

GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form for OPS4

1. PROJECT DATA				
GEF Project ID: 648		Review date:		
IA/EA Project ID:		GEF financing:	<u>At endorsement</u> (Million US\$)	<u>At completion</u> (Million US\$)
Project Name:	Coastal and Marine Biodiversity Management	IA/EA own:	\$4.10	4.18
Countries:	Mozambique	Government:	5.67	5.98
		Other*:	0.84	0.95
		Total Cofinancing	6.51	6.93
Operational Program:	OP#2: Coastal, Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems; Focal Area: Biodiversity	Total Project Cost:	\$10.61	\$11.11
IA	World Bank	<u>Dates</u>		
Partners involved:	Govt. of Mozambique – Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA)	Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		Jan. 2001
		Closing Date	Proposed: June 2005	Actual: Dec. 2007
Prepared by: Pallavi Nuka	Reviewed by: Neeraj Negi	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing (in months): 54 months	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing (in months): 78 months	Difference between original and actual closing (in months): 24 months
Author of TE: Aniceto Timoteo Bila		TE completion date: March. 2008	TE submission date to GEF EO: March. 2008	Difference between TE completion and submission date (in months): 0

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS AND KEY FINDINGS

Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluation reviews for further definitions of the ratings.

Performance Dimension	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office evaluations or reviews	GEF EO
2.1a Project outcomes	MS	MS	MU	MU
2.1b Sustainability of Outcomes	N/A	Significant Risks	High	MU(2)
2.1c Monitoring and evaluation	MU	MS	Negligible	HU
2.1d Quality of implementation and Execution	MS	MS	U	MU
2.1e Quality of the evaluation report	N/A	N/A	U	MU

2.2 Should the terminal evaluation report for this project be considered a good practice? Why?

No, the terminal evaluation (ICR) is based on achievement of activities under each component rather than on the achievement of environmental and developmental objectives. As a consequence, the report does not indicate whether the approach to sustainable development being tested in the project was successful or whether there has been any improvement in the management of coastal zones. The report does not provide specific information on the community development subprojects financed nor does it adequately explain the Bank's decision to finance a costly biodiversity

center at Pemba. The report also contains inconsistencies in cost reporting. The project cost table (Annex 1) in the report lists Borrower contribution as zero, although the Govt. of Mozambique was obligated to co-finance the project, and according to the GRM reports did.

2.3 Are there any evaluation findings that require follow-up, such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, mismanagement, etc.?

No such findings were mentioned in the report.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

3.1 Project Objectives

a. What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

The global environmental objective this project was “to ensure the effective protection of globally significant coastal and marine habitats and species” through the establishment of co-management systems for key marine and terrestrial conservation areas and adjacent buffer zones.

There were no changes in global environmental objectives during implementation.

b. What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation? (Describe and insert tick in appropriate box below, if yes at what level was the change approved (GEFSEC, IA or EA)?)

This project was designed as a pilot project to test an integrated approach to sustainable economic development. The development objective of the project was “to test and refine a participatory approach to sustainable economic development of coastal zone resources.” This was to be accomplished through “a strategic development planning process that balanced ecological, social and physical values, with the varying development interests in the coastal zone.” The project components were:

- (1) Creation and adoption, by national, provincial and district authorities in the pilot areas, of strategic spatial plans that fully integrate conservation with regional development.
- (2) Improved institutional capacity for integrated coastal zone management at provincial and district level and initiation of community-based conservation activities in key areas.
- (3) Sustainable private sector development and identification of best practices for biodiversity friendly development
- (4) Capacity building of key government and non-government stakeholders responsible for biodiversity protection, and raising public awareness of the value of conservation.

According to the ICR, the development objectives were never “formally revised,” but there were significant “adjustments” following the Sept. 2003 mid-term review to both the objectives and the GEO indicators. Following the mid-term review, Component 3 was dropped due to delays in developing spatial development plans and the allocation to Component 2 was increased to \$5.65M to cover construction of the \$3.9M Pemba Research Center. The reasoning behind the Pemba Center is not clear, but based on information in the ICR, the government wanted a large research station (rather than two small ones) in order to concentrate technical, human and financial resources. The Bank approved the construction of the center based on project savings and as a result of the changes introduced at the mid-term review. There were also minor changes to the other project components.

Overall Environmental Objectives	Project Development Objectives	Project Components	Any other (specify)	
		X		
c. If yes, tick applicable reasons for the change (in global environmental objectives and/or development objectives)				
Original objectives not sufficiently articulated	Exogenous conditions changed, causing a change in objectives	Project was restructured because original objectives were over ambitious	Project was restructured because of lack of progress	Any other (specify)
		X		

4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND SUSTAINABILITY

4.1.1 Outcomes (Relevance can receive either a satisfactory rating or a unsatisfactory rating. For effectiveness and cost efficiency a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU will be used)

a. Relevance (of outcomes to focal areas/operational program strategies and country priorities) Rating: S	
A.1. What is the relevance of the project outcomes/results to:	
(i) The national sustainable development agenda and development needs and challenges?	
Recent rapid growth in most of Mozambique's major sectors including agriculture, tourism, mining, energy and industry, poses a serious risk to the national natural resource base unless development is appropriately managed. Ensuring sustainable utilization of natural resources is therefore a priority for the country.	
(ii) The national environmental framework, agenda and priorities?	
This project is closely linked to the National Environmental Management Program (1994), which identified the need for integrated coastal zone management as one of the top five national priorities. This led to the development of a draft National Coastal Zone Management Policy and Program (CZMP) with the aim of addressing coastal zone issues in an integrated and coordinated manner. The project objectives are also consistent with the National Program for Forestry and Wildlife (PNFFB), which outlines the social, ecological, and economic objectives for terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity conservation, including increased community participation in terrestrial and marine resource management and conservation. This project implemented part of the coastal and marine strategy of this program, focusing on northern Mozambique.	
(iii) The achievement of the GEF strategies and mandate?	
The proposed project is consistent with the goals of the GEF Biodiversity Operational Program 2 addressing Coastal and Marine Ecosystems. The key conservation sites which will receive GEF support under the program have been identified as priority sites of global importance in the IUCN Review "A Global Representative System of Marine Protected Areas."	
(iv) The implementation of the global conventions the GEF supports (countries obligations and responsibilities towards the convention as well as the achievement of the conventions objectives)	
This project is consistent with the guidelines of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP), which stresses <i>in situ</i> conservation activities of coastal and marine ecosystems. It specifically responds to the Jakarta Mandate endorsed at COP2 by supporting conservation and sustainable use of vulnerable marine habitats and species.	
A2. Did the project promote of International (Regional and / or Global) Cooperation and Partnership¹	
The project did not have any international or regional linkages.	
b. Effectiveness	Rating: MS
<p>The project has achieved a number of outputs in three out the four original components. Spatial development plans (SDPs) were completed for all four pilot districts and are under implementation in two districts (Palma and Mossuril). Two conservation areas have been identified and are currently in the process of being legally ratified. A new biodiversity research center has been constructed at Pemba and will start monitoring of marine ecosystems. The project has implemented 50 small-scale income generation projects and it has improved the capacity of local governments and communities to manage coastal and marine resources. However, due late completion of the SDPs the project abandoned the component focused on private sector development. Moreover, it was not be able to accomplish the monitoring and evaluation required as a pilot project, which would permit comparison of this particular integrated approach to sustainable economic development with other approaches.</p> <p>The SDP component was designed to provide provincial and district administrations with strategic planning tools to facilitate sustainable use of coastal and marine resources. All four SDPs incorporate biodiversity and conservation concerns as well as the results of social-economic surveys. The completion of SDPs was delayed by almost 3.5 years, preventing implementation of the project's third component focusing on private sector development. Based on information in the ICR, the SDPs provide useful planning tools for provincial and district authorities, but their lack of legal status puts their long-term utility in doubt. The project could have benefited from policy and institutional reforms that would have provided a legal basis for compliance with the SDPs in the district planning process. The project has also supported the preparation of other instruments such as Coastal Zone Management Strategy (currently under review), which, if adopted at the national level, may provide the legal clout that the SDPs lack.</p> <p>The coastal zone management component has had mixed effectiveness. Two areas for conservation of critical biodiversity were identified under this component, but protected area status is yet to be given to these regions. At the time of project closing, these areas were still in the process of legal ratification due to the presence of human</p>	

¹ Please consider for regional and global project only

settlements in the proposed areas. According to the ProDoc, two small research stations were to be constructed under this component. Instead the Pemba Research Center was built and opened in April 2007. The Pemba Center is charged with biological monitoring of the coastal zone, and in coordination with Institute for Fisheries' Research is monitoring of small scale fishing in the six coastal districts of the Cabo Delgado Province.

The micro-project sub-component of the project had a slow start, but in the last two years of project implementation, more than 50 micro-projects were approved and implemented in the four pilot areas. The ICR notes that while this sub-component was effective, with 1800 households affected and a high IRR, its sustainability following project closing is doubtful.

The private sector development component was designed to build on the results of the SDPs and raise private sector involvement in conservation. The project did commission a study on financial mechanisms for private sector conservation, but the remaining activities under this component were dropped following the mid-term evaluation, when it became obvious that the SDPs would not be completed on schedule.

According to the ICR, the capacity-building component of the project was successfully implemented. More than 450 people were trained on sustainable management of natural resources as well as leadership and community conflict management. 40 district facilitators were trained in community awareness and capacity building and more than 25 communities benefitted from training workshops in the project area. Eight government employees completed Masters' Degrees on coastal zone management through project funding.

c. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness)

Rating: U

The project closed 2.5 years later than originally planned without completion of a major component and significant changes in other components. As a result of the delays and changes in project components, critical monitoring and evaluation activities were begun only a year before closing. However, reallocation of funds between project components meant that the total project cost was within the budgeted range.

The terminal evaluation (ICR) estimates a "collective financial IRR" of 32.7% for the small community development micro-projects, but it also points to serious sustainability concerns and suggests that the associated "overhead costs" were comparatively high (29% of delivered funds). There was no economic or financial analysis of the project's single largest investment, the Biodiversity and Marine Research Center at Pemba, whose annual operating costs are expected to exceed US\$ 350,000. The ICR describes this research center as a "potential direct cash liability."

The two areas identified for conservation comprise 81,000 ha, but legal establishment of these protected areas is pending. According to the ICR: "there is no reliable basis for estimating the total economic value of natural habitats in the target area" At the time of project preparation, potential revenues from tourism were estimated at US\$500 million annually. Capturing even a portion of this benefit still requires implementation of the management plans of Palma and Mossuril conservation areas, and according the SDPs the legal standing necessary to guarantee tenure and resource use.

d. To what extent did the project result in trade offs between environment and development priorities / issues (not to be rated) – this could happen both during the designing of the project where some choices are made that lead to preference for one priority over the other, and during implementation of the project when resources are transferred from addressing environmental priorities to development priorities and vice versa. If possible explain the reasons for such tradeoffs.

The project design attempted to balance environmental and developmental priorities with components focusing on biodiversity conservation and research as well components addressing sustainable use, alternative livelihoods, and private sector participation in conservation. During implementation a choice was made to invest in the Pemba Marine Research Center, an environmental priority, and the private sector development component was dropped. This was the result of delays completing and implementing the SDPs, From an implementation standpoint, it was easier for the project team to achieve a top-down activity, like construction of the Pemba Center, within the project time-frame, than to pursue a private sector development mechanism, which would have required seeking input and consensus among several government agencies, and numerous private developers.

4.1.2 Results / Impacts² (Describe Impacts) (please fill in annex 1 – results scoresheet and annex 2 – focal area impacts (against GEF Strategic Priority indicators, where appropriate and possible)

² Please consider direct and indirect global environmental results; any unexpected results; local development benefits (including results relevant to communities, gender issues, indigenous peoples, NGOs and CBOs)

Although this project failed to realize the objectives of explicit protection of key coastal habitats and private sector participation in conservation, it did put some systems and plans in place that make the realization of such benefits in the future more likely. The project targeted institutional strengthening and capacity building in decision support systems, such as spatial development plans, conservation area management systems, and training for communities, and governments at the national, provincial, and district levels. The project has contributed to enhanced staff performance and community participation through these training on leadership and conflict management, basic techniques for coastal zone management for technicians and district administrators. The micro-project sub-component was successful in stimulating a wide diversity of alternative income generating activities and promoting sustainable use of natural resources. The construction of the Pemba Research Center has permitted the government to start monitoring marine and coastal ecosystems and will provide a base for future biodiversity research in Mozambique. The center has attracted international research funding and may potentially boost eco-tourism in the area.

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four point scale (4= Likely (no or negligible risk); 3= Moderately Likely (low risk); 2= Moderately Unlikely (substantial risks) to 1= Unlikely (High risk)). The ratings should be given taking into account both the probability of a risk materializing and the anticipated magnitude of its effect on the continuance of project benefits.

a. Financial resources	Rating: MU (2)
At the project closing, there was no guaranteed or proposed follow-on funding for project activities, for micro-projects, or for the Pemba Research Center, which has operating costs of \$0.35 M annually. The project team is exploring possible funding sources include the Aga Kahn foundation, and the Nuffield foundation in the UK. The government may eventually absorb the Pemba Center's costs.	
b. Socio-economic / political	Rating: L (4)
The project has improved local capacities with regard to coastal zone management and biodiversity conservation. Local communities' experience with the micro-project has been positive and generated popular support for alternative income-generative activities. The public outreach campaign has been successful in raising awareness of the value of bio-diversity.	
c. Institutional framework and governance	Rating: MU (2)
The lack financial mechanisms to promote private sector participation in conservation may limit the ability of local governments to follow the SDPs. The coastal zone management strategy is under national review. But, until it is adopted, the lack of inter-sectoral coordination on biodiversity policy at the national level may hamper sustainable use of coastal resources. There are also unresolved issues regarding land tenure and resource rights in the proposed conservation areas.	
d. Environmental	Rating: ML (3)
The presence of communities living inside the proposed protected areas poses a small risk for conservation in these areas, unless these communities are trained in sustainable resource management.	
e. Technological	Rating: N/A
There were no technological risks associated with the project.	

4.3 Catalytic role³

a. INCENTIVES: To what extent have the project activities provide incentives (socio-economic / market based) to contribute to catalyzing changes in stakeholders?
The project funded over 50 micro-projects to promote alternative income-generating activities.
b. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: To what extent have the project activities contributed to changing institutional behaviors?
The project put in place planning tools (the SDPs) that will facilitate rational use of the natural resources by provincial and district authorities more likely in the future.
c. POLICY CHANGE: To what extent have project activities contributed to policy changes (and implementation of policy)?
The project has promoted the definition of a new type of protected area in Mozambique that would apply to site with human habitation. The project has also supported regulations on pollution in coastal areas, and has developed district wide macro-zoning plans (under implementation) and a national coastal zone management plan (under review).
d. CATALYTIC FINANCING: To what extent did the project contributed to sustained follow-on financing from Government and / or other donors? (This is different than co-financing.)
The project has not secured any sustained follow-on funding.
e. PROJECT CHAMPIONS: To what extent have changes (listed above) been catalyzed by particular individuals or institutions (without which the project would not have achieved results)?

³ Please review the 'Catalytic Role of GEF: How is it measured and evaluated – A conceptual framework' prior to addressing this section.

No such champions were mentioned.

4.4 Assessment of processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

a. Co-financing. To what extent was the reported cofinancing (or proposed cofinancing) essential to achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The proposed co-financing of \$0.84 M from the Govt. of Mozambique was essential for the project management and evaluation component. The TE report notes that the provision of counterpart funding has been a problem from the start of project implementation. In the first year of implementation the project was not registered at the National Budget and therefore was not eligible for counterpart funding. Towards the end of the project, more than a year passed before the government made funding available to pay the contractor involved in the construction of the research center in Pemba. These delays substantially affected project implementation, and on occasions the Bank team brought the issue to the attention of government. The government met its obligations, but in most cases with substantial delays

b. Delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?

There was a 2.5 year extension of the closing date resulting due to delays in implementing the SDPs and the additional time required to construct the large Pemba Research Center, which was introduced into the project following the mid-term evaluation. Due to late completion of the SDPs, the project was obliged to drop a major component focusing on private sector participation in conservation. Additional delays in the disbursement of counterpart funding held up project implementation at various stages, as noted above.

c. Country Ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability highlighting the causal links.

The poor level of country ownership at the national level has hampered project implementation, but ownership at the local and district level has been strong and has operated to improve and sustain outcomes. The national level executing agencies originally charged with the project were unable to coordinate effectively and withdrew from the project early on. At mid-term review the project was devolved to provincial and district level governments, which according to the terminal evaluation report improved outcomes, as incentives were clearer at this level.

4.5 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

a. M&E design at Entry Rating (six point scale): MS

The M&E plan in the ProDoc was based on a logical framework with indicators for each outcome and a list of critical assumptions. The ICR notes that most of the indicators were oriented on outputs rather than outcomes. Review of the Project document's logframe shows that higher level indicators were also included in order to monitor progress towards achievement of objectives. Monitoring and evaluation of progress and impacts was to be carried out through a detailed monitoring plan specifying the key indicators, data needs and data collection methods. This plan was to be developed by an independent consultant at the start of the project. Consultants were also responsible for evaluating and consolidating the monitoring data into semi-annual monitoring reports. These reports were to form the basis of the semi-annual Project review meetings.

b. M&E plan Implementation Rating (six point scale): HU

Work on the development of an M&E plan was delayed until the end of 2003 and the final M&E plan was presented in draft form in April 2005, four years into implementation. A pilot project should not have taken so long to develop and implement an M&E plan. This large time gap between the start-up of project activities and the finalization of a comprehensive M&E system prevented the project from capturing many of the lessons from project implementation.

b.1 Was sufficient funding provided for M&E in the budget included in the project document?

Yes, \$2.4M included in the budget proposed in the ProDoc for Project Management and M&E. This was to "finance the direct equipment, and operational and incremental staff costs of project coordination and management at the central and local level," as well as to support "the development and implementation of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism" including "data collection and processing, and an independent monitoring and evaluation team." The M&E system was charged to "(i) assess the overall effectiveness of the project in the context of the CZMP; (ii) evaluate the effectiveness in achieving project specific outputs and development objectives; (iii) incorporate and expand ecological indicators for the broader project area, including assessing impact at a landscape level (building on component 2.2); (iv) monitor the status of the social conditions of the pilot areas measured against the baselines established in component 1; and (v) advise on the most effective institutional structure for the future collection and evaluation of monitoring data concerning the state of the coastal zone."

b.2a Was sufficient and timely funding provided for M&E during project implementation? Unable to assess.

b.2b To what extent did the project monitoring system provided real time feed back? Was the information that was provided used effectively? What factors affected the use of information provided by the project monitoring system? The project team was unable to complete the M&E plan design in time to effectively implement it.

b.3 Can the project M&E system (or an aspect of the project M&E system) be considered a good practice? If so, explain why. U/A

4.6 Assessment of Quality of Implementation and Execution

a. Overall Quality of Implementation and Execution (on a six point scale): MU

b. Overall Quality of Implementation – for IA (on a six point scale): MU

Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as quality of the project design, focus on results, adequacy of supervision inputs and processes, quality of risk management, candor and realism in supervision reporting, and suitability of the chosen executing agencies for project execution.

The implementing agency for this project was the World Bank. The ICR rates IA performance as moderately satisfactory. But based on information in the ICR, the IA clearly underestimated national capacity for project implementation and management. The project was complex and involved multiple executing agencies that had no previous experience working together on integrated projects like this one. The ICR states “Simpler design adjusted to the implementation capacity could have improved implementation **and** project outcomes.”

The technical review of the project contained in the ProDoc clearly states that Component 1, creation of spatial development plans (SDPs), was beyond country resources and capacity and perhaps unnecessary even for the stated environmental objectives. Yet, this project component was not revised before the project start. As a result, the SDPs were delivered only in March 2007, three months before IDA credit closed and a rather more critical project component concerning private sector conservation was not implemented.

Another factor overlooked in project design was the issue of land tenure and resource rights in the project areas. The presence of human settlements in the proposed conservation areas was highlighted as a significant risk in the ProDoc. But the project design and objectives were not adjusted to account for this risk.

The quality of IA supervision is rated as Satisfactory in the ICR. But the IEG notes that Bank supervision was insufficient during the initial years of project implementation. During supervision missions, the focus was on issues that affect implementation and identifying fixes. Financial management and procurement was monitored through supervision missions and independent audits, but the project team needed more training than the Bank provided. The recommendations of the mid-term review were implemented effectively. However, the IA, by all accounts, did not push strongly for implementation of a project M&E system, and consequently the project team was not focused on results and outcomes. “Intensive supervision” by the Bank team (ICR) was necessary in the last two years to achieve outcomes. From these ICR and IEG reports, it is clear that additional training and supervision in the first half of the implementation period could have improved results.

c. Quality of Execution – for Executing Agencies⁴ (rating on a 6 point scale): U

Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as focus on results, adequacy of management inputs and processes, quality of risk management, and candor and realism in reporting by the executive agency.

Despite efforts made at the project design stage to ensure effective participation by partner executing agencies, MICOA, the National Directorate for Forestry and Wildlife (NDFW), and the National Coastal Zone Management Policy and Program (CZMP), they experienced problems in working together from early on and withdrew from the project. At the mid term-review the Bank team recognized the need for decentralization of project implementation to the provinces and districts where “incentives were much clearer.”

The ICR rates overall borrower performance as moderately satisfactory, despite major shortcomings and an overall poor quality of execution. Counterpart funding did not materialize until more than a year after grant effectiveness. In the first year of project implementation, the project was not eligible for counterpart funding because it was not registered with the Ministry of Finance. There were delays getting the Strategic Development Planning consultancy underway. There was a lack of ownership on the part of the initial executing agencies and overall inexperience with Bank procedures regarding procurement, disbursement and financial management severely affected project outcomes. Project oversight bodies developed by the government, the sustainable development council and the inter-agency technical committee for the coastal zone, never convened.

The Bank supervisory team brought these issues to the attention of government during missions, and at the mid-term review an agreement was reached to restructure the project. However, the PDOs and GEOs were never formally revised. According to the ICR the participation of provincial district governments following the restructuring was

⁴ Executing Agencies for this section would mean those agencies that are executing the project in the field. For any given project this will exclude Executing Agencies that are implementing the project under expanded opportunities – for projects approved under the expanded opportunities procedure the respective executing agency will be treated as an implementing agency.

“very positive” and crucial to achieving few successful project outcomes.

5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assess the project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

a. Briefly describe the key lessons, good practice or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects

1. *Monitoring and evaluation systems should be an integral part of project design.* The project structure and objectives had a focus on learning, but the lack of an adequate M&E system prevented capture of some of the lessons learned during implementation. From project identification the Bank should support the implementing agencies in establishing and maintaining a valid M&E system, in case of insufficient capacity.
2. *Modest objectives and indicators for small pilot project.* This project was designed as pilot with the objective of testing a sustainable development mechanism involving conservation and economic activities. The project had altogether 10 indicators, which were difficult to achieve given the economic and political situation of the country.
3. *Multiple implementing agencies make implementation difficult.* The number of agencies involved in implementation increased the complexity of the project and made coordination difficult. Project design should be kept simple for a low capacity environment.

b. Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation

Linkage between the integrated development planning component and policy reform is important. A combination of integrated development planning outcomes with policy reform would have been beneficial to the project outcomes, by setting the legal or administrative basis for the use of spatial development plans after the project closes.

6. QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings based on other information sources such as GEF EO field visits, other evaluations, etc.

Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluations review for further definitions of the ratings. Please briefly explain each rating.

6.2 Quality of the terminal evaluation report	Ratings
<p>a. To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?</p> <p>The TE evaluation provides an assessment of the achievement of activities under each component. The achievement of project development and environment objectives is mentioned briefly, and project impacts are discussed briefly.</p>	MU
<p>b. To what extent the report is internally consistent, the evidence is complete/convincing and the IA ratings have been substantiated? Are there any major evidence gaps?</p> <p>There are some inconsistencies in reporting counterpart funds, and some gaps – for example, the report does not adequately explain the Bank's decision to undertake establishment a costly biodiversity center at Pemba. The TE (ICR) ratings are on the whole more favorable than the IEG ratings.</p>	MU
<p>c. To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy?</p> <p>The report contains a fair assessment of project sustainability and risks to outcomes.</p>	S
<p>d. To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?</p> <p>The lessons learned are all supported by the evidence presented, but overlook basic lessons regarding government capacities to implement projects.</p>	MS
<p>e. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual</p>	MU

co-financing used? The report includes project costs by component. Actual co-financing amounts are not included.	
f. Assess the quality of the reports evaluation of project M&E systems? The report includes a brief evaluation of the projects M&E system.	MS

7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRERATATION OF THE TERMINAL EVALUTION REVIEW REPORT EXCLUDING PIRs, TERMINAL EVALUATIONS, PAD.

8 Project stakeholders and Key Contacts (Names, addresses, emails etc – mandatory for field visit countries)

9. Information Gaps (for Field visit countries only)