

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2014

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		64	
GEF Agency project ID		7400	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		Demand Side Management Demonstration	
Country/Countries		Jamaica	
Region		LAC	
Focal area		Climate Change	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		OP-5: Removal of Barriers to Energy Efficiency and Energy Conservation	
Executing agencies involved		Jamaica Public Service Co. (JPS)/Demand Side Management Unit (DSMU)	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Secondary executing agency/One of the beneficiaries	
Private sector involvement		Secondary executing agency	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		05/01/93	
Effectiveness date / project start		08/12/94	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		12/31/98	
Actual date of project completion		12/31/99	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	0.126	0.058
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		3.800	3.570
Co-financing	IA own		
	Government	4.313	3.225
	Other multi- /bi-laterals	4.150	2.830
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs	0.237	0.200
Total GEF funding		3.926	4.150
Total Co-financing		8.700	6.255
Total project funding		12.626	10.405
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		06/01/00	
TE submission date		06/01/00	
Author of TE		N/A	
TER completion date		10/23/14	
TER prepared by		Sean Nelson	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Joshua Schneck	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	N/R	S	MS	MU
Sustainability of Outcomes	N/R	L	U	MU
M&E Design	N/R	N/R	N/R	MS
M&E Implementation	N/R	N/R	N/R	S
Quality of Implementation	N/R	S	S	MS
Quality of Execution	N/R	S	U	MU
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	-	-	S	MU

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

As stated in the Project Document (PD), the primary GEO was to lower future CO₂, NO_x and SO₂ emissions through reductions in demand for electricity that would have the effect of lowering fossil fuel consumption used for power generation in the Jamaican power grid. The goal was to achieve electricity savings of either 7 peak MW or 30,000 MWh over 5 years. The Jamaican economy at that point was rather energy intensive. In addition, the Jamaican government had only recently started rationalizing electricity tariffs, so electricity savings were of particular interest.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The DO was to increase electricity sector capacity, along with the capacities of relevant agencies, to undertake electricity efficiency initiatives. This would allow the project's approach to be scaled-up and expanded throughout Jamaica in a subsequent project building off of this one's results.

The project had the following 6 components:

- 1) Commercial buildings electricity savings
- 2) Residential sector electricity savings
- 3) Industrial sector electricity savings assessment
- 4) Program M&E and quality control
- 5) Demand-Side Management (DSM) Unit institutional development
- 6) Institutional development of relevant local institutions

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The TE mentions **no** changes to the GEOs or DOs.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: Satisfactory
----------------------	-----------------------------

This project is relevant to the GEF under OP-5: Removal of Barriers to Energy Efficiency and Energy Conservation. The project's aim to increase the efficiency of the electricity sector would help to lower Jamaica's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including CO₂, NO_x and SO₂ emissions. In addition, the Jamaican government at the time was using demand-side programs and market-based energy pricing reforms to increase electricity efficiency. These measures were also undertaken as part of Jamaica's Fourth Power and Energy Sector Deregulation and Privatization loan agreement with the World Bank. Most of Jamaica's energy sources had to be imported. The only viable indigenous fuel source was wood, but over-exploitation and poor forest management had harmed Jamaica's environment.

4.2 Effectiveness	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
--------------------------	--

Note: It should be noted that the TE contains insufficient information on 3 of the 6 major project components. Information on the effectiveness of these project components was found in a separate report: the DSM Unit's Project Review. While the TE rates project effectiveness as "Satisfactory," the project achieved reductions in electricity usage and GHG emissions well below project goals. IEG rated this project's outcomes as "Moderately Satisfactory" due to the potential for GHG emission and electricity usage reductions. This rating is based on reductions that the DSM Unit was unlikely to achieve. While the project built up the DSM Unit's capacity, the Jamaican government and JPS had not fully embraced DSM activities. This makes it unlikely that the DSM Unit would have enough support to be successful in promoting sufficient GHG emission and electricity demand reductions in the future.

Summary: In total, the project appears to have lowered electricity demand by 2,533 to 4 peak MW and 10,313 to 13,000 MWh, resulting in 12,166 tons to 14,000 tons of CO₂ mitigated. This was below the

project targets. Despite the fact that the commercial and industrial sectors use the most electricity and have the biggest environmental footprint, the project only really produced results in the residential sector. The project appears to have created a competent DSM Unit.

1) Commercial buildings electricity savings **Moderately Unsatisfactory**

This component suffered from financing issues. The Jamaica Public Service Company, Limited (JPS) pulled its support to pre-finance electricity efficiency investments. In addition, overall economic problems in Jamaica, business' lack of funds to self-finance electricity efficiency investment measures and a loss of Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) funding also hurt this component's results. The project audited 15 major commercial electricity consumers on their energy use. Six of these businesses carried out the suggested energy efficiency measures. Overall, this component lowered electricity demand by estimated 3,700 MWh pa and 0.2MW of peak demand. The target in the last PSR was an annual reduction of 11,721 Mwh and 5.978 MW of peak demand, which this project had not yet reached.

2) Residential sector electricity savings **Satisfactory**

According to the TE, "in terms of public impact, the residential lighting program was the most successful component of the Project," (TE, p. 4) lowering demand by about 1.7 MW. A total of 32,000 households took part in the program, which made up about 10 percent of JPA residential consumers at the time. They bought nearly 100,000 compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs), which lowered peak demand by an estimated 1.7 MW. The TE states that "a consultants' review has concluded that the program was popular with consumers, satisfaction is high and a solid basis exists for replicating it on a larger scale" (TE, p. 4). The residential lighting program was initially unpopular and was stuck with low-quality CFLs. However, the DSM Unit improved the program's marketing (though the TE does not note how it dealt with the CFL quality issue), resulting in a successful program.

This component also had a solar power water heating program, but this program was only finished in late 1999, so it was still too early when the TE was written to assess its results. The project installed 300 solar water heaters (SWHs) in residential households. It was estimated that this would lower peak demand by 0.6 MW.

3) Industrial sector electricity savings assessment **Unsatisfactory** The TE notes that this component came in "under expectations" (TE, p. 3). It should be noted that the TE does not give details on this component and failed to address this component in its own section.

4) Program M&E and quality control **Unable to Assess**

The project hired independent consultants to assess each project component, including calculating the energy savings. The DSM Unit plans on using these reports to promote its services.

With this said, the TE provides few details on this component beyond noting that these consultants wrote reports. It is also unclear that the TE authors differentiated between project M&E and M&E as a project component.

5) Demand-Side Management (DSM) Unit institutional development **Satisfactory**

The DSM Unit benefitted from project support for training, technical assistance, and consultants' advice. As a result, the DSM Unit has helped to carry out work effectively on the other project components. In addition, the DSM Unit took part in public awareness campaigns.

6) Institutional development of relevant local institutions **Satisfactory**

Approximately US\$400,000 of project funding supported the Natural Resource Conservation Authority (NRCA), the Jamaica Environment Trust (JET) and the National Consumers League for energy conservation public education campaigns. The TE provides no details on these groups' contributions to these campaigns' results, though the DSM Unit's report claims these organizations' contributions "in the dissemination of information cannot be overstated" (DSM Unit Project Review, p. 10).

The project originally provided US\$600,000 of IDB funding to the Jamaica Bureau of Standards for product labeling and energy efficiency tests, but this funding was canceled due to a lack of additional co-financing and the Jamaican government's inability to provide a construction site on time.

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
-----------------------	--

Summary: The project experienced numerous delays during the project's early phase, though the DMS Unit states that the project overcame these delays and later gained positive momentum. However, the Jamaican government's early reluctance to publicly push for energy efficiency measures appears to have limited the project's ability to find sufficient commercial and industrial customers. This increased the project's reliance on JPS, but JPS's reluctance to promote project goals thus exacerbated this same problem. Financial management was satisfactory, with financial savings allowing the project to fund the SWH program and solar PV installations.

Delays: The TE only mentions 2 delays. The Jamaican government was slow to promote DSM measures despite paying lip service to the issue. Towards the end of the project, the Ministry of Mining and Energy (MME) started exerting pressure on JPS to support such programs. In addition, the Jamaican government was too slow to provide a construction site for the Jamaica Bureau of Standards initiative, which caused IDB funding to be canceled for this part of the project.

The DSM Unit's Project Review, which is included as an addendum to the TE, mentions further delays not discussed in the TE. JPS had recently implemented new financial accounting procedures and a new computer system, both of which at first slowed down JPS's internal processes. Since the DSM Unit was dependent on JPS for support and coordination, this inhibited the DSM Unit's ability to respond to customer needs during the project's early phases. The DSM Unit also needed to have access to the database tracking system to approve new customers. However, the mainframe link often went down.

In addition, an explosion at the Old Harbour Power Plant in 1994 caused a "cash flow deterioration" for the project (DSM Unit, p. 9). Following the explosion, the DSM Unit experienced problems recruiting

staff and commercial customers. The DSM Unit’s lack of experience working with donor agencies’ procurement procedures also caused delays in the project’s early days.

Management Issues: The project went through multiple task managers from 1996 to 1998 and “a hiatus in task management in late 1997 and early 1998” (TE, p. 7). This necessitated increased World Bank project supervision, which appears to have improved project management.

Financial Management: The project came in under budget at US\$9.85 million, compared with over US\$12 million at appraisal. Only the DSM Unit institutional development component came in significantly over the appraisal amount by some 55 % (US\$6.57 million versus an estimated US\$4.20 million). This was partially due to several project components coming in under budget. As a result, the project was able to allocate savings toward the SWH program and PV solar installations.

4.4 Sustainability	Rating: Moderately Unlikely
--------------------	------------------------------------

Summary: JPS at the time was paying the DSM Unit's salaries. However, it was unclear if the Jamaican government and JPS would politically and financially support expanding energy efficiency programs. Decision makers within both JPS and the Jamaican government had not yet made decisions that would make the project's sustainability clear.

The project’s sustainability is assessed according the following 4 risk factors.

Environmental: **Unable to Assess**

The TE includes no information on environmental risks to project sustainability.

Financial: **Moderately Likely**

The TE notes that expanding the residential lighting program will require that JPS return to the DSM Unit money from CFL sales to make expansion financially viable. A revolving fund was already set up to support SWH program expansion. JPS at the time was paying DSM Unit salaries, though it was unclear how long this would continue. It was also unclear if JPS would fund expanding DSM Unit programs.

Sociopolitical: **Moderately Unlikely**

While the MME had voiced support for DSM activities, the Jamaican government as a whole had not. The project existed in an ambiguous legal and policy environment when the TE was written. Jamaican energy policy at the time lacked a clear stance on energy efficiency and DSM.

Institutional: **Moderately Unlikely**

JPS had planned to mainstream the DSM Unit into its activities, though this required government approval. However, the DSM Unit's goals were in conflict with JPS's stated goal to increase electricity supplies. JPS also had not included DSM programs into its load balancing and electricity capacity expansion plans.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

At appraisal, the Jamaican government planned to provide US\$4.31 through JPS. This was broken down into US\$2.72 million for the commercial sector component and US\$1.36 million for the DSM Unit institutional capacity component, as well as US\$230,000 for contingencies. However, the Jamaican government only provided US\$3.22 million, which only went to the DSM Unit institutional capacity component. JPS experienced financial problems due to a tariff rate freeze and the Old Harbour plant explosion. This resulted in decreased funding to bring large-volume commercial customers into the project, which reduced these enterprises' participation. In turn, this shrunk the electricity demand reduction and GHG mitigation the project was able to achieve.

Other co-financing from other sources was originally going to be US\$4.39 million. In practice, the project received US\$3.06 million in co-financing, which was due to several project components coming in under budget. As a result, the project was able to allocate savings toward the SWH program and PV solar installations.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The TE itself only mentions 2 delays. The Jamaican government was slow to promote DSM measures despite paying lip service to the issue. Towards the end of the project, the Ministry of Mining and Energy (MME) started exerting pressure on JPS to support such programs. In addition, the Jamaican government also was too slow to provide a construction site for the Jamaica Bureau of Standards initiative, which caused IDB funding to be cancelled.

The DSM Unit's Project Review, which is included as an addendum to the TE, mentions further delays that the TE failed to mention. JPS had recently implemented new financial accounting procedures and a new computer system, both of which at first slowed down JPS's internal processes. Since the DSM Unit was dependent on JPS for support and coordination, this inhibited the DSM Unit's ability to respond to customer needs during the project's early phases. The DSM Unit also needed to have access to the database tracking system to approve new customers. However, the mainframe link often went down.

In addition, an explosion at the Old Harbour Power Plant in 1994 caused a "cash flow deterioration" for the project (DSM Unit, p. 9). Following the explosion, the DSM Unit experienced problems recruiting staff and commercial customers. The DSM Unit's lack of experience working with donor agencies' procurement procedures also caused delays in the project's early days.

The project received a year-long extension, though the TE does not adequately explain why this extension was requested and granted.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

While the MME had voiced support for DSM activities, the Jamaican government as a whole had not. The project existed in an ambiguous legal and policy environment when the TE was written. Jamaican energy policy at the time lacked a clear stance on energy efficiency and DSM. JPS had planned to mainstream the DSM Unit into its activities, though this required government approval. However, the DSM Unit's goals were in conflict with JPS's stated goal to increase electricity supplies. JPS also had not included DSM programs into its load balancing and electricity capacity expansion plans.

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
------------------------------------	--

The PD devotes 13 pages to describing the M&E program. The M&E design includes clear responsibilities outlined for each M&E contractor. The design also includes SMART indicators and detailed questions to answer on each project component. According to the TE, program M&E and quality control received about 10 percent of project funding to ensure the project could be replicated. However, the PD did not include a detailed schedule for when major M&E components, including when the Mid-Term Review (MTR), PIRs, etc., were due.

6.2 M&E Implementation	Rating: Satisfactory
-----------------------------------	-----------------------------

The M&E process appears to have been of high quality. The MTR suggested changing each sector's contribution to the GHG mitigation targets, though the TE says that in retrospect it should have suggested lowering the overall mitigation target as well for being too ambitious. The DSM Unit planned on using the consultants' reports on each project component (including GHG mitigation and energy savings estimates) to market and promote DSM activities to potential future customers.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
--	--

The project design, including the M&E design, was clear and detailed. It clearly laid out both the project's actions, as well as the project designers' assumptions about the future (future annual Jamaican GDP growth, future Jamaican energy demand growth, etc.). The World Bank displayed a high level of expenditure scrutiny to the point the TE called it "excessive" (TE, p. 7), which may have slowed down basic procurement. The M&E process appears to have been thorough and fact-based. World Bank supervision helped to keep the project on track despite several project management changes. However, the project design did not sufficiently account for 1) Jamaican government/JPS financial constraints and contradictions between DMS programs and 2) JPS's financial and planning goals.

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
---	--

The project used adaptive management based on the MTR to change each sector's contribution to the GHG mitigation targets, while leaving the overall target unchanged. The project team appears to have carried out work on each project component based on project spending per component in the Annex 2 in the TE. However, the Jamaican government failed to provide co-financing for the Jamaican Bureau of Standards, so this part was canceled.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented,

sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The project resulted in between 12,166 tons to 14,000 tons of CO₂ mitigated (TE, pp. 10-11). The Jamaican economy entered an unexpected slump during the project. In addition, the electricity tariff freeze and the Old Harbour plant explosion hurt JPS financially, reducing its contributions to the project. As a result, the project was unable to reach out to as many customers as originally planned (TE, pp. 5-6), lowering the amount of CO₂ mitigated.

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The project helped to lower peak electricity demand by 2.533 to 4 peak MW and by 10,313 to 13,000 Mwh (TE, pp. 10-11). About 32,000 JPS customer households purchased around 100,000 CFLs. The project installed 300 SWHs in residential households. 6 commercial enterprises carried out energy efficiency measures based off of project audits (TE, p. 4).

The Jamaican economy entered an unexpected slump during the project. In addition, the electricity tariff freeze and the Old Harbour plant explosion hurt JPS financially, reducing its contributions to the project. As a result, the project was unable to reach out to as many customers as originally planned, lowering the amount of reduced electricity demand, while also hurting the project's ability to engage in the large-scale commercial sector (TE, pp. 5-6).

At appraisal, the project had expected benefit/cost appraisals of 1.47 for the societal test, 1.31 for the total resource cost test and 3.86 for the participant test. At project completion, these ratios were 4.52, 4.03 and 7.78 respectively (TE, p. 14). The TE does not explain what these results mean for the economy as a whole or participant households/businesses in particular.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. "Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

Creating the DSM Unit has helped to institutionalize DSM as a goal worth pursuing in Jamaica. Both the DSM Unit and NGOs received training, but few details are giving regarding this training. The DSM Unit

and associated NGOs undertook public awareness campaigns, but the TE provides little evidence of these campaigns' results. Project energy audits and consultant reports also helped to improve knowledge of how businesses could benefit from and implement DSM programs (TE, pp. 3-5).

b) Governance

The DSM Unit worked closely with JPS, partly due to MME pressure on JPS to do so. However, the Jamaican government and JPS had an ambiguous stance on DMS programs as of the TE's writing (TE, pp. 5-6). The TE does not mention any new legislation or regulations the Jamaican government enacted in response to the project.

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The TE does not mention any unintended consequences due to the project.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The DSM Unit had expressed interest in expanding the CFL, SWH and solar PV initiatives to rural households, though this was only in the planning stage. It was unclear as of the TE's writing if the DSM Unit would receive the necessary support to carry out this program (TE, p. 7).

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The following are drawn from the TE's "Lessons Learned" section:

- DSM programs require clear and consistent government and energy sector support to succeed
- Institutions that aim to both implement DSM programs and expand electricity supplies will run into conflicts
- Executing agencies for DSM programs require sufficient managerial and financial independence for the project to be successful
- DSM programs require high-quality public education and promotional campaigns to ensure project success

- Energy efficiency audits across different sectors need to be coupled with financing to ensure that these audits' recommendations are actually implemented
- Projects need to abide by revolving fund designs to ensure DSM programs are financially sustainable over the long-term

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

The following recommendations can be inferred from the TE's body:

- The Jamaican government and JPS need to take a clear stance on DSM programs. This ambiguous political environment made future DSM planning difficult.
- The World Bank needs to work with the Jamaican government to continue to monitor the DSM Unit to ensure its sustainability. This will also help the DSM Unit to better refine its future goals.
- The DSM Unit needed to better define its future plans, including its plan to expand the CFL, SWH and solar PV programs to rural households.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE contained little to no information on half of the project's major components. The TE did not include a separate section on the Industrial component, so it is unclear what work, if any, was carried out for this component. While the project design may have been changed, this needs to be mentioned in the TE. The section discussing project components' results was only 3 pages long and was often lacking in details. The DSM Unit's review was often more informative than the TE itself.	U
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The TE itself does not mention many project delays that were noted in the DSM Unit's own report that was included as an annex to the TE. An explosion at a power plant that affected the project results is also not explicitly mentioned in the TE but noted in the DSM report. In addition, the stated amount of CO2 emissions mitigated is inconsistent, with some TE sections claiming 14,000 tons CO2 and other sections claiming 12,166 tons CO2. The numbers given for the reduction in electricity demand also has the same issue.	U
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The TE notes the ambiguous policy environment and JPS's ambivalent attitude toward DSM programs and the DSM Unit. The "Sustainability" section was even-handed on these issues, though it did not mention whether or not the DSM Unit was looking for financing from outside of JPS.	MS
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The "Lessons Learned" section appears to be fact-based and includes issues brought up repeatedly throughout the TE. However, it could have better addressed the effect of JPS's coming privatization on the project's outcomes, as well as the Old Harbour explosion's effects.	MS
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	Project costs are included in "Annex 2: Project Costs and Financing." The TE's body also directly addresses the role and level of co-financing during the project. However, these numbers are somewhat inconsistent with the numbers in the TE's body.	MU
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	It is unclear the extent to which the TE authors differentiated between M&E as a project component and project M&E. The TE does not address the quality of M&E design.	MU
Overall TE Rating		MU

Overall TE rating: $(0.3 * (2+2)) + (0.1 * (4+4+3+3)) = 1.2 + 1.4 = 2.6 = \text{Moderately Unsatisfactory}$

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

Global Environment Trust Fund Grant Agreement June 1, 1994

Memorandum and Recommendation of the Director, Latin America and Caribbean Country Department III, to the Regional Vice President, March 1, 1994

Supervision Mission reports, 1994-99

ICR Mission back-to-office report, February 11, 2000