

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2014

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		66	
GEF Agency project ID		4981	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		Red Sea Coastal And Marine Resource Management	
Country/Countries		Egypt	
Region		AFR	
Focal area		Biodiversity	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		OP2: Coastal, marine and freshwater ecosystems	
Executing agencies involved		Egyptian Government: Tourism Development Authority (TDA); Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA); Red Sea Governorate (RSG)	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Secondary executing agency (Hurghada Environmental Protection and Conservation Association (HEPCA))	
Private sector involvement		Secondary executing agency (Investors' Environmental Association)	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		04/01/92	
Effectiveness date / project start		12/30/94	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		09/30/96	
Actual date of project completion		06/30/02	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding		
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		4.750	4.417
Co-financing	IA own		
	Government	0.980	0.860
	Other multi- /bi-laterals		
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		4.750	4.417
Total Co-financing		0.980	0.860
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		5.730	5.277
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		12/27/02	
TE submission date		12/30/02	
Author of TE		N/A	
TER completion date		10/07/14	
TER prepared by		Sean Nelson	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Joshua Schneck	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	N/R	S	S	S
Sustainability of Outcomes	N/R	L	L	ML
M&E Design	N/R	N/R	-N/R	MU
M&E Implementation	N/R	N/R	-N/R	U/A
Quality of Implementation	N/R	S	S	MS
Quality of Execution	N/R	S	S	S
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	-	-	S	MS

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

As stated in the Project Document (PD) the GEO of the project is protecting biodiversity in the Red Sea, especially along the coasts. The Red Sea has a unique combination of coral reefs and wetlands, due to it being “the most saline body of water in direct connection with the world's oceans” (PD, p. 1). The region’s biodiversity was under threat due to shipping, tourism and oil extraction.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The primary DO was to create a Coastal Zone Management (CZM) program to allow for sustainable development around the Red Sea without harming biodiversity. At the time of the Project Document’s (PD) writing, people were moving from the Nile Valley to the Red Sea’s coast due to greater economic opportunities, which threatened to put further stress on the local ecology. Local businesses often saw their interests in conflict. In particular, the tourism and oil extraction sectors faced different incentives. Oil extraction, especially oil spills, threatened the tourism sector’s growth.

The 3 primary project goals are: 1) to stop biodiversity loss on the Red Sea, especially regarding the coral reefs; 2) to stop Egyptian pollution into the Red Sea; and 3) to show that institutional, legislative, scientific and management remedies can both protect local biodiversity while also promoting sustainable development. If Egypt can achieve this third goal, other Red Sea countries may do the same. The PD defines the following 6 project components:

- 1) Coastal Zone Management Plan
- 2) Environmental Assessment Capability
- 3) Marine Pollution Control
- 4) Reef Recreation Management
- 5) Marine Protected Area Establishment

6) CZM Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The TE notes that **no** changes were made to the GEOs or the DOs.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: Satisfactory
----------------------	-----------------------------

This project was relevant to the GEF under OP2: Coastal, marine and freshwater resources. The Red Sea was under threat due to oil exploration, shipping and tourism activities. Coral reefs and coastal wetlands were particularly vulnerable. This project was also relevant to the Egyptian government's environmental and local development goals. On the one hand, the government wished to continue oil exploration, but this also undermined local biodiversity and the tourism sector. Both the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Petroleum recognized that sustainable development along the Red Sea coast was necessary, but they lacked the institutional capacity to turn these wishes into results. This project was initially formally associated with the larger World Bank Private Sector Tourism Infrastructure and Environmental Management Project.

4.2 Effectiveness	Rating: Satisfactory
--------------------------	-----------------------------

Summary: The project completed and implemented the CZM Plan, which was the project's most important component. In addition, staff at all 3 executing Ministries received training, but the TE provides little detail on the quality or scope of the training. Environmental concerns have been formally integrated into the executing agencies, including through the new Environmental Unit within the Tourism Development Authority. Numerous local surveys and research projects helped to create a better understanding of the local ecology and environmental weaknesses. The project also built a

Visitors Center that can become a hub of local sustainable tourism activity and promotion. However, the CZM M&E process appears to have been inadequate.

1) Coastal Zone Management Plan: Satisfactory

The CZM Plan was completed as of September 1998. The Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), the Tourism Development Authority (TDA) and the Red Sea Governate (RSG) are in charge of carrying out the Plan. The TE does not assess the quality of the CZM Plan. The CZM Plan's design was based on numerous local surveys and research, including local species surveys. In addition, the Plan was also informed by the government's "Framework Program for Development of a National ICZM Plan for Egypt."

2) Environmental Assessment Capability: Satisfactory

The TDA now operates an Environmental Unit. It requires that tourism projects have to conform to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) regulations. The staff has "received adequate training" (TE, p. 7). The Environmental Unit has catalogued pollutant types and sources, as well as identifying where Egyptian environmental legislation needs to be strengthened and conducting public education campaigns.

3) Marine Pollution Control: Satisfactory

From 1997 to 1998, the project undertook marine pollution control research along the Red Sea coast. Among the topics covered were protecting coral reef and mangrove habitats, controlling pollution from oil drilling, M&E and environmental enforcement. The EEAA now has 40 Rangers patrolling the coast.

4) Reef Recreation Management: Moderately Satisfactory

The Reef Recreation Management Unit (RRMU) at the GEF office in Hurghada, along with the consulting firm McAlister Elliott Ltd, presented a Reef Recreation Management Plan in mid-1998. It created a framework for zoning and monitoring the reefs in the Hurghada – Safaga area. However, it is unclear if this Plan was ever implemented.

5) Marine Protected Area Establishment: Satisfactory

This component produced the Protected Areas Management Plan in May 1998, which outlines GEF support priorities for the Egyptian government's National Biodiversity Strategy and the National Coastal Zone Management Strategy. Both McAlister Elliott Ltd and the project team collaborated to produce this Plan. It built off of the ecosystem surveys and species inventories that the project had completed earlier. The key Plan component was the International Visitors Center (IVC) near Marsa Alam, which saw construction finished in 2001. The Investors' Environmental Association, a collection of local businesses focused on the hotel sector, help to run and manage the Visitors Center.

6) CZM Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): Unable to Assess

The TE is unclear on the difference between project M&E and the CZM M&E component. The TE provides scarce and confusing evidence regarding the quality of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) and the Project Evaluation Report, which were the 2 main M&E outputs. According to the TE, “in the two areas (Soma Bay and Marsa Alam), where the GEF project had direct involvement on the ground, [Bank] involvement has had positive effects” (TE, p. 8). However, it is unclear from the TE's description if the high quality of monitoring at Soma Bay was due to this project or the Tourism Infrastructure Project. The TE states that diving sites in Safaga remained “poorly managed” (TE, p. 8), which opened up local coral reefs to exploitation and degradation. It is unclear if this is due to poor monitoring or poor enforcement.

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
----------------	--

Summary: The project met with initial delays due to problems with project design and poor management. However, the project rapidly improved in efficiency when the original Project Manager (PM) was replaced with a new PM. In addition, the project came in under budget.

Delays and Management Issues: The project was affected by delays in carrying out a larger linked World Bank project: Private Sector Tourism Infrastructure and Environmental Management Project (LN 36050). Delays carrying out LN 36050 spilled over to this GEF project, though the TE does not specify what those delays were. The projects were later de-linked.

The project's 36-month time frame was originally separated into 2 stages: CZM Plan preparation/research (months 1-15) and initial CZM Plan implementation (months 16-36). However, this time frame turned out to be too ambitious. According to the TE, “after effectiveness, operationally the project continued to stay in a stage of 'preparation' for all 1995, largely addressing staffing, role clarification between the three joint agencies and disbursement arrangements” (TE, p. 5). The project did not become fully operational until 1997, which was after the September 1996 project closing date due to poor project management. Institutional weaknesses and greater than expected training needs also helped cause these delays.

The first year after project effectiveness saw delays due to difficulties in obtaining co-financing and challenges in complying with World Bank withdrawal and procurement standards and procedures. The project only started when it hired a PM and most (but not all) core staff in 1996. Purchasing equipment was only finished in 1997. 2 core team members resigned in 1997 due to problems with the PM's management ability. Both the PM and the Chief Planner resigned. The new PM appears to have improved project execution. The project received a 2-year extension, but the TE believes a longer extension should have been granted. Terrorist attacks also slowed down project execution by causing local logistical problems.

In addition, the EEAA was supposed to implement the Red Sea Protected Area (RSPA) “with USAID funding in parallel implementation with this project,” (TE, p. 6) but ranger hiring and training had only just begun as of the TE's writing.

Financial Management: The TE rated the project's financial management as satisfactory. All project cost components came in between 91 to 96 percent of the appraisal estimate. No component cost over 100 percent of the appraisal. The physical contingencies cost ended up being US\$0. Survey work came in under budget.

4.4 Sustainability	Rating: Moderately Likely
--------------------	----------------------------------

Summary: Local institutions, especially TDA and EEAA, had taken ownership of project activities. USAID and the EU funded ongoing relevant activities. However, terrorism threatened to impact tourism, which would affect local revenue streams.

The project's sustainability rating is assessed according to the following 4 risk factors.

Environmental: **Unable to Assess**

The TE does not include environmental risks to the project.

Financial: **Moderately Likely**

The project and the associated tourism groups that came out of this project have found ongoing financing for initiatives like the Red Sea Sustainable Tourism Initiative (RSSTI) from USAID and the EU. USAID appears to be the primary financier for associated activities. However, the project was also supposed to receive ongoing financing from tourism fees to carry out activities like running the Visitors Center in the newly developed Marsa Alem area. While Marsa Alem has seen a steady stream of tourism, other project areas and nearby areas have seen tourism drop due to terrorist attacks in the area and regional political unrest. USAID had created a Visitors Center management plan for sustainable development, which includes gaining both private and public sector support.

Institutional: **Likely**

The TDA and RSG require that all new construction or extensions in the project area must first undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The number of EEAA Rangers patrolling the Red Sea increased from 8 in 2000 to 40 in 2001 and growing, though this was behind schedule. In addition, TDA has enacted the RSSTI. As of the TE's writing, TDA had taken over project activities and integrated them into their normal operations. According to the TE, TDA and EEAA staff received adequate training.

Sociopolitical: **Moderately Likely**

Ongoing TDA and EEAA involvement reflect a high degree of country ownership. The TE contains little information on local community involvement or public opinion of the project. However, terrorism and a volatile regional political situation threatened local tourism, which threatened local funding.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

(Note: The TE's "Cofinanciers" section is left blank.)

The original estimated co-financing from the Egyptian government in the PD was US\$980,000 million in local currency. The actual amount distributed was US\$860,000. The government provided free land to build 2 project locations: the Marsa Alem Visitor Center and the EEAA Regional Branch Office (RBO) in Hurghada. Part of the reason actual co-financing was lower than expected co-financing was due to a lack of physical contingencies faced when executing this project, which had been factored into the original co-financing estimate. The TE notes that the project experienced "savings in the survey work and reports for the various project components," (TE, p. 10) but does not provide further details on these savings. The TE does not directly assess how the level of co-financing affected project outcomes.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project was affected by delays in carrying out a larger linked World Bank project: Private Sector Tourism Infrastructure and Environmental Management Project (LN 36050). Delays carrying out LN 36050 spilled over to this GEF project, though the TE does not specify what those delays were. The projects were later de-linked.

The project's 36-month time frame was originally separated into 2 stages: CZM Plan preparation/research (months 1-15) and initial CZM Plan implementation (months 16-36). However, this time frame turned out to be too ambitious. According to the TE, "after effectiveness, operationally the project continued to stay in a stage of 'preparation' for all 1995, largely addressing staffing, role clarification between the three joint agencies and disbursement arrangements" (TE, p. 5). The project did not become fully operational until 1997, which was after the September 1996 project closing date due to poor project management. Institutional weaknesses and greater than expected training needs also helped cause these delays.

The first year after project activities began saw delays due to difficulties in obtaining co-financing and challenges in complying with World Bank withdrawal and procurement standards and procedures. The project only started when it hired a Project Manager (PM) and most (but not all) core staff in 1996. Purchasing equipment was only finished in 1997. 2 core team members resigned in 1997 due to problems with the PM's management ability. Both the PM and the Chief Planner resigned. The new PM appears to have improved project execution. The project received a 2-year extension, but the TE believes a longer extension should have been granted.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

This project was executed by a collection of 3 Egyptian government agencies. The government is enforcing the project's CZM Plan. The TDA has integrated project initiatives into its ongoing activities. The 3 relevant ministries remained engaged throughout the process, partly due to the Egyptian government's Project Management Group's (PMG) coordination efforts. In addition, the PMG stepped in when necessary to replace the PM when the original PM was unable to execute the project satisfactorily. Development along the Red Sea now requires an EIA. In addition, the Egyptian government has expanded upon this project with further projects like the RSSTI, including securing EU and USAID funding.

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
-------------------------	--

The M&E design had a reasonably well-developed reporting schedule, including when a Mid-Term Review (called the mid-term progress report) would be presented. However, this was to be during the first year of the project in 1993, which the TE notes was too early. In addition, the indicators in the PD are often vague or non-existent (SMART or otherwise). This was partly because most components consisted of whether or not a certain task was completed (Example: "Publishing an atlas of the environmental resources of the Red Sea coast," PD, p. 25, Attachment 2). The M&E design in the PD does not address the quality of project execution, such as how to judge if the Red Sea coast atlas was of high quality. The PD does not include information on if and when the M&E indicators would be better developed. The TE does not include a dedicated budget for project M&E.

6.2 M&E Implementation	Rating: Unable to Assess
------------------------	---------------------------------

The TE rated the supervisory process as satisfactory on all levels. However, the TE is unclear on the difference between project M&E and CZM M&E as a project component and output. Since the TE provides scarce and confusing evidence regarding the quality of the M&E process, the MTR and the Project Evaluation Report, M&E implementation cannot be properly assessed.

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) was completed in November 1997. The M&E missions were run out of main Bank office in Egypt, which helped create a high level of communication, allowing for adaptive management. The TE notes that the monitoring in the Soma Bay area is effective, but it is unclear if this was part of this project or part of the related Tourism Infrastructure Project. Monitoring of coral reefs near Safaga needed to be improved.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
--	--

The TE notes that the project design was overly complicated. During project implementation, it became difficult to link the different project components together. In particular, the tourism and environmental protection goals often conflicted in practice, so they had to be separated from each other. In addition, the project design put too much focus on studies at the expense of being able to actually execute project activities in the field. The project design was overly ambitious for a 36-month time frame. Clarifying the 3 executing agencies' roles in relation to each other took longer than expected. The original project design was written with a poor understanding of where weaknesses existed within each of the 3 executing agencies. Finally, the project design lacked a guiding CZM framework to inform future action during project execution.

On the other hand, M&E appears to have been satisfactory and carried out with a high degree of communication and collaboration, though the TE is unclear on this point. According to the TE, "assistance provided by the Bank during the project's relatively long period of implementation helped the executing agencies to undertake the complex components and overcome any shortcomings in the original design" (TE, p. 12).

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: Satisfactory
---	-----------------------------

The Egyptian government executing agencies initially experienced a year-long delay "due to the lack of counterpart funding and difficulties in compliance with the Bank's standard procedures for withdrawals and procurement" (TE, p. 12). The project also experienced difficulties due to the first PM's poor

management. However, the PMG was able to adapt, such as de-linking the tourism and environmental components of the project and replacing the original PM with a new PM with greater project management skills. In the end, the project carried out work on all of its primary outputs.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

As this was largely a capacity-building project, there were no environmental changes due to the project noted in the TE.

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

While the project was designed with local economic growth due to sustainable tourism in mind, tourism growth due to this project was small due to nearby terrorist attacks (TE, p. 11). The Egyptian government places greater emphasis on environmental awareness public education campaigns targeting “investors and developers, international tourists, local communities, and school-children,” (TE, p. 9), but the TE does not give information on the scale or effectiveness of any public education campaigns.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

The project supported numerous surveys that have expanded the local knowledge base, including coastal mangrove stand inventories and marine biodiversity species surveys. In addition, the TE claims that “staff at TDA and EEAA has received adequate training” (TE, p. 7). The EEAA had 40 rangers patrolling the Egyptian portion of the Red Sea coast due to the project (TE, p. 11). As part of the Protected Areas Management Plan, the project supported building the Marsa Alam Visitors Center, which was finished in 2001 (TE, p. 8). Local executing agencies have also installed mooring buoys to protect untouched reefs to prevent future degradation or exploitation (TE, p. 9).

b) Governance

The project's CZM Plan is being enforced by the Egyptian government. As a result, the TDA now has an Environmental Unit, the EEAA requires that local development projects need to carry out EIAs and both the government and the private sector now have geographical information system (GIS) access (TE, p. 5, 7). The project helped to improve collaboration between the TDA, the EEAA and the Red Sea Governate, in addition to improving all 3 groups' collaboration with the local private sector (TE, p. 11). In addition, the project created a Reef Recreation Management Plan, this appears to have not been implemented as of the TE's writing. The project also supported writing the Protected Areas Management Plan, but it is unclear how much of this has been adopted beyond building the Visitors Center (TE, p. 8).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The TE does not note any unintended impacts due to this project.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The Egyptian government is carrying out the CZM Plan as part of its wider National Coastal Zone Management strategy (TE, p. 7). The RSSTI is helping to promote some environmentally-friendly tourism practices take from this project. The TDA has integrated this project's operations into its overall institutional framework (TE, p. 11).

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

The following is taken from the TE's "Lessons Learned" section.

Effective Impacts

- Promoting cooperation between government agencies can lead to improved project implementation. Since all 3 executing agencies were part of the day-to-day execution, they all were able to make sure their voices were heard and their interests addressed. These agencies have since hired the project staff, which helps ensure this project's goals and processes will be part of the government's approach to coastal biodiversity conservation and tourism promotion.
- GIS databases can have both government and private sector applications. Not only is the GIS database being used for CZM, but it is being used for investment planning as well. According to the TE, "the GIS has also proven to be an essential tool to achieve consensus amongst stakeholders" (TE, p. 13).
- Public-private partnerships, when well-executed, help to achieve project goals. NGO and private sector partners like the Hurghada Environmental Protection for Corals Agency (HEPCA), the Safaga Environmental Protection for Corals Agency, hotels and dive boat companies all helped achieve project goals.
- Spreading environmental awareness to private sector stakeholders can help ensure the private sector also holds project goals. The major local hotel operators formed the Investors' Environmental Association to run the Visitors Center and promote local sustainable development.
- Hiring both high-quality international experts and dedicated Egyptian nationals helped to ensure that there was knowledge spillover between both groups, which improved project execution.

Project Design

- Project goals and initiatives need to be consistent. This project should have put more emphasis on developing the CZM Plan, including crafting its overall framework earlier. This would have allowed the project team to carry out CZM activities sooner and more thoroughly, such as protecting local coral reefs.

Project Implementation

- Logistical and geographical considerations need more attention during project planning. The staff that actually carried out daily activities was going to be located in Hurghada, while policy and liaison work would be carried out in Cairo. However, not all intended staff was willing to

relocate to Hurghada for the duration of the project. As a result, both Cairo and Hurghada became field offices, which lowered collaboration between the different project units.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

Since the project's work was largely finished, project staff had already joined the relevant government agencies and ongoing work had secured USAID and EU financing already, there was relatively little need to put forward recommendations for the future. The TE does not have a dedicated "Recommendations" section, but the following can be inferred from the TE's body:

- In order to ensure proper monitoring, a greater number of rangers and boats will need to be operating along the Red Sea coast.
- CZM at Safaga diving sites will need to be improved to protect local coral reefs from exploitation.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TE systematically addresses each of the main project outputs. However, the TE makes no mention of whether or not the project had any effect on the rate of coral reef degradation or any other environmental impact or outcome.	MS
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The results are consistent except for the M&E sections (see below). The evidence included for project successes is often moderately convincing, but incomplete. There is no discussion of the quality of the CZM Plan or training programs. The TE also does not provide a great level of detail over why the project came in under budget.	MS
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The TE contains convincing information for financial and institutional factors affecting project sustainability. The sociopolitical factors are convincing, but the details of public understanding and engagement with biodiversity issues was lacking.	MS
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The “Lessons Learned” section is evidence-based. However, it does not provide a rationale or suggestions for improving CZM M&E, which is the project output that received the lowest rating in the TE. It also does not include a discussion of how CZM M&E went wrong.	MS
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	A budget with line items for project components is included in Annex 2, “Project Costs and Financing.” However, multiple expenditure categories are labeled “Miscellaneous” without explanation, though these items represented a small portion of total spending.	MS
Assess the quality of the report’s evaluation of project M&E systems:	The TE is contradictory on the quality of M&E. The TE rated project supervision as satisfactory, yet it also rated Output 6: “Reviewing, monitoring and evaluating the CZM project” as unsatisfactory. The former section had little detail. The latter was rated unsatisfactory due to poor protections of coral reefs at the Safaga diving company sites, but the TE does not establish that this was due to poor reviewing, monitoring and evaluating.	U
Overall TE Rating		MS

Overall TE rating: $(0.3 * (4+4)) + (0.1 * (4+4+4+2)) = 2.4 + 1.4 = 3.8 = \text{Moderately Satisfactory}$

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

1. Memorandum of the Director for a Egyptian Red Sea Coastal and Marine Resource Management Project, November 20, 1992, report number 11131 - EGT
2. Inception Report - December 1996
3. Baseline Studies Report - August 1997
4. Draft Coastal Management Action Plan - January 1998
5. Protected Areas Management Plan - May 1998
6. Reef Recreation Management Plan - May 1998
7. Final Coastal Zone Management Action Plan - September 1998
8. International Visitor Center Evaluation Report
9. Aide Memoires, Back-to-Office Reports and PSRs
10. Project Progress Reports