Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2014

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		68	
GEF Agency project ID		4871 (Algeria); 5347 (Morocco); 5588 (Tunisia)	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		Oil Pollution Management Project for the Southwest Mediterranean Sea	
Country/Countries		Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia	
Region		AFR	
Focal area		International Waters	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		OP-10: Contaminant-based operational program	
Executing agencies involved		Ministry of Transport (Algeria); Office d'Exploitation des Ports (Morocco); Office des Ports Nationaux Tunisiens (Tunisia)	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		N/A	
Private sector involvement		Secondary executing agency	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		04/06/1994	
Effectiveness date / project start		05/20/1994	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		12/31/1999	
Actual date of project completion		06/30/2000 (Algeria); 12/31/1999 (Morocco); 04/30/2000 (Tunisia)	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US $M)	**At Completion (US $M)**
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding		
	Co-financing		
GEF Project Grant		7.000 (A); 5.600 (M); 5.830 (T)	6.870 (A); 5.490 (M); 5.740 (T)
Co-financing	IA own		
	Government	0.390 (A); 0.700 (M); 0.520 (T)	5.100 (A); 1.240 (M); 2.550 (T)
	Other multi- /bi-laterals		
	Private sector		
	NGOs/CSOs		
Total GEF funding		7.000 (A); 5.600 (M); 5.830 (T)	6.870 (A); 5.490 (M); 5.740 (T)
Total Co-financing		0.390 (A); 0.700 (M); 0.520 (T)	5.100 (A); 1.240 (M); 2.550 (T)
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		7.390 (A); 6.300 (M); 6.350 (T)	11.97 (A); 6.730 (M); 8.290 (T)
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		06/10/2000 (Algeria); 05/05/2000 (Morocco); 04/28/2000 (Tunisia)	
TE submission date		06/12/2000	
Author of TE		N/A	
TER completion date		11/14/2014	
TER prepared by		Sean Nelson	
TER peer review by (if GEF EO review)		Joshua Schneck	

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	N/R	S	S	S
Sustainability of Outcomes	N/R	L	L	ML
M&E Design	N/R	N/R	N/R	U
M&E Implementation	N/R	N/R	N/R	U/A
Quality of Implementation	N/R	S	S	MS
Quality of Execution	N/R	S	S	S
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	-	-	S*	MS

*Only the Moroccan TE received an IA Evaluation Office Review rating. This field was left blank for the Tunisian and Algerian TEs.

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

Please note: This document covers 3 separate but interrelated TEs. The Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian sides of the project each had their own World Bank project ID and had a separate TE written. While these TEs include much overlap, including identical paragraphs on common elements, some sections are specific to a particular country's experience.

The project's overall GEO was to reduce the amount of petroleum products and pollutants that entered Mediterranean waters off the coast of the 3 project countries. At the time of the Project Document's (PD) writing, about 30 percent of all world oil traffic moved through the western Mediterranean. The area was averaging about 1 major oil spill a year in its waters. Ships also regularly released oily ballast and bilge waters, which also contributed to local pollution. These factors together affected the local environment, human development and tourism. Such oil pollution also negatively affects fishing waters and local ecosystems.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

The project's main DO was to build up capacity in the 3 project countries for ocean oil pollution management. All 3 countries lacked the ocean monitoring infrastructure to ensure international conventions on oil pollution in the ocean and the planning and response capacity to respond to oil spills. The project was made up of national objectives and regional objectives. They were as follows:

A) National Elements

1. Deballasting facilities: The project aims to improve deballasting facilities in 3 ports: Arzew in Algeria, Mohammedia in Morocco and Bizerte in Tunisia.

2. Construction: The project will build sheds in all project countries to hold relevant equipment, such as equipment to combat oil spills. Equipment and training will also be

provided. The project will also sponsor the construction of Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) stations in Algeria, but not Morocco and Tunisia since the latter 2 countries already have or are planning to have an adequate VTS in place.

3. Oily materials treatment: A system will be put in place to treat oily materials at processing centers. Selling re-refined materials will help improve the project's financial sustainability. Treatment will be done in an environmentally sound manner in compliance with MARPOL 73/78.

4. Oil spill contingency plan: The project would write and carry out oil spill contingency plans in all 3 countries. These would be based on risk assessment, in part to help ensure some degree of uniformity between the 3 countries to make coordination easier. The project would also provide training to support this component.

5. Oil spill response equipment: The project would provide the 3 countries with oil spill response equipment contingent on creating concrete pollution clean-up plans.

6. Monitoring and compliance: This component will improve monitoring capabilities of local institutions (research laboratories, etc.), while also creating an environmental management framework.

B) Regional Elements

1. Regional oil spill environmental sensitivity and contingency plans: According to the PD, "these plans will serve primarily as a template for national and local plans" (PD, p. 12) that will connect the 3 countries' national plans to each other.

2. Training: Training would be provided for 470 people across different project activities: 148 Algerians, 185 Moroccans and 137 Tunisians.

3. Regulatory mechanism, monitoring and compliance auditing: This component would ensure local financial management capacities were sufficient to carry out the project in a sustainable manner. In addition, the project needed to raise capacities to make sure the project did not simply push local pollution problems onto other Mediterranean countries outside of the project area.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

The TE does not mention any changes to the GEOs or the DOs.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 **Relevance**	Rating: **Satisfactory**

The project was relevant to the GEF under OP-10: Contaminant-based operational program. It was the first International Waters GEF project in the Mediterranean. The project aimed to stop and reverse hydrocarbon contamination of major international waters. Algeria at the time was in the middle of a multi-year process to strengthen and clarify its environmental regulatory framework, including attempting to regulate bilge oil and industrial waste and treat oil materials. Morocco's environmental regulations were often overlapping, so the government was attempting to consolidate its regulatory framework through World Bank projects: the Environmental Management Project and the Oil Pollution Management Project. This included reforming oil pollution regulation. The Tunisian Ministry of Environment and Land Planning (MEAT) was in the process of creating contingency plans to deal with oil spills.

4.2 **Effectiveness**	Rating: **Satisfactory**

Summary: The project promoted the creation of 3 National Contingency Plans (NPC) to combat oil spills, a Regional Contingency Plan (RPC) and raised the level of capacity to control pollution and respond to oil accidents. In addition, the project also took steps to prevent oil spills from occurring in the first place. The 3 project countries had representatives continuously meet through the project's Comite Regional Pour Coordination du Projet (CRCP), which was increasing coordination among project countries. The Algeria TE claims "the project has created the foundation for permanent cooperation in the region in terms of monitoring and compliance auditing, state of marine pollution reporting, and a common approach to spill response. It has potentially met the GEF objective of protecting international waters" (Algeria TE, p. 4). Overall, the project successfully reached its goals.

A) National Elements

1. Deballasting facilities **Satisfactory**

Algeria: Due to the project's efforts, the Arzew deballasting station was modernized to meet MARPOL standards for treating waste water.

Morocco: The Mohammedia deballasting station was improved to meet MARPOL standards for treating waste water.

Tunisia: The private sector firms of STIR and SOTULUB invested the money to upgrade relevant facilities and carried out these upgrades.

2. Construction **Satisfactory**

Algeria: The project built the VTS stations.

Morocco: Planned shed construction was completed.

Tunisia: Shed construction was carried out. Using savings from other project components, the project also built VTS stations in La Goulette.

3. Oily materials treatment **Satisfactory**

Algeria: The waste products from these deballasting stations in general are either being sold to the private sector or being recycled on-site.

Morocco: Oily materials are being re-refined through waste management programs.

Tunisia: The project contracted out treatment to 2 private firms: STIR (ballast water treatment) and SOTULUB (lubricant recycling).

4. Oil spill contingency plan **Satisfactory**

Algeria: The project wrote a NCP based on risk assessment to "assessment to identify and prioritize key actions to be taken at both the port and national levels" (Algeria TE, p. 3).

Morocco: The project designed a NCP that takes risk assessment into account. It outlines important actions that would need to be carried out at both the national and individual port levels. Involved parties are carrying out simulation exercises on a routine basis to test the NCP's quality and execution.

Tunisia: The project designed a NCP that takes risk assessment into account. It outlines important actions that would need to be carried out at both the national and individual port levels. Involved parties are carrying out simulation exercises on a routine basis to test the NCP's quality and execution.

5. Oil spill response equipment **Satisfactory**

Algeria: The Algerian government purchased environmental monitoring equipment and equipment to fight oil spills.

Morocco: The project purchased the required equipment. The purchasing agreements included training for personnel tasked with using the equipment.

Tunisia: The project purchased the required equipment. The purchasing agreements included training for personnel tasked with using the equipment.

6. Monitoring and compliance **Satisfactory**

Algeria: The project chose a national laboratory to carry out this component, but the TE does not name the specific laboratory. While the laboratory worked with the Bank to decide on and analyze baseline data, the laboratory was slow and sporadic at producing reports on seawater in project areas. Equipment purchasing delays caused this problem. Some equipment was never purchased.

Morocco: Local laboratories have taken on monitoring duties. Baseline studies of coastal waters were carried out. Follow-up reports have been produced every 6 months.

Tunisia: Local laboratories have taken on monitoring duties. Baseline studies of coastal waters were carried out. Follow-up reports have been produced every 6 months.

B) Regional Elements

1. Regional oil spill environmental sensitivity and contingency plans **Satisfactory**

The project sponsored the creation of a Regional Contingency Plan (RPC). The plan aims to protect coastal areas and to move spilled oil resources to select ports. Equipment is uniform among all 3 nations to make coordination easier. The plan also delineated potential sources of help from outside the 3 project countries. According to the Algerian TE, "the RCP is intended to serve as a template to link the national plans of the three countries" (Algeria TE, p. 3). The following organizations have signed a joint cooperative agreement to tackle oil spills: the ports at Algiers, Arzew, Bejaia and Skikda in Algeria, the Office d'Exploitation des Ports (ODEP) in Morocco and the Office de la Marine Marchande et des Ports (OMMP) in Tunisia. This agreement spells out each group's responsibilities.

2. Training **Satisfactory**

The project carried out joint training of personnel and joint simulations in service of the RCP in all 3 countries. This was done to encourage coordination and ensure that staff in all 3 countries had common skills and capacities. Three levels of personnel received specialized training:

Level I: Port managers, civil protection managers and regional coordinators.

Level II: Port offices, coastal site civil protection personnel

Level III: Assistant civil protection officers, port ground staff

Morocco:

The project sponsored a simulation exercise to test the Moroccan NCP at the port of Mohammedia.

3. Regulatory mechanism, monitoring and compliance auditing **Unable to Assess**

The TEs do not include sufficient information on this component. The Algeria TE includes part of a sentence that says sufficient work was carried out on this component, but provides no details.

4.3 **Efficiency**	Rating: **Satisfactory**

Summary: Delays during the project were moderate and were mostly due to problems outside of the project's control. While some parts of the project were more expensive than expected, there was no mention of major financial mismanagement during the project. No personnel management problems were mentioned in any of the TEs.

Delays: The 3 governments took longer than expected to agree on and approve the final draft of the RCP, but this was completed before the project's end. Delays are not mentioned for Morocco.

Algeria: The consultant tasked with determining what equipment would be needed for the project and what rehabilitation work was needed performed these tasks poorly. The Algerian portion of the project had to be extended by 6 months to ensure proper equipment could be purchased with remaining funds. The deteriorating security situation in Algeria caused the training program to be put off for about a year. The World Bank and the Algerian government worked together to eventually convince the training consultant that training could be carried out safely. The original design for improving the Arzew deballasting station was inadequate, which delayed execution while the design had to be amended.

Tunisia: The project received an extension of 4 months. This was required because some equipment being shipped from Europe had not yet arrived due to poor weather.

Financial Management: Since the project purchased much of the same equipment for all 3 countries, these equipment costs came in under budget. International competition helped lower the market price for this equipment.

Algeria: Two parts of the project – improving deballasting stations and purchasing laboratory equipment – cost more than twice the amount at appraisal. This is likely due to problems with the initial design and poor consultant advice respectively, but this is not stated explicitly.

Morocco: The Moroccan side of the project came in only US$400,000 over budget. However, the project was run successfully from a financial management standpoint, allowing the government to expand its oil pollution prevention activities, for which the Moroccan government paid. The unused portion of the GEF grant – SDR90,000 or about 3 percent of the total grant – was canceled since these funds were not needed. Deballasting station rehabilitation came in over budget (US$2.45 million versus US$700,000 at appraisal), but the TE does not explain why.

Tunisia: The Tunisian part of the project came in only US$400,000 over budget. However, the project was run successfully from a financial management standpoint, allowing the government to expand its oil pollution prevention activities, for which the Tunisian government paid. The unused portion of the GEF grant – SDR70,000 or about 2 percent of the total grant – was canceled since these funds were not

needed. Deballasting station rehabilitation came in over budget (US$2.45 million versus US$700,000 at appraisal), but the TE does not explain why.

4.4 **Sustainability**	Rating: **Moderately Likely**

Summary: The project raised institutional capacity across all 3 countries and multiple executing agencies. All 3 project country governments took steps to ensure that marine oil pollution received more attention, either through new legislation/regulations or the creation of new departments. While there is a good chance of raising the necessary funds to continue project activities, some doubt does remain due to the expensive and uncertain nature of such coastal work.

Project sustainability is assessed according to the following 4 risk factors:

Environmental: **Unable to Assess**

The TEs do no mention any environmental risks to project sustainability.

Financial: **Moderately Likely**

An issue that all such coastal projects face is that such projects are expensive, but available funds are limited. According to the Morocco TE, “all aspects of maritime pollution prevention and combat require considerable investments to meet requirements set by international conventions, many of which conflict with the demands of continuing economic growth” (Morocco TE, p. 6).

Algeria: Port authorities at waste reception facilities found cost recovery difficult, which made future investment and operations funding difficult to obtain. However, the Algerian government was implementing an environmental fund to support project activities.

Morocco: The project's environmental management plans has helped to improve capacities at national ports and national environmental regulations. This included cost recovery mechanisms that have strengthened financial sustainability. The government is also studying how to improve financial sustainability and cost recovery. The government has created an environmental fund to support project activities.

Institutional: **Likely**

The project, by supporting both regional training and coordination, has helped to ensure an ongoing relationship between executing agencies. The training and equipment procurement also raised institutional capacity. A sub-regional working group remains dedicated to ongoing training.

Morocco: During the project, the Moroccan government founded a specialized department dedicated to marine and land pollution within ODEP and the Ministry of the Environment. In addition, the Moroccan government “has formulated a comprehensive institutional and legal framework that permits better environmental management and law enforcement” (TE, p. 5). ODEP also has a long history of carrying

out World Bank projects, which makes institutional sustainability more likely. Following simulation exercises in Mohammedia and Tangiers, oil spill simulation exercises will be carried out every year to ensure that institutional capacity remains high.

Tunisia: Following simulation exercises in Tunis and Bizerte, oil spill simulation exercises will be carried out every year to ensure that institutional capacity remains high. 100 interested groups attended these simulations, which was double the 50 organizations expected.

Sociopolitical: **Likely**

Algeria: During the project, new regulations and decrees strengthened the government's ability to regulate and control oil pollution in Mediterranean waters. The government also created a Haut conseil de l'environnement et de developpement durable.

Morocco: The environmental management plans have led to improved environmental regulations.

Tunisia: The Tunisian government decided to create the Agence de protection et de l'amenagement du littoral (APAL) and the Centre international des technologies de l'environnement (CITE) after being inspired by project successes. APAL addresses marine pollution. CITE provides environmental protection training and technology promotion. APAL, ANPE and OMMP all created marine oil pollution units.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

Algeria: The Algerian government provided US$5.1 million in co-financing, which was much higher than the original estimate of US$390,000. The TE does not explain why this amount rose by so much. The Algerian government raised its support for the project and also waived taxes and customs duties related to the project. It should be noted that the Algerian grant funds were still being disbursed as of the TE's writing, so the total cost was only estimated at that point. No other co-financing for the Algerian side of the project was included.

Morocco: The project was run successfully from a financial management standpoint, allowing the government to expand its oil pollution prevention activities, for which the Moroccan government paid. The Moroccan government provided US$1.24 million in co-financing. The Moroccan government raised its support for the project and also waived taxes and customs duties related to the project. There were no other co-financiers.

Tunisia: The project was run successfully from a financial management standpoint, allowing the government to expand its oil pollution prevention activities, for which the Tunisian government paid. The Tunisian government provided US$2.55 million in co-financing, which was roughly quintuple the

initial amount at appraisal. The Tunisian government raised its support for the project and also waived taxes and customs duties related to the project. There were no other co-financiers.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The 3 governments took longer than expected to agree on and approve the final draft of the RCP, but this was completed before the project's end.

Algeria: The consultant tasked with determining what equipment would be needed for the project and what rehabilitation work was needed performed these initiatives poorly. The Algerian portion of the project had to be extended by 6 months to ensure proper equipment could be purchased with remaining funds. The deteriorating security situation in Algeria caused the training program to be put off for about a year. The World Bank and the Algerian government worked together to eventually convince the training consultant that training could be carried out safely. . The original design for improving the Arzew deballasting station was inadequate, which delayed execution while the design had to be amended.

Tunisia: The project received an extension of 4 months. This was required because some equipment being shipped from Europe had not yet arrived due to poor weather.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links:

Algeria: The Algerian government passed new environmental regulation during the project, though the TE does not specify if this addressed oil pollution. However, the Algerian government built off of this legislation with implementing decrees that directly addressed "regulation of industrial and bilge oil disposal, collection and treatment of oil materials and lubricants, definition of pollution level standards for surface water and beaches, obligation of ships to declare carriage of dangerous and toxic materials, and intervention of the coast guard in case of pollution at sea" (Algeria TE, p. 6). The Algeria TE does not specifically mention if the project helped to influence the legislation and decrees. The Algerian government also created a Haut conseil de l'environnement et de developpement durable.

Morocco: Building off of this project, the Moroccan government planned on conducting annual oil spill simulation exercises. During the project, the Moroccan government founded a specialized department dedicated to marine and land pollution within ODEP and the Ministry of the Environment. The new environmental management plans crafted through this project have led to improved environmental regulations. The government is also requiring that ports across the country carry out annual oil spill simulation exercises.

Tunisia: The Tunisian government created APAL and CITE in response to the project experience. APAL addresses marine pollution. CITE provides environmental protection training and technology promotion. APAL, ANPE and OMMP all created marine oil pollution units.

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 **M&E Design at entry**	Rating: **Unsatisfactory**

The PD devotes little space to M&E design. PD does call for the project to undergo a Mid-Term Review (MTR). However, no M&E budget is mentioned in the PD. The indicators, when provided, are generally not SMART, and lack targets and timelines. For instance, the PD says that "in Algeria, the project will include the construction of sheds," (PD, Part II, p. 10) but does not provide details on the number of sheds to be constructed, when these sheds are expected to be constructed, or any measure to assess of the quality of construction. The quality of detail of targets, when they are provided, tend to vary widely from objective to objective.

6.2 **M&E Implementation**	Rating: **Unable to Assess**

According to the TE, the M&E teams remained consistent throughout the project. They included World Bank staff, project staff and CRCP members. This ensured that CRCP remained active in carrying out M&E throughout the project's life. MTRs were carried out for all 3 project countries, though the TEs do not include detail on the MTRs' findings. As a result, scarce details on adaptive management are provided, so this section is rated Unable to Assess.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 **Quality of Project Implementation**	Rating: **Moderately Satisfactory**

The TEs for Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco do note any significant problems with World Bank project implementation on the Algerian portion of the project. The World Bank maintained a strong working relationship with project countries' governments and CRCP throughout the project. M&E implementation appears to have been satisfactory. The World Bank also helped to ensure training was carried out despite security concerns in Algeria. However, the M&E design, as detailed above, was unsatisfactory..

7.2 **Quality of Project Execution**	Rating: **Satisfactory**

Algeria: Despite some delays, the government and executing agencies carried out work on all components mentioned in the TE. In addition, the project partners showed an ability to adapt when initial efforts were inadequate in some areas and had to be improved. The government carried out work on all project components mentioned in the Algeria TE.

Morocco: The Moroccan government carried out project work on all project components mentioned in the Morocco TE. The government appears to have been proactive and committed throughout the project. The TE does not mention any major project execution problems.

Tunisia: The Tunisian government and its private sector partners carried out project work on project components mentioned in the Tunisian TE. The government appears to have been proactive and committed throughout the project. The TE does not mention any major project execution problems.

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

Note - In instances where information on any impact related topic is not provided in the terminal evaluations, the reviewer should indicate in the relevant sections below that this is indeed the case and identify the information gaps. When providing information on topics related to impact, please cite the page number of the terminal evaluation from where the information is sourced.

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The project contributed to cleaning Mediterranean coastal waters of oil pollution, though the TEs do not attempt to quantify the amount of improvement (Algeria TE, p. 5).

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

The improved environmental quality of coastal waters will likely improve the economic potential of the fishing and tourism industries, but no attempt is made to quantify the scale of this improvement (Morocco TE, 5).

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. "Capacities" include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. "Governance" refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

A joint training program raised institutional capacities across all 3 project countries and cooperation between countries. The RCP also raised institutional capacities (Algeria TE, pp. 3-4). The NCPs also raised institutional capacities across all 3 countries (Algeria TE, p. 3; Morocco TE, p. 4; Tunisia TE, pp. 4-5).

Tunisia: APAL addresses marine pollution. CITE provides environmental protection training and technology promotion (Tunisia TE, p. 5).

b) Governance

Algeria: The Algerian government improved its environmental protection legal framework, including addressing marine oil pollution, as a result of the project (Algeria TE, p. 6). The government also created a Haut conseil de l'environnement et de developpement durable (Algeria TE, p. 5).

Morocco: During the project, the Moroccan government founded a specialized department dedicated to marine and land pollution within ODEP and the Ministry of the Environment (Morocco TE, p. 5).

Tunisia: APAL, ANPE and OMMP all created marine oil pollution units (Tunisia TE, p. 5).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

The TEs do not mention any unintended impacts due to this project.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to

these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

The GEF was interested in creating a similar project with Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. A feasibility study was commissioned. However, progress had stalled because the GEF Secretariat decided to first wait for their release of studies on the Strait of Malaca and the Strait of Bosphoros. Waiting would allow for a higher level of coordination between international water projects (Algeria TE, p. 7).

Algeria: The project's success led to the "adoption of a multiport program to be implemented over the coming years, including a ship waste tracking system, port oil spill contingency and response plan for major Algerian ports, and oil spill response training exercises for all ports and other relevant agencies" (TE, pp. 8-9).

Morocco: Building off of this project, the Moroccan government planned on conducting annual oil spill simulation exercises (Morocco TE, p. 5).

Morocco: Building off of this project, the Tunisia government planned on conducting annual oil spill simulation exercises (Tunisia TE, p. 7).

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

- The project's success demonstrated to the project governments that investment in environmental protection and its ports are worthwhile, which convinced the Algerian government to enact additional environmental programs aimed at the nation's ports.
- The World Bank's use of a multidisciplinary team helped to make the project successful. The executing agency's consistent involvement with the CRCP also helped to ensure that it was a leader and engaged throughout the project.
- The project countries' strong level of project commitment, the creation of the CRCP and the pre-existence of key port institutions in all countries helped to lead to project success. Extending the project to engaged countries with port institutions can be successful. If the institutions do not yet exist, they have to be created first before the project can be pursued.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

- Since oil spills are not the only source of ocean pollution near ports, the additional initiatives should be added to project ports. For instance: 1) Implementation of an environmental coast zone and port management plan along the lines of the one being carried out in the Xiamen Special Economic Zone in China 2) carrying out additional pollution control programs and 3) addressing the problems posed by land-based pollution near ports.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The TEs fail to use the project components framework from the PD, but do not address why. The TEs claims that no changes were made to the project framework, but when this framework is mentioned, some components from the PD are missing. In addition, the TEs do not systematically address individual project components, but instead combine individual components into long paragraphs without a clear organizational framework. While this information is included, it is not well-organized.	**MS**
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	The TEs are internally consistent and convincing, though greater detail on project outcomes could have been provided, such as the quality of construction of project buildings. The regional components' outcomes are consistent across all 3 TEs.	**MS**
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The discussion of project sustainability are convincing, though the bodies' devote a decent amount of discussion towards potential financial sustainability risks that are not reflected in the overall sustainability rating.	**MS**
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The Lessons Learned sections could have been more comprehensive, such as including greater discussion of engaging local partners outside of government. The first lesson mentioned in each TE was more of a project summary than a lesson learned.	**MU**
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	Project costs were not always consistent within each individual TE, even within the same Annex section.	**MU**
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	M&E implementation appears to have been satisfactory, but details on MTR findings should have been mentioned. There is no discussion of the quality of M&E design.	**MU**
Overall TE Rating		**MS**

Overall TE rating: (0.3 * (4+4)) + (0.1 * (4+3+3+3)) = 2.4 + 1.3 = 3.7 = Moderately Satisfactory

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

List of equipment purchased, and inventory by location

List of personnel trained

Covenants

Borrower's ICR and comments