended.
d.. Scaling up
The achievements of the project already include a ranger-training course, a Manual for Participatory Development of Management Plans for Protected Areas, and a Monitoring Information System that were brought up to the national level.

4.4 Assessment of processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

a. Co-financing. To what extent was the reported cofinancing (or proposed cofinancing) essential to achievement of GEF objectives? Were components supported by cofinancing well integrated into the project? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?
Cofinancing was vital for the project. 2.0 million out of the 5.13 million spent in the project came from an International Development Association loan. The overall project was designed to integrate the loan and grant strategies; the project could not have happened without the cofinancing. The Government of Cambodia also invested 0.39 million in the project; the cofinancing from the government was larger than originally foreseen mostly because an additional input of \$10,100 was required for the extension period; also, some government fund input was required to compensate for small delays in credit and grant agreements, and for an error in the amendment letters concerning procurement, corrected in May 2005.
b. Delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?
The project experienced serious delays and required three extensions for a total of four years. The stated reasons for the extensions varied and included the completion of activities, the consolidation of achievements, and delays caused by long rainy seasons.
Other causes for the delays reported in the TE are:

- Constrained flow of funds between the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Environment and Virachey National Park.
- Initial lack of experience with procurement and decision to procure technical assistance through individual rather than firm contracts (TE does consider that this brought cost savings and stimulated capacity development)
- During the ICR mission to Virachey National Park, park staff indicated that available resources to cover salaries, field benefits, etc. were not sufficient. Virachey National Park lost several key staff to other organizations, and many rangers left the job.

The 2006 independent evaluation also noted:

- Insufficient international TA input during the early stages of the project.
- Delays in the procurement of goods and services.
- The physical distance between the two project offices.
- A weak legislative framework, which made it difficult to develop a coherent strategy for addressing both the needs of local communities and Virachey National Park conservation priorities.

The performance of the project was seriously affected by the delays in flow of funds, which lead to high staff turnover and delays in procurement. On the other hand, the expected outcomes related to strengthening the capacity of the Ministry of Environment may have benefited from the extension of the project by guaranteeing the presence of project-related staff.

c. Country Ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability highlighting the causal links.

The TE reports that both national and local levels of government demonstrated commitment and provided significant support to the project. The fact that the government's counterpart cofinancing materialized and the Protected Areas Law was finalized and signed into law, shows engagement at the higher levels. However, government has not been consistent in its actions given that it granted mining exploration concessions over Virachey National Park. The GEF Secretariat managed project review (SMPR) had also reported that the management plan for the forest concession proposed by Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries had not paid sufficient attention to environmental and social safeguards, undermining the commitments the Ministry of Environment; these logging concession were within the buffer zone of Virachey National Park.

4.5 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

a. M&E design at Entry Rating (six point scale): U

The information on objectives and indicators provided in different sections of the project appraisal documents was inconsistent. The TE noted that "M&E design... failed to establish clear links between objectives, outputs and indicators." The TE provided a cross-reference table of the two sets of Key Performance Indicators that appear in the project document, and found no consistency for almost half of the indicators. It also notes that most of the indicators were insufficiently specific, lacked base-lines and targets values and did not clearly identify data collection methods. The Secretariat managed project review (SMPR) performed in 2002 had already mentioned that the identification of indicators and assessment of baseline had not yet been implemented.

b. M&E plan Implementation Rating (six point scale): MU

There were serious problems with M&E at the beginning of the project. By 2002, the Secretariat managed project review (SMPR) had already noted that the identification of indicators and assessment of baseline had not been implemented. A set of indicators started appearing in the 2003 PIR; the TE notes that this first attempt was made three months before the original Closing Date, in the context of the first project extension, i.e. Key Performance Indicators were not tracked during the original project period. Additional M&E issues brought up in the TE include inaccuracy in baseline values, and unexplained changes to some indicators during the project. The 2002 Secretariat management review also documented that the resources identified to collect and analyze data were only being implemented marginally, and that the progress reports were being implemented only on progress of activities and not on outcomes or impacts.

A comprehensive and thorough November 2002 mid-term review helped to reorganize and refocus the project. The mid term review made a large number of recommendations. The key recommendations concerned project organization and management, refocusing the components and activities for greater impact, and improving its sustainability.

The TE describes that the situation on M&E improved starting in 2003, when the project began to use Annual Operating Plans to track progress, using a more detailed set of activities and indicators than those outlined in the Project Appraisal Document. Part of the project implementation included the set up of a Monitoring and Information System; the TE mentions that the Implementation Completion and Results Report mission witnessed the capabilities of the system and the staff that manages it to generate detailed data on different variables, although the accuracy of data in the system is suspect due to falsification of ranger-collected input data uncovered in 2005.

Finally, an independent evaluation was conducted in June 2006 by two international consultants.

b.1 Was sufficient funding provided for M&E in the budget included in the project document?

M&E was an element of the Project Management and Park Protection and Management components, both components

had enough funds allocated to them.
<p>b.2a Was sufficient and timely funding provided for M&E during project implementation? There is no information on resources invested in M&E. A mid-term review was done timely in 2002. Other than that, it seems evident that more funding was provided for M&E after 2003 than in the previous years.</p>
<p>b.2b To what extent did the project monitoring system provided real time feed back? Was the information that was provided used effectively? What factors affected the use of information provided by the project monitoring system? The 2002 Secretariat managed review reported that the project M&E plan was not used as a tool in support of adaptive management, because “there is no plan.” The TE notes that the original project M&E was exclusively used to report to the IA. However, the Annual Operating Plan was used as an effective project management tool, although not linked to the original project M&E or to its learning objectives. Also, the TE reports that the observed use of the Monitoring and Information System for decision making was below potential. However, the mid-term review did lead to important changes in the project that improved effectiveness and coherence.</p>
<p>b.3 Can the project M&E system (or an aspect of the project M&E system) be considered a good practice? If so, explain why. No. Indicators were not consistent, baseline was not accurate, data was falsified and M&E implementation started late in the project.</p>

4.6 Assessment of Quality of Implementation and Execution

a. Overall Quality of Implementation and Execution (on a six point scale): MS
b. Overall Quality of Implementation – for IA (on a six point scale): MS
<p>Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as quality of the project design, focus on results, adequacy of supervision inputs and processes, quality of risk management, candor and realism in supervision reporting, and suitability of the chosen executing agencies for project execution.</p> <p>The TE highlighted the important contributions that the World Bank provided to the project through the mid-term review; this was a milestone for a dramatic improvement in the project’s implementation. It also stresses the active support for public consultation provided on the draft Protected Area law, strong and sustained assistance for addressing illegal logging within the park, and support through multiple learning events with other conservation actors. Nevertheless, the TE notes serious failures in M&E, including significant shortcomings in the M&E design, lack of realism in PIR ratings, and lack of reporting on performance indicators during the first years of the project. The TE also considers that there was a poor assessment of project readiness for implementation.</p> <p>The 2002 Secretariat managed review considered that the World Bank’s role as a sector lending institution with regard to the forest concession next to the Virachey National Park reflected conflicting actions, as the forest concession management was threatening the progress of the project and apparently not complying with minimum environmental and social safeguards.</p>
c. Quality of Execution – for Executing Agencies³ (rating on a 6 point scale): MU
<p>Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as focus on results, adequacy of management inputs and processes, quality of risk management, and candor and realism in reporting by the executive agency.</p> <p>According to the TE, the Ministry of Environment assigned some of its best technical staff to strategic project positions at both the national and park level, and maintained engagement of top management in the project throughout implementation. A high level of governmental engagement was also proved by the signature of the Protected Areas Law, and by the counterpart contributions provided to the project. However, the TE provides information about major shortcomings on the government’s part, including the issuing of mining exploration licenses, forests concessions, illegal road building and falsification of monitoring data by park staff. It is worth noting that, although the EA took four years to discover the data falsification, they took corrective measures to clean and correct the information in the monitoring system; the price paid was the loss of significant time series of information. Also, conflicts between ministries in flux of funds, unresolved through the project, were one of the major causes of the project’s delays. As expressed in point 4.4.c, these actions outshined the commitment demonstrated by the governmental bodies that intervened in the project; the dedication proved by the Ministry of Environment and the local governments did not seem to be backed-up by a national commitment.</p>

5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

³ Executing Agencies for this section would mean those agencies that are executing the project in the field. For any given project this will exclude Executing Agencies that are implementing the project under expanded opportunities – for projects approved under the expanded opportunities procedure the respective executing agency will be treated as an implementing agency.

Assess the project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

<p>a. Briefly describe the key lessons, good practice or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects</p>
<p>The TE draws important lessons from the project, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protected Area and Natural Resource Management projects are complex by definition and often involve unclear legal and regulatory frameworks, low capacity of government officials, and poor understanding of rights and obligations of stakeholders. Addressing these fundamental constraints takes time and involves false starts. - Adequate attention to M&E design, implementation and utilization is important for every operation, but is essential for a learning experience. - To design an effective institutional capacity-building intervention, the whole organization should be first assessed to understand how its departments and systems interact and function. - Government capacity to implement donor-funded projects requires detailed of knowledge across a range of technical specialties including procurement. - The development of partnerships early in the implementation allows for greater leveraging of other resources and expertise and creates better opportunities for sharing experiences and lessons. - One of the important challenges in Cambodia during the life of the project was the rapidly changing social and economic context of conservation programs, and the community role in leading development programs at the local level. - It should be made clear whether community involvement is an instrument in achieving conservation goals or a goal in itself, and the community involvement program should be designed accordingly. - Civil servants cannot be expected to perform if they are not adequately remunerated.
<p>b. Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A longer time frame should be considered for Protected Area/Natural Resource Management projects with a capacity-building focus. - More attention must be paid to M&E. - When strengthening institutional capacity, the creation of external structures should be minimized, and functions should be assigned to the appropriate units within the institution. - Investments should be made early in counterpart implementation capacity and its limitations should inform project design. - Strategic partnerships should be sought early in project implementation. - Flexibility in project implementation is important in a dynamic social context and projects should be able to take advantage of opportunities as they arise and to modify the structure and nature of project elements if needed. - Up-front agreement should be achieved on community involvement. - Civil servants pay should be moved towards a Merit-Based Pay System. - Ministry of Environment leadership should be supported to continue to develop in its role as the manager of the National Protected Area system.

6. QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

<p>6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings based on other information sources such as GEF EO field visits, other evaluations, etc.</p>
<p>The TE includes an annex with information from an independent evaluation performed in 2006 (as a GEF requirement, apparently). Both evaluations reached the same conclusions and discussed similar problems.</p> <p>The independent evaluation rated overall performance for each outcome indicator; on average, performance was Moderately Satisfactory. For the same evaluation, Sustainability was Moderately Unlikely, and Monitoring and Evaluation was Moderately Satisfactory. These ratings are equivalent to those given in the TE (Moderately Satisfactory outcomes, Significant risk to development outcome, and Moderately Satisfactory quality of supervision).</p> <p>Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluations review for further definitions of the ratings. Please briefly explain each rating.</p>

<p>6.2 Quality of the terminal evaluation report</p>	<p>Ratings</p>
<p>a. To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives? All outcomes, outputs and indicators are discussed and appropriately assessed</p>	<p>HS</p>
<p>b. To what extent the report is internally consistent, the evidence is complete/convincing and the IA ratings have been substantiated? Are there any major evidence gaps?</p>	<p>S</p>

The TE rating for sustainability is higher than that expected for the evidence presented. Other ratings are consistent with the evidence presented in the report.	
c. To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy? The sustainability of the project was overestimated. However, at the time of the TE there was a project proposal for continued funding, which was later dropped by the World Bank.	MU
d. To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive? The evaluation presents a good set of well-supported lessons learned.	HS
e. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? Yes, the TE provides complete financial information.	HS
f. Assess the quality of the reports evaluation of project M&E systems? The assessment of M&E was one of the major contributions of the TE.	HS

7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRERATATION OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REVIEW REPORT EXCLUDING PIRs, TERMINAL EVALUATIONS, PAD.

Specially Managed Project Review
World Bank, Projects and Operations website