GEF EO Terminal Evaluation Review Form for OPS4

1. PROJECT DATA				
			Review date:	March 23,2009
GEF Project ID:	874		at endorsement (Million US$)	at completion (Million US$)
IA/EA Project ID:		**GEF financing:**	7.50	7.18
Project Name:	Assessments of Impacts and Adaptation to Climate Change in Multiple Regions and Sectors (AIACC)	IA/EA own:	2.11	2.11
Country:	Global, FSP	Government:	1.32	1.82
		Other*:	1.18	0.50
		Total Cofinancing	4.61	4.91
Operational Program:	Enabling Activity	**Total Project Cost:**	12.11	12.09
IA	UNEP	Dates		
Partners involved:	EAs: Global Change System for Analysis Research and Training (START), Third World Academy of Sciences (TWAS); Other collaborator: Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change	Effectiveness/ Prodoc Signature (i.e. date project began)		6/26/2001
		Closing Date	Proposed: 1/1/2004	Actual: 3/1/2008
Prepared by: Meg Spearman	Reviewed by: Neeraj Negi	Duration between effectiveness date and original closing (in months): 30 months	Duration between effectiveness date and actual closing (in months): 81 months	Difference between original and actual closing (in months): 51 months
Authors of TE: John E. Hay, Mary Jo Larson, Rosa T. Perez		TE completion date: July 2007	TE submission date to GEF EO: September 2008	Difference between TE completion and submission date (in months): 14 months

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

2. SUMMARY OF PROJECT RATINGS AND KEY FINDINGS

Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluation reviews for further definitions of the ratings.

Performance Dimension	Last PIR	IA Terminal Evaluation	IA Evaluation Office evaluations or reviews	GEF EO
2.1a Project outcomes	**HS**	**HS**	**HS-**	**S**
2.1b Sustainability of Outcomes	**---**	**ML**	**ML**	**ML**
2.1c Monitoring and evaluation	**S**	**MS**	**MS**	**MU**
2.1d Quality of implementation and Execution	**---**	**S**	**S**	**S**
2.1e Quality of the evaluation report	**---**	**---**	**--HS-**	**S**

2.2 Should the terminal evaluation report for this project be considered a good practice? Why? Yes, the report provides a comprehensive, independent and candid assessment of the project plan and implementation and covers the requirements stipulated in the GEFEO guidelines for terminal evaluations.
2.3 Are there any evaluation findings that require follow-up, such as corruption, reallocation of GEF funds, mismanagement, etc.? None indicated.

3. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

3.1 Project Objectives

a. What were the Global Environmental Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

No direct global environmental objectives, as this was a climate change enabling activity related to scientific and technical capacity building for adaptation and vulnerability assessment activities in developing countries. The project document states "This proposed global project would fund a number of studies assessing the impacts of climate change on a range of socio-economic sectors and ecological systems at the regional and national scale and the development of a range of adaptation response options. Science capacity building is a primary aspect of the project."

Indirect global environmental benefits from these activities could include the reduction of fossil fuel use, increased use of alternative transport and renewable energy use and subsequent reduction in GHGs and particulate pollution.

b. What were the Development Objectives of the project? Were there any changes during implementation?

The project document states three primary objectives are to:
1. "Support enabling activities by developing science capacity and assessment techniques and information targeted at the most vulnerable regions and sectors where capacity is needed…
2. Enhance the comprehensiveness of impact and adaptation assessments using a consistent methodological approach (Carter et al., 1994) by supporting regionally focused research to be undertaken by developing country experts, often in partnership with developed country experts… [and]
3. Contribute to global assessment activities in collaboration with IPCC by enabling selected developing countries, chosen on the basis of several criteria discussed in the SELECTION CRITERIA, to develop technical capacity and apply it to the assessment of climate change impacts and options for adaptation."
There were no changes were recorded for these objectives.

(describe and insert tick in appropriate box below, if yes at what level was the change approved (GEFSEC, IA or EA)?)

Overall Environmental Objectives	Project Development Objectives	Project Components	Any other (specify)

c. If yes, tick applicable reasons for the change (in global environmental objectives and/or development objectives)

Original objectives not sufficiently articulated	Exogenous conditions changed, causing a change in objectives	Project was restructured because original objectives were over ambitious	Project was restructured because of lack of progress	Any other (specify)

4. GEF EVALUATION OFFICE ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES AND SUSTAINABILITY

4.1.1 Outcomes (can receive either a satisfactory rating or a unsatisfactory rating. For effectiveness and cost efficiency a six point scale 6= HS to 1 = HU will be used)

a. Relevance (of outcomes to focal areas/operational program strategies and country priorities) Rating: S
The TE states that the project "delivered highly tangible outputs and outcomes at both project and sub-project levels," that were invariably "very relevant, and in many cases they were extremely important, globally and/or nationally."
A.1. What is the relevance of the project outcomes/results to:
(i) the national sustainable development agenda and development needs and challenges?
The project document acknowledges the gap in climate change scenarios for developing countries, and attributes this to having less significance to stakeholders as compared to the development of adaptation plans. Africa receives particular attention for modeling both in terms of potential impact and current lack of meteorological data. The project intends to lessen the risk of scientist leaving their countries and directly and indirectly strengthen capacity in over 60 countries. Also, in accordance with STAP recommendations, the project is designed to establish links between the project and

policy planning, and therefore includes broad stakeholder participation.

The TE notes that instead of addressing existing national priorities, AIACC has been "highly effective in shaping national priorities so that sustainable development can occur despite changes in the climate." However, many project researchers had poor linkages and/or understanding of government processes and agencies and initially, national governments were not adequately involved in the formulation and endorsement of AIACC sub-projects (which caused delays in implementation).

(ii) the national environmental framework, agenda and priorities?

As an enabling activity, financing is provided for building capacity toward national communications (NCs) process for climate change and in the case of the least-developed countries, for the preparation and development of National Adaptation Programs for Action (NAPAs). All 24 sub projects contributed toward NCs. As the TE explains, the project's learning component is key to national sustainable development agendas as it includes both south-south and north-south collaboration, and assessments include impact, vulnerability and adaptation.

(iii) the achievement of the GEF strategies and mandate?

As the project document explains, this enabling activity is very relevant to GEF's mandate and climate change portfolio objectives overall, as it carries indirect but significant potential for individual, political, economic, social and professional capacity building in the countries and regions involved. Key to project success is the collaboration between individuals in developed and developing countries, involving renowned climate modelers and vulnerability experts from the IPCC. The 24 sub-projects are designed to "enhance research collaboration and will actively encourage the formation of multi-sectoral and multi-country teams."

The TE notes that project outcomes are highly relevant to the climate change focal area and climate OPs, but also to other related focal areas such as biodiversity and desertification and indirectly cuts across all focal areas. The AIACC also has implications for potential connections between the efforts of this project and others within relevant regions. One of the lessons learned, however, is that this connection could have been made more explicit by working further with communities in countries where the enabling environment for adaptation remains weak, by completing project preparation within a year, from which a competitive project proposal would be created and submitted for GEF funding.

(iv) the implementation of the global conventions the GEF supports (countries obligations and responsibilities towards the convention as well as the achievement of the conventions objectives)

As stated above, the AIACC helps support UNFCCC framework countries through NAPA and preparation for national communications. The sub-projects helped fill the information gaps identified by the TAR of the IPCC and supported the submission of 9 NCs, 5 NAPAs and 29 NCs under preparation. Many of the AIACC scientists shared the joint award with 2007 Nobel Peace Prize recipients, Al Gore, with the IPCC.

A2. Did the project promote of International (Regional and / or Global) Cooperation and Partnership[1]

According to the TE, sub-project teams' findings and overall project results are now being shared more widely and can be seen as an excellent example of South-North flow of knowledge and technologies.

b. Effectiveness **Rating: S**

The TE remarks that AIACC was most successful in developing, adapting, and applying methods for assessing impacts and vulnerability, but, consistent with the performance of other climate change efforts, it was less successful in respect to identifying and assessing adaptation options. Due to the sequential nature of the process, some sub-project teams ran out of time to develop their adaptation work programs. Though a "top-down" approach was planned for building on an applying the IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Impacts and Adaptations, a "bottom-up" approach appears to have been more consistent with sub-project team technical capacity and local conditions. The final evaluation provides evidence that the project outputs have a "generally high level of credibility among stakeholders in relevant MEAs, the GEF and the IPCC, among others."

The TE lists a number of methodology-related achievements and shortcomings in #75, page 29-30. The following is an abbreviation:

- AS21 researchers developed a vulnerability assessment technique… the methods of which were used provide an example of expert judgment (choice of indicators) and ground-truth validation using information provided by the communities;
- The AF42 team developed and applied many methods; all can be considered robust, appropriate to the local context and effective. An example is the work of Parida et al., who projected catchment runoff coefficients out to 2020 using an artificial neural network model. This work has been published in Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 31, 928-934 (2006);
- The methods used by AF92 placed the stakeholder at the centre of the research - this was very important given that people in the study areas have developed indigenous knowledge systems that have so far enabled them cope with drought;
- In AF38 there was a shift from the proposed integrated modeling for the whole region to focus on a "bottom up"

[1] Please consider for regional and global project only

approach to better support ideas of community-driven assessment… However, the sub-project outputs do not have the credibility to influence policy makers seeking ways to address the adverse impacts of climate change;
 AS07 demonstrated very clearly that effective strategies for adapting to climate change should be site and time specific - farmers of the lower Mekong River basin have been adapting to climate impacts throughout history and their strategies for managing climate risks have evolved through time. The fact that it was difficult to separate adaptations made in response to climate pressures from actions taken in response to other factors due to demographic, social, economic, technological, and environmental and other changes, highlights the strong interactions between these various pressures and their consequences;
 LA32 analyzed risks to fishermen of climate-related changes in conditions, and easy and low cost adaptation measures. The team initiated the analysis for an Adaptive Control Information System (ACIS), but was unable to make substantial progress… The LA32 team now recognize that adaptation will require greater collaboration with other sectors and institutions; importantly, experiences with EcoPlata suggest that such a system could be implemented; and
 AF92 provides another example of methodologies developed by AIACC sub-projects to assess vulnerability being already widely used, including by the AIACC research teams in Thailand and Vietnam. New projects on climate change adaptation in Africa are being funded by the CCAA programme and the AMMA vulnerability project will also use the methodology. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has cited AF92 results to justify why African leaders should pay attention to climate change. The sub-project was listed by NEPAD as one that addresses its main priority areas of intervention. The work was also cited in the last Human Development Report (2006) of the UNDP. The UNDP Adaptation Policy Framework used some of the AF92 methods and findings when recommending appropriate steps for stakeholder engagement. These were considered crucial for effective assessments and eventual implementation of adaptation strategies.

c. Efficiency (cost-effectiveness) **Rating: HS**

The AIACC was highly efficient in achieving quality outputs and there is no evidence that it could have reached its objectives at less cost or in less time. In addition to co-financing leveraged at the project level, many sub-projects mobilized cash and other funding; which often took considerable time and effort by the sub-project teams. Compared to the relative costs of other ongoing global assessment activities the project was "at least comparable" to other efforts, allowing for differences in time and scale.

The TE highlights some of the main points about the budget and outputs:

- Personnel costs were 16% of total costs;
- Two thirds of the budget was provided to cooperating agencies for the assessment studies and to supporting organizations for training services;
- Direct expenditure on training was just over $1 million;
- Overall there was a small under-expenditure of $300,000; and
- Budgeted costs for the Science Director operations were exceeded by over 100%, attributable at least in part to the extension of the project by 18 months.

The TE also notes that the project appears to have complied with GEF requirements for incremental cost expenditures, directing the bulk of the budget toward the three critical components of stage II adaptation strategies; activity data, agreed and tested methodological tools, and training. Also, although overestimating assets in some instances, the project made effective use of existing resources, in part, with mixed results, through the mentoring program.

One of the shortfalls with efficiency was the failure to fully engage national governments from project inception, thus delaying some sub-project endorsements, thus resulting in a lack of formalized institutional arrangements and thereby causing delays in implementation. Due at least in part to the devotion of the sub-project teams, these delays did not have adverse affects on efficiency or project outcomes and sustainability.

d. To what extent did the project result in trade offs between environment and development priorities / issues (not to be rated) – this could happen both during the designing of the project where some choices are made that lead to preference for one priority over the other, and during implementation of the project when resources are transferred from addressing environmental priorities to development priorities and vice versa. If possible explain the reasons for such tradeoffs.

Although there are inferred trade-offs between development and environment under this project, specific examples from the TE were few. In the case of AF91 in Kenya, financial resources to enhance coping and adaptation activities related to malaria were expected, as the ties between the sub-project team and government were strong. In different contexts, such funding could be perceived as a loss of funding toward poverty reduction efforts. However, the TE notes that several sub-projects confirmed that poverty reduces the effectiveness of coping and adaptation, and that namely the livelihoods and food security of the rural poor are most threatened by climate change. Also, sometimes development efforts, such as in the case of negative environmental effected of intensified land use, in LA27, illustrate the importance of AIACC's role in fully understanding linkages and adapting a broad approach to adaptation.

4.1.2 Results / Impacts[2] (Describe Impacts) (please fill in annex 1 – results score sheet and annex 2 – focal area impacts (against GEF Strategic Priority indicators, where appropriate and possible)

4.2 Likelihood of sustainability. Using the following sustainability criteria, include an assessment of **risks** to sustainability of project outcomes and impacts based on the information presented in the TE. Use a four point scale (4= Likely (no or negligible risk); 3= Moderately Likely (low risk); 2= Moderately Unlikely (substantial risks) to 1= Unlikely (High risk)). The ratings should be given taking into account both the probability of a risk materializing and the anticipated magnitude of its effect on the continuance of project benefits.

a. Financial resources	**Rating: ML**
As long as climate change activities are not mainstreamed into the development and planning process, governments will not appropriate budgets for such efforts. The TE notes that AIACC has targeted relevant groups of early professionals and has helped mainstream adaptation. As explained in 4.2.c. below, there is evidence to suggest that AIACC partner institutions have proliferated in number and funding since the project's inception. Two noted success stories of this nature are AF04, where there is no longer a great reliance from outside the country for biodiversity and climate change, and LA 26, where an increasing demand for applied science in climate change had bolstered connections between universities and local jurisdictions. Financial risks are highly relevant to the context of the AIACC sub-project and therefore although the individual risks may be low, the global magnitude of this risk across the 24 regions affected is relatively large.	
b. Socio-economic / political	**Rating: ML**
The threats to longer-term sustainability at the sub-project are highly variable and efforts must be tied to local policies and activities such as those addressing malaria and cholera. Both 'need' and 'effectiveness' of efforts must be demonstrated if governments, donors and NGOs are to act. AF91 and AS21 were two examples where the successful involvements of government actors (and in the case of AS21, local communities) lead to frameworks and planning initiatives. However, the turn-over in government positions lends evidence to the urgent need to mainstream adaptation efforts if interests and priorities shift. The TE notes that the component related to climate change scenarios was "unduly narrow and 'top down'" in that it ignored the significance of changing factors other than climate, as well as ignoring the "appropriateness and benefits of using regional and local approaches." Given the high variability in stakeholder engagement, namely the early and sustained government interest and political support, there are apparent risks to the likelihood that the project activities will continue after sub-projects have officially ended.	
c. Institutional framework and governance	**Rating: ML**
The AIACC approach is to build on, work parallel with, and add value to the efforts of other partners and players. One of the three interconnected strategies of the AIACC is improved links between climate change science and policy communities. The TE notes that the individual and institutional capacities "show signs of being sustainable," for three reasons. First, the scientific institutions involved have a long-term commitment to research and training on climate change related hazards. Second, individual capacity building was targeted at early-career scientists. The TE comments that the early professionals trained through the project are entering higher level government and national institutions that address climate change. Finally, the AIACC has succeeded in developing cross-institutional collaboration and involvement with organizations and research programs such as IPCC, MA, IAAST, which has resulted in networks of engaged individuals and institutions. Yet, the TE remarks that these arrangements are vulnerable in the sense that financial resources will have to be continually secured in order to sustain training and that without funding, the institutions that participated in AIACC will pursue other opportunities in areas other than climate change and their connections with other institutions will weaken. However, along these lines, there is evidence of investments building on AIACC strategies, such as Advancing Capacity to Support Climate Change Adaptation (ACCCA) in Africa, and the new Climate Change Adaptation in Africa (CCAA) program is applying a model similar to AIACC. Lack of cooperation among institutions and jurisdictions is cited as a major risk to longer term impacts, and in some cases, regional cooperation proved to have its advantages.	
d. Environmental	**Rating: ML**
There are no direct environmental risks involved in the sustainability of this project. Evidence from several sub-projects supported the notion that poverty reduces coping and adaptation. However, given that environmental degradation often enhances poverty, project benefits will be compromised in the short and long-term with continued environmental degradation in developing countries. The TE notes that several AIACC sub-projects resulted in improved links between development activities and environmental conditions the broad approach toward adaptation may prove beneficial in preventing "mal-adaptation."	
e. Technological	**Rating: NA**

[2] Please consider direct and indirect global environmental results; any unexpected results; local development benefits (including results relevant to communities, gender issues, indigenous peoples, NGOs and CBOs)

NA

4.3 Catalytic role[3]

a. INCENTIVES: To what extent have the project activities provide incentives (socio-economic / market based) to contribute to catalyzing changes in stakeholders
Raising the profile of policy-oriented climate researchers, and showing by example what is possible to achieve at local, national and regional levels by sub-projects, appears to have incentivized the demand for climate change adaptation efforts across a multitude of stakeholders in various regions and sectors. The uptake of NAPA tools and methodologies is a contributor toward sustained incentive structures for positive changes in stakeholders.
b. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: To what extent have the project activities contributed to changing institutional behaviors
The TE states that capacity was build through AIACC sub-projects in terms of "knowledge, skills, institutions, linkages and networks." Many sub-project team members joined international scientific groups and programs, such as AF20 team members' involvement in Global Energy and Water Cycle Experiment (GEWEX) and African Monsoon Multidisciplinary Analysis (AMMA). Thus, the AIACC reinforced the capacity of the scientific team analysis and modeling, increasing visibility and allowing for members to not only gain access to institutions, but play leadership roles. A consortium of eight countries including Botswana, some Mediterranean and Latin American Countries is building on their AIACC experiences and has begun investigating the drivers and remedies of land degradation. Other examples of sub-projects further illustrate the notion that institutional behavioral change is occurring through the application and replication of methodologies developed through the project such as a hydrodynamic model in Uruguay, drought preparedness plans in Mediterranean countries and limited successes in replicating and up-scaling beach monitoring in the Seychelles.
c. POLICY CHANGE: To what extent have project activities contributed to policy changes (and implementation of policy)?
Policy changes are highly contextualized based on individual country and regional factors. Many of the policy changes are tied directly with the activities of existing government obligations, such as through NAPAs and NCs. The TE notes that the "relative or absolute dearth of policy-related expertise and experience on most sub-project teams, resulted in a comparatively weak assessments of adaptation options." If policy changes could not come about during the AIACC project through adaptation programs, it appears highly unlikely that they would after the project closed and motivation dwindles. Additionally, although there was an intention to drive changes from the "top-down" through the application of IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Impacts and Adaptations, limited understanding and local conditions supported a more "bottom-up" approach from the sub-project level. The TE lists a number of examples of achievements and shortcomings along these lines.
d. CATALYTIC FINANCING: To what extent did the project contributed to sustained follow-on financing from Government and / or other donors? (this is different than co-financing)
The TE notes that several of the African sub-project teams (AF07, AF42) have applied for grants through CCAA, ACCCA and under funding sources, demonstrating independent capacity for climate change research and adaptation efforts. Other projects have managed sustained funding through local universities and/or research institutions.
e. PROJECT CHAMPIONS: To what extent have changes (listed above) been catalyzed by particular individuals or institutions (without which the project would not have achieved results)?
Ms. Xianfu Lu was noted as an exceptional mentor in the context of this largely ineffective sub-project component.

4.4 Assessment of processes and factors affecting attainment of project outcomes and sustainability.

a. Co-financing. To what extent was the reported cofinancing (or proposed cofinancing) essential to achievement of GEF objectives? If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for it? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?
Co-financing was planned at $4.6 million and actualized co-financing and other leveraged support was slightly higher, at $4.9 million. The project extension by 18 months and the failure to obtain early government support by sub-projects are two reasons why funding was increased and sought from alternative sources from the original co-financers. The TE describes that securing co-financing in several sub-projects was "poorly handled" and that "for all sub-projects inadequate attention was given to documenting the cash and in-kind co-financing that was obtained." The TE reports that co-financing and other in-kind contributions had a "highly-beneficial effect on the project's outcomes and sustainability." For example, that the supplemental grants program, funded by USAID, enabled sub-project teams to design and implement stakeholder engagement activities which addressed shortcomings in the original

[3] Please review the 'Catalytic Role of GEF: How is it measured and evaluated – A conceptual framework' prior to addressing this section.

stakeholder engagement plans. Also, a "substantial" amount of in-kind support provided by institutions hosting major portions of the sub-project components enabled teams to engage in follow-up activities and helped enable the long-term sustainability of these sub-projects. Also adding value and contributing toward sustainability were in-cash from CIDA, the USAID, the USEPA and the Rockefeller Foundation, which allowed AIACC to build on core project activities with additional capacity building, stakeholder engagement and synthesis activities.

b. Delays. If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons for it? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability? If it did, then in what ways and through what causal linkages?

The TE states that some of the sub-project PIs reported delays from internal and external causes, but that overall feedback was positive. Although shortcomings were few, when they did occur, they had significant effects on implementation at the sub-project level, but no lasting effects on overall project outcomes and sustainability. However, the project was extended by 18 months and timely M&E feedback was affected by delays. Internal to the project, there were some examples of delays in receipt of funds from governments, who were not adequately involved during project design and inception, but other delays, such as local endorsement of sub-projects and a SARs outbreak, were beyond the scope of the project.

c. Country Ownership. Assess the extent to which country ownership has affected project outcomes and sustainability? Describe the ways in which it affected outcomes and sustainability highlighting the causal links.

All AIACC countries submitted their NCs, which recognize the urgency of climate change and call for more rigorous assessments of impacts and adaptation options, to the UNFCCC. However, many governments initially refused endorsements of sub-projects because of concern that they were not consistent with national priorities. The TE notes, however, that much of this may have been due to a lack of engaging governments in sub-project planning up front, and not initially acknowledging that governments were in a better position than academics and other researchers to decide what national priorities were undertaken. Nevertheless, there is evidence that all sub-projects managed to achieve appropriate levels of government involvement and results and findings from some sub-projects influenced government and NGO actions thereafter, especially in terms of connections between human health and climate change.

The TE goes on to explain that through the process of developing countries' submitting reports as parties to the UNFCCC, CBD, and other conventions, the AIACC has enhanced the knowledge and skill base of these countries, but more importantly, aided them in producing reports for relevant national and international agreements. Also, some projects delivered outputs and outcomes that supported ecosystem-based approaches to strengthen resource management, such as with biodiversity in South Africa (AF04) and water management with agriculture in the Mekong river basin (AS07) and in Egypt (AF90).

4.5 Assessment of the project's monitoring and evaluation system based on the information in the TE

a. M&E design at Entry **Rating (six point scale): MU**

Parts of the project M&E design are logical and fairly clear, but the TE comments that the plan is largely ambiguous in planned outputs/objectives, timeline and procedures.

The project document plan was for the technical and steering committee to review and select sub-project proposals, after which technical assistance will provide contact and support through the initial phases. Thereafter, "periodic" reporting is required of the researchers, to be collated by the executing agencies and consolidated into a progress report by the project manager, for distribution to the technical and steering committees. Changes affecting financial are to be addressed by the steering committee and changes in technical content is designated for the technical committee. Parallel to this, the "sustainability of the science capacity will be monitored and the potential for centers to develop out of these activities to be considered." The Steering Committee is to provide "scientific, technical, policy and strategic guidance" and the Implementation Committee is to guide the project coordinator on reports and make recommendations to the EA, who will, in turn, provide quarterly progress reports to UNEP. UNEP will then apply its M&E guidelines and procedures to evaluate progress through a MT and final evaluation.

The TE points out that the M&E plan does not meet GEF minimal requirements, due to an absence of "objectively verifiable indicators," a project baseline, and a comprehensive M&E plan, with organizational set up and itemized budget. However, the role of the project technical committee and peer-review of research papers for publication as AIACC working papers, were a noted as two particular strengths in design.

b. M&E plan Implementation **Rating (six point scale): MS**

According to the TE, M&E implementation went fairly well considering shortfalls in design and lack of information for several indicators through the 3rd and the final PIR. There was no mid-term review of the project and it was extended by 18 months due internal and external delays (See 4.4.b above and 4.5.b.2.b below). After initial delays, submission of sub-project reports to START and TWAS, and their subsequent reporting to UNEP was timely. Progress reports were used by project management to determine the technical assistance needed by sub-project teams. The TE notes that this

was helpful, but it did not address or resolve all forthcoming problems. By the third PIR, "highly satisfactory" ratings were based on indicators with complete information, whereas many "satisfactory" ratings were assigned to incomplete activities (these were subsequently raised to HS once completed). The lack of collection of critical information made it difficult to detect and resolve problems at the sub-project level, up until the third PIR. From that point onward, the lack of information became tied to performance. Also, participant evaluations of the training workshops indicated a satisfactory assessment, and questionnaires were distributed to sub-project PIs and stakeholders for the evaluation of project performance, outputs and outcomes; the results of which were made available to the terminal evaluation team. Overall, project delays and the lack of a comprehensive set of indicators from the outset, hindered M&E implementation; yet there was also strong evidence of "wise" and adaptive management under these circumstances.

b.1 Was sufficient funding provided for M&E in the budget included in the project document?
The TE notes that M&E activities fell under general administration in the project document and no specific provisions were made in the budget. There was no way, therefore, to objectively assess whether this was adequate. UNEP funded the terminal evaluation from its own resources.

b.2a Was sufficient and timely funding provided for M&E during project implementation?
There is no evidence that TWAS and START personnel received M&E training and review procedures (during or following the project). The late submission of the project's final report and the subsequent terminal evaluation have ensured that comprehensive up-to-date material is available, but the picture of how funds were allocated and utilized during implementation is unclear.

b.2b To what extent did the project monitoring system provided real time feed back? Was the information that was provided used effectively? What factors affected the use of information provided by the project monitoring system?

The TE explains that at the start of the project, it was agreed among UNEP, START and TWAS that progress and financial reporting would be completed semi-annually instead of quarterly, for both sub-projects to EAs and by EAs to the IA. Reporting by both entities were noted as "timely." The first available PIR covered activities through September 2004, the year that UNEP introduced the requirements for PIRs; which meant that the project was already in its fourth year and only 3 months until the originally planned project completion date. This PIR reported that the semi-annual reports by the EAs was "providing sufficient oversight and accountability to assure that project implementation had been effective and resources used appropriately." No midterm evaluation was completed because UNEP determined it was too close to project completion; the TE notes this lack of synthesis analysis as a shortcoming.

The progress reports from the two executing agencies were distributed to the technical and steering committees, and sub-project progress reports were distributed via website to project mentors, the technical committee and UNEP, for review and comment. The TE states that this process addressed many issues but did not capture or resolve all problems, in part due to personal time constraints of mentors. Also, the training workshops distributed questionnaires to sub-project PIs and stakeholders for the evaluation of project output, outcomes and performance. These resulted in many practical suggestions on how project activities could be made more useful. However, it is not clear whether or how this data was used, as it not made available to those undertaking the terminal evaluation.

Overall, the high ratings of this process as indicated in PIRs were found to be justified by the TE. Despite the 18 month project extension due to factors internal to the project, many of the factors affecting M&E were external to the sub-projects (university strike, reassignment of personnel, delayed access to data, interruptions in field work, and tsunami damage). The TE notes that adaptive management because more critical as decisions to produce additional outputs delayed project completion. The third and final PIRs showed "substantial improvement in the comprehensiveness and quality of the monitoring process," but that critical information was still missing for many indicators.

b.3 Can the project M&E system (or an aspect of the project M&E system) be considered a good practice? If so, explain why.

To the degree that the M&E system functioned throughout implementation and *eventually* resulted in comprehensive and candid assessment of project outputs, outcomes and performance, the M&E system could have been considered a good practice. However, as the TE points out, a lack of baselines, lack of information on some indicators, lack of itemized budget, project delays (those that could be considered internal), lack of midterm evaluation, lack of information on how feedback was utilized and possibly lead toward adaptive management action, all seemingly point toward non-attainment of minimal GEF requirements for a project M&E system. However, despite the inherent difficulties in the M&E of both a 'global' project and an 'enabling activity,' the AIACC reported on positive findings in capacity development for adaptive measures and, in many cases, produced high-quality technical products; which is only possible with a functional M&E system.

4.6 Assessment of Quality of Implementation and Execution

a. Overall Quality of Implementation and Execution (on a six point scale): S
b. Overall Quality of Implementation – for IA (on a six point scale): MS
Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as quality of the project design, focus on results, adequacy of supervision inputs and processes, quality of risk management, candor and realism in supervision reporting, and

suitability of the chosen executing agencies for project execution.

A program officer in UNEP Division for Policy Development and Law, working under the supervision of the policy unit chief, in collaboration with the GEF Unit, was to serve as the task manager for this project. The overall decentralized arrangement, with UNEP oversight, "proved to be highly successful;" but this was attributed, in large part, to the devotion of those overseeing the project and sub-project teams. General oversight of the project was through the AIACC Steering Committee, composed of representatives from GEF, World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), Secretariat for the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC), IPCC, the International Human Dimensions Programme (IHDP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, and the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP).

Though arrangements appeared to function, as described in section 4.5.b.2b above, UNEP did not complete a midterm evaluation as required by the project document (p17, #87.), and while it is not a formal requirement until well into the project timeline, the first PIR was completed 4 years in to the project. The TE comments that UNEP should have prepared annual reports on project implementation from the starts, and ensured an "appropriate level of information." Also in terms of learning during implementation through real-time feedback, "AIACC convened two meetings to facilitate the process of capturing general lessons with comparisons and synthesis across the AIACC studies. However, unlike the highly successful inception and initial regional workshops, most members of the sub-project teams were not involved." Furthermore, the TE notes that a final meeting of all AIACC sub-project teams to exchange experiences and lessons learned would have been valuable toward ensuring sustainability of project components. Also, in the context of government endorsement and securing adequate co-financing, poorly defined and implemented institutional and administrative arrangements for some of the sub-projects caused significant delays, or worse.

c. Quality of Execution – for Executing Agencies[4] (rating on a 6 point scale): S

Briefly describe and assess performance on issues such as focus on results, adequacy of management inputs and processes, quality of risk management, and candor and realism in reporting by the executive agency.

The TE notes, "The considerable experience of the two executing agencies, the Global Change System for Analysis, Research, and Training (START) and the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World (TWAS), in implementing science-based as well as policy oriented research projects in developing countries was reflected in the project design. The intention was to divide the work according to their comparative advantage. TWAS was to execute the project in the North and West Africa and Asian regions due to its proximity and contacts. In reality, all aspects of day-to-day project management, other than those relating to financial matters, were undertaken by the AIACC Science Director based in START. While such an arrangement may have been expedient, it certainly ignored the considerable value adding contributions TWAS could have made."

The project was designed to avoid political issues by focusing on the scientific aspects of climate change. Thus, through the experiences of START and TWAS, many AIACC teams gained technical expertise and other skills that helped them to engage in debates on the political and scientific dimensions of climate change, and communicate more effectively with politicians and advisors. The TE notes that there was evidence that the enabling environment for AIACC enabling activities was, for the most part, more than adequate at project inception.

5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Assess the project lessons and recommendations as described in the TE

a. Briefly describe the key lessons, good practice or approaches mentioned in the terminal evaluation report that could have application for other GEF projects

From the TE:
- The project's four components (Development and Application of Climate Change Scenarios, Assessment of Impacts and Evaluation of Adaptation Strategies, Training and Technology Transfer and Project Management) were in themselves practicable. However, initially, they included restrictions and omissions. The component related to climate change scenarios was unduly narrow and "top down" – it ignored the importance of considering changes other than in climate, as well as the appropriateness and benefits of using regional and local approaches. Unfortunately, given the emphasis AIACC ultimately, and appropriately, placed on its third objective ("to improve links between climate change science and policy communities to enable adaptation planning and action") there was no component of the project devoted specifically to achievement of this objective. Importantly, most of the actual and potential AIACC outcomes, and efforts to ensure their sustainability, related to this objective.

[4] Executing Agencies for this section would mean those agencies that are executing the project in the field. For any given project this will exclude Executing Agencies that are implementing the project under expanded opportunities – for projects approved under the expanded opportunities procedure the respective executing agency will be treated as an implementing agency.

- Stakeholder engagement at sub-project level was highly variable. Many of the teams underestimated the extent of stakeholder engagement that would be needed and useful for their activities and targeted end users. The importance of this dimension of the assessments was inadequately highlighted in the calls for both the pre and full proposals.
- Several lessons were learned about partnerships during project implementation. The research focus of the AIACC studies tended to favor proposals coming from university and similar institutions… When non-Government institutions play a lead role, it is important that formal partnerships be established with individual Governments early in both the project and sub-project preparation processes.
- The value added of TWAS [one of the two executing agencies, the Global Change System for Analysis, Research, and Training (START) and the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World (TWAS)], was under-utilized. TWAS was to execute the project in the North and West Africa and Asian regions due to its proximity and contacts. In reality, all aspects of day-to-day project management, other than those relating to financial matters, were undertaken by the AIACC Science Director based in START.
- It was often easy to overestimate the existing capacity of the study teams, and hence what they could deliver. [Also] …AIACC's mentoring scheme did not come close to realizing its full potential. Lessons learned as a result of mentoring experiences include: (i) need appropriately formalised process; (ii) the scheme worked better when mentors were chosen by sub-project teams; (iii) provide financial rewards commensurate with contributions and expertise of the mentor; and (iv) the term "technical advisor" is far less pejorative than is "mentor".
- Monitoring and evaluation were a weakness of AIACC, especially at the project preparation and design phase and with respect to evaluations scheduled to be undertaken by UNEP. The Project Document did not meet good practice requirements for monitoring and evaluation …. [Also] Many benefits would have resulted from bringing all AIACC participants together towards the end of the project to exploit the many synergies that have yet to be fully tapped, including transfer of methods and tools and of successful practices in stakeholder engagement.

b. Briefly describe the recommendations given in the terminal evaluation

(i) UNEP undertake monitoring of the longer term impacts of AIACC, with an emphasis on evaluating the sustainability of the project outcomes already documented, and on identifying activities which AIACC has catalysed…A report should be prepared, covering the period to the end of 2010; in addition to reporting on the specific evidence and findings, the report should also include lessons learned, success stories and factors, and relevant recommendations.
(ii) UNEP, START, TWAS and other relevant organizations give thorough consideration to working further with communities and countries where the enabling environment for adaptation remains very weak, to design and ultimately implement a project that builds on the AIACC experience and findings in order to strengthen the enabling environment and demonstrate effective and efficient adaptation initiatives. The time frame should be to complete project preparation within one year, by which time there would be a project proposal that is competitive in terms of receiving funding from GEF.
(iii) Biennial assessments of "quality at entry" conducted by the GEF Evaluation Office, in cooperation with its implementing agencies, include a more comprehensive examination of relevant terminal evaluation reports in order to determine the nature and extent of shortcomings in project preparation (including those in the Project Documents), the reasons why these occurred, the reasons why they were not identified in the STAP review of the draft project document and through other quality assurance processes, the short- and longer- term and irreversible consequences of the shortcomings and the lessons learned, including recommendations for remedial actions…

6. QUALITY OF THE TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

6.1 Comments on the summary of project ratings and terminal evaluation findings based on other information sources such as GEF EO field visits, other evaluations, etc.

Provide a number rating 1-6 to each criteria based on: Highly Satisfactory = 6, Satisfactory = 5, Moderately Satisfactory = 4, Moderately Unsatisfactory = 3, Unsatisfactory = 2, and Highly Unsatisfactory = 1. Please refer to document GEF Office of Evaluation Guidelines for terminal evaluations review for further definitions of the ratings. Please briefly explain each rating.

6.2 Quality of the terminal evaluation report	Ratings
a. To what extent does the report contain an assessment of relevant outcomes and impacts of the project and the achievement of the objectives? Although overall impact was difficult to assess given the nature of this global EA, to the extent possible, relevant outcomes were amply illustrated through case-study examples.	6
b. To what extent the report is internally consistent, the evidence is complete/convincing and the IA ratings have been substantiated? Are there any major evidence gaps? To the extent possible, for such a decentralized project, whenever evidence was available, the TE is consistent and complete. One particular areas lacking data and information on process is M&E.	5
c. To what extent does the report properly assess project sustainability and /or a project exit strategy?	6

The TE uses specific project examples to illustrate particular evidence of sustainability and general patterns beyond the life of the project.	
d. To what extent are the lessons learned supported by the evidence presented and are they comprehensive? Lessons learned are consistent with supporting evidence and are comprehensive.	6
e. Does the report include the actual project costs (total and per activity) and actual co-financing used? Missing data on M&E and use of co-financing in general.	5
f. Assess the quality of the reports evaluation of project M&E systems? To the extent possible the TE addressed these issues, but the M&E system was a weak point and data was lacking.	4

7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR THE PRERATATION OF THE TERMINAL EVALUTION REVIEW REPORT EXCLUDING PIRs, TERMINAL EVALUATIONS, PAD.

8 Project stakeholders and Key Contacts (Names, addresses, emails etc – mandatory for field visit countries)

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9. Information Gaps (for Field visit countries only)
