

Terminal Evaluation Review form, GEF Evaluation Office, APR 2013

1. Project Data

Summary project data			
GEF project ID		85	
GEF Agency project ID		P000311	
GEF Replenishment Phase		Pilot Phase	
Lead GEF Agency (include all for joint projects)		World Bank	
Project name		Biodiversity Conservation and Management	
Country/Countries		Cameroon	
Region		AFR	
Focal area		Biodiversity	
Operational Program or Strategic Priorities/Objectives		OP3: Forest Ecosystems	
Executing agencies involved		Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MINEF); Ministry of Planning; WWF; SNV	
NGOs/CBOs involvement		Secondary executing agency	
Private sector involvement		None	
CEO Endorsement (FSP) /Approval date (MSP)		27-Mar-1995	
Effectiveness date / project start		22-Dec-1995	
Expected date of project completion (at start)		31-Dec-1999	
Actual date of project completion		31-Mar-2003	
Project Financing			
		At Endorsement (US \$M)	At Completion (US \$M)
Project Preparation Grant	GEF funding	0.140	0.14
	Co-financing	-	-
GEF Project Grant		5.96	5.96
Co-financing	IA/EA own	0	0
	Government	1.0	0
	Other*	5.43	6.34
Total GEF funding		6.10	6.1
Total Co-financing		6.43	6.3
Total project funding (GEF grant(s) + co-financing)		12.53	12.4
Terminal evaluation/review information			
TE completion date		11-Sep-2003	
TE submission date			
Author of TE		Nicolas Kotschoubey	
Original GEF IEO TER (2004) preparer		Siham Mohamedahmed	
Original GEF IEO TER (2004) reviewer		Aaron Zazueta	
Revised TER (2014) completion date		10-May-2014	
Revised TER (2014) prepared by		Pallavi Nuka	
TER GEF IEO peer review (2014)		Joshua Schneck	

*Includes contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development, cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector, and beneficiaries.

2. Summary of Project Ratings

Criteria	Final PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office Review	GEF EO Review
Project Outcomes	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	MS
Sustainability of Outcomes	Substantial	Likely	U/A	ML
M&E Design	NA	NA	NA	MU
M&E Implementation	Highly Satisfactory	NA	NA	MS
Quality of Implementation	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	MU
Quality of Execution	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	MS
Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report	NA	NA	Satisfactory	MS

3. Project Objectives

3.1 Global Environmental Objectives of the project:

The global environmental objective of the project as described in the project document was to protect biodiversity in Cameroon's national parks. Cameroons' tropical forests, which are host to globally significant biodiversity and several endangered species face twin threats of logging and poaching. The ProDoc notes that both these threats are increasing, resulting in deteriorating forest ecosystems and declining populations of elephants and black rhinos. This project sought to build up national capacity to effectively manage parks and reserves and promote greater involvement of rural communities in sustainable natural resource management.

3.2 Development Objectives of the project:

(ProDoc) The project sought to build capacities in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MINEF) and to strengthen key national agencies working on ecology and biodiversity conservation. Six-priority project sites were selected during the preparation phase to act as pilot sites for developing protected area management plans integrating community based NRM.

The project development objectives were to:

- a) To provide support to the recipient in its effort to conserve and manage its biological resources;
- b) To promote involvement of rural populations in biodiversity conservation;
- c) To encourage sustainable utilization of renewable natural resources and promote sustainable and environmentally compatible development in regions surrounding protected areas.

The project had four components:

- a) Strengthening the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MINEF);
- b) Strengthening Biodiversity Related Research;
- c) Enhancing Protection and Management of Protected Areas in the Priority Sites;
- d) Support to Priority Project Sites.

3.3 Were there any **changes** in the Global Environmental Objectives, Development Objectives, or other activities during implementation?

According to the ICR there were no changes in project components or objectives, but, at mid-term review, the implementation structure was revised to clarify the role of MINEF and other implementing partners in the field. The goal of the revision was to stress partnership with, rather than administration by, MINEF. As the result of this implementation arrangement most of the site activities were outsource to NGOs.

4. GEF EO assessment of Outcomes and Sustainability

Please refer to the GEF Terminal Evaluation Review Guidelines for detail on the criteria for ratings.

Relevance can receive either a Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory rating. For Effectiveness and Cost efficiency, a six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess. Sustainability ratings are assessed on a four-point scale: Likely=no or negligible risk; Moderately Likely=low risk; Moderately Unlikely=substantial risks; Unlikely=high risk. In assessing a Sustainability rating please note if, and to what degree, sustainability of project outcomes is threatened by financial, sociopolitical, institutional/governance, or environmental factors.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

4.1 Relevance	Rating: Satisfactory
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Based on information in the ProDoc and the ICR, the project was closely tied to national environmental policies and priorities at the time. A 1992 UNDP-FAO mission to Cameroon had recommended that a National Environmental Management Plan (NEMP) be prepared for the country. Following this, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MINEF). This project was to be implemented in parallel with the NEMP process and serve as a model of locally integrated resource management. Policy studies and environmental data from this project were supposed to inform the NEMP. The project was also linked to the National Forest Law (1993) and the National Wildlife Law (1994), which established regulatory frameworks for the management of forest resources and the participation of local communities.

The project was also consistent GEF's goals in the Biodiversity focal area as the sites selected by the project contained globally significant and endangered plant and animal biodiversity.

4.2 Effectiveness	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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The project made significant progress towards achievement of objectives. Project outputs were largely consistent with expected outputs, however the project had a few key shortcomings that prevented it from fully achieving some objectives. The project enhanced PA management capacities within MINEF and improved the technical capacity of several national biological research organizations. The project also tested a way of involving local communities in conservation and sustainable natural resource management. Despite these achievements, the ICR notes that the project fell short in some areas. The project components were over-ambitious. The project tried to do too much at too many sites without sufficiently accounting for the time required to complete biological studies and engage communities in participatory NRM.

On capacity building in MINEF, the national ICR notes that "the type of capacity building that MINEF was to receive was not specified in any document." As a result most of the capacity building occurred in the area of equipment, construction, and data processing tools. Very few MINEF executives received training and as a result the transfer of knowledge and technical expertise at the higher level of management was limited. The project did setup a GIS-based database, as a platform for sharing and updating information on biodiversity between the MINEF centers and research agencies.

According to the ICR, the program gazetted two national parks, elaborated four development plans, helped gazette the community-managed forest at Kilum-Ijim, and fully rehabilitated the Cameroon National Herbarium (CNH), which resumed normal operation and re-launched the publication of the Flora of Cameroon series. The program

also created management plans for protected areas, which include production of non-timber forest products. However the management plans have been approved only at a few sites (unclear from the ICR which sites).

Based on the information in the ICR, important outputs at priority sites include: a) Mt. Kilum-Ijim: boundary demarcation, creation of 18 community forests with management plans for 8 of them, enforcement of regulations, and monitoring; b) Mt. Koupe: participatory delineation of agricultural and forest conservation zones and awareness raising; c) Mt. Cameroon: reservation of 2,500 km² for conservation, botanic garden, monitoring, and strengthening the bargaining power of villagers for a medicinal product; d) Campo Ma'an: creation of a 2,640 km² National Park as a mitigation measure for the Chad Cameroon pipeline, sustainable development activities, and sustainable logging plans; e) Southeast: creation of three National Parks (Boumba-Bek, Lac Lobeke, and Nki) and other conservation zones, cooperative agreements to control poaching, agreements with Congo, CAR and Gabon, and participatory management of hunting zones; f) Savannah: creation of wildlife corridors, reduction of conflicts between pastoralists, farmers and safari hunters, wildlife inventories, small-scale development projects, promotion of eco-tourism, and preliminary contacts with Nigeria and Chad.

4.3 Efficiency	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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Evaluation of efficiency is difficult because the ICR does not present any information on actual project costs. (The ICR presents data on Bank controlled expenditure only. No data is available on actual spending by the Govt. of Cameroon or other donors, including contributions from implementing agencies (WWF, SNV) from their own resources.) Total project cost at appraisal was US \$12.4 million. Actual costs were very likely much higher. The ICR notes that the Netherlands contribution eventually amounted to US\$ 6.34 million instead of US\$ 1.88 million originally promised at appraisal. A technical audit carried out by an external consultant (Pauwel De Wachter) in March 2003 estimated total actual expenses for this project at 21 Million USD including estimates for all contribution. This would mean that actual project costs were close to double the appraisal estimate.

The project was also marked by an unwieldy, overly complex, design and slow pace of implementation. The project closed on March 31, 2003 (40 months later than expected) after two extensions of its closing date. The project was designed as a pilot with broad objectives and activities, and with a strong emphasis on community participation. However, the design was complex, large, and took a long time to prepare. The project was to be implemented at six sites with co-financing and collaboration from nine institutions. The ICR notes that the project overestimated the experience and capacity of the MINEF to implement such a complex biodiversity project (the first of its kind in Cameroon). The project delays stemmed from lack of clarity in roles and responsibilities in implementation as well as various external factors including limited government resources and conflicts between the program and logging companies.

4.4 Sustainability	Rating: Moderately Likely
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The ICR rated the project 'Likely' for sustainability based on the fact that major elements of the project, for biodiversity and local development respectively, will be continued [in the short term] under two proposed Bank projects.

Financial (ML): The ICR reports that most of the project donors have committed to continue funding selected activities including: (a) at Kilum-Ijim, activities continue under the "Bamenda Highlands" project executed by Birdlife with financial support from GEF/UNDP; (b) at Mt Cameroon, a foundation (CAMCOF) has been established to receive funds for sustainable conservation at Mt Cameroon, Kilum-Ijim and other montane sites. There is no guaranteed follow-on funding for the project as a whole. The ICR notes that "sustainable sources of funding must be secured in order to strengthen" community based NRM component. Furthermore, it's not clear from the information in the ICR that the government can cover the annual operational cost of MINEF facilities and protected areas created under the project. There is reason to question the ability of the government to cover these costs given a civil service hiring freeze and a decade of 'structural adjustment.' The ICR does not provide any estimate

the annual operational costs of the facilities and protected areas. The ICR does state that the continuation of the program will depend on MINEF ability to provide funding to maintain guards and equipment in place. The project did not explore mechanisms, such as establishment of trust fund or investment opportunities for long term sustainability of the program developed under the project as suggested in the project document.

Socio-political (L): Based on the information in the ICR and previous TER, the program promoted the participation of local population and stakeholders in biodiversity conservation at all sites. The program also catalyzed the creation of numerous community-based organizations and NGOs focused on sustainable development. Project activities were extremely successful in resolving existing conflicts and preventing future ones by establishing dialogue and cooperation amongst stakeholders. For example at the Southeast and Savannah sites local partnerships between villagers, herders, hunters, loggers, and safari hunters were built which was described in the ICR as "remarkable" but without further explanation.

Institutional (ML): According to the ICR, the project management unit (PMU) will be integrated into MINEF as a permanent structure. MINEF capacities were enhanced at the middle and lower levels, but upper management was not well implicated in the project, which may create difficulties with integrating the PMU. The previous GEF EO TER notes that "While MINEF's capability has undoubtedly improved its ability to manage biodiversity effectively in the absence of massive donor support remains in doubt."

The project was instrumental in promoting the birth and emergence of local NGOs in charge of local development and conservation activities at all sites. These NGOs will continue operating under the follow-up projects (PSFE and PNDP). The project also supported creation of several Decrees and Decisions establishing national protected areas and national parks. A GIS database was established to share biodiversity information among the MINEF sites and research organizations.

Environmental (L): No environmental risks were identified in the TE report.

5. Processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes

5.1 Co-financing. To what extent was the reported co-financing essential to the achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The ICR only presents information on Bank controlled expenditure. No data is presented on actual costs or co-financing from the Government of Cameroon or other Donors, including contributions from implementing agencies (WWF, SNV) from their own resources. At appraisal, project cost was estimated at US\$ 12.4 million with \$US 5.96 from GEF (excl. PDF), US\$ 1.88 from the Netherlands, US\$ 1.5 million from Germany, US\$ 1.24 million from France, US\$ 0.77 million from the UK and US\$ 0.04 million from the EU.

GEF supported most of the national activities and some selected site-specific activities. By the end of the project the GEF Grant was fully disbursed. The contribution from the Netherlands (through a WB trust fund), estimated at 1.88 at appraisal, was increased to \$6.34 million when the project was extended. By project completion 95% was of the Netherlands grant was disbursed.

The ICR reports: "Other funds were provided either by the implementing agencies themselves (WWF, SNV, Tropenbos, GTZ), or by other Donors through parallel financing (DfID, FAC). They were administered independently and therefore not accounted for by the Bank. The amounts actually spent thus remain unknown. A technical audit in 2003 by an independent evaluation expert states that the total program cost was US\$ 21 million, although this cannot be confirmed."

According to the ICR and the previous GEF EO TER, the US\$ 1 million in co-financing from the Govt. of Cameroon

did not materialize as expected. "The government for example, was very slow in providing counterpart funding for essential activities such as paying the salaries of field staff. This may be attributed to the fact that the feasibility of a government contribution of \$1 million to the project cost was never analyzed." It's not clear how much the government eventually contributed.

5.2 Project extensions and/or delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If so, in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The project closed 40 months (3.25 years) later than expected. There were several causes of delays. First, roles and responsibilities for project implementation were not clearly outlined in the project document. As a result, the ICR reports "constant struggle over the management specifically of financial resources between MINEF and the NGOs." Second, the national structural adjustment program put a stop on recruitment of civil servants, leading to a serious staff shortage in MINEF. There were simply not enough personnel to carry out project activities in a timely manner.

A third source of delays was friction between local logging companies and the program. Loggers feared loss of concessions and forest access. The loggers persuaded several communities at project sites that the project would restrict community access to forests and resources. Consequently the project team was not well received in local communities and could not implement the community based NRM activities. This friction between the loggers and the project was not resolved until the new national forestry law went into effect in 1998. The law made the forest concession process much more transparent and competitive, and it put in place a framework to ensure that concession fees went directly to local communities.

A fourth problem leading to delays was illicit granting logging permits by MINEF staff at the Campo-Ma'an site in early 1998. Granting of new permits contravened the Grant Agreement and the permits had to be revoked by MINEF. This took several weeks and eventually the staff responsible were removed. But, the incident had far-reaching consequences. The Govt. of the Netherlands threatened to suspend financing and withdraw from the project in November 1998 and again in February 1999 because of lack of reporting.

An MTR in 1998, highlighted all these problems and led to restructuring of the project in 1999. Based on reporting in the ICR, because of all these problems, project implementation essentially halted during the 1998-99 period.

5.3 Country ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability, highlighting the causal links.

The project benefitted from a high level of country ownership in building a sound regulatory framework for PA creation and management. MINEF was heavily involved in the project from the preparation stage and MINEF staff worked closely with the IA and the PMU. Following project closure, the PMU will be permanently integrated into MINEF. The national government supported creation of new PAs and enforcement of the 1994 Forestry Law which regularized the process of awarding concessions.

However, on the budgetary and cofinancing side, and on project implementation, country ownership was weaker. Cofinancing from the government was very slow to materialize. The government for example, was very slow in providing counterpart funding for essential activities such as paying the salaries of field staff. The ICR also notes "cumbersome administrative procedure" and delays "encountered in implementing supervision recommendations."

6. Assessment of project's Monitoring and Evaluation system

Ratings are assessed on a six point scale: Highly Satisfactory=no shortcomings in this M&E component; Satisfactory=minor shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately

Satisfactory=moderate shortcomings in this M&E component; Moderately Unsatisfactory=significant shortcomings in this M&E component; Unsatisfactory=major shortcomings in this M&E component; Highly Unsatisfactory=there were no project M&E systems.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

6.1 M&E Design at entry	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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The project document includes an implementation schedule and a supervision schedule, but lacks a logframe matrix. The project document briefly describes arrangements for monitoring project implementation, reporting and supervision requirements (MTR, audits,PIRs), and it notes that a long term M&E plan for assessing impacts should be developed in the first phase of the project. The project document also indicates that baseline biological and socio-economic studies should be carried out at the start of the project. There was no separate budgetary allocation for M&E activities.

According to the ICR, a logframe was developed during the MTR in 1998 and subsequently used as the basis for a monitoring and evaluation system. The logframe matrix presented in the ICR is very weak. It conflates outcomes and indicators, and does not include any information on baseline levels or targets.

6.2 M&E Implementation	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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The project collected extensive baseline data on socio-economic and biological variables at all sites. Data is stored in databases at each project site and at the program's website, www.biocam.net. Based on the reporting in the ICR, it's not clear whether this information is updated.

The ICR uses the logframe to show that some expected outcomes were achieved. There is no indication in the ICR that the lograme was ever used as a tool for adaptive management. The ICR also does not provide any quantitative evidence of project achievements and to assess the overall status of biodiversity before and after the project.

According to the ICR, a planning, monitoring and evaluation system of analytical accounting at the local and central levels was established to ensure the evaluation and supervision of the program. Trimestrial monitoring and evaluation reports and semestrial supervision reports were produced and distributed to the government and all other actors. The MTR was carried out and recommendations of the MTR to restructure the program were implemented by the IA and EA. It's not clear if an independent terminal evaluation of the project was ever carried out.

7. Assessment of project implementation and execution

Quality of Implementation includes the quality of project design, as well as the quality of supervision and assistance provided by implementing agency(s) to execution agencies throughout project implementation. Quality of Execution covers the effectiveness of the executing agency(s) in performing its roles and responsibilities. In both instances, the focus is upon factors that are largely within the control of the respective implementing and executing agency(s). A six point rating scale is used (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory), or Unable to Assess.

Please justify ratings in the space below each box.

7.1 Quality of Project Implementation	Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
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The IA for this project was the World Bank. The ICR rates Bank performance in the preparation and appraisal stage as ‘Unsatisfactory’ and rates the quality of supervision during implementation as ‘Satisfactory.’”

The ICR notes that the project design stage took ‘longer than expected’ without clarifying how long or what was expected. The ICR also finds that project design had numerous flaws, which were not addressed until the MTR. The project was designed as a pilot in nature with rather broadly defined objectives and activities and a decentralized, collaborative relationship between various NGOs and MINEF, the EA. However, at the time of appraisal none of the baseline studies had been done so there was no clear idea of the threats to biodiversity. The project document lacked a logframe or any clear indicators to track progress towards and achievement of objectives. Training programs, the community participation/development activities, and institutional arrangements for implementation were not well elaborated in the project document.

Various risks, particularly funding risks, should have been identified and a mitigation strategy developed in the project document. The design did not account for the weak capacity and lack of project implementation experience at MINEF. The Government was not used to working collaboratively with NGOs. The WB IEG review notes that the feasibility of a \$1 million government cofinancing contribution, or the overall financial sustainability of the project, was never analyzed in the design stage.

According to the ICR, Bank performance up to the MTR was weak. “The pilot nature of this structure, compounded with weak political motivation from the GOC and the Bank, at the beginning of implementation, resulted in inefficient execution until mid-term.” There was confusion over roles and responsibilities of collaborating NGO’s, MINEF (the EA), and the Bank team. The Bank failed to take action to clearly define implementation roles and responsibilities and it failed to put a project M&E system in place. Bank oversight and supervision in the pre-MTR period was weak contributing in part to the issuing of illicit logging permits. Reporting by the Bank was weak. The Netherlands threatened to suspend financing in February 1999 because of inadequate reporting by the Bank of the activities of NGOs operating as implementing agencies under financing from the DFIS grant. In this case, the Bank had failed to provide progress reports in a format acceptable to DGIS.

Post-MTR, the ICR reports that the situation improved vastly. There appears to have been a personnel change in the Bank TTL for the project and the project itself was restructured and roles clarified. The ICR reports that oversight, supervision, and reporting by the Bank stepped up after the MTR. Disbursement processes were streamlined and dialogue between MINEF and the Bank increased. The problem with the Netherlands was resolved through improved communication between the NGOs, the Bank, and the Government of the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the project’s financial recordkeeping seems to have remained disorganized. The ICR reports that actual total project costs are unknown as are donor and NGO contributions.

7.2 Quality of Project Execution	Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
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The executing agency for the project was MINEF, but various project activities were also carried out by local and international NGOs. According to the ICR, the project implementation arrangement and responsibilities were not clearly delineated at the start of the project leading to “confusion about the respective prerogatives of MINEF and the NGOs during the initial period of implementation caused constant struggles over the management of financial and other resources, resulting, until the mid-term review, in recurrent stalemates and distrust.” Due to the freeze in recruitment of civil servants and the frequent transfer of key MINEF personnel and administrators, the project suffer from an acute staff shortage. These factors seriously hindered project implementation for 3.25 years, until the project was restructured following the MTR to clarify the role of MINEF and NGO partners. As the result of this implementation arrangement most of the site activities were outsourced to NGOs.

The ICR reports that after the MTR, project execution was more efficient, with “continual monitoring, supervision and reporting on program status.”

8. Assessment of Project Impacts

8.1 Environmental Change. Describe the changes in environmental stress and environmental status that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

None noted in the TE report.

8.2 Socioeconomic change. Describe any changes in human well-being (income, education, health, community relationships, etc.) that occurred by the end of the project. Include both quantitative and qualitative changes documented, sources of information for these changes, and how project activities contributed to or hindered these changes. Also include how contextual factors have contributed to or hindered these changes.

None noted in the TE report.

8.3 Capacity and governance changes. Describe notable changes in capacities and governance that can lead to large-scale action (both mass and legislative) bringing about positive environmental change. “Capacities” include awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, and environmental monitoring systems, among others. “Governance” refers to decision-making processes, structures and systems, including access to and use of information, and thus would include laws, administrative bodies, trust-building and conflict resolution processes, information-sharing systems, etc. Indicate how project activities contributed to/ hindered these changes, as well as how contextual factors have influenced these changes.

a) Capacities

- Knowledge about the status of biodiversity and approaches to community based NRM has been strengthened.
- The national Cameroonian capacity to collect, analyze and process data on conservation and management of biodiversity, which falls primarily under MINEF, was enhanced through the establishment of the Biodiversity Information System in Cameroon and the Biodiversity Geographic Information System Experts Network (BIOGENIC). It resulted in the creation of databases, networks and a website.
- However, under lessons learned, the ICR notes the “program initially invested heavily in studies, surveys and consultancies, however without building real capacity in the field or for MINEF. The study phase should have been linked more closely to the sustainable building of capacity in the field.”
- At the field level, the capacity of MINEF to control poaching through the DWPA was strengthened.
- The program enabled the Cameroon National Herbarium to acquire modern tools and equipment, laboratories, and internet connections.

b) Governance

- Several Decrees and Decisions for creation of protected areas and national parks were enacted.
- The decentralized decision-making and implementation approach used in this project has been accepted and adopted by the government as a tool for PA management. The role of MINEF within the project focused on public service (enforcement of laws and policy) while private partners implemented conservation and management

activities (research, studies, local development).

8.4 Unintended impacts. Describe any impacts not targeted by the project, whether positive or negative, affecting either ecological or social aspects. Indicate the factors that contributed to these unintended impacts occurring.

- The project was instrumental in promoting the birth and emergence of local environmental NGOs who were responsible for local development and conservation activities at all sites. This was not identified in the Project Document as an expected outcome of the project.

8.5 Adoption of GEF initiatives at scale. Identify any initiatives (e.g. technologies, approaches, financing instruments, implementing bodies, legal frameworks, information systems) that have been mainstreamed, replicated and/or scaled up by government and other stakeholders by project end. Include the extent to which this broader adoption has taken place, e.g. if plans and resources have been established but no actual adoption has taken place, or if market change and large-scale environmental benefits have begun to occur. Indicate how project activities and other contextual factors contributed to these taking place. If broader adoption has not taken place as expected, indicate which factors (both project-related and contextual) have hindered this from happening.

- As noted above, the decentralized decision-making approach applied in this project which relied on collaboration between government and local NGOs, was 'mainstreamed' into national conservation policies.
- More generally, as this was one of the very first GEF biodiversity projects to be implemented, the lessons from the project regarding NGO involvement and community based NRM have informed later GEF project.

9. Lessons and recommendations

9.1 Briefly describe the key lessons, good practices, or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects.

1. Sustainable sources of funding must be secured to strengthen local organizations and to provide adequate compensation for local populations to conserve biodiversity, and to sustain community-based development. For instance in this project the payments made by logging companies to local villagers proved to be very effective.
2. Effective GIS is an essential decision-making tool for biodiversity conservation in particular, and for natural resource management in general as it provides stakeholders with sensitive information on all important issues.
3. Although government institutions are in charge of biodiversity conservation policy at national level, implementation of these policies needs to be entrusted to other partners at local level. Such an organizational arrangement proved to be successful in this project and will be successful if repeated for other projects.

9.2 Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation.

1. Because of the successful of this project in increasing transparency of the distribution of fees from logging and hunting to the community and in managing natural resources, further funding of similar funding to Cameroon should be considered by the GEF to capitalize the solid foundation of this project.
2. The two proposed World Bank projects need to incorporate the lessons learnt from this program in terms of sustainability.

10. Quality of the Terminal Evaluation Report

A six point rating scale is used for each sub-criteria and overall rating of the terminal evaluation report (Highly Satisfactory to Highly Unsatisfactory)

Criteria	GEF EO comments	Rating
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To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives?	The ICR describes project outputs, with little attempt to evaluate their significance or to measure outcomes or impacts. Moreover, the project achievement could have been assessed in regards to increase of project cost from a proposed \$ 12 millions to \$21 millions.	MS
To what extent is the report internally consistent, the evidence presented complete and convincing, and ratings well substantiated?	There are some evidence gaps, including missing information on actual project costs, and missing detail on the MTR and project restructuring. The ratings reflect a kind reading of project performance. Outcomes, sustainability, and borrower performance were overrated given the evidence presented.	MS
To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and/or project exit strategy?	The ICR takes a short-term view of sustainability, assuming that the two follow-on WB funded projects will sustain most of the project activities. Longer-term financial viability and institutional sustainability are not realistically assessed in sustainability section, but the lessons learned section does address these issues.	MS
To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive?	The lessons learned are comprehensive and supported by the evidence presented.	HS
Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used?	The report only presents information about WB expenditures. There is no data on actual project costs or the actual contributions by the government and other donors.	U
Assess the quality of the report's evaluation of project M&E systems:	There is no single section devoted to assessment of the project M&E system. The ICR comments on M&E arrangements and activities throughout the report.	MU
Overall TE Rating		MS

11. Note any additional sources of information used in the preparation of the terminal evaluation report (excluding PIRs, TEs, and PADs).

1. Original GEF TER prepared by Siham Mohamedahmed.