



UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

## **Establishing Conservation Areas through Landscape Management (CALM) in the Northern Plains of Cambodia**

ATLAS ID 47478 PIMS 2177



White-shouldered Ibis



Giant Ibis

Photos © Phillip J. Edwards

## **Report of the Terminal Evaluation Mission**

**September 2012**

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## Acknowledgements

This is not really the work of the Terminal Evaluation Team but that of all the staff and people connected with the CALM Project who gave freely of their time and ideas to make the evaluation process a success. There are far too many people to mention by name – and hopefully everyone who contributed is included in the lists of names annexed to this report – but special mention must be made of WCS's Community Management Advisor, Ashish John, who gave unstintingly of his time in accompanying us during the field mission, and to WCS's Cambodia Programme Director, Mark Gately, who provided or coordinated the provision of, much of the information that we required. Both answered every question we asked and discussed the points we took every opportunity to raise

Following completion of the Draft Report on 9<sup>th</sup> August 2012, review comments were received from the UNDP-CO, WCS, the Forestry Administration, the Ministry of Environment, and the UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Adviser in Bangkok by 31<sup>st</sup> August 2012. These comments have either been included into the revised text where these related to factual inaccuracies in the draft, or have been reproduced in full and unedited as footnotes to the appropriate text to ensure a fair hearing to all parties. The Terminal Evaluation Team has made responses to some of the comments. We thank the reviewers sincerely for their efforts and insights which have undoubtedly improved this final report.

The views expressed in this report are intended to offer an overview of, and some of the lessons learned from, the CALM Project as it comes to its conclusion. We have tried to balance our thoughts and to offer fair perspectives of what was observed and learned from people far more knowledgeable about the Project and its context than we will ever be. Furthermore, in a complex project where there are many parties, and where some views are counterposed, it is impossible to find a form of words that would be acceptable to all in all cases. Nonetheless, we offer our sincere apologies in advance if anyone should take anything written to be anything other than constructive criticism.

PE would like to express his sincere gratitude to Loeung Kesaro for his perceptive thoughts and insights, and without whose linguistic skills none of this would have been possible. He was also responsible for either organising or coordinating all of the in-country logistics, and thanks to him and WCS the whole evaluation process ran like clockwork. Furthermore, he worked long and hard beyond his ToR and always with a ready smile to ensure that my welfare was taken care of, and his kindness and friendship have been much appreciated.

And finally, one of the delights of this sort of work remains that of visiting new and extremely welcoming countries and going home again having made new friends (and in this case renewing some old ones), seen new things, and witnessed with great admiration the dedication and enthusiasm that so many people bring to their work in conserving the important places of the world. I would like to thank them and wish them every success in their continuing endeavours.

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## ACRONYMS AND TERMS

Currency of Cambodia is the Riel (CR). At the time of the final evaluation, US\$ 1 = CR 4,000.

BD	Biodiversity
c.	circa (about)
CALM	[Establishing] Conservation Areas through Landscape Management [in the Northern Plains of Cambodia]
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CDP	Commune Development Planning
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CLUP	Commune Land-use Planning
CO <sub>2e</sub>	Carbon dioxide equivalents
CPA	Community Protected Areas
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSPMP	Civil Society Pro-poor Market Programme
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
FA	Forestry Administration
FLD	Farmer Livelihood Development (NGO)
GDANCP	General Department for the Administration of Nature Conservation and Protection
GEF	Global Environment Facility
Ha	Hectare(s)
IPA	International Project Advisor
ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organisation
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature – The World Conservation Union
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KIPD	Khmer Institute for Peace and Development (NGO)
KPWS	Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
METT	Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
MIST	Management Information SysTem
MoE	Ministry of Environment
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
NTFP	Non-timber Forest Product
OP	Operational Programme
PB	Project Board
PDF-B	Project Development Facility – Block B
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PK	Ponlok Khmer (NGO)
PVPF	Preah Vihear Protected Forest
REDD	Reduced Emissions from Degradation and Deforestation
RGC	Royal Government of Cambodia
ROtI	Review of Outcomes to Impacts
SCWP	Siberian Crane Wetlands Project
SMP	Sansom Mlup Prey (NGO)
SP	Strategic Priority
STAP	Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel
SVC	Sam Veasna Centre for Conservation (NGO)

TE	Terminal Evaluation
TET	Terminal Evaluation Team
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRAC	Target Resource Assignment for Care
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US\$	United States Dollar
VMN	Village Marketing Network
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Project Summary Table				
Project Title:	Establishing Conservation Areas through Landscape Management (CALM) in the Northern Plains of Cambodia			
GEF Project ID:	47478		<i>at endorsement (US\$)</i>	<i>at completion (US\$)</i>
UNDP Project ID:	2177	GEF financing:	2,300,000	2,300,000
Country:	Cambodia	IA/EA own:	1,600,000	2,462,888
Region:	Asia-Pacific	Government:	105,210	105,210
Focal Area:	Biodiversity	UNDP:	463,407	1,081,753
Operational Programme:	OP-3 (Forest Ecosystems)	Total co-financing:	2,168,617	3,649,851
Executing Agency:	Wildlife Conservation Society	Total Project Cost:	4,468,617	5,844,641
Other Partners involved:	Forestry Administration (Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries) and General Department for the Administration of Nature Conservation and Protection (Ministry of Environment)	Prodoc Signature (date project began):	7 <sup>th</sup> Dec. 2005	
		(Operational) Closing Date:	Proposed: 31 <sup>st</sup> Dec 2012	Actual: 31 <sup>st</sup> Dec 2012

## PROJECT DESCRIPTION

*The Northern Plains of Cambodia are the largest remaining extensive intact block of a unique landscape of exceptional global importance for biodiversity conservation. The area is either a last refuge for, or maintains a key population of over 40 species on the IUCN Red List, including six listed as Critically Endangered. The Project, consistent with the GEF Strategic Priority BD-2 (Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Production Landscapes and Sectors), was designed to address the problem of escalating biodiversity loss across the Northern Plains, caused by increasing human land and resource use. Over seven years (2006-2012) at three sites selected using the Landscape Species Approach, it used a three-pronged approach: (1) the introduction of biodiversity considerations into provincial level land use processes focusing particularly on building the capacity of provincial departments and authorities, and integrating specific project initiatives with established provincial planning processes; (2) the demonstration of specific mainstreaming interventions at three key sites (including community land-use tenure, community contracts and incentives for biodiversity supportive land-use practices, as well as work to mainstream biodiversity into the forestry and tourism productive sectors); and (3) strengthen biodiversity management by government in two categories of protected area, namely Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary under the remit of the Ministry of Environment and Preah Vihear Protected Forest under the remit of the Forestry Administration.*

Evaluation Rating Table		
Criterion	Comments	Rating
Monitoring and Evaluation		

Overall quality of M&E	The design of M&E was of a standard much advanced over that normal for the design period, with a fully itemised and costed Plan included in the Project Document covering all the various M&E steps including the allocation of responsibilities. Implementation of M&E has been of a particularly high standard, with excellent progress monitoring, strong internal activity monitoring, and impact monitoring that is particularly noteworthy for its quality and effectiveness.	Highly Satisfactory
M&E design at project start up	As above.	Highly Satisfactory
M&E Plan Implementation	M&E implementation has been of a very high standard, with excellent progress monitoring and strong internal activity monitoring. The impact monitoring, normally the weak point of any project's M&E, is particularly noteworthy for its quality and effectiveness and has been used to influence management decisions. Good responses have also been made to the mid-term review and the risk assessments	Highly Satisfactory
<b>IA &amp; EA Execution:</b>		
Overall Quality of Project Implementation/Execution	The Project has been well-organised and well-managed throughout providing products of the highest technical quality on time and within budget, while responding effectively to a range of internal and external challenges through good adaptive management	Highly Satisfactory
Implementing Agency Execution	WCS assembled a coherent, well-integrated team of the highest calibre which exhibited a real drive to ensure their targets were met, a demand for high technical quality in all that they did, and a desire to communicate their knowledge to others.	Highly Satisfactory
Executing Agency Execution	UNDP have provided an adequate level of supervision and backstopping to the Project, and its performance has benefitted as a direct result.	Satisfactory
<b>Outcomes</b>		
Overall Quality of Project Outcomes	Overall quality is of the highest order.	Highly Satisfactory
Relevance	The Project intervenes in a globally important landscape, is congruent with GEF and national priorities, and remains pertinent in the light of the current levels of threat	Relevant
Effectiveness	A review of outcomes to impacts (ROtI) shows the overall likelihood of impacts being achieved is two (66%) cases of Highly Likely and one (33%) of Moderately Likely.	Highly Satisfactory
Cost-effectiveness (Efficiency)	Project management costs were trimmed to 86% of those originally budgeted, and cost-effectiveness has been a priority of the implementing partner, WCS, throughout, amongst their priorities. This, combined with significant levels of additional co-financing leveraged by the Project's activities, means the overall cost-effectiveness of the Project has been extremely high	Highly Satisfactory
<b>Sustainability:</b>		
Overall likelihood of risks to Sustainability	Each risk dimension of sustainability is deemed to be critical, the overall rating for sustainability cannot be higher than the rating of the dimension with lowest rating	Unlikely



Financial resources	Good – WCS show long-term commitment to the area and there is evidence of considerable financial commitments from their donors despite no such commitment from the Government.	Likely
Socio-economic	Solid – beneficiaries show increased awareness and changed behaviours linked to agreed tenure and usufruct rights, plus economic benefits derived from the three incentive schemes introduced by the Project.	Likely
Institutional framework and governance	Institutionally good through strengthened capacity and support from senior staff in the MoE and FA. Poor governance poses serious risks.	Unlikely <sup>1</sup>
Environmental	No risks evident.	Likely
<b>Impact:</b>		
Environmental Status Improvement	Populations of 11 globally-threatened birds increasing; populations of four species of globally-threatened large ungulates stable.	Significant
Environmental Stress Reduction	Number of incidents of illegal hunting and logging declined significantly. Rate of forest loss within protected areas now an order of magnitude below those outside, but threat from poor governance and concessions granted outside of the legal framework remain a significant, and possibly growing, threat.	Minimal
Progress towards stress/status change	Generally very good – decreases in logging, hunting, pesticide use, plus improvements in protected area management capacity and economic benefits for local people through incentives rewarded by increasing (or increased stability of) key species' populations. Awareness-raising and lobbying to counter effects of concessions only partially successful.	Significant <sup>2</sup>
<b>Overall Project Results</b>		<b>Highly Satisfactory</b>

## KEY SUCCESSES

*Mainstreaming biodiversity considerations into the Preah Vihear Provincial Development and Investment Plans for 2011-2015; mainstreaming biodiversity considerations into 23 Commune Development Plans and the associated District Development Plans; training of over 5,000 government officials and local community members resulting in increased capacity to understand and take part in conservation planning processes and to undertake management activities and strengthen abilities to implement laws and regulations on the ground; designation of over 30,000 ha of land as either community use zones or sustainable use zones within KPWS; establishment of 32 CBOs to map, develop rules and regulations for, and manage natural resources and land within the CALM landscape including seven community protected area management committees, seven community protected forest management committees, five indigenous representation committees, four community forestry committees and nine village marketing networks, with an estimated 20,000 community members having benefited from Project activities; development and mentoring of three incentive schemes linking payments directly to conservation actions through: a) community-based and run nature-based tourism at one main site and two subsidiary sites, b) payments for forest protection based on premiums for agricultural products (Ibis Rice), and direct payments for bird nest protection; increased and better targeted law-enforcement operations in two protected areas; increased research and improved monitoring of wildlife within the northern plains to inform management decisions; completion of preparatory activities for an application for REDD+ funds to cover forests within the*

<sup>1</sup> **UNDP comment:** *The combining of good institutional framework and poor governance should be rating as moderately unlikely.* **TET response:** The TET believes that poor governance overrides good institutional framework. There is already a fairly good institution in the MoE, yet poor governance of it, and from higher up, is leading to the unsustainable situation that is currently visible. As such this, and hence the overall sustainability rating, remains as unlikely.

<sup>2</sup> **UNDP comment:** *There is no identified evaluation approach/methodology on how this rating is come up?* **TET response:** This is a good point and the TET agrees. No methodology is given in the TE guidelines (UNDP 2011) yet the assessment is given as a requirement - one of the numerous inconsistencies within the Guidelines themselves.

northern plains; and unquantifiable development of capacity at site and provincial level through training, technical assistance and provision of equipment, considered by some to be the Project's most important achievement.

## KEY PROBLEM AREAS

*Continuing social, economic, and military concessions made within internationally-recognised protected areas; no funds committed by either the MoE or the FA to cover operational costs to maintain law enforcement operations within KPWS or PVPF; no guaranteed commitment of funds from the donor community to assist with protected area operations or Project-supported initiatives, although preparatory work and submissions made; and the Project Board missed the opportunity to facilitate inter-sectoral interest and cooperation, a key part of mainstreaming.*

*The Terminal Evaluation (TE) of the Project was conducted over a period of 23 days between 26<sup>th</sup> June and 9<sup>th</sup> August 2012 by a team comprising one international and one national consultant. It was carried out in accordance with a decision of the Project Board (23<sup>rd</sup> February 2012), for although still six months ahead of its scheduled closure, most activities had been completed. The Evaluation's ToR is given in [Annex I](#), its itinerary in [Annex II](#) and the list of people interviewed in [Annex III](#). A list of indicators, their end of Project achievement level, together with performance rating is given in [Annex IV](#). After receipt of comments on 31<sup>st</sup> August 2012, which have been added as footnotes to the main text, the report was finalised on 7<sup>th</sup> September 2012.*

## KEY ISSUES

*The CALM Project has been well designed, and well- managed and implemented throughout, and stands as a testament to what can be achieved through the NGO implementation modality. Despite working in a very remote area, much of which becomes inaccessible during the wet season, and an unfavourable wider political environment, the team has managed to deliver a series of interventions that have significantly reduced the threats to a suite of globally-threatened wildlife which appear to be responding with stable or increasing populations. The Project has been underpinned by good science and a technical approach of the highest calibre throughout. It has incorporated biodiversity issues into the admittedly rudimentary landscape-level planning process in Preah Vihear Province; has formalised land tenure and usufruct rights for 23 villages; demonstrated successfully three innovative incentive schemes that link biodiversity conservation measures directly with economic benefits for the local communities and that could be expanded within the region or be replicated elsewhere in the country; and improved the management of Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary (KPWS) and Preah Vihear Protected Forest through increased capacity of staff and institutions. In the process, the Project has demonstrated a number of approaches particularly through incentive schemes. One of its biggest strengths has come about through a design-decision to work directly through existing government structures rather than parallel project structures, and this has been repaid by the MoE and the FA working in close cooperation together for the first time for many years, and in both institutions taking full ownership for most of the Project's outputs. Excellent work with 23 villages has brought benefits to an estimated 20,000 community members thereby laying a solid foundation for improved understanding of, and cooperation on, biodiversity conservation issues in the future. Evaluation of achievements against indicators (provided in [Annex IV](#)) show that of the 21 indicator/site combinations, 13 (62%) show successful achievement at the end of the Project and five (24%) show achievement nearly successful.*

*Importantly, the Project was designed within the Wildlife Conservation Society's longer-term commitment to the area, as evidenced by their operation in the area for over 10 years prior to the design of the CALM Project, and as a result it was preceded by considerable amounts of work that provided a solid platform on which to build its achievements and, perhaps even more importantly, it has structures in place to support those achievements after its end. Consequently, not only has the CALM Project achieved a great deal, those achievements are set to last well into the future and perhaps act as the foundation upon which to set the next building blocks<sup>3</sup>. However, while the sustainability of the Project's achievements themselves appears highly likely, current governance of*

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<sup>3</sup> **Forestry Administration comment:** [We] support this statement.

*protected areas and the wider landscape within the Northern Plains poses a severe risk to everything that the Project has achieved. The demand for economic and social land concessions in KPWS and the wider landscape, frequently declared apparently without reference to the transparent and accountable legal and formal planning frameworks and often associated with the military or with companies linked to politically-powerful individuals, has the potential to cause substantial damage to the integrity of the landscape, destroying biodiversity and local community livelihoods. The situation has become further complicated by an announcement made at the time of the TE by the Prime Minister that all land disputes were to be solved ahead of the next election. This has launched a new land registration process working outside of existing Government and Ministerial guidelines and legislative framework to reconsider all previously-agreed boundaries and to provide new temporary titles to all landholders. The effects are unknown but the concern of many stakeholders and Project partners is high.*

*Recommendations and Lessons Learned are listed on pages 49 et seq..*

## APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

1. The *Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects* issued by the Evaluation Office in 2012 states that:

*“Evaluations for UNDP-supported GEF-financed projects have the following complementary purposes:*

- To promote accountability and transparency, and to assess and disclose the extent of project accomplishments.*
- To synthesize lessons that can help to improve the selection, design and implementation of future GEF financed UNDP activities.*
- To provide feedback on issues that are recurrent across the UNDP portfolio and need attention, and on improvements regarding previously identified issues.*
- To contribute to the overall assessment of results in achieving GEF strategic objectives aimed at global environmental benefit.*
- To gauge the extent of project convergence with other UN and UNDP priorities, including harmonization with other UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) outcomes and outputs.”*

With this in mind, this Terminal Evaluation (TE), carried out by an independent team of consultants, was initiated by UNDP Cambodia as the GEF Implementation Agency for the *Establishing Conservation Areas through Landscape Management (CALM) in the Northern Plains of Cambodia* Project to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of Project activities in relation to the stated objectives, and to collate lessons learned.

2. The TE was conducted over a period of 23 days between 26<sup>th</sup> June and 9<sup>th</sup> August 2012 by a team comprising one international and one national consultant. It was carried out in accordance with a decision of the Project Board (23<sup>rd</sup> February 2012), for although still six months ahead of its scheduled closure, most activities had been completed. The approach was determined by the somewhat confusing and highly repetitive terms of reference ([Annex I](#)) which were closely followed, via the itinerary detailed in [Annex II](#). Full details of the objectives of the TE can be found in the TOR, but the evaluation has concentrated on assessing the concept and design of the Project; its implementation in terms of quality and timeliness of inputs, financial planning, and monitoring and evaluation; the efficiency and effectiveness of activities carried out and the objectives and outcomes achieved, as well as the likely sustainability of its results, and the involvement of stakeholders. The report was finalised on 7<sup>th</sup> September 2012 after receipt of comments on 31<sup>st</sup> August. The text has been revised to correct factual inaccuracies in the draft or to include additional information, while other comments have been reproduced in full and unedited as footnotes to the appropriate text to ensure a fair hearing to all parties. The Terminal Evaluation Team (TET) has made responses to some of these comments.

3. The evaluation was conducted through the following participatory approach to provide it with sufficient evidence upon which to base conclusions:

- extensive face-to-face and Skype/telephone interviews with the project management and technical support staff, including some members of the Project Board (PB). Throughout the evaluation, particular attention was paid to explaining carefully the importance of listening to stakeholders' views and in reassuring staff and stakeholders that the purpose of the evaluation was not to judge performance in order to apportion credit or blame but to measure the relative success of implementation and to determine learn lessons for the wider GEF context. The confidentiality of all interviews was stressed. Wherever possible, information collected was cross-checked between various sources to ascertain its veracity, but in some cases time limited this. A full list of people interviewed is given in [Annex III](#).
- face-to-face interviews with local stakeholders, particularly the beneficiaries, mainly in the village of Tmatboey (see paragraph 8);
- face-to-face interviews with relevant development institutions and individuals;

- a thorough review of project documents and other relevant texts, including the Project Document, Mid-term Evaluation (MTE), revised logframe, and monitoring reports, such as progress and financial reports prepared for UNDP and annual Project Implementation Reviews (PIR) for GEF, minutes of Project Board meetings, technical reports and other activity reports, relevant correspondence, and other project-related material produced by the project staff or partners; and
  - field visits to Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary and Tmatboey village.
4. Wherever possible the TET has tried to evaluate issues according to the criteria listed in the *UNDP-GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy*, namely:
- Relevance – the extent to which the activity is suited to local and national development priorities and organisational policies, including changes over time, as well as the extent to which the project is in line with the GEF Operational Programmes or the strategic priorities under which the project was funded.
  - Effectiveness – the extent to which an objective has been achieved or how likely it is to be achieved.
  - Efficiency – the extent to which results have been delivered with the least costly resources possible.
  - Results – the positive and negative, and foreseen and unforeseen, changes to and effects produced by a development intervention. In GEF terms, results include direct project outputs, short-to medium term outcomes, and longer-term impact including global environmental benefits, replication effects and other, local effects.
  - Sustainability – the likely ability of an intervention to continue to deliver benefits for an extended period of time after completion. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially and socially sustainable.
5. The original logframe in the Project Document was revised significantly during the inception period and agreed in the Inception Workshop and Report dated 19<sup>th</sup> July 2006. This new logframe, comprising four Components and four Outputs, and 11 indicators, has been used throughout as the basis for the this evaluation (see *Annex IV*), and the TE has evaluated the Project's performance against these according to the current six-point evaluation criteria provided to it by the GEF. This is reproduced in Table 1 for clarity.

**TABLE 1: CRITERIA USED TO EVALUATE THE PROJECT BY THE FINAL EVALUATION TEAM**

<b>Highly Satisfactory (HS)</b>	Project is expected to achieve or exceed <b>all</b> its major global environmental objectives, and yield substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The project can be presented as “good practice”.
<b>Satisfactory (S)</b>	Project is expected to achieve <b>most</b> of its major global environmental objectives, and yield satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings.
<b>Marginally Satisfactory (MS)</b>	Project is expected to achieve <b>most</b> of its major relevant objectives but with either significant shortcomings or modest overall relevance. Project is expected not to achieve <b>some</b> of its major global environmental objectives or yield some of the expected global environment benefits.
<b>Marginally Unsatisfactory (MU)</b>	Project is expected to achieve <b>some</b> of its major global environmental objectives with major shortcomings or is expected to achieve only <b>some</b> of its major global environmental objectives.
<b>Unsatisfactory (U)</b>	Project is expected <b>not</b> to achieve <b>most</b> of its major global environment objectives or to yield any satisfactory global environmental benefits.
<b>Highly Unsatisfactory (U)</b>	The project has failed to achieve, and is <b>not</b> expected to achieve, <b>any</b> of its major global environment objectives with no worthwhile benefits.

6. In addition, other scales have been used to cover sustainability (Table 2), monitoring and evaluation, and to assess impacts. The Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) method also requires ratings to be made for outcomes achieved by the project and the progress made towards the ‘intermediate states’ at the time of the evaluation. The rating scale is given in Table 3 while Table 4 shows how the two letter ratings for “*achievement of outcomes*” and “*progress towards intermediate states*” translate into ratings for the “*overall likelihood of impact achievement*” on a six-point scale. A rating is given a ‘+’ notation if there is evidence of impacts accruing within the life of the project which moves the double letter rating up one space in the six-point scale.

**TABLE 2: SCALE USED TO EVALUATE THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE PROJECT**

Likely (L)	There are no risks affecting this dimension of sustainability.
Moderately Likely (ML)	There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.
Moderately Unlikely (MU)	There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.
Unlikely (U)	There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.

**TABLE 3: RATING SCALE FOR OUTCOMES AND PROGRESS TOWARDS “INTERMEDIATE STATES”**

Outcome Rating	Rating on progress toward Intermediate States
<b>D:</b> The project’s intended outcomes were not delivered	<b>D:</b> No measures taken to move towards intermediate states.
<b>C:</b> The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, but were not designed to feed into a continuing process after project funding	<b>C:</b> The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started, but have not produced results.
<b>B:</b> The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, but with no prior allocation of responsibilities after project funding	<b>B:</b> The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which give no indication that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.
<b>A:</b> The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, with specific allocation of responsibilities after project funding.	<b>A:</b> The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which clearly indicate that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.

**NOTE:** If the outcomes above scored C or D, there is no need to continue forward to score intermediate stages given that achievement of such is then not possible.

**TABLE 4: RATING SCALE FOR THE “OVERALL LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT ACHIEVEMENT”.**

Highly Likely	Likely	Moderately Likely	Moderately Unlikely	Unlikely	Highly Unlikely
AA AB BA BB+	BB AC+ BC+	AC BC	AD+ BD+	AD BD C	D

7. The results of the evaluation were conveyed semi-formally to a core learning team comprising UNDP, and other stakeholders prior to the lead evaluator’s departure from Cambodia (see [Annex V](#)). **Lessons learned** have been placed in boxes and cross-referenced with a number hyperlinked to the “*Lessons Learned*” section where further discussion can be found. They are numbered according to the order in which they occur in the “*Lessons Learned*” section, not in the order that they occur in the text.

## CONSTRAINTS

8. The evaluation was undertaken during the warm wet season which significantly limited access to project sites in the Northern Plains. Only the new headquarters of Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary and the village of Tmatboey in Pring Thom Commune could be visited by the TET, and even then large sections of the new road to the latter was under deep floodwater. The TET understands that Tmatboey is in many ways the flagship village of the Wildlife Conservation Society’s (WCS) work both within the project and in a wider national context, and that project achievements

elsewhere may not be of quite the same order. The evaluators have tried to bear this in mind during their assessments. Furthermore, with the heavy rains, the villagers of Tmatboey were busy planting rice giving little opportunity for interviews, especially with the women.

## PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

### BACKGROUND AND DURATION

9. The Project appears to have been conceived by the Wildlife Conservation Society sometime in 2002 and the PDF-B became operational in December of that year. There is some confusion over the date of submission, understandably so given this dates back 9½ years. WCS suggest that the original submission date was intended to be 9<sup>th</sup> January 2004, but because of the introduction of GEF's Strategic Priorities for the first time in November 2003, this was delayed by three months in order to cope with the implications. However, the STAP Review is dated 19<sup>th</sup> February 2004, hence there is a contradiction. Nonetheless, the Project is recorded as entering into the GEF's work programme with the approval of the CEO Brief on 21<sup>st</sup> May 2004. Subsequently, GEF CEO endorsement was received on 12<sup>th</sup> September 2005 as a Full-sized Project under Operational Programme 3: Forest Ecosystems and as part of Strategic Objective Biodiversity #2 of the GEF Business Plan – Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Production Landscapes and Sectors. UNDP signed the Project Document with the Royal Government of Cambodia on 7<sup>th</sup> December 2005, thereby commencing the Project which was planned to run for seven years. First disbursements were made on 6<sup>th</sup> February 2006. The Mid-term Evaluation was undertaken in August 2009 and the final report completed in October 2009.

### PROBLEMS ADDRESSED

10. The Project Document states the problem to be addressed, thus:

*“Escalating land and resource use across the Northern Plains is leading to competing human-wildlife requirements and loss of key biodiversity values. Human land and resource use has increased partly as a result of increasing human population and in-migration, although population densities remain fairly low, but also because as security returns to the area there is much greater potential for resource exploitation. The conflicts are exacerbated by the current “open-access” management system of natural resources across the Northern Plains, which manifests through [three] threatening processes”*

The three processes were:

- a) Over-exploitation of wildlife resources – small-scale subsistence hunting causing disturbance to areas critical for wildlife (e.g. dense forest areas, rivers and seasonal waterbodies), and uncontrolled commercial hunting that has led to a massive decline in many species across the landscape;
- b) Over-exploitation of forest resources – particularly commercial logging that is encouraged by strong economic incentives and by the military, such logging also opening up areas through the construction of new roads which in turn provides new opportunities for hunting;
- c) Seasonal destruction of key waterbodies –through bomb, poison and electric fishing techniques that are generally used by temporary migrants (sometimes military or police), who enter an area to remove all the fish and then leave, thereby denying a critical resource that the key components of biodiversity and local human communities are dependent upon at some point of the year.

### EXPECTED RESULTS

11. The Project Document was written in 2002-3 when designers (including the lead evaluator) still had much to learn about the development of logframes. As such, the Project's logframe contains only a single “Project Objective”, thus:

*“The effective conservation of the key components of biodiversity of Cambodia's Northern Plains Landscape”*

which, because the Project can only contribute to this but not expect to achieve it within its lifetime, must be considered as a Development Objective. There are no Immediate Objectives, and the logframe describes “*Components*” and Outcomes although the latter are not worded appropriately for an Outcome. Furthermore, there is no explicit statement of the expected global environmental benefits being realised by the Project, as there would be in a Project Identification Form which was introduced much later in 2008. However, some ideas can be gleaned from the incremental cost matrix, summarised in Table 5 and the indicators which are assessed in [Annex IV](#).

**TABLE 5: SUMMARY OF EXPECTED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE PROJECT**

<b>Component 1:</b> Incorporating biodiversity into landscape-level planning processes: <b>Outcome 1:</b> Integrated conservation and development planning at the landscape-level	Global conservation values included in national and provincial planning strategies. Provincial Rural Development Committees reflect global conservation priorities.
<b>Component 2:</b> Applying Mainstreaming Measures: <b>Outcome 2a:</b> Community land-use tenure and title	Ownership (state/private) established for key sites for conservation, producing a framework upon which subsequent activities are developed. Recognition of key sites by govt. Reduction in threats to global biodiversity conservation values
<b>Outcome 2b:</b> Village agreements on natural resource management linked to direct incentives scheme.	Reduction in activities by communities that threaten global wildlife conservation values. Creation of link between biodiversity and incentives results in community support against immigrants that seek to exploit local wildlife.
<b>Component 3:</b> Strengthening capacity for biodiversity management <b>Outcome 3a:</b> Financial and management sustainability of activities	Long-term funding and management structure for an area of global significance for conservation.
<b>Outcome 3b:</b> Environmental awareness program targeted at communities and armed forces	Clear understanding by stakeholders of the global importance of species found on the Northern Plains.
<b>Outcome 3c:</b> Law enforcement	Global importance of biodiversity and critical ecosystem services recognised in enforcement activities. Reduction in illegal activities, especially at key sites.
<b>Outcome 3d:</b> Monitoring and adaptive site management	Ongoing monitoring of the impact of project outcomes in achieving global environmental benefits.

SOURCE: Project Document – incremental cost analysis

12. Baseline indicators were fully established, either during the PDF-B and given in the Project Document, or in 2005 ahead of the Project’s commencement, with very few being derived in 2006 – see [Annex IV](#).

## PROJECT PREPARATION

### CONCEPT AND DESIGN

13. The Project came about because survey work carried out in southern Laos in the mid-1990s and in the northern plains of Cambodia in the immediate aftermath of the cessation of hostilities, revealed it to be an area of exceptional importance for global biodiversity conservation. This area represented the largest remaining extensive intact block of a landscape unique in Asia that held an extraordinary assemblage of globally threatened species, being the last refuge for, or maintaining a key population of, over 40 species on the IUCN Red List, including six listed as Critically Endangered. In 2002, the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), already cooperating with UNDP, put forward the idea of developing a GEF project to assist in the conservation of this area at the landscape level. During the TE, it was suggested by some interviewees that the original idea was to work at the protected area level (i.e. Strategic Priority BD-1 Catalysing the Sustainability of Protected Areas), and this is reinforced through UNDP’s internal notes for one of its PIRs, but that close to the submission date the focus was changed to a mainstreaming one (i.e. BD-2 Mainstreaming Biodiversity into Production Landscapes and Sectors). The TET ran with this idea during the mission, even presenting it at the debriefing meeting on 13<sup>th</sup> July, but in fact it appears to be fallacious. Instead, WCS was trying to



pioneer the landscape approach in Cambodia from the word go, already having 10-12 such programmes worldwide. In the Northern Plains, five key determinants were at play in favour of this:

- Concentrating on just protected areas would mean having to work in the far north-west of Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary (KPWS) but since this area had been one of the last strongholds of the Khmer Rouge, this would have been neither politically expedient nor adequately secure;
- Not all of the landscape fell within existing protected areas – Preah Vihear Protected Forest (PVPF) was only established in 2003, and some areas were within economic concessions although inactive because of the moratorium on commercial logging, notably the Cherndar Plywood Concession, the O'Scach and O'Dar Rivers, and Phnom Tbeng plateau inside the TPP logging concession;
- Previous experience of working in eastern Cambodia had shown that in order to provide a more cohesive approach towards natural resource management, it was necessary to work with the decision-makers at the provincial level in order to influence and manage the trade-offs inherent in dealing with conservation and development;
- Following the unsuccessful World Bank-GEF Biodiversity and Protected Area Management Project, there was little appetite within the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) to deal with a similar approach again at the time; and
- The responsibility for protected areas with the RGC is split between the General Department for the Administration of Nature Conservation and Protection (GDANCP) of the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and the Forestry Administration (FA) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) which show significant antipathy towards each other. With KPWS being managed by the MoE and PVPF by the FA, a project based on protected areas would have had to favour one institution over the other with a serious consequential risk that the other would not fully engage – an issue avoided by treating both as equal partners in a landscape approach.

Nonetheless, the TET finds that there is a considerable degree of overlap here between a mainstreaming approach and a protected area one, with the Project heavily focussed within the protected areas of KPWS and PVPF. Activities on community forestry planning and village tenure, incentives, law enforcement, management, and financing, i.e. Outcomes 2 and 3, are all heavily concentrated on villages within the protected areas, while only the mainstreaming activities under Outcome 1 are truly mainstreaming in the wider sense, yet even here the focus has again been on villages within KPWS and PVPF – the point being that projects do not mainstream into protected areas, they mainstream around them. The issue is reinforced by the fact that a) less than 12% of the total Project spend was on Outcome 1 (see paragraph 40 and Table 6), and b) the geographic scope of the Project is geared to the success of protected area management but that it does not address issues which should be aimed at the landscape level, i.e. across provincial boundaries. Obtaining cross-boundary cooperative, or at least complementary, policies is the hallmark of good mainstreaming, and while the Project Document pays lip service to the idea of including the four provinces of the Northern Plains, the reality became that only one province was involved and that the Project did not even come to include the whole of KPWS, just its eastern section (i.e. the part that lies in Preah Vihear Province).

14. With the introduction of GEF's Strategic Priorities in November 2003, with the Project's design already at a very advanced stage, the landscape approach now fell under SP-2 (later to become BD-2) Mainstreaming Biodiversity into Production Landscapes<sup>4</sup> and Sectors which introduced a problem (also picked up by the TET independently) in that there were no "Production Landscapes" within the Northern Plains. After significant discussion between the designers and the Regional Technical Advisor of the time in Bangkok, it was decided that the widespread use of natural resources by villages itself represented an informal sector, and that since the RGC was allocating land for agricultural concessions and future donor developments were leading to improved infrastructure, engagement in these decisions to mitigate the more serious negative impacts was a valid reason for adopting SP-2.

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<sup>4</sup> **UNDP comment:** *It seems that the concept and approach were not clearly defined and explained. WCS uses their "Landscape Species approach" which gives more emphasis on species conservation rather than entire ecosystem conservation in the productive landscape.*

## Design Logic

15. The situation analysis in the Project Document highlighted the marginal nature of the “production” sectors across the Northern Plains referred to above, and it was recognised that :

*“Changes in land-use practices to incorporate conservation impacts will involve a loss of short-term earnings (from wildlife trade, timber etc...) in favour of long-term gain (e.g. income from wildlife tourism, sustainable resin-tapping, community forests, etc...). Encouraging these changes will require not only an increase in security of tenure, but also positive incentive measures to replace the short-term loss of production income.”*

As a result, the project was designed to apply a three-pronged approach, namely to:

- (i) introduce biodiversity into provincial-level land use processes (using participatory land use planning, land tenure and the implementation of new Laws).
- (ii) test specific mainstreaming interventions at four key sites<sup>5</sup> - community land-use tenure; community contracts and incentives for changes in land-use practices, biodiversity-friendly resin tapping, and working to mainstream biodiversity into two production sectors – forestry (in the concession sites) and tourism.
- (iii) strengthen biodiversity management at four key sites within the landscape mosaic by ensuring the needs of the landscape species (waterbirds and large mammals) are understood and addressed.

The second and third prongs were to be developed under the “Landscape Species Approach” pioneered by WCS to integrate biodiversity conservation into the broader development agenda through capacity building and demonstration. The result was a highly integrated set of complementary interventions.

16. Being designed in 2002/3, the CALM Project falls relatively early in GEF-3 and hence too early for many lessons to have been derived from previous projects. While the designers were clearly aware of the need to document and communicate lessons learned, and the Project Document contains many references to this effect, there are no overt references to lessons learned from previous projects being included in the design of this one.

## Logical Framework and Revisions

17. As indicated in paragraph 10, the logframe is somewhat unorthodox in that it has a single development objective, no immediate objectives, and components and outcomes. The extensive activities are also listed in full, complete with their own indicators. By common consent, the original logframe was considered to be too complicated with 33 indicators at the sub-component level and above, hence it was revised. The “Outcomes” were reduced to just four “Outputs”, one per Component, and the number of indicators were reduced to just 11. This was agreed at the Inception Workshop<sup>6</sup> of 19-20<sup>th</sup> July 2006. While many indicators were merged or thought superfluous, a couple had to be dropped for practical reasons, e.g. “*Percentage of water bodies with poison/electric fishing activity within key sites*” proved impossible to measure since there was no means to reliably test the toxicity of water samples (many waterholes being poisoned not with manufactured poisons but with large quantities of domestic fertilizer); and “*Number of hectares of grassland*” proved impossible to measure because the remote sensing could not differentiate natural grasslands from paddy fields. This simplification process coincided with a period of UNDP changing its global management to a results-based system using a management tool called Projects in Controlled Environments (PRINCE-2), for which WCS personnel attended a week-long training course. Nonetheless, there remained much confusion over indicators at this time, as confirmed by an e-mail trail seen by the Lead Evaluator. Nonetheless, WCS was keen to show the impacts of the Project and worked very closely with UNDP to derive the 11 indicators (two dealing with populations of key wildlife species, one with

<sup>5</sup> **UNDP comment:** Please check whether the four sites well equally covered and supported? It seems that there are two sites KPWS and PVPF received the most support. **TET response:** Yes, the TET agrees and shows that that was the case throughout the report – but the design originally intended four site.

<sup>6</sup> The Inception Workshop was held at the First National Biodiversity Forum on Reviewing Conservation Effectiveness of Five Critical Ecosystems. The first day included a presentation on the Project’s design while the formal launch and discussion of the programme was held during the second day.

habitat extent, two with illegal or unsustainable resource use, two with community livelihoods, two with mainstreaming biodiversity, and two with protected areas management). Although much simplified, the ensuing indicators were not significantly different from the original, but they were re-formatted such that all 11 were allocated to the development objective and the components (which now had no indicators attached to them) were removed from the results measurement framework. What is curious is that there is absolutely no explanation of this process contained in the Inception Report, although there is an explanation of how the activities were combined to simplify these.

18. The shortcomings of having all of the indicators relating to the development objective, and none to the components, was recognised somewhere in the second half of 2006. Thus, on 11<sup>th</sup> December 2006 a new table of indicators was produced assigning each to the relevant component ... but in the process leaving none allocated to the development objective! This table (reproduced here for completeness as [Annex VIII](#)) was intended to replace that contained in the Inception Report, yet again curiously it appears never to have been adopted by the Project; indeed the Mid-term Evaluation simply reports against both the original table of impact indicators and the activity indicators without any discussion of the unorthodoxy of the logframe. The table of indicators from the Inception Report appear to have been used throughout the Project, and as such have been used in this evaluation in order to assess the level of achievements (see [Annex IV](#)).

19. While the process outlined above clearly has some shortcomings, the indicators themselves do not. They are all SMART<sup>7</sup> and are amongst the most relevant and precise that the lead evaluator has come across in the evaluation of 20 GEF projects. All are based on sound scientific monitoring protocols using the most relevant measures for a given criteria, for example, the criterion for Indicator #2 (in Annex IV) was originally given as “*Encounter rates with wildlife on monitoring transects and points in Preah Vihear Protected Forest*” but was subsequently changed to “*Aggregated density for large ungulates (Sambar, Eld’s Deer, Wild Cattle) (number of groups/km<sup>2</sup>) in Preah Vihear Protected Forest*”. Only Indicator #7 has a degree of ambiguity with “*sustained improvement in cash income*” not being defined.

20. Also during the inception process the site Phnom Tbeng, considered the least important of the four identified during the PDF-B for biodiversity conservation, was suspended since the status of the Thong Pha Phum logging concession remained unclear. This decision was to be reviewed in 2008 if the status of the concession was clarified, otherwise it was to be removed – which is in fact what eventually happened.

### **UNDP Programming Context**

21. The sustainable management and rational use of the natural resources has been considered by UNDP to be essential to its strategy to alleviate poverty. Accordingly, and in line with the government’s national priorities, support to good governance in the fields of environmental and natural resource management was also a priority area. At the time of its design, the CALM Project was deemed to be congruent with these priorities as elaborated in the first *United National Development Assistance Framework* (UNDAF 2001-2005) where sustainable management of natural resources is one of the four programme areas for Cambodia, and the second *UNDP Country Co-operation Framework* (CCF 2001-2005). Under the natural resources programme, UNDAF focussed on supporting national efforts in land use planning, sustainable forestry and fisheries activities, and the promotion of environmental awareness and protection – all key deliverables for CALM. UNDP’s second CCF for Cambodia identified the “*Management of Sustainable Resources*” as one of the three programme areas, within which UNDP’s support was focused on:

- I. Strengthening monitoring and assessment of environmental sustainability;
- II. Promoting national policy, legal and regulatory framework for environmentally sustainable development; and
- III. Enhancing national capacity for participation in global conventions, regulatory regimes and funding mechanisms for environmentally sustainable development.

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<sup>7</sup> Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, Time-bound.

The CALM Project was complementary to all three programme areas. By the Project's start-up in 2006, the CCF had been replaced by UNDP's *Country Programme Action Plan 2006-2010* (CPAP). Within this context, the CALM Project contributed to Outcome 4, i.e. *"Improved capacity of national/sectoral authorities to plan and implement integrated approaches to environmental management and energy development that respond to the needs of the poor"*, and played a significant role in that Outcome achieving an "exceeds expectations" rating in the *UNDP Cambodia CPAP Results Assessment 2006-2008* published in 2009<sup>8</sup>. With the CPAP's update for 2011-2015, and a redrafting and re-organisation of Outcomes therein, the CALM Project has been seen to contribute to Outcome 2: *"By 2015, National and local authorities and private sector are better able to sustainably manage ecosystems, goods and services and respond to climate change"*, specifically through:

*Output 2.1: Pro-poor, sustainable forest/protected area management and bio-energy productions accelerated; and*

*Output 2.2: National readiness for REDD+ supported to enable government and communities to access financial incentives for reducing deforestation and forest degradation.*

## PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

### PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

22. The Project has been implemented through the **United Nations Development Programme** (UNDP) and its execution has been contracted through the **Wildlife Conservation Society** (WCS), an international NGO with its headquarters in New York, USA. UNDP authorised WCS to enter into contractual arrangements with physical and legal persons on their behalf, and to make direct payments against all categories of the project budget, and to manage project funds, including budget planning, monitoring, revisions, disbursements, record keeping, reporting and auditing that all observe UNDP rules. Thus, the Project has been executed in accordance with the standard rules and procedures of the UNDP NGO Execution Modality.

#### *Stakeholder Participation*

23. In addition to the WCS whose *râison d'être* conservation of rare wildlife is, the Project involved a wide range of organisations. One of the key design aspects of the Project, which has proved very successful, is that it did not set up parallel implementation structures but chose to work directly through government counterpart institutions, namely the **Forestry Administration** (FA) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), and the **General Department for the Administration of Nature Conservation and Protection** (GDANCP) of the Ministry of Environment (MoE). WCS also used five NGOs to work under their guidance and management to assist with implementation of specific Project activities, thus:

- Farmer Livelihood Development (FLD) supported the improvement of agricultural productivity at village level;
- Ponlok Khmer (PK) and the Khmer Institute for Peace and Development (KIPD) supported resource management activities (community forestry, mapping of residential and agricultural land inside the Protected Forest and forest concessions) while PK also supported indigenous land registration;
- Sansom Mlup Prey (SMP) supported the certification and marketing of *Ibis Rice*; and
- the Sam Veasna Centre for Conservation (SVC) supported and marketed the Project's ecotourism activities.

The latter two were supported financially and organisationally by WCS either at launch (SMP) or re-launch (SVC). All these NGOs are reported to have undertaken the tasks assigned to them to a high level of technical capacity and with adequate deployment of staff, management, and funds. Many

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<sup>8</sup> **UNDP comment:** *Through this assessment (CPAP MTR), the CPAP Outcomes have been revised and merged from 10 to only and CALM project contributed to Outcome 3 "National and local authorities and communities are better able to conserve biodiversity and respond to climate change", and output 3.1 (see the CPAP M&E).*

continue to carry out Project-initiated activities, post-Project, e.g. FLD, SMP and SVC. In addition, the Project has worked closely with the families from 23 villages (eight in each of KPWS and PVPF, and seven in O'Sach-O'Dar) and has established and/or built the capacity of 32 CBOs to map, develop rules and regulations and manage natural resources and land within the CALM landscape – seven community protected area management committees, seven community protected forest management committees, five indigenous representation committees, four community forestry committees and nine village marketing networks. The Project estimates that 20,000 community members have benefited from Project activities.

24. The Project focussed efforts on building local capacity for biodiversity management, including both government staff and local residents, through a mixture of formal training sessions and on-the-job mentoring in appropriate livelihood activities and in natural resource use. A key factor influencing the success of the site management activities has been the central role played by government staff, and the success of the project in empowering existing government management structures rather than creating parallel structures. The capacity of national staff was also increased by providing experience and training in a well-funded and well-equipped environment, including technical mentoring by WCS international staff. Skills development focused on field activities, but included reporting, data management and, where relevant, enhancement of office skills. As a result, the Project appears to have been successful in developing effective government “ownership”, engagement, participation, and motivation and the involvement of senior FA and GDANCP representatives ensured that lessons learned and experience from the Project reached the highest decision-makers. Government interviewees were very complimentary about this approach suggesting it was one of the Project’s great strengths since its staff at all levels increased their capacity which has resulted in residual institutional growth. By placing those government staff that are responsible for the management of natural resources at the heart of the Project, its activities have been consistent with government policies and strategy for the sector, and hence are likely to be more sustainable in the long-term. The success of the approach was perhaps best articulated by one senior government employee who said that WCS “were friends rather than partners”.

#### #4

**Lesson learned:** Working directly through existing government structures brings dividends.

25. The Project reached a wider audience through good communication at many levels – an informative and high quality website (<http://www.wescambodia.org/saving-wild-places/northern-plains.html>) which was frequently updated but the TET believe that it could have been improved by making the raft of reports and technical papers produced by the Project available there rather than just on another site<sup>9</sup>; a number of attractive brochures and posters for local schools and official events; pamphlets and leaflets for *Ibis Rice* presented internationally at the Development Marketplace exhibition (2008) and Equator Prize (2010), and a small number of presentations to international meetings. Importantly, it also placed considerable store in communicating results to the wider conservation community of academics and practitioners through a series of excellent technical and scientific articles, the former published through the Translinks Partnership (led by WCS and funded through USAID – see [www.translinks.org](http://www.translinks.org)), e.g. case studies on a) the Tmatboey community-based ecotourism project; and b) the bird nest protection programme; and on the effects of institutional controls on common pool resource extraction. Such articles take considerable time, effort and technical ability to publish, and too few GEF projects get around to publishing them. WCS is to be commended in doing so.

26. The Mid-term Evaluation refers to the Project Executive Summary prepared by GEF at the end of the preparatory phase and notes

*“that stakeholder involvement has been “a hallmark of CALM’s preparation and intervention logic”, focusing on MAFF and MoE and their Provincial Departments, and using Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques to explore environmental issues and problems with local people”.*

<sup>9</sup> and the TET could not find any link on the Project website to the Translinks website where such documents may have been stored.

It goes on to state that:

*“there has continued to be a substantial and satisfactory level of stakeholder participation in Project planning and implementation to date. The nature of the Project’s activities requires a high level of stakeholder involvement and this will need to (and appears likely to) continue through the remainder of the Project”.*

The TET can confirm that this has indeed been the case and that stakeholder engagement and participatory approaches have been of the highest order throughout.

27. There has been one area where the Project has not fared so well, and that is with its coordination with other projects, e.g. the International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO)-funded “Emerald Triangle” Project<sup>10</sup>. While one interviewee noted that CALM “*did not really seek to develop a “coalition of interested parties”*” in the face of “*overwhelming threats to the landscape*”, the TET feels that this is slightly harsh since such a role was outside of its design objectives, and it did attempt to tackle many of these issues on its own (e.g. see paragraph 69). It should also be said that the ITTO project was implemented in phases and not equally across all three countries as it was designed to, with Phase I able to take place only in Thailand and Phase II still lacking penetration in Laos. This latter point is important because the landscape-level ecosystems of northern Cambodia are more strongly linked to those of southern Laos than with those of eastern Thailand which are separated by a range of low mountains, hence close cooperation between the CALM Project and the ITTO project would have paid larger dividends if the relevant institutions of Laos were participating – which they were not. That said, it is generally acknowledged that one of the important successes of the GEF-funding for the CALM Project was to be able to provide a stable platform for seven years into which other organisations could provide funding, or which they could coordinate their own activities around – see Table 7.

The Project has worked closely with a large number of stakeholders throughout and the active engagement of stakeholders has been vital to fulfilling its achievements, hence stakeholder participation is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

## Gender

28. Neither the Project Document nor the Inception Report made any explicit reference to gender issues. However, during the early phase of the Project, a gender strategy was outlined and some of the early work did contain a gender component, e.g. activities undertaken as part of the Civil Society Pro-Poor Markets funded by DANIDA were supposed to establish committees with 50% women; the Project managed to establish committees with about 30% women. The MTE noted that:

*“Gender mainstreaming has occurred primarily in terms of participation in activities at community level (e.g., ecotourism, other livelihoods), where results are judged to be satisfactory to date.”*

but also crucially identified the fact that:

*“Mainstreaming at other levels (government planning and implementation of field activities) is severely constrained by the lack of gender balance in the institutions involved in implementation of field activities. The Project can (and should) raise this issue and identify potential interventions, but is hardly in a position to quickly influence rapid or large-scale changes within government institutions.”*

and noted concern over the fact that:

*“none of the Project staff are women, which limits contact with and delivery of support to women participants and beneficiaries of the Project”.*

It recommended that:

*“The gender strategy developed during the initial phase of the Project should be followed up by the development and implementation of a gender mainstreaming plan.”*

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<sup>10</sup> Management of the Emerald Triangle Protected Forests Complex to Promote Cooperation for Transboundary Biodiversity Conservation Between Thailand, Cambodia and Laos.

The subsequent management response agreed. At the Project Board meeting of 13<sup>th</sup> January 2010, a budget, using a top-up from TRAC funds, was allocated to support gender-related activities. A consultant (ENERGIA) was engaged in October 2010 to undertake gender action plans for several projects, and CALM was included in this. However, because implementation of the CALM Project was already well-advanced, implementation of a full gender action plan was not possible. Instead, Ponlok Khmer, a local NGO already involved with resource management activities for the Project, was commissioned to develop a project proposal for integrating gender issues into CALM. This proposal, requesting US\$ 50,000 out of a total of US\$ 110,000 and with a proposed start date of December 2011, was submitted jointly to the GEF Small Grants Programme and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), but the National Steering Committee responsible for selecting projects for grants refused the application.

29. As part of ENERGIA's work, WCS and some Project partners had attended a training workshop on 9-11<sup>th</sup> March 2011 and made follow-up actions to integrate gender issues into the project wherever possible. With the failure to find funding for a more formal approach, this informal approach continued. Some of the activities included:

- "Confidence building, Leadership and Gender" training was provided to the women members of committees at the three Project sites to improve their involvement in decision-making;
- Women-headed households were included on an equal basis in the procurement of *Ibis Rice* (see second bullet point, paragraph 71). The scheme also included a facility where members of the Village Marketing Network (VMN) could borrow rice during those periods that they ran out. Poorer VMN members were given lower interest rates, and women headed households who were poor benefited from this scheme;
- In the eco-tourism programme, WCS ensured that cooks (all women) were paid the same amount as guides (all men), i.e. US\$ 5 per day.

After the gender training other activities were improved, for example:

- land use planning had not considered the fact that some paddy fields belonged to women, but subsequently if a woman was the owner of the property, she was named as such;
- NTFPs collected by women were included in the resource use study as part of REDD+ preparation
- livelihood activities conducted by women were listed in the pre-FPIC (Free Prior Informed Consent) process for REDD+ (see final bullet point, paragraph 72).

## IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH

### *Project Oversight*

30. Operational oversight of the Project has been undertaken at the strategic level by a **Project Board** (PB) comprising representatives from each of the key project partners (UNDP, WCS, GDANCP, and FA) plus other attendees as invited. It is reported that meetings were conducted on a quarterly basis during 2008<sup>11</sup> but that these became three times per year in 2009 and twice yearly meetings thereafter. In the first half of the Project, representation of these organisations was mostly from the people involved directly with the Project, e.g. the National Site Managers from KPWS and PVPF, with the notable exception of the Director of Wildlife Sanctuary Department (GDANCP) but following recommendations from the MTE, the FA provided higher level attendees. The TET finds that the membership of the PB was somewhat restricted, and this is in line with the MTE which, although providing no discussion of the issue, made its Recommendation 8 thus:

*"The need for a high level Project Steering Committee that is operational at national level should be reviewed, particularly with regard to giving the Project a higher profile and possible increased influence at political level."*

<sup>11</sup> The TET has not seen the minutes for all the meetings in 2008.

It is noted that initially (e.g. in the Inception Report), oversight of the Project was to have been through the establishment of a Project Executive Group with a membership including MAFF, MoE, Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction, Ministry of Defence, Forestry Administration, regional representatives of the military, police (including border police), UNDP, WCS, Seila/Partnership for Local Governance and the Provincial Governors of Preah Vihear, Siem Reap and Odar Meanchey provinces. It is understood that after an initial meeting, this body was replaced by a Project Advisory Group (whose composition appears exactly the same as the PB described above) primarily because the senior government officials who were members of the Executive Group were often unavailable to attend meetings, sending junior staff in their place who were not sufficiently informed or mandated to take decisions required during the meeting. This is an understandable but also an undesirable outcome, and reflects poorly upon the degree of country ownership of the Project, placing its mainstreaming and conservation objectives in perspective for the very institutions that were seen as key partners, i.e. not being viewed as a high enough priority for senior members to attend a quarterly meeting. Perhaps reducing PB meetings to twice yearly at an earlier stage may have encouraged better attendance from a wider range of institutions ... but then again, perhaps not. Clearly the Project thought not since the response to the MTE's recommendation was to review the situation, but to ultimately make no changes other than to provide representation of the FA by an independent member in line with the MTE's recommendation #19.

31. The minutes show that the meetings were structured mainly around a review of progress and a discussion of the forthcoming work plans, but they also show that UNDP took a disproportionate amount of the discussion time, and interviewees confirmed this with several interviewees indicating that although the FA nominally chaired the meetings, they were in fact run by UNDP. Furthermore, the TET received a common view that the meetings were not well run, that priorities set by WCS for discussion were frequently changed by UNDP, and that as a consequence the less important issues relating to reporting and budgeting were dealt with at the cost of not dealing with certain strategic issues (see also paragraph 39), often to the extent that meetings ran out of time before such issues could be discussed. The TET's view, backed by interviewee's opinions, is that generally the PB tended to act more like a technical workshop than a governance meeting.

### ***Project Management***

32. The Project's implementation has closely followed the logframe throughout. It's organisational structure has been devolved so that rather than having the common form with a National Project Director and a National Project Manager, all key management and implementation roles have been played by national staff. A **National Site Manager** (Director of PVPF) was appointed by the FA, and has been responsible for implementation of site management activities in the PVPF and the adjacent O'Scach-O'Dar area. This position was held by Mr. Tan Setha throughout. A **National Project Coordinator** (Director of the Department of Wildlife Sanctuaries – Mr. Sy Ramony) was appointed from GDANCP, to be responsible for coordination of site management activities in KPWS. In 2008, this position was supplemented with the appointment of an **additional National Site Manager** to oversee CALM activities in the KPWS – (the Director of the eastern sector of KPWS – four people prior to January 2009 but Mr. Ea Sokha since). These positions served as the principal liaison between the Project and the relevant Government Ministries, as well as being responsible for reporting to UNDP/GEF and WCS on the Project's progress.

33. WCS appointed an **International Project Advisor** (IPA) who acted as the overall project manager and was jointly responsible for day-to-day management and decision-making for the project. This position was held by:

- Mr. Tom Clements – December 2005 to December 2007; and
- Mr. Hugo Rainey – December 2007 to January 2012.

An additional **Project Advisor (Communities)**, Mr. Ashish John, worked throughout on the community management components. The UNDP-CO maintained an overview ensuring that appropriate management milestones were completed adequately by enabling the Team Leader its Environment and Energy Cluster to act as a Project Assurance Officer. Although the Project was coordinated through WCS's Cambodia Country Office, the Project established four Project



Implementation Units (PIUs). Two were site-based and led by the National Site Managers in KPWS and PVPF and, being Government authorities, will exist beyond the lifetime of the Project, while two were thematic – one on communities led by the Project Advisor (Communities) and the other on research and monitoring and evaluation headed by the IPA.

34. While the Project's management and implementation has been focussed closely on the revised logframe throughout (see paragraph 17), the team has concentrated on raising awareness and developing capacity amongst stakeholders and beneficiaries to provide a solid baseline of understanding prior to, and continuing through, development of the Project's main activities. All persons interviewed expressed strong admiration for WCS's management approach and indicated that it was highly supportive of their various roles in the Project. One point is particularly noteworthy. It is widely known and acknowledged that the FA and the MoE are uneasy partners in sharing their remit for the conservation of natural resources and rarely work harmoniously in tandem. This Project has been a significant exception and the role of WCS as being seen as a trusted intermediary by both ministries has been crucial. This success needs to be built upon (see paragraph 88).

35. WCS appear to have assembled a coherent, well-integrated team of the highest calibre which has exhibited a real drive to ensure their targets were met, a demand for high quality in all that they did, and a desire to communicate their knowledge to others. Senior members have delegated well, not only to get things done efficiently, but to ensure the capacity of others was built through on-the-job real-life experience while remaining extremely responsive to queries and needs. Communication has been good through regular telephone/Skype calls and email contact, complemented by regular supervisory and technical visits, and Project staff were reported (and witnessed) as having intimate working relationships with government counterparts, stakeholders, and beneficiaries. In addition to the staff deployed directly on the Project, WCS provided a range of people to back-stop them in areas such as strategic approach and specialist technical areas, e.g. scientific monitoring. The organisation's technical grasp of the issues both scientific and political, ability to adapt responses to changing circumstances, and their supportive attitude to partners are all notable. As a result, there has been a high level of engagement with the appropriate authorities. As noted elsewhere (paragraphs 25 and 50), the Project staff have displayed outstanding communication skills by producing a range of informative, high quality, extremely clear and well-structured technical (and administrative) reports in a timely manner. Their dedication and commitment to this Project are noted by the TET as being particularly praiseworthy.

### ***Adaptive Management***

36. The Project's adaptive management has been of good throughout, stemming from the highly capable management backed by good decision-making by the Project Board and support and advice from the UNDP-CO. The MTE gave it a favourable review noting that the approach:

*“permits adjustments to Project activities in response to changing circumstances (including funding availability, successes that can be built on, and failures that require a modification in approach), based on clearly developed justification, feedback from participants and the agreement of all Parties, and without losing sight of the fundamental goals and objectives of the Project.”*

Adaptive management has operated effectively at both the strategic level and the tactical level. Four examples of the former:

- The biggest factor that the Project had to respond to during its lifetime was the consequences of increased military activity as a result of the border dispute with Thailand over the Preah Vihear Temple that began in August 2008. Much effort was directed at raising awareness amongst military commanders of the area's global importance for biodiversity; tackling the issues of illegal hunting and logging by military personnel (not an easy task for unarmed ranger patrols to confront in the face of armed soldiers); dealing with mitigating the worst detrimental impacts of siting new roads and installations, e.g. land-grabbing; and in opposing through political means the location of concessions within the protected area (most notably KPWS) – all with some degree of success.

- The fourth proposed Project site, Phnom Tbeng, was suspended and subsequently removed from the Project when the status of the concession could not be clarified and survey work showed that significant logging had reduced the biodiversity value of the site.
- During the inception period, the Project was simplified with both sub-components (Outcomes) and activities being merged to clarify and avoid duplication of effort. The basic Project design remained unchanged. The number of indicators was reduced, although the impact indicators were not directly attributable to the outcomes (see paragraph 17).
- The MTE made 25 recommendations and positive responses were made to the majority – the management response listing “agreed” to 20 of them, although in some cases this was just a requirement to keep on keeping on (see paragraph 57).

Examples of tactical level adaptation include:

- Agreement of the annual workplans at the PB meetings, where there would be extensive reviews of what was working and what was not, and adjustments made to fit accordingly;
- Undertake annual budget revisions to take account of high rates of inflation, an issue noted as a problem in the PIR; and

Notwithstanding this adaptive management, the TE finds that the formality of using the monitoring of indicators to provide a basis for adaptive management is effectively absent; but then again would argue that most of the issues that the Project had to adapt to would not have been covered in any way by the monitoring of those indicators (see also paragraph 59).

### ***Technical Management***

37. The technical management of the Project has been of the highest standard. The Project has deployed expertise of the highest calibre, whether internationally or nationally, and the products they have developed have also been excellent whether these are specialist material, e.g. development plans; scientific material, e.g. analyses of wildlife monitoring data, assessment of deforestation; or practically-based products e.g. agreed tenure/usufruct rights or incentives such as *Ibis Rice*. The Project’s explicit intention of favouring national consultants over international ones to help build local capacity and to provide greater cost-effectiveness has paid dividends if the quality of the end products is taken as a key criterion. WCS made an explicit decision to contract multiple NGOs in order to ensure that their specialist knowledge could be deployed in each and every location to which it was relevant, rather than using a single NGO to undertake all tasks within a single geographic location, even though this meant that a) management of the Project became more complex, and b) local communities (and the TET!!) experienced some confusion at first over the different roles each played. The result, however, was that the best technical advice available was brought to bear in all instances. A further strength of the Project has been in basing its interventions on the best scientific information available, and the strength of the scientific team involved is particularly noteworthy. The team have also shown sensitivity towards the realities of relatively low capacity on the ground by ensuring that such capacity is raised at all stages prior to the full roll-out of an activity, and in the selection of tools, the prime example being the use of the MIST software for monitoring purposes – an intuitive, open-source programme able to cover most aspects of protected area management.

The Project has been well-organised and well-managed throughout providing products of the highest technical quality on time and within budget, while responding effectively to a range of internal and external challenges through good adaptive management, hence the implementation approach has been evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

### **#6**

**Lesson learned:** Deployment of specialist NGOs aids implementation.

### ***UNDP supervision and backstopping***

38. UNDP-GEF supervision was accomplished by standard procedures and undertaken competently. Unusually, the TET received no complaints from interviewees about excessive UNDP-

GEF bureaucracy or delays in procurement, although UNDP-GEF's heavy requirements for reporting were criticised by one stakeholder not involved in the management of the Project who stated that:

*"... the focus of an ITA [international technical adviser] should be on the field, not on reporting. UNDP should recognise this and streamline its administrative requirements."*

The TET agrees. It is understood that there was at one stage a hiatus in funding arriving from GEF which WCS bridged, but it is believed that this was no fault of the CO. Key aspects of supervision were made through UNDP's involvement in the PB meetings and through the annual PIRs, but there was also frequent contact (phone/skype) between the CO and WCS. Members of the Energy and Environment Cluster were heavily involved in regular issues such as the review and approval of workplans and budgets, review of progress and performance against such workplans, and completion of the tracking tools. It appears that the CO was helpful and supportive throughout the implementation period, responding adequately to provide good guidance, honest and constructive criticism, and help to overcome particular problems as necessary.

UNDP have provided an adequate level of supervision and backstopping to the Project, and its performance has benefitted as a direct result, hence UNDP's supervision and backstopping role is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

39. There are, however, two issues that some interviewees expressed consenting views on that the UNDP-CO should look at – priorities and management style – and perhaps both are linked. There is a broadly-held perception that the UNDP-CO is so fixated on its own systems that it is not allowing itself to take a broader view, and that it is more interested in compliance than results. As one interviewee eloquently phrased it, *"UNDP is too busy reporting up to be looking down [at the broader picture]"*. As a CO it would seem that it is not alone in this, for interestingly, the Lead Evaluator has had this reported to him before when undertaking the terminal evaluation of the UNEP-GEF Siberian Crane Wetlands Project<sup>12</sup> (SCWP) and quotes from that report:

*"One member of staff ... had experience of working on both UNDP-GEF projects and this one, and raised a number of interesting points about the comparative experience of the two GEF Implementing Agencies. Most pertinent was the fact that UNEP's procedures (procurement, financial) were found to be considerably easier to deal with in project terms than UNDP's. No barriers were encountered, which with UNDP are frequent through that agency applying many unnecessary requirements which are absent from UNEP. Crucially, the point was made that UNDP appears to aim at compliance with procedures, not with outputs, while UNEP, or at least the SCWP, aims at producing on-the-ground results."*

There is evidence from the Risk Issues Log that supports this, with an item raised in December 2009 by the ITA which states:

*"Constantly changing reporting and planning formats add unnecessarily to the complexity of management. It results in changing monitoring plans and proposed outputs, usually without any perceivable benefit. Fortunately, changes in the last few months the reporting and workplan formats appear to have been worthwhile. It would be good to keep this format. I think everyone would learn how important it is to maintain stability of reporting."*

At least two interviewees suggested that UNDP-CO was concentrating its priorities too much on policy issues but that in reducing the size of its project portfolio it was losing some of its credibility over biodiversity and natural resource issues<sup>13</sup>. It used to be seen as a lead player in the broader biodiversity conservation debate within the country, able to design sensible projects and to implement them largely successfully, yet now is viewed increasingly as a fringe player with a contracting

<sup>12</sup> Development of a Wetland Site and Flyway Network for Conservation of the Siberian Crane and Other Migratory Waterbirds in Asia [Project Number: IMIS: GF/2328-2712-4627 and 4630; PMS: GF/6030-03].

<sup>13</sup> **UNDP comment:** *UNDP had been supporting biodiversity conservation for more than eight years from 2003-2011 to promote sustainable use of natural resources. UNDP remains committed to promote sustainable use of natural resources for poverty reduction, but we change our strategy in the new CPAP from biodiversity conservation of forest biodiversity to sustainable forest, REDD+ and livelihoods improvement.*

programme of field-based projects and a focus on climate change which relevance in Cambodia is seen by several interviewees to be at best marginal and at worst irrelevant. The TET is aware that the UNDP-CO is under considerable pressure to move to a programme basis rather than a project basis, witness one of the lessons learned from the *CPAP Results Assessment 2006-2008* that states:

*“Evidence suggests that UNDP has not yet overcome the **focus on projects**. The Country Programme and the Country Programme Action Plan appear secondary compared to projects and project documents. This leads to a certain inattention to the exact formulation of CPAP outcomes and outputs, its indicators and its monitoring. UNDP appears to focus most of its attention on planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating projects rather than the overall country programme. In some cases, projects implement activities which do not directly lead to the respective CPAP output but to a project output. For example, output 1.2 of the CPAP is defined as “capacity of the Ministry of Justice and local authorities developed to increase access to justice”, while the respective project focuses predominantly on Alternative Dispute Resolutions.”*

yet it needs to recognise that such a move comes with costs. The success of this Project in generating interest at the highest levels of decision-making within the RGC because of demonstrable and exciting results on the ground (see first bullet point paragraph 71) is a case in point – how many policy documents generate the same amount of interest? While a move to better align its projects to its respective CPAP outputs is undoubtedly desirable, ensuring its outputs align with on-the-ground needs and reality in the first place is probably key. More time to take a broader view is necessary, e.g. the team leader of the Energy and Environment cluster is widely respected outside of the UNDP-CO for the breadth of his contextual knowledge and grasp of broad technical issues yet the point was raised that this appears to be being stifled by the overbearing systems in which he is working. This focus on compliance also manifests itself in a tendency for UNDP-CO staff to micro-manage processes and people around them, as reported by several interviewees (and witnessed first-hand by the evaluators) (see also paragraph 31). While this is something that could be viewed as applying close attention to all the details, if one is being magnanimous, all too often it is interpreted by those involved as interference or lack of trust. It would seem there is a fine line between the two. It was reported by some interviewees that they felt a small degree of resentment in that it made the partnerships appear or feel unequal. This was even noted in the Project Board where there was a tendency for UNDP inputs and requirements to overshadow those of government institutions (see paragraph 31). Furthermore, by managing in this way, those involved find too little time to look at the broader issues, thereby reinforcing the negative aspects described above – hence the perceived linkage.

## FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT

40. On the financial front, the Project was adequately budgeted during its design with the GEF contribution being US\$ 2,300,000 and WCS committing US\$ 1,600,000 in parallel funding and UNDP committing US\$ 463,407 through its *Seila* programme, while the RGC committed US\$ 105,210 through an in-kind contribution. While the ultimate amount of the in-kind contribution from the RGC cannot be ascertained (one of the common problems with such financing) and hence is ignored for the remainder of this analysis, ultimately WCS leveraged US\$ 2,462,888 and UNDP provided US\$ 1,081,753, increases of 54% and 36% respectively on original targets. Therefore, the Project disbursed a total of US\$ 5,844,641 to 30<sup>th</sup> June 2012 for GEF and UNDP and to 31<sup>st</sup> December 2011 for WCS – see Table 6. If Project spending can be taken as a crude measure of the progress of implementation, then the Project has achieved the progress originally envisaged and much more besides, since this sum represents a very creditable 125% of the budget projected in the original Project Document – an increase of US\$ 1,151,465 – a very good achievement. Table 6 also highlights a number of points:

- Project management costs (Component 4) were primarily funded by GEF (46%), but were co-financed by UNDP (29%) and WCS (24%). Project management costs ran at only 86% of those projected – a very cost-effective result indicating significant efficiency in running the Project;
- Project management costs comprised just 13.08% of the total spend, an excellent performance and in line with other projects in the region, e.g. UNEP-GEF’s Siberian Crane Wetlands

Project<sup>14</sup> was 13.8%, that for the UNDP-GEF HHRB Project in China<sup>15</sup> was 11.25% at its mid-term, while that for UNDP-GEF Altai Sayan Project in Mongolia<sup>16</sup> came in at a whopping 33.8%. There is no indication that this was achieved through any lack of quality, but it is unlikely that it could have been achieved for significantly less. GEF's continued reductions in the allowable level of project management costs (to 5% under GEF-5) while understandable in terms of a drive for efficiency, would look unrealistic, and may become a false economy since such a target may be found to be achievable only with significant reductions in sound management and oversight.

- The final GEF : co-finance ratio in terms of monies spent was 1:1.54 (US\$ 2,300,000 to US\$ 3,544,641), a very good result;
- Spending on Component 1 (mainstreaming) (US\$ 693,168) accounted for only 11.86% of the total spend, an extraordinary low level for a project supposedly designed as an SP-2 project, compared to 75% spent on Components 2 and 3 which were focussed primarily (but not exclusively) on interventions within the two protected areas;
- GEF funding was heavily re-allocated in favour of Component 3 (improve management of the key sites for conservation) in view of significant extra co-funding being leveraged by WCS for Component 2 (establishment of appropriate community land tenure and resource-right use and engagement in conservation management) and UNDP making a significantly larger contribution to project management costs than initially budgeted.

**TABLE 6: TOTAL DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS BY OUTPUT TO 30<sup>TH</sup> JUNE 2012 (US\$) AGAINST FULL PROJECT BUDGET AS PER PROJECT DOCUMENT**

	GEF			UNDP			WCS parallel †			Total		
	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%
Component 1	442,350	316,739	72%	0	0	0%	333,050	376,429	113	775,400	693,168	89
Component 2	362,700	202,966	56%	59,238	71,967	121%	214,200	1,374,840	642	636,138	1,649,773	259
Component 3	939,200	1,426,609	152%	587,929	785,623	134%	861,100	524,983	61	2,388,229	2,737,215	115
Component 4	555,750	353,686	64%	146,010	224,163	154%	191,650	186,636	97	893,410	764,485	86
Total	2,300,000	2,300,000	100%	793,176	1,081,753	136%	1,600,000	2,462,888	154	4,693,176	5,844,641	125

SOURCE: UNDP, WCS and Project Document. †Figures are to 31<sup>st</sup> December 2011 only – do not include 2012.

41. The issue of “parallel” financing is an oddity of this Project. The TET understands that at the time the Project Document was submitted, WCS was not expecting it to be NGO-executed and hence the funds it committed were not to be routed through UNDP or the executing agency but would be kept under WCS's control, thereby being correctly termed parallel financing. However, when it was agreed to implement the project under the NGO execution modality, it appears that the finer points of this were never recognised (or changed if they were recognised), so that although in reality all monies from all sources have actually been co-finance, they have been termed parallel finance throughout the lifespan of the Project. Although it may cause some continuity issues amongst those directly concerned with the Project, in the interests of accuracy and to comply with GEF norms, the TET has applied the term co-financing to all such funds. Full details of the sources of the funding provided through WCS are given in Table 7.

<sup>14</sup> *Development of a Wetland Site and Flyway Network for Conservation of the Siberian Crane and Other Migratory Waterbirds in Asia* IMIS: GF/2328-2712-4627 and 4630; PMS: GF/6030-03.

<sup>15</sup> *Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Headwaters of the Huaihe River Basin* ATLAS ID 59594 PIMS 3934.

<sup>16</sup> *Community-based Conservation of Biological Diversity in the Mountain Landscapes of Mongolia's Altai Sayan Eco-region* ATLAS ID 39250 PIMS 1929.

**TABLE 7: SOURCES OF CO-FINANCING TO 31<sup>ST</sup> DECEMBER 2011 (US\$)**

The Asia Foundation	1,406,027
Eleanor Briggs (WCS trustee)	344,017
US Fish and Wildlife Service	190,988
World Bank	162,106
Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund	117,779
Jeniam Foundation	70,117
Technical Working Group for Forestry and Environment	59,148
Unrestricted core funds	36,015
Wild4Ever (private foundation)	23,781
Asia-Pacific Forum for Environment and Development	18,494
Elyssa Kellerman (WCS trustee)	13,189
Japanese International Cooperation	12,830
Local revenue	8,398
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,462,888</b>

NOTE: it is outside the scope of the TE to verify independently the financial figures contained in any of the tables and figures presented here through an audit.

42. The dozen co-funders listed in Table 7 serve to illustrate an important point raised by one of the stakeholders, that is that the core funding of the Project from GEF and the length of time that the Project operated for brought a real feeling of stability to conservation activities in the Northern Plains, providing a firm platform for many agencies to provide funding either directly through WCS, or indirectly through associated or coordinated activities. It meant also that the efforts of the institutions engaged in the Project, and those of associated organisations could be concentrated on actions rather than on seeking funding.

43. One issue raised by the UNDP-CO was the difficulty WCS appeared to have in attributing specific co-funds to specific activities and a seeming inability to allocate specific sources of funding to projected activities. The MTE also raised this point, thus:

*“Because Project activities are funded by a number of sources (in addition to GEF), attribution of specific results to individual donors is not necessarily clear-cut. There does not appear to be a simple solution to this and in the opinion of the Review Mission it is questionable if there needs to be, the ongoing and cumulative results of the Project in relation to its aims, objectives and specified outputs being the primary measure of success.”*

While the TET concurs that the cumulative results of the Project should be regarded as the primary measure of success, this may have been a larger issue had the Project had a less successful outcome. Nonetheless, the TET notes that WCS could largely attribute the funding of activities to specific donors retrospectively – the problem (particularly for UNDP and other donors) seemed to be that in committing funding to a specific activity to be undertaken at some point in the future, WCS could not indicate which organisation would actually fund it. In many ways, this is a small weakness in WCS’s overall ability to attract funding – its confidence in being able to attract funding causing it to commit funding prior to obtaining such funds. The TET urges WCS to exhibit caution with this approach lest at some point it be caught out and suffer a hit to its credibility. The UNDP-CO perhaps should relax slightly in relation to the issue, working on the basis that until proved otherwise, WCS appears to be able to honour its financial commitments and the actual identity of a donor will be revealed in due course<sup>17</sup>.

44. Some of the PIRs note that high inflation had significantly increased Project costs and that this was causing problems. The TET notes that this coincided with a sharp fall in the value of the US dollar – it suffered a 28% devaluation against the Euro between November 2003 (when the Project was budgeted) and April 2008 (two years into implementation). It is unknown whether the recorded

<sup>17</sup> **UNDP comment:** *It is not about UNDP, it rather than a principle that we should uphold that transparency in the context of co-financing is important. WCS never shared this information officially in the reporting process nor in the board meeting.*

“inflation” was purely an in-country issue or whether the weak dollar played a role. Nonetheless, the ability of WCS (and to some extent UNDP) to continue to find additional co-funding for the Project meant that the effects actually proved minimal by the end.

45. Tables 8-10 show the disbursement of GEF, UNDP, and WCS funds by component over time and these are graphed cumulatively in Figures 1-3. Budgets for individual years for the WCS co-financing are not available. These illustrate a number of factors:

- the typical slow start to the actual activities with only 50-75% of the expected budget being spent in 2006 (GEF funds only – Table 8 and Figure 1);
- a steady rate of use of GEF funds for all components except Component 2 which largely flat-lines after 2007;
- rapid and prolonged investment in Component 2 by WCS (Figure 2); and
- late input of UNDP funds in 2009, but a rapid increase for the next two years before these tail off into 2012 (but note these show half-year figures (Figure 3)).

**TABLE 8: TOTAL DISBURSEMENT OF GEF FUNDS (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY YEAR AGAINST BUDGET AS PER PROJECT DOCUMENT**

	2006			2007			2008			2009		
	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%
Component 1	88,600	57,890	65	81,900	49,319	60	74,300	61,399	83	73,200	41,659	57
Component 2	16,200	81,755	505	108,350	63,139	58	91,350	8,212	9	20,200	3,771	19
Component 3	323,650	237,439	73	203,900	326,445	160	124,850	222,487	178	99,450	209,162	210
Component 4	93,650	46,820	50	82,350	60,586	74	78,050	43,041	55	105,850	58,145	55
<b>Total</b>	<b>622,100</b>	<b>423,912</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>476,500</b>	<b>499,490</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>368,550</b>	<b>335,140</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>298,700</b>	<b>312,739</b>	<b>105</b>

**TABLE 8 CONT.**

	2010			2011			2012 †			Total		
	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%
Component 1	40,600	35,365	87	42,200	48,680	115	41,550	22,424	54	442,350	316,738	72
Component 2	10,050	3,047	30	8,700	19,739	227	7,850	23,300	297	362,700	202,966	56
Component 3	75,700	162,961	215	65,050	198,192	305	46,600	69,920	150	939,200	1,426,609	152
Component 4	56,350	58,587	104	55,200	31,311	57	84,300	55,185	65	555,750	353,686	64
<b>Total</b>	<b>182,700</b>	<b>259,962</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>171,150</b>	<b>297,924</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>180,300</b>	<b>170,830</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>2,300,000</b>	<b>2,300,000</b>	<b>100</b>

SOURCE: UNDP. Note: 2012 figures to 30<sup>th</sup> June only.

† to 30th June 2012 only.

**TABLE 9: TOTAL DISBURSEMENT OF WCS CO-FUNDING (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY YEAR**


	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total		
							Budget	Actual	%
Component 1	8,398	55,104	96,745	103,285	97,680	15,218	333,050	376,429	113
Component 2	32,428	85,013	306,756	500,508	404,133	46,002	214,200	1,374,840	642
Component 3	42,792	39,398	133,380	75,690	98,195	135,528	861,100	524,983	61
Component 4	9,386	33,233	28,316	51,642	48,840	15,218	191,650	186,636	97
<b>Total</b>	<b>93,004</b>	<b>212,748</b>	<b>565,199</b>	<b>731,125</b>	<b>648,848</b>	<b>211,965</b>	<b>1,600,000</b>	<b>2,462,888</b>	<b>154</b>

**TABLE 10: TOTAL DISBURSEMENT OF UNDP FUNDS (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY YEAR AGAINST BUDGET AS PER PROJECT DOCUMENT**


	2009			2010			2011			2012 †			Total		
	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%
Component 1	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-	0
Component 2	18,278	15,120	83	40,960	7,127	17	-	49,718	0	-	-	0	59,238	71,966	121
Component 3	28,150	86,440	307	298,097	385,836	129	121,495	173,159	143	140,187	140,18	100	587,928	785,623	134
Component 4	19,674	16,039	82	98,018	123,033	126	18,505	75,278	407	9,813	9,813	100	146,009	224,163	154
<b>Total</b>	<b>66,102</b>	<b>117,600</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>437,075</b>	<b>515,997</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>140,000</b>	<b>298,155</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>150,000</b>	<b>150,000</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>793,176</b>	<b>1,081,753</b>	<b>136</b>

SOURCE: UNDP. † to 30th June 2012 only.

**FIGURE 1: CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENT OF GEF FUNDS (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY YEAR AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET IN PROJECT DOCUMENT**




**FIGURE 2: CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENT OF WCS CO-FUNDS (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY YEAR AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET IN PROJECT DOCUMENT**






**FIGURE 3: CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENT OF UNDP FUNDS (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY YEAR AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET IN PROJECT DOCUMENT**




46. Figures 4-7 show the actual spend for each component by source (note different axis scales). These show clearly that Component 1 was funded by GEF and WCS with peak disbursement in 2008; Component 2 was kick-started by GEF but funded almost exclusively thereafter by WCS, with peak disbursement in 2009; and Component 3 was funded largely by GEF with late but significant inputs by UNDP with peak disbursement made in 2010 – so something of a progression of priorities from Component 1 to Component 3. Project management costs (Component 4) peaked in 2010 with a significant input from UNDP, believed to be connected with the preparatory work undertaken for REDD+


**FIGURE 4: DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS ON COMPONENT 1**




**FIGURE 5: DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS ON COMPONENT 2**



**FIGURE 6: DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS ON COMPONENT 3**



**FIGURE 7: DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS ON COMPONENT 4**



47. Throughout, WCS has exhibited excellent financial planning and management skills in dealing with the Project both in terms of the array of activities undertaken and the large number of donors involved. At all times, the PB has been kept abreast of the Project's progress through good reporting and this has allowed the necessary budget revisions to be made on a sound basis. Similarly, the link between WCS and the UNDP-CO has been efficient in ensuring that budget replenishments have been timely and there have been no inherent procedural delays.

Financial planning and management has been extremely effective throughout and the Project has displayed great ability in obtaining additional co-financing to that originally pledged. Accounting and reporting has been thorough and of the highest order, enabling sound decision-making to be made, hence financial planning has been evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

### ***Cost-effectiveness***

48. The *UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported GEF-financed Projects* (2011) eventually defines the criteria of "efficiency" in Box 3 as:

*"The extent to which results have been delivered with the least costly resources possible; also called cost effectiveness or efficacy."*

Since the term "efficiency" is rather ambiguous and could apply to efficiency in terms of time, energy-use or even carbon footprint, it has been replaced in this evaluation with the precise term "cost-effectiveness" to which it actually relates, as per Box 3.

49. Overall, the Project appears to have been extremely cost-effective since it has produced almost all of its planned deliverables within its original GEF budget, and has delivered additional benefits through an additional US\$ 1.15 million co-financing leveraged over and above that committed in the Project Document – a 48% increase. All levels of the Project have appeared to have taken cost-effectiveness very seriously, looking to get the best results for the money spent. This is a way of life for international NGOs, and another good reason to use them as implementing partners. Obtaining money from donors is hard work and requires considerable resource input, therefore spending it has to be done in such a way as to maximise its effect on-the-ground. International consultants have been used sparingly but to good effect, with most work being conducted through the relevant government agencies or using national research staff. Of particular note are the project management costs. First, the total spent amounted to just 86% of that originally budgeted indicating significant real efficiencies; and second, a reduction from the original budget of US\$ 893,410 which amounted to 19% of the originally budgeted expenditure, actually became US\$ 764,48, just 13.08% of the total (see Table 6) – that is approximately two-thirds of its originally planned proportion, an excellent performance.

50. Without a doubt, the Project has fulfilled the concept of incremental cost since without it there would have been neither the framework nor the funds available for a landscape-scale intervention to have been undertaken in the Northern Plains. While the existing land-use planning framework proved more difficult to mainstream biodiversity into than was initially surmised, and the legal framework much more fluid, the Project has still managed to fulfil everything it set out to do, and much more besides, especially with regard to incentive schemes. As a result, it has captured a lot of experience that will be of use to follow-on projects. Within the Cambodia context, it was completely innovative and had nothing on which to build and few lessons to take on board. Nonetheless, it has used existing scientific and technical information to achieve its aims while developing much new scientific information in turn – itself captured in a series of excellent academic and technical publications. The ROtI analysis (Table 11) shows a strong likelihood of most outcomes achieving their impacts and the sustainability of these appears to be very high assuming current governance problems allow it (see paragraph 84) – both issues increasing the effectiveness of the money spent.

Project management costs were trimmed to 86% of those originally budgeted, and cost-effectiveness has been a priority of the implementing partner, WCS, throughout, amongst their priorities. This, combined with significant levels of additional co-financing leveraged by the Project's activities, means the overall cost-effectiveness of the Project has been extremely high, hence it is evaluated as Highly Satisfactory.

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The design of M&E was of a standard much advanced over that normal for the design period, with a fully itemised and costed Plan included in the Project Document covering all the various M&E steps including the allocation of responsibilities. Implementation of M&E has been of a particularly high standard, with excellent progress monitoring, strong internal activity monitoring, and impact monitoring that is particularly noteworthy for its quality and effectiveness. The TET considers it to be "good practice", hence the overall rating for monitoring and evaluation has been evaluated as Highly Satisfactory.

### *M&E Design*

51. The Project design contained an excellent monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan, by far the most comprehensive in its depth and scope than any other GEF-3 project that the Lead Evaluator has come across, and especially notable since it was conceived prior to GEF introducing its improved M&E policy in 2006. Of particular note was a section on "*Conservation Impact Monitoring*" which clearly showed the scientific foundations upon which the designers, and WCS as an organisation, based the entire approach to the Project. This is encapsulated in the following:

*"In the project logframe, the monitoring program is designated a separate component in recognition of its importance, and the necessity of maintaining independence between project activities and their evaluation. This is particularly relevant given that the results of the monitoring program will be used to set reward rates for the incentive scheme. The project recognises the critical need for quantifiable indicators, not just for management to adapt activities, but to provide a public and transparent process to evaluate project success. Both communities and government need to understand and accept monitoring results for there to be genuine stakeholder buy-in to the project."*

All activities were listed and explained, and a table was included determining responsibilities, budgets and timeframe for each. Budgets were set realistically, with a total of US\$ 235,000 being set aside specifically for M&E activities. Although the logframe indicators were somewhat muddled in terms of how they related to objectives and/or outcomes (see paragraph 17), as indicators they are amongst the best the Lead Evaluator has seen. All were quantitative, SMART<sup>18</sup> and results-oriented. Baselines were either already set in the Project Document or determined immediately after Project commencement. The inclusion of indicators for each activity, while not used to measure Project achievements in this evaluation, were nonetheless very good for management purposes. At the stage of the Inception Report, clarifications and updates were made to the M&E plan but overall little was changed. The main addition was the inclusion and explanation of the two GEF Tracking Tools for SP-2 and SP-1.

The design of M&E was of a standard much advanced over that normal for the design period, with a fully itemised and costed Plan included in the Project Document covering all the various M&E steps including the allocation of responsibilities; hence monitoring and evaluation design has been evaluated as Highly Satisfactory.

### *M&E Implementation*

52. Monitoring and evaluation of Project activities have been undertaken in varying detail at three levels:

<sup>18</sup> Specific; Measurable; Achievable and attributable; Relevant and realistic; Time-bound, timely, trackable and targeted.

- i. Progress monitoring
- ii. Internal activity monitoring
- iii. Impact monitoring

53. Progress monitoring has been good and has been made through quarterly and annual reports to the UNDP-CO. The annual work plans have been developed at the end of each year with inputs from Project staff and the UNDP-CO. The annual workplans were then submitted for endorsement by the PB, and subsequently sent to UNDP for formal approval. WCS has also been largely in daily communication with the UNDP-CO regarding progress, the work plan, and its implementation. WCS has also ensured that the UNDP-CO received quarterly progress reports providing updates on the status of planned activities, the status of the overall project schedule, the products completed, and an outline of the activities planned for the following quarter. These report formats contained quantitative estimates of project progress based on financial disbursements. The UNDP-CO generated its own quarterly financial reports from Atlas from data provided by WCS. These expenditure records, together with Atlas disbursement records of any direct payments, served as a basis for expenditure monitoring and budget revisions, the latter taking place bi-annually following the disbursement progress and changes in the operational work plan, and also on an *ad hoc* basis depending upon the rate of delivery. The UNDP-CO has also required delivery projections along with work plans that are updated quarterly by WCS, and these have served as an additional monitoring tool, especially for quantitative estimates of the project progress<sup>19</sup>.

54. From the quarterly reports, the UNDP-CO has prepared Quarterly Operational Reports (150-word fixed-format) which have been forwarded to UNDP/GEF Regional Coordination Unit in Bangkok<sup>20</sup>, and in turn submitted to UNDP HQ and to GEF. The major findings and observations of all these reports have been given in an annual report covering the period July to June, the Project Implementation Review (PIR), which is also submitted by WCS to the UNDP-CO, UNDP Regional Coordination Unit, and UNDP HQ for review and official comments, followed by final submission to GEF. All key reports were presented to PB members ahead of their half-yearly meetings and through this means, the key national ministries and national government has been kept abreast of the Project's implementation progress. Annual Project Reports (APR) covering calendar years (Jan-Dec) were prepared as part of the annual work plan monitoring tools as required by UNDP's regulations

55. The MPO and the UNDP-CO have maintained a close working relationship, with Project staff members meeting, or talking with, CO staff on an almost daily basis to discuss implementation issues and problems. The PIRs available to the TET appear incomplete in places, but the UNDP-CO appears to have monitored the Project through a number of field visits although "*and colleagues*" appears to often to determine how often these included members of the Energy and Environment Team Leader and/or the Biodiversity Programme Officer. Since September 2008 four field visits<sup>21</sup> were organised, and reports were made to the office. This indicates a good level of supervision. No records for 2011-12 appear to be available. The Regional Technical Advisor made a field visit to the site in November 2010. The CO has also participated in all Project Board Meetings. The Project has been subject to annual audit with nothing of significance found wanting.

56. The Project's risk assessment has been updated quarterly together by WCS and the UNDP-CO with the main risks identified along with adequate management responses and person responsible (termed the risk "owner") who in most cases differs from the person who identified the risk. Two logs appear to have been kept – a Risk Log which contains external risks, and a Risk Issue Log which contains largely internal risks. In the former, although the potential impacts are detailed and a probability of them occurring are provided, most of them do not have a risk level attached, e.g. critical, moderate. Eighteen risks are present in the Risk Log as at December 2011, of which seven had expired and only two were marked as "*increasing*" – these being the increases in designation of social

<sup>19</sup> **UNDP comment:** Recently, UNDP-CO has designed and exercised the Integrated Assurance Mission (IAM) twice a year for every project, and the first exercise with the CALM project happened in May 2012.

<sup>20</sup> Since start 2011, these reports are entered directly into Atlas.

<sup>21</sup> 16-17<sup>th</sup> February 2009; 10-12<sup>th</sup> June 2010; 1-4<sup>th</sup> November 2011; and 28-31<sup>st</sup> May 2012.

and economic concessions within KPWS. The Risk Issue Log contained seven issues as of June 2012, but only three of these were active and none were deemed to be increasing.

57. A Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) was undertaken between in August 2009 with a final report submitted in October. The report contains no formal ratings for any of the elements usually rated, although the words “satisfactory”, “appropriate”, “effective”, and “adequate”, and phrases such as “no major issues ... were identified” appear liberally. A complete reading of the report returns an overview that the Project was considered to be on track and the

*“effectiveness (progress achieved against planned outputs and suboutputs) can be judged to be satisfactory to-date”.*

This is consistent with the findings of the PIR at that time which considered progress to be Satisfactory (UNDP-CO Highly Satisfactory in 2007; National Project Manager Highly Satisfactory in 2009). Despite the overall contentment shown by the report, the MTE still made 25 recommendations, although nine of these were simply to recommend continuation of certain actions, whose point eludes the TET, e.g.:

*“Recommendation 1: It is recommended that the adaptive management approach taken by the Project to-date be continued.”*

*“Recommendation 2: ... It is recommended that the government counterpart institutions continue all efforts to find an effective, long-term political and administrative solution that will minimize forest and biodiversity loss to military activities.”*

*“Recommendation 10: ... Reporting at the current standard needs to be continued to the end of the Project.”*

*“Recommendation 15: The support of local and provincial stakeholders needs to continue to be built through a mainstreaming approach.”*

and sometimes with repetition, e.g.:

*“Recommendation 7: Another biodiversity conservation initiative, the Transboundary Project funded by ITTO ... at least partially overlaps the CALM Project area. There has already been some cooperation ... and this needs to continue as long as both projects are active in the area.”*

*“Recommendation 20: The Project should maintain dialogue with other projects in the area to maximize synergies.”*

Many are weak and unfocussed suggesting that options<sup>22</sup> or actions should be “explored” or “examined” without specifying a particular course of action. Nonetheless, a management response was provided for all but one

*“Recommendation 16: The impacts of in-migration (in response to improved economic opportunities) and natural population growth on resource use and demand levels should be considered and incorporated in planning processes”*

which may have been too vague for the Project and the UNDP-CO to formulate a response to.

58. Internal activity monitoring undertaken by WCS and the National Site Managers appears to have been good comprising a range of mechanisms to keep abreast of the situation and to respond quickly and effectively to any areas of concern. These comprised many of the methods used to track progress, and implementation has been heavily guided by the Annual Work Plan and the quarterly plans submitted to release funds. Generally the Project has been small enough not to require formalised communication or monitoring procedures; members being in almost daily contact. Where external contracts have been issued, these were on a lump-sum basis payable according to milestones

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<sup>22</sup> **UNDP comment:** *It is not appropriate for one evaluator to comment on the recommendation of another’s evaluation. It is important in this exercise for the TET to validate to what extent the recommendations from the MET has been responded.*  
**TET response:** The TET respectfully disagrees. The MTE is a part of the Project just as any other component is. The lead evaluator has seen many strong and extremely helpful mid-term evaluations that have made major contributions to the success of their projects and this has been acknowledged in the final evaluation. Here, the MTE was weak, and it is important to note that the vagueness of many of its recommendations has had an effect on how they were responded to.

defined by time and quality – failure to achieve either resulting in forfeiture of some part of the payment. By and large, this provided enough incentive for sound delivery.

59. Unusually, impact monitoring has been very well-developed, with formal protocols in place to measure wildlife populations, habitats, illegal incidents, financial gains to beneficiaries, etc. (see Annex IV) using state-of-the-art scientific methods. Undoubtedly this has arisen from the strong scientific backgrounds of the Project’s designers, enhanced by the same of its managers. Much of this impact monitoring has arisen because of the emphasis on this aspect included in Component 3 through the MIST system, but not only from this. The ethos is widespread and there is some evidence that even the effectiveness of training courses was in some cases measured by rudimentary before-and-after questionnaires. While it is difficult to find direct evidence to show that the considerable work undertaken in monitoring the impact indicators was used to influence in any way the adaptive management that the Project has practiced, it is certain that positive results encouraged the actions that led to them, e.g. supporting villagers to increase their share of tourist revenue by increasing services; expanding the nest protection scheme. At a finer level, operational decisions on the patrolling and law enforcement activities were guided closely by the MIST system, enabling the authorities to identify under-visited areas and provide remedial actions. However, as is most often the case, the adaptive management of the Project has been influenced to a much greater extent by external variables and overcoming the problems (or taking opportunities) that these have presented than by responding to internal monitoring.

M&E implementation has been of a very high standard, with excellent progress monitoring and strong internal activity monitoring. The impact monitoring, normally the weak point of any project’s M&E, is particularly noteworthy for its quality and effectiveness and has been used to influence management decisions. Good responses have also been made to the mid-term review and the risk assessments, and the TET considers it to be “good practice”, hence the implementation of monitoring and evaluation has been evaluated as Highly Satisfactory.

## PROJECT RESULTS

### ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVES

60. A Summary of the Project’s achievements is given directly below, followed by an outline of the attainment of objectives. This is followed by a Review of Outcomes to Impacts in Table 11 and a brief discussion on the verifiable impacts. A summary evaluation of Project Output is given in Table 13 followed by a more detailed description. A detailed evaluation of the level of achievements made against the indicators of success contained in the logframe is given in Annex IV.

#### *Summary of Achievements*

60. The CALM Project has been well designed, and well- managed and implemented throughout, and stands as a testament to what can be achieved through the NGO implementation modality. Despite working in a very remote area, much of which becomes inaccessible during the wet season, and an unfavourable wider political environment, the team has managed to deliver a series of interventions that have significantly reduced the threats to a suite of globally-threatened wildlife which appear to be responding with stable or increasing populations. In the process, the Project has demonstrated a number of innovative approaches particularly through incentive schemes that could be expanded within the region or be replicated elsewhere in the country. One of its biggest strengths has come about through a design-decision to work directly through existing government structures rather than parallel project structures, and this has been repaid by the MoE and the FA working in close cooperation together for the first time for many years, and in both institutions taking full ownership for most of the Project’s outputs. Excellent work with 23 villages has brought benefits to an estimated 20,000 community members thereby laying a solid foundation for improved understanding of, and cooperation on, biodiversity conservation issues in the future. As will be seen below, the achievement of the outputs and activities under each of the four components has been evaluated as highly satisfactory, and the evaluation of achievements against indicators (provided in Annex IV) show that

of the 21 indicator/site combinations, 13 (62%) show successful achievement at the end of the Project and five (24%) show achievement nearly successful.

Overall, the Project has achieved or exceed all its major global environmental objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The project can be presented as “good practice”, and hence its attainment of objectives and results is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

61. Key Project achievements include:

- mainstreaming biodiversity considerations into the Preah Vihear Provincial Development and Investment Plans for 2011-2015;
- mainstreaming biodiversity considerations into 23 Commune Development Plans and the associated District Development Plans;
- training of over 5,000 government officials and local community members resulting in increased capacity to understand and take part in conservation planning processes and to undertake management activities and strengthen abilities to implement laws and regulations on the ground;
- designation of over 30,000 ha of land as either community use zones or sustainable use zones within KPWS;
- establishment of 32 CBOs to map, develop rules and regulations for, and manage natural resources and land within the CALM landscape including seven community protected area management committees, seven community protected forest management committees, five indigenous representation committees, four community forestry committees and nine village marketing networks, with an estimated 20,000 community members having benefited from Project activities;
- development and mentoring of three incentive schemes linking payments directly to conservation actions through:
  - a) community-based and run nature-based tourism at one main site and two subsidiary sites;
  - b) payments for forest protection based on premiums for agricultural products (*Ibis Rice*); and
  - c) direct payments for bird nest protection
- increased and better targeted law-enforcement operations in two protected areas;
- increased research and improved monitoring of wildlife within the northern plains to inform management decisions;
- completion of preparatory activities for an application for REDD+ funds to cover forests within the northern plains; and
- unquantifiable development of capacity at site and provincial level through training, technical assistance and provision of equipment, considered by some to be the Project’s most important achievement.

62. The main problem areas identified by the TET are:

- continuing social, economic, and military concessions made within internationally-recognised protected areas;
- no funds committed by either the MoE or the FA to cover operational costs to maintain law enforcement operations within KPWS or PVPF;
- no guaranteed commitment of funds from the donor community to assist with protected area operations or Project-supported initiatives, although preparatory work and submissions made; and
- the Project Board missed the opportunity to facilitate inter-sectoral interest and cooperation, a key part of mainstreaming.

## Objective Indicators

63. As has been described (see paragraph 11), a single “Project Objective” was articulated in the logframe which has been considered as a development objective. No immediate objectives were given. Furthermore, during the logframe’s revision, a series of 11 impact indicators were defined. Although not strictly objective indicators, since they can also be re-arranged to fit the outputs (see [Annex VIII](#)), they are the closest (and only) indicators available. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the indicators are all highly relevant and precise and are based on good science and monitoring protocols. When these 11 indicators are broken down to apply to the three Project sites, 21 combinations are produced. Full details and an evaluation of achievements against targets are provided in [Annex IV](#). Suffice it to say that of these 21 indicator/site combinations, 13 (62%) show successful achievement at the end of the Project, five (24%) show achievement nearly successful, and only three (14%) have not been achieved – one being the management plan for KPWS which is still awaiting the necessary legislative framework to define zones; one being no increase in the populations of key species of large ungulates, although no decrease has occurred, and the third being an increase in illegal logging incidents in the O’Schach-O’Dar site where the TET understands that patrolling has been less intensive. The TET believes this to be an extremely creditworthy performance.

## Effectiveness

### Review of Outcomes to Impacts

64. Table 11 provides a review of the likelihood of outcomes being translated into intended impacts using the recently-introduced methodology described in paragraph 6 and Tables 3 and 4.

**TABLE 11: REVIEW OF OUTCOMES TO IMPACTS AT THE END OF PROJECT SITUATION**

Component	Findings	Review of Outcomes to Impacts <sup>23</sup>
<b>Site Level Outcomes</b>		
<b>Outcome 1:</b> Biodiversity incorporated into the landscape-level planning processes	Biodiversity issues have been incorporated into the Preah Vihear Provincial Development Plan 2011-2015 complete with quantitative indicators (see <a href="#">Annex X</a> ). Provincial Investment Plan identifies sources of finance, which are largely from donors. Biodiversity issues are also evident in at least two Commune Development Plans. Thus, the measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started but have not yet produced results.	AC: Moderately Likely
<b>Outcome 2:</b> Mainstreaming measures applied	Tenure and usufruct rights have been formalised for 23 villages and the committees established to manage Community Protected Areas and Community Protected Forests are evident. Three incentive schemes have been demonstrated successfully, linking biodiversity conservation measures directly with economic benefits for the local communities. Therefore, the measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and are producing results that indicate they can progress towards the intended long term impact.	AA: Highly Likely
<b>Outcome 3:</b> Capacity for biodiversity management strengthened	Capacity of staff and institutions increased through provision of training and equipment. Monitoring improved for law enforcement activities, wildlife populations and habitat integrity. Research undertaken. Sustainable financing examined, but all eggs in one basket, namely development of a REDD+ proposal. METT scores for both protected areas show significant increases, so the measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started to produce results, but the lack of firm financial commitments gives rise to some concern as to whether they can progress towards the intended long term impact.	AB: Highly Likely

<sup>23</sup> See Appendix 7 of TOR in Annex I.



As a result of the review of outcomes to impacts (ROtI), the overall likelihood of impacts being achieved is two (66%) cases of Highly Likely and one (33%) of Moderately Likely, hence the Project is expected to achieve most of its major global environmental objectives, and yield satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, and its effectiveness is evaluated as Satisfactory.

## Impact

65. Although not within the capability of the TET to verify independently, the monitoring data collected by the Project shows verifiable improvements in the ecological status of the area. This is most effectively highlighted by the increase in the populations of certain species of globally threatened birds. Table 12 shows the total density of four species of globally threatened waterbird<sup>24</sup> as measured over between 1,831 and 2,618 km<sup>2</sup> of KPWS and PVPF between 2005-6 and 2011-12. Total densities have more than doubled over the period, peaking at 22.24 birds/100km<sup>2</sup> before dropping quite sharply in 2010/11 as a result of a drought, before increasing again in 2011-12. Figures for a control area outside of the nest protection scheme show a similar drop during the drought, but crucially densities of only one-third the level in the area protected by the Project's activities. Further details can be found in Figures 8 and 9 in paragraph 71. Data collected for indicator #2 ([Annex IV](#)) also show that the density of large ungulates has stabilised, and even though the target of a 15% increase has been missed, such an increase may have been impossible with species with slow reproductive rates and long periods before reaching sexual maturity. Stability probably represents an increase in the ecological status, or at least a reduction in environmental stress, i.e. reduced or no hunting.

**TABLE 12: DENSITY OF GLOBALLY THREATENED WATERBIRDS IN CAMBODIA'S NORTHERN PLAINS**

Season	Birds/100km <sup>2</sup>	
	KPWS & PVPF	Control
2005-6	9.24	
2006-7	13.06	
2007-8	17.28	
2008-9	19.77	
2009-10	22.24	7.59
2010-11	16.29	5.43
2011-12	20.93	

66. Reduced environmental stress is also demonstrated by the fact that deforestation rates are significantly reduced in the protected areas. Quantitative forest cover analysis conducted by the Project suggests that it has been successful in reducing deforestation rates. Comparison of deforestation rates shows that there was an order of magnitude difference in the annual rate of forest loss between the CALM landscape (0.19%) and the buffer area (1.67%). In the CALM landscape the total area of forest lost between 2002 and 2010 was 7,511 ha (1.5% of the original total forest area) compared to 46,416 ha (12.6%) in the buffer area. Unfortunately, deforestation accelerated in the study area over time and existing differences in the rates of forest loss at the start of the project were magnified. In 2002-2006 the CALM landscape lost forest at an annual rate of 0.16% but from 2006-2010 this annual rate increased to 0.21%, while in the buffer area those annual rates of loss were 1.07% and 2.27% respectively. The Project appears to have helped mitigate the rate of forest loss inside the CALM landscape boundaries from 2006-2009 despite increased pressure for deforestation as shown by increasing rates of loss in the buffer area, but this pressure increased greatly during 2009-2010 (mainly from concessions) and exceeded the capacity of the Project to cope with it during this period. Further evidence is provided by the figures from indicator #5 ([Annex IV](#)) where the incidence of illegal logging has dropped by 94.5% in PVPF; 41.8% in KPWS; but increased in the O'Scach-O'Dar area by 13%. Another measure of reduced stress is that of hunting where the number of illegal

<sup>24</sup> Giant Ibis (*Pseudibis gigantea*), Greater Adjutant (*Leptoptilos dubius*), Lesser Adjutant (*L. javanicus*), and Sarus Crane (*Grus antigone*).

hunting incidents encountered on patrols has dropped by 88.5% in PVPF, a similar percentage in KPWS, and 82.5% in the O'Scach-O'Dar area (see indicator #4 in [Annex IV](#)).

## ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OUTPUTS

67. This section provides an overview of the main achievements of the Project. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account. The following paragraphs have included some heavily-edited parts of a draft version of the Final Project Report very kindly supplied by the WCS Country Director – Mark Gately – in response to a request from the TET for a summary of activities undertaken. The TET acknowledges the work of all involved and thanks them and WCS for their kind assistance.

**TABLE 13: EVALUATION OF THE END OF PROJECT SITUATION AS PER THE REVISED LOGFRAME**

Component		Evaluation*					
		HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Output 1	Integrated conservation and development planning at the landscape-level						
Output 2	Establishment of appropriate community land tenure and resource-right use and engagement in conservation management						
Output 3	Improved management of the key sites for conservation						
Output 4	Adequate reporting on project outcomes and indicators						

\* Note: HS = Highly satisfactory; S = Satisfactory; MS = Marginally satisfactory; MU= Marginally unsatisfactory; U = Unsatisfactory; HU = Highly unsatisfactory. Components are hyperlinked to relevant section.

The Project has incorporated biodiversity issues into the admittedly rudimentary landscape-level planning process in Preah Vihear Province; has formalised land tenure and usufruct rights for 23 villages and demonstrated successfully three incentive schemes that link biodiversity conservation measures directly with economic benefits for the local communities; and improved the management of KPWS and PVPF through increased capacity of staff and institutions. All four Project outputs are ranked individually as Highly Satisfactory, hence overall the achievement of outputs and activities is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

### *Component 1: Incorporating biodiversity into landscape-level planning processes*

#### **Output 1: Integrated conservation and development planning at the landscape-level**

68. The major problem for work under this output was the absence of an established land-use planning and mapping framework to mainstream biodiversity issues into. Even provincial boundaries appear not to have been fixed, with different maps showing them in completely different places. The same appears to be true in relation the protected area boundaries. The Project overcame this by attempting to plug into the decentralisation and de-concentration process current within the provinces. Despite it reducing in geographic scale to cover just Preah Vihear Province, the Project appears to have achieved a lot. Working first through the DANIDA- and DfID-funded Civil Society Pro-poor Market Programme (CSPPMP) and through the UNDP-funded *Seila* Programme, and using trainers from these to train NGO partners' staff, the Project and these NGO partners helped to register community-based organisations (CBOs) in 23 communes selected on CSPPMP criteria for their vulnerability to poverty. Commune councillors were trained to understand that CBOs had to be accepted into the planning process, and CBOs were trained in how to make such contributions through a Commune Development Planning (CDP) process developed by *Seila* and and where possible (CLUP Pilots) include information into the Commune Land Use Planning (CLUP) process developed by *Seila* and the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction. The Project worked to apply CDP to improve the mapping of existing infrastructure and spatial use of natural resources within the communes, particularly to define areas for community forestry. The CBOs then worked to ascertain their priorities, and these were entered into the planning matrix. As a result, over 5,000 government officials and local community members have been trained in understanding conservation planning processes and including them in landscape planning activities, and biodiversity and natural resource management issues have been included into the five-year Provincial Development Plan and the one-year District Development and Commune Development Plans. The Preah Vihear Provincial

Development Plan (2011-2015) states under a heading “*Status of land use and natural resources and environmental management*”:

*“Preah Vihear is rich in forests, rivers, streams, mineral resources, and wildlife. Preah Vihear has three PAs covering a total area of 300,000 ha and they are Kulen Promptep Wildlife Sanctuary, Boeung Per Wildlife Sanctuary and Preah Vihear Protected Forest. People migrate from other provinces to settle in Preah Vihear. This causes land conflicts, forest destruction, and environmental pollution. To avoid these challenges, provincial authority in cooperation with NGOs conducts public awareness on forests laws and environmental protection laws. The Province has determined boundaries of PAs, and organised community forests to encourage local communities to participate in resources management. Limited fund and human resources are challenges for implementation activities.”*

It also includes these issues with objectives and indicators (see [Annex X](#)) and an investment plan that identifies US\$ 37.8 million for environmental and natural resource management related projects already in the pipeline for the same period – mainly from donors.

69. The major threat to this Output has been the creation of economic and social land concessions, granted to companies with links to powerful individuals and to the military. These concessions are declared on an *ad hoc* basis, outside of the formal planning systems that exist in the Province, and have the potential to cause substantial damage to the integrity of the landscape, destroying biodiversity and local community livelihoods. One issue not foreseen at the time of the Project’s design was a border dispute with Thailand over ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple to the north of KPWS. This dispute resulted in military hostilities in 2010 and hence significant military activity ensued including the building of roads and installations. Subsequently, the military deemed a need for housing for its troops’ families and agricultural land for their upkeep. Many of the requests for such social and economic and military concessions included land located inside KPWS. The Project undertook numerous meetings with military officials to try and ensure that the selection of military concessions took conservation concerns into account, and worked closely with the Governor, politicians, and officials informing them of the value of the landscape. As a result, the TET has seen six letters sent by the Governor to military commanders rejecting their request for land totalling 3,896 ha inside KPWS and requesting that they look outside its boundaries, on the basis that such concessions would adversely affect the Critically Endangered White-shouldered Ibis and the livelihoods of people from the nearby village of Tmatboey who benefit from ecotourism revenue derived from visitors viewing the birds. Another six areas totalling 5,464 ha have been agreed nearer the boundaries, and another three areas for agriculture totalling 16,731 ha are awaiting the decision of the Prime Minister although the TET understands that the Governor and MoE have recommended rejection. The level of success achieved in this respect by the Project has led to a change in tactics as the PIR 2011 states:

*“Indeed, the military seemed to have learnt their lesson from previous years and are now ignoring line agencies and requesting concessions directly from the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers”.*

This output has achieved all its major objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The output can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

## ***Component 2: Applying Mainstreaming Measures***

### **Output 2: Establishment of appropriate community land tenure and resource-right use and engagement in conservation management**

70. At the start of the Project, land and resource-use patterns in the CALM landscape were characterised by an ‘open-access’ system that resulted in general over-exploitation, with no incentives for sustainable or co-ordinated management. Although the new Protected Area Law specifically required the zonation of Wildlife Sanctuaries to incorporate the rights of local people, the issue of providing tenure and defining the boundaries of natural resource use for in villages in and on the

boundaries of protected areas was complicated by the current flux of that legislative framework. Within a protected area (in this case the KPWS), the draft decree on community protected areas has not yet been registered, and the draft procedure has not yet been ratified. Nonetheless, since the Project used this procedure it appears that the MoE agreed to it and was able to recognise Community Protected Areas (CPA), i.e. provide tenure for existing residential and agricultural land (community use zones) and usufruct rights for natural resources within agreed defined areas (sustainable use zone) for each commune within or along its boundaries. As a result, over 30,000 ha of land designated as either community use zones or sustainable use zones under the provisions of the Protected Area Law, with some boundaries demarcated on the ground using concrete posts. More than 30 CBOs have been established and trained in natural resource management. Natural resource management committees have been created and land-use plans completed in nine villages, with the process currently underway in an additional five sites within or adjacent to the KPWS. In the protected forests (in this case PVPF), the arrangement is different with Community Protected Forests covering residential and agricultural land, but commune members have the right to collect non-timber forest products from anywhere within the forest. Work has been carried out on 15 villages within the PVPF and Community Protected Forest Plans have been established for them all. In addition, the boundaries of the protected areas themselves have been defined and in some places demarcated on the ground.

71. The importance of tenure and usufruct rights cannot be over-emphasised. As one interviewee noted *“This is what people have dreamed about ... waited and waited for. The Project has contributed a catalytic effect”* and as a result biodiversity conservation issues are now seen by villagers in a much more favourable light. Furthermore, it now enables the senior staff of the government partners (MoE and FA) to approach their senior ministers over community issues and with that to draw the attention of the Prime Minister to listen over community forestry/community protected areas. In addition to strengthening the security of tenure that local communities have over their land, the Project has made significant progress in the development of payment for ecological services (PES) initiatives to encourage active participation in natural resource management. What is impressive is that the Project has not established just a single scheme, but three separate yet complementary ones. Each requires local people to participate actively in conservation through the development of land-use plans, no-hunting agreements, and similar initiatives, in return for a financial incentive. What is key in this instance is that, unlike in so many GEF-funded projects, the financial rewards for those involved are linked directly to the conservation outcome, not through some indirect pathway; if the outcome (reduced hunting of endangered species, reduced habitat clearance, etc.) is not achieved, then no payments are made. The Project has established a rigorous monitoring system to measure the conservation outcomes and ensure that the link between conservation success and financial incentives is maintained. The three incentive schemes are:

- **Community-based ecotourism:** The presence of a large number of globally threatened bird species within the Northern Plains makes it attractive to birders. The key attractions are the critically endangered giant ibis and white-shouldered ibis which are found conveniently close together in the vicinity of the village of Tmatboey. The Tmatboey Ibis Project was initiated in 2004 ahead of the CALM Project but the latter has served to establish it as a local community-based tourism enterprise that directly links revenue received with species conservation over the long-term. Ecotourism services are organised by the community, with facilitation and training provided by WCS and local NGO partners. All tourism promotion, guide training and bookings were initially managed by WCS, but these are now undertaken by a local NGO partner, the Sam Veasna Center for Wildlife Conservation (SVC), based in Siem Reap. All tourism activities within the village are managed by the locally-elected CPA Committee. The committee is responsible for maintaining a community guesthouse (built with parallel project funding), providing cooks, guards for the guesthouse, and local bird guides, as well as other people providing assistance as required and are paid for their service either from the guesthouse fee (e.g. bringing firewood or carrying water) or directly by guests (e.g. for laundry). Tourists pay for all services provided, but also pay into a village fund, itself cleverly set up on an incentive basis to maximize the tourists chance of seeing the birds – US\$ 30 per person if one or both ibis species are seen; US\$ 15 if not. The village fund is used for local development projects which have been chosen by the community (e.g. a new road, a well, a temple) and organized by the CPA Committee. These mechanisms help to ensure that income is transparently and equitably shared among households, and to maximise the number of villagers directly involved. This

management system ensures that there is a high degree of local ownership for the project, and that a large proportion of the financial benefits are captured by local people.

The system was initiated in 2006 with a comprehensive training program for the village committee, with the aim that they would take over responsibility for all aspects of tourism management for the 2007 season. This training included book-keeping, development of rules and regulations for the committee, establishing rules for deciding expenditure, and criteria for recruitment of villagers to tourism positions. The roles of all service providers, such as guides, cooks and cleaners, were clearly defined during this process. As a consequence of these changes, the community took over responsibility for tourism management (previously performed by WCS) and for procuring food (i.e. the village had moved up the 'value chain'), with WCS continuing to play a hands-off mentoring role. In addition, a number of new groups were formed, particularly the Women's Group, and so the overall range of services available increased. Income therefore greatly improved in the 2007 season, see Table 14. Although tourist numbers increased only by 8% to a total of 78 visitors (26 groups), total revenue increased by 68% from \$3,553 to \$5,961. The per tourist contribution to the village fund remained unchanged at \$30/tourist, but the total service payments increased from \$21/tourist to \$47 (+124%), the first season in which the average service payments were greater than contributions to the village fund. This increase was entirely due to the villagers capturing a greater percentage of the money paid, because they controlled more of the value chain and had diversified the range of tourism services available, and this proportion has continued to grow ever since as the villagers take over the provision of more and more services (see Table 14).

**TABLE 14: VALUE OF BIRD-RELATED TOURISM TO TMATBOEY VILLAGE**

Year	Total (\$)	Services (\$)	Fund (\$)	Average Service Payment/ Tourist (\$)	% of overall revenue captured by the village
2003	0	0	0		
2004	498	128	370	10	11.4%
2005	2,588	1,058	1,530	21	14.1%
2006	3,553	1,453	2,100	21	14.1%
2007	5,961	3,641	2,320	47	19.9%
2008	12,271	8,491	3,780	67	23.9%
2009	10,152	6,923	3,229	62	26.4%
2010	11,121	8,499	2,622	71	32.0%
2011	17,775	13,461	4,313	71	33.7%

SOURCE: WCS.

To place these figures in context, in 2003 household incomes would be around US\$ 350/yr from rice, resin, and other NTFPs. With c.200 households in Tmatboey, total income to the village would have been c. US\$ 7,000/yr.

Figures for 2009 (and 2010) reflect the impact of the global recession.

<b>#2</b>	<b>Lesson learned:</b> Direct payments make excellent incentives to achieve conservation goals.
<b>#5</b>	<b>Lesson learned:</b> Constant contact with communities is vital to community-based natural resource management projects.

Significant progress have been made in expanding the Tmatboey experience to additional villages, e.g. Chhep in PVPF where three critically endangered vulture species and the endangered white-winged duck are found, and in Prey Veng in KPWS where sarus cranes, a colony of oriental darters, and an ancient temple occur. Tented camps have been installed at both locations and the Project has implemented capacity building sessions with the local communities. Funding for this work was obtained from a private foundation that was interested in expanding the Tmatboey model – funding was provided for the purchase of high quality safari camping equipment from a supplier in South Africa, while washing and sanitary facilities are of high quality and a well has been drilled to provide water for the site for food preparation and washing areas.

In 2007, Tmatboey won the Wild Asia Foundation's prize as best community-based eco-tourism project, and followed that up by being nominated in the final shortlist (of 25) for the Equator Prize. These accolades in turn brought the initiative to the attention of the Senior Minister for the Environment who subsequently made a visit to the village and was impressed enough to request a further six sites be identified and developed for nature-based tourism. The initiative was also presented to the National Assembly to general approval.

**#1**

**Lesson learned:** Results focus attention.

- Payments for forest protection based on premiums for agricultural products: This initiative provides local communities with an incentive to engage in conservation by offering farmers a premium price for their rice (about 10% above otherwise market value) if they agree to abide by conservation agreements that are designed to protect the critically endangered waterbirds and other globally threatened species using the protected areas. These agreements are enforced by a locally-elected natural resource management committee which is composed of representatives from the village, thereby guaranteeing a high degree of 'local ownership' of the scheme. The implementation of the project in each village follows a prescribed number of simple steps. Firstly, a 'Village Marketing Network' (VMN) is formed in the village. This is responsible for purchasing the rice from farmers and for verifying that the farmers have respected the conservation agreements, with oversight from the natural resource management committee. A local NGO, Sansom Mlup Prey<sup>25</sup> (SMP), organises the collection of the rice from participating villages and delivers it to a mill where it is processed. SMP then packages and labels the final product as '*Ibis Rice*' and it is sold at a 7% premium to supermarkets, and medium- to high-end hotels and restaurants, focusing on Cambodia's large tourism trade (2 million visitors to Angkor Wat in 2010) and expatriate community. Certification has been received from the Wildlife Friendly Enterprise Network for *Ibis Rice* so it can now be marketed under the Wildlife Friendly trademark. Marketing focuses on explaining the social and biodiversity benefits it brings to the Northern Plains of Cambodia. WCS continues to support both the VMN and SMP in monitoring conservation agreements, rice quality, and working with other partners to provide agricultural extension support to raise productivity. The initial establishment costs of the initiative were covered by parallel funding through a World Bank Development Marketplace Award for 2009-2010.

This pilot initiative has demonstrated the success of *Ibis Rice* and it has proved popular with local people; participating families in four villages rose from 39 in 2008 to 115 families (575 people) in 2010, and revenue paid to local communities rose from US\$ 8,700 in 2008 to US\$ 36,500 in 2010. In addition to the 10% premium, each participating community uses their own scales to weigh rice, which increases the amount received by each family since trader's scales are biased against the farmer. Finally, the increased competition from *Ibis Rice* sales has caused traders to increase their floor price by 50-100% in all villages, which benefits the wider community as a whole. One of the major factors influencing the success of engaging local communities in conservation efforts was the early identification of one or two 'champions' within the communities, who were confident that the CALM Project outputs would be beneficial for village members, and was able to convince others to participate. Once this had been successfully achieved in the first pilot site (Tmatboey) this success could then be used to encourage additional villages to participate. Another important component was the involvement of specialist NGOs such as SVC and SMP, who were able to build the capacity to undertake commercial activities such as marketing and sales, which fall outside the usual remit of a conservation NGO such as WCS. Despite this success, it was apparent to the TET, at least in Tmatboey but presumed to be the same elsewhere, that while the villagers welcome the incentive and understand the requirements for their involvement, they do not fully understand the mechanism of the market. The TET recommends that WCS "completes the circle" and raises the awareness of the villagers about where their rice goes and why people are prepared to pay a premium for it, i.e. the indirect value that consumers place upon conserving the "special"

<sup>25</sup> Approximately translated as Saving Shade Trees.

wildlife of the Northern Plains, thereby reinforcing the directness of the link between the crop and wildlife conservation.

<b>The TET recommends</b> that WCS educate villagers involved in producing <i>Ibis Rice</i> about why consumers value it.			
<i>Responsibility</i>	<i>Task</i>	<i>Time frame</i>	<i>Deliverable</i>
WCS	Undertake awareness-raising with the producers of <i>Ibis Rice</i> as to why consumers are prepared to pay a premium for it.	When possible for existing villages, but for newly-involved villages, at the time the scheme is first introduced.	Increased understanding of the direct link between the premium people are prepared to pay and the continued well-being of the wildlife around the villages.

Since the majority of the inhabitants of rural communities in Cambodia are engaged in rice farming, the scheme has the potential to benefit a high proportion of the population within each village. However, the TET believes that the business model being pursued by WCS needs some serious tweaking. SMP is registered as a “not-for-profit” organization but there is a great deal of difference between an organization not making a profit and one that makes a profit but reinvests this in pursuance of its objectives. In 2008, the *Ibis Rice* initiative made a profit of about US\$ 8,000 but this was then shared equally and returned to the participating farmers. Since then, no profits have been made – in fact SMP has had insufficient funding to buy all the rice it intended to purchase despite WCS providing the necessary funding through its donors (US\$ 46,000 in 2012). The TET notes that obtaining support for projects which explicitly link social benefits to biodiversity benefits is relatively difficult, but nonetheless recommends that WCS pursue an option that fully capitalizes SMP to buy sufficient rice to make sufficient profit each year to enable it to expand the *Ibis Rice* scheme into one or more new villages each year, thereby becoming self sufficient, rather than continuing to drip-feed it with small amounts of money on an annual basis.

<b>The TET recommends</b> that WCS alter their business model for <i>Ibis Rice</i> to enable it to become self-sufficient.			
<i>Responsibility</i>	<i>Task</i>	<i>Time frame</i>	<i>Deliverable</i>
WCS	Provide a capital lump sum sufficient for SMP to buy enough rice each year to enable the incentive scheme to be expanded into one or more new villages each year.	As soon as possible	Business financial plan and sufficient one-off capital injection to fund it.
WCS/SMP	Ensure that the concepts of profit and re-investment are prioritised within the business plan commensurate with affording villagers a premium price, such that the incentive scheme can be continually expanded within the region.	As soon as possible	Adaptation of business plan to fully accommodate the concepts of profit and re-investment.

- **Direct payments for bird nest protection:** This programme provided conditional payments to local people to protect the nests of nine globally threatened bird species, since the collection of eggs and chicks posed a serious threat to them. Under the programme, nests were located by local people (usually resin-tappers or local farmers), or community rangers contracted by WCS seasonally to undertake research. Local people received a reward of US\$ 5 for reporting a nesting site. For all species except Giant Ibis<sup>26</sup>, a permanent protection team of two people was established for each nest (or colony in the case of adjutant storks or darters), with the people who found the nest given the first option to form that protection team; otherwise nest protectors were sought from local forest product collectors or the nearest village. Prior to 2008, protectors received a payment of US\$ 1 per day for their work and an extra US\$ 1 per day upon completion if chicks fledged successfully. The total payment of US\$ 2 per day was judged an acceptable daily wage based on village consultations. From 2008 payments were increased to US\$ 2.50 per day due to rising food prices. Community rangers received a monthly salary (US\$ 50-70) plus the same daily payment. Protection teams remained in place until the last chick

<sup>26</sup> Giant Ibis were not thought to be valued for trade or consumption and hence were not given intensive protection, but predator-exclusion belts were placed around the base of nesting trees from 2006 because these had been shown to increase nesting success.

fledged, or in the case of Sarus Cranes (which are precocial), until the eggs hatched. Protection teams were visited every 1-2 weeks by the community rangers, and monthly by WCS monitoring staff to collect data on the location of each active nest, dates of laying, hatching and fledging, habitat type, nest characteristics, and the number of birds, eggs, and chicks present for each species on each visit. Nests were deemed to have failed if they became unoccupied prior to fledging. Monitoring staff investigated all cases of nest failure to determine the cause, and payments were not made if nests failed due to human disturbance or collection.

The programme has benefited about 100 households each year, out of the approximate 4,000 households across the 24 villages where the programme operates. In the majority of villages, <5% of households were engaged in the programme, although in a few villages up to 33% of households were involved. The average payment per protector was a significant contribution to incomes in remote rural villages. The majority of villages received <US\$ 750 per year, but some villages earned >US\$ 2,000 per year. Total payments varied depending upon the number of key species present, or species with particularly long breeding periods. Antil village received the greatest amount, with >US\$ 14,000 of payments over the four years, mainly due to the presence of a colony of Greater Adjutants nearby which requires at least six months of protection each year. The average payment per nest protector was US\$ 80-160, but there was considerable variation in the payments made, depending upon the species protected (as different species needed protecting for different periods of time). Some individuals were specialist protectors, switching species depending on the season and receiving continual employment for several months. Community rangers received significantly more, averaging US\$ 500-800 per year with a maximum of >US\$ 1,200. The distribution of payments is therefore uneven both between and within the villages, with only a small number of people generating high incomes from nest protection. The average payment per protector is significant in comparison with the 2009 estimate of household consumption in rural forested regions from the 2007 Cambodia Socio-Economic-Survey of US\$ 329±16. Despite the uneven distribution of benefits and the small number of people involved, 67% of 467 households interviewed were familiar with the programme and could describe accurately how it worked. Of these, the vast majority (95%) thought that the distribution of benefits was fair and understood that the primary beneficiaries were individual households (93%). Full details of the programme are shown in Table 15.

**TABLE 15: DETAILS OF DIRECT PAYMENT NEST PROTECTION PROGRAMME BY YEAR**

	2005-6	2006-7	2007-8	2008-9	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12
Nest protection payments (US\$)	10,425	10,786	10,933	11,890	19,022	15,873	18,253
Community rangers (US\$)	9,925	8,503	8,575	10,666	12,618	12,089	13,427
Total local payments (US\$)	20,350	19,289	19,508	22,556	31,640	27,962	31,680
% of total programme cost	-78%	-74%	-72%	-71%	65%	56%	67%
Expenses (US\$)	2,506	3,470	3,914	5,195	12,215	17,550	10,999
Salaries (US\$)	3,098	3,160	3,560	4,180	4,482	4,632	4,866
Total WCS monitoring costs (US\$)	5,603	6,630	7,474	5,195	16,697	22,182	15,865
% of total programme cost	-22%	-26%	-28%	-29%	35%	44%	33%
Total programme cost (US\$)	25,953	25,918	26,986	31,930	48,337	50,144	47,545
Nests Protected	217	342	416	360	425	317	397
Average Cost/Nest (US\$)	120	77	66	89	114	158	120


SOURCE: WCS.

The significant rise in the average cost per nest and the proportion of the costs attributable to WCS is the result of an enlarged research programme. The decline in the number of nests in 2010-2011 was the result of fewer breeding pairs because of drought.


The programme has achieved considerable success. Over the past seven years it has protected 2,474 nests, and protected nests showed significantly improved success rates in comparison to control sites, e.g. the success rate of protected lesser adjutant and sarus crane nests was 88.5% during the 2009-11, compared to 36.9% for unprotected controls. Results of the scheme for white-shouldered ibis and lesser adjutant are shown in Figures 8 and 9 respectively.



**FIGURE 8: BREEDING SUCCESS AND ROOST SIZE OF WHITE-SHOULDERED IBIS IN KPWS**



**FIGURE 9: BREEDING SUCCESS OF LESSER ADJUTANT STORK UNDER THE NEST PROTECTION PROGRAMME**



This output has achieved all its major objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The output can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

### ***Component 3: Strengthening capacity for biodiversity management***

#### **Output 3: Improved management of the key sites for conservation**

72. Four areas of support were provided under this output:

- Site-based management structures (staffing and infrastructure): The Project prioritised improvements in the available infrastructure, equipment, and technical training for government staff. New headquarters buildings were constructed at Takhung (KPWS) and Trapeang Pring (PVPF) and a number of smaller ranger stations were constructed inside both protected areas. Basic office equipment (e.g. laptop computers and printers) were provided along with necessary patrolling equipment such as vehicles, motorbikes, a boat and outboard engine, and field equipment. Existing staffing arrangements were supported at KPWS and PVPF with only a small number of additional staff required in specific positions, but significant funding was provided in salary subsidies to enhance the size and motivation of the ranger force at both sites. Annual formal training sessions were conducted by WCS technical staff for all law enforcement personnel.
- Site-based monitoring: This focuses on short- and medium-term monitoring of performance and effectiveness of Project activities, as well as on long-term impact indicators such as wildlife populations and forest cover. Three key types of monitoring were undertaken:
  - The law enforcement teams used a database program called MIST (Management Information SysTem), originally developed for the Ugandan Wildlife Authority, to produce standard monthly reports on patrolling effort and coverage, and actions taken by patrolling teams against illegal activities. MIST was also used to monitor threats, focusing on key illegal activities such as hunting, logging and land clearance, using data from patrol and other field teams to calculate simple indices, such as the number of illegal activities encountered per square kilometre patrolled – see indicator #s 4 and 5 in Annex IV. The TET understands that ownership and operation of this system has been handed over to the MoE and FA.
  - Wildlife monitoring surveys formed a core part of the Project activities since they provided essential information on the species targeted for conservation. Wildlife rangers were recruited locally since they have the best knowledge of the forests and wildlife. Planning the surveys and keeping the teams in the field is relatively cheap, relative to the size and impact of the surveys, while employing local people helped to contribute to local livelihoods and created positive local perceptions of the Project. Surveys concentrated on key species identified in the Project Document – see indicator #s 1 and 2 in Annex IV. Surveys were carried out from 2006 to 2009 using line transects and increasing effort was put into surveys by increasing the number of times each transect was walked in succeeding years.
  - Forest cover (see indicator #3 in Annex IV) was to be measured using satellite imagery at least every two years, but advances in the quality and availability of satellite imagery made much more frequent analysis possible. Free, high quality multi-spectral, satellite imagery, updated every 16 days, is available online for the whole of Cambodia from the Landsat 7 sensor operated by the US Government. WCS GIS staff have been trained in rapidly processing these images, so that they can be disseminated to protected area managers who can then use them to identify and deal with new clearance hotspots. Landsat 7 imagery is of medium resolution (30 m x 30 m pixels) and hence is sufficiently detailed to show all but the smallest patches of deforestation or other habitat change. For law enforcement purposes it is not necessary to conduct any elaborate analysis, just to compare two images from different time points (ideally quite close together) to identify areas of deforestation. A list of grid reference points can then be passed on to the protected area manager to arrange a response. Further quantitative details are given in paragraph 66.

- Ecological research activities: The Project conducted specific applied research activities or collaborated with researchers to help understand specific situations to assist in determining the direction of project implementation. Studies included:
  - One doctoral study to understand the changes in community perception and impacts of different incentive schemes.
  - Two doctoral studies to understand the ecology, conservation methods, and effects of agricultural expansion on the breeding habitat of the giant ibis.
  - Research to understand how best to protect of giant ibis and white-shouldered ibis nests.
  - A study to document the use of natural resources by communities in both KPWS and PVPF.
  - Four student research studies – two each on gibbons and elongated turtles.
- Development of options for sustainable financing of conservation activities: The main, if not sole, emphasis for this aspect of the Project fell on the development of a REDD+ project to provide a source of sustainable funding for conservation activities in the CALM landscape, but primarily for KPWS. WCS developed a feasibility study report for REDD+ providing order of magnitude estimates of the potential CO<sub>2</sub>e emission reductions that could be generated in KPWS which showed that a REDD+ project would be technically feasible inside KPWS. Carbon stock assessments were also carried out by reserve staff and local community members in KPWS and across the CALM landscape to assess the carbon stocks of the major forest types, an essential step for making predictions about the potential carbon offsets that could be generated by activities developed as part of a REDD+ project. Carbon stocks in evergreen and semi-evergreen forests were calculated at 591 tonnes/ha CO<sub>2</sub>e and in deciduous dipterocarp forest at 326 tonnes/ha CO<sub>2</sub>e. Another report examined the rate of forest loss within and around the CALM landscape, analysing the effect of management activities on controlling deforestation rates. It compared forest cover trends in areas which had benefited from management support under GEF-funded activities to areas without such management support. Management effectiveness in reducing deforestation was found to be substantial (see paragraph immediately preceding for detailed figures).

KPWS has been highlighted as a priority site for implementation of a national REDD+ programme in the country's *REDD+ Roadmap*, finalised in late 2010. In early 2012, WCS secured a small grant from UNDP to develop and implement four key aspects of REDD+ development in KPWS, i.e. a) finalisation of the project management model, b) local community engagement, c) completion of carbon stock assessments and d) the development of deforestation and carbon accounting methodologies), that will contribute significantly to the long-term sustainable management of natural resources at the site. Concurrently, funding was secured from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to train KPWS staff in appropriate techniques for raising awareness about climate change, with the ultimate goal of securing free, prior and informed consent process for local villages in the development of a REDD+ project.


73. As a result of this work, the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool scores for KPWS and PVPF have risen over the Project. The rise describes an asymptotic curve which is typical of projects working with protected areas with most progress made at the beginning when changes to the legal and regulatory context of the reserves; their planning; and their inputs (staffing and budgets) and processes (staff and resource management, programmes, etc.) are relatively easy, being achieved largely by provision of equipment and training. Improvements become much harder to achieve in the later stages when these are concerned with outputs (e.g. workplans, visitor facilities, communication and trust between stakeholders) and outcomes (management of objectives, regulation of access, economic benefits to local communities)<sup>27</sup>. Table 16 shows the scores by year and Figure 10 illustrate these. PVFP continues to scores more highly than KPWS because the ITTO Project assisted in developing a

<sup>27</sup> See also Ashwell, D.. 2011. *A Case Study in Lessons for Promoting Transformative Change in Biodiversity Conservation from UNDP Project Investments from 2006-2010*. Draft Report.

management plan for it using inputs from CALM (e.g. wildlife data from patrolling and research teams). This Plan was recognised by the FA and signed by its General Director in May 2010. KPWS still does not have a management plan because the necessary legislation to define zones within protected areas under the *Law on Protected Areas 2008* has still not yet been agreed and endorsed. In 2011 the methodology and scoring system for the METT was radically altered with many more factors included and with a result that the total score possible became much higher. Although this new system was completed by the Project's management, they also continued to display their great understanding of monitoring tools by continuing to use the old system enabling direct comparisons to be maintained throughout the Project's lifetime. Furthermore, the Project ensured that the same people completed the METT each year ensuring that no individual bias affected the scoring – something that few projects understand or carry out.

**TABLE 16: METT SCORES FOR PROTECTED AREAS IN CALM PROJECT**

	KPWS	PVPF
2006	33	37
2007	40.5	51
2008	48	65
2009	63	74
2010	74	77
2011	73	76
2012	73	76



This output has achieved all its major objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The output can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

#### **Component 4: Project Management and Evaluation**

##### **Output 4: Adequate reporting on project outcomes and indicators**

74. The project management aspects have been dealt with elsewhere in the report, e.g. implementation (paragraph 32 *et seq.*), adaptive management (paragraph 36), financial (paragraph 40 *et seq.*), and monitoring and evaluation (paragraph 51 *et seq.*), and implementation has been achieved to the highest standards. The project used 29 indicators designed to assess progress of implementation of each of the activities specified in the Project's logical framework and has reported annually to UNDP-GEF using standard (globally applicable) tracking tools to measure site-level management effectiveness.

This output has achieved all its major objectives, and yielded substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The output can be presented as “good practice”, hence is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

## **STRATEGIC ISSUES**

75. As can be seen from the foregoing part of the evaluation, the TE believes that this has been a well-conceived and well-implemented project that has achieved most of its stated aims. The aim of this section is to concentrate on some key cross-cutting issues.

## RELEVANCE

76. A discussion of the relevance of the CALM Project towards the national development priorities is clouded by the political realities that provide a different picture on the ground to that which is stated in national policy. Therefore, this section covers three distinct but overlapping issues – relevance to biodiversity conservation and GEF priorities; relevance to national policy; and relevance to the current context on-the-ground.

77. Biodiversity conservation and GEF priorities: The most significant measure of relevance has to be that whether the Project addresses the conservation of globally threatened biodiversity. In the case of the Northern Plains of Cambodia, this is overwhelmingly the case since the area represents the largest remaining extensive intact block of a unique landscape of exceptional global importance for biodiversity conservation being the last refuge for, or supporting a key population of, over 40 species on the IUCN Red List, including six listed as Critically Endangered. With regard to GEF priorities, the CALM Project was designed under GEF-3, so the priorities under this are relevant. The Programme Objective for OP-3 Forest Ecosystems at that time was:

*“(a) Conservation or in-situ protection, will be sought through protection of primary/old growth and ecologically mature secondary forest ecosystems, by establishing and strengthening systems of conservation areas, focusing primarily on tropical and temperate ecosystems in areas at risk; and*

*(b) Sustainable use forest management will be sought by combining production, socio-economic, and biodiversity goals. The Operational Strategy calls for a range of uses from strict protection on reserves through various forms of multiple use with conservation easements to full scale use.”*

and a successful outcome was defined as:

*“one where globally important biodiversity has been conserved or sustainably used in a specific forest ecosystem”.*

Amongst the 16 activities listed as being “consistent with the incremental cost approach” that GEF could pay for are:

*“(a) integration of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use objectives in land use and natural resource use management plans;*

*(b) integrated pilot projects providing alternative livelihoods to local and indigenous communities residing in buffer zones of globally important biological areas;*

*(c) integrated conservation and development projects around protected forests;*

*(d) participatory management of natural resources, and alternative livelihoods;*

*(e) tenure reform and land titling in the buffer zones around important protected forests;”*

It should be clear from the descriptions of activities included under the foregoing section *Achievement of Project Outputs* (paragraphs 67-74) that the Project has fulfilled these aims and approaches. Furthermore, the Project remains in line with GEF-5 priorities, since under *Objective Two: Mainstream biodiversity conservation and sustainable use into production landscapes/seascapes and sectors*, the rationale states:

*“The incorporation of biodiversity conservation, sustainable use, and benefit-sharing into broader policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks is not taking place in many GEF-eligible countries because of a number of factors. These factors include poor governance, weak capacity, conflicting policies (e.g., tenure regimes biased against “idle” lands), and the lack of scientific knowledge and incentives.”*

and that:

*“GEF will support the development and implementation of policy and regulatory frameworks that provide incentives for private actors to align their practices and behaviour with the principles of sustainable use and management.”*

78. National priorities: Despite having a considerable protected area site-based focus, the CALM Project was conceived as, and has been implemented with, a landscape-level intervention, mainstreaming biodiversity issues as successfully as possible into a weak and fragmented planning framework. This work was carried out in part within the fabric of the Project Support to Democratic Development 2008-2010 and remains in line with the first three-year implementation plan for 2011-2013 produced by the National Committee for Democratic Development. The importance of the Northern Plains landscape was highlighted in the *National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan* adopted by the RGC in 2002 and which remains current. On a sectoral basis, the main policy document relevant to the Northern Plains is the *National Forest Programme 2010-2029*. This document, developed and produced during the second half of the Project's lifetime, will steer forestry issues over the next 20 years. The Project has been congruent with a number of Programmes and Sub-programmes within this document, notably:

- *Programme 2: Conservation and Development of Forest Resource and Biodiversity*
  - *Sub-programme 2.4 Conservation of Wildlife and Biodiversity* – This includes the identification and definition of national conservation priorities (including the REDD initiative), ensuring effective management of Protected Forest and other conservation areas<sup>28</sup>, the establishment and management of recreation areas and eco-tourism, and the prevention of illegal wildlife trade and management of confiscated animals, as well as research and data management and public awareness.
- *Programme 3: Forest Law Enforcement and Governance Programme*
  - *Sub-programme 3.2 Law Enforcement and Forest Crime Monitoring and Reporting* – including the development of effective monitoring and reporting mechanisms for forest crimes.
- *Programme 4: Community Forestry Programme*
  - *Sub-programme 4.1 Community Forestry Identification and Formalisation* – including an 11-step formalisation process which the Project followed in PVPF and the Oscach-O'Dar areas.
  - *Sub-programme 4.2 Community, Institutional and Livelihoods Development.*

79. Current context: As the CALM Project comes to an end, its relevance remains high since the Northern Plains, and particularly KPWS remain under considerable threat, perversely from Government actions. The continuing issuance of concessions for social and economic reasons, plus those requested by the military, mean that the loss of forest land remains high and the threat of more loss even higher still. The recent pronouncements by the country's leadership over the need to solve all land disputes ahead of the next election and the subsequent new land registration process (see paragraph 84) has raised concerns over this issue. Although the Project has managed to have some success in helping the MoE and the Provincial Governor to reject some of these concessions, continued vigilance and efforts by stakeholders still active after Project closure will be necessary. In this regard, the strengthened capacity and increased confidence of the local level MoE and FA staff; the recognition of the importance of biodiversity in the Provincial Plan along with its economic role through ecotourism; the formalisation and recognition of commune land tenure, usufruct rights, and the boundaries of the protected areas; and the possibility of the development of a REDD+ project will all play key roles in continuing conservation efforts.

The Project intervenes in a globally important landscape, is congruent with GEF and national priorities, and remains pertinent in the light of the current levels of threat; hence it is evaluated as Relevant.

<sup>28</sup> Although an FA Programme, this is intended to cover all protected areas as defined by IUCN.

## SUSTAINABILITY

80. The evaluation of the sustainability of this Project is somewhat difficult in that despite great efforts made by the Project team, the sustainability is seriously compromised by the political context and events of the immediate and recent past. As will be seen below, the sustainability at the Project level is actually very strong and it is difficult to see what more those involved could have done, yet ultimately these efforts are negated by the instability introduced by the highest levels of Government.

81. **Financial:** The outlook for the long-term financial sustainability of the Project appears unusually good in some respects while being disappointing in others. WCS declare that they have a long-term commitment to the area, and while there is no evidence to support this in terms of written declarations or contracts, it is clear to the TET that this is so, after all the conservation of rare wildlife is its *raison d'être*, the northern plains hold unparalleled diversity of such wildlife in South East Asia, and WCS was clearly operating in the area for a period exceeding 10 years before the current Project was designed, let alone implemented. Indeed, one of the strengths of involving international NGOs such as WCS in a GEF project is the fact that, unlike most nationally-executed projects where a project team is established solely for the duration of implementation, such organisations see the GEF project not as a stand alone intervention, but as being designed to fit into a bigger process – a single if big step on a much longer journey. As a result, WCS have already committed large amounts of funds to conservation work in the area, and show every intention of continuing to commit such funds to follow-up activities. WCS estimate that it will require US\$ 400-500,000 per year to maintain activities to a level necessary to ensure the Project's gains are not lost and indicated that such levels of funding, although high, were achievable. The TET understands that significant contributions to such funding has been promised to them from the Cargill and MacArthur Foundations and through the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund, while the US Fish and Wildlife Service had agreed to continue to fund the wildlife monitoring system. Some of this was to become available in July 2012, but will now be delayed until December 2012 because of the exigencies of the US taxation system – an unfortunate but not critical delay.

### #3

**Lesson learned:** Designing a project to be part of a much longer and wider process generates huge benefits for sustainability, and through the synergies developed provides the intervention with much greater effectiveness than that which can be achieved by stand-alone projects.

82. What remains disappointing is that although the MoE and FA continue to pay the basic salaries of their respective rangers in KPWS and PVPF, they have not committed the basic operational funds necessary for them to undertake their basic task, i.e. patrolling. Both protected areas report that they have insufficient monies to pay for fuel to get the rangers to and from the start and end of their patrols, nor for food and other basic necessities for the patrols themselves. This is despite the fact (or perhaps in MoE's case because) of the success that such patrols have had in decreasing the levels of illegal hunting and logging within the protected areas. The dedication of the staff and the difficulties they endure on patrol (large distances, extreme heat, constant bouts of malaria, armed criminals) are compounded by those brought about by this shortage of money, and yet somehow they manage to continue with their work. Despite JICA having provided some funding to PVPF through 2011-12 (US\$ 60,887) and 2012-13 (US\$ 41,109) of which US\$ 5,540 (9.1%) and US\$ 1,800 (4.4%) respectively has been earmarked specifically for fuel and motor repairs for the patrol teams (decreasing because of the money expected from the Cargill Foundation), as a result of the Project ending the number of rangers in each protected area has been reduced by about half, yet it is hoped that when WCS's follow-up funding does come on tap, numbers (and patrols) may again be increased. The *National Forest Programme 2010-2029* of the FA also prioritises the need for a budget to prevent forest crime. The continuance of WCS's activities in the area makes the financial sustainability of the Project Likely.

83. **Socio-economic:** The social sustainability of the Project appears particularly solid. The awareness-raising activities have certainly been beneficial and undoubtedly changed people's minds at the community level as regards hunting, conservation, and the use of natural resources. The empowerment of local communities through agreeing tenure and rights over natural resource use has been one of the lynchpins upon which all behavioural change has occurred. For many others, this has

been matched by provision of economic benefits directly linked to species- or habitat-based conservation measures such as ecotourism and *Ibis Rice*. Rarely are such direct links made by a project and these incentives are particularly strong (and in the case of *Ibis Rice* could be made to be self-sustainable). They have contributed greatly to the economic well-being of many villagers, and to wider village communities, and as a result enjoy a very wide support base which is being used to help in replicating the schemes in other villages. As a result, the socio-economic sustainability is adjudged to be **Likely**.

84. Institutional and Governance: The institutional sustainability of the Project is good. Those agencies directly involved appear strongly committed towards its aims and the impacts that it has had. Clearly, the decision to route all activities directly through existing Government institutions has paid dividends in this respect, and the Directors of the two protected areas along with Headquarters staff in Phnom Penh are not only extremely supportive of what has been accomplished but also are strong advocates of its achievements. A further corollary of this strategy has been that both institutions have been significantly strengthened at several levels and are now able to play a stronger technical and administrative role in future conservation initiatives. However, current governance of protected areas and the wider landscape within the Northern Plains poses a severe risk to everything that the Project has achieved and to the biodiversity conservation sphere in the immediate future. Despite the Project having achieved a modicum of success in helping to get applications for military concessions within KPWS rejected, there remain outstanding applications for agriculture which are much larger than those rejected (16,731 ha cf. 3,896 ha) and the acid test will be to see if the Prime Minister will now agree with the Governor and MoE in rejecting these or side with the more powerful military and grant them. Notwithstanding this, there is further considerable pressure from powerful politically-connected persons and corporations for social and economic concessions to be granted inside of internationally recognised protected areas in general and KPWS in particular. While the FA is resisting these as far as it can, the MoE appears intent on granting most of them. Since the economic value of most of these concessions is generally held to be of low value, but the forest has to be cleared to accommodate them, the view is widely held that this is simply a legal device to circumvent the current moratorium on logging. The situation is further complicated by an announcement made at the time of the TE by the Prime Minister that he wanted to solve all land disputes ahead of the next election. As a result, a new land registration process has been put into effect working outside of existing Government and Ministerial guidelines and legislative framework to reconsider all previously-agreed boundaries and to provide new temporary titles to all landholders. The effects are unknown but the concern of many stakeholders and Project partners is high. Therefore, while the institutional sustainability is believed to be **Likely**, current governance poses an overwhelming risk to the sustainability of the Project's outcomes and hence governance has to be considered to be **Unlikely**.

85. Environmental: There are no environmental risks associated with the sustainability of this Project, hence the environmental sustainability is deemed to be **Likely**.

Since UNDP-GEF deems each risk dimension of sustainability to be critical, the overall rating for sustainability cannot be higher than the rating of the dimension with lowest rating, and as such the overall sustainability of the regional component is ranked as **Unlikely**.

## CATALYTIC ROLE AND REPLICATION

86. Discussion of replication in relation to the CALM Project has to be undertaken at two levels – the macro-level of replicating it as a landscape-scale project, and the micro-level with regard to replication of its products and site-based interventions. Clearly it is too early for there to have been shown any level of replication at the macro-level, but CALM has shown that the landscape-scale approach can work in Cambodia and could be replicated in another part of the country, e.g. the Cardamom Mountains. The integrated nature of the policy-level mainstreaming, the determination of tenure and usufruct rights at a village level, and the development of incentives to change people's behaviour in favour of biodiversity conservation, coupled and underlain by work at a protected area level (capacity building, increased enforcement, research and monitoring) provide a solid model of success that it is hoped may influence future project design in the country. The major issue, as always, remains in finding sufficient finance.



87. At the micro-level, CALM's performance is good. Most outputs of the Project fall under the middle two levels of catalytic role, i.e. demonstration and replication. Examples of the former (the lower of the two) include the monitoring system (MIST); direct payments for nest protection; and the process of mainstreaming biodiversity into Provincial Development Plans. However, replication (the next higher level) has been undertaken for activities such as *Ibis Rice*, ecotourism, and the development of Commune Development Plans as well as determination of tenure and usufruct rights through community forestry. The model for ecotourism is being replicated by WCS at other sites, for example at Chhep in PVPF where a vulture "restaurant"<sup>29</sup> is being operated successfully, and at other sites such as Prey Veng in KPWS where sarus cranes are present. While the infrastructure in each differs, the underlying model of a community-owned, socially-acceptable, sustainable business remains the same. The model is not widely replicable within the same area since:

*"tourists need to see only one bird of each species in order to be satisfied and developing new sites would require additional attractions (e.g., new or unique species)"*<sup>30</sup>

Nonetheless, the development of a series of such sites is mutually reinforcing since it provides a "circuit" for tourists to visit rather than a single attraction – a major issue when tourists are attempting to maximise viewing opportunities for the expensive international air fares paid. Such replication is also occurring by WCS outside of the Northern Plains, e.g. at Ang Trapeang Thmor near the Tonle Sap but the model is equally applicable for elsewhere where charismatic or endemic species can be found, e.g. Cambodian laughingthrush (*Garrulax ferrarius*). *Ibis Rice* is also being replicated village by village within the Project's immediate area and could be scaled up to a national scheme in areas where it is relevant. It also appears that ideas from this are being applied to other existing schemes, e.g. FLD has been involved in buying honey directly from village marketing networks for some time but after its involvement with the Project it has now been linked to a premium for environmental benefits at the village level while being marketed more effectively under a brand name – *Khmer Empire Honey*.

## COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

88. It would be good to be able to report that the RGC has been supportive of the Project throughout, yet because of the contradictions displayed with the Government as regards biodiversity conservation, it is impossible to make such a simple statement. Certainly the two main Government institutions that the Project has been channelled through have been very supportive (i.e. the FA and the MoE) and one of the key aspects of this has been the degree of close cooperation that both have shown to the other – unusual for two institutions with a record for disagreement and mutual distrust. The *Technical Working Group on Environment and Forestry* involving the MoE, FA, donor community and civil society is widely held not to work, and the links forged by this Project could provide a basis for closer cooperation acting initially on a site-based level. Indeed, when discussed at the de-briefing meeting on 13<sup>th</sup> July where the National Site Managers were asked how they would describe their working relationship, the answer of "*We're good friends*" spoke volumes for the Project's success in this sphere. While the TET recognises that government bodies are independent of UNDP and international NGOS, it recommends that WCS, as a trusted intermediary, and the UNDP-CO, should help to establish a formal interagency cooperative group between the FA and MoE prior to the end of CALM to build upon this Project's success to maintain (or increase) the levels of interagency cooperation and coordination between protected areas in the Northern Plains. This could act as a model for other regions in Cambodia and perhaps ultimately, nationally; on small steps, big steps can follow.

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<sup>29</sup> One of the major perceived problems for the rarity of vulture species in Cambodia is lack of food since the populations of big mammals have declined. By getting tourists to pay regularly for the provision of carcasses at a specific place, the vultures get food, the tourists get close encounters with the vultures, and the local people get the economic benefits derived from the tourists and in turn come to value the vultures – an extremely elegant model.

<sup>30</sup> Clements, T., John, A., Nielsen, K., Vicheka, C., Sokha, E. and Piseth, M.. 2008. *Tmatboey Community-based Ecotourism Project, Cambodia*. Translinks Case Study.

**The TET recommends** that WCS and the UNDP-CO should help to establish a formal interagency cooperative group between the FA and MoE to increase the levels of interagency cooperation and coordination between protected areas.

<i>Responsibility</i>	<i>Task</i>	<i>Time frame</i>	<i>Deliverable</i>
WCS/UNDP-CO	Propose and agree the formalisation of interagency links between the MoE and FA at a regional level (or higher if appropriate) through an appropriate modality (working group, committee, etc.)	By the end of the Project	Proposal (and subsequent agreement) to formalise interagency links
WCS/UNDP-CO	Facilitate development of the ToR for such a group and foster its initial growth.	By the end of the Project and beyond if appropriate	Minutes of group meetings

89. Both institutions have embraced the community forestry approach championed by the Project to provide the degree of stability of tenure and rights to resources that are a prerequisite for the development of incentives to promote biodiversity conservation in a common resource context. Both have benefitted from institutional and individual level capacity building, particularly at the site level, e.g. the application of MIST for law enforcement work and scientific monitoring. The *Terminal Evaluation of the Tonle Sap Conservation Project* made the observation that

*“The evidence of MoE ownership of the project was weak. This is tied to the project design and strategy that focussed on field outputs rather than headquarters support and capacity building ...”*

but the CALM Project would appear to show that link to be erroneous, since the CALM Project also had a site- or landscape-based focus without significant efforts directed at headquarters of either key institution, yet ownership within both headquarters was evidently strong with senior figures expressing their satisfaction at the achievements made. The *Terminal Evaluation of the Tonle Sap Conservation Project* goes on to point out that

*“The project organization, with much of the decision making authority outside of MoE, contributed to these criticisms of a donor-driven approach. “Within GDANCP, there was essentially one staff that was dedicated to working with/on the TSCP which distanced the project from the government agencies ...””*

and the TET believes this to be more likely the reason for lack of government ownership, since CALM was specifically designed to work through existing Government structures and the resultant levels of ownership are testament to the success of this approach.

90. The Project’s outcomes have largely been incorporated into the fabric of the national and local government. As has been shown (paragraph 68), biodiversity considerations have been mainstreamed into Provincial and Commune Development Plans; tenure and usufruct rights have been formalised for villages; incentive schemes have been given political support; monitoring and law enforcement capabilities have been adopted (if not financially supported); and one means of sustainable financing (REDD+) is being pursued. In all of this the RGC, at least within the narrow confines of the MoE and FA, display considerable support and ownership. And yet, looming over all of this, remain the problems arising through poor governance and a disregard for national laws and international designations (see paragraph 84) that make all concerned wonder just how important biodiversity conservation and the sustainable use of natural resources really is to the political leadership of the country.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

91. The recommendation herewith cannot help with the CALM Project which will end shortly but may help to establish its legacy.

- WCS and the UNDP-CO should help to establish a formal interagency cooperative group between the FA and MoE to increase the levels of interagency cooperation and coordination between protected areas (see paragraph 88).

- WCS alter their business model for Ibis Rice to enable it to become self-sufficient (see paragraph 71).
- WCS should educate villagers involved in producing *Ibis Rice* about why consumers value it (see paragraph 71).

## LESSONS LEARNED

92. Lessons learned have been arranged under project-related headings, and cross-referenced back to the paragraph where they appear. Further discussion and key points for future projects have been added in this section. Some of the lessons learned given below have arisen from discussions with persons interviewed during the evaluation and the TET thanks them for their insights.

### STRATEGIC

#### **#1 *Results focus attention*** [see paragraph 71].

Producing results successfully on-the-ground tends to draw the attention of senior politicians to a project's aims. While most projects produce a lot of paper, and this one is no exception, paper rarely galvanises the interest in the same way that tangible results do. Results engender trust by proving that changes are possible and proving the efficacy of the methods used.

*Key points for future projects:*

- a) *Wherever possible, GEF projects, and mainstreaming projects in particular, should endeavour to produce tangible results to demonstrate key points of change in order to draw political interest and garner political support for their wider aims.*

#### **#2 *Direct payments make excellent incentives to achieve conservation goals*** [see paragraph 71].

The Project has established three separate incentive schemes in which villagers or communities can participate, exchanging certain agreed behaviours for financial reward. What is remarkable is that in each case, the financial rewards for those involved are linked directly to the conservation outcome, not through some indirect pathway; if the outcome (reduced hunting of endangered species, reduced habitat clearance, etc.) is not achieved, then no payments are made. Too frequently, such schemes are indirect either involving a third party or situation, e.g. promises of increased economic benefits through provision of goods for the tourist trade over which villagers do not have control (e.g. through a protected area), or payments through a water company for watershed protection of which they may see part. In this instance, because those involved have direct control over the service provided (tourism, rice production, nest protection), are rewarded financially directly for provision of that service, and continuing provision is linked directly to a healthy conservation status, the results have been outstanding.

*Key points for future projects:*

- a) *Wherever possible, when designing incentive schemes (for mainstreaming projects) or economically beneficial schemes for local people, direct links between the reward and the desired conservation outcome should be as direct as possible. This can best be achieved if local people can be provided with direct control over the continued provision of the good/service under consideration and receive a payment/financial (or other) reward directly for providing it in the way that is desired.*

### DESIGN

#### **#3 *Designing a project to be part of a much longer and wider process generates huge benefits for sustainability, and through the synergies developed provides the intervention with much greater effectiveness than that which can be achieved by stand-alone projects*** [see paragraph 81].

This is possibly the single most important lesson learned from the CALM Project and is applicable to all GEF projects. CALM was designed, and was always seen during its implementation, as being part

of a much longer process. It was fitted within a framework of existing Memoranda of Understanding between WCS and the individual ministries and also with the Government as a whole. As a result it was preceded by considerable amounts of other work that provided a solid platform on which to build its achievements and, perhaps even more importantly, it has structures in place to support those achievements after its end. Consequently, not only has CALM achieved a great deal, but those achievements are set to last well into the future and perhaps act as the foundation upon which to set the next building blocks – a reality unfortunately all too rare with GEF projects.

*Key points for future projects:*

- a) *Wherever possible, GEF projects should be designed within an existing demonstrable process to promote the chances their accomplishments being sustainable.*
- b) *Where this is not possible, sustainability can be improved by the project trying to establish such a process as part of its defined activities. Designing a sustainability plan into the management activities from a project's mid-point can catalyse this, e.g. on a simplistic scale, see the UNDP-GEF project Community-based Conservation of Biological Diversity in the Mountain Landscapes of Mongolia's Altai Sayan Eco-region<sup>31</sup>.*

#### **#4 Working directly through existing government structures brings dividends** [see paragraph 24].

The Project chose to work directly through government counterpart institutions rather than setting up parallel implementation structures as, for example, did the Tonle Sap Conservation Project. This decision has proved very successful not only in empowering government by providing experience and training in a well-funded and well-equipped environment, but also in developing effective government “ownership”, engagement, participation and motivation, thereby promoting long-term sustainability of the Project's achievements.

*Key points for future projects:*

- a) *Projects should seek to work directly through existing structures or embed its management within such structures to promote the sustainability of its achievements.*

## **PROJECT MANAGEMENT**

#### **#5 Constant contact with communities is vital to community-based natural resource management projects** [see paragraph 71].

It may be a truism, but to be successful, community-based projects depend upon the trust and motivation of the local communities targeted. To achieve this, the quality and commitment of those employed as advisors and social mobilisers are key attributes of a project. This Project has been blessed with particularly impressive advisors and mobilisers, but what the TET believes to be the most important factor has been the almost constant contact that they have had with the communities throughout the Project's lifetime by deploying people on the ground for long periods of time. This frequency of contact has undoubtedly enabled the Project to build high levels of trust, capacity, and motivation which in turn has facilitated the change in people's mindsets and behaviours and brought about the success of the three incentive schemes.

*Key points for future projects:*

- a) *Projects working with communities should deploy sufficient human resources with those communities to build trust and capacity in the people sufficient to catalyse the behavioural changes the project seeks.*

#### **#6 Deployment of specialist NGOs aids implementation** [see paragraph 37].

The CALM Project's use of multiple NGOs in the same locality has brought the best technical expertise to bear on local issues even at the slight costs incurred through increased complexity of approach. As a result, technical implementation has gone smoothly and brought about successful results, generally thought to be of a higher standard than had the more pragmatic and more easily managed alternative of using a single organisation to cover all issues in a given locality been applied.

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<sup>31</sup> See footnote # 10.

*Key points for future projects:*

- a) Projects should deploy the best technical resources that are available to them, even if this means using multiple organisations in one locality with a concomitant increase in management costs.*
- b) Good communication with the local communities is necessary such that they understand the differing roles of each organisation deployed thereby minimising confusion.*

## **ANNEX I : TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR END-TERM EVALUATION**

**Project title:** Conservation Areas through Landscape Management (CALM) in the Northern Plains of Cambodia  
**Project no:** 00047478  
**Duty station:** Phnom Penh, with travel to the Preah Vihear  
**Duration:** Maximum 23 working days during the period 02 June – mid July 2012

### **1. Background and Project Overview**

The Northern Plains of Cambodia are the largest remaining extensive intact block of a unique landscape of exceptional global importance for biodiversity conservation. The area is either a last refuge for, or maintains a key population of over 40 species on the IUCN Red List, including five listed as Critically Endangered. The project addresses the problem of escalating biodiversity loss across the Northern Plains, caused by increasing human land and resource use. This is achieved through a seven-year, three-pronged approach: (1) the introduction of biodiversity considerations into provincial level land use processes; (2) the demonstration of specific mainstreaming interventions at four key sites (including community land-use tenure, community contracts and incentives for biodiversity supportive land-use practices, as well as work to mainstream biodiversity into the forestry and tourism productive sectors); and (3) strengthen biodiversity management by government at the three key sites.

Establishing Conservation Areas Landscape Management (CALM) in the Northern Plains is a seven year (2006-2012) UNDP/Global Environment Facility (GEF)-supported project aiming at developing the management capacity for biodiversity conservation in the Northern Plains. The project is consistent with the GEF Strategic Priority BD-2 (Mainstreaming Biodiversity in Production Landscapes and Sectors) and facilitation of mainstreaming of biodiversity within production systems. The project interventions work to introduce biodiversity values into landscape-level land-use planning processes. Implementation is focused particularly on building the capacity of provincial departments and authorities and integrating specific project initiatives with established provincial planning processes. These specific project initiatives include the direct implementation of the new land law and sub-decree on community forestry to develop management plans for natural resource areas that include conservation of key components of biodiversity. The project also works with the forestry and tourism sectors, and the provincial departments of agriculture and environment, to enhance the recognition of key components of biodiversity in planning and management strategies.

The Project is nationally executed by the Wildlife Conservation Society and project assurance is provided by the UNDP Cambodia Country Office.

The Project design includes provision for an independent End-Term Evaluation to be completed at Project end. The CALM was scheduled for operational closure at the end of 2012 however, due to logistical, financial, and operational considerations, the CALM Board recommended in February 2012 to conclude implementation of all CALM activities at the end of second quarter 2012.

In line with UNDP-GEF Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) policies and procedures, all full-sized and medium-sized projects supported by the GEF should undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation.

The terminal evaluation must provide a comprehensive and systematic account of the performance of a completed project by assessing its project design, process of implementation, achievements vis-à-vis project objectives endorsed by the GEF including any agreed changes in the objectives during project implementation and any other results.

Terminal evaluations have four complementary purposes:

- To promote accountability and transparency, and to assess and disclose levels of project accomplishments;
- To synthesize lessons that may help improve the selection, design and implementation of future GEF activities;
- To provide feedback on issues that are recurrent across the portfolio and need attention, and on improvements regarding previously identified issues; and,
- To contribute to the GEF Evaluation Office databases for aggregation, analysis and reporting on effectiveness of GEF operations in achieving global environmental benefits and on the quality of monitoring and evaluation across the GEF system.

## **2. Objectives of the Terminal Evaluation**

The Monitoring and Evaluation policy in UNDP/GEF at the project level has four objectives:

- to monitor and evaluate results and impacts – particularly on global biodiversity values;
- to provide a basis for decision-making on necessary amendments and improvements for future by stakeholders;
- to promote accountability for resource use, including efficiency and effectiveness of implementation; and
- to provide feedback on lessons learned.

A Terminal evaluation is a monitoring and evaluation process that occurs at the project level at the end of project implementation. Terminal evaluations are intended to identify potential project design problems, assess progress towards the achievement of objectives, identify and document lessons learned (including lessons that might improve design and implementation of other UNDP/GEF projects), and review the extent to which the project addressed the recommendations in the Mid-Term Evaluation. It is expected to serve as a means of validating or filling the gaps in the initial assessment of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency obtained from monitoring. The Terminal evaluation provides the opportunity to evaluate overall project success or failure and to make recommendations for consideration in future projects. Terminal evaluations also assist transparency and improve access to information for future reference.

The CALM Terminal Evaluation is being initiated by UNDP pursuant to the evaluation plan in the Project Document, and donor reporting requirements. The CALM Terminal Evaluation aims to assess the relevance, performance and success of the CALM at the end of its seven-year implementation period. It will examine current impact and sustainability of results, including the contribution to capacity development and rural livelihood improvement, and the achievement of global and national environmental goals. It will also identify and document lessons learned and make recommendations that will maximize the impact of the CALM going forward, and/or that might improve design and implementation of similar projects.

The Terminal Evaluation is intended to be a systematic learning exercise for project partners. The exercise is therefore structured so as to generate and share experience and practical knowledge. To achieve this, the evaluation will take place in a consultative and participatory rather than advisory manner.

## **3. Principles and Scope of the Evaluation**

The CALM Terminal Evaluation will be conducted in such a way to ensure that key principles of evaluation are closely respected. The Terminal Evaluation will be independent, impartial, transparent, ethical, useful and credible.

The following broad areas will be covered by the Evaluation:

- relevance of the project concept, design and implementation arrangements in today's context. This includes overall relevance of the Project in the broader global and national context, i.e.

whether the Project outcomes are consistent with the GEF Biodiversity Focal Area Strategy and country priorities;

- Project ownership at the national and local levels;
- stakeholder participation, including government, community, civil society and gender balances in participation and influence;
- Mainstreaming gender - whether the project has taken adequate measures to ensure gender concerns are mainstreamed in the implementation of the project activities;
- Project effectiveness, i.e., progress achieved to date against planned outputs and sub-outputs, and likelihood of achieving planned objectives in time;
- partnership and complementarity with other relevant on-going or past activities;
- likely sustainability of the Project achievements and impacts, including financial, sociopolitical, institutional framework and governance, and environmental sustainability, as well as an assessment of the feasibility of planned replication and exit strategies;
- any catalytic role played by the project;
- financial aspect: planning, execution and sustainability, including the timely delivery and use of co-financing;
- Project efficiency: cost effectiveness and financial supply;
- effectiveness of the application of adaptive management principles through monitoring and evaluation (including effective use of log frame, UNDP risk management system, the Annual Project Implementation Reviews, and other monitoring tools and mechanisms as appropriate);
- extent to which the Project effectively addressed the Mid-Term Evaluation recommendations through UNDP/CALM management responses, and;
- any other unplanned achievements.

The assessment will be based on the GEF Terminal Evaluation Guidelines and will include an assessment of 1) Project results 2) Assessment of Sustainability of Project Outcomes 3) Catalytic Role 4) Monitoring and Evaluation Systems 5) Processes that Affected Attainment of Project Results. The report will also present the evaluation team's Lessons and Recommendations. Ratings for different aspects of project will need to be presented by the evaluation team with appropriate data, analysis and explanations as outlined below. All these sections **MUST** be presented in the final report. The report must also contain an annex with co-finance details and appropriate tracking tools.

## **A. Assessment of Project Results<sup>32</sup>**

The terminal evaluation will assess achievement of outputs and outcomes and will provide ratings for targeted objectives and outcomes. The assessment of project results seeks to determine the extent to which the project objectives were achieved, and assess if the project has led to any other short term or long term and positive or negative consequences and an assessment of impacts when appropriate. While assessing a project's results, the evaluation will seek to determine the extent of achievement and shortcomings in reaching project's objectives as stated in the project document and also indicate if there were any changes and whether those changes were approved. If the project did not establish a baseline (initial conditions), the evaluator should seek to estimate the baseline condition so that achievements and results can be properly established.

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<sup>32</sup> *“Results: The positive and negative, and foreseen and unforeseen, changes to and effects produced by a development intervention. In GEF terms, results include direct project outputs, short to medium-term, outcomes, and longer term impact including global environmental benefits, replication effects, and other local effects.”* Source: The GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy (2006); page 19.



The following three criteria should be assessed to determine the level of achievements/ impacts of project outcomes and objectives and must be rated as objective as possible and must include sufficient and convincing empirical evidence

For Each Output and Outcome to be rated for below	Rating to be scored for each	Key Justification for rating
<p>1. <b>Relevance:</b> Were the project's outcomes consistent with the focal areas/operational program strategies and country priorities?</p>	<p><b>Satisfactory (S):</b> The project had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Satisfactory (MS):</b> The project had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):</b> The project had significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Unsatisfactory (U)</b> The project had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):</b> The project had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p>	
<p>2. <b>Effectiveness:</b> Are the actual project outcomes commensurate with the original or modified project objectives9)? In case the original or modified expected results are merely outputs/inputs then the evaluators should assess if there were any real outcomes of the project and if yes then whether these are commensurate with the realistic expectations from such projects.</p>	<p><b>Satisfactory (S):</b> The project had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Satisfactory (MS):</b> The project had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):</b> The project had significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Unsatisfactory (U)</b> The project had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):</b> The project had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p>	

<p>3. <b>Efficiency:</b> Was the project cost effective? Was the project the least cost option? Was the project implementation delayed and if it was, then did that affect cost-effectiveness? Wherever possible, the evaluator should also compare the cost-time vs. outcomes relationship of the project with that of other similar projects.</p>	<p><b>Satisfactory (S):</b> The project had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Satisfactory (MS):</b> The project had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):</b> The project had significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Unsatisfactory (U)</b> The project had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):</b> The project had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p>	
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The evaluators will also assess other results of the project, including positive and negative actual (or anticipated) impacts or emerging long-term effects of a project. Given the long term nature of impacts, it might not be possible for the evaluators to identify or fully assess impacts. Evaluators will nonetheless indicate the steps taken to assess long-term project impacts, especially impacts on local populations, global environment, replication effects and other local effects.

### **Overall Rating:**

*NOTE: The overall outcomes rating cannot not be higher than the lowest rating on relevance and effectiveness. Thus, to have an overall satisfactory rating for an outcome, project must have at least satisfactory ratings on both relevance and effectiveness.*

### **B. Assessment of Sustainability of Project Outcomes**

As per the GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy, 2006, a terminal evaluation will assess at the minimum the “likelihood of sustainability of outcomes at project termination, and provide a rating for this.” The sustainability assessment will give special attention to analysis of the risks that are likely to affect the persistence of project outcomes. The sustainability assessment should also explain how other important contextual factors that are not outcomes of intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. Sustainability will be understood as the likelihood of continued benefits after the GEF project ends.

The following four dimensions or aspects of sustainability should be addressed:

Key issues	Rating	Key justification for rating
<p>1. <b>Financial resources:</b> Are there any financial risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes? What is the likelihood of financial and economic resources not being available once the GEF assistance ends</p>	<p><b>Likely (L):</b> There are no or negligible risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Likely (ML):</b> There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p>	

(resources can be from multiple sources, such as the public and private sectors, income generating activities, and trends that may indicate that it is likely that in future there will be adequate financial resources for sustaining project's outcomes)	<p><b>Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability</p> <p><b>Unlikely (U):</b> There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p>	
2. <b>Sociopolitical:</b> Are there any social or political risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes? What is the risk that the level of stakeholder ownership (including ownership by governments and other key stakeholders) will be insufficient to allow for the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained? Do the various key stakeholders see that it is in their interest that the project benefits continue to flow? Is there sufficient public / stakeholder awareness in support of the long term objectives of the project?	<p><b>Likely (L):</b> There are no or negligible risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Likely (ML):</b> There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability</p> <p><b>Unlikely (U):</b> There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p>	
3. <b>Institutional framework and governance:</b> Do the legal frameworks, policies and governance structures and processes pose risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project benefits? While assessing this parameter, also consider if the required systems for accountability and transparency, and the required technical know-how are in place.	<p><b>Likely (L):</b> There are no or negligible risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Likely (ML):</b> There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability</p> <p><b>Unlikely (U):</b> There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p>	
4. <b>Environmental:</b> Are there any environmental risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes? The terminal evaluation should assess whether certain activities will pose a threat to the sustainability of the project outcomes. For example, construction of dam in a protected area could inundate a sizable area and thereby neutralizing the biodiversity related gains made by the project.	<p><b>Likely (L):</b> There are no or negligible risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Likely (ML):</b> There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability</p> <p><b>Unlikely (U):</b> There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p>	
<b>Overall Rating:</b>		

**NOTE:** All the risk dimensions of sustainability are critical. Therefore, overall rating for sustainability will not be higher than the rating of the dimension with lowest ratings. For example, if a project has an 'Unlikely' rating in either of the dimensions then its overall rating cannot be higher than 'Unlikely'.

### C. Catalytic Role

The terminal evaluation will also describe any catalytic or replication effect of the project. If no effects are identified, the evaluation will describe the catalytic or replication actions that the project carried out. No ratings are required for the catalytic role.

#### **D. Assessment Monitoring and Evaluation Systems**

As per the GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy, 2006, a terminal evaluation will assess whether the project met the minimum requirements for project design of M&E, the implementation of the Project M&E plan and whether long-term monitoring provisions to measure mid-term and long-term results (such as global environmental effect, replication effects, and other local effects) after project completion exist. Terminal evaluation reports will include separate assessments of the achievements and shortcomings of the project M&E plan and of implementation of the M&E plan.

#### **M&E during Project Implementation**

**M&E design.** Projects should have a sound M&E plan to monitor results and track progress towards achieving project objectives. An M&E plan should include a baseline (including data, methodology, etc.), SMART14 indicators and data analysis systems, and evaluation studies at specific times to assess results and adequate funding for M&E activities. The time frame for various M&E activities and standards for outputs should have been specified. The evaluation should present its assessment on these.

**M&E plan implementation.** A terminal evaluation should verify that: an M&E system was in place and facilitated timely tracking of progress towards projects objectives by collecting information on chosen indicators continually through the project implementation period; annual project reports were complete, accurate and with well justified ratings; the information provided by the M&E system was used during the project to improve project performance and to adapt to changing needs; and, projects had an M&E system in place with proper training for parties responsible for M&E activities to ensure data will continue to be collected and used after project closure.

**Budgeting and Funding for M&E Activities.** In addition to incorporating information on funding for M&E while assessing M&E design, a separate mention will be made of: whether M&E was sufficiently budgeted at the project planning stage; and, whether M&E was adequately and timely funded during implementation.

Project monitoring and evaluation systems will be rated as follows on quality of M&E design and quality of M&E implementation:

1. **Highly Satisfactory (HS):** There were no shortcomings in the project M&E system.
2. **Satisfactory(S):** There were minor shortcomings in the project M&E system.
3. **Moderately Satisfactory (MS):** There were moderate shortcomings in the project M&E system.
4. **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):** There were significant shortcomings in the project M&E system.
5. **Unsatisfactory (U):** There were major shortcomings in the project M&E system.
6. **Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):** The Project had no M&E system.

The ratings should be justified with objective evidence.

#### **Overall rating:**

**NOTE:** The overall rating of M&E during project implementation will be solely based on the quality of M&E plan implementation.” The ratings on quality at entry of M&E design and sufficiency of funding both during planning and implementation stages will be used as explanatory variables.

#### **Monitoring of Long Term Changes**

The M&E of long term changes is often incorporated in the GEF supported projects as a separate component and it may include determination of environmental baselines, specification of indicators, provisioning of equipment and capacity building for data gathering, analysis and use. This section of the terminal evaluations will describe the actions and accomplishments of the project in the establishment of a long term monitoring system. The review will address the following questions:

1. Did this project contribute to the establishment of a long term monitoring system? If it did not, should the project have included such a component?
2. What were the accomplishments and short comings in establishment of this system?
3. Is the system sustainable, i.e. is it embedded in a proper institutional structure and has financing?
4. Is the information generated by this M&E system being used as originally intended?

#### **E. Assessment of Processes that Affected Attainment of Project Results**

Among other factors, when relevant, it is suggested that the evaluation team considers the following issues affecting project implementation and attainment of project results. However, evaluators are not expected to provide ratings or separate assessment on the following issues but they could be considered while assessing the performance and results sections of the report:

1. **Preparation and readiness.** Were the project's objectives and components clear, practicable and feasible within its timeframe? Were the capacities of executing institution and counterparts properly considered when the project was designed? Were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated in the project design? Were the partnership arrangements properly identified and the roles and responsibilities negotiated prior to project approval? Were counterpart resources (funding, staff, and facilities), enabling legislation, and adequate project management arrangements in place at project entry?
2. **Country ownership/drivenness.** Was the project concept in line with the sectoral and development priorities and plans of the country or of participating countries in the case of multi-country projects? Are project outcomes contributing to national development priorities and plans? Were the relevant country representatives, from government and civil society, involved in the project? Did the recipient government maintain its financial commitment to the project? Has the government approved policies or regulatory frameworks been in line with the project's objectives?
3. **Stakeholder involvement.** Did the project involve the relevant stakeholders through information-sharing, consultation and by seeking their participation in the project's design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation? For example, did the project implement appropriate outreach and public awareness campaigns? Did the project consult and make use of the skills, experience and knowledge of the appropriate government entities, NGOs, community groups, private sector, local governments and academic institutions in the design, implementation and evaluation of project activities? Were perspectives of those that would be affected by decisions, those that could affect the outcomes and those that could contribute information or other resources to the process taken into account while taking decisions? Were the relevant vulnerable groups and the powerful, the supporters and the opponents, of the processes properly involved?
4. **Financial planning.** Did the project have the appropriate financial controls, including reporting and planning, that allowed management to make informed decisions regarding the budget and allowed for timely flow of funds. Was there due diligence in the management of funds and financial audits? Did promised co-financing materialize? (Please fill the form in Annex 1 on co-financing).
5. **Implementing/Executing Agency's supervision and backstopping.** Did Implementing/Executing Agency staff identify problems in a timely fashion and accurately estimate its seriousness? Did Implementing/Executing Agency staff provide quality support and advice to the project, approved modifications in time and restructured the project when needed? Did the Implementing/Executing Agencies provide the right staffing levels, continuity, skill mix, and frequency of field visits for the GEF projects?
6. **Co-financing and Project Outcomes and Sustainability.** If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for the variance? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability, and if it did affect outcomes and sustainability then in what ways and through what causal linkages?
7. **Delays and Project Outcomes and Sustainability.** If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons? Did the delay affect the project's

outcomes and/or sustainability, and if it did affect outcomes and sustainability then in what ways and through what causal linkages?

## **F. Lessons and Recommendations**

The evaluators will present lessons and recommendations in the terminal evaluation report on all aspects of the project that they consider relevant. The evaluators will be expected to give special attention to analyzing lessons and proposing recommendations on aspects related to factors that contributed or hindered: attainment of project objectives, sustainability of project benefits, innovation, catalytic effect and replication, and project monitoring and evaluation. Evaluators should refrain from providing recommendations to improve the project. Instead they should seek to provide a few well formulated lessons applicable to the type of project at hand or to GEF's overall portfolio. Terminal evaluations should not be undertaken with the motive of appraisal, preparation, or justification, for a follow-up phase. Wherever possible, the reports should include examples of good practices for other projects in a focal area, country or region.

## **4. Evaluation Approach and Methodology**

### **4.1 Involvement of stakeholders in the evaluation process**

This evaluation exercise is intended to be inclusive and participatory, engaging multiple actors, within as well as outside the Project, in its execution as well as learning process. The Evaluation Team will meet and engage in discussions with key stakeholders of the Project at different stages during the evaluation period. The preliminary results of the evaluation will be shared with all key stakeholders, from donors to community partners and beneficiaries. For example, Project partners, having been presented with the preliminary results, will assist the Evaluation Team to identify key questions and issues, conduct further research where necessary, analyze findings and make recommendations. The Evaluation Team plays the role of facilitator or mentor in this participatory process, conducting workshops, guiding the process at critical junctures and consolidating the final report. Experience has shown that establishing a cooperative relationship between Project partners and the Evaluation Team increases the likelihood of the Project partners adopting and achieving the intended objectives.

### **4.2 Establishment of a Core Learning Team**

To improve stakeholder engagement in the evaluation process, a "Core Learning Team" will be established to help guide the process. The Core Learning Team (10-15 members) will comprise:

- key executing and implementing agency staff;
- the managers and key staff of the Project; and
- the UNDP task manager of the Project.

The Core Learning Team will serve as the direct focal point for the Evaluation Team. Cooperation between the Core Learning Team and the Evaluation Team is expected not only to increase the quality and relevance of the evaluation, but also to increase ownership of and commitment to the evaluation exercise by the Project partners. This is expected to lead to greater acceptance and adoption of the evaluation outputs. The Core Learning Team's main purposes, in addition to the above-mentioned role as the direct focal point to help facilitate effective and efficient evaluation process, are threefold:

- to discuss the draft evaluation report and preliminary findings, and to develop the related follow-up plan to implement recommendations;
- to lead the process of negotiation and approval of the agreement/understanding among the partners regarding results of the evaluation; and
- to ensure that recommendations of the evaluation are, to the extent possible, adopted and implemented over the remainder of the Project.

A suggested list of the Core Learning Team members will be provided by the Project, for finalization and confirmation upon the arrival of the Evaluation Team.

### **4.3 Evaluation methodologies**

The Evaluation Team will follow internationally recognized standard, norms and ethics of evaluation. Methodologies for conducting the evaluation will include but not necessarily be limited to the following:

- desk review of key documentation, including: 1) Project materials such as the Project Document, consultant reports, Annual and Quarterly Work Plans, field reports, monitoring reports (including GEF annual Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs)), financial reports and correspondence; 2) relevant policy documents and laws; and 3) reports of other relevant projects, researchers and conservation organizations;
- briefings with UNDP, MoE, MAFF, WCS, UNDP/IFAD Rural Livelihood Improvement Project (RULIP), NCDDS and other stakeholders;
- interviews, questionnaires and other approaches for collecting and analyzing data;
- consultations with major donors and national institutions involved in natural resources management activities;
- field visits to selected Project sites, to meet with local Project staff, government counterparts, residents and resource users, to assess the extent to which the Project is addressing their needs effectively and how it could address their needs better; and
- workshops to discuss and agree upon findings and recommendations.

Following the GEF evaluation guidelines, the Evaluation Team is expected to assess project effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, and any other relevant key aspects against a set of criteria and rating system (e.g. highly satisfactory etc.). The evaluation methodology, including such criteria, will be developed by the Evaluation Team and finalized upon the Team's arrival and before commencement of the evaluation exercise.

## **5. Planned Process and Output**

### **5.1 Process**

The steps below outline the major phases and activities in the Terminal Evaluation process. This is intended only to be a guide to the Evaluation Team in formulating their approach, methodology and timetable. The consultants engaged to undertake the Terminal Evaluation will be given reasonable flexibility to modify the processes and approaches as they see fit, within the bounds of the specified Terms of Reference and outputs required.

1. Desk review of Project progress to date. Preliminary assessment, on the basis of information available, of key issues to be addressed (refer to Section 3 above).
2. Briefing for the Evaluation Team, as well as the Executing Agencies and the CALM Project Team, in order to contextualize the activities and scope, and finalize the methodologies of the Terminal Evaluation.
3. Preliminary review process. Stock-taking of existing knowledge (identification of key stakeholders, the roles of partners, key sources of information and reports; identification and understanding of key challenges, opportunities, risks and expected outcomes).
4. Field work and further investigations. Field visits and investigations aimed at deriving preliminary findings about the effectiveness and relevance of Project interventions/activities.
5. Presentation of preliminary findings of the Terminal Evaluation to the Core Learning Team and wider stakeholders.
6. Preparation of a draft report with recommendations. This process includes:
  - agreement on conclusions, recommendations and follow-up actions (to be determined jointly between the Evaluation Team and key stakeholders through a consultative process facilitated by the Core Learning Team);
  - articulation of lessons learned; and
  - sharing of the draft Terminal Evaluation Report with stakeholder groups for review and validation.
7. Generation and dissemination of Terminal Evaluation Report, through the following process:

- finalization of the report incorporating inputs from stakeholder groups (by the Evaluation Team working through the UNDP Country Office);
- debriefing with the Executing Agency, implementing agencies, other Project partners, and the Core Learning Team. This debriefing will provide a consolidated picture of the findings, recommendations and lessons learned from the evaluation process;
- submission of the Terminal Evaluation Report to the UNDP/GEF unit in Bangkok, to UNDP-GEF Headquarters, and to the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP) Office, and subsequent posting on the GEF website;
- sharing of the Terminal Evaluation Report with the GEF independent Monitoring and Evaluation Unit and UNFIP as a public document; and
- dissemination of the final report to national stakeholder groups by the Executing Agency.
- The Evaluation Team will also be requested to present the key findings at a UNDP Staff Learning Session.

## 5.2 Outputs

The Terminal Evaluation will produce the following outputs:

- a detailed Terminal Evaluation Report in concise English, including lessons learned and recommendations, using on the specified UNDP/GEF format (no more than 50 pages, excluding Executive Summary and Annexes) with sections and assessment ratings outlined earlier in the TOR; and
- record of key outputs from the evaluation process, including workshop outputs, and minutes of meetings with stakeholders.
- summary presentation of Terminal Evaluation Report findings to be presented at the Project Terminal Workshop

Although the Evaluation Team will have certain flexibility in structuring the report, a suggested format is provided in Annex A.

## 6. Implementation Arrangements

Roles and responsibilities of different partners for the execution of the Terminal Evaluation are as follows:

### **UNDP Country Office:**

- helps to initiate and finalize the Terms of Reference, finalise budget with partners, recruits consultants in consultation with UNDP/GEF regional centre and other project partners, and finalizes the agenda for the Evaluation Mission;
- is responsible for all logistical and administrative arrangements;
- communicates with the National Project Manager to facilitate the Mission;
- circulates the final report to national stakeholders as well as relevant offices of the UN and GEF;
- based on discussions with key stakeholders, compile a management response in accordance with UNDP's internal requirement and format, within one month after the completion of the evaluation report.

### **National Project Directors of the Main Beneficiaries:**

- assists in coordinating the Evaluation Mission;
- helps to review and provides inputs and insights on the findings of the Evaluation Team; and
- chairs meetings/workshops during the evaluation process.

### **Implementing Partner (WCS):**



- provides input on the recruitment of consultants and endorses budget;
- reviews and endorses the recommendations of the Mid-Term Evaluation; and
- assists in coordinating the Mission, and facilitates consultation between the Evaluation Team and relevant stakeholders.

**General Department of Nature Conservation and Protection Administration under MoE and Forestry Administration under MAFF:**

- facilitates field visits and local meetings at the Project sites.

**Project Team:**

- facilitates all aspects of the Evaluation Mission including provision of relevant documentation.

**8. Composition of the Evaluation Team**

**9.**

Two Consultants, one International and one National, will be responsible for conducting and reporting on the evaluation, under the guidance of and reporting to UNDP's Environment and Energy Cluster. The International Consultant will be designated as Team Leader and will carry overall responsibility for organizing and completing the evaluation and delivering the final report. The National Consultant will assist with technical analysis and with translation/interpretation, and coordination of logistical arrangements.

The Evaluation Team will draw lessons learned and make recommendations that will maximize the impact of the CALM in moving forward, and that may improve design and implementation of other UNDP/GEF/UNF projects. The International Consultant will have overall responsibility for the coordination, drafting, completion and delivery of the Mid-Term Evaluation Report, including methods, findings / lessons learned, recommendations and follow-up actions to be taken. The National Consultant will, under the overall direction of the International Consultant, have responsibility for the day to day coordination and implementation of evaluation activities, and will assist with reporting of the evaluation findings. The National Consultant will provide particular support with methodologies and with Khmer language interpretation and translation.

**Qualifications - International Consultant**

1. Minimum of a master's degree or equivalent in natural resource management, environment, development or related field demonstrably relevant to the position.
2. Strong technical background and proven competency in biodiversity conservation, protected areas management, or related areas of natural resource management, including demonstrable expertise in project formulation, implementation and evaluation. A minimum of 15 years of relevant experience is required.
3. Experience with UNDP's current project formulation, implementation and evaluation procedures is useful, but not essential. Familiarity with GEF programming and procedures, as well as its evaluation policies and guidelines, will be a useful asset.
4. Excellent English writing and communication skills. Demonstrated analytical skills, ability to assess complex situations, to succinctly and clearly distill critical issues, and to draw practical conclusions.
5. Demonstrated ability to work with developing country government agencies and NGOs. Previous work experience in Southeast Asia, and ideally in Cambodia.
6. Previous work experience with United Nations or other multilateral/bilateral development assistance agencies is a useful asset.
7. Experience leading multi-disciplinary, multi-national teams in high stress. Ability to meet short deadlines.
8. Excellent interpersonal, coordination and planning skills. Sense of diplomacy and tact.

9. Ability and willingness to travel to provincial areas.
10. Computer literate (MS Office package).

#### **Qualifications - National Consultant**

1. Master's degree or equivalent in natural resource management, environment, development or related field demonstrably relevant to the position.
2. Strong technical background in biodiversity conservation, protected areas management, or related areas of natural resource management in Cambodia. A minimum of 5 years of relevant experience is required.
3. Good understanding of RGC and local/international NGO programming and implementation procedures. Familiarity with GEF programming and procedures will be an asset.
4. Good writing and communication skills in English.
5. Experience working with local communities.
6. Previous relevant work experience with United Nations or other multilateral/bilateral development assistance agencies.
7. Excellent organizational skills with attention to details. Experience of technical translation / interpretation (Khmer-English) is an asset.
8. Excellent interpersonal, coordination and planning skills, and ability to work in a team.
9. Ability and willingness to travel to provincial areas.
10. Computer literate (MS Office package).

### **8. Mission Schedule**

The Mission comprises three components: 1) start-up, a period of 1-3 days during which the International and National Consultants, working from their home base, will familiarize themselves with background materials; 2) stakeholder consultations and field visits, report drafting and in-country presentation, currently planned for the period 4-21 June 2012; and 3) receipt of stakeholder comments on the draft final report, currently planned for latest 4 July, and incorporation into a final report to be submitted by the International Consultant (working from his/her home base) to UNDP by 13 July 2012.

### **Annex A: Suggested structure of the Final Evaluation Report**

#### **Executive summary**

Brief description of project  
Context and purpose of the evaluation  
Main conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

#### **Introduction**

Purpose of the evaluation  
Key issues addressed  
Methodology of the evaluation  
Structure of the evaluation

#### **The Project and its Development Context**

Project start and its duration  
Problems that the project seek to address

Immediate and development objectives of the project  
Main stakeholders  
Expected results

## **Findings and Conclusions**

### **Executive Summary**

- a. Brief description of project
- b. Context and purpose of the evaluation
- c. Conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

### **Introduction**

- a. Purpose of evaluation
- b. Key issues addressed
- c. Methodology of the evaluation
- d. Structure of the evaluation

### **The project and its development context**

- a. Project start and its duration
- b. Problems that the project seek to address
- c. Immediate and development objectives of the project
- d. Main stakeholders
- e. Results expected

### **Assessment of Project Results**

### **Assessment of Sustainability of Project Outcomes**

### **Catalytic Role**

### **Assessment Monitoring and Evaluation Systems**

### **M&E during Project Implementation**

### **Monitoring of Long Term Changes**

### **Assessment of Processes that Affected Attainment of Project Results**

### **Lessons and Recommendations**

### **Annexes:**

- 1. Cofinancing etc.**
- 2. Tracking Tools**
- 3. Management Responses**
- 4. TOR**
- 5. Itinerary**

1. List of persons interviewed
2. Summary of field visits
3. List of documents reviewed
4. Questionnaires used and summary of results
5. Co-financing and resource leveraging (see Table 1 attached)

## **Annex B: TOR Terminal UNDP-GEF Project Evaluation Criteria**

The following are the key sections to be included in the UNDP-GEF Terminal evaluation reports. The reports must contain the following sections and present objective and justified ratings as noted.

### **A. Assessment of Project Results<sup>33</sup>**

The terminal evaluation will assess achievement of outputs and outcomes and will provide ratings for targeted objectives and outcomes. The assessment of project results seeks to determine the extent to

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<sup>33</sup> “**Results:** The positive and negative, and foreseen and unforeseen, changes to and effects produced by a development intervention. In GEF terms, results include direct project outputs, short to medium-term, outcomes, and longer term impact including global environmental benefits, replication effects, and other local effects.” Source: The GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy (2006); page 19.

which the project objectives were achieved, and assess if the project has led to any other short term or long term and positive or negative consequences and an assessment of impacts when appropriate. While assessing a project's results, the evaluation will seek to determine the extent of achievement and shortcomings in reaching project's objectives as stated in the project document and also indicate if there were any changes and whether those changes were approved. If the project did not establish a baseline (initial conditions), the evaluator should seek to estimate the baseline condition so that achievements and results can be properly established.

The following three criteria should be assessed to determine the level of achievements/ impacts of project outcomes and objectives and must be rated as objective as possible and must include sufficient and convincing empirical evidence

<b>For Each Output and Outcome to be rated for below</b>	<b>Rating to be scored for each</b>	<b>Key Justification for rating</b>
<b>1. Relevance:</b> Were the project's outcomes consistent with the focal areas/operational program strategies and country priorities?	<p><b>Satisfactory (S):</b> The project had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Satisfactory (MS):</b> The project had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):</b> The project had significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Unsatisfactory (U)</b> The project had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):</b> The project had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p>	
<b>2. Effectiveness:</b> Are the actual project outcomes commensurate with the original or modified project objectives9)? In case the original or modified expected results are merely outputs/inputs then the evaluators should assess if there were any real outcomes of the project and if yes then whether these are commensurate with the	<p><b>Satisfactory (S):</b> The project had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Satisfactory (MS):</b> The project had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):</b> The project had</p>	

realistic expectations from such projects.	<p>significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Unsatisfactory (U)</b> The project had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):</b> The project had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p>	
<p><b>3. Efficiency:</b> Was the project cost effective? Was the project the least cost option? Was the project implementation delayed and if it was, then did that affect cost-effectiveness? Wherever possible, the evaluator should also compare the cost-time vs. outcomes relationship of the project with that of other similar projects.</p>	<p><b>Satisfactory (S):</b> The project had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Satisfactory (MS):</b> The project had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):</b> The project had significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Unsatisfactory (U)</b> The project had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p> <p><b>Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):</b> The project had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives, in terms of relevance, effectiveness or efficiency.</p>	

The evaluators will also assess other results of the project, including positive and negative actual (or anticipated) impacts or emerging long-term effects of a project. Given the long term nature of impacts, it might not be possible for the evaluators to identify or fully assess impacts. Evaluators will nonetheless indicate the steps taken to assess long-term project impacts, especially impacts on local populations, global environment, replication effects and other local effects.

### **Overall Rating:**

*NOTE: The overall outcomes rating cannot not be higher than the lowest rating on relevance and effectiveness. Thus, to have an overall satisfactory rating for an outcome, project must have at least satisfactory ratings on both relevance and effectiveness.*

## **B. Assessment of Sustainability of Project Outcomes**

As per the GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy, 2006, a terminal evaluation will assess at the minimum the “likelihood of sustainability of outcomes at project termination, and provide a rating for this.” The sustainability assessment will give special attention to analysis of the risks that are likely to affect the persistence of project outcomes. The sustainability assessment should also explain how other important contextual factors that are not outcomes of intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. Sustainability will be understood as the likelihood of continued benefits after the GEF project ends.

The following four dimensions or aspects of sustainability should be addressed:

<b>Key issues</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>Key justification for rating</b>
1. <b>Financial resources:</b> Are there any financial risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes? What is the likelihood of financial and economic resources not being available once the GEF assistance ends (resources can be from multiple sources, such as the public and private sectors, income generating activities, and trends that may indicate that it is likely that in future there will be adequate financial resources for sustaining project’s outcomes)	<p><b>Likely (L):</b> There are no or negligible risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Likely (ML):</b> There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability</p> <p><b>Unlikely (U):</b> There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p>	
2. <b>Sociopolitical:</b> Are there any social or political risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes? What is the risk that the level of stakeholder ownership (including ownership by governments and other key stakeholders) will be insufficient to allow for the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained? Do the various key stakeholders see that it is in their interest that the project benefits continue to flow? Is there sufficient public / stakeholder awareness in support of the long term objectives of the project?	<p><b>Likely (L):</b> There are no or negligible risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Likely (ML):</b> There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability</p> <p><b>Unlikely (U):</b> There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p>	
3. <b>Institutional framework and governance:</b> Do the	<b>Likely (L):</b> There are no or negligible risks that affect this	

<p>legal frameworks, policies and governance structures and processes pose risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project benefits? While assessing this parameter, also consider if the required systems for accountability and transparency, and the required technical know-how are in place.</p>	<p>dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Likely (ML):</b> There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability</p> <p><b>Unlikely (U):</b> There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p>	
<p>4. <b>Environmental:</b> Are there any environmental risks that may jeopardize sustenance of project outcomes? The terminal evaluation should assess whether certain activities will pose a threat to the sustainability of the project outcomes. For example, construction of dam in a protected area could inundate a sizable area and thereby neutralizing the biodiversity related gains made by the project.</p>	<p><b>Likely (L):</b> There are no or negligible risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Likely (ML):</b> There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p> <p><b>Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability</p> <p><b>Unlikely (U):</b> There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.</p>	
<p><b>Overall Rating:</b></p>		

**NOTE:** All the risk dimensions of sustainability are critical. Therefore, overall rating for sustainability will not be higher than the rating of the dimension with lowest ratings. For example, if a project has an ‘Unlikely’ rating in either of the dimensions then its overall rating cannot be higher than ‘Unlikely’.

### C. Catalytic Role

The terminal evaluation will also describe any catalytic or replication effect of the project. If no effects are identified, the evaluation will describe the catalytic or replication actions that the project carried out. No ratings are required for the catalytic role.

### D. Assessment Monitoring and Evaluation Systems

As per the GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy, 2006, a terminal evaluation will assess whether the project met the minimum requirements for project design of M&E, the implementation of the Project M&E plan and whether long-term monitoring provisions to measure mid-term and long-term results (such as global environmental effect, replication effects, and other local effects) after project completion exist. Terminal evaluation reports will include separate assessments of the achievements and shortcomings of the project M&E plan and of implementation of the M&E plan.

### M&E during Project Implementation

**M&E design.** Projects should have a sound M&E plan to monitor results and track progress towards achieving project objectives. An M&E plan should include a baseline (including data, methodology, etc.), SMART14 indicators and data analysis systems, and evaluation studies at specific times to assess results and adequate funding for M&E activities. The time frame for various M&E activities

and standards for outputs should have been specified. The evaluation should present its assessment on these.

**M&E plan implementation.** A terminal evaluation should verify that: an M&E system was in place and facilitated timely tracking of progress towards projects objectives by collecting information on chosen indicators continually through the project implementation period; annual project reports were complete, accurate and with well justified ratings; the information provided by the M&E system was used during the project to improve project performance and to adapt to changing needs; and, projects had an M&E system in place with proper training for parties responsible for M&E activities to ensure data will continue to be collected and used after project closure.

**Budgeting and Funding for M&E Activities.** In addition to incorporating information on funding for M&E while assessing M&E design, a separate mention will be made of: whether M&E was sufficiently budgeted at the project planning stage; and, whether M&E was adequately and timely funded during implementation.

Project monitoring and evaluation systems will be rated as follows on quality of M&E design and quality of M&E implementation:

1. **Highly Satisfactory (HS):** There were no shortcomings in the project M&E system.
2. **Satisfactory(S):** There were minor shortcomings in the project M&E system.
3. **Moderately Satisfactory (MS):** There were moderate shortcomings in the project M&E system.
4. **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):** There were significant shortcomings in the project M&E system.
5. **Unsatisfactory (U):** There were major shortcomings in the project M&E system.
6. **Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):** The Project had no M&E system.

The ratings should be justified with objective evidence.

#### **Overall rating:**

**NOTE:** The overall rating of M&E during project implementation will be solely based on the quality of M&E plan implementation.” The ratings on quality at entry of M&E design and sufficiency of funding both during planning and implementation stages will be used as explanatory variables.

#### **Monitoring of Long Term Changes**

The M&E of long term changes is often incorporated in the GEF supported projects as a separate component and it may include determination of environmental baselines, specification of indicators, provisioning of equipment and capacity building for data gathering, analysis and use. This section of the terminal evaluations will describe the actions and accomplishments of the project in the establishment of a long term monitoring system. The review will address the following questions:

1. Did this project contribute to the establishment of a long term monitoring system? If it did not, should the project have included such a component?
2. What were the accomplishments and short comings in establishment of this system?
3. Is the system sustainable, i.e. is it embedded in a proper institutional structure and has financing?
4. Is the information generated by this M&E system being used as originally intended?

#### **E. Assessment of Processes that Affected Attainment of Project Results**

Among other factors, when relevant, it is suggested that the evaluation team considers the following issues affecting project implementation and attainment of project results. However, evaluators are not expected to provide ratings or separate assessment on the following issues but they could be considered while assessing the performance and results sections of the report:

1. **Preparation and readiness.** Were the project’s objectives and components clear, practicable and feasible within its timeframe? Were the capacities of executing institution and counterparts properly considered when the project was designed? Were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated in the project design? Were the partnership



arrangements properly identified and the roles and responsibilities negotiated prior to project approval? Were counterpart resources (funding, staff, and facilities), enabling legislation, and adequate project management arrangements in place at project entry?

2. **Country ownership/drivenness.** Was the project concept in line with the sectoral and development priorities and plans of the country or of participating countries in the case of multi-country projects? Are project outcomes contributing to national development priorities and plans? Were the relevant country representatives, from government and civil society, involved in the project? Did the recipient government maintain its financial commitment to the project? Has the government approved policies or regulatory frameworks been in line with the project's objectives?
3. **Stakeholder involvement.** Did the project involve the relevant stakeholders through information-sharing, consultation and by seeking their participation in the project's design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation? For example, did the project implement appropriate outreach and public awareness campaigns? Did the project consult and make use of the skills, experience and knowledge of the appropriate government entities, NGOs, community groups, private sector, local governments and academic institutions in the design, implementation and evaluation of project activities? Were perspectives of those that would be affected by decisions, those that could affect the outcomes and those that could contribute information or other resources to the process taken into account while taking decisions? Were the relevant vulnerable groups and the powerful, the supporters and the opponents, of the processes properly involved?
4. **Financial planning.** Did the project have the appropriate financial controls, including reporting and planning, that allowed management to make informed decisions regarding the budget and allowed for timely flow of funds. Was there due diligence in the management of funds and financial audits? Did promised co-financing materialize? (Please fill the form in Annex 1 on co-financing).
5. **Implementing/Executing Agency's supervision and backstopping.** Did Implementing/Executing Agency staff identify problems in a timely fashion and accurately estimate its seriousness? Did Implementing/Executing Agency staff provide quality support and advice to the project, approved modifications in time and restructured the project when needed? Did the Implementing/Executing Agencies provide the right staffing levels, continuity, skill mix, and frequency of field visits for the GEF projects?
6. **Co-financing and Project Outcomes and Sustainability.** If there was a difference in the level of expected co-financing and actual co-financing, then what were the reasons for the variance? Did the extent of materialization of co-financing affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability, and if it did affect outcomes and sustainability then in what ways and through what causal linkages?
7. **Delays and Project Outcomes and Sustainability.** If there were delays in project implementation and completion, then what were the reasons? Did the delay affect the project's outcomes and/or sustainability, and if it did affect outcomes and sustainability then in what ways and through what causal linkages?

## F. Lessons and Recommendations

The evaluators will present lessons and recommendations in the terminal evaluation report on all aspects of the project that they consider relevant. The evaluators will be expected to give special attention to analyzing lessons and proposing recommendations on aspects related to factors that contributed or hindered: attainment of project objectives, sustainability of project benefits, innovation, catalytic effect and replication, and project monitoring and evaluation. Evaluators should refrain from providing recommendations to improve the project. Instead they should seek to provide a few well formulated lessons applicable to the type of project at hand or to GEF's overall portfolio. Terminal evaluations should not be undertaken with the motive of appraisal, preparation, or justification, for a follow-up phase. Wherever possible, the reports should include examples of good practices for other projects in a focal area, country or region.

## Annex 1: Cofinancing

Co financing (Type/Source)	IA own Financing (mill US\$) Total (mill US\$) Total Disbursement (mill US\$)		Government (mill US\$)		Other* (mill US\$)		Total		Total Disbursement (mill US\$)	
Grants	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Loans/Concessions (compared to market rate)										
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Credit										
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Equity investments										
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> In-kind support										
<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> Other (*)										

\* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and

## Annex 2: Final Tracking Tools

## Annex 3: UNDP/ Government Management Responses

## Other Annexes as required

## Annex C: Consultants' Task Schedule

Dates	Task	Time Suggested
1 June	Consultants prepare for evaluation including desk review of documents provided in advance at home office and develop preliminary evaluation methodology	1 day
4 June	International consultant arrives in country. Consultants attend briefing session with UNDP CO and Regional Technical Advisor (AM) and key project staff (PM)	1 day
5-6 June	Further desk review of relevant documents and reports, preparation and presentation of evaluation methodology and report outline Design review and discussion	2 days
7 June	Meetings with project stakeholders, refinement of methodology and development of proposed report outline based on stakeholder comments, and further desk review	1 day
8 June	Meetings with key stakeholders in Phnom Penh	1 day
9 June	Travel to Preah Vihear (AM) Meeting with project staff (PM) Overnight Tbeng Meanchay	1 day
10 June	Site visit Tahkung Headquarters (AM)	1 day

<b>Dates</b>	<b>Task</b>	<b>Time Suggested</b>
	Visit Tmatboey village and meet community members and local stakeholders (PM) Overnight in Tmatboey guesthouse	
11 June	View ecotourism facilities and key species (AM) View site management issues Overnight Tbeng Meanchay	1 day
11 June	Other field visits and discussion with Preah Vihear-based staff and stakeholders.	
12 June	Return from Preah Vihear (AM) Initiate preparation of first draft report in Phnom Penh (PM).	1 day
13-15 June	Preparation of first draft report in Phnom Penh, including meetings to validate/clarify findings	3 days
18 June	Presentation of findings to Core Learning Team (10-15 core persons) and follow up discussion Presentation at the UNDP Staff Learning Session.	1 day
19-20 June	Incorporation of comments in report	2 days
21 June	Submission of first draft report to UNDP for further circulation and clarification. International consultant departs	1 day
22-30 June	Stakeholders provide comments on first draft (this is outside the consultants' brief)	N/A
01-03 July	Home-based work to finalize report based on comments from stakeholders, followed by submission of the second draft report to UNDP for further circulation	3 days
Mid of July	Board meeting review to adopt the final report as well as a management response	N/A
End of July	Compilation and submission of a management response	N/A
August	Publication of the final report	N/A

Note: Total consultancy time comprises 23 working days (21 days per above schedule plus 2 days as required)

## ANNEX II : ITINERARY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE FINAL EVALUATION MISSION

\* = Member of Project Board.

	Date	Activities
Wed	27 <sup>th</sup> June	All day: Document review.
Thu	28 <sup>th</sup> June	All day: Document review.
Fri	29 <sup>th</sup> June	am: 1. Document review. pm: 1. Document review. 2. Meeting (telephone) with International Technical Adviser (Dr. Hugo Rainey).
Mon	2 <sup>nd</sup> July	Lead evaluator travels to Cambodia.
Tue	3 <sup>rd</sup> July	am: 1. Lead evaluator arrives Phnom Penh. 2. Rest. pm: 1. Meeting with Assistant Country Director and Head of Energy and Environment Cluster, UNDP (Mr. Lay Khim). 2. Meeting with Programme Analyst, UNDP (Mr. Chhum Sovanny).
Wed	4 <sup>th</sup> July	am: 1. Meeting with Country Programme Director, WCS (Mr. Mark Gately). 2. Meeting with Community Management Advisor, WCS (Mr. Ashish John). pm: 1. Briefing meeting with 13 participants (see Annex VI).
Thu	5 <sup>th</sup> July	am: 1. Meeting with, Director of Wildlife Sanctuary Department, Ministry of Environment (Mr. Sy Ramony*). pm: 1. Travel to Tbeng Meanchey, Preah Vihear Province (5 hours).
Fri	6 <sup>th</sup> July	am: 1. Field visit to Headquarters of Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary. 2. Meeting with Deputy Director of Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary (patrolling) and Deputy Director of Provincial Department of Environment (Mr. Chhun Chheng). 3. Meeting with, Deputy Director of Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary (community) (Mr. Sok Vutthin). pm: 1. Travel to Tmatboey village. 2. Meeting with Member of Commune Council, Pring Thom Commune (Mr. Tep Kam). 3. Meeting with Head of Tmatboey Community Protected Area Management Committee (Mr. Dip Kim Oun) and members of Tmatboey CPA Management Committee (Mr. Choin Chheat; Mr. Keng Run; and Mr. Mark Leurt). 4. Meeting with Head of Village Market Network for NGO Farmer Livelihood Development (Mr. Chan Oun) and member of network (Ms. Vuth Sinim). 5. Meeting with Community Management Advisor, WCS (Mr. Ashish John).
Sat	7 <sup>th</sup> July	am: Free – birding. pm: 1. Meeting with Director of Preah Vihear Protected Forest and National Project Site Manager (Mr. Tan Setha). 2. Meeting with Community Conservation Officer of Preah Vihear Protected Forest (Mr. Hort Sothea). 3. Meeting with Head of Tmatboey Community Protected Area Management Committee (Mr. Dip Kim Oun). 4. Field visit to view roost site of White-shouldered Ibis.
Sun	8 <sup>th</sup> July	am: Free – birding. pm: 1. Travel to Tbeng Meanchey.
Mon	9 <sup>th</sup> July	am: Meeting with, Community Agricultural Network Coordinator, NGO Sansom Mlup Prey (Mr. Suon Samay). 2. Meeting with Director, NGO Ponlok Khmer (Mr. Cheat Lom). pm: 1. Meeting with, Senior Provincial Programme Advisor, Project Support to Democratic Development, Preah Vihear Provincial Administration (Ms. Nut Samean) and Capacity-building Adviser, Project Support to Democratic Development, Preah Vihear Provincial Administration (Mr. Cheam Mony). 2. Meeting with HE, Governor, Preah Vihear Province (Mr. Oum Mara), Deputy Governor (Mr. Suy Serith), Head of Cabinet (Mr. Khoy Khun Ho), Deputy Director, Forestry Cantonment (Mr. Ith Phum Rea), and Deputy Director, Inter-sectoral Division (Mr. Sruy Saty).

Date		Activities
Tue	10 <sup>th</sup> July	am: 1. Meeting with Director, Kulen Promptep Wildlife Sanctuary (eastern sector) and Project National Site Manager (Mr. Ea Sokha). pm: 1. Travel to Phnom Penh (5 hours).
Wed	11 <sup>th</sup> July	am: 1. Meeting with Deputy Director-General, Forestry Administration, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Mr. Ung Sam Ath*). 2. Meeting with Country Programme Director, WCS (Mr. Mark Gately) and Community Management Advisor, WCS (Mr. Ashish John). pm: 1. Meeting with Technical Advisor to Director-General, Forestry Administration (Mr. Hiroshi Nakata).
Thu	12 <sup>th</sup> July	am: 1. Meeting with Executive Director, NGO Farmer Livelihood Development (Mr. Sok Somith). 2. Document review. pm: 1. Meeting with Counsellor, DANIDA (Mr. Jacob Jepsen). 2. Presentation preparation. 3. Meeting with David Ashwell (independent environmental consultant).
Fri	13 <sup>th</sup> July	am: 1. Interviewed by Programme Manager and Senior Biodiversity Specialist, Global Environment Facility (Ms. Yoko Watanabe). 2. Meeting with Programme Analyst, UNDP (Mr. Chhum Sovanny). pm: 1. De-briefing meeting with 11 participants (see Annex VI). 2. Meeting with Director, Asia Regional Programme, WCS (Mr. Colin Poole).
Sat	14 <sup>th</sup> July	am: Lead evaluator departs Phnom Penh.
Tue	17 <sup>th</sup> July	am: 1. Meeting (Skype) with Regional Technical Advisor, UNDP-GEF (Mr. Sameer Karki). 2. Report writing. pm: 1. Meeting (telephone) with former International Technical Adviser and Project Designer (Mr. Tom Clements).

## ANNEX III : PERSONS INTERVIEWED

\* = Project Board Member. (S) = skype interview. (T) = telephone interview. Alphabetic order.

### UNDP / GEF

Chhum Sovanny	Programme Analyst, UNDP Cambodia
Lay Khim	Assistant Country Director and Team Leader of Energy and Environment Cluster, UNDP Cambodia*
Sameer Karki	Regional Technical Advisor, UNDP-GEF (S)

### WCS / Project Staff

Ashish John	Community Management Advisor
Hugo Rainey	Former International Technical Advisor (T)
Mark Gately	Country Programme Director*
Tom Clements	Former International Technical Advisor and Project Designer (T)

### Ministry of Environment

Chhun Chheng	Deputy Director (patrolling), Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary
Ea Sokha	Director Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary (eastern sector) and National Project Site Manager
Sok Vutthin	Deputy Director (community), Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sanctuary
Sy Ramony	Director of Wildlife Sanctuary Department*

### Forestry Administration, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

Hiroshi Nakata	Technical Adviser to Director-General
Hort Sothea	Community Conservation Officer, Preah Vihear Protected Forest
	Ranger, RENCHINHUMB SOUM
Tan Setha	Director, Preah Vihear Protected Forest and National Project Site Manager
Ung Sam Ath	Deputy Director-General*

### Preah Vihear Provincial Administration

Cheam Mony	Capacity Building Adviser, Project Support to Democratic Development
Ith Phum Rea	Deputy Director, Forestry Cantonment
Khoy Khun Ho	Head of Cabinet, Provincial Governor's office
Nut Samean	Senior Provincial Programme Adviser, Project Support to Democratic Development
Oum Mara	Provincial Governor
Sruy Saty	Deputy Director, Inter-sectoral Division, Provincial Governor's Office
Suy Serith	Deputy Provincial Governor

### Community Stakeholders and Beneficiaries

Chan Oun	Head, Village Market Network, Sansom Mlup Prey (NGO) and member of Tmatboey village
Choin Chheat	Member of Tmatboey Community Protected Area Management Committee
Dip Kim Oun	Head, Tmatboey Community Protected Area Management

	Committee
Keng Run	Member of Tmatboey Community Protected Area Management Committee
Mark Leurt	Member of Tmatboey Community Protected Area Management Committee
Tep Kam	Member of Pring Thom Commune Council
Vuth Sinim	Member, Village Market Network, Sansom Mlup Prey (NGO) and member of Tmatboey village

#### **NGOs**

Cheat Lom	Director, Ponlok Khmer
Sok Somith	Director, Farmer Livelihood Development
Suon Samay	Community Agricultural Network Coordinator, Sansom Mlup Prey

#### **Miscellaneous**

David Ashwell	Independent Environmental Consultant
Jacob Jepsen	Counsellor, DANIDA

## ANNEX IV : SUMMARY EVALUATION OF PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS BY OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

The Project logframe in the Project Document was revised in the Inception Report, and despite another revision being made it never appears to have been adopted – see Annex VIII. The present evaluation matrix uses the version contained in the Inception Report and also used by the MTE. The delivery status herein is taken from the most recent information available from WCS.

### KEY:

GREEN = Indicators show achievement successful at the end of the Project.

YELLOW = Indicators show achievement nearly successful at the end of the Project.

RED = Indicators not achieved at the end of Project

HATCHED COLOUR = estimate; situation either unclear or indicator inadequate to make a firm assessment against.

**Project Objective:** The effective conservation of the key components of biodiversity of Cambodia's Northern Plains Landscape.

#	Aim	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
1	<b>Objective:</b> The effective conservation of the key components of biodiversity of Cambodia's Northern Plains Landscape	Biological populations Number of nests of key bird species found within key sites for conservation	Baseline data exists for 3 key sites – 217 nests in 2005.	20% increase in total key species records at three sites by year 5, 30% by year 7	2,697 nests protected and 4,734 chicks fledged through the nest protection scheme. Yearly breakdown: 2003 = 46 nests, 53 chicks; 2004 = 166 nests, 232 chicks; 2005 = 217 nests, 393 chicks; 2006 = 342 nests, 579 chicks; 2007 = 416 nests, 614 chicks; 2008 = 360 nests, 621 chicks; 2009 = 425 nests, 748 chicks; 2010 = 317 nests, 629 chicks, 2011= 408 nests, 865 chicks.	This represents a 188% increase in the nests of key species. While some of this undoubtedly has come about through increased survey effort and inclusion in the scheme, a large proportion will represent a real increase in populations (see paragraph 65). During the MTE it was agreed that the original performance indicator i.e. <i>the percentage of km squares where key</i>						



#	Aim	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
						species are recorded (patch occupancy), was no longer consider the appropriate scientific measure and was replaced accordingly. Similarly, key bird species were increased to include a wider range of globally important species. Full list below <sup>34</sup>						
2		<p>Aggregated density for large ungulates (Sambar, Eld's Deer, Wild Cattle) (number of groups/km<sup>2</sup>) in Preah Vihear Protected Forest</p> <p>Asian elephant <i>Elephas maximus</i> was not included because this method does not work, nor wild cats nor dhole <i>Cuon alpinus</i> since densities were too low to obtain meaningful measurements.</p>	0.28 groups/km <sup>2</sup> (95% Confidence Intervals: 0.11-0.72 groups/km <sup>2</sup> ) (2006)	15% increase in key species <sup>35</sup> populations at Preah Vihear Protected Forest by year 7	<p>0.28 groups/km<sup>2</sup> (95% Confidence Intervals: 0.15-0.52 groups/km<sup>2</sup>) (2009).</p> <p>The quality of the data collected during 2011 was subsequently discovered to be unreliable for accurate analysis.</p>	<p>No statistically significant increase observed, although small increase suggested by confidence figures at least indicates no population decline. Possible reason for lack of perceived success may lie with longevity of species and slow reproductive rates.</p> <p>At the point of the TE, WCS's monitoring expert indicated that the performance indicator given here was a more accurate</p>						

<sup>34</sup> Key Species: White shouldered Ibis *Pseudibis davisonii*, Giant Ibis *P. gigantea*, Sarus Crane *Grus antigone* White-winged Duck *Cairina scutata*, Masked Finfoot *Heliopais personata*, Red-headed Vulture *Sarcogyps calvus*, Black-necked Stork *Ephippiorhynchus asiaticus*, Oriental Darter *Anhinga melanogaster*, Greater Adjutant *Leptoptilus dubius*, Lesser Adjutant *Leptoptilus javanicus*, White-rumped Vulture *Gyps bengalensis*.

<sup>35</sup> Gaur *Bos gaurus*, Banteng *Bos javanicus*, Eld's Deer *Panolia eldii*, Sambar Deer *Rusa unicolor*.

#	Aim	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
						measure of performance than the original indicator, i.e. <i>Encounter rates with wildlife on monitoring transects and points in Preah Vihear Protected Forest</i> . The TET accepted this given that “wildlife” was undefined and the indicator was limited to PVPF and did not include KPWS.						
3		Maintenance of habitat										
	Number of hectares of forest within core areas of key sites	Protected Forest - 118,860	No decreases in forest area across key sites in comparison with baseline in years 3 and 7	121,117 ha total, of which 657 ha (0.54%) is deforested and 882 ha (0.73%) is proposed for private community use – total 1,539 ha (1.27%).	Area has increased through re-defining boundaries of PVPF in agreement with FA, but area at end of Project is 119,578 ha which represents a 0.6% increase in area.							
		Wildlife Sanctuary – 100,802		98,614 ha total, of which 1,819 ha (1.84%) is deforested and 724 ha (0.73%) is proposed for private community use – total 2,543 ha (2.56%).	Area at end of Project is 96,071 ha, a 4.7% decrease because of social concessions granted to the military – largely outside the Project’s control – see paragraphs 69 & 84.							
		O'Scach-O'Dar – 22,943		23,125ha total, of which 1,134ha (4.90%) is deforested and 123 ha (0.53%) is proposed for private community use – total 1,257 ha (5.44%).	Area at end of Project is 21,868 ha, also a 4.7% decrease – reason unknown to the TET.							
		Reduction in illegal or unsustainable resource use										

#	Aim	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
4		Number of hunting incidences (traps/dogs/guns) per km-square surveyed during patrols	PVPF: 4.0/100km <sup>2</sup> (2005) and 1.0/100km of patrols (2005).	50% reduction in Protected Forest site by year 2, achieved at remaining sites by year 4. 75% reduction at all sites by year 5	0.135 incidents/100km of patrols (2008) 0.102 incidents/100km of patrols (2009) 0.124 incidents/100km of patrols (2010) 0.115 incidents/100km of patrols (2011).	An 88.5% decrease by year 6.						
			KPWS: 1.1/100km <sup>2</sup> (2006/7) and 0.12/100km of patrols (2006/7) (there are issues related to data collection for KPWS and it may have been substantially under-reported)		0.148 incidents/100km of patrols (2008) 0.191 incidents/100km of patrols (2009) 0.130 incidents/100km of patrols (2010) 0.118 incidents/100km of patrols (2011).	Given the baseline data is thought to be erroneous, 2011 figures represent a 20.3% reduction on 2008 levels and is of a larger magnitude than in PVPF (15% reduction between 2008 and 2011) where the target was achieved against more accurate baseline data.						
			O'Sach-O'Dar: 0.942 /100km of patrols (2005).		0.126 incidents/100km of patrols (2008) 0.071 incidents/100km of patrols (2009) 0.293 incidents/100km of patrols (2010) 0.171 incidents/100km of patrols (2011).	An 82% reduction by 2011, although this had been as low as 92.5% in 2009.						
5		Number of logging incidences per km-square surveyed during patrols	PVPF: 7.6/100km <sup>2</sup> (2005) and 1.9/100km of patrols (2005).	50% reduction in Protected Forest site by year 2, achieved at remaining sites by year 4. 75% reduction at all sites by year 5	0.370 incidents /100km of patrols (2008) 0.178 incidents /100km of patrols (2009) 0.158 incidents/100km of patrols (2010) 0.105 incidents/100km of patrols (2011).	2011 figure represents a 94.5% reduction by Year 6. WCS report that "Improved patrol strategy and tactics have reduced logging to low levels. Reporting of logging activity may have improved through increased patrol activity; thus logging levels compared to patrol effort is a more						

#	Aim	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
						<i>appropriate measure now and this has declined."</i>						
			KPWS: 4.8/100km <sup>2</sup> (2006/7) and 0.52/100km of patrols (2006/7) (there are issues related to data collection for KPWS and it may have been substantially under-reported)		0.554/100km of patrols (2008) 0.711/100km of patrols (2009) 0.300/100km of patrols (2010) 0.303/100km of patrols (2011).	2011 figure represents a 41.8% reduction by Year 6. Given the baseline data is thought to erroneous, 2011 figures represent a 55.3% reduction on 2008 levels but this is smaller than in PVPF where a 71.7% reduction was recorded between 2008 and 2011).						
			O'Scach-O'Dar: 0.454 /100 km of patrols (2005).		0.315 incidents/100 km of patrols (2008) 0.285 incidence/100 km of patrols (2009) 0.147 incidents/100 km of patrols (2010) 0.513 incidents/100 km of patrols (2011).	A reduction of 67% in incidents by 2010, but an increase in 2011 putting incidents above the baseline by 13%						
6		Improved Community Livelihoods										
		Community tenure or title over agricultural and residential land	0 families in 2005	Land-use planning completed in 5 villages by year 3, 8 by year 5 <sup>36</sup>	Within the 3 project sites, 13 villages have improved tenure from land use planning and agreements with authorities. 10,346 hectares of CPAs recognized by MoE and 20,807 hectares of community zone identified and 3,390 hectares of paddy fields mapped for 1,811 families. 32 Community Based Organizations (CBOs) capacity were built to map, develop rules and regulations and manage natural resources and land within the CALM landscape; 7 CPA committees, 7 Community Protected Committees, 5 Indigenous Representation Committees, 4 Community Forests							

<sup>36</sup> Information provided by WCS; supplementary information on PVPF Management Plan provided by ITTO Transboundary Project.

#	Aim	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
7		Number of families that experience a sustained improvement in cash income as an indirect consequence of project initiatives (e.g. tourism, agricultural development, conservation contracts)	0 families in 2003	100 families at two sites by year 4. 150 families by year 7	In 2011-2012, 231 families benefitted from various incentive contracts – 141.35 tonnes of paddy procured from 132 families from 6 villages at 10% higher price than middlemen, another 99 persons (43 women) from 3 villages earn a total of US\$ 26,667 from ecotourism activities.	The phrase “sustained improvement” is not defined and is therefore not SMART. Nonetheless, it is clear that a large number of families in the Project area have benefited from increased incomes.						
8		Mainstreaming Biodiversity										
		Number of <i>Seila</i> /PLG Commune Development Plans (CDPs), Provincial Development Plans, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments, Sectoral Agency Plans, Land-use plans including or considering conservation priorities	No CDPs/PDPs/ESIAs consider conservation activities. There are no Government approved land- use maps. MAFF and MoE have no key site management plans	5 by year 3, 10 by year 7	National resource management and conservation priorities mainstreamed into 16 Commune Development Plans/Commune Investment Plans (and thereby into two District Plans covering 2 years and one Provincial Development Plan covering 5 years) by year 2010. Cooperation with NCDD programme continuing.							
			There are no Government approved land-use maps	Land-use plans: 5 villages by year 3, 8 by year 5 to have established land and resource tenure	Land-use plans, including maps, have been derived for 9 villages and are being used by the protected area authorities (PVPF & KPWS). However, these are not yet officially approved by government because the appropriate legal framework is awaiting ratification.	In the MTE, an indicator on management plans was included here but this duplicates indicator 11 in its entirety and has been dropped from here.						
9		Number of villages and families with successfully implemented incentive scheme	Contract established with 1 village (10 families (2005)) for initiation of eco-tourism, in exchange for	Incentive scheme contracts in 5 villages by year 3, 8 by year 5 (see footnote 26)	Incentive schemes benefit 265 people in more than nine villages –132 families in nine villages through Ibis Rice; 99 individuals in three villages through ecotourism.							

#	Aim	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
		contracts.	reduction of hunting and wildlife trade									
		Contracts with 10 families for bird nest protection (2005)	Individual contracts with 30 families		25 individuals from eight villages have contracts for wild bird nest protection.							
10		Improved Protected Area Management										
		Protected Areas zoned and demarcated.	None exist	Protected Forest zoned by the end of year 3,	Zonation completed for PVPF with agreed rules and regulations across 112,616 ha. Demarcation process for PVPF completed with final review of land claims underway.	It is not clear that this was achieved by year 3, but it is so at the end of Project.						
				Wildlife Sanctuary by year 4	KPWS land claims collected at key sites. Community zoning completed or underway in 7 villages	As below (see indicator 11), zoning definitions within PAs not yet agreed. Community zoning approved by MOE for pragmatic purposes.						
11		Protected Area management plans	MAFF and MoE have no key site management plans	Key Site Management Plans: 2 by year 3	Management plan for PVPF (2011-2015) approved in May 2010 and now under implementation.	Not produced by year 3 but successful by end of Project.						
					Management plan for KPWS is still in draft.	Law on Protected Areas (which covers KPWS but not PVPF) was passed only in 2008. The necessary legislation to define zones within PAs has still not yet been agreed and endorsed.						

## ANNEX V: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT FORMAL MEETINGS

### Briefing held on 4<sup>th</sup> July 2012

Alphabetic order

Ashish John	Community Management Advisor, WCS
Ches Sopheap	Manager, Office of Technical Adviser to Director-General, Forestry Administration
Chhum Sovanny	Programme Analyst, UNDP Cambodia
Chun Sophat	Programme Officer, M&E, UNDP Cambodia
Ea Sokha	Director Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sactuary and National Project Coordinator
Hiroshi Nakata	Technical Adviser to Director-General, Forestry Administration
Jacob Jepsen	Counsellor
Lay Khim	Assistant Country Director and Team Leader of Energy and Environment cluster, UNDP Cambodia
Loeung Kesaro	National Evaluator
Mark Gately	Country Program Manager, WCS
Phillip Edwards	Lead evaluator
Sy Ramony	Director of Wildlife Sanctuary Department, Forestry Administration
Tan Setha	Director, Preah Vihear Protected Forest and Project National Site Manager

### De-briefing held on 13th July 2012

Alphabetic order

Ashish John	Community Management Advisor, WCS
Chhum Sovanny	Programme Analyst, UNDP Cambodia
Chun Sophat	Programme Officer, M&E, UNDP Cambodia
Ea Sokha	Director Kulen Promtep Wildlife Sactuary and National Project Coordinator
Hiroshi Nakata	Technical Adviser to Director-General, Forestry Administration
Loeung Kesaro	National Evaluator
Mark Gately	Country Program Manager, WCS
Napoleon Navarro	Deputy Country Director – Programme, UNDP Cambodia
Phillip Edwards	Lead Evaluator
Tan Setha	Director, Preah Vihear Protected Forest and Project National Site Manager
Ung Dara Rat Moni	Adviser, NAPA follow up, UNDP Cambodia


## ANNEX VI: LIST OF PROJECT BOARD MEMBERS

Alphabetic order

Name	Title	Agency
Lay Khim	Assistant Country Director and Team Leader of E&E	UNDP Cambodia
Mark Gately	Country Program Manager	Wildlife Conservation Society
Sophie Barances	Deputy Country Director (Programme)	UNDP Cambodia
Sy Ramony	Director of Wildlife Sanctuary Department	Ministry of Environment
Ung Sam Ath	Deputy Director General	Forestry Administration, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries



## ANNEX VII: MAP OF NORTHERN PLAINS



## ANNEX VIII: REVISED TABLE OF PROJECT INDICATORS

### PROJECT OBJECTIVE: THE EFFECTIVE CONSERVATION OF THE KEY COMPONENTS OF BIODIVERSITY OF CAMBODIA'S NORTHERN PLAINS LANDSCAPE


Note 11-12-2006: this Table replaces Table 5 in the Project Inception Report ("Project Impact Indicators"). The same impact indicators identified previously have been maintained, but they have been assigned to specific outputs 1-3, based on the project components. The numbers **1-11** used previously have been kept, as these are also referred to in the project logical framework. The link between the indicator and the UNDP Cambodia Country Action Plan (2006-2010) is given. The old indicator **7** (number of families that experience a sustained improvement in cash income as an indirect consequence of project initiatives (e.g. tourism, agricultural development, conservation contracts) has been deleted, given its similarity to indicator **9** (Number of villages and families with successfully implemented incentive scheme contracts). A new indicator **12** has been designed for Output 4. **TET NOTE: This table never appears to have been formally adopted and used by the Project – see paragraph 18.**

Indicator	Baseline	Target	GEF OP or SP Indicator	UNDP Country Action Plan (2006-2010)	Verification Means	Assumptions
<u>Output 1: Integrated conservation and development planning at the landscape-level</u>						
<b>8.</b> Number of <i>Seila</i> /PLG Commune Development Plans (CDPs), Provincial Development Plans, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments, Sectoral Agency Plans, Land-use plans including or considering conservation priorities.	Currently none consider conservation priorities of the Northern Plains. There are no Government approved Land-use maps. MAFF and MoE have no key site management plans.	Land-use plans: 5 villages by year 3, 8 by year 5 to have established land and resource tenure Key Site Management Plans: 2 by year 3. Others: 5 by year 3, 10 by year 7.	GEF SP2: incorporated biodiversity aspects into sector policies and plans at national and sub-national levels, adapted appropriate regulations and implement plans accordingly.		- Revised existing plans - New plans - Government approved village land-use plans - Key Site Management Plans	Authorities' interest in being involved in coordinated land-use planning continues.  <i>Seila</i> /PLG accepted as main provincial planning framework, or is replaced by an equivalent body.  Provincial capacity can be increased or is sufficient for coordinated planning.
<u>Output 2: Establishment of appropriate community land tenure and resource-right use and engagement in conservation management</u>						
<b>6.</b> Community tenure or title over agricultural and residential land.	0 families in 2005.	Land-use planning completed in 5 villages by year 3, 8 by year 5 <sup>1</sup> .	GEF SP2: people show improved livelihoods (especially local and indigenous communities) based on more sustainable harvesting.	# of sites of CBNRM identified and approved under the support of UNDP projects. # of CBOs established to manage CBNRM. # of hectares of land secured with land user	Community land-use planning (Component 2).	Community Livelihoods are most threatened by unsecured access to land resources (i.e. lack of tenure or title).

Indicator	Baseline	Target	GEF OP or SP Indicator	UNDP Country Action Plan (2006-2010)	Verification Means	Assumptions
				right to local communities through PLUP process or through CBNRM granted under the UNDP supported project.		
<b>9.</b> Number of villages and families with successfully implemented incentive scheme contracts.	Contract established with 1 village for initiation of eco-tourism, in exchange for reduction of hunting and wildlife trade. Contracts with 10 families for bird nest protection (2005).	Incentive scheme contracts in 5 villages by year 3, 8 by year 5 <sup>1</sup> . Individual contracts with 30 families.	GEF SP2: number of replications applying incentive measures & instruments (e.g. trust funds, payments for environmental services, certification) within and beyond project boundaries.  GEF SP2: people show improved livelihoods (especially local and indigenous communities) based on more sustainable harvesting.	# of sites of CBNRM identified and approved under the support of UNDP projects. # of CBOs established to manage CBNRM.	- Approved contracts	Community and district initiatives are supported by higher authorities.  Sufficient interest exist in key species eco-tourism.  The targeted eco-tourism market requires minimal infrastructure investment.
<b>10.</b> Protected Areas zoned and demarcated.	None exist.	Protected Forest zoned by the end of year 3, Wildlife Sanctuary by year 4.	GEF SP1: PAs supported show improved management effectiveness against baseline scenarios.	# of key conservation sites with proper land use zoning and land use planning approved.	- Government approved zonation	Government support for project management and activities continues  Security threats remain limited.
<b>Output 3: Improved management of the key sites for conservation</b>						
<b>1.</b> The percentage of Km squares where key species <sup>2</sup> are recorded (patch occupancy).	Baseline data exists for 3 key sites.	20% increase in total key species <sup>2</sup> records at three sites by year 5, 30% by year 7	GEF OP3 (Biodiversity)		Site Monitoring programs (Component 3) - standardized transect data	Conservation areas are of sufficient size to support biological populations
<b>2.</b> Encounter rates with wildlife on monitoring transects and points, in Preah Vihear	Results of monitoring transects and points	15% increase in key species <sup>2</sup> populations at Preah Vihear	GEF OP3 (Biodiversity)		- point counts - fixed camera-traps	Populations are not too small to be able

Indicator	Baseline	Target	GEF OP or SP Indicator	UNDP Country Action Plan (2006-2010)	Verification Means	Assumptions
Protected Forest.	established at Preah Vihear Protected Forest in year 1.	Protected Forest by year 7.				to recover from past over-exploitation
3. Number of hectares of forest within core areas of key sites.	Protected Forest - 118,860 Wildlife Sanctuary – 100,802 O'Scach-O'Dar - 22,943	No decreases in forest area across key sites in comparison with baseline in years 3 and 7.	GEF OP3 (Biodiversity)		Site Monitoring programs (Component 3) - analysis of time-series remote sensing data	Land encroachment can be effectively controlled
4. Number of hunting incidences (traps/dogs/guns) per km-square surveyed during patrols.	Baseline data exists.	50% reduction in Protected Forest site by year 2, achieved at remaining sites by year 4. 75% reduction at all sites by year 5.			Site Monitoring programs (Component 3) - data collection within key sites, including core areas and village management	
5. Number of logging incidences per km-square surveyed during patrols.	Baseline data exists.	50% reduction in Protected Forest site by year 2, achieved at remaining sites by year 4. 75% reduction at all sites by year 5.				
11. Protected Area management plans.	None exist.	Protected Forest management plan by the end of year 3, Wildlife Sanctuary by year 4.	GEF SP1: PAs supported show improved management effectiveness against baseline scenarios.	# of hectares of protected areas, protected forest and fishery sanctuary areas, as well as critical wetland areas are well protected for biodiversity conservation and rural livelihood development # of conservation site management plans approved which integrate rural livelihoods.	- Management Plans exist and are reviewed annually	Government support for project management and activities continues  Security threats remain limited.
<b>Output 4: Adequate reporting on project outcomes and indicators</b>						
12. Project APR and financial reports	None exist.	Completed annually.			- reports	
<sup>1</sup> Priority villages have already been identified during the PDF-B, defined as villages particularly close to keystone resources for wildlife, where establishment of land management systems is an urgently required intervention.						
<sup>2</sup> Key Species: Asian Elephant, Giant Ibis, Eld's Deer, Large Cats, Dhole, Sarus Crane, Vultures, Wild Cattle (Gaur and Banteng), White-shouldered Ibis, White-winged Duck.						

## ANNEX IX: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PROJECT



## ANNEX X: PREAH VIHEAR PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2011-2015)

Goal 3: Use and management of economically potential natural resources for provincial development which are not harmful to the environment and protect the environment sustainably				
GOAL AND OBJECTIVES	Indicators			Development strategy
	Unit	2010	2015	
Environment				
3.3.3 Goal: Establishment of community protected areas (CPA)				
Undertake initial steps required to have CPA established	community	08	25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Consult with stakeholders to determine forest areas for management by community</li><li>Formulation of CPA rules and regulations in a participatory process and have these rules endorsed by provincial governor</li><li>Raise awareness on relevant legal tools to the community</li><li>Develop capacity of CPA commission and villagers by all possible means</li><li>Survey/record demographic situation in the community</li><li>Develop a management plan that meets requirement of local community needs</li><li>Seek development partners to assist the established community</li></ul>
Elect CPA Commission	commission	08	25	
Identify protected (forest) areas to be given to community	rule	08	25	
Formulate CPA rules and regulations	rule	04	25	
Develop CPA management plan	rule	01	04	
Make agreement between General Department of Administration for Nature Conservation and Protection (MoE) with CPA Commission	rule	01	04	
3.3.4 Goal: Conservation of natural resources and biodiversity				
Ranger stations and sub-stations for patrolling activities in areas where there are high biodiversity value	site	07	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Construct more ranger sub- stations, increase number of rangers and equip with necessary materials for patrolling activities</li><li>Raise awareness on relevant legal tools to the community</li><li>Cooperate with army to effectively enforce laws</li><li>Cooperate with local authorities and villagers in identifying community zones (core, conservation, and sustainable use zone)</li><li>Plan land use with inputs from experts to ensure green environment in all three protected areas</li></ul>
Identify management zones	zone	00	01	
Research rare species	zone	01	03	
Tree nurseries	site	00	02	
Reforestation	hectare	00	10	
Reduce pressure on natural resources by improving local livelihoods	community	00	04	
Resin extraction	community	01	04	
3.3.5 Goal: determine boundaries of community areas				
Get information on current land use	community	07	10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Get UTM coordinates on ground and put them in GIS system</li><li>Determine current types of land use</li><li>Draw maps based on data entered in GIS systems</li><li>Consult with concerned institutions and stakeholders before submission to the government for final endorsement</li><li>Demarcate physical boundaries of communities</li><li>Seek development partners</li></ul>
Develop maps showing boundaries of community areas with agreement from local community	community	07	10	
Request official recognition from government	community	00	10	
Demarcate official boundaries on ground	community	00	02	

3.3.9 Goal: Reduction in green house gas emission				
Plant trees in flooded areas where degraded	hectare	00	1000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Prevent encroachment of state forest land for individual property</li><li>• Disseminate governmental sub-decree No. 72</li><li>• Organize environmental day and environmental awareness campaign by all means to raise awareness of the public on issues arising from green house gas</li><li>• Seek development partners</li></ul>
Carry out environmental impact assessment on all development projects	percentage	30	100	
Forestry Administration Cantonment				
3.4.11 Goal: strengthen forest management and laws enforcement				
Community regulations	community	18	21	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Implement all required eight steps</li></ul>
Seedlings and tree planting	pole	12000	60000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Establish tree nurseries in every district and plant trees every year</li></ul>
Disseminate Forestry Laws, Regulations No. 01 and 02, and Circulations No. 02	village	60	300	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Disseminate Forestry Laws and Regulations No. 01 and 02 and Circulation No. 02</li></ul>
Working group get and consolidate data of forest land that was encroached/illegally occupied	site	12	60	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Plan timing and locations to implement activities cooperatively</li></ul>
Working group (sub commission) enforces laws and conduct monitoring on ground to develop maps, to issue warrant to take state forest land back	site	12	60	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Plan timing and locations to implement activities cooperatively</li></ul>
Demarcate boundaries	pole	50	600	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Working group raise awareness to communities in target areas</li><li>• Get UTM coordinates from target areas and demarcate boundaries on ground</li></ul>