PROGRAMMATIC IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION
AND RESULTS REPORT
ON
NILE BASIN TRUST FUND
AND
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY GRANTS
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$81.98 MILLION
TO THE NILE BASIN INITIATIVE
FOR
THE SHARED VISION PROGRAM

June 30, 2010

AFTWR
Nile
Africa and Middle East and North Africa Regions
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I. Program Data

A. Basic Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>Program Name:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda</td>
<td>Nile Basin Initiative Shared Vision Program</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PICRR Date:</th>
<th>ICRR Type:</th>
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<tr>
<td>05/28/2010</td>
<td>Programmatic ICRR</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lending Instrument:</th>
<th>Grantee:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Nile Basin Initiative</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental Category: C</th>
<th>GEF Global Focal Area: I (for NTEAP)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grant Amount (US$ millions)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Original</td>
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<tr>
<td>SVP Project Name</td>
<td>Project ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSI: Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement Project</td>
<td>P075948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWUAP: Efficient Water Use for Agricultural Production</td>
<td>P075947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTEAP: Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project</td>
<td>P070073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPT: Regional Power Trade Project (Phase I)</td>
<td>P075945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDBS: Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing Project</td>
<td>P075952</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRPM: Water Resources Planning and Management Project (Phase I)</td>
<td>P075946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP-C: Shared Vision Program Coordination Project</td>
<td>P076499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implementing Agencies: Nile Basin Initiative

Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: AIDB, Canada*, Denmark*, EU*, Finland*, France*, GEF, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands*, Norway*, Sweden*, Switzerland, UK*, USA, WB* and UNDP (*contribute to the WB-managed NBTF).

B. Key Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVP Project Name</th>
<th>Concept Review</th>
<th>Appraisal</th>
<th>Approval</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBSI: Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement Project</td>
<td>09/28/2001</td>
<td>05/08/2003</td>
<td>03/17/2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTEAP: Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project</td>
<td>08/30/2001</td>
<td>05/20/2002</td>
<td>04/08/2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPT: Regional Power Trade Project (Phase I)</td>
<td>09/28/2001</td>
<td>12/15/2003</td>
<td>05/05/2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDBS: Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing Project</td>
<td>12/03/2001</td>
<td>07/16/2004</td>
<td>02/03/2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRPM: Water Resources Planning and Management Project (Phase I)</td>
<td>11/07/2001</td>
<td>03/14/2003</td>
<td>04/22/2003</td>
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</table>

1 Indicates final figures disbursed by the implementing agency through UNOPS against project activities. In some cases, the full grant amount was disbursed from the parent TF to UNOPS; however, in those cases the unutilized amount is being returned to the NBTF prior to legal closure.

2 The undisbursed amount for WRPM II will be transferred to WRPM I, as it is a direct continuation of the project.
B. Key Dates (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVP Project Name</th>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Mid-Term Review</th>
<th>Closing</th>
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<tr>
<td>RPT: Regional Power Trade Project - Phase I</td>
<td>P075945</td>
<td>06/10/2004</td>
<td>05/23/2007</td>
<td>06/30/2008</td>
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<td>SDBS: Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing Project6</td>
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<td>06/02/2005</td>
<td>07/13/2007</td>
<td>06/30/2008</td>
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<td>WRPM: Water Resources Planning and Management Project - Phase I</td>
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<td>02/11/2005</td>
<td>06/20/2008</td>
<td>04/30/2009</td>
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**Shared Vision Program Mid-Term Review** 20/08/2007

C. Ratings Summary

C.1 Performance Rating by PICRR

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<tr>
<th>Outcomes</th>
<th>Bank Ratings</th>
<th>Grantee Ratings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Risk to Development Outcome</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance:</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grantee Performance:</td>
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C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Grantee Performance

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<th>Bank</th>
<th>Ratings</th>
<th>Grantee</th>
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<td>Quality at Entry:</td>
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<td>Grantee:</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quality of Supervision:</td>
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<td>Implementing Agencies:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Bank Performance:</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Overall Grantee Performance:</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
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D. Sector and Theme Codes

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<th>Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)</th>
<th>Original</th>
<th>Actual</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General water, sanitation and flood protection sector</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</table>

E. Bank Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>At ICR</th>
<th>At Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice President:</td>
<td>Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili (AFR)</td>
<td>Callisto E. Madavo (AFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shamshad Akhtar (MNA)</td>
<td>Jean-Louis Sarbib (MNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director:</td>
<td>Richard G. Scobey (AFCRI)</td>
<td>Praful C. Patel (AFTPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letitia Obeng (MNSRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Manager:</td>
<td>Ashok K. Subramaniam (AFTWR)</td>
<td>David Grey (AFTNL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Team Leader:</td>
<td>John Bryant Collier</td>
<td>Barbara Miller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR Team Leader:</td>
<td>John Bryant Collier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR Primary Author:</td>
<td>Petros Aklilu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICR Author:</td>
<td>Christopher Ward</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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3 RPT Phase II remains active with an estimated closing date of June 30, 2011.
4 WRPM Phase II remains active with an estimated closing date of December 31, 2012.
5 Please see Annex 2 for detailed ratings of individual SVP Projects.
II. Executive Summary

i. This is a Programmatic Implementation Completion and Results Report (PICRR) on the Shared Vision Program (SVP), a key pillar of the Nile Basin Initiative’s (NBI)\(^6\) Strategic Action Program. Because the SVP was conceived as an integrated program, with specific program development objectives, this report assesses the implementation and results of the SVP as a whole and its constituent projects.

ii. **Cooperation on the Nile began at a technical level in 1967 and gathered pace in the 1990s.** In February 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative was established as a transitional arrangement. The member countries’ shared vision was: “to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources”. The Strategic Action Program also set out the specific objectives of NBI and mandated the creation of implementation programs: the Shared Vision Program to build support and capacity for cooperation, and two sub-basin Subsidiary Action Programs to promote cooperative investment and prepare regional trans-boundary investments. This initial institutional architecture has guided NBI development for a decade.

iii. **Two principles were implicit in the partnership:** i) cooperative development was the best way to optimize the benefits from the shared Nile River; and ii) the sharing of multiple benefits was the key to equitable utilization.

iv. **Development Objectives:** The development objectives of the Shared Vision Program were to: i) build trust among the Nile riparian countries; ii) build capacity in member countries; and iii) create an enabling environment for trans-boundary investments.

v. **One umbrella coordination project and seven thematic projects were selected as key instruments to achieve the development objectives while promoting collaboration among the Riparian Countries.** The agreed projects resulted from a series of deliberations among the Riparian Countries. Despite intensive and a lengthy preparation of SVP Projects, the initial phase leading to the Mid-Term Review was characterized by slow start-up. Project Management Units were established from ground-up without a back stopping existing institution, and absence of procedures for both financial management and procurement, exasperated by a slow recruitment of key project staff. As projects neared closure, it became clear that problems stemming from uncertainty over the future institutional form of Nile cooperation presented risks to the sustainability of SVP achievements.

vi. **Notwithstanding the initial implementation bottlenecks, final program outputs were numerous albeit the outcomes were variable.** The SVP Project outputs were designed collectively to facilitate and feed into the identification and preparation of national and trans-boundary investments of the Eastern Nile and Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programs. Several of these technical outputs and the promotion of basin-wide stakeholder participation and involvement in the dialogue on the Nile were significant contributions to the overall development objectives of the SVP. Selected notable results of the SVP Projects include the formal and informal training of thousands of technical staff in the Nile Basin aimed at correcting the prevailing knowledge imbalance on Nile related issues in general and water resource planning and management in particular; the recognition of environmental threats facing the land and water resources of the Nile Basin and the identification of trans-boundary strategies to address common issues; facilitation and promotion of trans-boundary power purchase agreements; and guidelines and best practices for trans-boundary water resource strategies, planning and management. Inherent in the development of these technical outputs, is the opportunity for Nile Riparians to meet on various occasions—Steering Committee and Working Group meetings, knowledge disseminating seminars, study tours, etc and build trust and confidence that would promote collective responsibility for and development of the shared Nile Basin water resources.

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\(^6\) The NBI is a partnership among nine of the ten Nile Riparians: Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Eritrea participates in the NBI as an Observer.
vii. Governance of the SVP Projects demanded a complex structure to ensure full riparian representation. SVP projects were located in six different countries and each had its own Project Management Unit, under the overall guidance of Project Steering Committee comprising representatives of all the riparian countries. To advise the Nile Council of Ministers, the apex governing body of the NBI, is a nine member Nile Technical Advisory Committee. A Nile Secretariat, located in Entebbe, Uganda, provided overall coordination of the NBI.

Assessment of SVP Development Objectives—Relevance, Efficacy and Efficiency

The Overall Rating of the SVP is Moderately Satisfactory.

viii. SVP Development Objectives remain highly relevant to the riparian states today and will remain so for the foreseeable future. In view of recent issues arising among the Nile riparian countries on the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), continued trust and confidence building measures remain critical for harmonizing. Despite progress made in building ‘capacity’—focusing largely on human resources, the knowledge and institutional capacity gaps are still significant.

ix. SVP has made several contributions to building trust. SVP and the Subsidiary Action Programs (SAPs) have jointly contributed to the remarkable progress towards trans-boundary cooperation. Nile Basin networks and partnerships, including Nile Basin University Forum, the Nile Media Network, and networks of parliamentarians, women and NGOs have contributed to trust building. It is equally notable that rising trust observed during the past ten years has been largely at the technical level and little progress has been made in the political arena.

x. SVP had a major focus on raising technical skills and expanding knowledge and information. In addition to the learning implicit in all SVP activities, most projects had specific components to develop skills, including the development and delivery of training programs and materials, study tours, and exchange visits. SVP has improved skills, knowledge and data exchange, and contributed to narrowing the imbalances between riparians. However, it had limited intervention to strengthen riparian institutions.

xi. SVP has contributed to the enabling environment for investment in the Nile basin countries. SVP has helped to formulate templates and guidelines for policy alignments, including water resource management policies, environmental policy on impact assessment, wetlands, biodiversity, water quality, and institutional frameworks for regional power trade. These improvements, together with the growing trust and confidence in cooperation, have paved the way for Riparians to collaborate on trans-boundary investments. To date, the portfolio in the Nile Basin is over US$1.3 billion of investments under implementation and preparation. These projects cover power generation and trans-boundary trade, irrigation and drainage, watershed management, natural resource management, and flood control and preparedness.

xii. Assessment of the Efficiency of SVP. Although cost effectiveness cannot be measured accurately, the SVP projects were largely implemented within approved budgets.

xiii. Risks to Development Outcomes are Substantial: The major risk to SVP development outcomes is linked to the establishment of an inclusive and permanent institutional cooperation mechanism. One risk stemming from uncertainty over future cooperation is to the trust and confidence that SVP has built up. If the move towards systematic cooperation appears to falter, this could lead to disillusionment and the erosion of trust. This risk needs to be recognized and actively managed. Sustainability also depends on capacity to adopt the SVP outputs. These risks are within NBI and at country level. The transitional support under the ongoing Institutional Support Project is a key mechanism for sustainability and mitigating such risks.
Assessment of Bank and Grantee Performance

The Bank’s overall performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

xiv. The Bank supported a participatory process that resulted in a Riparian-owned, innovative and comprehensive program of projects designed to achieve SVP objectives. The Bank was effective in coordinating and providing quality enhancement of a highly complex participatory process. The Bank’s performance in ensuring Quality at Entry is rated Satisfactory.

xv. Supervision of SVP was a monumental task. Supervision of SVP Projects was weak during the start-up phase until Mid-term review when the Bank augmented its supervision capacity and tapped the skills of participating Development Partners. The load was enormous for one team leader trying to manage simultaneously eight projects to a standard equivalent to the supervision of Bank-financed projects. Despite the program nature of SVP, supervision rarely assessed the SVP program as a whole except at Mid-term Review. The Bank effort was not always integrated between the two Bank Regions concerned. NBI in general and SVP in particular have not consistently engaged the attention of Bank management responsible for the individual riparian countries, and were not prominent in their dialogue with their clients. Quality of Bank Supervision is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

The Grantee’s overall performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

xvi. Nile-SEC had very limited managerial and technical capacity, and the coordination project (SVP-C) and the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS) were entrusted to provide project coordination and supervision support. Overall, SVP-C support contributed to coordination of a sprawling program, and increased synergies between SVP and the SAPs. However, SVP-C (like the Bank) never really fulfilled the recommendation at the mid-term review to monitor SVP at the program level, although the SVP coordination meetings did help to improve coordination and promote a programmatic overview. Nearly all PMUs viewed UNOPS as ineffective due to changing procedures and slow decision making. NBI Secretariat failed to develop a communications strategy that would have managed public expectations and this failure has created a risk for sustainability of SVP outcomes. The Grantee’s performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

The performance of the Implementing Agencies (PMUs) is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

xvii. Nearly all the PMUs had implementation start-up problems and found the UNOPS management services slow, cumbersome and unpredictable. Despite these common issues faced by the PMUs, their performance in the delivery of the agreed work programs was generally good, but varied considerably among the Project Management Units (PMUs). A synoptic review suggests that overall, all SVP projects suffered from a slow and protracted start-up, but that subsequent implementation was largely proactive, results-oriented and problem-solving.

Lessons Learned

xviii. There are several lessons for both the Bank and the Grantee. These lessons are also relevant to other Regional Programs/Projects.
Lessons for the Bank and Grantee:

1) Even such a highly complex regional program can succeed if there is political will, participation, prudent institutional and technical design, and strong partnerships.

2) A political process that is critical to lasting regional cooperation demands wide stakeholder participation and transparency. To compliment such critical elements, a strong communications program to liaise between policy makers, implementing institutions and the general public should be a top priority.

3) As SVP projects were designed without clarity on permanent institutional arrangements, no “exit strategy” was built in, and planning for sustainability had to be conducted towards the closing of projects. For such a program, thought should be given from the start to anchoring functions in national or regional organizations or transition arrangements made early on through partnerships and other approaches. Modalities should be kept under review as the political and institutional context evolves.

4) A program with an unfinished agenda will benefit from a bridging arrangement.

5) The trained staff and those who have served in different capacities in SVP are valuable assets to be tapped in future NBI and Riparian Country operations.

Lessons for the Bank:

6) For Bank staff, technical assistance oriented operations do not lend themselves to management recognition and reward for serving the client effectively.

7) The location of the core task team is critical for effectively managing a regional operation.

8) Prior to granting no-objection to the selection of an agency to provide project management services, the Bank should carry out a thorough review of the agency’s capability and procedures.

9) In a regional program, Development Partners may share responsibilities in providing technical support to the clients.
III. Background

1. The eight SVP projects were designed as a program, and this report evaluates them on a programmatic basis. This is a Programmatic Implementation Completion and Results Report (PICRR) on the Shared Vision Program (SVP), a key pillar of the Nile Basin Initiative’s (NBI) Strategic Action Program. Because the SVP was conceived as an integrated program, with specific program development objectives, this report assesses the implementation and results of the SVP as a whole and its constituent seven trans-boundary thematic projects and one coordination project. The PICRR was prepared in two stages. In a first stage, findings were shared with the Nile riparian countries, the development partners and the various stakeholders. In a second stage, feedback from stakeholders was incorporated and the report was converted into a modified Bank ICRR format.

2. Facing considerable challenges, cooperation on the Nile began at a technical level in 1967 and gathered pace in the 1990s. Cooperation on the Nile is challenging. There are ten riparians with widely varying history and interests, and in the past there have been low levels of trust, cooperation and communication. The challenges of moving towards cooperative development and management are thus considerable. Efforts to develop cooperation in the Nile Basin date back to 1967, when eight riparians (Ethiopia joined only as an observer in 1971) established HYDROMET to conduct hydro-meteorological surveys. In 1983, Egypt and Sudan led an initiative called Undugu (“brotherhood”) to lay the groundwork for basin-wide cooperation and to draft plans for development of Nile waters. However, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania did not take part. From 1992-9, TECCONILE engaged all ten riparians, although Burundi, Kenya, Eritrea and Ethiopia held only observer status. This effort, facilitated and funded by CIDA, had significant outcomes: the establishment of the Nile Council of Ministers of Water Resources (Nile-COM), the identification of 22 technical assistance and capacity building projects, and the design of the Nile River Basin Action Plan (NRBAP, 1995). The NRBAP, openly addressed, for the first time, the issues of economic development and equitable utilization of Nile waters.

3. Dialogue was also broadened and relationships established through a series of high ‘academic’ conferences. In parallel to TECCONILE, a forum for exchange of views was mounted, the Nile 2002 Conferences (1993-2002). Politicians, technicians and academics met together in their personal capacity, with international water and legal experts. These conferences successfully opened dialogue between all riparians on all issues at both political and technical levels in an informal and non-representative context.

4. Review of the NRBAP led to agreement amongst riparians to move ahead on an inclusive cooperative footing. In 1997, Nile-COM requested the World Bank to coordinate financial support for the NRBAP and subsequently agreed to the Bank’s proposal for an International Advisory Group to review NRBAP and then to seek an inclusive way forward. This review, drawing upon experience from many international river basins, formed the basis for consultative meetings in 1998 which led to strategic agreement among the riparians that an inclusive cooperative process should be set up.

5. From this agreement, NBI, SVP and the SAPs were born. In February 1999, Nile-COM took the decision in Dar es Salaam to establish the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) as a transitional arrangement. The NBI countries’ shared vision is set out in the Strategic Action Program, which was agreed in Dar es Salaam: “to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources”. The Strategic Action Program also set out the specific objectives of the NBI (Box 1) and mandated the creation of implementation programs: the Shared Vision Program (SVP) to build support and capacity for cooperation, and two Subsidiary Action Programs (SAPs) to promote cooperative investment and prepare regional trans-boundary investments. This initial institutional architecture has guided NBI development for a decade.

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7 The NBI is a partnership among nine of the ten Nile Riparians: Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Eritrea participates in the NBI as an Observer.
Box 1: Objectives of the Nile Basin Initiative

The Strategic Action Program set out the specific objectives of the NBI:

- to develop the Nile Basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way to ensure prosperity, security, and peace for all its peoples
- to ensure efficient water management and the optimal use of the resources
- to ensure cooperation and joint action between riparian countries, seeking win-win gains
- to target poverty eradication and promote economic integration
- to ensure that the program results in a move from planning to action

6. Following the Dar es Salaam agreements, a governance structure was set up, together with a secretariat, two investment arms, and national offices. The NBI governance structure comprises Nile-COM and its Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC). Reporting to the governance structure is the Nile Basin Initiative Secretariat (Nile-SEC), based in Entebbe, with responsibilities for planning, monitoring, knowledge and information management. The two sub-regional Subsidiary Action Programs (SAPs) are: the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Program (ENSAP) and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP). In each country, NBI National Offices headed by the national TAC member were established to serve as the focal point for all NBI-related activities.

7. Development partners united to support NBI, notably through NBTF. In 2001, the International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON) meeting in Geneva brought together the Nile Basin States and a large number of development partners. Participants pledged US$140 million to support the establishment of the NBI institutions and to finance the SVP and also committed to support cooperative trans-boundary investment projects. To date, 18 Development Partners have provided support to the NBI totaling approximately US$250 million. The majority of this support (close to US$200 million) is channeled through the multi-donor Nile Basin Trust Fund (NBTF) that was established in 2003 and which, at the request of Nile-COM, is managed by the World Bank. The NBI donor partnership and NBTF have provided an important mechanism to coordinate support to NBI programs and projects. Eight other development partners coordinate with the NBTF as bilateral financiers and actively participate in NBTF Committee (NBTF-C) meetings and deliberations.

8. Nile-COM set up a parallel political process, to negotiate a cooperative framework agreement (CFA) among the Nile riparian countries. Nile-COM mandated a Negotiating Committee, comprised of riparian experts supported by an international legal advisor, to develop a permanent basis for systematic cooperation on Nile development and management. The Committee, together with Nile-COM, has worked on a draft CFA since then.

9. Although linked, the SVP/SAP development process and the CFA political process are formally separate. The NBI’s technical cooperation, including the SVP, was separated by design from the CFA process in order to keep regional development and technical assistance initiatives moving forward independent of political discussions. At the closing of SVP, considerable positive momentum was evident on the development agenda, while at the same time the still-continuing political negotiations on the CFA entailed an uncertain legal future for the NBI. It is important to keep the CFA in mind when

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8 ENSAP includes Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The ENSAP regional office, called the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO), is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
9 NELSAP includes Burundi, DR Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda as well as Egypt and Sudan as downstream riparians. Ethiopia is an observer. The NELSAP Coordination Unit (NELSAP-CU) is based in Kisali, Rwanda.
10 NBTF Partners: ADB, Canada*, Denmark*, EU*, Finland*, France*, GEF, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands*, Norway*, Sweden*, Switzerland, UK*, USA, WB* and UNDP (*contribute to the WB-managed NBTF)
11 On April 13, 2010, in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, seven members of the Nile Council of Ministers agreed to open the CFA for signature for not more than one year while Egypt and Sudan rejected the declaration. As of May 20, 2010, five riparian countries—Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda—have signed the CFA.
discussing SVP outcomes and the risks to sustainability. It is also equally important to remember that these two processes are separate.

IV. Program Context, Development Objectives and Design

A. Context at appraisal

10. The challenge in 1999 was to build trust, capacity and the investment environment that would consolidate a constituency and capability for permanent cooperative arrangements. In 1999 when the SVP was conceived, the Nile riparians had moved tentatively towards cooperation. Basic knowledge about the Nile had been gathered, a practice of cooperation at the technical level and of dialogue at all levels had begun, and an initial institutional framework (Nile-COM, TAC, NBI) had been set up. Key principles had been tabled: that there was considerable extra value that could be gained from development and management of the Nile; that cooperative development was the best way to realize that extra value; that the sharing of multiple benefits of water rather than just water allocations was the key to equitable utilization; and that integrated water management with common institutions was essential to cooperative development. These ideas were implicit in the NBI mission and all subsequent discussions among riparians. What was required was to move ahead to develop the trust and capacity that would enable this vision to be translated into specific institutions and to develop the enabling environment for the investments needed to realize the economic benefits of cooperation for the population.

11. Common development issues facing riparians created a strong justification for cooperative actions. The Nile River, flowing from south to north, is the longest river in the world and the source of great civilizations. Today the basin is home to over 160 million people and the basin countries home to over 390 million people, most of whom live in extreme poverty and food insecurity. Many Nile countries are subject to recurrent floods and droughts, environmental degradation and severe energy shortages. Five are amongst the fifteen poorest countries in the world. All have strong poverty reduction objectives: they are all signatories to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and so are committed to meet the agreed multi-sectoral social, economic and environmental targets by 2015. In this context of extreme poverty, cooperative actions offer the prospect of a boost to economic development and consequent poverty reduction.

12. In this context, six overriding issues were identified to be addressed under the SVP:

a. Loss of economic value due to the absence of trans-boundary water resources management: The water resources of the Nile are the basin’s primary natural resource, critical for food security, drinking water supply and sanitation, power generation and transport. The Strategic Action Program (see I above) recognized the need for efficient and equitable utilization of this scarce resource, which was already known to be vulnerable to climate change. The resources had hitherto been developed on a country by country basis, without any integrated plan. As a result, some riparians had proceeded much further with development than others, and overall there was a considerable economic benefit foregone. Some studies estimated that under full cooperation, the economic value of the use of Nile water would double. The SVP was therefore to address water resources policy, project planning and management and the efficiency of water use (three SVP projects were to address this issue: WRPM, SDBS, EWUAP).12

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12 References in parenthesis are to the projects of the SVP family that were designed to address each issue. See Section II B below for details of each project.
b. *Lack of integrated planning and management due to weak institutional capacity and lack of balance between the various riparians:* Institutional capacity, knowledge and skills in water resources planning, development and management were limited, and distribution of capacity was uneven between the Nile riparian countries. Therefore, the SVP was designed to build capacity and develop institutions, with a particular focus on the less well developed upstream countries (ATP, WRPM, EWUAP and SDBS were the lead projects to address these issues).

c. *Proliferation of severe environmental threats due to the absence of a framework for trans-boundary environmental management:* One result of the lack of integrated basin-wide planning was the emergence of trans-boundary environmental issues which had been identified in the Nile Basin Trans-boundary Environmental Analysis. The SVP was therefore to help develop a basin-wide framework to address trans-boundary environmental issues (NTEAP and WRPM were expected to address this issue).

d. *Lost hydropower potential and unsatisfied demand for energy due to lack of market development and framework for trans-boundary power trade:* The Nile riparians have abundant potential for the development of power generation and trans-boundary power trade. However, this potential was not being utilized fully. The SVP was therefore to promote power trade and create a regional power market, so preparing the enabling environment for investment in hydropower generation and trans-boundary transmission (RPT and SDBS were designed to address this issue.).

e. *Pervasive food insecurity, particularly in the upper riparians, due to lack of integrated planning and of technical solutions for agricultural water development and management.* Food insecurity is widespread in the Nile Basin. With the exception of Egypt, the Nile riparians face recurrent food shortages due not only to lack of purchasing power but also to the vulnerability of their predominantly rain fed production systems to climatic uncertainties and natural disasters like drought and flood. The SVP was therefore designed to address the future of agricultural water, both at the level of integrated water resource planning and management (e.g. issues of trade-offs between hydropower and irrigation) and at the institutional and technical level of agricultural water management (WRPM, EWUAP, and SDBS were the lead projects to address this issue).

f. *Lack of a basin-wide perspective and a low level of understanding and commitment to cooperative development, due to the lack of regional mechanisms for information exchange and stakeholder voice:* There was no formal basin-wide mechanism for exchange of Nile Basin related information and data. A key element for trust and confidence building was seen to be the sharing of information. More generally, there was a low level of understanding and commitment to cooperative development amongst stakeholders. To enhance exchanges and promote stakeholder participation, measures to share information and data and to build confidence and promote the role of stakeholders in the Nile Basin were identified as central to SVP’s objectives (the lead projects that were designed to address this issue were WRPM, NTEAP and CBSI).

**Rationale for Bank Involvement**

13. *At the request of riparians, the Bank agreed to coordinate development support and financing for the Nile.* Bank involvement began with Nile-COM’s formal request (to the Bank President) to lead a review of the NRBAP and to coordinate financial support to NBI, which materialized in the establishment of the Bank-led consortium of Development Partners and the setting up of the NBTF (see I above).

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13 The Nile Basin Transboundary Environmental Analysis (May 2001) was prepared by the Nile riparian countries using a highly participatory process in 2000/2001 through a GEF PDF II grant for the preparation of NTEAP.
14. The Bank’s long experience in supporting river basin cooperation, and cooperative development of the Nile was a good match for the Bank’s overarching poverty reduction goals. The SVP Project Appraisal Document (PAD) presents a convincing case for support by Bank and Development Partners to the NBI in general and SVP in particular, based on Bank comparative advantage and track record, and on the good fit with Bank goals and strategies. The Bank’s track record in supporting cooperation on international rivers dates back to a catalytic role in negotiations of the Indus River Treaty between India and Pakistan. The PAD also correctly argued that support for SVP would promote the Africa Region’s country assistance strategies and its global commitment to poverty reduction under the MDGs. Progress in the identification of regional and national projects under the NBI was directly in line with the Bank’s Water Resource Management Strategy and was expected to increase opportunities for Bank assistance.

15. The relevance of this rationale for Bank involvement has increased in the last decade. Since 2003, the Bank portfolio in regional projects has increased substantially, particularly in the Africa Region, which by 2008 accounted for nearly 50 percent of Bank lending for regional projects. The Bank has also been actively supporting cooperation on other river basins—Niger, Senegal, Mekong, Indus, and others - and has a pipeline of similar projects in the Africa Region. In 2008, the Regional Integration Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa and the 2009 World Development Report on Reshaping Economic Geography underlined the need for a regional approach in managing shared natural resources. SVP also fits well with current Bank and global strategies for the prevention of regional conflicts, and for socially and environmentally sustainable development.

B. Program Development Objectives and Key Indicators

16. SVP was designed with the objectives of building trust, capacity and an enabling environment for investment. SVP was conceived as a multi-country, multi-sectoral grant-funded program of collaborative action, exchange of experience, and trust and capacity building intended to establish a strong foundation for regional cooperation. According to the Strategic Action Program, SVP aims were to promote the shared vision of the riparians through a “limited but effective set of basin wide activities and programs”, whose main goal was to build support and capacity for cooperation and to create an enabling environment for investments and action on the ground within an agreed basin wide framework. The specific development objectives agreed for the SVP are to: build trust and capacity, and an enabling environment for investments in Nile Basin countries.

Program Design Summary

| NBI mission | ✓ Achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefits from, the common Nile Basin water resources |
| SVP Development Objectives | Build trust and capacity, and an enabling environment for investments in the Nile Basin countries. |
| Outcome Indicators | • Increased basin-wide dialogue and exchange of information |
| | • Functioning network of professionals |
| | • Enhanced skills and expanded information bases |
| | • Informed riparian dialogue on trans-boundary development opportunities, challenges and impacts |
| | • Enhanced stakeholder participation in the NBI process |
C. The SVP Projects: Components of the SVP

17. During the period 2003-2005, the Bank approved the eight projects that made up the SVP: seven thematic projects and an SVP coordination project. For the purpose of this PICRR, the eight SVP projects are treated as “components” of the SVP.14

18. The eight SVP projects and their project development objectives (PDO) are:

a. **ATP - Applied Training** (NBTF Grant US$14.38 million; approved 02/2004; effective: 10/2004; closed: 12/2009): to strengthen capacity in selected subject areas of water resources planning and management in public and private sectors and community groups; strengthen centers with the capacity to develop and deliver programs on a continuing basis; and expand the frequency and scope of basin interchange among water professionals.

b. **CBSI - Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement** (NBTF Grant US$11.56 million; approved: 03/2004; effective: 07/2004; closed: 12/2009): to develop confidence in regional cooperation under the NBI, both at the basin and local levels, and ensure full stakeholder involvement in the NBI and its projects.

c. **EWUAP - Efficient Water Use for Agricultural Production** (US$4.66 million; approved 03/2005; effective: 03/2005; closed: 06/2009): to provide a sound conceptual and practical basis to increase the availability and efficient use of water for agricultural production.

d. **NTEAP - Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project** (US$8.99 million NBTF Grant and US$8.0 million World Bank GEF Grant approved 04/2003; effective: 10/2003; closed: 12/2009. NTEAP also received a UNDP GEF Phase I Grant for US$8.8 million and a UNDP GEF Phase II Grant for US$6.7 million): to provide a strategic framework for environmentally sustainable development of the Nile River Basin and support basin-wide environmental action linked to transboundary issues in the context of the NBI Strategic Action Program.


f. **SDBS - Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing** (US$4.22 million; approved: 02/2005; effective: 03/2005; closed: 06/2009); to strengthen Nile River basin-wide socioeconomic cooperation and integration.

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14 While this PICRR looks at the SVP as a whole, it reports more specifically on the projects that closed between December 2008 and December 2009.
g. WRPM - Water Resources Planning and Management (Phase I US$12.81 million; approved: 10/2004; effective: 02/2005; closed: 12/2009; and Phase II US$11.20 million; closing: 12/2012. WRPM also received an AfDB Grant for US$3.0 million and a GTZ contribution for US$4.8 million): to enhance analytical capacity for a basin-wide perspective to support the development, management, and protection of Nile Basin water resources in an equitable, optimal, integrated and sustainable manner.

h. SVP-C - SVP Coordination (NBTF Grant US$11.6 million; approved: 04/2003; effective: 10/2003; closed 12/2008. SVP-C also received a GTZ contribution for US$310,000): to strengthen the capacity of NBI institutions to execute basin-wide programs and ensure effective oversight and coordination of the NBI’s Shared Vision Program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVP Projects</th>
<th>SVP Financing (US$ millions)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NBTF Final Phase I Grant Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Name</td>
<td>Project ID Trust Fund #</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATP: Applied Training Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSI: Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement Project</td>
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<td>EWSAP: Efficient Water Use for Agricultural Production</td>
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<td>NTEAP: Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project</td>
<td>P070073 TF052133 GEF TF051539</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPT: Regional Power Trade Project (Phase I)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDBS: Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing Project</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRPM: Water Resources Planning and Management Project (Phase I)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP-C: Shared Vision Program Coordination Project</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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Table 1 – SVP Financing

19. Synergy between projects in pursuit of SVP objectives was built in. The SVP was designed first at the program and then at the project level. Albeit each project was designed to meet its own development objectives, the overall goal was to contribute to the achievement of the SVP development objectives of building trust and capacity, and an enabling environment for investment. Thus all the projects had elements of trust building among stakeholders e.g. by sharing data and experience on water resources, attending learning seminars, designing and implementing trans-boundary micro-projects etc. Although ATP took the lead in capacity building, other projects such as NTEAP, RPT and WRPM were

¹⁵ As detailed in SVP Project Appraisal Documents (PADs).
also designed to strengthen human resources in the riparian countries. With respect to creating an enabling environment for investments, the CBSI, SDBS, WRPM and RPT were the prime movers. Total program cost was US$130 million, financed by NBTF, GEF and other bilateral and multilateral sources, together with riparian country contributions, which were in kind (see Table 1 above).

Revision to SVP Projects

20. Several components within SVP projects were revised, particularly at mid-term review. During implementation, the SVP projects faced challenges and evolving needs. A flexible approach was adopted. Components were added e.g. social development and development communication in CBSI and a trans-boundary diagnostic environmental analysis in NTEAP. Project components were also dropped under SDBS (the Nile Trans-boundary Development Facility) and RPT (the regional power trade forum). For RPT, the development objectives was also modified to: “facilitate the development of regional power markets among the Nile Basin Countries”. These changes were a pragmatic response to new challenges, implementation difficulties, a changing regional context, and new opportunities. They were, however, within the SVP Development Objectives and were designed to improve project contribution to the overall SVP outcomes.

D. Benefits and Beneficiaries

21. The broad long-term benefits of the NBI include poverty alleviation and enhanced regional stability. The specific benefits of SVP reflected the Development Objectives: (a) the establishment of a foundation for cooperative investment; (b) improved cooperation, dialogue, capacity, networks and knowledge within the SVP-related sectors; and, more generally (c) enhanced inter-country trust and dialogue leading to greater economic cooperation and integration.

22. Beneficiaries of the SVP are diverse—local, national, regional and global. With the adoption and acceptance of the Nile River as a ‘shared resource’ of the people of the Nile Basin, the benefits emerging from ‘equitable and sustainable utilization’ would accrue to over 390 million people inhabiting the Nile Basin countries. Specific target beneficiaries included the NBI institutions; local and national governments; professional staff in SVP-related fields; national and local decisions-makers; planners and resource managers; and civil society, including the private sector, the media, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and community based organizations. More generally, the global community was expected to benefit from enhanced peace and stability, economic development and environmental good practice, especially in the era of climate change.

V. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

A. Project Preparation Process

23. Program design was identified by stakeholders and approved by Nile-COM. Following the decision of Nile-COM to commission the SVP, a series of workshops was held, beginning with a

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16 Added under Phase II of GEF support and, at closing of NTEAP, transferred to Nile-Sec for completion)
comprehensive SVP design workshop in Sodere, Ethiopia in May 1999. In March 2001, Nile-COM approved an outline for the seven thematic projects. Subsequently, in Cairo, Egypt in February 2002, the Nile-COM also approved the concept of SVP-C as a coordination project that would strengthen the capacity of NBI institutions and coordinate the SVP thematic projects.

24. **A participatory preparation process was supported by technical inputs and quality control from development partners.** Nile-TAC oversaw and guided the identification and preparation of the SVP projects. For each project, national sector specialists submitted national reports to a project working group, covering the sectoral issues, policies, institutional arrangements and the priority areas to be addressed under the project. Each working group then formulated the respective project document which was reviewed in workshops and then presented through Nile-TAC to Nile-Com for endorsement. This approach had two advantages: it increased riparian ownership of the process and the product; and it created a platform for riparian states to deliberate on a shared agenda. Development partners, including the AfDB, UNDP, GEF, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and led by the Bank, facilitated the preparation, helping to build consensus on the final design and ensuring that the projects met international technical, financial, fiduciary, environmental and social safeguards requirements. The Bank prepared individual PADs for each project, together with an overall ‘SVP PAD’ for the program as a whole.

25. **SVP projects were located in six different countries and each had its own PMU.** Although it would have been administratively simpler and more cost effective to centralize the SVP program with Nile-SEC in Entebbe, the Nile-COM made the decision that SVP projects would be located in a number of riparian capitals in order to ensure national ownership and visibility of the NBI. Each project was designed to be implemented by a project management unit (PMU) headed by a regional project manager (RPM). Working Groups were also to be constituted as needed to provide technical input and review. The projects also had representation in each country, in the form of paid or unpaid National Project Coordinators (NPCs).

26. **Governance of the SVP Projects demanded a complex structure to ensure full riparian representation.** Nile-COM was the overall governing body of the SVP, although most governance functions were delegated to Nile-TAC, supported by Nile-SEC. Each SVP project was governed by a Project Steering Committee (PSC) comprising one or two representatives from each country for national representation and the Nile-TAC member from the host country for regional representation.

**B. Project Design and Quality at Entry**

27. **Although the Program Design Summary does not clearly demonstrate the results chain, the SVP projects are necessary and sufficient to reach the program development objective and the overall goal.** The NBI goal and the SVP Development Objectives are mutually reinforcing and clearly formulated. Although the Program Design Summary (Log Frame) presented in the overall SVP Master PAD is quite brief, and does not trace the linkages from program to overall goal in any detail, it is clear that taken together the expected program outcomes are necessary and sufficient to achieve the goal. Similarly, taken together, the eight projects as described in their respective PADs were appropriate and sufficient to achieve the objectives of the overall SVP program. The design also focused on elements that would promote ‘benefits sharing’ among the Nile riparian countries rather than on issues related to water allocation. This design approach served the SVP well by mobilizing the NBI members around projects intended to build trust, confidence and capacity, and the creation of an enabling environment for investments. Two aspects, nonetheless, might have been clearer: one is that the target date for achieving
the SVP Development Objectives is not explicitly established in the SVP Master PAD. Second, most of the performance indicators specify qualitative targets, making measurement difficult.

28. **The projects had attainable objectives and were appropriately designed and equipped to achieve them.** Regional projects often exhibit ambitious design features but have weak implementation track records. SVP design largely avoided this problem: although the development objectives appear ambitious, the design response was measured and appropriate. Another frequent problem is the tendency to load projects with physical investments upfront. In this respect, too, an appropriate design choice was made for SVP, to focus on laying the technical foundation and developing the human resource base for a long term collaborative environment. With regard to on the ground physical activities, only NTEAP included a small community based micro-grant component, which was successfully integrated with the policy and capacity building components.

29. **As projects neared closure, it became clear that two problems stemming from uncertainty over the future institutional form of Nile cooperation presented risks to the sustainability of SVP achievements, and design could possibly have provided for more consultation, transparency and flexibility on the issue.** First, SVP projects were designed separately from the political discussions about the establishment of a permanent institution and resulted in the delivery of the SVP without any built in “exit strategy”. As a consequence, planning for sustainability was only begun after the MTR of the SVP projects. Second, as SVP gathered momentum and the parallel political discussions in the basin also progressed, expectations rose of agreement on cooperation and the delivery of related benefits. In a sense, this was an achievement of the SVP – but it was also a problem, as the risk of disappointment with lack of progress on the establishment of a permanent organization increased. What might have been considered in SVP design was a provision for frequent consultation with Nile-COM and for informing the general public, especially at mid term, and the flexibility to adjust SVP in the light of the political reality.

30. **More consultation with regional institutions might have added value.** More liaisons with regional knowledge-generating institutions could have informed the options for project institutional arrangements and possibly indicated opportunities for outsourcing selected tasks.

31. **Project quality at entry was on the whole good.** Overall, quality at entry was good, which is due in large part to the lengthy preparation period (1999-2003), the extent of country participation, and the high level of technical inputs from countries and development partners. A project level assessment of the design of the eight projects reveals few problems of quality at entry. The main risks were:

a. Over-complexity, which was a problem for NTEAP, and corrected at the mid-term review.

b. Complex implementation arrangements implicit in the scattered location of projects and the elaborate governance structure. This risk was mitigated by the ample financing provision for frequent travel for consultation and coordination among SVP projects and other NBI activities and on the whole did not prove a major constraint during implementation (see below). On the positive side, the multiple locations and frequent exchanges between sites contributed to building trust and confidence.

32. **Program sequencing could have reflected priority needs in improving knowledge and capacity.** Implicit in the SVP was the reality that there was uneven knowledge and capacity amongst riparians (see

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17 In practice, by December 2009, six SVP Projects had closed and the first phase of the two remaining projects had closed earlier. Therefore, for the purpose of the PICRR, December 31, 2009 has been adopted as the target date for assessing the achievement of the SVP Development Objectives.
18 In the Africa Region, 25 percent of regional projects are currently rated as problem projects, reflecting complexity of design and weak implementation capacity in multi-country operations.
19 Of the eight SVP Projects, the World Bank’s Quality Assurance Group (QAG) has assessed only NTEAP and CBSI (as part of the Learning Review of Regional Projects). Although the review did not rate the quality at entry, it noted the complexity of NTEAP and of the overall SVP and NBI institutional and financial arrangements. However, the review concluded: “That said, design of this particular project was relatively straightforward, being based on previous analytical work.”
II A above). Unfortunately, this did not trigger a planned sequencing of the SVP Projects to ‘level the knowledge playing field’. For example, ATP and WRPM were critical to the SVP capacity building objective, and could have been accorded a higher priority for earlier preparation and approval. However, in practice ATP and WRPM were amongst the most prompt of SVP projects to take-off, and overall SVP contributed to narrowing the knowledge gap.

C. Program Implementation and Issues

33. Despite substantial preparation efforts, projects took a long time to take-off. There were several reasons for the slow start. First, SVP Projects were launched with minimal institutional backstopping at Nile-SEC that was itself also in a formative stage. Administrative and implementation procedures had not been developed, which created an added challenge for project start-up. Recruitment of key project staff took longer than anticipated, partly because of the need for balancing representation between countries, which made the selection process longer and may have compromised quality in one or two cases. Several projects were launched without key staff. Another common bottleneck was the time taken by PMUs and PSCs to fully understand project objectives, design and implementation procedures. Project launch workshops were held, but did not resolve all issues. SDBS, which experienced a very slow start and management problems, did not benefit from a formal launch workshop, even though its design was exceptionally difficult to comprehend and implement.

34. In order to align all projects on the same procurement and financial systems, Nile-SEC signed a Management Service Agreement (MSA) with United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). As the NBI was a nascent institution and the PMUs were new, UNOPS was contracted to provide project services (staff recruitment, procurement, financial management and auditing, etc.) for the SVP following a rigorous selection process. UNOPS legal status to operate in all countries was seen as an added benefit. Despite the anticipated benefits, nearly all the PMUs reported that the complex UNOPS system and procedures exacerbated start-up delays.

Implementation Experience Leading to Mid-Term Review (MTR)

35. After initial start up problems, three projects - NTEAP, WRPM and ATP -- took off rapidly, largely due to strong management teams and supportive PSCs. Two projects – EWUAP and SDBS – were slower to get up to speed, due to problems of comprehending the project design and management. RPT stalled when its major output – the establishment of a regional power trade forum was superseded by the parallel establishment of the Eastern African Power Pool. CBSI management made a commendable effort to implement the project, but was faced with changing needs (to include social development and development communications) and with the complexity of the challenge of building awareness and understanding of the benefits of regional cooperation. In addition, CBSI had to respond to multiple un-programmed demands from Nile-SEC, the SAPs and other SVP projects.

36. All SVP projects were constrained by the cumbersome and at times changing procurement, financial management and accounting procedures of UNOPS and by the consequent delays in the release of funds from NBTF.

From MTR to Closing

20 In addition, UNOPS was expected to build fiduciary and management capacities in the NBI institutions. This never materialized and in 2008, the MSA was amended to drop the capacity building component.
37. In mid-2007, Nile-SEC/SVP-C, together with the Bank and certain development partners, launched the mid-term review (MTR), which was the only review of the SVP program, as a whole during the implementation period. Prior to the MTR, there was no independent evaluation of the SVP, though an independent evaluation of NTEAP was conducted in accordance with GEF guidelines. Following MTRs for the individual projects, the SVP MTR assessed progress against targets, analyzed the causes of slow implementation, and recommended a series of adjustments to project components, financing reallocations, and extension of closing dates (with and without cost implications). The MTR also helped to prioritize the deliverables for the three low performing projects – RPT, SDBS and EWUAP – and to lighten the task of SDBS by recommending the dropping of an unfunded mandate on private sector participation which Nile-SEC had proposed. Stronger Nile-SEC/SVP-C and Bank supervision was recommended. The review also assessed SVP in the light of possible establishment of a permanent river basin organization, and recommended planning to prepare for the migration from the SVP to the future functions this organization.

38. The recommended adjustments did not warrant amendments to the Grant Agreements, except for RPT where the PDO and outcomes were changed to eliminate the power trade forum and to refocus the project on technical assistance.

39. After the MTR, implementation gathered pace and quality and the projects closed with no further delays. Though SVP projects required extension beyond their initial completion dates, this was attributable to slow start-up. For the six closed SVP Projects, the actual implementation period (through December 2009) ranges from three and half years for EWUAP to six and half years for NTEAP. These durations, with an average elapsed time of six months for effectiveness and a single extension of closing date, are not outliers compared with Bank-wide operations.

D. Coordination with SAPs and Others

40. The SAPs developed more rapidly than SVP, leading to some duplication of effort and loss of SVP value added. In the original Strategic Action Plan framework, SVP projects were conceived, in addition to their role of building trust and capacity, as producers of knowledge, best practices and potential investment programs for the SAPs, and this was an integral part of the SVP design. It was also expected that the joint investment programs would take some time to mature. In the event, the SAPs established themselves more quickly than anticipated and moved ahead in their mandate to identify and prepare regional investments. Given the long preparation and slow start-up of the SVP, outputs which should have been useful to the SAPs were delayed. The SAPs developed their own internal capacities and data gathering. This led to some overlap and duplication – for example, both SAPs carried out their own power trade studies ahead of the comprehensive RPT study (to be completed as planned only in 2011). These parallel efforts diminished the expected benefits of linkages between the SVP and the SAPs.

41. Aided by strengthened coordination, SVP did directly support the SAPs. Nile-SEC/SVP-C worked hard to ensure that SVP contributed to the SAPs through coordination, promoting a demand-driven approach in the SVP projects. Semi-annual coordination meetings between SVP and SAP staff were held to ensure work planning collaboration amongst all partners and to strengthen “SAP relevance” and responsiveness. SVP had some success in this: (1) there were a number of SVP/SAP work program links, such as staff training and study tours, and data exchange; (2) SVP/SAP coordination was effective in the formulation of the research agenda for SDBS and water policy priority setting under WRPM; (3) SVP projects responded to specific requests from the SAPs – for example, EWUAP carried out studies on irrigation potential for NELSAP; and (4) four SVP projects built capacity in the SAPs: (i) NTEAP
recruited environmental specialists for both SAPs; (ii) CBSI recruited social development specialists and development communications specialists for both SAPs; (iii) CBSI developed social development guidelines for NBI as a whole and then assigned and supervised social development and communication specialists in the SAPs; (iv) WRPM dedicated a water modeler to NELSAP-CU and trained the national DSS staff; and (v) RPT also provided training on power trade agreement to NBI countries.

42. However, SVP fell short of expectations in support to the SAPs, for four reasons. First, despite best efforts, the SVP PMUs were not always able to respond to new requests while they were under tremendous pressure from the PSCs to deliver their own agreed work program, particularly as some SAP requests involved project preparation support that was not eligible for financing under SVP Grants. Second, the PMUs did not have the full complement of specialized staff to respond expeditiously. Third, the SAPs were sometimes keener to strengthen their own internal capacities by hiring their own specialists or seeking support from SVP projects to assign specialists instead of relying directly on the SVP PMUs. Finally, and most importantly, SVP outputs that should have been inputs to the SAPs were either too late or not immediately usable - for example, NELSAP-CU found SDBS work on benefit sharing “theoretical”.

43. All SVP projects practiced a participatory and demand-driven approach with stakeholders, and there are some outstanding examples of this. Through SVP, many stakeholders participated in Nile-related activities, and this demand-driven approach had an influence on outcomes. WRPM, for example, sought full participation of riparian stakeholders in prioritizing the policy formulation agenda. Through scoping studies, trans-boundary water policies were identified by the riparians as a key need, and WRPM provided tailor-made technical assistance to national administrations in this area. This resulted in policy changes in some countries: for example, Kenya has subsequently drafted a trans-boundary water resource strategy. EWUAP’s participatory studies and training on agricultural water have been influential in the formulation of the 2009 Tanzania irrigation strategy.

44. Collaboration with regional institutions was fruitful, although uneven. Selected SVP Projects worked well with other regional institutions. For example, RPT, after a slow start, developed a strong and supportive collaboration with the Eastern African Power Pool. ATP worked with many partner institutions, including the Global Water Partnership, World Water Council, and the International Water Management Institute (IWMI). NTEAP worked actively with many partners, training and collaborating with Lake Victoria Basin Commission on wetlands and water quality, supporting and negotiating Memoranda of Understanding with the Ramsar Secretariat and with Rambol Nature; and working with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the formulation of a natural resources strategy. Regional universities and networks have also been tapped to promote efficient water use, water resources, and environmental management as well as enhance communication. There were, however, some missed opportunities. IWMI was implementing a two-year Challenge Program from the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) on Water and Food Nile Basin Focal Project but there was little coordination with relevant SVP projects such as NTEAP, EWUAP and WRPM and IWMI.

E. Monitoring and Evaluation

45. The SVP PAD was not instructive on the M&E design, implementation and dissemination strategy. It was assumed that each PMU would design its own Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system and that Nile-SEC/SVP-C would develop an overall system to monitor and evaluate SVP outcomes. While NTEAP, as the largest SVP Project, had provision for an M&E Lead Specialist, the other projects were required to divide M&E responsibilities among program staff. The PADs for the individual SVP projects elaborated on the SVP log frame and set additional “outcome/impact indicators”. However, the quality of these indicators was variable as a tool to measure outcomes, and there was limited baseline data.
against which to monitor results. For example, CBSI never conducted the proposed baseline stakeholder opinion survey.

46. The switch in 2007 to a Results Based System (RBS) was never fully effective and made comparison with original indicators difficult. During implementation, the overall performance of the SVP Projects against the SVP Development Objectives was not measured (see Section V below). In 2007, at the urging of the Development Partners, NBI adopted an RBS for the organization as a whole, and replaced the originally agreed SVP log frame and performance indicators with a revised results framework, tying each SVP project into overall NBI outcomes and goals. Whilst this was a worthy exercise, the adaptation consumed enormous energy, and the new architecture of results and indicators was never well understood and was not consistently used for reporting. SVP staff found it very time consuming to use. At completion, the individual project ICRs reported against the RBS results, making it awkward (although not impossible) to match results against original (PAD) indicators. In 2007, NILE-SEC started reporting in its Annual Report against the RBS outcomes of the NBI, but has not yet made a specific report on the achievement of SVP results. Overall, the M&E system at the level of Nile-SEC and SVP projects has been adequate at reporting against output indicators but inadequate to measure achievement of outcomes.

F. Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

47. There were no safeguard issues, and SVP has contributed to good practice on environmental regulation in the basin. The SVP Projects are technical assistance projects and the Environmental Classifications in the PAD Environmental Data Sheets were either C or S3, indicating the absence of safeguard issues. NTEAP, in collaboration with Nile-SEC has drafted an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) module and RPT has developed EIA procedures specific to power investments.

48. In addition to implementation problems, the UNOPS financial system created problems for financial reporting. Soon after signing the service agreement, UNOPS shifted to a new ‘ATLAS’ financial system. The switch slowed implementation substantially, and ATLAS proved unable to report by category, project components or procurement thresholds. Responding to complaints, UNOPS transferred its operations unit for the SVPs to Nairobi, Kenya and adapted ATLAS to prepare Interim Un-audited Financial Reports satisfactory to the Bank. Thereafter, satisfactory reports were prepared and submitted to the Bank on a timely basis. However, problems remained as the UNOPS system operated on a “commitment” basis, and there were often discrepancies in timing between UNOPS records and Bank disbursement records. Satisfactory reconciliations were nonetheless eventually carried out. The audits of the SVPs were carried out by the Internal Audit unit of the UN based in New York. In most instances, un-qualified audit opinions were issued. Where issues were highlighted, UNOPS was able to provide satisfactory responses and the issues were resolved.

49. Procurement reporting was also problematic. The Atlas system was incapable of providing procurement plans and updates as required by the Bank, and these reports had to be prepared manually. Bank post procurement reviews of SVP projects highlighted incomplete and scattered filing systems and some individual procurements that had followed UNOPS rules and thresholds rather than the Bank’s guidelines, as were stipulated by the NBI’s MSA with UNOPS. After the reviews, the projects addressed issues and made improvements to the SVP procurement systems and no recorded fiduciary problems resulted.

G. Post Completion Operation and Transitions to Next Phase

21 The NILE-SEC is preparing an overall report on SVP results in parallel to this PICRR; however, it is not expected to be completed before the fall of 2010.
50. Mainstreaming and sustainability plans guided transition to permanent operations, but the volume of activities transferred is creating challenges for the new hosts, particularly in Nile-SEC. Alerted at MTR to the issue of the need to prepare for transition of SVP functions and outputs to permanent operations, and working under continuing uncertainty over the possible establishment and mandate of a river basin organization, Nile-SEC/SVP-C helped the SVP projects to plan for transition. Each project prepared a mainstreaming and sustainability program showing how networks and goodwill, human resources, knowledge and knowledge products were to be mainstreamed within Nile-SEC, the SAPs, member country institutions, and existing and new regional partners. These plans guided the transition process on closure of the SVP projects. A leading host of SVP functions and outputs is Nile-SEC, which is taking over activities on: information and communications (from CBSI), capacity development (from ATP), water quality monitoring, wetlands, environmental education and capacity building (from NTEAP); the regional power data bank (from RPT); water policy (from WRPM); and the benefit sharing framework (from SDBS). Some of these functions are supported under the NBI Institutional Strengthening Project (NBI-ISP).\(^{22}\) Where there is an ongoing process, as for institutional design, communications and the basin sustainability framework, or the harmonization of systems across NBI, the prospects of sustainability are good, particularly where there is support from the transitional NBI-ISP. However, the agenda being transferred is large and there is a risk of lack of focus, capacity and resources.

51. Functions and outputs have also been transferred to the SAPs and to country institutions. Some functions have been transferred to the SAPs, including social development and development communications, and further development work on agricultural productivity and trade. NELSAP-CU and ENTRO are rolling out investment programs in integrated water resources, hydro-power generation and trans-boundary transmission lines, watershed management and flood control preparedness based in part on SVP Project outputs (Table 2). Some functions are being transferred to countries: in-country representation of NBI through country focal points (CBSI); water quality monitoring and planning for wetlands (NTEAP); national planning for trans-boundary resources (WRPM); and Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) education (ATP). In addition, Egypt has also expressed interest to host the water quality monitoring designed under NTEAP.

52. Some functions have been transferred to third parties. Examples include: IWRM education transferred to the Nile Basin University Forum (NBUF) and the University of Bergen; cooperation on wetlands transferred to Ramsar Secretariat; and small environmental grants transferred to GEF. In addition, some of the networks created under SVP such as the Nile Media Network\(^{23}\), made up of government and private journalists are expected to continue on an autonomous basis.

53. Notwithstanding these initiatives, mainstreaming and sustainability of SVP functions and outputs represents a challenge, especially in the absence of a permanent river basin organization (see VI G below).

### Table 2: A Summary of Key SVP Project Outputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVP Project</th>
<th>Key SVP Project Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applied Training Project</td>
<td>• NBI Capacity Building Strategy developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Long-term collaboration for research signed with Bergen University, Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• MSc curriculum on IWRM developed and Universities identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Virtual Distance Learning Platform developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 15 PhD and 91 MSc candidates graduated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{22}\) The ISP is a US$24.02 million Grant financed project which became effective in October 2008. The Development Objective is “The NBI has strengthened foundation for institutional sustainability, enhanced capacity, and harmonized corporate management to more effectively deliver programs and projects.”

\(^{23}\) In December 2009, the Nile Media Network was granted a legal recognition in Tanzania on the occasion of the NBI 10th Anniversary. However, several national media networks are still awaiting approval of their legal status from their respective governments.
VI. Assessment of SVP Development Objectives

54. This assessment of how far SVP achieved its development objectives reviews: (i) the relevance of the development objectives to current priorities of the riparians, of NBI, and of the World Bank; (ii) achievement of objectives, including a discussion of causal linkages between outputs and outcomes; (iii) the efficiency with which SVP delivered its results; and (iv) an overall evaluation of SVP outcomes, taking account of relevance, achievement of objectives, and efficiency.

A. Relevance of SVP Development Objectives

55. The SVP development objectives - to build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investments - remain highly relevant to the riparians today, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Trust between Nile basin stakeholders is essential to practicing cooperation at any level, to reaching agreement on core issues, and to arriving at the consensus that would allow the institutionalization of cooperation within a regional river basin organization. Capacity in all riparians is essential to develop and manage the Nile on a cooperative basis, and a favorable investment environment is essential to moving ahead particularly with the trans-boundary projects that will bring the benefits of cooperation to the population. Achieving the NBI’s shared vision remains a work in progress, with some gains in
cooperation having been made. As the NBI celebrated its tenth anniversary in December 2009, political negotiations on a permanent institution continued and the Nile riparians clearly voiced commitment for continued cooperation. Hence the SVP development objectives continue to be highly relevant.

56. **SVP development objectives also remain relevant to World Bank objectives.** Regional cooperation and integration are increasingly a priority for the Bank, particularly in Africa (see II A above). In addition, recent Bank Country Partnership Strategies have also been highlighting in varying degrees the importance of the NBI to the long term socio-economic development of the riparian countries.

### B. Achievement of SVP Development Objectives:

57. This section evaluates how far SVP achieved its development objectives of building trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investments.

**The objective of building trust**

> "Under conditions of high trust, problem solving tends to be creative and productive. Under conditions of low trust, problem solving tends to be degenerative and ineffective"

R. Wayne Boss

58. **SVP has contributed to rising trust in the merits of cooperation and the NBI.** The challenge faced by SVP was to build trust that cooperation would bring more benefits than action by individual riparian states. Target stakeholders for trust-building were, essentially, the entire population of the Nile Basin and, within those countries, key political and professional constituencies able to influence decisions. The history of trust building in the Nile began in the 1960s, with very low key technical cooperation. The momentum picked up under TECCONILE and the Nile 2002 conferences in the 1990s (see Section I above). Coming after the decision to establish NBI and to work towards permanent institutional arrangements for cooperation, SVP was expected to build trust with the following outcomes: increased basin wide dialogue, functioning networks of professionals, informed riparian dialogue on trans-boundary development, and enhanced participation in the NBI process.

59. **Thanks in part to trust built under SVP; NBI has made remarkable progress towards cooperation.** The establishment of a river basin commission and of agreements on the management of shared resources typically requires protracted negotiations. For some basins the process has taken 40 or 50 years, and NBI is still in the early stages, as can be seen from Chart 1. Nonetheless, NBI has made marked progress moving from a situation where there was no forum to deliberate on the utilization of the resources of the Nile to a stage where there are multiple mechanisms for negotiation, dialogue and discussion among countries, where data and information are shared, and where joint investments are being planned and implemented. Key to this has been the substantial progress both on the trust building agenda of the SVP and on the SAP’s national and trans-boundary investment program. This is a notable achievement in a relatively short period compared to other river basin initiatives.

**Chart 1: Typical progress of river basin cooperation**

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24 A review of Country Partnership Strategies for the riparian countries issued since 2006 showed that NBI is adequately covered in the 2008 Ethiopia Country Assistance Strategy and the 2008 Sudan Interim Strategy. In nearly all the other Country Assistance Strategies, NBI is also discussed marginally.

Many of the SVP results have contributed to this trust building, including:

a. The engagement of a large number of key people in professional dialogue, exchange of information, networks and training: The PSCs alone brought together about one hundred senior officials on a regular basis, working groups involved several hundred more, training programs involved several thousand professionals in the public and private sectors, and the micro-grants program involved 20,000 people. All of the PSCs are evolving, to some extent, as continuing communities of interests and two, NTEAP and RPT, initiated a permanent dialogue among PSC members. They are the NTEAP PSC, which forms a natural network made up of national directors of environment; and RPT, where the PSC comprised both the Permanent Secretaries of the national ministries responsible for electricity affairs and CEOs of power utilities. The Power Technical Committee (PTC) is made up of power planning experts of the national power utilities.

b. The development of sustainable institutional set ups, binding people together in shared practice: Several SVP projects created networks and partnerships, including NBUF (now facilitated by the University of Bergen), the Nile Media Network, and networks of parliamentarians, women and NGOs established through CBSI. Many projects produced policies and guidelines, including: trans-boundary water policy assistance guidelines and technical assistance (WRPM); an institutional, regulatory and cooperative framework model for regional power trade, together with public private partnership models (RPT); and a water quality monitoring program and trans-boundary wetlands and biodiversity strategies (NTEAP).

c. The development of an informed dialogue on Nile cooperation: CBSI took the lead in promoting dialogue, developing extensive stakeholder participation and a data base, and setting up the development communications functions for the SAPs. Several projects produced best practices that would inform dialogue (on agricultural water, trans-boundary water resource management, trans-boundary wetlands and biodiversity, and power trade development). The very large number of workshops, the biennial Nile Development Forum (which became the successor of the Nile 2002 conferences), and the annual Nile Day all created platforms for informed dialogue.

SVP’s failure to complete the benefit sharing framework stands out as a lost opportunity to build trust. Take-up of the various policies and guidelines has been slow, and NBI will need to continue to promote adoption. In addition, some of the networks look vulnerable now that SVP has ended (see VI G below). Perhaps the most serious shortfall is that only first steps have been taken towards developing the benefit sharing framework. As this framework was supposed to convince stakeholders that benefit sharing was a valuable approach that goes beyond just sharing of water, failure to deliver a usable product is a serious deficiency affecting the potential of reaching agreement in future investment planning. Without a credible framework, it is not surprising that key decision makers remain unconvinced on the topic and stick to water sharing perspectives that will reduce the scope for solutions.

Box 2: NTEAP Enhancing Basin-Wide Cooperation
NTEAP contributed to the strengthening of national institutions to address trans-boundary environmental threats to the Nile resources. Burundi and D. R. Congo have developed environmental education modules and integrated them in the school curriculum. In Sudan, NTEAP supported the development of a National Environment Management Plan, working closely with the Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan.

Trans-boundary wetlands management plans have been developed for the Sio-Siteko Wetlands along the Uganda – Kenya border and the trans-boundary management plan for the Dinder-Alatish protected areas along the Ethiopia-Sudan border. These were developed in consultation with the respective local governments and are currently under implementation. These initiatives have encouraged the countries to work together to manage and monitor shared resources in ways that they never did before – collaboratively.

Source: Berina Uwimbabazi

62. Nonetheless there is compelling evidence that, taken overall, SVP has served to build rising trust in cooperation and the NBI. There is substantial evidence that demonstrates the rising trust among the riparians since the NBI’s inception. A 2008 public opinion poll in eight NBI countries indicated an atmosphere of trust (Annex 3). Stakeholders representing public and private sectors, the media, civil society, women, the elderly, academia and lawyers attested to a quantum jump in trust. CBSI National Project Coordinators attribute this rising confidence and trust to “the demystification of the Nile” suggesting that the Nile was “a discussion taboo” prior to SVP launch. Stakeholders recognize that the opportunities created under the SVP for public and other stakeholder participation have unveiled sensitive issues for discussion with civility and knowledge-based exchanges. They point out that previously data sharing amongst riparians was nearly absent, data being considered sensitive. Today, there is more openness. The Nile-COM has adopted interim procedures for data and information sharing and exchange, and the NBI Secretariat is facilitating the exchange of information process for planned NBI projects. Riparians are also sharing their water resource data base and information, not previously exchanged, at least on a limited basis in the context of: (i) preparing NBI investment projects; (ii) conducting regional studies, such as Cooperative Regional Assessments under ENTRO and NELSAP-CU and investment plans for trans-boundary sub-basins in the NEL region; and (iii) the development of a common information management and modeling system, the Nile Decision Support System (DSS). The Nile DSS and the Nile Information System (Nile-IS), being developed by WRPM, will store and make freely available Nile basin technical data, reports and information. Overall, it is evident that trust has increased considerably over the last ten years. Box 2 presents cases of cross border community actions.

The objective of building capacity

63. SVP had a major focus on raising technical skills and expanding knowledge and information. In addition to the learning implicit in all SVP activities, most projects had specific components to develop skills, including the development and delivery of training programs and materials, study tours, and exchange visits. ATP took the lead, with the training of 1,500 professionals in IWRM, the education of 15 PhDs and 91 MScs, the development of an MSc curriculum, and the design of an E-Learning platform. EWUAP trained 500 professionals in agricultural water management. RPT, WRPM and NTEAP delivered specialist training programs. WRPM, for example, trained an additional 20 MSc students at IHE-Delft in advancing modeling and data management; conducted advanced regional training and GIS/data management; and organized specialized study tours on modeling-related issues to the Mekong River Commission and the United States Bureau of Reclamation. RPT conducted specialized training in power purchase agreements that led to the successful negotiation of an agreement between Ethiopia and Sudan. Backing up the training was the development of knowledge products, including best practice
studies on agricultural water and trans-boundary water management, and the SDBS linking of economic think tanks and the resulting research papers in five thematic areas. Data capture and management was another important contribution, led by the WRPM, including the development of the Nile DSS and the Nile Information System (Nile-IS).

64. **SVP has improved skills, knowledge and data exchange, and contributed to narrowing the imbalances between riparians.** These programs have boosted the technical knowledge of staff working in the NBI and, coupled with access to regional data and information on water resources, the SVP has contributed to reversing the knowledge imbalance prevailing among the riparians. Today, riparian technical staff are confidently discussing and debating water resources, hydrology, environmental, power sector, agricultural technology and trade issues in various NBI fora. Nile-IS and DSS are evolving as NBI’s knowledge bank; while the Nile DSS will manage more technical data. This result is largely attributable to the capacity building elements embedded in all SVP projects, as well as to the broader national capacity building programs.

65. **SVP, however, had limited intervention to strengthen riparian institutions.** SVP focused its capacity building efforts on raising technical skills and expanding data and knowledge. However, capacity building requires a two-pronged approach—raising technical skills and addressing institutional weaknesses. The institutional strengthening aspect (institutional reforms, regulatory frameworks, incentive structure to retain trained staff, operating procedures) did not figure in the priority SVP agenda. Nonetheless, a start has been made under SVP, particularly developing institutional frameworks for trans-boundary management in water resources, environment and power. However, redressing the current imbalance between the water resource management institutions will require a major intervention to build capacity over time to meet the growing demands of future investments in the Basin.

**The objective of building an enabling environment for investment in the Nile basin countries**

66. **The SVP contributed to the enabling environment for investment in the Nile basin countries.** Trans-boundary investment requires: (1) alignment of policies; (2) access to data; and (3) a favorable investment climate including regulatory frameworks. Progress is being made towards meeting these three conditions, and SVP has contributed. SVP has helped to formulate templates and guidelines for alignment of policies, including water resource management policies, environmental policy on impact assessment, wetlands, biodiversity and water quality, and institutional frameworks for regional power trade. All NBI member countries have accepted the trans-boundary policy guidelines developed under WRPM Project. The adoption of the guidelines in the formulation of national policies and strategies would facilitate trans-boundary investments. On data, the Nile-COM has adopted interim procedures for data and information sharing and exchange. Phase I of the Decision Support System (DSS) being developed under the WRPM is completed and has opened new access to regional data for investment formulation and decision. Regarding the investment climate and regulatory frameworks, riparians are rolling out various economy-wide reforms, incentives and legal frameworks that will facilitate investments in their economies. SVP has contributed through the regulatory framework model for regional power trade. However, overall, there is a large unfinished agenda, particularly in key areas like agricultural and irrigation policy.

67. **These improvements in the enabling environment, together with the growing trust and confidence in cooperation, have paved the way for riparians to collaborate on trans-boundary investments.** To date, the portfolio in the Eastern Nile and Nile Equatorial Lakes regions includes more than US$700 million of investments under implementation and US$600 million under preparation. These projects cover power generation and trans-boundary trade, irrigation and drainage, watershed management, natural resource management, and flood control and preparedness. Nile cooperation has also played a key role in

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27 This was the result of a choice at the design stage, when the NBI chose to restrict the capacity building agenda to staff training.
facilitating Bank-financed projects such as the Tana Beles IWRM project in Ethiopia (US$70 million) and the Eastern Africa Power Market Project APL (US$895 million, phase 1). Larger, more complex projects valued in the billions – such as the Joint Multipurpose Program in the Eastern Nile – are also under study.

C. Evaluation of the Efficiency of SVP

68. Although cost effectiveness cannot be measured quantitatively, the SVP projects were largely implemented within approved budgets. SVP Projects do not lend themselves to standard efficiency evaluations (net present value, economic rate of return, or measuring actual costs against a benchmark). Several approaches are, however, possible to evaluate whether SVP was cost effective. First, SVP projects were by and large within their budget: all experienced delays and most required extensions, but most projects ultimately delivered their outputs within the appraised budget. Second, the arrangement with UNOPS turned out to be not only a hindrance to efficient implementation but also costly. Third, the decentralized nature of SVP created significant extra costs in terms of travel and coordination. This issue was debated at the time of program design. Given the compelling nature of the project to promote trust and confidence, establishing a presence of the SVP in as many riparian countries as possible was deemed appropriate by the Nile-COM – in the end, only Rwanda, Burundi and DRC did not host a project, though Rwanda does host NELSAP-CU. Although it is impossible to assign an economic value to the benefit derived from decentralization, it certainly brought an enormous advantage in terms of commitment and ownership. In addition, it allowed the in-kind costs of allocating buildings and other resources to be spread over six countries. In terms of operational efficiency, location had disadvantages and advantages. The fact that the ATP PMU was located far away from the center of Cairo resulted in high staff turnover. By contrast, for WRPM, there were operational advantages in being conveniently seated next to ENTRO which facilitated exchange on technical issues.

69. A fourth issue is whether separate projects and PMUs were essential, or could some major tasks have been outsourced. Notwithstanding the justification for a decentralized approach, the SVP might have considered tapping qualified regional institutions. EWUAP, ATP and SDBS might have been suitable candidates for competitive outsourcing to selected regional organizations. For instance, developing guidelines for water harvesting and community-based, small and large scale irrigations systems and identifying best practices are subjects that might have been handled by regional organizations. Arranging for applied training and strengthening regional training centers, and conducting the SDBS mandated studies might have been contracted competitively to regional universities and training institutions. Such an implementation arrangement would have avoided the cumbersome tasks of setting up and staffing so many PMUs, resulting in substantial cost savings. Under these arrangements, the capacities of the regional institutions and their links to the NBI might also have been strengthened.

D. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

70. Overall, as discussed in Section B above, there has been a significant increase in trust and capacity, and improvement in the investment environment during the life of SVP. Relations among riparians have improved since the launching of the NBI. Understanding among technical staff has reached a level of maturity and the uneven knowledge gap has narrowed. New investment opportunities have also been identified and are under preparation and implementation. However, the achievements attained in meeting the SVP development objectives could not be attributed solely to the SVP interventions but also to the strong presence of ENTRO and NELSAP-CU. The two sub-basin organizations have successfully mobilized the support and confidence of their constituent riparians by demonstrating results on the ground, so that achievements must be seen as a result of an overall NBI effort, both SVP and SAPs.
71. The overall rating of the SVP is **Moderately Satisfactory**. This rating takes account of moderate shortcomings in SVP’s achievement of its objectives, in its efficiency and relevance, and the uneven performance of the SVP Projects. The rating reflects the trust and confidence generated among stakeholders and the partial success in building capacity in the riparians and in creating an enabling environment for investments. The achievements attained are also partially attributed to the successful roles of the two sub-basin organizations—ENTRO and NELSAP-CU. Attribution of results between SVP and the SAPs is not easy, but it is clear that both have been essential components of the Strategic Action Program, and have been complementary in moving towards the Nile Shared Vision.

### E. Overarching themes, other outcomes and impacts

72. Some results of SVP are not fully captured in the analysis above. This includes SVP’s contribution to giving all riparians an equitable, effective voice, and the knock on effect of NBI’s focus on the basin as a unit of analysis.

73. **SVP has ‘levelled the playing field’ of understanding and skill among all upstream riparians.** The Nile process has given a voice to riparians, enabling these states for the first time to influence the regional water agenda and policies. By creating fora for dialogue and raising capacity, SVP has facilitated effective participation by all riparians.

74. **Collaboration in the NBI in general and SVP in particular has triggered other parallel initiatives.** One notable effect of NBI and SVP is the increasing focus on the Nile Basin as a unit for water management and agricultural research. For example, under the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water & Food, IWMI, the International Livestock Research Institute, and the World Fish Center have launched a joint research program on **Improved Agricultural Water Management in the Nile Basin**, with topics ranging from production systems and water productivity to hydronomic zoning. The recent global focus on climate change has also concentrated attention on the Nile as an at-risk unit of weather and hydrological analysis.

### F. Summary of the findings of the Stakeholder Analysis

75. CBSI conducted a public opinion poll cum stakeholder analysis in 2008. A total of 124 respondents were randomly selected from eight riparian countries (details in Annex 3). The findings show general awareness of the critical issues facing the basin and good understanding of the challenges and opportunities of cooperation. Respondents were unequivocal on the benefits of cooperative management and were overwhelmingly in favor of moving toward a permanent status to facilitate investment. However, respondents from all countries and groups complained about the perceived lack of “results on the ground”, which was seen by some as a result of limited NBI effectiveness and relevance. Some respondents stressed the need for NBI to manage stakeholder expectations, emphasizing timely but tangible results.

### G. Risks to SVP Development Outcomes

76. The **major risk to SVP development outcomes is linked to the establishment of an inclusive and permanent institutional cooperation mechanism.** It is neither the mandate nor the intention of this review to discuss the current status of the CFA; this is the business of the sovereign states of the Nile basin only. However, it is important to recognize that the risk to SVP development outcomes is Substantially reduced.
if the orderly and timely move to a permanent and inclusive institutional cooperation mechanism takes place. On the other hand, the risk to SVP development outcomes is increased if this move does not take place. SVP has contributed to the widespread optimism prevalent amongst many stakeholders.

77. **One risk stemming from uncertainty over future cooperation is to the trust and confidence that SVP has built up.** As discussed above, SVP has successfully built up trust, and this is widespread amongst the population. Annual Nile Day celebrations throughout the basin with public gatherings, radio and television programs, and the widely attended Nile 2002 Conferences and its successor the Nile Basin Development Forum (NBDF), have all raised expectations of substantial benefits of cooperation across the Nile Basin. If the move towards systematic cooperation appears to falter, this could lead to disillusionment and the erosion of trust. This risk needs to be recognized and actively managed.

78. **Sustainability also depends on capacity to maintain linkages and continue functions, and there are risks both within NBI and at country level.** The SVP mainstreaming and sustainability programs (Section III. G above) were well planned and on the whole well implemented, but sustainability depends in part on the willingness and capacity of NBI, which has limited capacity and resources, to maintain all the linkages and functions. As mentioned, networks are vulnerable, especially if informal, and some, such as the Nile Trans-boundary Development Network (of universities under SDBS) look quite fragile in the absence of external financing. Follow-up on the training agenda depends largely on the success of NBUF. As discussed above (IV B), capacity building has created opportunity, but there are associated risks. A key concern is how to retain and tap the experience of professionals who have participated in SVP (PSC and working group members, NPCs, consultants, trainees etc.). SVP projects and NBI as a whole have identified measures to manage some of these risks. All professionals figure on an NBI roster and some may be retained in one form or another – most EWUAP PSC members, for example, have been assigned by their governments to the PSC of the follow-up RATP. The NTEAP PSC has discussed ways to maintain virtual interaction and act as an informal advisory body to governments and the NBI. In most cases, however, there are no agreed formal arrangements for follow up. Therefore, as discussions about the future shape and functions of NBI evolve, it will be essential to ensure maintenance of at least key linkages and functions. At country level, the sustainability of functions like water quality monitoring or the development of trans-boundary water policy depends on the willingness of governments to organize and continue their work on the cooperative agenda and to link this with NBI. The continuity of NBI relations in-country is vulnerable, as national arrangements to ensure the transition from SVP NPCs to national focal points and to maintain an active in-country NBI activity are not yet fully in place. The country level risk will require active follow-up and management from both NBI and its member countries.

79. **The transitional support under NBI-ISP is a key mechanism for sustainability.** As discussed above (III G), NBI-ISP includes transitional support to key SVP functions that are being transferred to NBI, and this enhances prospects for sustainability. In addition, NBI-ISP is supporting an institutional design process which will define options for the institutional architecture, functions, and costs and financing of the future River Basin Organization (RBO) (always subject, of course, to political decisions on the options).

80. A key message for minimizing the risks to development outcomes is that reaching an agreement to form a permanent RBO would require continued dialogue among riparian states in the spirit of the NBI witnessed during the last ten years. It is equally critical that the initiatives launched among members of Project Steering Committees to maintain their technical consultations informally testify to the strength of trust and confidence developed among the members. Riparian States should support such initiatives and the various basin-wide stakeholder organizations.

**The Risk to Development Outcomes: Rating: Substantial**
VII. Assessment of Bank and Grantee Performance

A. Bank Performance

Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory

81. The Bank supported a participatory process that resulted in a well-owned, innovative and comprehensive program of projects well articulated to achieve SVP objectives. The Bank’s essential principle of project preparation was to ensure that the riparian countries were ‘in the driver’s seat’ to promote a genuine ownership of both the process and the product. Throughout this participatory process (see III. A above), which averaged two to three years, the Bank worked with selected development partners for each project to provide technical support to the working groups and share international good practice. Once the project design was agreed, the Bank took the lead in packaging the Grant documents for approval, including well documented PADs. There were inevitably some design problems, particularly regarding complexity, unwieldy implementation arrangements and project sequencing (see Section III above). Although conditions of effectiveness required key staff to be recruited to form the PMUs28, start up was in practice slow and inefficient. More thorough arrangements for start up of such a complex program should have been made. However, overall, the Bank has to take credit for coordination and quality control of a highly complex participatory process that resulted in an innovative and comprehensive set of projects well articulated to achieve the objectives of the umbrella SVP program.

Quality of Bank Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

82. At the start of implementation, the Bank streamlined supervision under a single task team leader. The SVP Supervision Plan called for an annual review of implementation of “SVP and individual project progress”. In the same way as for projects financed directly by the Bank, the Bank initially assigned individual task team leaders for each SVP project. However, soon after implementation began, there was a major turn-over of team leaders. At that stage, in an effort to streamline the supervision of the SVP projects in order to free Bank resources to support the more rapid development of the SAP investment programs and to reduce overall Bank supervision cost, one team leader was made responsible for all eight projects. The SVP team leader was supported by technical experts (many of them the former preparation TTLs) for each SVP Project as well as staff and consultants hired under support provided for in the NBTF. This arrangement was under the overall guidance of the Nile Program Manager and Coordinator.

83. Supervision was largely directed from headquarters, and was ‘limited’ up to mid-term review. Despite the substantial and close engagement required with the riparians, the Bank only established a field presence for NBI in 2007, reinforcing this in 2009 when the Nile Program Coordinator moved to the Uganda Country Office. As a result of this lack of proximity and the reduced staff and budget, the scope and technical depth of Bank supervision was ‘limited’ up to the period leading to the mid-term review. The Bank supervision input in the first years of SVP was not always adequate to help Nile-SEC/SVP-C and the PMUs resolve the start-up and early implementation problems. The annual average supervision expenditure for the period FY03-06 was $174,000 compared to $414,000 for the period FY07-09, marking a significant average annual increase of about 140 percent. The weaknesses of the UNOPS arrangement, which caused so many delays and inefficiencies, might possibly have been mitigated by more intensive supervision. However, it is not evident that there were alternatives to UNOPS or that the

28 While it was desirable to make funds available to recruit key staff prior to project start-up, Grant administration procedure did not permit such a facility. Moreover, dearth of technical staff in NBI Secretariat (which served as the “counterpart ministry” did not allow staff assignment to the infant PMUs.
Bank could have brought about improvements at the level of one program in what turned out to be systemic constraints in UNOPS services.

84. **The load was enormous for one team leader trying to manage simultaneously eight projects to a standard equivalent to the supervision of Bank-financed projects.** The duration of early Bank supervision missions was short and the scope was largely stock taking and technical. Bank supervision up to MTR was characterized to the PICRR mission as ‘process-oriented and providing limited technical support’. Even the NTEAP micro-grant projects received minimal field technical inputs from Bank review missions.

85. **Supervision impacts improved after the mid-term review, although sometimes projects could not implement agreed actions promptly.** In 2007, the Bank and Nile-SEC/SVP-C conducted a thorough mid-term review of implementation progress based on detailed terms of reference. The review recommended more intensive Bank supervision as well as monitoring by Nile-SEC/SVP-C. The Bank implemented the recommendation by increasing staffing and budget. This had a significant impact on all projects, and particularly on those – RPT, EWUAP, SDBS – which had been flagging. The successful completion of the SVP program is in part attributable to this strengthened supervision effort. Nonetheless, there was some lack of effectiveness and timely implementation of the Bank’s advice. One reason for this was the complex governance structure: projects were accountable not only to Nile-SEC/SVP-C and to development partners, but also to their PSCs, which sometimes took a different view.

86. **Despite the program nature of SVP, supervision rarely assessed the SVP program as a whole.** Until the mid-term review, neither Bank supervision nor Nile-SEC/SVP-C monitoring reported on progress of the projects toward achieving the SVP development objectives. Instead, supervision efforts focused solely on the review of individual SVP Projects, and supervision of SVP as a program was only conducted as part of the mid-term review. Even then performance was not measured against the program-level indicators. After MTR, the Bank supported Nile-SEC/SVP-C in regular SVP-wide meetings which helped to promote linkages between projects and allowed the Bank and NBI to revive a synoptic view of SVP as an integrated program.

87. **Development partners contributed valuable strategic and technical support.** Development partners notably CIDA, DFID, GEF, GTZ, Norway, SIDA, GEF, and UNDP, participated in review missions and/or the mid-term review and provided strategic and technical support to the projects. Examples include: (i) DFID’s support to the inclusion of benefit sharing in SDBS and of social development as a core project design element in ENSAP; (ii) Norway and SIDA’s technical support to RPT; and (iii) CIDA’s support for gender policy formulation – all these enriched the quality of implementation. GTZ has also played a very constructive role, working closely with the Bank on WRPM and supporting the water policy component. More systematic programming of this partner involvement might have strengthened the delivery of coordinated support and eased the constraints on the Bank in providing full service supervision to so extensive a program.

88. **The Bank effort was not always integrated between the two Bank Regions concerned.** Middle-East and North Africa Region (MENA) participation in the SVP was not consistent. MENA staff were engaged in preparation of the SVP, but they later moved to the Africa region. A staff member from the Egypt Country Office was part of the task team for a brief period, but the absence of MENA staff in the MTR was conspicuous and was limited to chairing the MTR meeting.

89. **Early Bank involvement in SVP was not consistently integrated with other Bank work in the riparian countries but this has been improving.** NBI in general and SVP in particular have not consistently engaged the attention of Bank management responsible for the individual Nile countries, and
were not prominent in their dialogue with those clients. An exception is their engagement with SAP related investment. This may be explained by a lack of clarity on the role of Country Units in dealing with regional programs coupled with the low level of incentives in overseeing technical assistance operations. Since a Bank internal reorganization in 2008, the Africa Regional Integration Department has been proactive in reviewing supervision reports and in providing comments and guidance.

90. During the life of the SVP, the Bank’s ratings of Development Outcomes and Implementation Progress of SVP Projects were largely candid. Ratings for EWUA and SDBS Projects with less than US$5 million Grants were not required. The ratings in the Implementation Status Report (ISR) and the PICRR were consistent with nearly all projects rated Moderately Satisfactory for the likelihood of achieving the Development Objectives. In the post MTR supervision reports, the quality and depth of review improved with instructive action plans. Often, management comments endorsed the findings and reflected them in follow-up management letters.

Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately satisfactory

91. The Bank’s overall performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory: Although Bank performance in design was satisfactory, supervision was only moderately satisfactory, particularly up to the mid-term review. Despite having adequate annual supervision budgets for SVP projects, the Bank’s performance in providing timely and effective implementation assistance was sometimes inadequate. The Bank could have played a more pro-active role to help unlock the binding implementation issues and to provide hands-on technical support, particularly in the early period. It appears that the Bank was giving higher priority to the SAPs, in the hope of establishing early investments on the ground. This not only constrained the SVP projects which were struggling with implementation issues, but contributed to their lagging behind the SAP programs that they were supposed to be supporting. After the mid-term review, Bank supervision was still of variable intensity and quality but overall was effective. Linkages within the Bank, however, were not always adequate to ensure integration of SVP into the overall Bank strategies within the countries concerned.

B. Grantee and Implementing Agencies Performance

Nile-SEC and SVP-C Performance

92. SVP-C was to support Nile-SEC in facilitating, coordinating and supervising overall program implementation. Nile-SEC was the official grantee for the eight SVP projects, and was responsible for coordinating the SVP program and for providing core service to the projects. Nile-SEC had very limited managerial and technical capacity, and hence the coordination project SVP-C was designed to equip it for its responsibilities, primarily in respect of SVP. SVP-C comprised a program coordination component, including a senior staff member responsible for overall SVP coordination, and smaller components to augment Nile-SEC capacity in financial management and procurement, knowledge management and information sharing. In addition, SDBS and CBSI were located within Nile-SEC, and CBSI essentially developed Nile-SEC’s public information and communications function.

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29 The Nile Basin accounts significantly in selected RCOs: Egypt’s agriculture is totally dependent on the Nile, 80 percent in Rwanda, 70 percent in Uganda, and 32 percent in Ethiopia. The signifcance of the Nile Basin in these countries warrants the Bank’s Country Units engagements in the NBI.
93. **Nile-SEC itself had little capacity to steer or support SVP.** Nile-SEC was struggling to establish its role as the secretariat of NBI at a time when the SAPs were developing rapidly and behaving with increasing independence. The turnover of Executive Directors\(^{30}\) of NBI did not lend itself to long term organizational strengthening, planning or implementation. As a result, Nile-SEC itself did little more than conclude agreements with funding agencies and oversee SVP in a very general fashion.

94. **SVP-C added value to SVP through support to implementation, supervision and coordination, and to planning for mainstreaming and sustainability, but never took a programmatic approach.** Within Nile-SEC, SVP-C worked hard to support SVP implementation and coordination. Particular areas of support included: (i) support to establishment of the PMUs and the recruitment of staff; (ii) negotiation and oversight of the UNOPS arrangements; (iii) initially “oversight” and later “supervision” of the SVP projects\(^{31}\); (iv) coordination amongst SVP projects and between SVP and the SAPs; (v) arrangements for mainstreaming and sustainability; and (vi) coordination of completion and handover arrangements, including completion reporting. Overall, SVP-C support contributed to coordination of a sprawling program, and increased synergies within SVP and with SAPs. However, SVP-C (like the Bank) never really fulfilled the recommendation at the mid-term review to monitor SVP at the program level, although the SVP coordination meetings (see above) did help to improve coordination and promote a programmatic overview. Although mainstreaming and handover had to be conducted under conditions of uncertainty (see III.G and IV.G above), overall the transition process designed and overseen by SVP-C was relatively orderly, and certainly increased the prospects that SVP outputs would be used and sustained.

95. **SVP-C’s development of the results based system complicated program M&E and brought only limited benefits.** In addition to its SVP oversight role, SVP-C implemented the program to strengthen Nile-SEC. The component affecting SVP was the introduction of the results based monitoring system, into which all PMUs had to retrofit their original Log Frame. The costs and loss of time that this incurred are described above (Section IV.E). The system remains complex and the investment has never been fully justified.

96. **Nile-SEC failed to develop a communications strategy that would have managed public expectations and this failure has created a risk for sustainability of SVP outcomes.** Nile-SEC never provided strategic guidance and action in communication. When CBSI launched the communications program, Nile-SEC should have provided guidance, liaising with Nile-COM as needed. This might have helped to avoid the current situation (see IV.G above) where SVP achievements are at risk from high expectations.

97. The overall performance of the Grantee is rated **Moderately Satisfactory.** This rating reflects the Nile-SEC/SVP-C’s mixed performance in supporting SVP projects, and Nile-SEC’s lack of strategic management of the SVP communications function. Nile-SEC should have been in the frontline to manage the public’s expectation on the outcomes of the SVP and the future of the NBI.

**Performance of Implementing Agencies (PMUs)**

98. The decentralized organizational structure of the SVP created eight separate PMUs. While the PSCs provided an oversight and guidance to the PMUs, the latter were responsible for their performance and enjoyed considerable management autonomy.Nearly all the PMUs had implementation start-up problems and found the UNOPS management services slow, cumbersome and unpredictable. Despite these common issues faced by the PMUs, their performance in the delivery of the agreed work programs was generally good, but varied considerably among the PMUs. A synoptic review suggests that overall, all SVP projects suffered from a slow and protracted start-up, but that subsequent implementation was

\(^{30}\) The two year term for the Executive Director of Nile-SEC made for problems of continuity.

\(^{31}\) The SVP-C PDO was changed at mid-term review from “oversight” to “supervision.”
largely proactive, results-oriented and problem-solving. Management and staff quality was on the whole
good to very good. Reporting was generally timely and complete. Fiduciary performance was sound 32.

99. There were nonetheless outliers to this picture. At mid-term review, three SVP Projects had
serious implementation problems which triggered adjustments in project objectives and output
deliverables. Subsequent performance improved, and all projects closed with their revised deliverables
substantially completed. Supervision missions generally commented on PMU flexibility and ability to
identify and respond to problems. They commended PMUs for timely actions taken on agreed issues,
although in some cases reporting lack of progress on agreed actions. These performance differences
reflect the strength of the respective PMU Regional Project Managers and the quality and timely
recruitment of key project staff. Overall, the performance of the SVP PMUs is rated Moderately
Satisfactory.

Justification of Rating for Overall Performance

100. The overall performance of the Grantee is Moderately Satisfactory. This rating reflects the
generally effective performance of Nile-SEC/SVP-C and the PMUs, offset by the weak performance of
the Nile-Sec in overseeing and developing in a timely manner a communication strategy to address both
public and development communication needs. Nile-SEC was also not effective in addressing the start-up
implementation problems of nearly all SVP Projects. Finally, Nile-SEC had agreed at Mid-Term to start
a program level review of SVP. This undertaking was not complied with throughout the life of the SVP.

VIII. Lessons Learned

101. Designing and managing an ambitious and complex regional program requires highly
experienced technical, communication, legal, social and political skills both on the part of the clients and
the Bank. There are several lessons emerging from the design and implementation of the Shared Vision
Program, a unique operation in the Bank portfolio.

Lessons for the Bank and Grantee

102. Even such a highly complex regional program can succeed if there is political will,
participation, prudent institutional and technical design, and strong partnerships. The ownership of
nine countries was initiated by a political decision and sustained through a highly participatory
preparation and implementation process. Designers resisted the temptation to cover every possible need
or to front-load the program with physical investment. The PSCs maintained government engagement
throughout, and acted as a bridge to national institutions and decision makers. The dispersed nature and
organizational set up of PMUs posed implementation and coordination challenges, but these were largely
surmounted. At program end, transition and sustainability are huge challenges, but NBI and the riparian
countries have planned to manage the risks involved and maintain SVP outputs, networks and functions.
Despite the challenges involved in so complex a program, success was achieved through a combination of
political will, participation, prudent institutional and technical design, and strong partnerships.

32 With one exception, where UNOPS withdrew the delegated financial authority after the departure of the FM and Procurement Officer.
103. **A political process that is critical to lasting regional cooperation demands wide stakeholder participation and transparency.** In the absence of such critical elements, a strong communications program to liaise between policy makers, implementing institutions and the general public should be a top priority. The SVP successfully engaged stakeholders in the vision of Nile cooperation. A key element in building trust was that the riparian countries occupied the “driver’s seat”, and stakeholder participation has been a hallmark of SVP and the NBI as a whole. However, participation, transparency and communication – essential principles in building trust – have not characterized the parallel political process institutionalizing cooperation. At the NBI tenth anniversary event in December 2009, one Ugandan member of Parliament said: “Politicians, professionals, peasants – all need transparency and disclosure of information”. The political discussions and negotiation have been conducted in confidentiality, and communication on the subject has been limited. As a result, the trust and expectations raised by SVP risk being questioned. In such cases, if the political process cannot be conducted in a participatory and transparent fashion, with open debate, at least a strong communications program to liaise between policy makers, implementing institutions and the general public should be a top priority especially for a politically sensitive regional operation.

104. **As SVP projects were designed without clarity on permanent institutional arrangements, no “exit strategy” was built in, and planning for sustainability had to be conducted towards program closing.** For such a program, thought should be given from the start to anchoring functions in national or regional organizations or transition arrangements made early on through partnerships and other approaches. Modalities should be kept under review as the political and institutional context evolves. SVP was designed as part of the interim NBI arrangement. There was an expectation that at some stage agreement would be reached on permanent cooperation after which the SVP outcomes would be mainstreamed into sustainable institutions. As when and how this would happen could not be foreseen at the design stage, no “exit strategy” was developed. As program completion approached and there was no agreement on permanent status, each project was required to plan for mainstreaming and sustainability on an ad hoc basis. The result was rapid planning for closures, and an apparent “rush” of several PMUs to disseminate their products, conduct workshops, and search for national institutions to take over products and outstanding activities as the Grant Closing dates approached. In the event, the design and implementation of a process for mainstreaming and sustainability was largely successful. Much is being mainstreamed in national institutions or within NBI, some with support from NBI-ISP. However, there is a risk to sustainability that could have been avoided if projects had been anchored in national or regional organizations, or transition arrangements made early on through. Identifying the modalities for phasing out projects should be a core element of program design, and these modalities should be kept under review during implementation as the political and institutional context evolves.

105. **A program with an unfinished agenda will benefit from a bridging arrangement.** SVP ended with the institutional future of NBI still undecided, and NBI-ISP was put in place as a three year bridging arrangement. This flexible approach to transition provides a good lesson to similar regional projects in which the political and institutional contexts are evolving with uncertainties on outcomes and timing.

106. **The trained staff and those who have served in different capacities in SVP are valuable assets to be tapped in future NBI operations.** NBI has invested heavily in SVP and created substantial human resource assets. Over 2000 technical people have been trained in various forms or gained valuable experience. Many senior professionals have gained from serving in the various committees of the SVP Projects, and consultants have also gained experience. A lesson for the NBI and similar projects is to ensure that an active roster of these key professional is maintained, with an eye to their future involvement. In addition, NBI and similar organizations should foster the spontaneous emergence of related networks. A good example is the initiative by the NTEAP PSC members who plan to meet virtually and exchange experiences in implementing the products of NTEAP in their national programs, and to offer their services in an advisory capacity.
Lessons for the Bank

107. For Bank staff technical assistance oriented operations do not lend themselves to management recognition and reward for serving the client effectively. As a result, staff would often shy away from such tasks in favor of large high profile investment operations. This is a particular distortion of incentives in the Bank that requires resolution.33

108. The location of the core task team is critical for effectively managing a regional operation. A multi-country and multi-sectoral operation involving politically sensitive trans-boundary issues would benefit from strong field presence of the Program Coordinator and selected core members. Most of the early start-up problems of SVP Projects could have been addressed more expeditiously with field presence and intensive implementation support to the PMUs and Nile-SEC.

109. Prior to granting no-objection to the selection of an agency to provide project management services, the Bank should carry out a thorough review of the agency's capability. UNOPS presented unique advantages for a multi-country program and an infant organization, but the significant implementation problems encountered brought the selection into question. The Bank should, for future assignments with UN or other agencies, ensure that a thorough review is undertaken of their systems and that accountable agreements are reached on service standards.

110. In a regional program, Development Partners may share responsibilities in providing technical support to the clients. Although there was an ad hoc division of responsibility among the Development Partners in supporting the SVP Projects, a more formal assignment of responsibility may produce better results and ease the burden on the convening Development Partner.

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33 This behavior also mirrors the minimal attention Country Units accord to SVP compared to SAPs which are investment oriented.
# ANNEX 1 – SVP Project Grants: Original and Actual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Original Grant Amount (US$ millions)</th>
<th>Final Grant Amount (US$ Millions)</th>
<th>Disbursements Actual (US$ Millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applied Training Project</td>
<td>18.61</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>14.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement Project</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>11.56</td>
<td>11.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficient Water Use for Agricultural Production</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>4.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project (NBTF)</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>8.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project (World Bank GEF)</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>7.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Power Trade Project</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>5.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Grant Financing Regional Power Trade Project - Phase II&lt;sup&gt;35&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<td>Socioeconomic Development and Benefit Sharing Project</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>3.65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water Resources Planning and Management Project&lt;sup&gt;36&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12.81</td>
<td>12.81</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Grant Financing Water Resources Planning and Management Project - Phase II&lt;sup&gt;37&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>3.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shared Vision Program Coordination Project</td>
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<td>11.60</td>
<td>9.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>84.09</strong></td>
<td><strong>97.29</strong></td>
<td><strong>77.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>34</sup> Indicates final figures disbursed by the implementing agency through UNOPS against project activities. In some cases, the full grant amount was disbursed from the parent TF to UNOPS; however, in those cases the unutilized amount is being returned to the NBTF prior to legal closure.

<sup>35</sup> RPT Phase II will close on December 31, 2011.

<sup>36</sup> The undisbursed amount for WRPM I will be transferred to WRPM II, as it is a direct continuation of the project.

<sup>37</sup> WRPM Phase II will close on December 31, 2012.
ANNEX 2 - SVP ICR Summaries

SVP ICR Summary Analysis Tables

1. Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>ATP</th>
<th>CBSI</th>
<th>EWUAP</th>
<th>NTEAP</th>
<th>RPT</th>
<th>SDBS</th>
<th>WRPM</th>
<th>SVP-C</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Achievement of PDO</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>MU</td>
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<td>Efficiency</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>U</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>HS</td>
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<td>OVERALL RATING</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
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</table>

2. Contribution to the overall SVP outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>ATP</th>
<th>CBSI</th>
<th>EWUAP</th>
<th>NTEAP</th>
<th>RPT</th>
<th>SDBS</th>
<th>WRPM</th>
<th>SVP-C</th>
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<tr>
<td>SVP PDO: Build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investment in the NB countries</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>S</td>
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<td>PAD SVP Indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased basin-wide dialogue and exchange of information</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Functioning networks of professional</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>MS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhanced skills and expanded information bases</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informed riparian dialogue on transboundary development opportunities, challenges and impacts</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>MS</td>
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<td>Enhanced stakeholder participation in the NBI process</td>
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<td>MU</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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3. Overall project assessment
### Area of assessment

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<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>ATP</th>
<th>CBSI</th>
<th>EWUAP</th>
<th>NTEAP</th>
<th>RPT</th>
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<th>WRPM</th>
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<tr>
<td>Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>MU</td>
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<td>Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>Contribution to Overall SVP Outcomes</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MU</td>
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<td>Assessment of Bank Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry</td>
<td>MS</td>
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<td>Quality of Supervision</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Bank Performance</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Implementing Agency Performance</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MU</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Performance ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PICRR rating scheme</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>No shortcomings in achievement of objectives, efficiency, or relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Minor shortcomings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Moderate shortcomings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MU</td>
<td>Significant shortcomings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Major shortcomings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>Severe shortcomings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Risk ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PICRR rating scheme</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Low or Negligible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SVP ICRR Summary: Applied Training Project (APT)

1. Design Issues and Quality at Entry
1.1 Project contribution to Nile Vision: Capacity building in IWRM was key to optimal development and management at the basin scale in line with the Nile Vision. The project was appropriately designed to achieve this goal.
1.2 Clarity of outcomes and indicators: The original PDO and indicators are straightforward and monitorable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD PDO</th>
<th>Strengthen capacity in water resources planning and management; strengthen centers for training on a continuous basis; and expand interchange between water professionals in the basin.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD output indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network of training institutions established and functional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise in IWRM upgraded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basin training institutions strengthened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of expertise strengthened.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Project strategy: ATP was designed to address two gaps: lack and uneven distribution of IWRM capacity in the basin; and lack of interaction between water professionals. The mix of components, with short term training and longer term education, capacity building in IWRM for educational institutions, and network development was an appropriate strategy to address these gaps. However, design was not clear on how short term training would add up to cumulative development of expertise, and the patchy nature of short term training proved a problem for the project (see 2.12 below).
1.4 Structure, complexity, number of components: The three components – short term capacity building, long term capacity building, and promoting basin interchange – were straightforward and appropriate. Resources (US$18.6 million) were ample. In retrospect, additional staff resources would have benefitted the project during implementation and not over-stretched the ample financial resources available.
1.5 Appropriateness and efficiency of project location: Egypt had good experience in IWRM and was particularly interested in the SVP training activity, so the location in Cairo was appropriate. However, the location created some operational problems, due to the siting of the office well away from the center of Cairo, the requirement that the project pay taxes, and the difficulty of getting visas for some nationals.
1.6 Stakeholder commitment and involvement: Nile-COM, Nile-TAC and key stakeholders were extensively involved in project design.
1.7 Bank inputs: Bank preparation was sound and provided for risk management through flexibility during implementation.
1.8 Conversion to RBS. The ATP RBS log frame is essentially an expansion of the PAD. The RBS indicators are largely straightforward quantitative output indicators, which were clear and easy to report against. It is not evident, however, that the supposed switch from “activity-based” planning and reporting to a “results-based” approach made any difference.

2. Implementation Issues
2.1 Start up: Despite the common constraints and a late start, the project became operational in its first year, with assessments done, the first scholarships awarded, and the Nile Net set up. ATP could not, however, complete all its activities by closing.
2.2 UNOPS: Long delays in procurement, payments and staff recruitment were experienced.
2.3 Procurement/FM: Staff turnover and the UNOPS constraint led to inefficiencies in both procurement and financial management. The withdrawal of the Delegation of Authority when the FM and Procurement Officer left the project exacerbated the problem at the end of the project.
2.4 Links to SAPs: Links to SAPs were weak, and the SAPs were not represented in the PSC.
2.5 Links to other SVP projects: ATP cooperated on training with other SVP projects, including EWUAP, exploiting synergies. However, there were also inefficiencies implicit in having similar or overlapping training and networking arrangements in several SVP projects (e.g. water management training in EWUAP and ATP, networking with universities in SDBS and ATP).
2.6 Adequacy of government and other stakeholder involvement: Liaison with the National NBI Offices was weak, as PSC members were not from the ministry concerned.

2.7 Role and value of PSC: The PSC was effective, but could have had more strategic and decision-making effect if it had met twice annually, instead of just once.

2.8 Role and value of Nile SEC/SVP-C inputs: Nile-SEC was supportive of ATP, and signed memoranda of understanding with ATP partners (Rambole Natura, Kenya Water Institute).

2.9 Role and value of partner inputs: ATP worked with many partner institutions, including the Global Water Partnership, World Water Council, and IWMI. Through CAPNET, ATP obtained support from African institutions, including Netwas, IWSD and others.

2.10 MTR and restructuring: At MTR, a no cost extension of one year was agreed, and an expansion of the number of academic institutions and modules as well as strengthened links between technical and socio-economic aspects of IWRM were incorporated. In 2009, a balance of US$4 million was returned to the NBTF.

2.11 Reporting and M&E: While participants did rate the quality of training received under the project and staff maintained those records, overall M&E of outcomes remained challenging due to limited staff resources.

2.12 Adequacy of actions taken in response to problems: ATP proved responsive to changing circumstances: (1) disappointing results from short courses were overcome by improving implementation, increasing the number of participants and ensuring continuity of participation; (2) the Nile Net proved too expensive and was deftly reborn as a more participatory Nile Basin University Forum (NBUF); (3) greater need in the upstream countries rapidly became apparent and more MScs and a new postgraduate diploma facility were added; (4) scholarship award became a political issue, and ATP responded by setting up a regional committee with clear rules; (5) when the unpaid NPCs proved to have too little time and to be unaccountable to project management, NPC assistants were hired to do some of the work; (6) when sustainability and cost emerged as risks, ATP developed a low cost, high outreach E-learning program which was enthusiastically taken up by NBUF. In response to demand, ATP also added (7) an applied research activity, although this proved hard to supervise.

2.13 Implementation and management efficiency: Two regional staff proved too few for this administratively challenging project. UNOPS, high turnover amongst national PMU staff and the poor delivery of the NPCs were further constraints. Despite these handicaps to efficiency, ATP managed to deliver the bulk of its outputs. The change of project manager during the last year of implementation did, however, lead to a slowing down of delivery.

2.14 Bank inputs: The Bank fielded regular well-staffed missions, and made many contributions to improving both implementation and substance. One issue was that the Bank expected its recommendations to be implemented straightaway, but ATP considered that changes to design or work program were a decision for the PSC. Additionally, ATP benefited from a relationship with WBI that allowed for some additional resources for developing an NBI Capacity Building Strategy.

Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes Rating: Satisfactory

| PAD PDO: Strengthen capacity in water resources planning and management; strengthen centers for training on a continuous basis and expand interchange between water professionals in the basin. | Overall ATP largely achieved its objective by creating capacity and professional exchange, and by establishing momentum to continue. Four sessions on IWRM raised the awareness of 88 policy makers; 156 academics were educated at postgraduate level to become IWRM trainers and the capacity of basin institutions to deliver IWRM training was strengthened through development of an MSc curriculum and modules, adopted by basin institutions; 1,325 practitioners (target 800) were trained in short IWRM courses; four professional exchange programs and collaboration with IWRM networks in the region and worldwide brought professionals into dialogue; research and publications contributed to knowledge; and the Nile Basin University Forum, with a secretariat, brought a permanent network of exchange and excellence. The E-Learning initiative can bring low cost learning to a broad audience. | Ach'nt S | Efficiency | Rel'vnce MS |
4. Transition, sustainability and risk

4.1 Transition of functions to Nile-SEC: ATP has created important awareness and capacity in IWRM that are critical to current activities, notably the Nile Basin Sustainability Framework; they are also key to the future RBO. In the short term, Nile-SEC has to oversee the completion of MSc and PhD education from ATP, develop an internal training plan based on the Long term Capacity Development Strategy prepared by ATP, and facilitate the launch of the E-Learning initiative. Although the funds for training are potentially available (from the US$4 million returned to NBTF) and NBI-ISP component 2.5 contains provision for follow on activities, Nile-SEC has not yet produced the required work plan and budget to trigger allocation of the funds. Nile-SEC also needs to follow up on the memoranda of understanding signed with Rambole Natura and KEWI.

4.2 Transfer of functions to SAPs: Not applicable

4.3 Transfer of functions to countries: Three universities have so far taken up the MSc course. One issue is whether capacity built in universities and agencies will be retained, and a tracer study on ATP alumni is proposed.

4.4 Transfer of functions to others: Not applicable

4.5 Transition of networks and goodwill: NBUF has been established with enthusiasm, but Nile-SEC will need to follow up to ensure that this translates into sustainable capacity building activities. The University of Bergen is expected to play a major role to play here. The Alumni of ATP Scholarships can play a more general networking role. For short courses, materials have been handed over to the networks but arrangements for putting on and financing courses are unclear, and there is a risk that nothing will happen. A needs assessment has been recommended, but it is surprising that this was not done under the project.

4.6 Transfer of arrangements for knowledge products: Research and publication of knowledge products are unfinished, and this will need follow up by NBI.

4.7 Other sustainability issues: ATP has been instrumental in securing financing for future IWRM training in the basin from Switzerland.

4.8 Political economy risks: Strong support by downstream riparians for training may suggest that there is a preference for technical rather than management and development cooperation. NBI will have to ensure that training is – and is seen as – a contribution to cooperative management and the building of IWRM capacity in the RBO and basin-wide, rather than as a substitute for it.

5. Contribution to the overall SVP outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVP PDO</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investment in the NB countries</td>
<td>ATP has helped develop awareness on IWRM at policy level, and new capacity amongst professionals and educational institutions. Professional exchanges and networking within and beyond the basin have contributed to building capacity and trust. The project delivered some components beyond expectation, and took the initiative to get the University of Bergen arrangement up and running.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **PAD SVP Indicators**

- **Increased basin-wide dialogue and exchange of information**: NBUF, the ATP Alumni, and the research program contribute to informed dialogue on IWRM.
- **Functioning networks of professionals**: Prospects for continued networking through NBUF are good, as University of Bergen will support the infant Forum.
- **Enhanced skills and expanded information bases**: IWRM can be applied directly by the numerous practitioners trained in short courses.
- **Informed riparian dialogue on transboundary development opportunities, challenges and impacts**: n/a
6. **Overall project assessment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to overall SVP Outcomes</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Bank Performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Supervision</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Bank Performance</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Implementing Agency Performance</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **Conclusions and lessons about project performance and outcomes**

7.1 *Management and administrative systems proved cumbersome.* There was a need for better systems from the start.

7.2 *The NPC model proved unworkable.* High level national professionals with their own work program could not be expected to organize courses, and were not accountable to ATP management. Salaried ATP staff should have been recruited from the beginning.

7.3 *ATP was understaffed and closed too soon.* Training and educational development take considerable time. ATP has closed with many loose ends and a sizable follow up burden for Nile-SEC. More staff were required if the original delivery schedule was to be maintained. Adequate time should have been built in to be able to hand over a sustainable process.

8. **Conclusions and lessons on improvements for the future**

8.1 *E-Learning is cost effective, but its value needs to be demonstrated in practice.* There are good prospects and much enthusiasm for the E-Learning approach, and good institutional preparation has been made. However, there are numerous steps still to be taken, and Nile-SEC needs to take an early decision about the E-Learning strategy and business plan.

8.2 *NBUF also needs NBI facilitation.* NBUF looks very promising, but it will need continuity and support. University of Bergen is expected to provide this.

9. **Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date ISR Archived</th>
<th>DO</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Actual Disbursements (US$ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>05/28/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>12.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11/26/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>12.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>05/26/2009</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>13.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>12/30/2009</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>14.61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. **Disbursement Profile**

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38 Originally, ISRs were not required for regional trust funds; however, in 2008 all Trust Fund Projects over US$5.0 million were mainstreamed at which time the team began preparing ISRs for ATP.
11. Bank Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>At ICR</th>
<th>At Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice President:</td>
<td>Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili (AFR)</td>
<td>Callisto E. Madavo (AFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shamshad Akhtar (MNA)</td>
<td>Jean-Louis Sarbib (MNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director:</td>
<td>Richard G. Scobey (AFCRI)</td>
<td>Michel Wormser (AFTPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letitia Obeng (MNSRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Manager:</td>
<td>Ashok K. Subramanian (AFTWR)</td>
<td>David Grey (AFTNL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Team Leader:</td>
<td>John Bryant Collier</td>
<td>Ashok Subramanian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SVP ICRR Summary: Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement Project (CBSI)

1. Design Issues and Quality at Entry

1.1 Project contribution to Nile Vision: Confidence building and stakeholder involvement were essential to the Nile Vision and the project was appropriately designed to achieve these goals. CBSI was an innovative project: a stand-alone operation focused on communications, social development and stakeholder involvement. And it soon became a corporate function, due partly to its co-location with the Nile-SEC and demand from Nile-SEC and SAPs

1.2 Clarity of outcomes and indicators: The original PDO and indicators are straightforward, although it is not clear how the indicators were to be monitored.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD PDO: Develop confidence in regional cooperation under NBI and ensure full stakeholder participation in the NBI and its projects.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAD output indicators:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional confidence building and stakeholder unit and national offices that facilitate dialogue and basin-wide cooperation established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public information about the NBI within participating countries and around the world improved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable regional confidence building and national stakeholder inclusion activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Project strategy: The project was well designed to achieve its objectives through its four components: (1) regional implementation and facilitation; (2) public information; (3) stakeholder involvement; and (4) confidence building. The design did not, however, make explicit that CBSI should be responsible for developing an NBI-wide strategy to address strategic engagement issues, setting out which stakeholders to address with which message, over what time scale and for what expected result. This was to prove an issue later on, when lack of such a strategy left some of the communications effort unfocussed.

1.4 Structure, complexity, number of components: An appropriate design choice was made to have a single CBSI NBI-wide rather than delegate functions to projects. The project budget was US$15 million.

1.5 Appropriateness and efficiency of project location: The project was efficiently located with its centre at Nile-SEC, units in the SAPs, and national officers in each country.

1.6 Stakeholder commitment and involvement: Nile-COM, Nile-TAC and key stakeholders were extensively involved in project design.

1.7 Bank inputs: Bank preparation was, on the whole, sound, though CBSI was re-designed twice during preparation due to a change of Task Team Leaders early on during the process. Bank inputs did provide for risk management through flexibility during implementation.

1.8 Conversion to RBS. RBS is essentially an expansion of the PAD except: (1) there is less emphasis on sustainable mechanisms; and (2) social development and gender are included. The RBS indicators are appropriate, but there was little support from Nile-SEC for M&E and CBSI had little time to use the RBS as it was designed.

2. Implementation Issues

2.1 Start up: Implementation was extremely slow to start. Staff recruitment was arduous but with good results.

2.2 UNOPS: As with all SVP projects, CBSI suffered considerable inefficiencies and delays from the cumbersome UNOPS services.

2.3 Procurement/FM: As CBSI was based at the Nile-SEC (along with SDBS and SVP-C, the three projects were meant to share FM and Procurement staff. This, compiled with the number of activities planned in Uganda by the other SVP Projects, caused staff to be over stretched and delays in both procurement and payments.
2.4 **Links to SAPs**: CBSI developed strong structural links to the SAPs, and set up the social development and development communication functions within the SAPs.

2.5 **Links to other SVP projects**: CBSI maintained links across the SVP family, and did its best to integrate SVP activities and outputs into its programs. However, CBSI’s relevance and ability to communicate could have been enhanced if the cross-cutting nature of its work had been reflected in a structured relationship with other SVP projects. Essentially, CBSI could have been an “overarching” project rather than just one of seven parallel projects.

2.6 **Adequacy of government and other stakeholder involvement**: Overall, stakeholder involvement was excellent, but liaison with TAC and other national ministries was challenging: TAC member turnover, difficulty of interacting with non-water ministries, poor inter-ministerial coordination. Stakeholder involvement was largely urban, and the project had little outreach in rural areas. Managing expectations (of a huge “Nile cooperation dividend”) was a problem throughout CBSI’s work, as the project tried to balance the need to engage key constituencies against the inevitable anticipation of benefits.

2.7 **Role and value of PSC**: The PSC was effective, especially once civil society representatives were added (at CBSI’s suggestion). Effectiveness would have been enhanced had there been systematic follow up on previous recommendations.

2.8 **Role and value of Nile SEC/SVP-C inputs**: CBSI worked very closely with Nile-SEC and SVP-C, and Nile-SEC effectively used CBSI as their corporate communications function, which presented challenges and opportunities to the project.

2.9 **Role and value of partner inputs**: the Nile Basin Discourse (NBD)\(^{39}\) did not prove an effective link to the full range of civil society. Alliances with other NGOs came late, and could have been built earlier in the life of the SVP.

2.10 **MTR and restructuring**: An appropriate informal restructuring was made before the MTR to include social development and development communications within the project.

2.11 **Reporting and M&E**: Lack of a baseline survey compromised results measurement from the outset. CBSI never developed an effective mechanism for monitoring performance and measuring results – staff were too busy for what should have been a full time assignment. An opinion survey should have been conducted at the beginning, with regular follow up, every 2-3 years.

2.12 **Adequacy of actions taken in response to problems**: CBSI was generally effective in reacting to changing need. In addition to the inclusion of civil society in the PSC (see section 2.7) and to the proposal for restructuring (see section 2.10), CBSI, for example, took the initiative in 2004 to seek DFID interim financing for the social development officer in ENTRO.

2.13 **Implementation and management efficiency**: CBSI management was proactive in responding to changing requirements, incorporating social development and development communications, and successfully increasing participation of civil society in project governance. However, CBSI management needed to have a better strategic grasp and tighter work programming. Staff were generally well-qualified and effective. NPCs were effective, although over-burdened by multiple tasks, including administration that should have been done by government. In Entebbe, CBSI efficiency was reduced by many non-core tasks imposed on its staff.

2.14 **Bank inputs**: Supervision was inadequate at the start and lacking on social development. Once the project got going, Bank supervision was generally adequate, flexible and proactive. With hindsight, social development and development communications skills should have been included in the team from the start.

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\(^{39}\) The Nile Basin Discourse (NBD), which is independent of the NBI, is also a sustainable network of civil society organizations that works closely with the NBI.
3. Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes: Rating: Moderately satisfactory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative and explanation of ratings</th>
<th>Ach’tnt</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Rel’vnce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall CBSI largely achieved its objective by building trust and confidence, providing for stakeholder involvement and helping create a receptive environment for investment. Results on acceptance of cooperation and of NBI were positive. However, outcomes were less than optimal because the project did not develop an NBI-wide communications strategy until late on (2007), so that early communications efforts lacked clear objectives and strategic approach. Nonetheless, CBSI did support the SAPs in carrying out their own independent communications strategies that fully recognized the need to manage expectations. The communications strategy was also weakened by the failure of Nile-COM to give clear guidance on what was expected regarding the development of the CFA. As a result, expectations were not adequately managed. Delays in implementation due to unclear task, lack of strategic approach, weaknesses in work programming, unwieldy administrative systems and overload with non-core tasks reduced the efficiency of delivery.</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Transition, sustainability and risk

4.1 Transition of functions to Nile-SEC: Public information and communications functions have been transferred to Nile-SEC and look sustainable. However, at the end of the project, a number of loose ends remained, with no very clear time-bound action program for tying them up. These loose ends included: (1) establishment of the stakeholder data base; (2) media analysis; (3) finalization of gender policy; (4) improvement of the web site; (5) sustainability of networks, apart from the Nile Media Network and NBD; and (6) finalization and implementation of eight strategies and guidelines prepared under CBSI.

4.2 Transition of functions to SAPs: Social development and development communications functions are embedded in the SAPs and should be sustainable. However, absence of any social development capability at Nile-SEC may lead to a loss of strategic focus at the corporate level.

4.3 Transition of functions to countries: Arrangements for handover of in-country functions are far from complete and continuation of in-country functions looks vulnerable. This is currently a major issue for Nile-SEC and for member governments who have made commitments to finance and supply staff but with so far little or no capacity actually in place.

4.7 Other sustainability issues: Several networks developed under CBSI have been very useful (press, lawyers, parliamentarians, etc.) but their future is uncertain. This is a current challenge for Nile-SEC and the SAPs.

4.8 Political economy risks: CBSI achievements may be vulnerable to exaggerated expectations and to the political risks implicit in advocating the CFA.

5. Contribution to the overall SVP outcomes

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40 The Learning Review of Regional Projects rates CBSI as MU (rather than MS) on “Likelihood of Achieving DO”, on the grounds that “under existing geopolitical conditions, it is unlikely that full confidence in regional cooperation can be developed”. However: (1) full confidence is not mentioned in the original PDO; and (2) evidence from the 3D Year Event and other happenings around the basin testifies to a high level of confidence.
### Narrative and explanation of ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SVP PDO: Build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investment in the NB countries</td>
<td>CBSI design was highly relevant to the SVP objective of building trust and of creating an enabling environment. In practice, CBSI was effective in building trust and confidence amongst a broad range of stakeholders. Lack of strategic vision on communications until late on diminished the final achievement. CBSI’s contribution to the investment enabling environment exceeded design expectations through the addition of social development and development communications to the SAPs.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PAD SVP Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased basin-wide dialogue and exchange of information</td>
<td>CBSI communications outreach is considerable</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functioning networks of professional</td>
<td>Many alliances and networks were forged, but apart from the Nile Media Network, their future usefulness and sustainability are unclear. The issue here is that there was no systematic development of these stakeholder / professional networks, aside from the Nile Media Network. For example, basin wide networks of lawyers and elders were important for CBSI’s stakeholder outreach and in gauging public opinion in the basin, but there is no apparent incentive for these groups to be formalized and sustained after CBSI closure.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced skills and expanded information bases</td>
<td>Social development was successfully integrated into NBI practices by actions of CBSI during implementation</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed riparian dialogue on transboundary development opportunities, challenges and impacts</td>
<td>CBSI addition of development communications contributed to understanding of development opportunities.</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced stakeholder participation in the NBI process</td>
<td>CBSI promoted stakeholder participation throughout the NBI, but did not finalize the public participation strategy. Take up by the SAPs has been patchy (e.g. Rusumo Falls)</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6. Overall project assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory&lt;sup&gt;41&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Bank Performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Supervision</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Bank Performance</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Implementing Agency Performance</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7. Conclusions and lessons about project performance and outcomes

7.1  *Management and administrative systems proved cumbersome*. There was a need for better systems from the start, and early attention to start up.

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<sup>41</sup> The Learning Review of Regional Projects rates CBSI as MU (rather than MS) on “likelihood of achieving PDO”, on the grounds that “under existing geopolitical conditions, it is unlikely that full confidence in regional cooperation can be developed”. However: (1) full confidence is not mentioned in the original PDO, and (2) evidence such as the 10 Year Event testify to a high level of confidence.
7.2 **The NBDF did not deliver as expected**. More attention should have been paid at design and implementation stages to setting up an efficient workable model. The Bank should have been more proactive in resolving problems.

7.3 **Project objectives should have been interpreted through a better understanding of NBI’s overall purpose and strategy, through a better understanding of stakeholders and by more transparency on the CFA. This would have allowed better management of expectations.** A clearer understanding of the NBI goals from the start, reflected in an NBI-wide communications strategy, and a baseline survey at the outset would have helped sharpen the selection of stakeholders, the tailoring of messages by stakeholder and by country, and the rhythm of delivery. On this basis, a more strategic approach could have been taken, and expectations better managed. A mandate from Nile-COM for more transparency on the CFA would also have helped to manage expectations on that issue and to counter misinformation.

8. **Conclusions and lessons on improvements for the future**

8.1 **The use of networks needs to be clear from the outset.** When setting up networks within a process with uncertain timelines and outcome, care should be taken to define objectives, and prepare sustainability plans and exit strategies.

8.2 **Inclusion of civil society adds value.** NBI should seek to empower civil society by including it in governance structures.

8.3 **Overall, the relationship with NBD was less productive than it might have been.** A new relationship with NBD should be formed, linked to independent capacity building efforts for NBD.

8.4 **Approaches tailored to different country situations could have helped CBSI to advance the NBI agenda better.** Country-specific strategies should target specific approaches in the light of the political economy of each country.

8.5 **Lack of a baseline survey compromised results measurement from the outset and the RBS never proved very useful to CBSI.** Indicators should be defined at the outset, and an opinion survey conducted at design stage. Staffing should be included for M&E.

9. **Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date ISR Archived</th>
<th>DO</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Actual Disbursements (US$ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>05/28/2008</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>8.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11/26/2008</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>10.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>05/26/2009</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>10.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>08/25/2009</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>10.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12/30/2009</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>11.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. **Disbursement Profile**

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42 One exception is the NBDF held in Khartoum, attended by over 350 participants, the Nile Ministers of Environment issued a 12-point ‘Khartoum Declaration’ supporting cooperation on environmental management in the basin.

43 Originally, ISRs were not required for regional trust funds; however, in 2008 all Trust Fund Projects over US$5.0 million were mainstreamed at which time the team began preparing ISRs for CBSI.
11. **Bank Staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>At ICR</th>
<th>At Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili (AFR)</td>
<td>Callisto E. Madavo (AFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shamshad Akhtar (MNA)</td>
<td>Jean-Louis Sarbib (MNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director:</td>
<td>Richard G. Scobey (AFCRI)</td>
<td>Michel Wormser (AFTPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letitia Obeng (MNSRE)</td>
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<td>Ashok K. Subramanian (AFTWR)</td>
<td>David Grey (AFTNL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Team Leader:</td>
<td>John Bryant Collier</td>
<td>Sarah Keener</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Design Issues and Quality at Entry

1.1 Project contribution to Nile Vision: Agriculture is the largest user of water, a major production sector, and source of incomes to the majority of poor people in the basin. Hence, focus on agricultural water was central to the NBI goal of sustainable socio-economic development through use and benefits of Nile water.

1.2 Clarity of outcomes and indicators: The original PDO and indicators are clear and generally monitorable, but ambitious for a small project. Expected outputs included an improved enabling environment for development and production, and options or reform and best practice. The linkages between agricultural water management and basin management issues were not spelled out.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD PDO</th>
<th>Provide a sound conceptual and practical basis to increase the availability and efficient use of agricultural water.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAD output indicators</td>
<td>Regional dialogue, best practices and national capacity for sustainable watershed management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consultations and best practices on community-managed irrigation, and awareness on efficient irrigation water use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Options for reform of public irrigation, and opportunities for irrigation development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National level support for agricultural and irrigation policy, and national capacity strengthened</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Project strategy: Four components were to achieve the goal set: (1) project coordination and facilitation; (2) water harvesting; (3) community managed irrigation (small scale); and (4) public and private managed (large scale) irrigation. The design of components 2-4 was a series of studies, workshops, trainings etc., with the expected links to outputs and outcomes not always detailed. It was not clear how EWUAP was to change the enabling environment or affect policy. A larger scale project, perhaps with an investment component as NTEAP had, would have been required to fully achieve the PDO.

1.4 Structure, complexity, number of components: The original design was very detailed but sometimes hard to understand. The key performance indicators in the PAD ran to eight pages. A well-prepared PIP provides further detail. The project budget of US$5.28 million was adequate.

1.5 Appropriateness and efficiency of project location: Location in a major agricultural country within the irrigation board building and close to CGIAR research institutions, and with the strong interest of government, was productive. The Kenyan government provided excellent support.

1.6 Stakeholder commitment and involvement. There was extensive stakeholder consultation during preparation.

1.7 Bank inputs: The Bank team provided detailed professional inputs. Design was clear.

1.8 Conversion to RBS: Conversion to the RBS brought simplicity and clarity, condensing the results framework to three outcomes and six monitorable and doable outputs.

2. Implementation Issues

2.1 Start up: Implementation was extremely slow to start. Staff recruitment was slow. Little support was provided early on to aid project staff in their comprehension of the project.

2.2 UNOPS: The problems experienced by all SVP projects constrained the efficiency of EWUAP too.

2.3 Procurement/FM: EWUAP benefited from an excellent FM and Procurement Officer and provided above average services for the project as well as other SVP Projects which conducted activities in Kenya.

2.4 Links to SAPs: EWUAP worked extensively with the SAPs. The SAPs took part in workshops, study tours and PSC meetings, and EWUAP executed studies and workshops for the SAPs. The final EWUAP reports contained action plans for possible SAP investments. Both ENTRO and NELSAP-CU have irrigation and water harvesting projects that draw on EWUAP. The Regional Agriculture Trade and Productivity Project (RATP) implemented by NELSAP-CU is continuing EWUAP’s methodological and study work on agricultural water. EWUAP overall contributed to “paving the way for cooperative implementation of efficient irrigation and water harvesting through the SAP investment programs” (PIP 1.3.1).

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44 For example, NTEAP’s PDO is couched in similar language but NTEAP’s donor resources (US$325 million) were six times greater than EWUAP’s (US$5 million).
2.5 **Links to other SVP projects:** EWUAP was proactive in seeking linkages with other SVP projects, and organized joint training with ATP.

2.6 **Adequacy of government and other stakeholder involvement:** Governments actively participated through the PSC and the NPCs. Working groups of experts aided project analysis, and about a dozen national institutions took part in a workshop with a view to becoming NBI partners as “centers of excellence”.

2.7 **Role and value of PSC:** The PSC was effective, with an excellent chairperson from the host country. One drawback, however, was that PSC members and NPCs came from a variety of ministries, with no single focal point per country.

2.8 **Role and value of Nile SEC/SVP-C inputs:** From the mid-term review onwards, SVP-C took a constructive hand in pushing the project forward. However, EWUAP and the role of agricultural water in basin planning and management were the least understood of all the SVP projects and topics, and the least well integrated into NBI thinking and planning. This may have been because NBI and partners tended to look on agriculture as a “water user” that should not be integrated into decisions on water resource allocation. Latent tension between riparians over the future of diversions for irrigation may have compounded NBI’s reticence.

2.9 **Role and value of partner inputs:** EWUAP liaised with national and regional agricultural research agencies and NGOs, including KARI, FAO etc.

2.10 **MTR and restructuring:** The MTR provided useful clarification and impetus. A critical assessment found very slow progress and some confusion about project objectives and activities. Five key deliverables were identified, and the targeting of these deliverables subsequently drove the project to a successful conclusion.

2.12 **Adequacy of actions taken in response to problems:** Late start up made economies necessary, and EWUAP responded flexibly by implementing the watershed management and community-managed irrigation components together, saving time and money. EWUAP also responded flexibly to demand, for example mounting special workshops on participation in irrigation management and on GIS.

2.13 **Implementation and management efficiency:** Despite a slow start, the project closed on time and 10% under budget, largely because of the combining of the watershed management and community-managed irrigation components. After initial problems of comprehension, management was somewhat flexible and quite results-oriented. In-country implementation was constrained by the unpaid status of NPCs.

2.14 **Bank inputs:** There was no launch workshop, and the Bank provided scant support in the first two years of implementation. Starting with the MTR, Bank inputs intensified and were adequate, helping the project to focus on essentials and to stick to programs and timetables. Major outputs were peer reviewed by Bank consultants.
3. **Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes**

**Rating:** Moderately satisfactory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD PDO:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide sound conceptual and practical basis to increase the availability and efficient use of water.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Narrative and explanation of ratings**

| Overall, EWUAP partly achieved its objectives by promoting regional dialogue, documenting best practice, and forming a trained and committed cadre of 400 professionals (including 130 participants in study tours). Quality of the 8 major reports was good, but some of the country level material was inadequate. Work on large scale irrigation was a useful GIS-based inventory and analysis, but scarcely touched on the proposed reform and policy issues. *Centers of Excellence* were identified, but NBI has not followed up. | MS |

| Delays in implementation due to uncertainty over design, slow start up, ineffective national coordination, and lack of early support from the Bank and NBI reduced efficiency of delivery. | MU |

| **Relevance** remains in principle high, and the SAPs have taken over much of the work. However, uncertainty remains about the role of agricultural water in basin planning (see section 2.8). | MU |

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4. **Transition, sustainability and risk**

4.1 **Transition of functions to Nile-SEC:** It is not clear whether Nile-SEC will continue the policy and capacity building work in agricultural water, maintain the loose network of professionals created, or follow up on the initiative of *Centers of Excellence*. Some EWUAP outputs are inputs to the Basin Sustainability Framework.

4.2 **Transition of functions to SAPs:** Follow up on some EWUAP initiatives will be through RATP, under the aegis of NELSAP-CU. Project work on irrigation and watershed management in both SAPs builds on EWUAP outputs.

4.3 **Transition of functions to countries:** EWUAP had little input at the policy level, and apart from capacity and reports, nothing has been transferred at the country level.

4.5 **Transition of networks and goodwill:** A roster of actors in the sector has been prepared and transferred to Nile-SEC.

4.6 **Transition arrangements for knowledge products:** Products have been disseminated, and uploaded to the on-line Nile IS: follow up by the Nile-SEC knowledge management function is needed.

4.8 **Political economy risks:** Divergence of positions over the scope for upstream agricultural water diversions led to the downsizing of the project at design. The same implicit divergence between the perceived interests of downstream riparians and those of the upstreamers presents a risk to the application of EWUAP findings and to rational planning for agricultural water at the basin scale.

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5. **Contribution to the overall SVP outcomes**

| SVP PDO: Build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investment in the NB countries | EWUAP design was relevant to the SVP objective of building capacity and an enabling environment for investment in agricultural water. The project delivered substantial knowledge products, built capacity, and prepared the ground for SAP investment in both watershed management and irrigation. However, the project fell short at the policy and institutional level of creating a momentum for cooperation on agricultural water in the basin. | MS | MS |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVP PDO Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased basin-wide dialogue and exchange of information</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Narrative and explanation of ratings

| Functioning networks of professionals | Over 500 professionals participated, but no arrangements for sustaining a network have been put in place. Sustainability is unclear. | S | MU |
| Enhanced skills and expanded information bases | Training and knowledge products were satisfactorily delivered. | S | S |
| Informed riparian dialogue on transboundary development opportunities, challenges and impacts | EWUAP conducted some studies and workshops with and for the SAPs. However, no real dialogue on agricultural water as part of transboundary IWRM has been developed. | S | MU |
| Enhanced stakeholder participation in the NBI process | PSC actively engaged in NBI issues, and there is continuity of PSC members with RATP. Agricultural water is well considered in SAP activities but is not well represented in current basin-wide processes such as the Basin Sustainability Framework. | S | MU |

### 6. Overall project assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assessment of Implementing Agency Performance</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7. Conclusions and lessons about project performance and outcomes

7.1 **Clear design and hands on support from the start are essential.** For a pioneer project in an isolated environment, clear but flexible design and hands on support from the very start are essential.

### 8. Conclusions and lessons on improvements for the future

8.1 **Agricultural water is an essential part of Nile basin planning.** Agricultural water is a key element in basin planning and development, especially as it is the largest user and climate change will increase demand, especially in upstream countries. NBI needs to factor questions of efficiency, water saving, and comparative value of irrigation and other agricultural water sources into planning at the basin scale, and to make the conceptual and practical connection between local/in-country water management and transboundary and basin-scale issues. An agricultural water capacity is essential in the future Nile basin planning team. The political economy risk (see 4.10 above) needs to be managed.

8.2 **EWUAP outputs need to be actively managed for sustainability.** The professional capacity and the knowledge created by EWUAP needs to be maintained and put to use by NBI, and a strategy for this should be developed.

8.3 **A continuity role for PSC members would build on their knowledge and commitment to NBI.** An enormous investment has been made in PSC members, who are knowledgeable and committed to NBI, and a first class interface with member governments. All possible arrangements should be made to ensure they remain involved, whether in networks or – preferably – in a follow on role such as that played by several EWUAP PSC members who are now on the RATP PSC.

### 9. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Since the EWUAP grant was below US$5.0 million ISRs were not required.

### 10. Disbursement Profile
11. Bank Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
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<th>At Approval</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Team Leader:</td>
<td>Berina Uwimbabazi</td>
<td>IJsbrand de Jong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SVP ICRR Summary: Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project (NTEAP)

1. Design Issues and Quality at Entry

1.1 Project contribution to Nile Vision: Environmental sustainability is integral to the Nile Vision. The project was appropriately designed to create the necessary knowledge, instruments, capacity and experience in sustainable environmental management linked to transboundary issues. The focus on knowledge rather than investment was appropriate as a first step towards cooperative action.

1.2 Clarity of outcomes and indicators: The original PDO and indicators are straightforward and monitorable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD PDO</th>
<th>Provide a strategic framework for environmentally sustainable action, and support basin-wide environmental action linked to transboundary issues.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAD output indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional dialogue and cooperation on transboundary environmental and natural resource management issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community level involvement and action on transboundary environmental issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental awareness enhanced through awareness raising, education and networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Project strategy: Five components were designed to achieve the objective: (1) institutional strengthening to facilitate regional cooperation; (2) community level land, forests and water conservation; (3) environmental education and public awareness; (4) wetlands and biodiversity conservation; and (5) basin-wide water quality monitoring. The linkages between components and outputs are clear, and the project was resourced adequately to achieve its objectives. The linkages to transboundary issues are well drawn, and there is appropriate emphasis on strategic framework, on understanding of linkages between water resources development and environment, and on dialogue and stakeholder involvement.

1.4 Structure, complexity, number of components: The original design was sound. However, it was somewhat over-complex, and the concept of a “strategic environmental framework” was initially not well understood. The project was adequately financed (US$32.5 million).

1.5 Appropriateness and efficiency of project location: The project was located in Khartoum, with national coordinators and microgrant coordinators in each country. These arrangements proved efficient.

1.6 Stakeholder commitment and involvement: The project was based on transboundary environmental analysis carried out by Nile riparians with external support.

1.7 Bank inputs: The Bank played an active and decisive role in project design.

1.8 Conversion to RBS. Conversion to RBS brought greater clarity by defining five outcomes specifically linked to each of the five components.

2. Implementation Issues

2.1 Start up: Implementation was slow to start. This led to the need for two one year no-cost extensions.

2.2 UNOPS: UNOPS procedures and management were arduous and caused delays and costs.

2.3 Procurement, FM: Delays in procurement and disbursement slowed implementation. These delays were exacerbated by poor staff capacity and late turnover of the FM and Procurement Officer.

2.4 Links to SAPs: NTEAP provided environmental staff, who have been retained under the NBI-ISP, at each of the SAPs. They provided input into development of environment guidelines for NBI projects, as well as the basinwide wetlands strategy, and initiating the state of the basin evaluation.

2.5 Links to other SVP projects: NTEAP worked closely with WRPM and contributed approximately US$2.5 to DSS Development and the Wetlands database provided an input to the DSS. The water quality component made significant contributions to the data sharing protocol developed by WRPM. At the national level, NTEAP NFPs and National Microgrant Coordinators worked closely with CBSI NFPs. NTEAP also worked with RPT in development of EIA guidelines for power transmission projects.

2.6 Adequacy of government and other stakeholder involvement: Overall, stakeholder involvement was good. The project was actively supported at the highest level, and the Government of Sudan gave strong support. Numerous stakeholders were involved throughout in dialogue, working groups and networks.

2.7 Role and value of PSC: The PSC was effective. The members were the Directors of Environment from each country, so high level and with a common profile and institutional placing. The PSC was proactive in, for example, introducing the innovation of National Eligible Projects in 2005.
2.8 Role and value of Nile SEC/SVP-C inputs: NTEAP worked well with the Nile SEC/SVP-C, particularly on SVP/SAP coordination and Monitoring and Evaluation (NTEAP was the only SVP Project to have a Monitoring and Evaluation Lead Specialist). However, while coordination was good, there was limited NBI supervision or direct input into NTEAP activities beyond participation in World Bank/UNDP review missions.

2.9 Role and value of partner inputs: UNDP/GEF were effective partners, providing hands on guidance. NTEAP worked actively with many other partners, training and collaborating with Lake Victoria Basin Commission on wetlands and water quality, supporting and negotiating Memoranda of Understanding with the Ramsar Secretariat and with Rambol Nature.

2.10 MTR and restructuring: The MTR found the project somewhat overburdened, and some simplifications and a clearer focus were introduced.

2.11 Reporting and M&E: NTEAP prepared informative reports on a monthly, semi-annual and annual basis, and reported against RBS indicators. NTEAP introduced participatory monitoring, which proved very popular and strengthened ownership. Good communications were maintained through newsletters, the website, CD-ROMs for key outputs etc. Some 70 micro-grant projects have been documented as best practice.

2.12 Adequacy of actions taken in response to problems: NTEAP showed good flexibility in responding to the changing environment, factoring in new activities such as the Nile River Awareness Kit and the Rambol Environmental Awareness Initiative. NTEAP also responded positively to the PSC instruction to conduct Nationally Eligible Projects: however, this overstrained capacity and a number of these projects have been left incomplete. Additionally, the inclusion of Nationally Eligible Projects to the NTEAP work program was not well planned and misunderstandings arose between the project and some riparian countries because the technical assistance nature of the project and its safeguards category (C), precluded NTEAP from financing works. NTEAP also made plans to conduct a state of the basin report and a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA). The terms-of-reference for those activities were drafted and are now being taken up by the NBI-ISP.

2.13 Implementation and management efficiency: NTEAP was adequately financed (US$32.5 million) and staffed (7 lead specialists, 9 national coordinators and 10 microgrant coordinators). These resources were used efficiently, and after a slow start, implementation arrangements worked well, despite the handicap of UNOPS.

2.14 Bank inputs: Eight joint World Bank/UNDP implementation review missions were adequately staffed with good continuity. Missions were helpful in adjusting design (particularly in defining the Strategic Environmental Framework/TDA) and improving implementation. In addition to visiting the PMU, missions also made field visits to microgrants and environmental education and awareness activities in most of the riparian countries. The project benefitted from a close and productive working relationship between the World Bank and UNDP on NTEAP supervision.

3. Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative and explanation of ratings</th>
<th>Ach’mt</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Rel’vnce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAD PDO: Provide a strategic framework for environmentally sustainable action, and support basin-wide environmental action linked to transboundary issues. Overall NTEAP achieved its objective. Training, networking, collaboration with national agencies and in working groups, and the development of the environmental and social assessment framework all contributed to institutional strengthening. The microgrants program, with its 347 community projects, created widespread community capacity and ownership, as well as substantial assets on the ground. Environmental education programs and networking, capacity building and piloting built environmental awareness in civil society. Regional and national working groups, the development of the wetlands strategy and training built capacity for wetlands management. The water quality monitoring working group, strategy and program created awareness, methods and capability in water quality monitoring.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Project implementation was carried out within a reduced budget and with a two year extension necessitated by start up delays and added tasks. Despite unwieldy administrative systems and some task overload, efficiency was overall good.

Relevance remains very high, and environmental issues are at the heart of follow on work on the Basin Sustainability Framework.

4. Transition, sustainability and risk

4.1 Transition of functions to Nile-SEC: NTEAP has a well-considered sustainability plan under which most activities are transferred to Nile-SEC and to countries. Nile-SEC is expected to take responsibility for follow up on water quality monitoring, wetlands, environmental education, and capacity building. Although this is a big agenda, action on it is already underway: for example, wetlands strategies / guidelines will be developed under the NBSF. Environmental education is, however, not being continued (not seen as a core function). Capacity building is taken up under NBI-ISP component 2.5]. Memoranda of Understanding have been negotiated on environmental education, on wetlands and on small grants (GEF), and these need follow up. The Basin Sustainability Framework exercise will take over on certain aspects, but there is a risk that Nile-SEC will not have the environmental capacity to sustain such a wide range of initiatives. It is also planned that the PSC will continue to meet in a consultative role.

4.2 Transition of functions to SAPs: NTEAP supported the SAPs by hiring two environmental specialists to be based at ENTRO and NELSAP-CU, respectively. These specialists have worked with the SAPs to begin developing an environmental and social policy for the NBI that is being completed under the NBI-ISP. The NTEAP specialists were also both retained by the SAPs and continue to provide service to the NBI.

4.3 Transition of functions to countries: Arrangements for handover of in-country functions began in 2007 when national counterparts to the NPCs were appointed. Water quality monitoring is the responsibility of national agencies, and there is a Substantial risk that this will not be sustained evenly. There are no national agencies with specific responsibility for wetlands, and there is a risk that follow up to project gains will be haphazard and uncoordinated, unless Nile-SEC is able to take the initiative.

4.4 Transition of functions to others: Some education will be done under a partnership with Rambol Nature; cooperation on wetlands will be with the Ramsar Secretariat; and NBI will partner GEF in the small grants program.

4.5 Transition of networks and goodwill: It is expected that the wetlands, water quality and journalists working groups will continue to be active.

4.6 Transition arrangements for knowledge products: Project reports etc. have been widely disseminated and follow up will be the responsibility of Nile-SEC through Nile IS.

4.7 Other sustainability issues: N/A

4.8 Political economy risks: NTEAP has noted the sensitivity of environmental action to political unrest and internal conflict. The project encountered this risk in four countries during implementation, and has developed a good mitigation strategy.

5. Contribution to the overall SVP outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVP PDO: Build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investment in the NB countries</th>
<th>Narrative and explanation of ratings</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NTEAP design was highly relevant to the SVP objective of building capacity and of creating an enabling environment. Institutional strengthening, community actions and the environmental awareness program built broad capacity, and specific capability was developed in specialist areas, notably wetlands and water quality, The investment environment was improved by the convergence of legal, regulatory and policy frameworks, and specific investment opportunities were opened up by the wetlands and park management plans that were prepared. The microgrants program delivered benefits to over 20,000 people.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Overall project assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Bank Performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Supervision</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Bank Performance</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Implementing Agency Performance</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Conclusions and lessons about project performance and outcomes

7.1 Start up was slow and time and resources were lost. A well planned pre-implementation phase built in to project planning could have saved resources and avoided disappointed expectations of early delivery.

8. Conclusions and lessons on improvements for the future

8.1 Participatory monitoring could be applied in other NBI activities. Participatory monitoring has improved ownership, resource mobilization and knowledge. It even attracted the attention of ministers and heads of state. Its application in all relevant NBI activities could be considered.

8.2 The PSC could continue on a consultative basis. The PSC comprises nine national Directors of Environment and is a first class resource, used to working together. The group should be continued on a consultative basis.

8.3 NBI needs to develop a strong environmental capability and to follow up on key environmental processes that NTEAP began. The gains of NTEAP are vulnerable if there is no follow up. Nile-SEC is building up an environmental team. In addition to the Basin Sustainability Framework, continued linkages with the working groups and follow up on implementation of the water quality and wetlands strategies are needed.

9. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date ISR Archived</th>
<th>GEO</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Actual Disbursements (US$ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>05/21/2003</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12/01/2003</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>03/02/2004</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>05/10/2004</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{48}\) As a GEF financed project ISRs were prepared for NTEAP throughout implementation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date (ISO)</th>
<th>GEO</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Actual Disbursements (US$ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11/08/2004</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>01/07/2005</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>06/16/2005</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>12/22/2005</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>06/16/2006</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12/15/2006</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>3.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>06/27/2007</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>7.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>12/03/2007</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>12.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>05/20/2008</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>14.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>11/27/2008</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>16.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>05/26/2009</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>16.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>08/28/2009</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>16.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>12/31/2009</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>16.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Disbursement Profile

11. Bank Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>At ICR</th>
<th>At Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice President:</td>
<td>Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili (AFR)</td>
<td>Callisto E. Madavo (AFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shamshad Akhtar (MNA)</td>
<td>Jean-Louis Sarbib (MNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director:</td>
<td>Richard G. Scobey (AFCRI)</td>
<td>Praful Patel (AFTPI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letitia Obeng (MNSRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Manager:</td>
<td>Ashok K. Subramanian (AFTWR)</td>
<td>David Grey (AFTNL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Team Leader:</td>
<td>John Bryant Collier</td>
<td>Inger Andersen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SVP ICRR Summary: Regional Power Trade Project (RPT), Phase I

1. Design Issues and Quality at Entry

1.1 Project contribution to Nile Vision: Development of a regional electricity market is expected to foster cooperation amongst riparians and ensure that resources are developed and managed for maximum benefit in an integrated and environmentally sustainable manner. This approach is essential to the Nile Vision and the project was appropriately designed to achieve these goals.

1.2 Clarity of outcomes and indicators: The original PDO and indicators stated in the SVP PAD are limited in scope. The project outcomes set in the RPT PAD give a better idea of what was originally intended. In the event, changes in the sector led to revision of the PDO and outcomes soon after implementation began (see below, 1.3 and 2.10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD PDO</th>
<th>Establish the institutional means to coordinate the development of regional power markets amongst Nile Basin countries.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SVP PAD output indicators</td>
<td>Regional Power Trade Forum established and operating[^40].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Basin-wide study of long term power supply, demand and opportunities cooperatively conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPT PAD outcome indicators</td>
<td>Dialogue, cooperation and understanding on legal, regulatory and pricing regimes to support power trade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic framework for advancing power trade, including a forum and strategy and plans for expanding generation and transmission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investments identified and promoted, data base updated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sector reform strategies promoted, advisory services provided.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Project strategy: The project was designed to achieve its results through three components: (1) regional coordination and implementation; (2) establishment of a power trade forum; and (3) a comprehensive basin wide study. The strategy was appropriate at the time of appraisal, but in the event, a power pool framework, the East African Power Pool (EAPP) was established in 2005 independently of RPT. Hence at MTR (see below, section 2.10), the PDO and results were amended, and Component (2) was revised to facilitate development of regional power markets within that framework.

1.4 Structure, complexity, number of components: The project was well structured and adequately financed (US$6.2 million) in the context at appraisal.

1.5 Appropriateness and efficiency of project location: The project was located at Dar, and was well housed and supported by the Tanzania government. Location was not a constraint to efficiency.

1.6 Stakeholder commitment and involvement: Strong stakeholder engagement characterizes RPT throughout, and this was evident during preparation, when two senior officials from each country took part. Nonetheless, there was a lack of transparency in the lack of information provided on the parallel process led by NEPAD that established the EAPP.

1.7 Bank inputs: Bank preparation was sound, and NORAD provided extensive technical support. Technical preparation was, however, soon overtaken by the creation of EAPP. Given that even government participants in the preparation did not anticipate this, the Bank team cannot be faulted for not foreseeing this eventuality.

1.8 Conversion to RBS: Conversion to RBS came at a good moment for RPT, as the DO was being revised, and the project was able to adapt its outcomes and indicators accordingly within the RBS system. The conversion process also proved useful to RPT as it demonstrated that the project would have neither the time nor the financing to achieve its revised objectives, and that a Phase II with additional financing would be necessary.

2. Implementation Issues

2.1 Start up: Implementation was extremely slow to start, with a project launch in 2003 but the PMU not operational until the end of 2005 and only fully staffed in November 2006.

[^40]: This indicator was changed at MTR to assist the NBI countries in developing the tools for improving access to reliable, low cost, sustainably generated power.
2.2 **UNOPS**: UNOPS systems and procedures proved extremely cumbersome, and long delays were experienced.

2.3 **Procurement, FM**: Procurement of consultants was very slow and early on it was difficult to identify a regional FM and Procurement Officer for the Project. After the appointment (two years into project implementation) of the FM and Procurement Officer, the situation improved.

2.4 **Links to SAPs**: In concept, RPT was to prepare both the institutional framework and the comprehensive basin wide analysis of opportunities to drive the planning of multipurpose river basin development through the SAPs. In practice, the SAPs moved more rapidly ahead, doing their own limited power trade studies in advance of the comprehensive study to be done by RPT, which now will not be available until 2011. Nonetheless, RPT cooperated throughout with the SAPs, including joint funding and hosting of investment meetings and study tours for SAP investment areas.

2.5 **Links to other SVP projects**: RPT cooperated well with other SVP projects, including: (1) cooperation with SDBS on the benefit sharing framework; (2) organization of regional power trade workshops by ATP; (3) collaboration with NTEAP on the power trade EIA; (4) cooperation on design, development and data for WRPM’s data support system (DSS); and (5) joint work with CBSI on a study of power sector stakeholders.

2.6 **Adequacy of government and other stakeholder involvement**: Government commitment was strong throughout, including two ministerial conferences (at the outset and at the end of Phase I), and four very senior officials involved in the PSC and Power Technical Committee (PTC). Many stakeholders were involved on an unpaid basis in the study evaluation panels and working groups.

2.7 **Role and value of PSC**: The PSC and the technical level PTC met twice a year, and provided hands on oversight, and in-depth discussion of project reports. The two PSC representatives were ministry permanent secretary and CEO of the utility, and the PTC members were also high level officials from the ministry and utility. Beyond strict project business, the PSC served as an important platform for discussion on regional power development and opportunities for power trade.

2.8 **Role and value of Nile SEC/SVP-C inputs**: Nile-SEC provided some logistical support, which was adequate.

2.9 **Role and value of partner inputs**: Once the project objectives were revised, RPT worked effectively with EAPP and the East African Community (EAC), which participated in project meetings, training and workshops. Links and study tours were also made with the Southern and Western Africa Power Pools. National environment agencies participated in the development of the power trade EIA framework and procedures.

2.10 **MTR and restructuring**: Following creation of the EAPP, a revision to the PDO was agreed at MTR: “facilitate development of regional power markets”, with two key results: (1) technical assistance for compatibility in the policy and regulatory environment, operating standards and access rules, and for fostering a framework for power trade; and (2) facilitation of infrastructure development for power trade. Component 2 was formally revised. It was agreed to postpone the comprehensive study to an eighteen month Phase II (January 2010 to June 2011) and to make a no cost extension to the original project, now called Phase I, to the end of 2009. The grant agreement was revised when the follow-on Grant was approved.

2.11 **Reporting and M&E**: RPT reporting has been substantive, and based on the RBS.

2.12 **Adequacy of actions taken in response to problems**: Faced with the challenge of the unexpected creation of EAPP, RPT went through a long period of uncertainty characterized by initial inactivity and then by a spirit of competition. Eventually, by 2007, RPT and EAPP had set up a committee to work out a scheme of cooperation, and RPT refocused on capacity building and development of knowledge and standards in support of the embryonic EAPP. The strategic work was postponed until agreement of all stakeholders could be obtained, and this is now programmed for Phase II. Faced with the challenge of initial delays and higher than expected costs, RPT management rephased and prioritized activities and proposed a Phase II to the project. The actions taken were appropriate, and helped RPT to achieve its revised objectives.

2.13 **Implementation and management efficiency**: After the very slow start, RPT was adequately staffed (RPM and three lead specialists) and well managed.

2.14 **Bank inputs**: No review missions were conducted in the initial years of uncertainty (2005/6) when the Bank could have been expected to engage in dialogue or restructuring. Once the project got going in 2007, supervision was adequate. A well staffed MTR, including NORAD, reached practical agreements with RPT management and NBI. Subsequently, the Bank relied on NORAD to review the studies and other outputs.

3. **Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative and explanation of ratings</th>
<th>Ach’mt</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Rel’vnce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rating: Moderately satisfactory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After enduring a long period of delay and uncertainty, RPT quickly got up to speed and achieved its revised objective by: (i) building capacity for power trade through training and workshops (see table below); (ii) creating and disseminating knowledge and exchange of ideas through studies (see table below); (iii) facilitating specific power trade agreements (Ethiopia/Sudan, Ethiopia/Kenya); (iv) facilitating specific public-private partnerships (Tanzania for Ruhidji, KPLC/KenGen, Kenya joint projects with Tanzania and Ethiopia); and (v) creating a platform (including the PSC and PTC) and networks (including the Virtual Power Forum) for dialogue to advance cooperation and investment.

Delays in the project reduced the usefulness of outputs, particularly to the SAPs, which justifies an overall rating of MS rather than S.

Delays in startup reduced the efficiency of delivery and entailed increased costs. After the MTR, management was efficient and cost effective.

After initial uncertainty, relevance remains very high, and has even increased, as there is a track record of success, strong country engagement, and an organizational framework (EAPP) that RPT can help develop and then hand over to.

Delays in the project reduced the usefulness of outputs, particularly to the SAPs, which justifies an overall rating of MS rather than S.

4. Transition, sustainability and risk

4.1 Transition of functions to Nile-SEC: As part of the preparations for Phase II, RPT has prepared an excellent Exit Strategy, programming all the transition actions set out in sections 4.1-7. Nile-SEC will take over certain functions, notably the Regional Power Data Bank, which will be integrated in to the DSS.

4.2 Transition of functions to SAPs: In Phase II (US$4.1 million), RPT will prepare the comprehensive basin wide study of actual and potential power trade opportunities and a long term development strategy and portfolio of investment projects. This will form the basis of SAP investment programs. SAPs are already using some outputs, including the PPP Guidelines.

4.3 Transition of functions to countries: Specific outputs and functions, which are in varying stages of adoption by national authorities and which will form the basis of future agreements on power trade include: EIA framework and guidelines, adopted by national environmental agencies; PPP guidelines; and the compendium of best practices in hydropower multipurpose coordination.

4.4 Transition of functions to others: Capacity has been developed in EAPP through joint work, training and studies. At the end of Phase II, EAPP is expected to take over regional training programs, the Virtual Power Forum, the working groups (as needed), and the power data base (with Nile-SEC).

4.5 Transition of networks and goodwill: Not applicable.
4.6 Transition arrangements for knowledge products: Reports have been widely distributed and are available on the web. At the close of Phase II, it is expected that project outputs will be delivered to EAPP for further dissemination and use.

4.7 Other sustainability issues: Given the well prepared Exit Strategy, the political and economic momentum to power trade, and the growth of EAPP as a permanent institution, it is expected that there will be only a moderate risk to the sustainability of RPT outcomes.

4.8 Political economy risks: Provided that EAPP grows as expected and the current strong political support continues, there is low political economy risk.

5. Contribution to the overall SVP outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SVP PDO: Build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investment in the NB countries</th>
<th>RPT design was highly relevant to the SVP objective of building trust and capacity and of creating an enabling environment. In practice, the project has been effective in building trust and confidence amongst power sector stakeholders from ministerial level down, and has been instrumental in developing standards and best practice that will underpin investment. Phase II is expected to develop an investment strategy and a portfolio of projects.</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD SVP Indicators</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased basin-wide dialogue and exchange of information</td>
<td>The PSC and PTC, workshops and the virtual forum have created a platform for enhanced basin-wide dialogue.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functioning networks of professional</td>
<td>The PSC and PTC have become a network of permanent secretaries, CEOs and senior officials of ministries and utilities.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced skills and expanded information bases</td>
<td>Training and studies have built capacity and knowledge in power trade options and practices.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed riparian dialogue on transboundary development opportunities, challenges and impacts</td>
<td>The dialogue on development opportunities has been strengthened through the preliminary basin-wide identification of options and by the development of operational models for regulation, markets and PPP.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced stakeholder participation in the NBI process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Overall project assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
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<td>Assessment of Bank Performance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Supervision</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Conclusions and lessons about project performance and outcomes

7.1 The use of working groups to review studies engaged a broader range of stakeholders, tapped expertise and built commitment.
7.2 RPT was able to retrofit the RBS in a constructive way to redefine its outcomes after the MTR.

8. Conclusions and lessons on improvements for the future

8.1 Careful political economy analysis can avoid wasted effort. The process to set up EAPP was going on at the time of project preparation and appraisal. Had it been detected and analysed, project design would have been different and time and money would not have been wasted.
8.2 A clear and well-conceived exit strategy prepared well in advance of project closing increases the chances of efficient handover and sustainability of outcomes.
8.3 Well designed project governance can generate needed political support and develop into a platform for cooperation, as the RPT PSC and PTC appear to be doing.

9. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date ISR Archived</th>
<th>DO</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Actual Disbursements (US$ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>05/28/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>5.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12/05/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>06/05/2009</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>5.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Disbursement Profile

11. Bank Staff

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47 Originally, ISRs were not required for regional trust funds; however, in 2008 all Trust Fund Projects over US$5.0 million were mainstreamed at which time the team began preparing ISRs for RPT.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>At ICR</th>
<th>At Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice President:</td>
<td>Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili (AFR)</td>
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<td>Shamshad Akhtar (MNA)</td>
<td>Christiaan Poortman (MNA)</td>
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<td>Michel Wormser (AFTPI)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sector Manager:</td>
<td>Ashok K. Subramanian (AFTWR)</td>
<td>David Grey (AFTNL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Team Leader:</td>
<td>John Bryant Collier</td>
<td>Mangesh Hoskote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SVP ICRR Summary: Socio-economic Development and Benefits Sharing Project (SDBS)

1. Design Issues and Quality at Entry

1.1 Project contribution to Nile Vision: At the time SVP was identified, the overall NBI goal was framed as “to foster sustainable socio-economic development in riparian countries through the equitable use of, and benefits from, common Nile Basin water resources.” Coordinated basin-wide management was expected to produce direct benefits from additional water resources and development based on water, and also related socio-economic benefits from intra-regional trade and investment in regional infrastructure. Socio-economic research and dialogue and the development of knowledge and methodologies on economic integration and benefit sharing were seen as essential to the Nile Vision and the project was appropriately designed to achieve these goals.

1.2 Clarity of outcomes and indicators: The PDO is very broad, but the output indicators are straightforward and specific. It is not clear why “support to SVP” was a priority, rather than support to SAPs, who were to incorporate benefit sharing approaches into their analysis and project planning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD PDO: Strengthen Nile River basin wide socio-economic cooperation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAD output indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogues initiated and sustained through workshops and other means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basin-wide network of economic and policy research institutions established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct support to other SVP projects on economic integration and benefit sharing provided.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied research products, papers, proceedings and capacity building outputs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Project strategy: Project strategy was to provide knowledge and tools on the benefits from cooperation to analysts and decision takers in the riparian states through two components: the Nile Transboundary Development Network, a network of economic planning and research institutions that would work together to explore opportunities for cooperative socio-economic development and integration; and (2) the Nile Transboundary Development Facility, a facility to support research and pilot activities on benefit sharing by a wide range of stakeholders, including NGOs, civil society groups, private sector etc. Expectations were high: “Decision makers will look to SDBS products to inform their decisions on regional integration and benefit sharing.” (PAD) The project was intended to be implemented over six years, with two three year phases.

1.4 Structure, complexity, number of components: Implementation experience later demonstrated that the initial design was not detailed enough, particularly on the concept of benefit sharing and how the project was to address it. In addition, both NTDN and Nile Transboundary Development Facility turned out to be a greater management challenge than provided for. Project resources for the three year project (US$4.56 million) were ample for the tasks proposed.

1.5 Appropriateness and efficiency of project location: As the most intellectual and strategic of the SVP projects, SDBS was appropriately located in NBI’s thinking head at Entebbe.

1.6 Stakeholder involvement and commitment: Riparians contributed significantly to design. After the broad outline of the project was agreed at the first SVP planning meeting held in Sidere, Ethiopia in May 1999, a series of consultations and workshops were held with regional and national research institutions, national ministries of planning and finance etc.

1.7 Bank inputs: Bank preparation was sound, and the PAD is well written and clear, but was not detailed enough to guide the project (see 1.4 above). This was the last SVP project to be prepared (two years after the Program PAD).

1.8 Conversion to RBS: The RBS log frame is essentially a redescription of the PAD but with more precision on outcomes, and the (temporary) addition of a private sector component. The conversion process occupied much staff time, and the value of that investment is doubtful.

2. Implementation Issues

2.1 Start up: Implementation was extremely slow to start. The project was only fully staffed at end 2006, and the MTR came after only six months of implementation. Early on, problems of lack of office space and other support together with project management challenges further handicapped implementation.

2.2 UNOPS: The slowness of UNOPS represented a constraint, particularly for the agreements with the Participating Institutions (PIs).
2.3 **Procurement, FM:** As SDBS was based at the Nile-SEC (along with CBSI and SVP-C, the three projects were meant to share FM and Procurement staff. This, compiled with the number of activities planned in Uganda by the other SVP Projects, caused staff to be over stretched and delays in both procurement and payments.

2.4 **Links to SAPs:** SAPs were represented on the PSC, and CBSI and the PIs consulted them to agree a common agenda, which included a study and integrated investment strategy on gender mainstreaming in SAPs. However, the expectation that SDBS would provide conceptual and methodological guidance on economic integration and benefit sharing upstream of the development of the SAP investment programs has been disappointed: SDBS has been too late to do more than respond to limited specific requests from SAPs.

2.5 **Links to other SVP projects:** SDBS was seen as a cross-cutting project and close links were maintained with CBSI (to report on products) and with ATP. SDBS outputs were presented to the regular SVP/SAP coordination meetings.

2.6 **Adequacy of government and other stakeholder involvement:** Government involvement was through participation in the PSC, and through the dissemination and dialogue activities of the PIs.

2.7 **Role and value of PSC:** The PSC was high level, with the TAC member and one other member per country, although high turnover of members led to lack of continuity in following this complex project. A PSC Manual of Procedures was prepared. The PSC reviewed selected outputs in detail, including the Phase I Benefit Sharing Framework (BSF), for which the PSC requested further detailed case studies.

2.8 **Role and value of Nile-SEC/SVP-C inputs:** Nile-SEC provided some logistical support, which was adequate.

2.9 **Role and value of partner inputs:** SDBS was supposed to work with NBD, to reach NGOs and civil society. However, cooperation with NBD seems to have happened only at the end of the project.

2.10 **MTR and restructuring:** At MTR, it was plain that the project (which had only really started months before) would need a one year extension to complete Phase I, and this was accorded. In 2007, at the request of TAC, Nile-SEC added an unclear and burdensome private sector component: little was ever done on this and the component was dropped a year later. In mid-2008, when it became clear that the PIs were not capable of high level work on benefit sharing, a free standing consultant study on BSF was added.

2.11 **Reporting, M&E:** Adequate.

2.12 **Adequacy of actions taken in response to problems:** SDBS showed some flexibility to respond to change, including: (i) setting up the SDBS/SAP dialogue that created a demand-responsive behavior from SDBS; and (ii) deletion of the Nile Transboundary Development Facility when it became apparent that the project could not cope with its implementation in time.

2.13 **Implementation and management efficiency:** SDBS management developed operating manuals (for the PSC, Nile Transboundary Development Network). Overall, management was very participatory, with lots of workshops and forums. Quality control of the numerous products was effected through five peer reviewers. Major implementation problems were caused by: (a) weakness in project management, although this improved after the first two years of the project; (b) the long and arduous itinerary from work program to disbursement, which challenged even good management; and (c) difficulty in getting common understanding on the project concept and how it was to be implemented.

2.14 **Bank inputs:** Supervision was patchy and intermittent, with too little continuity and relevant professional input. Eventually, DFID insisted on the launch of a special study on BSF. Bank review of outputs was not systematic.

3. **Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating: Moderately unsatisfactory</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narrative and explanation of ratings</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ach’tm</strong></td>
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</table>
Overall SDBS partly achieved its objective by: (i) producing and disseminating scoping studies, key topic studies and policy briefs on subjects relevant to maximizing transboundary benefits; (ii) developing a conceptualization, training manual and initial training materials on benefit sharing and conducting training of 55 trainers in benefit sharing methodology; and (iii) responding to SAP demand and producing investment strategies for transboundary investments. The expected adoption of the benefit sharing concept into the policy and practice of riparians has made some progress, especially in the draft CFA, but it is not yet fully integrated into national policies. A benefit sharing methodology is not yet fully developed. The impact of the key topic studies and policy briefs has been limited. The process also built capacity and developed a habit of cooperation between the nine PIs, but the PIs have not attained their hoped for status (within Nile Transboundary Development Network) as a permanent network of high level policy advisers “facilitating dialogue, leading applied research and influencing policy making and implementation” (PAD: 10).

Delays in implementation due to unclear tasks, lack of strategic management, weaknesses in work programming, unwieldy administrative systems and overload with non-core tasks reduced the efficiency of delivery and led to waste of resources on nugatory and non-core tasks.

Relevance remains very high, although SDBS developed too late to provide expected methodological guidance to the SAPs.

### 4. Transition, sustainability and risk

4.1 **Transition of functions to Nile-SEC**: Nile-SEC is responsible for follow up on the BSF Phases 2 and 3. The SDBS Sustainability Roadmap also proposes that Nile-SEC follow up on NTDN, and on the PIs and resource people involved in SDBS, although there is no specific plan or agreement to do this, and the objective is not clearly defined. Nile-SEC essentially has to take over responsibility for certain activities that would have taken place in the second phase of SDBS.

4.2 **Transition of functions to SAPs**: The BSF Phase 1 is available to the SAPs. Informal comments are that it is ‘too theoretical’ (NELSAP-CU) and ‘less useful than the ENTRO study’ (ENTRO).

4.3 **Transition of functions to countries**: PIs are responsible for in-country transition, and clearly they could be an asset, but no clear plan exists for what is expected of them.

4.4-4.7 **Other transition issues**: It is not clear if NTDN will continue in any form (see section 3 above). All products were disseminated in hard copy, on CD and on the website, and were the subject of cluster and individual country workshops led by the PIs and a final stakeholder workshop. NBD has agreed to follow up and to ensure continued targeted dissemination.

4.8 **Political economy risks**: It was expected that PIs would have the autonomy to explore “difficult issues of political economy”. It is not clear that this has happened. It had been expected that the benefit sharing framework might support the movement towards cooperative management based on benefit sharing, but as no substantive final product emerged, this hypothesis was never tested (see PICRR IV B).
**SVP PDO:** Build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investment in the NB countries

SDBS design was highly relevant to the SVP objectives: adoption of benefit sharing rather than water sharing as the basis of Nile cooperation has been seen as key to building trust. The development of knowledge and methodologies on economic integration and benefit sharing was key to building the relevant capacity, and would underpin coordinated basin-wide investment planning. SDBS made only limited progress towards developing the tools and capacity, and to convincing policy makers.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD SVP Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased basin-wide dialogue and exchange of information</td>
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<td>MS</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDBS put on numerous large workshops, which facilitated dialogue and exchange.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Functioning networks of professional</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTDN was a first rate initiative, and much has been gained through it, but its</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>future usefulness and sustainability is unclear.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhanced skills and expanded information bases</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDBS produced some useful knowledge products and capacity, but only produced part</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the key benefit sharing methodology and capacity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informed riparian dialogue on transboundary development opportunities, challenges</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
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<tr>
<td>and impacts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Much of the SDBS output concerns development opportunities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhanced stakeholder participation in the NBI process</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>U</td>
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<tr>
<td>Broad participation of civil society etc. was envisaged through NBTF, but this</td>
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<td>was cancelled.</td>
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</table>
6. Overall project assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Rating</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribution to Overall SVP Outcomes</td>
<td>Moderately unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Bank Performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry</td>
<td>Moderately unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Supervision</td>
<td>Moderately unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Bank Performance</td>
<td>Moderately unsatisfactory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assessment of Implementing Agency Performance</td>
<td>Moderately unsatisfactory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Conclusions and lessons about project performance and outcomes

7.1 Management and administrative systems proved cumbersome. There was a need for better systems from the start, and more attention to early start up.

7.2 Project leadership and partner support were lacking. For an intellectually challenging and innovative project like this, it is essential to have good intellectual leadership from the outset, and to have close and consistent supervision from a task team with experience and continuity.

8. Conclusions and lessons on improvements for the future

8.1 Follow up on the benefit sharing study is very important. The development, dissemination and adoption of the benefit sharing concept and methodology remains critical to the political process and to the development of investments. Nile-SEC needs to launch the follow up Phases 2 and 3 with all dispatch.

9. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Since the SDBS grant was below US$5.0 million ISRs were not required.

10. Disbursement Profile

11. Bank Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Vice President:</td>
<td>Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili (AFR)</td>
<td>Gobind Nankani (AFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Shamshad Akhtar (MNA)</td>
<td>Christiaan Poortman (MNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Richard G. Scobey (AFCRI)</td>
<td>Michel Wormser (AFTPI) Inger Andersen (MNSRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector Manager</td>
<td>Ashok K. Subramanian (AFTWR)</td>
<td>David Grey (AFTNL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Team Leader</td>
<td>Berina Uwimbabazi</td>
<td>Claudia Sadoff (ARD) Christina Leb (Co-TTL, AFTNL)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. **Design Issues and Quality at Entry**

1.1 **Project contribution to Nile Vision:** Cooperative development foreseen under the Nile Vision requires a technical foundation of knowledge, skills and tools that can facilitate water resources planning and management from a basin-wide perspective. Needed are national policies, project planning and management skills, and communications and decision-making tools adapted to the transboundary level. Creating a common understanding and aligning national policy and practice on the specific challenge of transboundary planning and decision taking will create an enabling environment for cooperative development and joint investment planning. This was the appropriate goal of the project.

1.2 **Clarity of outcomes and indicators:** The original PDO and indicators are straightforward.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PAD PDO:</strong></th>
<th>Enhance analytical capacity for a basin-wide perspective to support the development, management and protection of Nile Basin water resources in an equitable, optimal, integrated and sustainable manner.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **PAD output indicators** | Water policy formulation and implementation capacity strengthened.  
Capacity for preparation and management of joint projects enhanced.  
Nile Decision Support System (DSS) coupled with human capacity and institutional support developed and operating. |

1.3 **Project strategy:** Three technical components were to deliver the outcomes: (1) a *water policy component* would enable basin countries to cooperate on an equal footing, based on sound national integrated water resources management policy; (2) a *project planning and management component* was to strengthen national capacities for multi-country project planning and management; and (3) the *Nile Basin DSS* would support informed decision making from a regional perspective by providing a common platform for communication, information and water resource analysis. This strategy was appropriate.

1.4 **Project structure:** Total project NBTF grant was planned to be US$23.8 million, in two phases. The Phase I grant (US$12.8 million) closed in April 2009, and the balance of about US$5.5 million was transferred to the US$11.2 Phase II grant which closes in December 2012. WRPM has also benefitted from a US$4.8 million grant from GTZ to address transboundary water policy and a US$3.0 million grant from AfDB to provide capacity building for project planning and management.

1.5 ** Appropriateness and efficiency of project location:** The project was located in a major riparian water-source country, Ethiopia, and was well supported by the Ethiopian government. Location was not a constraint to efficiency, and proximity to a major partner, ENTRO was an advantage.

1.6 **Stakeholder commitment and involvement:** At the national level, this appears to be strong at many levels including the PSC and Water Policy Task Force. Additionally, the DSS core team (2 specialists hired for each country and 2 assigned government counterparts) help ensure country buy in and relevance, as well as adequate data collection and information sharing.

1.7 **Bank inputs:** Bank preparation was sound, with a thoughtful, well presented PAD.

1.8 **Conversion to RBS:** Conversion to RBS focused the attention of project management on deliverables. In particular, the RBS has been successfully used as a management tool for the DSS component to increase accountability.

2. **Implementation Issues**

2.1 **Start up:** Start up varied among components. The water policy component started promptly in 2004, but particular delays affected the project planning and management component.

2.2 **UNOPS:** As for all SVP projects, UNOPS systems and services proved unwieldy and not user friendly. In Phase II, major contracts will be administered by NBI, with UNOPS continuing (at least for 2010) to provide other procurement and financial management services.

2.3 **Procurement/FM:** WRPM benefited from an excellent FM and Procurement Officer and provided above average services for the project as well as other SVP Projects which conducted activities in Ethiopia.
2.4 **Links to SAPs**: The objectives of WRPM feed directly into the SAPs’ mandate. The SAPs are represented on the PSC, and SAP staff have taken part in WRPM training. The MTR noted a need for a better match of training with SAP needs, and WRPM proved responsive to this observation.

2.5 **Links to other SVP projects**: Training under the project planning and management component has been coordinated with ATP. All SVP projects have coordinated with the DSS component to agree on sourcing and providing data.

2.6 **Adequacy of government and other stakeholder involvement**: Overall, stakeholder involvement has been strong, although working group representatives were not always from the same institution. A high level Water Policy Task Force met every six months to oversee the water policy component. There was extensive participation in the stakeholder consultations that contributed to the DSS needs assessment and conceptual design. Officials participated in the preparation of the road map for data sharing, which was then endorsed by Nile-COM.

2.7 **Role and value of PSC**: The PSC met six times during Phase I and was effective in guiding the project.

2.8 **Role and value of Nile-SEC/SVP-C inputs**: WRPM and Nile-SEC have cooperated effectively in the development of the Nile Information System (Nile-IS), and WRPM is collaborating on the development of the Basin Sustainability Framework at Nile-SEC.

2.9 **Role and value of partner inputs**: GTZ financed the water policy component and provided substantial technical inputs and evaluations. GTZ is also financing the IWRM component if NBI-ISP, providing invaluable continuity for the transition towards the functions of the “possible RBO”. AfDB cofinanced the project planning and management component with NBTF.

2.10 **MTR and restructuring**: At MTR, the project was found to be on track after a delayed start. The Review found that the project planning and management component had finally begun to gather momentum, but that this needed to be sustained and that an extension of the closing date would be necessary for that component.

2.11 **Reporting and M&E**: WRPM was the only SVP project to have a specific sub-component for M&E, with a dedicated M&E officer and budget. This proved a good investment as M&E fed back into management decisions and adjustments to project activities.

2.12 **Adequacy of actions taken in response to problems**: Faced with the lacklustre start to the project planning and management component, WRPM management took the decision in 2007 to adjust the focus to reflect emerging needs, with more emphasis on practical training, management support, and hands on guidance. This less technical, more practical approach was helpful in getting the component up to speed.

2.13 **Implementation and management efficiency**: The project was well staffed, with two lead specialists, although there was some delay in recruitment of the project planning lead specialist. The DSS benefited from a lead specialist and a regional modeller, as well as in-country specialists. A regionally recruited M&E specialist and IT/GIS specialists completed the professional staff. This group of specialists were welded by the project manager into a coherent team, which delivered most of the Phase I project within budget and without major delays. The water policy component was completed as planned in December 2008. The project planning and management component, after a slow start and the 2007 reformulation, was set to complete by December 2009 but ran into problems over the quality of consultancy work on training materials. Phase I of the DSS component laid the basis, and Phase II is under implementation, working according to a three year development plan which has monitorable targets every six months.

2.14 **Bank inputs**: Supervision has been adequate, with particularly close follow up of the key DSS component. The Bank provided strong technical support and review of all outputs.

3. **Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative and explanation of ratings</th>
<th>Ach’mt</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Rel’vnce</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Rating: Moderately satisfactory
Overall WRPM Phase I largely achieved its objective. The water policy component was completed as planned in December 2008. The component has contributed to developing national water policies and capacities based on IWRM principles and good practices addressing the transboundary dimension. Outputs of this demand-driven component were: water policy baseline and needs assessment, country action plans for technical assistance, international study tours, an exchange program, and water policy guidelines.

Eight countries set up working groups on national water policy development, and seven countries prepared proposals for addressing transboundary dimensions in national water policy. WRPM provided technical assistance to five of these countries, and the remaining two are being supported under NBI-ISP. As a result, the transboundary dimension is being considered in national policy, Nile countries have reached a common policy ground, and there is greater balance of capacity in policy analysis capacity between the countries.

Despite these good achievements, delays in implementation have reduced the efficiency of delivery.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative and explanation of ratings</th>
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<td>S</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>S</td>
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4. Transition, sustainability and risk

4.1 Transition of functions to Nile-SEC: The water policy function has been transferred to Nile-SEC, where it will be managed within the IWRM function. The training activity in project planning and management is to be included in the NBI Capacity Building Strategy that NBI is developing.

4.2 Transition of functions to SAPs: The outputs of the project planning component are available within the SAPs – guidelines, trained staff.

4.3 Transition of functions to countries: Both the water policy component and the project planning and management component have primarily strengthened national capacities in taking account of transboundary and cooperative dimensions in national policy, planning and management. The DSS depends on strong linkages between national and regional levels to ensure ownership and actual use of the DSS for decision making within countries. It also depends on country commitment to maintain the national DSS centers and to exchange data freely.

4.4 Other transition and sustainability issues: It is proposed that the DSS component should eventually evolve into a centre of excellence providing advanced technical services.

4.8 Political economy risks: Some WRPM achievements are vulnerable to changes in national policy. WRPM has contributed to regional cooperation, and its products are valued, but the risk to sustainability from delays in the political process remains.
5. Contribution to the overall SVP outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative and explanation of ratings</th>
<th>Design</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SVP PDO: Build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investment in the NB countries</strong></td>
<td>WRPM design was highly relevant to the SVP objective of building trust and capacity and of creating an enabling environment. The cooperation of the policy working groups, the adoption of the procedures for data exchange, and the growth of skills in project planning and management demonstrate how WRPM has contributed to the SVP PDO.</td>
<td>S</td>
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**PAD SVP Indicators**

| Increased basin-wide dialogue and exchange of information | The policy working groups and the exchanges between regional and national DSS centers are testament to the increased dialogue and exchange of information, which has led to increased common understanding of the interaction between national polices, regional needs and cooperative development. | S | S |
| Functioning networks of professionals | All components have created a loose community of practice, including the policy working groups and the DSS advisory group of senior officials. These have been strengthened by training, study tours and exchange visits. | S | S |
| Enhanced skills and expanded information bases | Skills have been enhanced by all three components, but particularly the project planning and management component, which had a largely capacity building vocation. | S | S |
| Informed riparian dialogue on transboundary development opportunities, challenges and impacts | The DSS will be a prime tool for identifying opportunity. Skills developed through the project planning and management component will be essential to investing into that opportunity. | S | MS |
| Enhanced stakeholder participation in the NBI process | The interactions created by the project have gained some momentum: for example, the regional and national DSS centers and the various working and advisory groups are all stakeholders now. | S | MS |

6. Overall project assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Rating</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Satisfactory</td>
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<td>Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome</td>
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<td>Satisfactory</td>
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</table>

8. Conclusions and lessons on improvements for the future

8.1 Follow up is needed to develop the transboundary dimension in water policy for riparians and in the SAPs. With the closure of the water policy component at the end of 2008, three needs were apparent: (1) to strengthen national capacity further in managing the interface between national water policy and the transboundary dimension; (2) to build a permanent water policy capacity within Nile-SEC and in preparation for the “possible RBO”; and (3) to develop capacity within the SAPs for addressing the transboundary water policy dimension in investment work. These needs are being addressed under NBI-ISP but it will be essential to ensure continuity and to sustain dialogue.
and support for riparians. Water policy changes can take some years to be adopted and translated into actual policy documents, and NBI needs to maintain a persistent dialogue and support.

8.2 IWRM capacity building also needs follow up. As the project planning and management component moves towards its close, it is intended (see above) to include any follow up in the NBI Capacity Building Strategy. There is a need for follow up on the large number of professionals trained in IWRM, and to ensure maintenance and further use of the training materials developed.

8.3 There is a need for careful “succession planning” for the DSS. It will be imperative to ensure that the data exchange continues, that national centers are sustained, and that the regional DSS can be transformed into a sustainable institution, whether as a centre of excellence or otherwise. This process is in hand.

9. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date ISR Archived</th>
<th>DO</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Actual Disbursements (USD millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>05/28/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>5.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11/26/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>7.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>04/30/2009</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>8.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Disbursement Profile

11. Bank Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Shamshad Akhtar (MNA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Christiaan Portman (MNA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director:</td>
<td>Richard G. Scobey (AFCRI)</td>
<td>Michel Wormser (AFTPI)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Inger Andersen (MNSRE)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

48 Originally, ISRs were not required for regional trust funds; however, in 2008 all Trust Fund Projects over US$5.0 million were mainstreamed at which time the team began preparing ISRs for WRPM.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sector Manager</td>
<td>Ashok K. Subramanian (AFTWR)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>David Grey (AFTNL)</td>
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<td>John Bryant Collier</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Barbara Miller</td>
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</table>
SVP ICRR Summary: Shared Vision Program Coordination Project (SVP-C)

1. Design Issues and Quality at Entry

1.1 Project contribution to Nile Vision: The SVP goals, facilitated by SVP-C, of building trust, capacity and an enabling environment for investment were central to the Nile vision of sustainable socio-economic development.

1.2 Clarity of outcomes and indicators: The original PDO and indicators are straightforward.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD PDO: Ensure effective oversight of the SVP; and strengthen capacity of NBI to execute basin-wide programs.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAD output indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP projects effectively coordinated.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity of NBI to manage basin-wide programs strengthened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial management and procurement systems developed to international standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBI website and resource centre enhanced and operating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E system implemented.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1.3 Project strategy: The project objectives were to be achieved through (1) a large (US$4.0 million) SVP program coordination component, and four smaller components (total value US$1.1 million) to augment Nile-SEC capacity: (2) financial management and procurement; (3) knowledge management and information sharing; (4) M&E; and (5) capacity building. Essentially, synergy was foreseen between the specifics of SVP coordination and the task of building permanent capacity for managing basin-wide programs within NBI. This was a reasonable approach. The project was to be executed by Nile-SEC itself, which was appropriate as it gave Nile-SEC experience in project management.

1.4 Structure, complexity, number of components: The project budget of US$5.4 million was adequate for the initial design.

1.5 Appropriateness and efficiency of project location: Given the project objectives, locating SVP-C in Entebbe was the only choice.

1.6 Stakeholder commitment and involvement: Commitment to SVP as a whole, and a fortiori to SVP-C, was very strong. SVP was seen as the first step to realizing the Shared Vision, and was the first large scale cooperative program amongst all riparians. The hosting of SVP projects, the provision of financial and material resources, and the considerable commitment of political and administrative effort to the SVP are all testament to this commitment.

1.7 Bank inputs: The Bank brought both skills in cooperative management and convening power to the SVP, and has demonstrated strong continuing commitment during design, implementation and evaluation. The Bank has also demonstrated its capacity to take the long view and to factor in the volatile political economy dimension.

1.8 Conversion to RBS: SVP-C commissioned and oversaw the conversion of SVP – and all NBI – to the results-based approach. For SVP-C itself, the process of conversion helped the project focus on the key deliverables, rather than on activities.49

2. Implementation Issues

2.1 Start up: Implementation started very promptly. This was essential as SVP-C was to play a key role in the preparation, appraisal, negotiation and start up of all seven other SVP projects.

2.2 UNOPS: As UNOPS was the financial management and procurement service provider for all other SVP projects, SVP-C supervised the UNOPS contract as part of Nile-SEC functions. Therefore, SVP-C had to be responsible for its own procurement and financial management, in order to avoid conflict of interest. UNOPS performance proved deeply problematic. At the systemic level, there was a fundamental mismatch between the complex nature of SVP projects, very decentralized with multiple geographic and organizational levels in nine countries, and the wooden, bureaucratic and centralized UNOPS systems. SVP-C struggled on behalf of the projects to improve matters, and UNOPS did gradually introduce somewhat better performing systems. More importantly, SVP-C persuaded UNOPS to decentralize to the Basin (to Nairobi): this proved more expensive for SVP but brought some efficiency gains, if only from sheer proximity.

2.3 Procurement/FM: As SVP-C was based at the Nile-SEC, along with CBSI and SDBS, the three projects were meant to share FM and Procurement staff. This, compiled with the number of activities planned in Uganda by the other SVP Projects, caused staff to be over stretched and delays in both procurement and payments. In addition,

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49 See 2.11 below for an assessment of the RBS for the SVP and NBI as a whole.
SVP-C was meant to coordinate UNOPS capacity building efforts, which failed and were removed from the MSA when it was amended.

2.4 **Links to SAPs**: The logic of SVP was that it would create the enabling environment into which SAPs would invest. In practice, SVP projects took four to five years from initial idea to actual start up, and in the meantime the SAPs had become operational. Much of the sequencing foreseen in SVP project design was therefore irrelevant. SVP-C early on identified this generic problem, and pushed all SVP projects to review and strengthen their relevance by dialoguing with the SAPs, sharing all relevant activities, and seeking demand from the SAPs wherever it was within their mandate. SVP-C institutionalized this process by setting up semi-annual SVP/SAP coordination forums.

Specific support to SAPs was provided by all SVP projects e.g. ATP training in flood management, RPT support on negotiating power trade, EWUAP pre-investment studies, CBSI support to SAP communications function. In addition, SVP-C developed the RBS from which SAPs benefited.

2.5 **Links to other SVP projects**: Although the areas of intervention of the SVP projects were well defined and the project design was sharp, there were many areas of synergy open to the SVP projects, and SVP-C promoted cooperation systematically. Examples include: cooperation between ATP and EWUAP on training, or RPT cooperation with SDBS on the benefit sharing framework and with NTEAP on the power trade EIA.

2.6 **Adequacy of government and other stakeholder commitment**: See above, section 1.6.

2.7 **Role and value of PSC**: Nile TAC acted as SVP-C PSC, ensuring high level ownership and affording TAC a regular synoptic view of the SVP family of projects. SVP-C was able to use this window to get agreement on generic issues such as NBI Country Offices.

2.9 **Role and value of partner inputs**: SVP-C managed partnerships on behalf of Nile-SEC, including partnerships with: FAO Nile, Nile Basin Capacity Building Network, IWMI, and University of Bergen.

2.10 **MTR and restructuring**: At MTR, it was agreed that closer supervision and quality control of SVP was needed, and the SVP-C PDO was changed to read “effective *supervision* of the SVP”, rather than the previous “oversight”. The project grant was increased to US$11.6 million, with most of the increment going for UNOPS services to all SVP projects. At the same time, the four small components supporting Nile-SEC proper were gathered into a single NBI Institutional Strengthening Component.

2.11 **Reporting and M&E**: SVP-C implemented the conversion of NBI, and especially of SVP, to a results based system. The objective was to integrate all NBI activities into a single framework, linked to the achievement of overall institutional goals. The process proved expensive, not so much in direct consultant costs but in terms of staff time, delays and opportunity cost. The value of the change-over is contested: some projects found the process useful for rethinking objectives and activities; others found little or no value added and continued with “business as usual”. Even at the closing of SVP projects, opinions are divided, with some projects finding the system invaluable for demonstrating results and linking them to the bigger vision, others virtually ignoring the RBS or struggling to match RBS results with original outcomes and outputs.

2.12 **Adequacy of actions taken in response to problems**: In addition to the issues discussed above, SVP-C faced the following challenges:

1. **Weak in-country counterparts to SVP**: working with CBSI, SVP-C developed national coordination strategy and action plan, and through TAC consistently promoted action.

2. **SVP projects had too many masters – Nile-SEC/SVP-C, PSC, World Bank, UNOPS**: SVP-C at least mitigated the problem by ensuring common financial reporting formats, standardizing project programming and reporting using the RBS system, and organizing joint review missions with partners.

3. **SVP projects were not adequately supervised in the early years**: at MTR, SVP-C agreed with the World Bank on a strengthened supervision function, including greater input from SVP-C itself.

4. **Project delays, largely due to slow start up**: SVP-C negotiated with partners to obtain no-cost extension, where justified.

5. **SVP projects lacked legal status**: SVP-C pushed for all countries to grant NBI legal status, and this was eventually agreed and is being implemented.

6. **There were major risks that SVP outputs and outcomes would not be sustained after closing**: SVP-C developed a rigorous methodology for planning for sustainability and mainstreaming, and pushed all projects to prepare and implement plans.

2.13 **Efficiency of implementation**: SVP-C staff dealt efficiently with the challenges of a complex, multi-center program. However, little attention was paid to the issues of sustainability and mainstreaming of SVP outputs/functions during the life of the SVP-C Project. These issues were taken up, belatedly under the NBI-ISP.
2.14 **Bank inputs**: Bank supervision inputs to this large program were on the whole good, although weaker in the beginning and occasionally patchy all through. For SVP-C, the MTR proposed supervision and supervision reporting [but no separate supervision appears to have been done].

3. **Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes**  
   **Rating**: Moderately satisfactory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall SVP-C largely achieved its objectives.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SVP-C (i) guided the SVP family of projects to a largely satisfactory conclusion; (ii) established a mechanism for coordination amongst NBI programs and projects; (iii) helped solve many of the generic and project-specific problems that were affecting SVP implementation; (iv) engaged NBI in a massive and largely productive exercise to plan for sustainability of SVP outputs and outcomes; and (v) helped to mainstream core functions and key products into NBI (“future RBO” or SAPs), and to institutionalize them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP strengthened Nile-SEC institutional capacity in program management, financial management and procurement, knowledge management and M&amp;E. In addition, SVP-C was instrumental in mainstreaming gender within NBI. SVP-C also took the lead in preparation of the NBI-ISP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With early start up, vigorous management and hard working staff, SVP was <strong>efficient</strong> in its delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong> remains high.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>PAD PDO</strong>: Ensure effective oversight of the SVP; and strengthen capacity of NBI to execute basin-wide programs.</th>
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<td>MS</td>
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4. **Transition, sustainability and risk**

4.1 **Transition of functions to Nile-SEC**: Many SVP outputs and functions are transferred or will be transferred to Nile-SEC. In addition, there are a number of project activities that are incomplete or require follow up. NTEAP (4.1) provides an example: Nile-SEC is expected to take responsibility for follow up on water quality monitoring, wetlands, environmental education, and capacity building as well as on the afore mentioned Memoranda of Understanding on environmental education, on wetlands and on small grants (GEF). There is a risk that Nile-SEC will not have the capacity to engage with, let alone sustain, such a wide range of initiatives.

4.2 **Transition of functions to the SAPs**: SVP-C oversaw elaborate planning for transfer to SAPs, and this has largely been effected. Examples include: transfer of social development and development communication functions from CBSI; and transfer of study and networking functions on agricultural water from EWUAP.

4.3 **Transition of functions to countries**: Arrangements for handover of in-country functions are not always complete and continuation of many in-country functions looks vulnerable.

4.5 **Transition of networks and goodwill**: Numerous networks have been created, and some are slated for further support, or at least will remain plugged in to NBI. There is a risk that Nile-SEC will lack the needed capacity.

4.6 **Transition arrangements for knowledge products**: Although knowledge products have been widely disseminated, follow up will be needed, and Nile-SEC needs to strengthen its knowledge management function to manage this risk.

4.8 **Political economy risks**: These affect the sustainability of the entire SVP program, and largely relate to uncertainty over the status of commitment to cooperation.

5. **Contribution of SVP (and SVP-C) to the overall SVP outcomes**

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50 Because SVP-C is largely a facilitating project for the other SVP projects, this analysis is made, first, of SVP as a whole, and then for SVP’s specific contribution.
SVP PDO: Build trust, capacity, and an enabling environment for investment in the NB countries

SVP design was highly relevant to the SVP objective of building trust and of creating an enabling environment. For example, CBSI was effective in building trust and confidence amongst a broad range of stakeholders. RPT built trust and confidence amongst power sector stakeholders from ministerial level down.

SVP contributed materially to the creation of an enabling environment for investment. Direct effects came from products such as EIA guidelines (NTEAP) and many outputs of RPT, including the institutional, regulatory and cooperative framework model for regional power trade and the public-private partnership (PPP) models.

SVP-C coordination of SAP/SVP synergies facilitated SVP contributions to specific SAP investments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of assessment</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement of objectives and overall assessment of outcomes</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Bank Performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Supervision</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Bank Performance</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of Implementing Agency Performance</td>
<td>Moderately satisfactory</td>
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</table>

6. Overall project assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAD SVP Indicators</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased basin-wide dialogue and exchange of information</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functioning networks of professionals</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced skills and expanded information bases</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informed riparian dialogue on transboundary development opportunities, challenges and impacts</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced stakeholder participation in the NBI process</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Conclusions and lessons about project performance and outcomes

7.1 There is a need for early planning of a well thought through sustainability and mainstreaming strategy.

8. Conclusions and lessons on improvements for the future

8.1 NBI has inherited precious resources from the SVP – for example, networks, working groups, partnerships – and it is vital that these now be selectively but actively managed.

8.2 The RBS is clearly a powerful tool, but the retro-fitting process during SVP was not always productive, and there is a tendency to over-complicate matters. The use of the RBS should be critically reviewed from a practical viewpoint.

9. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date ISR Archived</th>
<th>DO</th>
<th>IP</th>
<th>Actual Disbursements (USD millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>05/28/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11/26/2008</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>9.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. Disbursement Profile

11. Bank Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>At ICR</th>
<th>At Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vice President:</td>
<td>Obiageli Katryne Ezekwesili (AFR)</td>
<td>Callisto E. Madavo (AFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shamshad Akhtar (MNA)</td>
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51 Originally, ISRs were not required for regional trust funds; however, in 2008 all Trust Fund Projects over US$5.0 million were mainstreamed at which time the team began preparing ISRs for SVP-C.
ANNEX 3 – NBI Report of Findings from Opinion Research with Key Stakeholders

Conducted by the Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement Project
November 2008

I. Background

In order to develop a more in-depth understanding of key stakeholders’ perceptions of key issues related to the NBI, a primarily qualitative research assessment was conducted with opinion leaders in 8 NBI countries. Findings from the study will help guide future NBI communication, outreach and programmatic strategies. For the overall study, 124 interviews (either face-to-face or by telephone, depending on the availability of the respondent) were conducted in 8 countries.

II. Research Findings

Following is a summary report of the key findings from the research.

A. Overall Context

1. Key Priorities and Challenges

Respondents from all countries and stakeholder groups identified similar priorities and challenges, both in their countries and for the region. By far the most commonly mentioned of these included:

- Poverty/food insecurity
- Conflict and security
- Governance/corruption.

Respondents also identified a variety of secondary challenges, the overwhelming majority of which can be directly related to the inability of individual countries to manage water resources effectively. These included:

- Environmental concerns (pollution, deforestation, etc.)
- Lack of consistent source of power for industrialization
- Lack of agricultural productivity (insufficient irrigation and dependence on rainfall)
- Threats and compromises to citizens’ overall quality of life.

B. Regional Cooperation

1. A rationale for greater cooperation across countries

Within this context of widespread concerns related to water and water management, respondents from all countries and stakeholder groups repeatedly acknowledged the need for countries in the Nile Basin to work together in a more systematic and cooperative way.

C. Regional Cooperation related to Water Resource Management

Research identified a range of risks and benefits associated with regional cooperation for water management in the region. Following is a brief summary of the most commonly cited risks and benefits.

1. Risks of participating

Respondents identified a variety of potential risks of participating in regional cooperation, including:

- Loss of sovereignty
- Regional conflict (both the fear that negotiations could actually precipitate conflict and a recognition of the potential impact of political instability and regional conflict on cooperative agreement)
- Potential sacrifice of authority and quality control.

2. Risks of not participating

In addition to the risks of participating, respondents also identified the following potential risks of not participating in regional cooperation:

- Conflict/war
- Economic isolation
- Loss of regional influence
- Pollution and waste
- Domino effect – with problems resulting from mismanagement in one country spreading throughout the region.

3. Benefits of participating
For the majority of respondents, the potential benefits of participating in regional cooperation far exceeded any risks associated with cooperating with neighboring countries. These included:

- Conflict resolution and increased security
- Crisis management
- Increased cooperation and integration
- Potential for increased economic development
- Potential for increased trade/opening markets
- Shared technical knowledge and expertise
- More effective regional development
- Greater influence in the region (for those with existing resources, expertise, etc.).

In this context, a substantial majority of respondents from all countries and stakeholders groups believed that cooperative water management is a both necessary and potentially beneficial initiative in the region.

4. Challenges

Respondents across all groups identified a variety of factors that both reinforce the need for cooperative water management in the region and increase the difficulty of cooperative engagement in the short-term. These include:

i. Lack of prioritization at the government level: Respondents (except in Egypt) report that water is not viewed as a priority in their countries—particularly in government policy.

ii. Lack of political leadership and will

iii. Lack of awareness of water shortages and other water-related problems at all levels of society

iv. Widespread corruption, cronyism and neglect

v. Lack of knowledge and technical expertise

vi. Lack of financial resources and institutional capacity

vii. Lack of integration at the ministry level

viii. Lack of understanding of the relationship between water and nearly every aspect of governance and development (food, agriculture, power, industry, transportation, health/sanitation, security)

ix. Isolation/self interest

x. Other existing bi-lateral agreements

xi. Lack of resources of member countries

xii. Competing regional commitments

5. Opportunities

For many respondents, these challenges also represent an enormous opportunity for NBI to play several key roles in the region moving forward:

- An honest broker, mediating conflict and mistrust among member countries and facilitating productive relationships between countries going forward.

- A catalyst for awareness and change (motivator, convener, facilitator, educator)

- Water Knowledge Bank: a center for useful, applicable, accessible knowledge on water management (policy and scientific), with particular emphasis on knowledge that is mobile and deployed.

- A facilitator of increased ownership and commitment to the cooperative process among member countries going forward.

- Dissolve mistrust (experts = ambassadors)

6. A built-in constituency

Respondents clearly understand water’s role in their countries’ well being. Virtually all stakeholders recognize the connection between water, development and security. Water resource management is referred to as “an absolute— but unrealized— priority.”

7. Egypt

Across the countries there is a strong concern, at best—fear and suspicion at worst—about Egypt’s role and interest in cooperation. For many respondents, Egypt is not just a concern; it represents an overriding and one of the primary obstacles to productive cooperative engagement in the region.

a. Suspicions of donor bias

Respondents repeatedly acknowledged long-time resentment over the “unfair terms” provided by existing treaties, along with enduring suspicions of external donor bias toward Egypt in all issues related to the Nile Basin.

b. Resentments of Egyptian dominance in the region
Egypt is widely viewed by other member countries as occupying a dominant – and dominating – position in watershed management (resulting from accumulated experience and expertise, the urgency of its need, and its ongoing commitment to understanding and addressing water-related issues). A substantial majority of respondents view Egypt as largely self-interested in its approach to the Nile, with little reason or incentive to cooperate with its neighbors.

c. **Huge potential for Egypt as partner and model**

In spite of these persistent resentments and concerns, respondents also recognize the enormous value that Egypt could bring to their countries in terms of expertise, experience, knowledge and skills related to water management. In this context, Egypt is perceived by other countries as simultaneously the biggest obstacle to cooperation and the best argument for cooperation. Respondents outside of Egypt believe there is great technical capacity in the country related to water and recognize that Egyptian experts could bring critical knowledge to their countries. Respondents also recognize the importance of the Nile for Egypt. A respondent notes that water is life and death for Egypt and what they have done is in order to survive.

D. **Nile Basin Initiative – Awareness and Perceptions**

1. **Awareness**

Respondents reported varying levels of awareness of NBI and its ongoing work in their individual countries and the regional overall, ranging from 4.7 (on a 10-point scale) in Tanzania to 6.5 in Sudan.

2. **Perceptions**

Research revealed a wide range of understanding of NBI’s role and objectives among respondents. Respondents variously described NBI in the following ways, with no single dominant role emerging among respondents overall. Following are the most commonly cited roles and objectives for NBI:

- A forum for mutual understanding, cooperation and the exchange of ideas and concerns
- A deliberative body, whose primary purpose in the ratification of a cooperative agreement for regional water resource management
- Guarantor of equitable distribution of resources
- Source of knowledge on all things related to the Nile

In addition to this diverse knowledge and expectations, a substantial group of respondents reported that they know very little about what NBI is and is meant to accomplish.

3. **Overall positive impressions**

In spite of the widespread confusion and/or lack of basic knowledge regarding the formal role and objectives of NBI, the vast majority of respondents provided a positive assessment of NBI overall. Most respondents described NBI as fulfilling a perceived crucial need in the region for greater collaboration and coordination. Generally speaking, NBI is virtually synonymous with coordination and better management of the Nile, fulfilling a crucial need in addressing the current absence of collaborative thinking on water management related to the Nile Basin. Respondents from all groups described NBI as an essential corrective to what they perceive as a critical lack of knowledge and expertise throughout the region.

In this context, the vast majority of respondents from all groups described NBI as both beneficial and effective, both for their individual countries and for the region overall.

4. **Concerns about NBI**

In spite of their largely positive assessment of NBI, respondents also reported a range of concerns regarding NBI’s potential to fulfill its promise in the region. These included:

a. Results: Lack of visible “progress on the ground”

b. Awareness: Lack of awareness at all levels of society regarding the potential benefits of NBI

c. Relationships: Ongoing suspicions and mistrust among countries throughout the region

5. **A “Tipping Point” for NBI**

Research strongly suggests that the combination of (1) heightened expectations, (2) limited outreach, and (3) continued lack of progress on the ground has created a serious expectation-management challenge.

- On the positive side, research revealed that NBI currently enjoys widespread credibility among all stakeholder groups, with the potential for enormous achievements in the region.
The vast majority of respondents recognize a critical connection between NBI and the region’s ongoing, interrelated needs for water, food, development and security.

- On the negative side, the critical need for cooperative water management in the region – combined with the general information vacuum regarding NBI and its activities – has resulted in ill-defined and amorphous aspirations toward NBI that often lead to grandiose and highly unrealistic expectations.

Research suggests that the situation has potentially reached a tipping point, in which NBI must either begin to fulfill its potential or suffer a decline in enthusiasm and receptivity among key stakeholders. Respondents repeatedly cautioned that simply maintaining the status quo is not an option.

E. Looking Forward for NBI
Research for the study revealed a number of key priorities and indicators for determining NBI’s success – or lack of success – going forward. These include:

1. Cooperative Framework
Throughout the interviews, respondents from all groups repeatedly stressed the importance of a fully endorsed cooperative framework for ensuring NBI’s future effectiveness. Ideally, respondents emphasized the need for NBI to ratify the framework as quickly as possible – and in a way that ensures equitable use and distribution of the Nile’s resources for all member countries.

In reality, however, the majority of respondents recognized the difficulty of achieving this result in the short-term future. They insisted, however, that this understandable delay is no excuse for the absence of communications regarding the ongoing status of the negotiations. The key to maintaining NBI’s credibility in the short-term is to be highly transparent and responsive about the ongoing status of the framework negotiations and other related organizational activities. Continued silence, respondents warned, will eventually undermine stakeholders’ confidence and trust in NBI.

Ongoing silence regarding the status of the cooperative agreement is also believed to increase stakeholders’ widespread suspicions that lack of ratification is an excuse for lack of action.

2. Need for transitional narrative for the Cooperative Framework
Given the time and difficulty that are inevitably involved in ratifying the Cooperative Framework, respondents suggested the need for a transitional narrative that positively links current deliberations to future benefits. Several respondents noted that – given the longstanding conflicts and mistrust throughout the region – the achievement of having reached this point in the current negotiation process is in itself significant – and should be reported as such in NBI’s ongoing communication with stakeholders.

3. Results on the ground
Respondents from all countries and groups repeatedly complained about the conspicuous lack of “results on the ground.”

Combined with the perceived lack of progress on the cooperative framework, this absence of visible projects contributes to an emerging impression of ineffectiveness and irrelevance.

4. Redefine Results
In this context, the challenge for NBI is to redefine the meaning of “results on the ground,” demonstrating to stakeholders how NBI can make meaningful contributions throughout the region without the current ability to deliver, for instance, a fully functioning dam or hydroelectric plant.

To achieve this end, respondents reported the need for NBI to communicate its role and relevance on several key levels, including:

- Facilitating the cooperative regionalization of the Nile Basin
- Catalyzing (and potentially enforcing) member governments to clarify and commit to policies related to water management.
- Assuring a harmonized, comprehensive, consistent, systematic approach to water policies across the region, including:
  - Facilitating knowledge sharing, best practices and other cooperative learning initiatives across countries (avoid reinventing the wheel)
o Coordinating high level technical visits across countries (ambassadorial opportunity as well)
  o Ensuring that countries meet shared commitments related to water management through oversight and monitoring mechanisms. (Accountability and responsibility will result after establishing country by country benchmarks.)
  o Provide intellectual guidance on moving issue of water out of just one ministry (water) and throughout a range of ministries including foreign affairs, finance, etc., to help broaden constituencies.

- Building capacity of government and communities, with a particular emphasis on government efforts to ensure participation of affected communities and stakeholder groups.
- Supporting government efforts to educate and communicate more effectively about water management and water as a key priority, including shared best practices among and within member countries.

5. Build support for country priorities
Research also suggests the need for narratives that highlight country-specific initiatives with tangible benefits to local populations. This might include, for example, providing support for country efforts for ‘low hanging fruit’ initiatives that begin to build awareness for all issues related to Nile (e.g., Niles Days, Nile Cup, re-vegetating the banks of Nile for local communities, etc.).

6. Need for strategic outreach
Research suggests that there is no pressing need for NBI to “prove itself” in the current environment. Among respondents, NBI is already branded as smart, credible and focused on the right issues. In order for NBI to sustain its credibility over time, however, respondents insist that it must leave the Ivory Tower and reach out beyond its current interactions with representatives of government Water Ministries to include other relevant stakeholders and beneficiaries (government, parliament, media, university, civil society, etc.)

Respondents suggested that this can be achieved by increased outreach to journalists (widely viewed as the most effective partners for “telling the NBI story”) and greater attention to the needs and concerns of local communities and local governments (with particular emphasis on “local custodians,” i.e., farmers, fishermen, etc.).

V. Implications and Recommendations
Research for the study suggested the following recommendations for enhancing NBI’s effectiveness in the region moving forward.

1. The need for a “Defining Message” – The link between water and development must become a mantra to move governments to act, and communities to demand action. To reinforce this vital connection, the following models should be stressed and (wherever possible) practically illustrated in all future communications with stakeholders:
   • Water = Development + Security + Food
   • NBI = Water + Development + Security + Food

2. Communication and Outreach – Virtually all respondents agreed that, in order to be successful, NBI must substantially expand its outreach to include key stakeholders and beneficiaries (beyond its current emphasis on Water Ministry officials) and to build broader constituencies and relationships at all levels of society. Critical areas of need include:
   • Journalists,
   • Parliamentarians,
   • Representatives of local communities (local officials, CSO leaders, etc.).

Increased NBI outreach, according to respondents, should provide regular updates regarding the status of the Cooperative Framework (always defining the negotiations as an arduous but ultimately positive process). A number of respondents also noted the need for NBI to update and improve its website. Throughout all communications and interactions with stakeholders, NBI should define itself in relation to three interrelated roles/benefits:
   • An honest broker between traditionally isolated nations,
   • A motivator for and convener of cooperative discussions, learning, etc.,
3. **Investment in Government Policy and Capacity** – NBI’s value is largely determined by the country infrastructure in which it exists. Respondents from all groups repeatedly complained that lack of knowledge and capacity at the national government level limits the effectiveness of water management throughout the region. Many respondents emphasized the urgent need for NBI to encourage, train and equip government officials in various aspects of effective water resource management, including:

- Encouraging a multi-ministry approach to water (instead of the current exclusive emphasis on Water Ministries)
- Providing government officials with training and incentives to educate and motivate the public around water issues
- Serving as a “Water Knowledge Bank” for relevant government officials at all levels
- Addressing current shortages in institutional capacity and technical expertise
- Including parliamentarians in forthcoming communications and training.

4. **Managing Stakeholder Expectations/Developing a Transitional Narrative** – Respondents stressed NBI’s urgent need to manage stakeholder expectations, emphasizing modest but tangible results on the ground. More than anything else, this would require the development and dissemination of a cohesive narrative around the ongoing process for achieving the Cooperative Framework and related activities (e.g., convening multi-country meetings, building a library of respected technical expertise, facilitating the sharing of information and expertise among countries, etc.).

5. **Egypt as a Model for Cooperative Water Management** – Respondents also suggested the usefulness of mobilizing Egyptian (and Sudanese) professionals to provide training, consultation and “best practice” demonstrations for other member countries. All training mechanisms should be tailored to the needs and interests of member countries (e.g., workshops, on-the-job training, exchange programs, etc.). Respondents agreed that such activities have the potential to address critical national and local needs for information and technical expertise while simultaneously mitigating widespread mistrust of Egypt as an obstacle to cooperative engagement in the region.
ANNEX 4 – Summary of NBI Comments on PICRR

NILE BASIN INITIATIVE

SVP PROGRAMMATIC IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETISON AND RESULTS REPORT

CONSULTATION MISSION

MARCH 22 - 31, 2010

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Introduction

1. **Mission Objective.** The World Bank conducted a consultation mission for the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) Shared Vision Program (SVP) Programmatic Implementation Completion and Results Report (PICRR) from March 22-31, 2010 in order to solicit feedback from the NBI Secretariat and other stakeholders throughout the Basin on the preliminary draft SVP PICRR. The mission was led by Mr. J.

2. **Acknowledgements.** The mission wishes to thank all participants for taking the time to join the meetings and discuss the PICRR. The mission also greatly appreciates the organizational support provided by the NBI National Offices in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya as well as the many staff from the NBI Secretariat, ENTRO, NELSAP-CU; staff from several SVP projects; and other stakeholders. The mission schedule and a list of Officials met are attached as Annexes 1 and 2, respectively. The Consultation Note is presented in Annex 3.

3. **Mission Objectives.** The objectives of this mission were to discuss the draft SVP PICRR prepared by the World Bank and solicit feedback from key SVP stakeholders.

4. **Programmatic ICR Overview.** The objective of the SVP is to build trust, capacity and an enabling environment for identifying and preparing regional investments in the Nile Basin countries. By viewing the SVP as an interlinked program rather than a series of standalone projects, the Programmatic ICR is aimed at a more complete review of SVP outcomes and lessons learned.

5. Specifically, the Programmatic ICR assesses (a) the degree to which the program achieved its development objective and outputs as set out in the project documents; (b) other significant outcomes and impacts; (c) prospects for the project’s sustainability; and (d) Bank and borrower performance, including compliance with relevant Bank safeguard and business policies. It also provides data and analysis to substantiate these assessments, and it identifies the lessons learned from implementation.
6. The current PICRR draft is based on outputs from the SVP Projects; completion reports prepared by the SVP Projects and NBI Secretariat; and an initial fact-finding mission conducted by the PICRR consultants, Mr. Aklilu and Mr. Christopher Ward, in November and December 2009. A presentation was prepared by the consultants and given during the three consultations during the mission.

7. The mission was pleased with the care taken by participants to review the draft in advance and with the substantive nature of comments and observations. In general, the response to the draft PICRR was positive – some general observations include:

a. Concern was raised about how SVP outcomes will be sustained, both those that are to be taken up by the NBI and those that will be passed on to the countries or other regional institutions;
b. NBI countries will need to take on more ownership of programs like the SVP in order to not rely so heavily on contributions from development partners in the future; and
c. Given the progress made on Nile cooperation during the life of the SVP, the overall rating of “moderately satisfactory” was seen by some to be lower than expected – the mission did point out that the SVP is not the only attributable program within the NBI and that not all SVP projects were able to deliver there expected outcomes.

An overall summary of comments on the PICRR received during the mission are attached as annex 3.

8. **Next Steps.** It was agreed that the Lead Consultant will prepare a final draft PICRR by April 7, 2010, taking into account comments received during the mission. The updated draft, along with annexes dealing with each SVP Project, will be circulated for further comment no later than April 15, 2010. The NBI Secretariat is requested to prepare formal comments on the PICRR and submit them to the Bank no later than May 7, 2007. As these formal comments will be annexed to the final PICRR and published, the mission recommends that the NBI Secretariat consult with Nile-TAC on the submission prior to the deadline.

9. The table below outlines the timeline for the completion of the PICCR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Task</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 22-30</td>
<td>SVP PICRR Consultation Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15</td>
<td>Final PICRR report with annexes sent to NBI and Partners for comment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7</td>
<td>NBI and Development Partners submit formal comments to the PICRR to the Bank. These comments will be annexed in the final published document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7-June 15</td>
<td>Internal Bank Clearance of Final PICRR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 25</td>
<td>Final WB SVP PICRR submitted for publication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annexes**

1. Mission Schedule
2. List of Consultation Participants (Please see Annex 6 of PICRR for these lists)
3. Notes on PICRR Consultation
NILE BASIN INITIATIVE

SVP PROGRAMMATIC IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

CONSULTATION MISSION

MARCH 22 - 31, 2010

AIDE-MEMOIRE – ANNEX 1

MISSION SCHEDULE

Meeting Objectives:

- To discuss the findings of SVP projects internal evaluation conducted by Nile-SEC;
- To discuss mainstreaming and sustainability of SVP outputs;
- To discuss SVP Implementation Completion Report (ICR) prepared by the World Bank;

Expected Outcomes:

- To provide inputs to the SVP projects internal evaluation and the SVP ICR
- To come up with recommendations to be taken-up by NBI entities and the countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>TOPICS</th>
<th>CHAIRPERSON</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9:00 – 9:10</td>
<td>Welcome Remarks by NBI Secretariat – Hamere Wondimu</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9:10-9:20</td>
<td>Objectives of the Meeting by World Bank - J.B. Collier</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9:20 - 9:30</td>
<td>Opening remarks by Host Country (TAC member or will be decided</td>
<td>Host Country, Nile-TAC member</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by the Host Country)</td>
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<tr>
<td>9:30 – 10:30</td>
<td>Presentation: Summary of internal evaluation of SVP Projects –</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>John Ogwang</td>
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<tr>
<td>10:30 – 11:00</td>
<td>Health break</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 – 12:00</td>
<td>Key issues and sustainability of SVP Products and Functions - –</td>
<td>One of the SVP PSC members (will be selected during the meeting)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamere Wondimu</td>
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<tr>
<td>12:00 – 13:00</td>
<td>Plenary discussion, issues, feedback and recommendations on the SVP</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>internal evaluation and Sustainability</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:00-14:00</td>
<td>Lunch break</td>
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<tr>
<td>14:00 – 15:30</td>
<td>Presentation: The SVP Program level implementation completion report –</td>
<td>One of the SVP PSC members (will be selected during the meeting)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petros Aklilu.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:30 – 16:00</td>
<td>Health break</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:00 – 17:00</td>
<td>Plenary discussion, issues and feedback on the SVP Program level</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>implementation completion report.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:00 – 17:30</td>
<td>Wrap-up and Closure of the meeting</td>
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</table>
NILE BASIN INITIATIVE

SVP PROGRAMMATIC IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

CONSULTATION MISSION

MARCH 22 - 31, 2010

AIDE-MEMOIRE – ANNEX 3

NOTES ON PICRR CONSULTATION

A World Bank Mission comprising JB Collier, Mission Leader, AFTWR; Berina Uwimbabazi, Operations Officer, AFTWR; and Petros Aklilu, Consultant for the PICRR, visited Cairo (March 22-25), Nairobi (March 23-27) and Addis Ababa (March 28-31), to present the draft report at consultation meetings of Nile riparian countries. The meetings were attended by Nile TAC members, and former PSC members and Regional Project Coordinators, and representatives from Egypt, Sudan, Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia, the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO), and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Program (NELSAP). Mrs. Hamere Wondimu, Senior Programme Officer and Mr. John Ogwang, Head of Monitoring and Evaluation represented the NBI Secretariat.

The NBI Secretariat Team presented the findings and conclusions of the Internal Evaluation of SVP Projects followed by a presentation on Mainstreaming and Sustainability the Results of the SVP Projects. This note summarizes the comments received on the draft PICRR. The Nile-Sec Team will issue a separate note on the feedback received to their presentations.

The draft PICRR was generally well received and the meetings concurred with the assessment and ratings, and the lessons learned. The meetings appreciated the complexity of the SVP and the difficult task in presenting an overall program level assessment. The specific comments received are as follows:

1. A participant reminded the meeting of the difficult context prevailing at the time NBI was launched, the complexity of the SVP in the absence of existing NBI institutions, systems and procedures to start-up the program, and the political economy surrounding the Nile riparian countries. It was noted that the Development Objectives of the SVP were relevant at the time of design and agrees with the PICRR that they are equally relevant today. While a Rate of Return is not feasible on the achievement of the SVP, the fact that all-inclusive cooperation on the Nile has been fostered, which never existed in the past, is a major achievement of the SVP. The participant felt that despite other shortcomings of the SVP, the Rating of Moderately Satisfactory is low.

2. A question was also raised if the Development Objectives were established recognizing the political economy of the Region and if the interventions had adequate instruments to address the political dimensions of the SVP.

3. A participant also noted that despite the participation of the country working groups, the Bank had the upper hand in the design of selected SVP Projects and in Mid-Term Review.
4. While the SVP achieved a lot, the level of trust gained hitherto did not reach to the point which would allow the signing of the CFA and therefore maintaining trust among NBI member countries is a Risk. It was agreed that trust and confidence building is a continuum and should be nurtured.

5. The meeting agreed that the absence of a complete benefit sharing framework did not allow the Nile riparian countries to engage on such an important subject and the SAPs to adopt the framework.

6. The meeting also noted that SVP was not designed to adopt the products generated from the various projects.

7. While agreeing with the performance ratings of the Grantee and Implementing agencies, a participant questioned that the report should have rated the performance of the Nile-COM and Nile-TAC since the two bodies have played a significant role in the overall implementation of the SVP. While separate ratings were made for the overall governance of the SVP, the Grantee, is the Secretariat for the both the Nile-COM and Nile TAC and rating each entity would be cumbersome.

8. On the Results Based Monitoring and evaluation, the meeting noted that the adoption was desirable and helped the PMUs to identify their contributions to the overall NBI objectives. The meeting also recognized that the adoption of the system was an enormous challenge for the PMUs.

9. A participant concurred with the PICRR that outsourcing of selected SVP Projects was a possible viable option for selected projects.

10. The meeting agreed with the PICRR that expectations about the future of NBI was not properly managed reflecting the absence of a Communication Strategy at the level of NBI Secretariat. With respect to the absence of an Exit Strategy, the meeting noted that there was a great deal of expectation to present another package of Projects following the completion of the SVP Projects. Instead, it turned out that SAPs were accorded a higher priority.

11. The meeting noted that the contribution of the Nile riparian countries to the operational cost of NBI Secretariat is insignificant and relying heavily on the support of Development Partners compared to the strong commitment of the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) member countries financing the full operation cost of the Commission.

12. The challenges in taking the SVP products forward for adoption and the presentations of the Nile-Sec on the subject were discussed in detail. Several participants noted that the Nile-Sec should prepare a concrete action plan (including the completion of the unfinished SVP tasks) to be presented to the Nile-COM for decision. Otherwise the products will remain shelved. A related issue is the capacity of the NBI Secretariat and NBI Country Offices and the identification of champions in each NBI country to lead the adoption of the SVP products. The experience of the LVC was noted in ensuring the adoption and implementation of knowledge products. Once Good Practices are identified, the LVBC presents recommendations to the East Africa Community for review and decision, and enacted as binding on member states.
The meetings noted that the choice of UNOPS was expensive for NBI and the Bank should have explored other options. It was further noted that although other options were considered, the Bank should have vetted more rigorously the choice of UNOPS.

On the future of the NBI Secretariat and to test its capacity, a participant asked the Bank Team if the NBI Secretariat could be designated as the fund manager for NBI-ISP while maintaining Bank supervision.

The Bank Team thanked the participants for their thoughtful and frank feedback and invited them to send the Bank other comments they may have on the draft report in the next two weeks. A final revised report will be submitted to the NBI Secretariat for official comments to be included as an Annex of the final PICRR. The Bank Team also responded to the questions raised and assured the meetings that where appropriate and justified, the revised report will reflect the comments accordingly.

1. On the rating, the Bank is open to reviewing evidences that may justify a higher rating. It explained that the a Moderately Satisfactory rating for the overall Development Objectives reflected the moderate shortcomings observed in each of the objectives as explained in the report. Another aspect of this assessment is the acknowledgement of the role of the SAPs in promoting the DOs of the SVP and the two SAPs have made significant contributions. Following the explanation, the participant who raised the issue concurred with the rating.

2. With respect to the role of the Nile-COM and TAC and the need to rated their performance, the Bank Team responded by acknowledging that their actions had bearings on the implementation of the SVP projects. For the Bank, the NBI Secretariat is the front-line entity representing the NBI governing bodies, designated as the Grantee and it was appropriate to target the assessment at the level of NBI Secretariat.

3. In response to the idea from participants for the possible NBI Secretariat administering the NBI-ISP Grant, the Bank Team indicated this concept would need to be reviewed during the upcoming mid-term review in September 2010. Changes in the NBI-ISP would be subject to the Bank’s assessment that the NBI has demonstrated ongoing satisfactory project delivery of both the substantive components and the fiduciary management.

A participant had asked if Minutes of the meeting is being prepared for signature. The Bank Team explained that the purpose of the consultation was not to issue formal Minutes for signature but would ensure that a summary note would be prepared and distributed to all participants on the comments made and discussions of the meetings.
ANNEX 5 – Key Persons Consulted

PICRR Mission November – December 2009

Ethiopia
H.E. Asfaw Digamo; Minister of WR; and Nile-COM member
Hon. Ato Alemneh Abera, Chair, Parliamentary Committee on NRM
Ato Teferra Beyene, TAC Member
Ato Menelik Alemu, A/Dir. General, for Intl. and Consular Affairs, Mo Foreign Affairs, FDRE.
Dr. Hashem Ghany, RPM WRPM, PMU
Dr. Abdelkadir, Lead Specialist, DSS
Dr. Osman, Lead Specialist, Project Planning and Management (former LS for Water Policy and Planning)
Dr. Khalid Eldaw, Executive Director, ENTRO
Eng. Mekuria Tafesse, Consultant, ENTRO former ED of ENTRO
Dr. Tesfaye Tafesse, NPC, SDBS
Ato Dereje Derbew; Sr. Energy Expert, Ministry of Mines and Energy,
Ato Tesfaye, NPC, CBSI
Ato Abiyu Hailu, President, Ethiopia Nile Basin Discourse Forum
Ms. Almaz Woldetensai, Chair, Women’s Network for the Nile
Ato Dejene Tessema, Editor in Chief, Ethiopian Herald—representing Nile Media Network
Ms. Wubua Mekonnen, NPC, NTEAP
Mr. Ken Ohashi, Country Director, World Bank
Mr. E. V. Jaganathan, Sr. Irrigation Engineer, World Bank

Sudan
H.E. Kamal Adli, Minister of Irrigation
Dr. Salaheldien Yousif, TAC Member
Dr. Saadeldin Ibrahim Izzeldin; Secretary General, Higher Council for Environment and
& Natural Resources
Mr. Osman Yousif Ibrahim, CBSI
Mr. Gedion Asfaw, RPM, NTEAP
Ms. Intisar Salih, M&E Lead Specialist, NTEAP
Mr. Nastour Adam Ismail; NMN/NBI/STV
Mr. Mohamed Khalafalla; MO/WR-WQWG
Khalid El Amin Elmosheraf; MGE (Ed. Planning)
Al Baqir Rahma Al Basheer; NCCCR
Haliz Elohiel Mohamed; Sudan National Discourse Forum – SNDF
NADIA Babiker-Shakak; Mo/WR, WQWG
Faiasal MoHHD Elkordi; Mo/WR
Abderrahim Fraiji; Sr. Operations Officer, World Bank

Egypt
H.E. Dr. Mohamed Nasr El-Din Allam, Nile-COM Chair
Dr. Abdel F. Mettwawe, TAC Member
Dr. Mohamed Abuzeid, former Minister of MWR&I, now, President of Arab Water Council
Dr. Wael M. Khairy, Director, NBI Office of Egypt; Nile TAC Member, ENSAPT, Nile Water Sector,

MWR & Irrigation,
Eng. Tahani Moustafa, Sileet, Technical Officer Engineer, Program Officer, NBI Office
Dr. Eng. Ahmed Moustafa A. Moussa; Minister’s Technical Office, Ministry of Water Resources & Irrigation
Dr. Mohmed Amer, PSC Chairman; Advisor to Drainage Research Institute, National Water Research Center
Eng. Nasser Ezat, Negotiator, CFA
Dr. Hossam Emam, Lawyers’ Network
Dr. Yaser Elwan, National DSS Specialist, DSS Unit, NBI
Dr. William Kudoja: RPM, ATP
Mr. Tamene, Lead Specialist, ATP
Dr. Hesham Mustafa, NPC, CBSI
Dr. Ithar Khalil, NPC, NTEAP

Dr. Emad Adly, National Discourse, and General Coordinator, The Arab Network for Env. & Development
Dr. Mohammad Abu Seder, Member of the Shoura, Egyptian Parliament
Dr. Mohamed H. Amer; President, ENICID, National Water Research Centre
Mr. Essam El Shikh, Journalist
Mr. David Craig, Country Director, World Bank

Kenya
Eng. David Stower, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI)
Mr. John Rao Nyaoro, Director of Water Resources, MWI and Chief Nile Negotiator
Mr. Fred H. Mwango, and Member, Nile Technical Assistance Committee, and
Mr. Daniel T. Mogusu, Deputy Director, Transboundary Waters and Desk Officer, NBI, MWI
Ms. Rose Thuo, former Chair of Project Steering Committee, EWUAP
Ms. Jackline Mogeni, NPC, Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement Project
Eng. David Mwangi, Chief Manager, Kenya Power and Light Co.
Mr. Hosea Wendot, Principal Irrigation Engineer, National Irrigation Board, and former, NPC for EWUAP
Mr. Jan Philip Klever, Associate Portfolio Manager, Africa Regional Office, UNOPS
Mr. Patrick Warui, Finance Specialist, ARO, UNOPS

Rwanda
Eng. Emmanuel Olet, Program Officer for Water, NELSAP-CU
Eng. Desire Nzayanga, Program Officer for Power Trade and Development, NELSAP-CU
Mr. Peter Maina, Senior Economist, NELSAP-CU
Mr. Emmanuel Makusa, CBSI NFP

Uganda
Hon. Tubwita Grace Bagaya, MP and Chair of NBI Parliamentary Forum
Hon. Yiga Anthony, MP and Member of NBI PF
Hon. Kasamba Mathias, MP and Member of NBI PF
Mr. Kagolee Kivumbi, Secretary, Judicial Service Commission, PSC Chair, CBSI
Ms. Henriette Ndombe, Executive Director, Nile-SEC  
Eng. Callist Tindimugaya, TAC Member and Member of PSC, CBSI  
Dr. Canisius Kanangire, Head of Strategic Planning, Nile-SEC  
Dr. Tom Waako, Program Officer, Nile-SEC  
Dr. Gordon Mumbo, RPM, CBSI  
Ms. Hamere Wondimu, Sr. Project Coordinator, Nile-Sec  
Dr. Helen Natu, RPM, SDBS  
Dr. John K. Ogwan, Head of M&E, Nile-Sec  
Ms. Jane Baitwa, Communications Specialist, CBSI  
Ms. Kundhavi Kadiresan, Country Manager, World Bank  

Tanzania  
Eng. Humphrey Ndwiga, RPM, RPT  
Mr. Raymond Marki, CBSI NFP  
Mr. John McIntire, Country Director, World Bank  

While in Tanzania, the PICRR team also participated in the NBI Ten Year Celebrations and met with stakeholders from around the Basin  

PICRR Consultation Mission – March 2010  

Cairo Meeting, March 22, 2010  

Dr. Abdel Fattah Metawie, Nile-TAC Chair  
Dr. Ahmed Ragab, Deputy Chairman, NWS  
Dr. Moustafa Gaweesh, PSC, WRPM-NBI  
Dr. Wael M. Khairy, Nile-TAC member, Egypt  
Dr. Ahmed Farahat, Representative of Participating Institute (National Planning Institute) for SDBS-NBI  
Dr. Maha Tawfik, Head of the Training Center- National Coordinator of ATP  
Dr. Hesham Mostafa, Head of Central Department for the needs of the planning sector- National  
Dr. Fathy Elgmal, Director of Hydraulics Research Institute - National Center for Water Research-  

National Coordinator of EUWAP  
Dr. Khalifa Hamdy Hussainy, EWUAP PSC member  
Dr. Yasser Elwan, National Specialist, DSS Unit, WRPM-NBI  
Dr. Mohamed Said Khalil, NTEAP PSC member  
Eng. Waleed Hakiki, TF member, PPM Comonent, WRPM-NBI  
Mr. Marwan Badr, SDBS PSC member  
Dr. Mohamed Hassan Amer, ATP PSC member  
Dr. Khaled Waseef, CBSI PSC member  
Eng. Tahany Sleet, NBI-Office  
Eng. Nashwa Elsrogy, NBI-Office  
E-mail: nashwa_sorogy@yahoo.com  
Eng. Enass Ahmed, NBI-Office  
Eng. Rasha Hosny, NBI-Office  
Mr. Ibrahim Salih Adam, Nile-TAC member, Sudan
Nairobi Meeting, March 25, 2010

Mr. Fred. K. Mwango, Nile-TAC member, Kenya
Mr. David Jakaiti, Nile-TAC member, Kenya
Dan.T.Mogusu, NBI Focal Person
Ms. Rose Thu'o, EWUAP PSC Chair
Mr. David Kembo, SDBS PSC member
Eng. Mwalimu K. Masau, ATP PSC member
Mr. Kitamirike Jackson, NBI Focal Person
Ms Grace Mrawenayo, NBI Focal Point, Burundi
Mr. Liberat Nahimana, TAC member, Burundi
Mr. Hubert Kapiamba Ilunga, Nile-TAC member, DRC
Mr. Augustin Mawalala, Nile-TAC member, DRC
Mrs Catherine Ssemakula, EWUAP PSC member
Mrs. Passy Washeba, SDBS PSC Chair
Ms. Helen Natu, RPM SDBS
Mr. Meraji Msuya, Former NBI ED

Addis Ababa Meeting, March 29, 2010

Ato Tefera Beyene, Nile-TAC member Ethiopia
Ato Zenebe Kebede, Nile-TAC member
Ms. Lakech Haile, CBSI PSC member
Ato Fekahmed Negash Nuru, WRPM PSC Chair
Ato Gedion Asfaw, RPM NTEAP
Dr. Tadele Gebreselassie, RPM EWUAP
Dr. Hesham A.Ghany, RPM WRPM
Dr. Ahmed Khalid Eldaw, ENTRO Executive Director
Dr. Salah Shazali, ENTRO Senior Operations Officer, TTL ENTRO NBI-ISP
Dr. Solomon Abate, ENTRO Regional Project Coordinator (Watershed)
Eng. Ayalew Nigussie, ENTRO Regional Project Coordinator for the Eastern Nile Irrigation and Drainage Project
Dr. Wubalem Fekade, ENTRO, Regional Social Development Specialist
ANNEX 6 – References and Supporting Documents

World Bank Official Documents:


Joint Mid-Term Report - UNDP and World Bank, May, 2007

Mid-Term Review Meeting Background and Minutes (World Bank internal meeting). Shared Vision Program. Nile Basin Initiative


**Nile Basin Initiative Documents:**


“Telling Nile Story”. Nile Basin Initiative

Nile Basin Initiative Management Services Agreement with UNOPS (and subsequent revisions)

Nile Basin Initiative Annual Reports for Projects of the Shared Vision Program

Nile Basin Initiative Shared Vision Program Project Completion Reports 2009


**Other Documents:**

Collins, Robert, "Managing the Water of the Nile: Basis for Cooperation?" in Honoring Haggai Erlich;