

GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form for OPS4

1. PROJECT DATA				
GEF Project ID: 802		Review date:		
IA/EA Project ID:		GEF financing:	<u>At endorsement</u> (Million US\$)	<u>At completion</u> (Million US\$)
Project Name:	Conservation of Biodiversity through Integrated Collaborative Management in the Rekawa, Ussangoda and Kalametiya Coastal Ecosystems	IA/EA own:	\$0.75	0.71
Countries:	Sri Lanka	Government**:	1.34	0.97
		Other*:	0.02	0.02
		Total Cofinancing:	1.36	0.99
Operational Program:	OP 2: Coastal, Marine, and Freshwater Ecosystems; Focal Area: Biodiversity	Total Project Cost:	\$2.11	\$1.70
IA	UNDP	<u>Dates</u>		
Partners involved:	Govt. of Sri Lanka—Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources-Coast Conservation Dept. (CCD)	Effectiveness/ Project document Signature (i.e. date project began)		April 2001
		Closing Date	Proposed: July 2005	Actual: July 2006
Prepared by: Pallavi Nuka	Reviewed by: Neeraj Negi	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing (in months): 48 months	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing (in months): 62 months	Difference between original and actual closing (in months): 14 months
Author of TE: Phillip Edwards Kalinga Padmalal		TE completion date: March 2007	TE submission date to GEF EO: April 2008	Difference between TE completion and submission date (in months): 13 months

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

** Government co-financing was in-kind, and not included in the total budget for the project.

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS AND KEY FINDINGS

Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluation reviews for further definitions of the ratings.

Performance Dimension	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office evaluations or reviews	GEF EO
2.1a Project outcomes	S	U	N/A	MU
2.1b Sustainability of Outcomes	N/A	HU	N/A	MU
2.1c Monitoring and evaluation	N/A	U	N/A	U
2.1d Quality of implementation and Execution	MS	HU	N/A	MU
2.1e Quality of the evaluation report	N/A	N/A	S	MS

2.2 Should the terminal evaluation report for this project be considered a good practice? Why?

No. While the terminal evaluation report provides an acceptable assessment of the project outcomes and design, some significant information is missing. The terminal evaluation team was not able to directly interview the National Project Director for this project and relies only on informal comments by others in judging his role in project performance. The negative ratings for the project implementation and outcomes are attributed solely to poor project management, without sufficient consideration broader national and structural issues that were exogenous to the project. The terminal evaluation report does not contain sufficient detail on proposed and actual project costs. The report does note that “nothing meaningful” was found regarding project finances given the poor financial management of the project, but all findings should have been elaborated in the report.

2.3 Are there any evaluation findings that require follow-up, such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, mismanagement, etc.?

There are two evaluation findings regarding finances and project reporting, which require follow-up. The most serious concern is that funds have been disbursed to the Coast Conservation Department, but several project activities have not been completed, without any clear explanation of where funds went. In one example in the TE report, funds earmarked for eco-tourism project were diverted to an irrigation project, which had no links to the project objectives. Based on information in the TE report, the UNDP oversight of the project’s financial management was lax (p.19), with the UNDP country office apparently overlooking the finding of independent annual audits. In addition, there were instances where there were disconnects between the figures on actual achievements of deliverables reported by the project team and UNDP.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

3.1 Project Objectives

a. What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

The global environmental objective of this project was to “address the threats to globally significant biodiversity in the Rekawa- Kalametiya-Ussangoda coastal reach (p. 6, Project Document).”

There was no change in global environmental objectives during implementation.

b. What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation? (Describe and insert tick in appropriate box below, if yes at what level was the change approved (GEFSEC, IA or EA)?)

Based on information in the project document, the development objective was “to ensure the conservation and sustainable use of globally significant biodiversity through the development of a collaborative management system, actively involving local communities, NGOs and government agencies (p.10, Project document).”

The project components were:

1. Prepare a Coastal Environmental Profile and a replicable Special Area Management Plan for Rekawa, Ussangoda and Kalametiya (RUK) coastal area.
2. Participatory mechanisms for resources management developed and livelihoods of the local community improved through the introduction of nature based tourism initiatives and other sustainable sources of income.
3. Conservation programs for the globally significant biodiversity established at the project site and local biodiversity units established to enhance community awareness.
4. Efficient policy level coordination and law enforcement established to improve biodiversity conservation.
5. Establish an effective monitoring system to assess development activities and their impact to biodiversity.

There were no changes in development objectives during implementation.

Overall Environmental Objectives	Project Development Objectives	Project Components	Any other (specify)
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c. If yes, tick applicable reasons for the change (in global environmental objectives and/or development objectives)				
Original objectives not sufficiently articulated	Exogenous conditions changed, causing a change in objectives	Project was restructured because original objectives were over ambitious	Project was restructured because of lack of progress	Any other (specify)

4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND SUSTAINABILITY

4.1.1 Outcomes (Relevance can receive either a satisfactory rating or a unsatisfactory rating. For effectiveness and cost efficiency a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU will be used)

a. Relevance (of outcomes to focal areas/operational program strategies and country priorities) Rating: S

A.1. What is the relevance of the project outcomes/results to:

(i) The national sustainable development agenda and development needs and challenges?

The project was designed to improve ecological and economic conditions in three lagoon areas, Kalametiya (200 ha), Lunama (212 ha) and Rekawa (250 ha). The construction of poorly designed irrigation schemes in these areas has resulted in significant environmental degradation and the loss of the fishing as a source of livelihood for the local population, which is amongst the most economically disadvantaged groups in the country. Population pressures threaten the existing mangrove forests and turtle hatching areas. Economic development initiatives focused on areas such as the tannery project, which has been proposed as a centralized facility for relocation projects, shell mining and collection of mineral garnet sand resources, will - unless carefully planned, managed and monitored - aggravate the problems already encountered.

(ii) The national environmental framework, agenda and priorities?

This project was designed to build upon the successful 1996 Rekawa Special Area Management Plan (SAMP) and extend its reach to cover the entire coastal reach from Rekawa-Ussangoda-Kalametiya. This Plan was jointly developed by the Rekawa SAMP Committee, which includes local resource use committees and State agencies with support from the Coast Conservation Department (CCD), National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (NARA), the University of Rhode Island (URI) and USAID. Consistent with the SAMP principles, this project was designed to address local concerns and involve resident communities as well as local and national government agencies. This project is consistent with the objectives of the national Biodiversity Action Plan, "Coastal 2000", the National Environmental Action Plan and the Coastal Zone Management Plan.

(iii) The achievement of the GEF strategies and mandate?

The project falls under GEF OP#2 on coastal marine and freshwater ecosystems and Biodiversity focal area.

(iv) The implementation of the global conventions the GEF supports (countries obligations and responsibilities towards the convention as well as the achievement of the conventions objectives)

The project was designed to assist the Government of Sri Lanka implement the Convention on Biological Diversity, ratified on March 1994.

A2. Did the project promote of International (Regional and / or Global) Cooperation and Partnership¹

NA

b. Effectiveness

Rating: MU

The outcome ratings provided in the TE report and the PIRs for this project differed greatly. The PIRs generally rate progress towards meeting objectives as satisfactory, while the TE report judged outcomes to be largely unsatisfactory. The TE report notes that "the PIRs submitted to UNDP and forwarded to GEF are largely exercises in self-assessment" and that "in far too many cases the information given is misleading." Despite a largely negative terminal evaluation, evidence from the PIRs and the terminal evaluation report itself suggests that the project has achieved some outputs.

The primary output from this project was the Special Area Management Plan (SAMP) for the entire Rekawa-Ussangoda-Kalametiya (RUK) area. The SAMP was prepared by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature-Sri Lanka (IUCN-SL), through two biodiversity assessments, a coastal environmental profile, a rapid livelihood assessment, and a training needs assessment in the RUK area. The SAMP has been approved by the national Coast Conservation Department (CCD), but has not yet been endorsed by the National Steering Committee. According to the terminal evaluation report, the SAMP has "no useable base maps, land use maps, nor other such meaningful information," but it has nevertheless been useful in identifying some basic needs and resources. The lack of integration with the local planning system or with the Hambantota District-level development plan, may limit the SAMP's utility

¹ Please consider for regional and global project only

in guiding future development.

The second project component was focused on reducing destructive livelihood practices, and, based on both the TE report and the APRs, has achieved most intended outputs. The revolving fund created to help develop alternative livelihoods is now operating under the management of the Bata-atha South Fisheries Cooperative, and 90 loans have been disbursed to 86 individuals for sustainable livelihoods projects. 157 people participated in business trainings, and workshops on alternative livelihoods and ecotourism. This component was also supposed to support ten eco-tourism ventures and website, but unfortunately the budget allocated for this activity was diverted to build the Muththagaha Canal. As result, only three eco-tourism ventures were funded.

The project has fostered significant community involvement with 18 Biodiversity Societies established at the village level and a Biodiversity Task Force (BTF) founded by representatives from these Societies. But, collaboration between the community and government agencies is still limited. The Societies and the Task Force have no mandated planning or advisory role, and their impact on local decision-making has been minimal.

The project conducted a variety of outreach activities in the RUK area for villagers, school children and government officials with the objectives of reducing and controlling coral mining and shell mining of the RUK area. Activities included community-mapping exercises, demarcation of wildlife areas, and signboards explaining illegal practices. A Coastal Research and Visitors Center is under construction at Kalametiya and the Lunama-Kalametiya Wildlife Sanctuary was established in 2006, with some limited resources for enforcement. The aim of the Sanctuary was to protect bird habitat, but as it was created within months of closing there is no monitoring data to show impacts on bird populations.

In terms of enhanced policy coordination, one District and two Divisional Coordinating Committees have been established and have committed to reducing certain activities such as coral-, sand-, and shell mining. But, according to the TE report, inappropriate developments sanctioned by the same committees is leading to additional habitat loss.

The project has not developed an effective monitoring system. Water quality stations were deployed early in project implementation, and 13 months of water quality data is available, but no attempt has been made to analyze this data.

c. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness)

Rating: U

Total estimated project cost was \$0.77M plus some \$1.13M from the CCD of in-kind contributions. The TE report does not provide information on total project costs, noting that the project's ineffective bookkeeping system did not track costs by component or activity.

The planned project duration was 5 years, but the project received a one-year extension and closed in 2006. Project implementation suffered from poor leadership, inept financial management, and conflicts with NGOs, consultants, and other government agencies. There is also some evidence from the TE report that project funds were diverted for activities unrelated to project objectives.

On the positive side, the revolving loan fund is being well managed by the Bata-atha South Fisheries Cooperative, and the rate of defaults on loans is only 10%, despite the devastation from the 2004 tsunami. The original seed capital from GEF was approximately \$39,600 and despite the defaulted loans, the current value of the fund is \$40,130. The number of small-scale enterprises receiving loans from the fund for developing sustainable livelihood activities continues to increase and the demand for micro-credit in the RUK area is high.

Overall, the project has taken 6 years to deliver only a few viable outputs, with very limited outcomes and with considerable investments. Therefore, efficiency is rated unsatisfactory.

d. To what extent did the project result in trade offs between environment and development priorities / issues (not to be rated) – this could happen both during the designing of the project where some choices are made that lead to preference for one priority over the other, and during implementation of the project when resources are transferred from addressing environmental priorities to development priorities and vice versa. If possible explain the reasons for such tradeoffs.

The project design addressed both environmental and developmental priorities through an inter-related set of components focused on biodiversity assessments, collaborative planning, sustainable livelihoods, and community based management. There were no clear trade-offs in project implementation, but the most successful output was the revolving fund, which was more oriented towards development than environmental conservation. This was not the result of an obvious choice, but clearly the fund was more popular than components focusing solely on environmental issues.

4.1.2 Results / Impacts² (Describe Impacts) (please fill in annex 1 – results scoresheet and annex 2 – focal area impacts (against GEF Strategic Priority indicators, where appropriate and possible)

Project impacts have been limited and, due to the project’s poor monitoring system, impact measurement is unreliable. The SAMP has identified areas for conservation. Training and loans for sustainable livelihoods have been successful and over a hundred individuals are successfully following alternative occupations. According to information from the BTFs, outreach activities and the creation of a Wildlife Sanctuary, have led to a decrease in unsustainable practices, particularly mining for shells, sand, and corals. Law enforcement has improved through the establishment of functional BTFs, which identify illegal activities, direct abusers to alternative livelihoods, and assist enforcement agencies as necessary to reduce biodiversity loss. The TE report also notes that turtle egg collection and turtle killing has been almost eradicated in the project area, mainly through the efforts of Turtle Conservation Project, an international NGO, which consulted on the project.

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four point scale (4= Likely (no or negligible risk); 3= Moderately Likely (low risk); 2= Moderately Unlikely (substantial risks) to 1= Unlikely (High risk)). The ratings should be given taking into account both the probability of a risk materializing and the anticipated magnitude of its effect on the continuance of project benefits.

a. Financial resources	Rating: MU (2)
The long-term financial viability of the revolving fund for sustainable livelihoods is likely. At the end of the Project, the Trustees of the fund took a decision to continue operation for at least another five years, but eligibility for loans is limited to those who have passed through a business training. No effort has been made by CCD to find ways of ensuring sustainable finance for the Lunama-Kalametiya Wildlife Sanctuary, the Visitors’ Center, the Biodiversity Task Forces, or implementation of the RUK SAMP. The ecotourism sub-component has only one profitable enterprise.	
b. Socio-economic / political	Rating: ML
The Biodiversity Task Force will likely continue to function after project closing as they are linked to the revolving fund, but greater integration into the planning system is necessary. The Biodiversity Societies have support from village populations, but it is unlikely they will continue without outside inputs. The IUCN and the TCP were major partners, and will likely carry on project related conservation and outreach activities.	
c. Institutional framework and governance	Rating: MU
There are significant institutional risks to the sustainability of project outcomes. The SAMP has no legal or planning mandate to impact future growth in the area. The CCD, the executing agency, does not have the capacity to continue project activities on its own. The project was also poorly integrated with local governments and the Rekawa Development Foundation (RDF), one of the leading NGOs operating in the area, which might have better ensured sustainability.	
d. Environmental	Rating: MU
Developments authorized at the District level, including a teak plantation, are in conflict with the SAMP for the project area. Realization of these developments would lead to additional habitat loss and counteract some of the project’s environmental outcomes.	
e. Technological	Rating: N/A
No technological risks were associated with this project.	

4.3 Catalytic role³

a. INCENTIVES: To what extents have the project activities provide incentives (socio-economic / market based) to contribute to catalyzing changes in stakeholders?
The project established a revolving loan fund to promote adoption of sustainable livelihoods and reduce destructive practices. 155 individuals received loans to fund the alternative income generating activities. Project reports indicate that shell, sand, and coral mining has declined by 88% as a result.
b. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: To what extent has the project activities contributed to changing institutional behaviors?
The creation of the Biodiversity Societies and the Task Force has established a community network for the promotion and enforcement of biodiversity conservation. This has shifted communities towards a conservation mindset and provided a forum for discussion, which has the potential to impact local decision making.

² Please consider direct and indirect global environmental results; any unexpected results; local development benefits (including results relevant to communities, gender issues, indigenous peoples, NGOs and CBOs)

³ Please review the ‘Catalytic Role of GEF: How is it measured and evaluated – A conceptual framework’ prior to addressing this section.

c. POLICY CHANGE: To what extent have project activities contributed to policy changes (and implementation of policy)?
The SAMP has incorporated biodiversity concerns into planning guidelines for future development, but as the SAMP does not have any legal status, District and Provincial authorities are not obligated to follow the guidelines.
d. CATALYTIC FINANCING: To what extent did the project contributed to sustained follow-on financing from Government and / or other donors? (This is different than co-financing.)
No sustained follow-on financing has been secured for project activities.
e. PROJECT CHAMPIONS: To what extent have changes (listed above) been catalyzed by particular individuals or institutions (without which the project would not have achieved results)?
The Turtle Conservation Project (TCP) and the IUCN, the quasi-executing agency, advocated for this project and provided ongoing support to the project team so that some outcomes could be achieved. The TE notes that most of the project outcomes are attributable to IUCN participation.

4.4 Assessment of processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

a. Co-financing. To what extent was the reported cofinancing (or proposed cofinancing) essential to achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?
The Project document budget indicates a total co-financing amount of \$1.15 M. The IUCN was to provide \$22,000 for personnel, training, and travel. The Govt. of Sri Lanka was to provide \$1.13 M total of in-kind contributions. This contribution was not included in the budget total, and there was no indication which components would be supported by the Govt. There are indications that the level of actual co-financing was far lower than proposed. Based on information in the TE report, the project team was understaffed with team management spending only 20% of their time on project activities. The project appears to have been 'back-burnered' at the CCD and this led to very poor realization of outcomes.
b. Delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?
Based on information in the TE report, there were several delays project implementation. CCD was slow in recruiting staff and hiring consultants for the project. Partners complained of not receiving payments in a timely manner. The monitoring database delivered by IUCN had major problems, and it took an additional six months to get the database running. The project experienced a long delay at initiation, putting implementation almost two years behind schedule. There was also a delay in getting approval for a project extension, effectively reducing a requested yearlong extension into about three months of additional implementation time. The TE report notes that the stop-start nature of the project implementation, made it difficult to maintain momentum and good relations with community groups.
c. Country Ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability highlighting the causal links.
There appears to have been very little country ownership of this project. CCD was occupied with the much larger Coastal Resources Management Project occurring simultaneously in much the same area and the Hambantota Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project nearby. The project team was understaffed and there was no guidance or direction from the national level Project Steering Committee at the start of project implementation. The national level steering committee did not even meet until 2 years into the project. The 2004 tsunami stretched even further an already understaffed department at CCD. Inter-ministry and inter-departmental coordination was lacking and the delays getting approval for payments and various other aspects of the project, hindered implementation.

4.5 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

a. M&E design at Entry	Rating (six point scale): S
The M&E plan in the Project document includes a logical frame matrix with indicators for each objective, a list of activities, and critical assumptions. The Project document also contained a project implementation plan and a note on M&E activities, which mentioned "an extensive monitoring component will be built into the project." The Project document also stipulated that a project steering committee was to be established at project initiation and was to meet every 6 months to review progress, and the Special Area Management Committee would report on project progress and implementation. The M&E plan also included a mid-term and terminal evaluation.	
b. M&E plan Implementation	Rating (six point scale): U
The project team did not implement the M&E plan set out in the Project document. According to the TE report, the project team was not aware of the project log frame, and "no proper monitoring tools were provided by the national project manager (NPM) to his staff." Impact monitoring to assess impacts of Project activities does not appear to have	

been undertaken at all. There was no attempt to track indicators such as monthly incomes, area of shell mining, nor any attempts to evaluate training and education activities.

The Sept. 2003 tri-partite review did result in a decision to develop an M&E framework and MIS system for the project. Work on this was begun in May 2004 and completed in early 2005, far too late to be of much use for project implementation.

The project team did produce quarterly and annual reports for the UNDP – these were drafted by the IUCN (in its role as the Project Facilitation Organization) for CCD. In the absence of a functioning monitoring system run by the project team, these reports were only qualitative assessments.

b.1 Was sufficient funding provided for M&E in the budget included in the project document?

The Project document budget did not include a separate line for M&E activities.

b.2a Was sufficient and timely funding provided for M&E during project implementation? Unable to assess.

b.2b To what extent did the project monitoring system provided real time feed back? Was the information that was provided used effectively? What factors affected the use of information provided by the project monitoring system? The M&E plan was never implemented. The mid-term evaluation did provide several recommendations, some of which were implemented by the project.

b.3 Can the project M&E system (or an aspect of the project M&E system) be considered a good practice? If so, explain why. No.

4.6 Assessment of Quality of Implementation and Execution

a. Overall Quality of Implementation and Execution (on a six point scale): MU

b. Overall Quality of Implementation – for IA (on a six point scale): MU

Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as quality of the project design, focus on results, adequacy of supervision inputs and processes, quality of risk management, candor and realism in supervision reporting, and suitability of the chosen executing agencies for project execution.

The IA for this project was the UNDP. Based on information in the TE report, the project design was too complex for the limited capacity and budget of the executing agency, the Coast Conservation Department (CCD). Apparently the IA was aware of this, because the IUCN was appointed as the Project Facilitation Organization (PFO), with the duties of a ‘shadow’ executing agency. Due to the poor relations between the CCD and IUCN, this arrangement did not work smoothly.

UNDP supervised the project through quarterly reports, annual field visits from 2002-2005, and a mid-term evaluation. An additional joint UNDP-GEF mission visited the Project area in February 2005 to assess the effects of the Tsunami on the Project and make recommendations. However, UNDP oversight of the project implementation was inadequate. Project staff, with limited input or verification by UNDP, wrote the APRs/PIRs forwarded to GEF. The project team did not have a sound method for managing finances, and according to the TE report, the UNDP has not given sufficient attention to the findings of the project’s annual audits.

Based on information in the TE report, UNDP had serious difficulties with the lack of cooperation between the various government ministries involved in implementation, including the CCD. Closer supervision of the CCD at the start of implementation was needed to hire a project manager, get activities off the ground, and establish a sound management system.

c. Quality of Execution – for Executing Agencies⁴ (rating on a 6 point scale): U

Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as focus on results, adequacy of management inputs and processes, quality of risk management, and candor and realism in reporting by the executive agency.

The Coast Conservation Department (CCD) under the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, and in collaboration with the World Conservation Union (IUCN-SL) as the Project Facilitation Organization executed the project. A National Level Coordinating Committee (NLCC) was established to oversee and facilitate project implementation.

Based on information in the TE report, project execution was marked by weak management. CCD capacity to execute the project was low and the project leadership was dysfunctional. The National Project Manager in charge of day-to-day affairs was not appointed until Aug. 2002 and was not given sufficient authority by the National Project Director

⁴ Executing Agencies for this section would mean those agencies that are executing the project in the field. For any given project this will exclude Executing Agencies that are implementing the project under expanded opportunities – for projects approved under the expanded opportunities procedure the respective executing agency will be treated as an implementing agency.

(also the Director of the CCD) to effectively manage the team. Vehicles and functional computers for field offices were not supplied until late 2004, three years into the project. The project team did not make efforts to monitor project results or impacts. Financial management was poor and there were significant delays in hiring and paying consultants. Oversight and quality control of the services provided by consultants was lacking.

The TE report raises questions about the level of candor in project reports, considering that the project had monitoring or records system to back up claims about impacts. Many of the project outputs listed in the 2006 and 2007 PIRs cannot be objectively verified, as there was no monitoring system in place to measure these outputs. There are also some inconsistencies between project staff and the UNDP office on reports of project implementation. In the 2006 PIR, for example, the National Project Director rates progress as 'Satisfactory' commenting "90% of field activities were implemented successfully according to the work plan 2006, with full involvement of local community." But for the same year, the UNDP country office rates progress as only 'Marginally satisfactory' commenting "Due to the inability of the executing agency to obtain the required extensions in time and loss of project staff due to the same reason, the project implementation activities were hampered immensely during the last year."

The NLCC was not effective in keeping the project on track. It was supposed to meet quarterly, but in actuality it met on average once every six months. Based on information in the TE report, the NLCC kept very tight control on project team appointments and TORs, which delayed implementation. Execution was also very fragmented with the IUCN, the Turtle Conservation Project (NGO), and the Dept. of Wildlife Conservation all handling different components. The result was poor focus on the project's broader objectives.

5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assess the project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

a. Briefly describe the key lessons, good practice or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

General

1. NGOs involved in developing GEF project concepts and in designing GEF projects need to have their expectations regarding their involvement (both at the design and implementation stages) better based in reality through a process of education and awareness.
2. The duty of care a project has to its participants needs to be clarified for projects that fail to deliver on promises thereby causing significant financial loss to its intended beneficiaries.
3. The central message of the global importance of wildlife for which GEF biodiversity conservation projects are established, needs to be ensured during their implementation and better still incorporated into their design to give a different approach – that of focusing on the biodiversity and building social development around that rather than doing the development to build “capital” to spend on conservation efforts.
4. In-kind contributions from Governments (but much less so with NGOs) are highly suspect and should be discontinued since civil servants are usually asked to double up project activities with their normal jobs to the detriment of the project. Such contributions seem also to be financially unaccountable. The practice needs to be stopped, and Governments asked to contribute the money directly to hire dedicated staff.
5. The professional capacity of an executing agency should be evaluated independently during project design and any weaknesses addressed fully as a preparatory activity.
6. The number, type, and scale of existing and, crucially, forthcoming projects already in an executing agency’s portfolio requires more rigorous examination during project design and their effects in terms of resources and priority to the project under consideration assessed.
7. The non-technical clauses of contractual documents written within projects are as important as the technical specifications contained therein and require just as much attention to detail or more since they can lead to just as much dispute and delay. Methods of resolving disputes quickly should be incorporated.
8. It is not enough for a Project to create plans on paper and to call that a success. While implementation of such plans may fall beyond the timetable of a given project, such plans need to firmly identify, and if possible obtain firm commitments to, finance the activities. In addition, where such plans have a policy component, this needs to be fully integrated into the appropriate policy and planning framework or else it will fail to deliver the intended results.

Specific

1. Close collaboration with ERD and the National Planning Division during the actual design process of projects for Sri Lanka should lead to the avoidance of delays at project start-up by negating the need for extensive screening.
2. Senior Staff involved in implementing projects should make serious commitments towards achieving its objectives. Lack of commitment was very clear at all levels of the management and oversight of the RUK Project from its inception.
3. Hiring of a Project Facilitation Organization is a waste of money, as is running part of the project through another management arrangement requiring a second steering committee. This should not be repeated in any future project. If the capacity of the intended executing agency is so low as to require the services of a Project Facilitation Organization, then better to execute the project through that organization directly and ensure close collaboration with the Government agency to expedite the necessary Government inputs.
4. Implementation of the activities for livelihood and biodiversity conservation in communities necessitates a well-coordinated effort and a common goal across national, district, divisional, and village levels. In this instance, the lack of such coordination significantly retarded effective implementation of the project and hampered achievement of expected outcomes.
5. Training and education in biodiversity conservation and livelihood development is not easy, necessitating a well-tailored plan and careful step-wise implementation so that the project staff know where to begin, what to do next, and where to end. This Project’s training activities lacked clear direction to support its goals.

b. Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation

General

1. GEF should look at producing information for, and disseminating it more effectively to, NGOs involved in the conceptualization and design of GEF-funded projects. This information needs to explain what the GEF process involves, what the basic requirements of implementation are, and what the expectations of an NGO can be regarding their involvement.
2. GEF should consider adding a professional capacity assessment of the proposed executing agency to the design of all Projects to ensure proficient implementation of the Project on the ground.
3. Close attention must be paid to the portfolio of the proposed executing agency to ensure that there is adequate spare capacity to undertake proposed projects.

RUK/Sri Lanka Specific

1. In the light of a number of inconsistencies, financial irregularities and other factors including very limited visible outputs, consideration should be given to having the RUK Project audited externally by UNDP or GEF HQ.
2. Eligibility for loans from the revolving fund should be widened to include people who have not been resource abusers, while still tying loans to operations (commercial or otherwise), which benefit coastal biodiversity.

6. QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings based on other information sources such as GEF EO field visits, other evaluations, etc.

Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluations review for further definitions of the ratings. Please briefly explain each rating.

6.2 Quality of the terminal evaluation report	Ratings
a. To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives? The TE report contains a fairly comprehensive assessment of outcomes relative to the project's objectives.	S
b. To what extent the report is internally consistent, the evidence is complete/convincing and the IA ratings have been substantiated? Are there any major evidence gaps? The report is internally consistent and no major evidence gaps were noted, but the financial details were not included. The ratings of the TE report are lower than the IA ratings of MS in the 2006 PIR. However, the UNDP Review of Terminal Evaluation Reports overall concurs with the findings of the TE report.	MS
c. To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy? The report provides a fair assessment of sustainability, but no discussion of an exit strategy.	S
d. To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive? The lessons learned are comprehensive, and well supported by the evidence presented regarding project design and implementation.	S
e. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? No actual project costs are listed, because of the state of the project's financial records.	U
f. Assess the quality of the reports evaluation of project M&E systems? The TE report assesses both M&E design and implementation.	S

7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRERATATION OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REVIEW REPORT EXCLUDING PIRs, TERMINAL EVALUATIONS, PAD.

8 Project stakeholders and Key Contacts (Names, addresses, emails etc – mandatory for field visit countries)

9. Information Gaps (for Field visit countries only)

