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Conservation of the Biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda

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Terminal Evaluation, December 2012 Final Report

Republic of Uganda

GEF OP3
GEF Strategic Priority Biodiversity (SP-1):
Catalyzing Sustainability of Protected Areas

**Government of the Republic of Uganda
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development**

United National Development Program (UNDP)

Stuart Williams & Stephen Khaukha

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We would like to stress that the evaluation is intended to give a summary of what has been achieved in the project as well as glean some of the lessons that can be learned from it in what was a relatively short period. In the report, we have tried to offer constructive criticism where we think it is warranted and we hope that those involved in the project take it as such. We believe that there are lessons to be learned from the past five years and that if these lessons are incorporated in future projects, then all of your efforts will have been worth it.

The forests of the Albertine Rift are among the very most important places in the world but they face tremendous pressures. We met with dedicated people, the majority of whom have no resources to do their jobs but still they remain at their posts, creatively doing what they can to restore and conserve these forests. We would like to offer them our thanks and wish them every success in their continuing endeavours.

Stuart Williams
Kampala, Uganda

Stephen Khaukha
Kampala, Uganda

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Executive Summary

The Terminal Evaluation (TE) was carried out by one Lead Consultant and one National Consultant with a mission to the field in Uganda between 05 – 10 November 2012. The TE took place four months after the close of the project. During the evaluation, the team met and interviewed a large number of stakeholders including i) members of the Project Steering Committee (PSC), ii) stakeholders within the national government organizations within Kampala and within local government (at district and sub-county level) in the field, iii) stakeholders within targeted local communities and private forest owners, iv) members of the small team that was responsible for the implementation of the project, v) people from partner organizations who were involved in implemented aspects of the project, and vi) people from UNDP-CO.

Key Findings and Issues

The project was beset with issues starting right from its exceptionally long gestation. Having been conceived in 1996, it was only in 2006 that the project documents were finally fully approved and in 2007 the contracts signed. One immediate consequence of this was that *all* the cofinancing was redundant: the cofinancers had either completed the work that was supposed to be carried out simultaneously or had withdrawn their funding. If the implementation had started on time, the project would have worked at a higher, strategic level in synergy with a suite of work that was being implemented on the ground. As a consequence, the project was immediately torn as to the role it should play. But from the outset, the Inception Report did not adequately refocus the project on the priorities at the time of the project's start. Indeed, it was two years before the project began to find the role that it should play; this coincided with the recruitment of the TA. The MTE was carried out in late 2010 although it was only approved in April 2011 by which time the project, according to the official GEF timeline, had only eight more months to run. The project's application for a year's no-cost extension was cut to six months and so the project was drawn to a close on 30 June 2012.

The key issues, therefore, for the project were:

- Long gestation meaning that when the project finally started, there was no cofinance with the exception of in-kind cofinance by GoU.
- Poor adaptability at the beginning of the project to changes that had occurred over its gestation; in short, the inception period resulting in an Inception Report that did not adequately address the changes that had taken place
- An over-ambitious design that did not fully address all the drivers of deforestation
- Implementation issues, including:
 - Inadequate monitoring by MWE and UNDP-CO and therefore allowing some of the issues in the project to go either unnoticed or to be altered after long delays
 - Consistent delays in the delivery of funds from UNDP-CO to the PMU

- Lack of focus on the logframe – which, in fact, was not even updated following the amendments proposed during the MTE or presented in the project’s Final Report.
- Delays in getting key personnel into place – most notably the TA to the project
- Poor understanding of the GEF timeline leading to a less than satisfactory closure of the project
- Building unrealistic expectation among local communities (particularly districts officers, PFOAs and CFM groups) that will probably lead, inadvertently to further deforestation as the expectations will not be fulfilled
- While there were some sustainability gains (e.g., increased knowledge among local communities and district level capacity increased), there were significant sustainability issues. As examples: i) the strategic plan was completed in the final month of the project with no funding to implement it, and ii) the incentives to the CFM groups and PFOAs obviously end with the closure of the project and it is likely that these groups will disband. Further, part of the sustainability was based on the assumption of REDD+ processes starting soon after the project’s closure; it appears that there may be some years to wait before this does start up (with the exception of WCS’s pilot REDD+ project).

Key results

Driving around the region in which the project was operational over the course of the field visit during the Terminal Evaluation, it is apparent that the project did not achieve its objective of conserving the forests of the Albertine Rift. Indeed, the evidence is that the rate of deforestation in the project’s area has *accelerated* over the course of the project. Nonetheless, the project did achieve some significant results – the majority of which are *process* associated rather than results of conservation impact:

- The project did manage partly to retain its strategic focus with the production of the Strategic Plan for the Northern Albertine Rift. Moreover, the process that was used to develop the strategic plan was exemplary in its inclusiveness of the key stakeholders. This increases the likelihood of the plan being (at least partially) implemented as it is already being incorporated into government budgets.
- The training and use of people recruited from local communities to carry out monitoring of animal populations within the forest. More than anything, this transfers responsibility and knowledge to the people.
- Improving the understanding of the location of the forest corridors that link Budongo CFR and Kibale National Park and an analysis of the options for sustainably financing conservation of the forest corridors.
- The people living adjacent to forests received various livelihood benefits as mechanisms to incentivise forest conservation. This included delivery of 87,000 seedlings (some of which were of indigenous species), 2,100 beehives, 300 energy-saving stoves and training to women’s groups.

- The capacity at the district level was significantly increased. Importantly, this was ‘on-the-job’ training – for example in the production or review of district ordinances.
- The project achieved significant success in environmental education and awareness creation – thanks to the energy of one of the project’s staff members as well as the use of the kingdoms – which the people hold in high esteem.
- The involvement of many stakeholders, not only as participants for planning processes but also as sub-contractors brought them together and often reduced conflicts among them.
- The project (eventually) demonstrated adaptability particularly following the recruitment of the TA. This adaptability was captured in the internal review of the project in 2009 and later in the MTE.

Item	Rating	Comment
Overall Project Results	MU	<p>While the project has generated useful lessons, while there are some useful products from the project and while people have worked hard in this project, because the overall objective of the GEF funding – to cover incremental costs to result in global environmental benefits – was not achieved, we must rate it as MU. This is coupled with the increase in the rate of deforestation over the course of the project’s lifetime. GEF emphasizes the need to achieve <i>impact</i> through outcomes in its projects. The project fell short on this, particularly when compared with other similar GEF projects around the globe.</p> <p>In addition and as discussed above, the TE evaluators remain unconvinced about the sustainability of the results achieved by the project or the processes put into place. For example, even the most enthusiastic PFOs were already allowing seedlings to become swamped with weeds; the pilot projects aimed at alternative livelihood options for people living close to forests were faltering. We saw no evidence of take-up or scaling up the work carried out by the project.</p>
IA & EA Execution		
Overall quality of implementation & execution		Because the project resulted in so many different stages, each of which was implemented with different degrees of effectiveness and efficiency, it is difficult to assign a single, overall rating for Implementation Agency Execution. The start-up of the project was unsatisfactory (U); the interim stage (under the first PM before the TA was recruited) was moderately unsatisfactory (MU); the final two years was implemented effectively and efficiently and was, therefore, satisfactory (S) but the poorly planned and implemented closure of the project was unsatisfactory (U).
Implementation Agency Execution		The project was supposed to be jointly implemented by the MWE and WWF. Aside from its role as Chair of the NPSC, the MWE did not engage in the implementation of the project and, consequently, its role should be rated as unsatisfactory (U). In contrast, WWF implemented the project. While the implementation picked up in the last two years of the project – largely as a result of the recruitment of the TA and the second PM – the flaws in the project’s implementation mean that WWF’s performance, overall, must be rated as moderately satisfactory (MS).
Executing Agency Execution	MU	The engagement of the MFPED was largely unsatisfactory: they hardly engaged at all. However, the MWE took the role of Executing Agency – even though, they, too, took little role in the project (with the exception of Chairing the NPSC).
GEF Agency (i.e., UNDP)	MU	Again, the performance of the GEF Agency, UNDP, is complex. The performance of the UNDP-CO could have been much better to ensure effective implementation of the project. In contrast, the UNDP RTA

Item	Rating	Comment
		provided satisfactory support to the project.
M&E		
Overall quality of M&E	MU	As with other aspects requiring evaluation, it is difficult to provide a single rating because each of the stages of the project were markedly different. The review process in August 2010 significantly improved the M&E framework while at project start-up, it appeared to be satisfactory.
M&E design at project start-up	S	
M&E plan Implementation	MU	While the actual components of the M&E plan, as proscribed in the project document, were implemented (i.e., there was an MTE, the PIR and APRs were produced, there were financial audits of the project), the M&E did not always produce the adaptive management that should otherwise result from these processes and some problems persisted throughout the implementation of the project.
Outcomes		
Overall quality of project outcomes	MS	The project made gains but the majority of these were <i>process</i> gains as opposed to impacts. The absence of impacts at the scale at which the project was operating meant that there were shortcomings to the outcomes of the project.
Relevance	MS	The project retained a focus on a critical issue in Uganda – deforestation which is recognised in many policies and strategies. However, as discussed in the main document, the project did not focus on the principal drivers of deforestation.
Effectiveness	MU	Because the project did not achieve many of its objectives, it cannot be said to have been effective. During its final two years, it was, however, effective in what could be achieved in that short time frame.
Efficiency	U	The repeated delays resulted in a highly inefficient project because these hampered the conversion of funds to outcomes.
Sustainability		
Overall likelihood of risks to sustainability	MU	When the different elements of sustainability are combined, even if some of the institutions will persist, we rate the overall sustainability of the project's activities and impacts to be moderately unlikely. This is partly due to the poorly anticipated termination of the project (which precluded detailed planning and implementation of an exit strategy) and partly due to the enormous socio-political challenges that the areas face.
Financial resources	ML	We rate financial sustainability as ML because there are a number of initiatives that are either under implementation (PES) or under development (REDD+). In addition, there is the potential for further innovative schemes (purchase of forests under conservation easement scheme; offsets from oil and gas industry). The key issue here is not whether these funds will be forthcoming but the <i>time</i> it will take before they are fully realized and on a scale that is appropriate to conserve both the forests and the corridors that link them.
Socio-economic	MU	We have rated socio-economic sustainability MU not because we believe there will be societal collapse in the area! However, we have little hope that all the CBOs that have been set up by the project will sustain the test of time: we believe that while the funding may come, it will be too little, too late and that the people in these CBOs will have turned their attention to other livelihood opportunities.
Institutional	ML	In contrast with the CBOs, we believe that the other institutions are relatively strong even though they are poorly funded (relative to the financial resources that will be necessary to conserve and restore the forests of the northern Albertine Rift). Thus, the district organizations and international NGOs will continue to work in the area albeit at a scale that does not match the issues. As such, we rated institutional sustainability as ML.
Environmental	U	The scale of the issues – particularly a population growth of 5.2%, a political climate in which evictions are prohibited, poorly funded and marginalized environment sector – mean that securing the forests of the

Item	Rating	Comment
		Albertine Rift (between the larger forest blocks of Budongo and Kibale NP) is unlikely (U). As an illustration and as is mentioned in the text, the rate of deforestation has <i>increased</i> over the life of the project.
Catalytic Role		
Production of a Public Good	N/A	The project did not have a specific focus on replication or the replicability of its activities. However, there are a number of good lessons to be learned from the project and a number of good practices that warrant replication elsewhere. As mentioned in the text, these are primarily <i>processes</i> that the project tested over the course of its implementation. Unlike many other GEF projects, the project also did not focus on demonstration although resources dictated that the activities were (re)focused in a subsection of the area covered by the project.
Demonstration	N/A	
Replication	MS	
Scaling up	N/A	

Key lessons learned

Despite the significant shortcomings to the project's results, there were many lessons to be learned from the project. Indeed, if these lessons are adopted by future projects in Uganda, then it may have been worthwhile after all. The key lessons were:

- When there is a long project development period, the inception period is especially important to bring the project's design up-to-date and to ensure it remains relevant.
- Understanding of GEF processes and timelines is important. If the project had understood the timeline, the first two years might have been more usefully implemented (see Figure 1).
- The district officers proved to be competent and enthusiastic. Projects should, where possible, work with these people. In addition, the project personnel understood that the awareness and education aspects of the project should be implemented by the Bunyoro and Tooro Kingdoms because these institutions are trusted by the people.
- Having good staff is an obvious key to project success – but they also must be recruited at the start of the project.
- The Terminal Evaluation should be conducted before the project has closed. This would facilitate the process immeasurably.
- Monitoring of projects is essential. Without it, adaptive management – so badly needed in this project – cannot take place.
- Projects should carefully manage the expectations of the local communities with whom they work. Building unrealistic expectations can be dangerous and, in this case, may lead to further deforestation.
- In order to overcome some of the sustainability issues and to shore up the investment that has been made, UNDP-CO should be creative in finding mechanisms to continue some of the processes that have been set in motion with the hope that they may, eventually, result in impacts. In addition, the lessons learned from this project should be incorporated into the UNDP-GEF project for Kidepo that is currently under development.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIG	Alternative Income Generating activities
ARCOS	Albertine Rift Conservation Society
ARF	Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda
AWP	Annual Work Plan
BD	Biological Diversity
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resource Management
CBO	Community Based Organization
CFM	Collaborative Forest Management
CFR	Central Forest Reserve
CO	County Office
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CSWCT	Chimpanzee Sanctuary and Wildlife Conservation Trust
DDP	District Development Plan
DEAP	District Environment Action Plan
DEO	District Environment Officer
DFO	District Forestry Officer
DFS	District Forestry Services
DLG	District Local Government
DNRO	District Natural Resource Officer
ECOTRUST	Ecological Conservation Trust of Uganda
ENR	Environment and Natural Resources
EOP	End of Project
EU	European Union
FIEFOC	Farm Income Enhancement and Forest Conservation Project
FMP	Forest Management Plan
FRMCP	Forestry Resources Management and Conservation Project
FSSD	Forestry Sector Support Department
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GoU	Government of Uganda
IEC	Information, Education, Communication
JGI	Jane Goodall Institute
LLUP	Local Land Use Plan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
METT	Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
MFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MOLG	Ministry of Local Government
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
MTWH	Ministry of Tourism, Wildlife and Heritage
MWE	Ministry of Water and Environment
NaFORRI	National Forestry Resources Research Institute
NARCG	Northern Albertine Rift Conservation Group

NDBD	National Biodiversity Data Bank
NDP	National Development Plan
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NFA	National Forestry Authority
NFP	National Forest Plan
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for International Development
NPC	National Project Coordinator
NPM	National Project Manager
NPSC	National Project Steering Committee
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NSA	Non State Actors
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PA	Protected Area
PDF	Project Development Fund
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PES	Payment for Ecosystem Services
PFO	Private Forest Owner
PFOA	Private Forest Owners Association
PIMS	Project Information Management System
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PM	Project Manager
PMU	Project Management Unit
PPG	Project Preparation Grant
PRODOC	Project Document
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries
REPA	Rights Equity and Protected Areas (CARE project)
RPP	Readiness Preparation Proposal
SIP	Sector Investment Plan
SRF	Strategic Result Framework
TA	Technical Advisor
TOR	Terms of Reference
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

1 Introduction

1. The Terminal Evaluation of the UNDP-GEF project “Conservation of the Biodiversity of the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda (ARF)” was carried out according to the UNDP-GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy. Thus, it was carried out with the aim of providing a systematic and comprehensive review and evaluation of the performance of the project by assessing its design, processes of implementation and achievement relative to its objectives. Under this overarching aim, its objectives were i) to promote accountability and transparency for the achievement of GEF objectives through the assessment of results, effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and impact of the partners involved in the project, and iii) to promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing on the results and lessons learned from the project and its partners as a basis for decision-making on policies, strategies, programme management and projects, and to improve knowledge and performance.
2. As such, this TE was initiated by UNDP-Uganda as the GEF Agency for the CBARF project to determine its success in relation to its stated objectives and to understand the lessons learned through the implementation of the project.
3. The TE was conducted by two consultants – one Lead Consultant and one National Consultant. Both consultants were independent of the policy-making process, and management of the assistance to the project¹. Importantly, the National Consultant was involved in the Inception Report and Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) of the project. Neither consultant was involved in the supervision of the project.
4. The TE was carried out over a period of 25 days during the period from 24 September to 30 November 2012. Carrying out the TE at this point in the project’s implementation timeline was in line with UNDP/GEF policy for Evaluations which stipulates that the TE needs to be completed within six months (before or) after project termination (which, for this project, was 30 June 2012).

1.1 Approach and methodology

5. The approach for the TE was determined by the Terms of Reference (TOR, see Annex I). The TOR were followed closely but the evaluation focussed on assessing i) the concept and design of the project, ii) its implementation in terms of quality and timeliness of inputs, financial planning, and monitoring and evaluation, iii) the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the activities that were carried out, iv) whether the desired (and other undesirable but not intended) outcomes and objectives were achieved, v) the likelihood of sustainability of the results of the project, and vi) the involvement of stakeholders in the project’s processes and activities.
6. The TE included a thorough review of various documents with a focus on the project documents and other outputs, documents, monitoring reports, Annual Project Reports (APR), Project Implementation Reviews (PIR), relevant

¹ It should be noted that the National Consultant was involved in some aspects of the implementation of the project.

correspondence and other project related material produced by the project staff or their partners. The evaluation assessed whether a number of recommendations that had been made following monitoring and evaluation processes – most importantly the Mid-Term Evaluation – were implemented and to ascertain the explanations if they were not.

7. The TE process was wholly based in Uganda (i.e., it did not include a “mission” to Uganda as such). The evaluation process followed a participatory approach and included a series of structured and unstructured interviews, both individually and in small groups. Site visits were also conducted i) to validate the reports and indicators, ii) to examine, in particular, any infrastructure development and equipment procured, iii) to consult with local authorities or government representatives and local communities, and iv) to assess data that may be held only locally. The evaluators worked with the Project Staff to agree on a list of people with whom the TE team should meet. Particular attention was paid to listening to the stakeholders’ views and the confidentiality of all interviews was stressed. Whenever possible, the information was crosschecked among the various sources.
8. The evaluation was carried out according to the UNDP/GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy. Therefore, activities and results were evaluated for their: i) **Relevance** – thus, the extent to which the results and activities were consistent with local and national development priorities, national and international conservation priorities, and GEF’s focal area and operational programme strategies, ii) **Effectiveness** – thus, how the project’s results were related to the original or modified intended outcomes or objectives, and iii) **Efficiency** – thus, whether the activities were carried out in a cost effect way and whether the results were achieved by the least cost option. The results, outcomes, and actual and potential impacts of the project were examined to determine whether they were positive or negative, foreseen or unintended. Finally, the **Sustainability** and **Replicability** of the interventions and results were examined to determine the likelihood of whether benefits would continue to be accrued after the completion of the project. The sustainability was examined from various perspectives: financial, social, environmental and institutional.
9. In addition, the evaluators took pains to examine the achievements of the project within the realistic political and socio-economic framework of Uganda over its implementation period.
10. The (amended) logical framework with Outcomes, Outputs and indicators towards which the PMU worked partly formed the basis of the TE (but see below for the caveat to this approach).
11. According to the GEF policy for TEs, the relevant areas of the project were evaluated according to performance criteria (Table 1).

Table 1. The ratings that were assigned to the various aspects of the project, in accordance with UNDP/GEF policies.

Rating	Explanation
Highly satisfactory (HS)	The aspect had no shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

Satisfactory (S)	The aspect had minor shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	The aspect had moderate shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)	The aspect had significant shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Unsatisfactory (U)	The aspect had major shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency
Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)	The aspect had severe shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency

12. To date, there have been no aspects of the project that have been deemed Not Applicable (N/A) or Unable to Assess (U/A).

13. In a similar way, the sustainability of the project's interventions and achievements was examined using the relevant UNDP/GEF ratings (Table 2).

Table 2. The ratings that were assigned to the different dimensions of sustainability of the interventions and achievements of the project.

Rating	Explanation
Likely (L)	Negligible risks to sustainability, with key outcomes expected to continue into the foreseeable future
Moderately Likely (ML)	Moderate risks, but expectations that at least some outcomes will be sustained
Moderately Unlikely (MU)	Substantial risk that key outcomes will not carry on after project closure, although some outputs and activities should carry on
Unlikely (U)	Severe risk that project outcomes as well as key outputs will not be sustained
Highly Unlikely (HU)	Expectation that few if any outputs or activities will continue after project closure

14. The TE was carried out with a number of audiences in mind, including: i) the Ministry of Water and Environment and the National Forestry Authority (NFA), ii) the UNDP-CO, iii) the numerous partners involved with the project, including state and non-state actors, and iv) the GEF and its partners.

15. The report follows the structure of TEs recommended in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF-Financed Projects. As such, it first deals with a description of the project and the development context in Uganda (Section 2), it then deals with the Findings (Section 3) of the evaluation within three sections (Project Formulation, Project Implementation and Project Results, respectively). The report then draws together the Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons from the project (Section 4).

16. *Audit trail for final report.* The draft report was submitted to UNDP-CO on 21 November 2012 (as per contract). This was distributed to stakeholders and a summary of the results of the evaluation was given to key stakeholders on 26 November 2012. Comments on the draft were discussed at the stakeholder meeting. Further comments were received from UNDP-CO, including those

written into the minutes of the stakeholder meeting. These have been incorporated into the final report.

2 Project Description and Development Context

17. The project had a very long gestation from its original conception in 1996. The PDF-A (with associated funding of USD 23,000) was approved in 1998 and the project entered into the GEF pipeline in 2000 following the approval of the PDF-B (with associated funding of USD 365,000 that included USD 65,000 of in-kind funding from GoU). The initial draft project document was completed in 2004, with an expectation that the project would run for a five-year period from 2006-2011. However, the PRODOC needed to be completed and the revised document was endorsed by the GEF Council on 20 December 2006 with final approval and signature on 08 May 2007. From this point, there remains some confusion about the actual operational start date of the project: however, the UNDP-RTA reports that this should have been May 2008 (on establishment of the PMU).
18. The project was designed to develop a strategic program that, when implemented, would reduce the rates of deforestation in the Albertine Rift Forests – and specifically the critical forest corridors that lie between the Budongo Forest Reserve to the north and the Kibale National Park to the south. As stated in the project document, this is of importance because the Albertine Rift harbours the highest numbers of endemic species on the African continent across many taxa and globally ranks second in terms of threatened species.
19. Overall, the objectives of the project remained relevant to the national development context which rightly identifies forest management, watershed management and sustainable management of natural resources as important within the country. These are entrenched in the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (PEAP) and its successor, the National Development Plan (2010/11 – 2014/15), the Forest Policy, the National Forest Plan and the ENR Sector Plan.
20. The project was also in line with the UNDP's Country Programme Action Plan (including that for 2010-2014). Specifically, the project worked i) to develop District Environment Action Plans (DEAPs) for two districts and review those for another five districts; ii) to assist with the process of incorporating the DEAPs into the Strategic Plan, iii) to assist with the process of integrating the DEAPs into the District Development Plans (DDPs), iv) to develop and build the capacity of CBOs (specifically, within the context of the project, of PFOs and CFM groups).
21. It must be stated from the outset that the project was operating in a very challenging environment in which several barriers to forest management, conservation and restoration persist:
 - a. The Albertine Rift forest area between Masindi and Kyenjojo is the area of the country – if not the world – with the highest human population growth rates. Currently, these are estimated to be 5.2% per annum (compared with the national average of 3.2%, UBOS, 2012²).

² Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (2012). Statistical Abstract. UBOS, Kampala, Uganda. We understand that stating that population growth flies in the face of the national policy that a big empowered

- b. A portion of the population growth rates can be directly related to high rates of immigration into the area. This presents challenges because the immigrants do not have historical connections with or knowledge of the forests and their values and importance. In addition, when the immigrants seek land in the area once they have arrived, they are pointed towards the forests as most other land is either unproductive or already under cultivation.
- c. The 1995 Constitution transferred many of the forests outside of protected areas into private ownership. This was particularly the case for the corridors between the forest reserves. The fate of these forests lie in the hands of their private owners – and there are strong economic reasons for these people i) to cut the forests to accrue income from timber and charcoal, and ii) to convert the forests into agricultural land. Indeed, in this way, privatisation of land will have contributed to acceleration of deforestation and forest degradation in the area.
- d. With the exception of a conditional grant for wetlands and a small amount of generated revenue (for which there is strong competition), the district natural resource authorities have no budget with which to carry out any work at all. These departments at the district level are, therefore, wholly dependent on funding from projects such as this to operate.
- e. NFA manages the major forest blocks within the Albertine rift region, which are important for biodiversity conservation (constituting about 72% of the forest area in the districts of Masindi, Hoima, Kibaale, Kyenjojo and Kyegegwa). However, all interviewees over the course of the terminal evaluation expressed the opinion that its capacity to manage (and protect) these forests is limited; this was also reported in the PIR. During the project's implementation, NFA faced the significant institutional upheavals, including increases of encroachment into CFRs and other activities (often coupled with hostility and brutality against staff), reduced funding for forest conservation (e.g., with the end of the Forestry Resources Management and Conservation Project (FRMCP) in 2008), reported gross corruption and misuse of offices by top NFA officials (which also had infected the organization to the CFR level), high staff turnover, and reduced funding from own revenue and donor support.
- f. Finally, the challenges were exacerbated by the scale of the issues relative to the size of the project. The area is huge and the project could only have impacts, if at all, on a small portion of the area.

population is good for transforming the national economy. Without entering into a debate about this policy, if population growth is not to result in outright transformation of the natural environment, then i) it will have to be carefully managed with adequate protection of the natural environment and ii) environmental management is based on the implementation of legislation including regulations and is only as good as the governance. If, for any reason, there are flaws in governance then environmental management itself becomes undermined – and herein lie our concerns about population growth.

3 Findings

3.1 Project Formulation

22. As mentioned above, the project was formulated over the period of ten years (1996 – 2006); this was a time frame over which there were many socio-economic changes in Uganda and in the project area. However, despite these socio-political changes, one thing remained bleakly constant: the deforestation and forest degradation in the corridors among and even within the forest reserves of the Albertine Rift. As such, the overriding goal of the project remained relevant.
23. There were two primary issues of concern with the project formulation. First, the project was overambitious in its design and, second, there was an insufficient review process once the process of implementation of the project had begun to bring the project in line with the changes that had occurred over its gestation: in other words, the Inception Report was inadequate relative to the changes that had actually taken place. For example, the projects that were associated with co-financing had either been completed or cancelled; this meant that the project's objectives should have been re-evaluated relative to these changing circumstances.
24. The project was designed as a five-year (or 60 month) project. The project's overall goal was to:
- Conserve and manage rich biodiversity forests in the Albertine Rift, allowing Sustainable Development of all Stakeholders.*
25. This appears a lofty goal and the project's purpose was similarly ambitious: “*To support conservation and management of nationally and globally important biodiversity resources in Albertine Rift forests in Uganda.*”
26. Under this purpose, the project had four Outcomes towards which it was working:
- Outcome A:** An overall conservation and management strategy for the Albertine Rift forested protected area system in place and functioning
- Outcome B:** CFRs are strengthened and provide conservation and sustainable management of forest resources
- Outcome C:** Forest connectivity maintained within the northern corridor
- Outcome D:** Incentives for community based forest conservation initiatives in place and functioning
27. The project's formulation, at this point, becomes confused and is not in line with the majority of UNDP-GEF project documents. Indeed, there were three areas of the project document describing the project activities, output and outcomes – and these did not align in the project document. In addition, the project documents (including the internal review of August 2009) also included two monitoring frameworks: the logframe with indicators by outcome and another framework, described as being the “Project Implementation Targets” in the 2009 internal review, with “indicators and targets” by “activity/output”. We assume that the project designers put such a system in place to result in greater progress in the project through two sets of targets, one linked with outcomes and the other linked to activities.

28. As can be seen from the above four outcomes, the project aimed to have a strategic, capacity development role – leaving the co-financers to work at a site level. However, by the time the project started, the co-financers had either completed their work (even though, at the site level, there was little or no impact of these projects therefore significant gaps or issues remained) or no longer actually available. This left the project thin on the ground as well as trying to support strategic developments. The confusion was partly resolved during the internal review of the project in 2009 (notably after *over two* years of project life and only once the TA had been recruited) and further resolved following the MTE in 2010 (but finally approved and partly adopted in 2011).
29. However, as this section is dealing with project formulation, it is worth noting that the internal review and the MTE resulted in a significant re-focussing of the project. To a large degree, this was through the process of identifying achievable targets and, in the words of the MTE, to “take the project back to the people”. The MTE strongly recommended that the support to the NFA and CFRs stop because there was “little incremental value to GEF”. The TE team agree with this stance, but only up to a point, because this decision undoubtedly resulted in acceleration of deforestation in the CFRs and there was a partial loss of the project’s original purpose – which was more strategic. [However, we do note that this situation is complex, with political imperatives, the breakdown in the rule of law with deliberate incursions into the forests by immigrants and veterans and institutional failures within the NFA that led to poor resource allocation into the field. And yet if these are the primary drivers of deforestation, we conclude that there are formulation issues because none of the project’s design or activities were targeting these issues.]
30. Overall, because the previous reviews of project formulation (including the internal review in 2009 and the MTE) were extensive, there is no reason to repeat their findings here. Instead, though the report, where we found additional issues with the project’s design and formulation during the TE process, we mention it whenever relevant. What we can say at this junction is that the Inception Period culminating in the Inception Report was inadequate because it did not sufficiently address the formulation issues.

3.1.1 Role of UNDP-CO

31. As shall be discussed throughout this report, there were issues with the implementation of the project. Some of the responsibility for this lies at the door of the UNDP-CO. There are a number of examples that illustrate this point:
- a. In 2009, there was an attempt to bring the project up-to-date and in line with the UNDP-CO programme within Uganda. This document was submitted by the project to the UNDP-CO for comment and response but none was forthcoming.
 - b. The monitoring and evaluation of the project by the UNDP-CO could have been much better: the UNDP-CO members of staff appear to have rarely visited the project office or the field sites where the work was taking place. They did, however, attend the National Project Steering Committee meetings. We recall that the first two years of project was poorly implemented: had the project been well monitored by UNDP-CO during this period, the issues would have been realised early and the time and

resources would have been better used. Indeed, it was only with the (late) recruitment of the Technical Adviser (TA) that this was flagged.

- c. The project was continually hampered by delays in delivery of funding. In some years, funding only started flowing to the project from UNDP-CO in May – some five months after the beginning of the year’s financial year. While both the UNDP-CO and WWF point the finger at the other when the TE team tried to understand these delays, that they not only occurred but occurred repeatedly through the project life is indicative of the UNDP-CO’s inability to manage the situation effectively.
32. In contrast, occasionally the PMU team communicated direct to the UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Advisors in Pretoria – primarily with regard to the preparation of PIRs and project follow-up. On these occasions, the team received good support and communication between the project team and the UNDP-GEF RTC was effective, efficient and productive.

3.1.2 Stakeholder participation

33. The processes of stakeholder participation and inclusion arguably rank as the principal results and **lessons learned** from the project. Stakeholder participation appears to have been good throughout the project formulation process and was described as being “a central plank” of the project. It was described as being “a key and successful ingredient” of the work that was undertaken during the PDF-B stage. A detailed description of the stakeholder engagement process was described in Annex 10 of the project document.
34. The project was designed to work through existing national and local government institutions, and through local community organizations (whether existing or those to be created by the project).
35. This objective in the project’s formulation proved to be accurate and this is reflected in the key results of the project:
- a. The Strategic Plan was developed in a fully participatory way, critically including the District Planners, DNROs, DEOs and DFOs. The result of this is that these people now feel some sense of ownership of the Plan and, thus, as a consequence aspects of the Strategic Plan are much more likely to appear in their District Development Plans and be implemented (if and when they have the funding to implement anything).
 - b. The capacity development objectives of the project were realised by working with people “on-the-job”. Thus, for example, the district planners were trained in legal issues and the process of developing legislation while carrying out the process of writing or reviewing their own ordinances.
 - c. The project established two CFM groups and a number of private forest owners’ associations. These required considerations of incentives for these people, capacity development and, of course, participation. In particular, the Community Development officers in subcounties played a key role in community mobilization and training.
36. Another aspect of stakeholder participation was the successful sub-contracting of work to non-state actors. Initially, this was problematic as the contractual arrangements had poorly defined terms of reference and areas of responsibility.

However, once the internal review had taken place in 2009, and the TA and the second PM were recruited, the subcontracts were well targeted and reflected the strengths of the organizations involved. As a consequence, this practice resulted in some good results – among them, for example, the geographical analysis of the corridors among all the forest reserves in the project area.

3.2 Project Implementation

37. As will be seen from the description of the project's implementation and results, more can be learned from the *processes* of project implementation than the *results* themselves. As such, we will explore aspects of project implementation in depth.
38. The project was designed to have a 60-month implementation period. Indeed, it would be inconceivable for any project whose goal was "*Conserve and manage rich biodiversity forests in the Albertine Rift, allowing Sustainable Development of all Stakeholders*" to be designed for anything less than this period of time particularly given the complexity of the area and the nature of the drivers of deforestation. And yet the implementation of the project was fraught with delays and misunderstandings such that it appears that actual time in which the project could implement any work was reduced to 26.5 months (see Figure 1). It is hardly surprising, then, that the project did not achieve all of its objectives.
39. As indicated above, the project document was approved and signed on 08 May 2007. While there was substantial spending (US\$ 94,045) in 2007, the Project Management Unit (PMU) was only established in May 2008 – one year after the project document was signed. It appears that according to GEF, the project's clock started ticking from the signature date (although there is discrepancy in the PIR which stated that the project's start date was May 2008; as indicated above, there was confusion about this among all stakeholders). Thus, no conservation activities were implemented during the first year of this ambitious five-year project; thus, the first year was wasted. If this appears a harsh statement, it should be contrasted with the time taken to set up other UNDP-GEF projects – including recruitment of staff, securing of office premises, procurement of vehicles, delivery of the Inception Report etc – usually a matter of no more than three months after the project document and contracts are signed.
40. In 2008, the PMU only received its first tranche of funding in November and was then given a handful of weeks in which to account for spending in that year - given that all UNDP finance needs to be closed by 15 December each year.
41. It is notable here that unlike some other UNDP-GEF projects elsewhere that are also implemented by sub-contractors, WWF could only provide limited pre-finance for project activities (from the period from 2009-2011) and would not pre-finance the project activities (with the exception of staff salaries, in 2012). Therefore, as discussed below, late delivery of funds was a serious impediment to project implementation.
42. It was then not for another eight months – until August 2009 – that the project's TA was recruited. Thus, from May 2008 until August 2009, the then Project Manager worked with little support. During this period, contracts were issued to a number of organizations. The contracts were unfocussed, the selection of the implementing partner was not matched to the organizations' comparative strengths and, consequently, little was achieved during this period. *Indeed, this*

meant that over two years of the implementation of an ambitious five-year project were far less than optimally implemented. Obviously, this is profoundly unsatisfactory.

43. On arrival of the TA in August 2009, there was an internal review of the project particularly of the activities and budgeting. This resulted in a revision of the project's logframe (within the permissible limits of GEF's guidelines which do not allow for amendments at the outcome level without the project having to return to the GEF Council for review and re-approval); the revised logframe was endorsed by the National Project Steering Committee in their meeting in October 2009. From this point until the termination of the project on 30 June 2012 (a period of only 21 months), the project was implemented efficiently and effectively.
44. The Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) was carried out towards the end of 2010 (although it was only approved in April 2011). It described the way forward based on the assumption that the project would continue to be implemented for a further two years. However, soon after the approval of the MTE, the UNDP-CO and the PMU were reminded that according to the project's timeline, it was due to be terminated at the end of 2011!
45. Thereafter, the PMU requested a year's no-cost extension; only six months were granted (the rationale for GEF not to grant a longer extension was that GEF3 projects should not run into GEF5) and, consequently, the project was terminated on 30 June 2012 having held the final stakeholder meeting on 18 June 2012 and the final National Project Steering Committee meeting on 19 June 2012. Therefore, the project only ran on for 15 months after the MTE was approved (in April 2011, some five months after the draft report was submitted to UNDP-CO).




Figure 1. A schematic representation of the timeline of the implementation of the project showing some of the major milestones and significant issues. These are described in detail in this section of the report.

46. With such convolutions, it is difficult and unconstructive to attempt to apportion blame for this narrative of the project's rather inelegant implementation. Instead, throughout this document we try to glean the lessons learned. Here we draw a number of conclusions and **lessons**:

- a. When there has been a lengthy project development³, the Inception Period and resulting Report is critically important to re-align the project with the context at the point at which implementation is due to begin. This should begin with a review of whether the project remains relevant (which, in this case it did because deforestation rates were increasing) and whether the GEF Agency (in this case, UNDP) has the capacity and is fully prepared for the project's implementation.
- b. The PMU recruitment must be efficient and occur immediately; in addition, there is a need for orientation of the PMU so that they fully comprehend the project and are familiar with the project expectation right from the beginning
- c. Project monitoring, particularly in circumstances where capacity is low, is essential such that the start-up issues faced by this project are immediately flagged. Both WWF and UNDP-CO should have carried out proactive monitoring throughout the project to assure its quality.

3.2.1 Implementation modalities and project management

47. In part, the discussion about implementation modalities and project management has already started in the narrative above. The project was implemented under Nationally Execution (NEX) modalities with the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MFPED through the Aid Liaison Department, ALD) as the Executing Agency (but deferred to Ministry of Water and Environment under the revised role of the ALD) with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as the GEF Agency.

48. A National Project Steering Committee (NPSC) was established to oversee the implementation of the project. Thus, it was responsible i) to ensure the project was implemented according to plans and budgets – and, consequently, it was responsible to approve annual workplans and budgets – and ii) to ensure coordination and information flow among all the relevant ministries.

49. In theory, under the above structures, the project was jointly implemented by the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) as joint Implementation Agencies. In practice, the project was implemented by WWF (see Figure 2 for the project's theoretical management structure).

50. The project was then to be implemented, under the coordination of this joint management system, with a number of different partners of comparative advantage, as selected by the Implementation Agency:

- a. National Forestry Authority (NFA)

³ Under GEF-5 procedures, projects are supposed to be in the pipeline for a maximum of 18 months or the projects risk forfeiture of the funding.

- b. Jane Goodall Institute
 - c. Chimpanzee Sanctuary and wildlife Conservation Trust (CSWCT)
 - d. Wildlife Conservation Society
 - e. Aktion Afrika Hilfe (AAH)
 - f. ECOTRUST
 - g. District Local Governments (Masindi, Hoima, Kibaale, Kyenjojo, Kyegegwa)
 - h. Tooro Kingdom
 - i. Bunyoro Kingdom
51. This structure proved complex and ineffective, and the project became one that was implemented by WWF (and was referred to by all stakeholders interviewed throughout the evaluation process, as the “WWF Project”) and, during the last two years of its implementation, by a number of partner organizations.
52. Oversight and monitoring of the project by the Executing Agency and by UNDP-CO could have been much better (for substantiation of this statement, see sections on Role of UNDP-CO under Project Formulation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Adherence to Logframe, Financial Planning and Sustainability). The MWE was largely a silent partner in the implementation of the project only taking the role of chairing the NPSC even though a budget was allocated to MWE to support a focal point. Indeed, the project remained mostly unknown in the FFSD – the forestry technical arm of the MWE!
53. Despite these inefficiencies, interviewees were unanimous that the model of implementing this project by sub-contracting the work to WWF still proved to be *more effective* than if the government had implemented the project. All stakeholders and partners who were interviewed were unanimous in their view that project implementation may have been more problematic had the project not been sub-contracted to WWF. In other words, government processes and bureaucracies would have been a further barrier to effective and efficient implementation of the project.
54. Furthermore, once the TA and second Project Manager were recruited, the project became much more efficient and effective. However, as described above, this was only for the remaining two years of a five-year project: too short to have an impact on the biodiversity goals of the project.
55. Once the project carried out its internal review in August 2009 (see M&E discussion below), the project’s implementation process changed. The PMU implemented many aspects of the project directly with specific and well defined aspects being implemented through partner organizations (including other non-state actors as well as District Natural Resource Departments). With the responsibilities of these organizations being well defined, this worked well.
56. Are there any **lessons** that can be drawn from the project’s implementation? The effort to try to ensure coordination among the different stakeholders – resulting in complex implementation arrangements – resulted in the opposite: implementation by WWF and the majority of the other stakeholders taking a step back from the

implementation. For projects to work effectively in circumstances such as those in Uganda, implementation arrangements must be as simple as possible.




Figure 2. The proposed and initial management structure for the project from which it functionally evolved

Item	Rating	Comment
IA & EA Execution		
Overall quality of implementation & execution	MU	Because the project resulted in so many different stages, each of which was implemented with different degrees of effectiveness and efficiency, it is difficult to assign a single, overall rating for Implementation Agency Execution. The start-up of the project was unsatisfactory (U); the interim stage (under the first PM before the TA was recruited) was moderately unsatisfactory (MU); the final two years was implemented effectively and efficiently and was, therefore, satisfactory (S) but the poorly planned and implemented closure of the project was unsatisfactory (U).
Implementation Agency Execution	MS	The project was supposed to be jointly implemented by the MWE and WWF. Aside from its role as Chair of the NPSC, the MWE did not engage in the implementation of the project and, consequently, its role should be rated as unsatisfactory (U). In contrast, WWF implemented the project. While the implementation picked up in the last two years of the project – largely as a result of the recruitment of the TA and the second PM – the flaws in the project’s implementation mean that WWF’s performance, overall, must be rated as moderately satisfactory (MS).
Executing Agency Execution	MU	The engagement of the MFPED was largely unsatisfactory: they hardly engaged at all. However, the MWE took the role of Executing Agency – even though, they, too, took little role in

		the project (with the exception of Chairing the NPSC).
GEF Agency*	MU	Again, the performance of the GEF Agency, UNDP, is complex. The performance of the UNDP-CO could have been much better to ensure effective implementation of the project. In contrast, the UNDP RTA provided satisfactory support to the project.

*While there may be some confusion about nomenclature, UNDP is taken as the GEF Agency for this analysis.

3.2.2 Project staff

57. The project had a relatively large team (although the MTE perceived it as being the minimum necessary) and a relatively high turnover resulting from a number of resignations and two dismissals (see Table 3). WWF is to be commended that when dismissals were warranted, this was acted on rapidly rather than leaving the issues in place to further impede the implementation of the project.

58. The importance of having good leadership was more than amply demonstrated in this project: until the TA was recruited in August 2009 and the second PM from early in 2011, the project faltered and was hampered with ineffective and inefficient implementation. This is an important **lesson** and, as mentioned above, these members of staff need to be in place as early as possible in the project's implementation.

Table 3. The staff employed over the implementation of the project, their positions and their duration of employment.

Name	Position	Period of service
Project manager	Kiizza Wandira	May 2007 to August 2010 (resigned)
	Andrew Grieser Johns (Acting)	September – November 2010
	James Okiria-Ateker	December 2010 - EOP
Technical Advisor	Andrew Grieser Johns	August 2009 - EOP
Field Assistant - promoted to Field Officer	George Kacha Kaija	Late 2008 – EOP
Field Assistant	David Wamudhu	Late 2008 – April 2010 (dismissed)
	Nicholas Katusabe	June 2011 – EOP
Environmental Education Officer	Helena Nambogwe	May 2010 – EOP
Administrator (Kampala-based)	Rebecca Mukite	Late 2008 – mid 2011? (resigned)
Accountant	Herbert Zirikana	Late 2008 – early 2010 (resigned)
Accounts Assistant (replaced Accountant)	Michael Otiti	Early 2010 – late 2010 (dismissed)
	Rebecca Mukite	Assumed role for a few months between Michael and William

	William Sunday	July 2011 – EOP
Office Assistant	Aidah Kaudha	Late 2008 – early 2010 (resigned)
	Flavia Sakaru	Early 2010 – EOP
Driver	Emmanuel Magezi	2008 – EOP
	Peter Akora	2008 – EOP
	Nuhu Ssenyimba	2009 – EOP

59. There were no apparent issues of staff cohesion, particularly once the second PM and the TA were recruited.

3.2.3 Adherence to logframe

60. Aside from the conceptual difficulties associated with having two monitoring frameworks (as described above), the project's logframe was amended a number of times during the project's life. It was first amended during the Inception Period; again following the TA's review of the project in September 2009. Following the MTE, further amendments were proposed. *However, the amendments proposed in the MTE were not adopted.* As such, the "final" logframe towards which the project was working was one produced in August 2009.
61. In addition, the project's final report in June 2012 did not even present the project's logframe, indicators, targets and end-of-project situation! This may give some indication of the degree to which the project adhered to the logframe.
62. Our efforts to coax a final logframe from the project team members over the course of the TE failed and we managed to fill in some of the table (see Annex 2). It is, however, far from complete and this again reiterates the need to carry out terminal evaluations before the closure of the project.
63. However, the project did work with the Strategic Results Framework (SFR); this too was modified through the project's lifetime. Indeed, the project's final report relates the success (or otherwise) of each of the activities; thus, it related targets and outputs to activities (although these were not presented in table form therefore not following the format of the SFR in the project document).

3.2.4 Financial Planning

64. As has already been mentioned, while all the co-financing letters were signed in good faith at the project formulation stage, the project formulation and delays to start implementation meant that by the time implementation began in 2007 (and in earnest in 2008), the co-financing was exhausted or the funds were no longer available (see Table 4). Nonetheless, this does not mean that none of the organizations that had signed up as co-financers were active in the area. On the contrary, there were a number of synergistic activities being carried out. In addition, the UNEP-GEF PES pilot project started in the area; again, this is synergistic with the CBARF project from which some of the lessons have been incorporated. Therefore, there were some benefits of these pre-project investments but they were did not wholly fulfil the roles that was previously envisaged – meaning that the project had to fill in some of the gaps that remained.

Table 4. The value of the project including the funding from GEF and sources of co-finance and leveraged funds (both cash and in-kind).

Type	Donor	Value (USD)
UNDP-managed grants	GEF	3,395,000
	UNDP	0
Partner-managed grants	Govt. of Uganda	0
In-kind donations	Government of Uganda	418,099
TOTAL		3,813,099

65. As is normal for UNDP-GEF projects, the annual workplans with associated budgets were approved on an annual basis by the National Project Steering Committee.
66. However, the project was beset with problems associated with cash flows. In 2012, the project funds were delivered from UNDP-CO to WWF by the end of March 2012. This was the most efficient delivery – and reflects the fact that both WWF and UNDP had learned lessons through the implementation of the project and had sought ways to improve (but not quite perfect) fund delivery. The least efficient delivery was in 2008 in which project funds were delivered just ten days before the financial year was due to close at the end of the year. Across the rest of the project years (2009, 2012 and 2011), the project funds were delivered between April and June each year.
67. Unless efficiencies can be found to such chronic delays in funding, pre-financing the activities by sub-contractors may offer an alternative mechanism by which project activities may be implemented without delay or interruption. Indeed, this occurs in similar other projects in the region in which implementation has been sub-contracted to a non-state actor⁴ but aside from the salaries to the members of the project's staff, WWF provided only limited pre-finance to fund project activities from 2009-2011 and no pre-finance in 2012. Indeed, in 2011, WWF issued explicit instructions that under no circumstances was any project, including this one, was any pre-finance to be provided. This meant that for large periods during the project's implementation, no funds were available.
68. While both UNDP-CO and WWF point fingers at each other for this inefficiency (and it is likely that the responsibility lay with both organizations), what is more surprising is that the bodies that were established to provide oversight to the project did not manage to find an effective solution to overcome this perennial issue. This is one of the roles of the National Project Steering Committee – as the body with overall responsibility for the project's implementation.
69. The **lessons** here must be:
- If project is sub-contracted to a non-state actor, that organization must agree to pre-finance the project. That organization can then provide expense accounts on a quarterly basis for reimbursement by UNDP-CO.

⁴ For example, the UNDP-GEF SDPASE in Ethiopia that is being implemented by GIZ.

- b. The structures (particularly the NPSC) and organizations (particularly UNDP although clearly given that the UNDP-CO was implicated in the delays this may have been problematic) with responsibility to monitor the implementation of the project must find solutions to problems such as these early in the project's lifetime.
70. There remains a lack of clarity about the expenditure at the project's start up in 2007. In 2007, US\$ 94,045 were spent in "pre-project" finance: it was this spending, with the signature of the project document, that started the project's clock ticking. These funds were allocated to "Professional services (UNDP misc. costs;" it is possible (but not fully clear) that these funds were spent on inception consultancies. In addition, in the period from March 2008 until the TA's arrival in August 2009, the project provided expensive and inefficient sub-contracts to international NGOs and the NFA. The project became much more effective and efficient once the project had been re-formulated and re-focussed.
71. The overall GEF budget was underspent over the course of the project (see Table 5) partly because the project was unable to access funds throughout the project (as discussed above) and because of the changing nature of the project. Indeed, all the budget lines associated with Outcomes were either underspent. However, in the case of Outcome C, there was significant overspend. Quite how such a significant overspend was allowed on one of the outcomes remains unclear.
72. In short, the financial planning, budgeting and expenditure was problematic although this is simply symptomatic of the greater implementation issues faced by the project (and as discussed above).

Table 5. The budget (as it appears in the annual, approved workplan) and actual expenditure, by Outcome and funding source, for the project.

	GEF			Co-Finance			Total		
	Budgeted	Actual	%	Budgeted	Actual	%	Budgeted	Actual	%
Outcome A	1,629,329	1,052,830	64.6						
Outcome B	573,950	492,698	85.8						
Outcome C	337,228	606,166	179.7						
Outcome D	854,493	793,008	92.8						
Total	3,395,000	2,944,702	86.7	7,953,189	418,099	5.3	11,348,189	3,362,801	29.6

3.2.5 Cost effectiveness

73. All large procurements for the project were made through UNDP, thus adhering to UNDP's procurement rules. For smaller procurements – all of which fell within that year's approved workplan and budget, WWF used its own rules (which are, in fact, equivalent to those of both the Government of Uganda and UNDP) and, consequently, the project was assured of cost-effectiveness. As such, procurement of all services, materials and equipment, including consultancies and studies, has been made through transparent competitive tendering processes.
74. For the sub-contractual processes, partners were not selected through a competitive process but rather negotiated with those organizations that had specific strengths in the areas being sought. Of course, this relied on an understanding of the competitive competencies of the organizations involved. It was fully recognized that during the first two years of the project's implementation, an ineffective system was in place but once the TA and second

PM were recruited and the MTE was conducted, the practices previously used were eliminated.

75. The project was audited annually in the first quarter of each year by independent, external auditors. Each audit examined the expenditure statements, statement of assets and equipment and statements of cash. In the final three years, at least, the audits were qualified for but the reasons were clarified .
76. There were three aspects of the project that resulted in very low cost effectiveness.
77. First, as has been described above, the first year of a five-year (ambitious) project working in exceptionally challenging circumstances was wasted. The second year fared not much better with badly defined contracts being issued to various sub-contractors. It was only with the recruitment of the TA that the efficiency of the project improved. This is tantamount to wasting two years and therefore extremely inefficient.
78. Second, the transfer of funds from the UNDP-CO to the PMU (via WWF) was delayed throughout the project. In the majority of the years, this was for up to five months during which time the project had limited ability to carry out any activities at all.
79. Again, these things must be considered in the context that this was a project that was being implemented in a challenging environment and even with a full five years of implementation it would have battled to achieve everything described in the project document. It is for these reasons that we maintain that monitoring and evaluation by the UNDP-CO could have been much better.
80. The confusion in the UNDP-CO, WWF and PMU regarding the starting date (and, thus, projected termination date), and the reluctance of GEF to allow this, a GEF3 project to extend into GEF5, led to an unexpectedly abrupt termination of the project. While there may have been a strong rationale from GEF to do this, first, it increased the risk that the project's activities and impact will be unsustainable (and hence representing low cost efficiency) but also (as described below) it may have already led to an accelerated rate of deforestation. Had the GEF had been cognisant that their decision would have resulted in these consequences, we wonder whether they would not have allowed a longer , better planned and more sustainable termination of the project.
81. Moreover, in terms of cost-effectiveness and efficiencies, there was no evidence of real efforts to be cost effective. The project did not appear to have actively sought cost-saving or cost-effective synergies although at least, in the final two years of the project, they ensured that subcontracts went to those organizations with the appropriate strengths.
82. Finally, the practice of paying "sitting allowances" for people to attend meetings (that should be part of their jobs!) was very costly and ineffective. It is perceived to be an "incentive" for people to attend meetings but resulted in attendance of people with little or no interest in the project or its activities. Understandably, people's transport and out-of-pocket DSA should be covered, and this should facilitate attendance and buy-in (e.g., of district technical staff), but these should not be the primary reason people attend these meetings (as happened with farmers).

3.2.6 Monitoring and evaluation

83. Already in this report we have mentioned the inadequacies and ineffectiveness of the monitoring of the project. It was not that the appropriate structures and procedures were not set up, but rather that the majority of the flaws in the project's implementation (e.g., profound delays in the delivery of funds) were not suitably managed. The funding delays, therefore, persisted until the end of the project.
84. Indeed, the project's Monitoring and Evaluation Framework⁵ was extensive and included Quarterly Progress Reporting, Annual Progress Reporting (APR), the Project Implementation Reviews (PIR), Tripartite Reviews, Financial Reporting, Mid-term Evaluation and the current Terminal Evaluation. In addition, the National Project Steering Committee met twice a year. In short, the project was not short of monitoring structures and processes. And yet, despite these things, a number of problems persisted until the end of the project and other problems were only arrested once the TA was recruited.
85. The UNDP-CO's monitoring of the project should have been much better. While there was representation on the NPSC, UNDP-CO only visited the project office and the field once in the course of project implementation. This is in contrast to the monitoring envisaged in the project document where the UNDP-CO was supposed to visit the field sites at least once a year. That assumes that all is going well – which was hardly the case in this project and we would have expected the alarm bells to be ringing and the GEF Agency – UNDP – to be visiting the sites and trying to find ways around the implementation issues faced by the project.
86. Furthermore, the project joint implementers, the MWE, also did not visit the project to monitor its activities. Indeed, the project had budgetary provision for MWE to monitor the project activities, but this was never utilized
87. There was one aspect of the monitoring and evaluation process that was successful: once the TA was recruited, an internal review of the project was conducted. This review resulted in a revised logframe and budget, and the project's M&E plan – which was approved by the NPSC in October 2009. This resulted in changes to the project's implementation: there were changes within the project's staff, a change in the location of the project's office, a change in the way the project was implemented – through the use of many partners, and, finally, a change in the foci of the project. All of these changes were further endorsed in the MTE – despite the shortcomings of the approval of the MTE and the lack of adoption of some of the recommendations therein.

Item	Rating	Comment
M&E		
Overall quality of M&E	MU	As with other aspects requiring evaluation, it is difficult to provide a single rating because each of the stages of the project were markedly different. The review process in August 2010 significantly improved the M&E framework while at project start-up, it appeared to be satisfactory.
M&E design at project start-up	S	
M&E plan Implementation	MU	While the actual components of the M&E plan, as proscribed in the project document, were implemented

⁵ See CBARF Project Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, Amendment, August 2010.

		(i.e., there was an MTE, the PIR and APRs were produced, there were financial audits of the project), the M&E did not always produce the adaptive management that should otherwise result from these processes and some problems persisted throughout the implementation of the project.
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3.3 Project Results

88. The project results have been described in detail in the final project report. We have examined those results and verified them during the field visit. However, as we shall describe below, we believe that the principal results of the project are the lessons that can be derived from the processes that the project put into place, at least for the last two years of the project's implementation. These are mostly already described above.

3.3.1 Attainment of objectives

89. First, it should be noted that it is difficult to evaluate project results against the objectives when the changes to the logframe that were proposed in the MTE were not adopted by the NPSC. Indeed, it is doubly challenging because even those sections of the logframe (from the last formally approved logframe – the one that was adopted following the project's internal review in August 2009) that remained relevant were not filled either for the project's final report or for the TE (despite repeated requests for assistance with this).

90. In contrast, the project used the Strategic Results Framework (SFR) as the primary tool for monitoring the project's results (even though it was not presented in table form in the final report). Yet, even when assessing the project's results using the SFR, the project fell short of its objectives.

91. At the level of the project's purpose, there were four indicators towards which the project was working:

- a. *Rates of deforestation in the Albertine Rift have decreased by 50% of baseline levels by EOP.* Evidence indicated that rates of deforestation increased over the course of the project. At the project's start, deforestation rates were estimated to be 5,400ha/year; by the end of the project, this had increased to 8,300ha/year. Moreover, deforestation rates are estimated to be accelerating, particularly on private land. The project's final report⁶ does give an explanation for this ("increasing population, immigration and political intervention"). If these are the drivers of deforestation in the project area (and undoubtedly they are – this was verified during the TE field visit), this begs the question of why organizations (including this project) are not seeking solutions to these issues.
- b. *Populations of key indicator species are maintained or increase in the Albertine Rift forest reserves by EOP.* While one (arguably rather optimistic) interviewee did maintain that there had been an increase in the number of chimps in the project's area, the project's final report is conspicuously silent on the results of this indicator (cf. the PIR where the

⁶ UNDP-GEF CBARF End of Project Report, June 2012.

indicator is explored in more detail). Indeed, the project's "spider diagram" suggests that there was an increase. However, in the face of a rate of deforestation of 8,300ha/year, it is inconceivable that the populations of key indicator species could be maintained let alone increase. Indeed, surveys indicated a 25% decline in chimpanzees in the heavily encroached Kagombe CFR. In contrast, the chimp populations in the principal CFRs (e.g., Bugoma and Budongo) are stable. If the integrity of these forests is eroded in any way, these populations will decline as well and there is no room for complacency. The shrinking forests also mean that the interface between humans and wildlife (particularly chimps) is growing – thus, interactions and conflict will continue to escalate.

The project failed to monitor many other key indicator species – such as the forest raptor – which are dependent on the corridors and are undoubtedly declining as a result of erosion of these corridors.

- c. *Eleven forest reserves have revised management plans under implementation by EOP.* While the management plans for the CFRs were prepared before project implementation, only one forest management plan (that of Budongo FR) has been approved by the government in early 2012. In the future, it will be important to ensure that these management plans continue to be implemented and that the management effectiveness of these forest reserves continues to be monitored using the METT (which showed no improvement in management over the project's lifetime).
- d. *The area of Albertine rift forests under conservation management is increased by 89,916 ha by EOP.* The end of project report does not mention the area of the Albertine rift forests that are under conservation management by the end of the project. However, the PIR takes a somewhat upbeat approach to this indicator stating that the target was achieved "if interpreted at the strategic level" – but there is a misinterpretation of the indicator. The indicator demands an *increase in the area under conservation management* not a potential to improve management in the whole area. The means of verification for this indicator is the area covered by collaborative forest management – suggesting that the increases should come from CFM areas. The project only established two CFMs (in Paachwa and Kiryanga sub-counties of unspecified size) over its lifetime but these areas were significantly less than the target.

92. The **key results** from the project are the following:

- 93. *The production of the Strategic Plan*⁷ – with a focus on the Northern Albertine Rift forests – was completed and approved in June 2012: thus, coinciding with the termination of the project. Obviously, this did not provide time to implement the plan as was originally envisaged. Nonetheless, the production of the strategic plan was a significant achievement for the project, not least because of the process that was used to produce it. It was a participative process and key stakeholders – and principally the district level technical staff and planners – were central to the

⁷ MWE (2012) *Strategic Plan for the Northern Albertine Rift of Uganda, 2011-2020*. Edited by Andrew Grieser Johns Kampala, Uganda.

process. The consequence is that these people feel a strong sense of ownership of the plan. The strategic plan was produced under Outcome A.

94. Because it was produced right at the end of the project, the project team needed to consider the likelihood of it being implemented. They tried to ensure sustainability of the plan by i) ensuring that the MWE felt ownership of the plan, ii) intimately including the District Planners in the process of its development such that they, too, feel ownership of the plan and hence were much more likely to incorporate elements of the plan into their own DDPs, iii) transfer some of the ownership to the Northern Albertine Rift Conservation Group (NARCG) – the loose association of NGOs that are present in the area and who may pick out pieces of the plan for their own work, and iv) try to persuade the NGOs that they could use the plan as a fund-raising tool (because, after all, it is a government owned document). Other aspects of sustainability are discussed in the Sustainability section below.
95. *The training and use of community-based monitors.* Sixteen people, recruited locally from the communities living in and around the forest corridors that were the focus of the project, were trained to carry out the monitoring of biodiversity in specific parts of the project area. The monitoring focuses primarily on the mammalian fauna, with chimpanzees *Pan troglodytes* being the key target species. However, the monitoring does cover other species of primate. The data are “cleaned,” analysed and they are submitted to the National Biodiversity Databank (NBDB) housed at Makerere University in Kampala.
96. While it is acknowledged that the *quality* of the data may not be the most rigorous, the real value of this monitoring lies in its educational benefits. Thus, it represents a transfer of responsibility to the local communities and thereby increases the awareness of the people to what is happening in their forests. It is no surprise, then, that awareness among local communities increased over the course of the project (from a baseline of 70%, it increased to 90% of people surveyed).
97. As ever, there are concerns about sustainability. Again, the project was aware of these concerns and “ownership” of the community monitoring process was transferred to CSWCT and the local government. In reality, the monitoring process needs to become institutionalised by CSWCT (even though they are an NGO and dependent on periodic funding) as the local government has no funding to support this kind of work (for more discussions on this, see the Sustainability section).
98. *Designing forest corridors.* The project, in collaboration with WCS, produced maps of the potential forest corridors between Kibale National Park and Budongo Forest Reserve (see map in Annex 8). The aim of this work was to examine the areas that were necessary to restore connectivity among the forest reserves in the area and used a number of parameters to derive the optimum corridors. The extension of the mapping process was to engage with communities in a form of local land use planning as well as identifying those areas that required restoration and planting indigenous forest tree species in those areas. Because there is a strong desire for fast-growing exotics for which there is a vibrant market, many people also requested *Eucalyptus* or *Pinus* spp. seedlings as well. The forest corridors principally use the river courses because this links into legislation that prohibits development closer than 30m from the river bank.

99. In addition, the project sought solutions for trying to protect or restore these forest corridors. This was working with private forest owners associations or CFM groups. The project worked with these people to demarcate their land and plant trees, or participate in the sustainable management of the forest reserves.
100. In terms of sustainability of these interventions, the project worked to transfer the responsibility to the district authorities (including incorporating these aspects into DDPs, budgets and workplans). While in principle this was the right thing to do, as is discussed below, this approach may be flawed because the district authorities have no budget to allow them to implement the work. However, the project did try to facilitate the work of the districts through transferring the project's assets (including vehicles, motorbikes, and office equipment and furniture) to the district authorities (but, again, there are potential issues of sustainability, see Sustainability section below).
101. *Delivering incentives to local communities.* The project worked with local communities in a number of ways. As mentioned above, this included private forest owners association and CFM groups. While the aim of these groups, which were all established with the assistance of the project, was forest conservation and restoration, their livelihood strategies were also diversified with the assistance of the project.
102. As a result, 2,100 beehives were distributed between December 2010 – April 2012. There was variable colonization of the beehives, with up to 70% colonization in some areas with the potential to produce 4-5 tonnes of honey per annum. The people who took beehives were trained and a market was guaranteed. However, when local communities were interviewed, one woman had produced 15kg of honey. It was not cost effective for the Beekeepers Association that had provided the training and guaranteed the market to collect just 15kg of honey. In addition, no processing equipment was provided so the people remained with raw honey. Part of the reason for these issues was that the project was terminated well before the planned end of the beekeeping project – this was planned for April 2013.
103. The project also worked with women's groups, training them to produce handicrafts. These included production of walking sticks with beads – which increased the market value of the walking sticks ten-fold (from UGX 5,000 to UGX 50,000). Once again, there were sustainability issues as the markets were not guaranteed and the beads needed to be sourced from some distance away.
104. In addition, the project worked with people to get them to adopt energy-saving stoves. An estimated number of 300 stoves were delivered. However, we received differing reports about whether they were being used. One person estimated that “most” were in use, while another estimated that “only 50% were in use”.
105. Finally and as mentioned above, the project delivered seedlings to people. An estimated 87,000 seedlings were purchased by the project and delivered. The survival of the seedlings varied across the recipient communities but the range was between 40-80%. Training was provided and the TE team saw evidence of maintenance of seedlings that were flourishing as a result. However, the caveat here was that because the market for exotics (specifically *Eucalyptus* and *Pinus* spp.) is more vibrant than that for indigenous trees, there was a greater demand for

these exotic species. This, of course, does not assist the restoration of degraded indigenous forests.

106. The project did work to establish tree nurseries but this proved unsuccessful and all nine that were supported had closed by the end of the project.
107. One **conclusion** can be drawn from this work: the people are opportunistic and seize the opportunity for diversification, even if it is for a short period of time. Once the project has stopped, then people will simply resume their previous activities, even if that includes some activities that lead to deforestation. As such, changing behaviour remains a significant challenge.
108. *Increasing capacity at the district level.* One of the significant successes that the project did have was to increase the capacity of the district level staff. This was particularly the case with the natural resource, environment, forestry and planning staff. These people participated in planning processes, the development or review of ordinances and the development of district level plans. They facilitated the work of the project. In short, once they had some resources to work with and had some training, these people embraced their work willingly.
109. Unfortunately there is a caveat here as well. This revolves around the funding that these district officers receive on an annual basis (see Sustainability section for a discussion on this).
110. *Successes in environmental education.* The final area in which the project had significant successes was in environmental education. This was largely attributable to the energy of Helena Nambogwe, the team's Environmental Education Officer. The project established wildlife clubs and worked with schools – with the hope of imparting change among adults through their children. However, these actions were ephemeral and in the absence of the project, they may peter away. Nonetheless, some of the children will undoubtedly be touched by the project's activities.
111. In addition to the direct implementation that was carried out by the project's Environmental Education Officer, the project also worked through the Bunyoro and Tooro kingdoms for their education campaign. This was a successful ploy as these are trusted and deeply respected institutions among the people living in the project's target areas.
112. *Working with a broad group of stakeholders brought them together and this led to reduced institutional competition and conflicts.* Because the project did so well to bring together all key stakeholders (e.g., NFA, District Local Government, local communities and NGOs) in a number of the processes that it carried out, this led to dialogue among the stakeholders and consequently an improvement of the relationships among them.
113. In contrast to these successes, there were parts of the project that were less successful. These are generally associated with project implementation processes (e.g., delivery of funds, sustainability issues, etc) and they are described in detail elsewhere in the report. There is, however, one part that warrants description here for the purpose of the **lessons** that can be derived from it:
114. *One CFM group refused to sign the agreement.* This CFM group (in Kijuna sub-county), apparently, was comprised principally of migrant people that had settled within the CFR and, somewhat as a consequence, they distrusted the

project and any representatives of the government. They imagined that the process was simply an elaborate mechanism to have them evicted from the forest and hence they refused to enter into an agreement. This provide the lesson that **trust** is an obvious and critical component of such projects.

Item	Rating	Comment
Outcomes		
Overall quality of project outcomes	MS	The project made gains but the majority of these were <i>process</i> gains as opposed to impacts. The absence of impacts at the scale at which the project was operating meant that there were shortcomings to the outcomes of the project.
Relevance	MS	The project retained a focus on a critical issue in Uganda – deforestation which is recognised in many policies and strategies. However, the project did not focus on the principal drivers of deforestation.
Effectiveness	MU	Because the project did not achieve many of its objectives, it cannot be said to have been effective. During its final two years, it was, however, effective in what could be achieved in that short time frame.
Efficiency	U	The repeated delays resulted in a highly inefficient project because these hampered the conversion of funds to outcomes.

3.3.2 Replication

115. There was no focus on replication. Indeed, there was no mention of replicability in the project document or the project’s final report. As such, there was no effort to carry out work that would be purposefully communicated for replication. There were no demonstrations that were carried out with the intention of scaling-up at the end of the project. There were, in contrast, a number of pilot projects – especially with regard to the socio-economic work – that could, potentially be scaled-up. For example, there was a demand for the establishment of a PFO in Kiryanga, to develop a FMP, and the increased demand for tree planting materials. [However, this could possibly have been in anticipation of the “expected projects” rather than a deliberate replication of the project outputs/outcomes.]
116. However, it should be noted that various aspects and various lessons from the project should be incorporated into future GEF projects in Uganda. These lessons (both positive for replication and negative for avoiding) are spelt out throughout this report and are summarised in the final section of the report. In addition, the project’s final report also dwells on lessons learned. Many of the perceived lessons learned from the TE process (see below) converge with those indicated in the project’s final report.

3.3.3 Country ownership

117. There are both positive and negative aspects here. The Strategic Plan that was produced by the project can be seen to be “owned” by the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE). In addition, because the process to develop the Strategic Plan was so participatory, many of the participants feel that they have a vested interested and some ownership of the plan.

118. However, given the rather infamous policy-implementation divide in Uganda, even with MWE “ownership” of the Strategic Plan, it is questionable whether it will be implemented (but for further discussion, see section on sustainability).
119. In addition, the project was implemented by WWF – a departure from the joint implementation originally planned. Despite signing a commitment to do so, the MWE did not even appoint a focal person to engage in the implementation of the project or monitor its progress. It was telling that across the landscape and, without exception, all interviewees referred to the project as the “WWF project” rather than by any other name. And so while the project may have been working to fulfil some of the development priorities for the country, it was largely divorced from the national institutions – with the exception of some departments in the NFA (e.g., the CFM department).

3.3.4 Mainstreaming

120. As with replicability, mainstreaming was not mentioned in the project document, the MTE or the final report. In other words, there was no focus on mainstreaming.
121. Despite the lack of mainstreaming in its design, the project did work closely with the Districts (Masindi, Hoima, Kibaale and Kyenjojo) in the development of their District Development Plans (DDPs) with their Natural Resource and Environment components – the District Environment Action Plan (DEAPs). Through these activities, the project did achieve some level of mainstreaming at the district level (but, again, there are profound questions regarding implementation and sustainability – see the section on sustainability below).

3.3.5 Sustainability

122. The TE assessed the sustainability of the activities and results of the project, taking into account the different facets of sustainability.

3.3.5.1 Institutional Sustainability

123. The project worked to establish a number of different institutions, primarily among local communities. These included Private Forest Owners Associations (PFOAs) and Collaborative Forest Management Associations (CFMs).
124. The establishment of such community-level institutions can be challenging from a sustainability perspective; received wisdom suggests that, where possible, work should focus on building on existing organizations rather than creating new and potentially unsustainable ones. Thankfully, WWF has already started some work with the PFOAs, particularly in the area of certification (e.g., in the area of Kalinzu CFR). This is a laudable initiative and we hope that others follow suit.
125. It appears as if the people that engaged with the project did so out of an opportunistic mind-set to access project benefits.. While forest conservation was embedded in some aspect of their constitution, the people, when interviewed, appeared to be much more interested in the direct benefits that they received (or anticipated) than their responsibilities to forest management (including restoration and conservation). As such, the sustainability of community-level is strongly linked with financial sustainability – discussed below.

126. In contrast, the sustainability of government organizations is largely assured. However, the *continued functionality* of government organizations – particularly at a district level – is not assured because it, too, is dependent on funding.
127. While the larger non-state actors (including international and national NGOs) operate in a hand-to-mouth way, their fund-raising abilities are significantly greater than either the local-level CBOs or local governments. As such, their presence and activities are also assured. The sustainability of the loose association of non-state actors in the NARCG may be questionable but if the lead organizations remain focused, particularly on the implementation of the strategic plan, then this would be strongly beneficial as a strategy to ensure the implementation of the Strategic Plan and sustainability of the project's activities and impacts. Indeed, we **recommend** that, if at all possible, the UNDP-CO facilitate this by providing funding to catalyse the convening of meetings of this forum at least every year.

3.3.5.2 Financial Sustainability

128. The sustainability of the activities and impacts that the project has had pivots almost entirely on what finances can be put into place. Indeed, it appears likely that if finances are not put into place, the rate of deforestation will accelerate as a result of unfulfilled expectations among local communities.
129. As mentioned above, the sustainability of community-level organizations (or CBOs) is dependent on financing. With the poorly planned and implemented termination of the project, the mechanisms for financial sustainability of these organizations were not yet ensured. However, there are some ongoing and emerging possibilities: i) UNEP-GEF is implementing a pilot payment-for-ecosystem services (PES) project in the area with private forest owners (PFOs) receiving UGX 70,000/ha/year of forest conserved and ii) a potential REDD+ project (which remains under preparation) with a pilot REDD+ project that will be implemented in 2013. While the PES is providing some level of finance to compensate land owners to keep forest on their land, it remains insufficient relative to the income they can generate from other forms of land use (for example, rice production can earn approximately UGX 800,000/ha/year – after the land owner has also harvested and accrued the value of the timber when s/he cuts the forest). In addition, it is estimated that REDD+ will only cover half the costs of other forms of land use. Thus, for financial sustainability – which will, thereafter, contribute to environmental sustainability – financing to cover the other half will have to be found. The project, through WCS, did carry out an analysis of the sustainable financing options for the conservation of the forest corridors⁸. These partly remain theoretical while other options will take a long time to implement. In addition, other possibilities that may exist were not explored: for example, purchase of all of the private forests, as a form of conservation easement. An alternative to this is simply to rent the land, *ad infinitum*, entering into a resource-use agreement with the landowners and with the possibility of reforesting areas for future harvest allowing investors the possibility of recouping their investment.

⁸ Akwetaireho, S., J. Ujhazy & A. Plumtre (2009) *An assessment of the sustainable financing options to support conservation of the Northern Forest Corridors of the Albertine Rift*. Wildlife Conservation Society, Kampala, Uganda.

130. Most alarmingly, the poorly planned and implemented termination of the project – with the end of support to the CBOs – led the project to make promises and build expectation that funding from REDD+ will be soon forthcoming. Only four months after the termination of the project, when the TE took place, private forest owners are becoming impatient. Apparently, some have already cut their forests or at least cleared parts of them (although this was not actually verified over the course of the field visit by the TE team). Building expectation in this way is expressly dangerous, particularly as the delivery of REDD+ funding is likely to be time-consuming and challenging. Indeed, two REDD+ processes are underway – the first is the government’s REDD+ initiative and the second is a REDD+ pilot project to be undertaken by WCS. The pilot project that is to be carried out by WCS will be implemented in early 2013 but it will have a limited coverage (i.e., few forests will benefit) and will be implemented over a two-year period. This project will feed into the national REDD+ process being managed by FSSD with inputs from organizations such as the World Bank. This process will take a *minimum* of three years, probably more.
131. The **lessons** here are i) that expectations should be managed, and ii) this may yet lead to further acceleration of the rate of deforestation in the area. Appropriate exit strategies that are not based on building potentially unrealistic expectation should be planned and put into place well before the termination of a project. Accelerated deforestation would be a tragic unintended consequence of the project’s poorly planned and implemented termination.
132. The CBOs are not the only people who were left hanging with the termination of the project. The District Natural Resource teams are equally dependent on projects to fund all the activities they carry out⁹. Therefore, they too are holding out hope for the future REDD+ project that the current CBARF project promised was on its way. Indeed, the districts do not have any funding to use or maintain the significant assets transferred to them on termination of the project (including vehicles, motorbikes, office equipment and office furniture). As far as we can ascertain, the project did not engage with the relevant line ministries to secure similar conditional grants that would then allow for use and maintenance of these assets.
133. If there is any delay in the implementation of the REDD+ project, these otherwise relatively highly motivated people will certainly lose hope and become increasingly despondent, and the assets will cease to function without maintenance.

⁹ The District Natural Resource offices at the District level (or lower) receive no funding from the central government with the exception of a conditional grant for wetlands. This wetlands grant was as a result of successful lobbying and inclusion in the Poverty Action Fund – this results in an annual conditional grant from the central government to the districts across the country. In contrast, there is no conditional grants – or any funds of any type – from the central government to the district governments for environment, forestry or any form of natural resource management. The districts can use revenue that the districts accrue in the year – including that from natural resource or forestry – but the process of applying for these “supplementary funds” is complicated, bureaucratic and, more often than not, are often already depleted before they can be used by the DNRO – even though they are supposed to be guaranteed 10% of the revenues they accrue.

3.3.5.3 Socio-economic Sustainability

134. Socio-economic sustainability is similarly linked with financial and institutional sustainability. However, in addition, the project area has the highest population growth in Uganda: because of immigration as well as an elevated birth rate, the current rate of population growth is 5.2% per annum. Under these circumstances, with the immigrants seeking land for development, slowing, arresting or reversing the rate of deforestation becomes very challenging indeed.
135. As has been mentioned above, local communities are opportunistic and see the arrival of a project as a means to diversify their livelihoods even for the relatively short period of time that is the project's life. It is unlikely that the poorly planned and implemented termination will significantly threaten the livelihoods of people living in the area. They may well be disappointed with the loss of the opportunity that the project afforded but will soon return to the previous livelihood strategies (and whether or not the linkage between the livelihood options – e.g., women making handicrafts or beekeeping – and the conservation of the forests is clear in the minds of the local communities remains open to question). This will, however, include harvesting products from forests – including timber and fuelwood.

3.3.5.4 Conclusion on sustainability

136. Environmental sustainability is, in conclusion, linked to both the institutional and financial sustainability. The unexpected timing of the termination of the project (at least, as far as UNDP-CO, WWF and the PMU were concerned) meant that an appropriate exit strategy was not planned and implemented. Most importantly and partly as a result, the project made promises and built expectations that local communities and district organizations would receive funding from the REDD+ project – and yet it may be more than three years before this will actually start (unless the area happens to fortuitously fall within WCS's pilot project). Already, there are allegations that the delay of a few months since the termination of the project has already led disappointments and consequently to an increased rate of deforestation.
137. In addition, the scale of the issues in the area – ranging from a human population growth of 5.2%, immigration of people seeking land and finding it in the forests, poor governance – mean that projects such as these come and go and are as powerless as King Canute to turn back the tide of deforestation.

Item	Rating*	Comment
Sustainability		
Overall likelihood of risks to sustainability	MU	When the different elements of sustainability are combined, even if some of the institutions will persist, we rate the overall sustainability of the project's activities and impacts to be moderately unlikely. This is partly due to the poorly anticipated termination of the project (which precluded detailed planning and implementation of an exit strategy) and partly due to the enormous socio-political challenges that the areas face.
Financial resources	ML	We rate financial sustainability as ML

		because there are a number of initiatives that are either under implementation (PES) or under development (REDD+). In addition, there is the potential for further innovative schemes (purchase of forests under conservation easement scheme; offsets from oil and gas industry). The key issue here is not whether these funds will be forthcoming but the <i>time</i> it will take before they are fully realized and on a scale that is appropriate to conserve both the forests and the corridors that link them.
Socio-economic	MU	We have rated socio-economic sustainability MU not because we believe there will be societal collapse in the area! However, we have little hope that all the CBOs that have been set up by the project will sustain the test of time: we believe that while the funding may come, it will be too little, too late and that the people in these CBOs will have turned their attention to other livelihood opportunities.
Institutional	ML	In contrast with the CBOs, we believe that the other institutions are relatively strong even though they are poorly funded (relative to the financial resources that will be necessary to conserve and restore the forests of the northern Albertine Rift). Thus, the district organizations and international NGOs will continue to work in the area albeit at a scale that does not match the issues. As such, we rated institutional sustainability as ML.
Environmental	U	The scale of the issues – particularly a population growth of 5.2%, a political climate in which evictions are prohibited, poorly funded and marginalized environment sector – mean that securing the forests of the Albertine Rift (between the larger forest blocks of Budongo and Itwara CFR) is unlikely (U). As an illustration and as is mentioned in the text, the rate of deforestation has <i>increased</i> over the life of the project.

* As per *Guidelines for GEF Agencies in Conducting Terminal Evaluations* and *UNDP Evaluation Guidelines for GEF-Financed Projects*, sustainability is rated as: Likely (L), Moderately Likely (ML), Moderately Unlikely (MU), Unlikely (U), Highly Unlikely (HU).

3.3.6 Catalytic role

138. As is mentioned above, replicability was not a focus of the project – although, interestingly, the MTE rated the replication approach as satisfactory. Certainly, the result of an increased rate of deforestation over the life of the project is not one that one would want replicated. However, as has been mentioned through this report, the principal results of the project have been processes. The process of participation in the development of, for example, the Strategic Plan was exemplary and it is a practice that should be replicated as often as possible (for example, in the development of management plans for protected areas – including those under the management mandates of both the NFA but also of UWA).

139. In addition and while there was not a specific focus of the project on replication *per se*, the project has generated a number of lessons learned. Where applicable, these appear throughout this report – in the relevant sections – but are summarised in the Lessons Learned section below. The process of re-focusing the project following the internal review in August 2009 and the MTE in November 2010 could be argued to have led to a demonstration. The availability of resources (time, funding and human resources) dictated that the project focus its activities down to a subsection (Kibaale and Kyenjojo Districts) of the area covered by the project – and the thinking that underpinned this move was that good practices could then be later replicated or scaled up.

Item	Rating	Comment
Catalytic Role		
Production of a Public Good	N/A	The project did not have a specific focus on replication or the replicability of its activities. However, there are a number of good lessons to be learned from the project and a number of good practices that warrant replication elsewhere. As mentioned in the text, these are primarily <i>processes</i> that the project tested over the course of its implementation. Unlike many other GEF projects, the project also did not focus on demonstration although resources dictated that the activities were (re)focused in a subsection of the area covered by the project.
Demonstration	N/A	
Replication	MS	
Scaling up	N/A	

3.3.7 Impact

140. The rate of deforestation in Murchison-Semliki landscape increased over the course of the project's implementation. This means that the project had limited impact on the rate of deforestation when reducing the rate of deforestation was its overall goal. However, at the level of the individual landowner (thus, at a very small scale), the project did have impacts. Some of the private forest owners with whom the project worked did agree to protect their forests, some of them carried out enriching planting, developed management plans (and are thus prepared for REDD+ funding). Nonetheless, as described above, we still have questions about the sustainability about even the most promising examples.

141. The project did, however, have an impact on the capacity of people working in the area. Here we can mention, most importantly, the personnel working at a district level: the District Planning Officers (DPO), the District Natural Resource Officers (DNRO), the District Environment Officers (DEO) and the District Forestry Officers (DFO). The capacity development for these people focussed primarily on planning processes – because the project worked with them in the development of ordinances, district development plans and district environment action plans.

4 Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons

142. Driving around the region in which the project was operational over the course of the field visit during the Terminal Evaluation, it is apparent that the project did

not achieve its objective of conserving the forests of the Albertine Rift. Indeed, the evidence is that the rate of deforestation in the project's area has *accelerated* over the course of the project.

143. It must be stated that, at least at present, this increase in deforestation was not due to the presence of the project but, rather, because the scale of the issues facing the corridor forests that lie between Budongo FR and Kibale NP. In part, this might lead to the accusation that the project was not focussed in the right direction: if one really wishes to tackle deforestation in this area one would need to find mechanisms to manage the population growth, the immigration and land-use planning, the marginalization of the environment sector, governance issues and the socio-political climate that prevents protection of the natural resources of the country. There may be elements of truth to this. In addition to these factors, there is the issue of scale and the fact that people are dependent on natural resources for many parts of their livelihoods – including income. When making decisions, for private forest owners or those people living beside forests, at present it makes *short-term* economic sense to clear forests.
144. However, we also cannot say that the project failed because there were many lessons to be derived from the processes and way in which the project was implemented. These are, for the most part, listed below. *If and only if* these lessons are truly learned and incorporated into future projects in Uganda, then the investment would have been worthwhile (and that is not just confined to UNDP-GEF projects but also other UNDP projects and, indeed, any project based interventions that are carried out in Uganda). It does mean, however, that the objective of GEF – which is to provide incremental financing – has not been achieved.

Item	Rating	Comment
Overall Project Results	MU	<p>While the project has generated useful lessons, while there are some useful products from the project and while people have worked hard in this project, because the overall objective of the GEF funding – to cover incremental costs to result in global environmental benefits – was not achieved, we must rate it as MU. This is coupled with the increase in the rate of deforestation over the course of the project's lifetime. GEF emphasizes the need to achieve <i>impact</i> through outcomes in its projects. The project fell short on this, particularly when compared with other similar GEF projects around the globe.</p> <p>In addition and as discussed above, the TE evaluators remain unconvinced about the sustainability of the results achieved by the project or the processes put into place. For example, even the most enthusiastic PFOs were already allowing seedlings to become swamped with weeds; the pilot projects aimed at alternative livelihood options for people living close to forests were faltering. We saw no evidence of take-up or scaling up the work carried out by the project.</p>

4.1.1 Recommendations and Lessons Learned

145. Because the project has terminated, the recommendations presented here focus primarily, but not exclusively, on the UNDP-CO and the activities that it may carry out in order to build on the investment that it has made.
146. **Design must be realistic and relevant.** The project's design was over-ambitious and did not address the real drivers of deforestation in the area. Projects should aspire to achieve conservation gains but there is little point in making projects over-ambitious. The "achievable" part of SMART indicators is as important as all other aspects.
147. In addition, countries may be tempted to either exaggerate portions of project design to secure GEF (or, indeed, any other donor) funding. In the worst cases, this takes projects far from the realm of reality and relevance to local context. If projects fall outside the criteria for GEF funding, it is better to find alternative sources of funds. If none of the donor appear to cater for the specific direction of any project, then countries have the recourse to ensure that the specific area becomes a priority in future editions of policy and strategy documents such as Poverty Reduction Plans. Given that the majority of donors align their funding areas with PRPs, funding should eventually become available.
148. **Importance of the Inception Period.** When projects have lengthy preparatory periods¹⁰, the analysis carried out in the Inception Period is critical to the project's success. Thus, all projects whose gestation is greater than two-three years and whose approval also takes one-two years should plan for a three-month inception period during which all aspects of the project documents are brought up-to-date and in line with the actual context into which project implementation will start operating. The chances for duplication or for carrying out activities
149. **Communication and understanding among project implementers.** There were various bits of evidence that indicated that communication and understanding the implementation process was not good. The clearest example of this was the PMU's surprise when they were informed in April 2011 (notably before the MTE had been approved) that the project had only eight months to run according to the GEF timeline (see Figure 1). After that, they termed the termination of the project as "abrupt" and this led to inadequate closure of the project and all the sustainability issues described above. It is imperative that everyone involved in the project's implementation – but especially the UNDP-CO and PMU – have a clear understanding of UNDP-GEF processes and expectations.
150. **Working directly with districts.** This is an important lesson and one that is seen in many projects around the world: where local government authorities are receptive to and positive about projects, the project will achieve good successes. The district authorities in the districts in which the project worked were hungry for work and some funding to allow them to carry out their work. The work would, of course, be better still if mechanisms for sustainability were put in place before the project was obliged to terminate its activities.
151. The opposite is, of course, also true: unmotivated, obstructionist local government staff can become a barrier to project success.

¹⁰ Although, as previously mentioned, this should be much more difficult under the guidelines of GEF5.

152. **Good project staff is a key to project success.** This was more than abundantly demonstrated in this project: it was only after recruitment of the TA and the second PM that the project really began to have results. The issue with this project was that it took over two years (from the official start of the project in 2007) to recruit the TA.
153. **Understanding the local context and the strengths of local institutions is a key to project success.** Because the project implementers understood the socio-cultural situation in which they were working, they appreciated which institutions and groups would have the biggest influence on the people. In this case, this proved to be the Bunyoro and Tooro kingdoms.
154. **Conduct the Terminal Evaluation *before* the project has terminated!** This TE was conducted four months after the close of the project. This has hampered the process of carrying out the TE. Thus while the arrangement of meetings with the appropriate people went relatively well in the circumstances, we expect that had we been accompanied by the Project Manager (willingly, while he was still engaged by the project), it would have been even smoother. The absence of a completed logframe is, however, the most apparent symptom of not holding the TE before the project's closure.
155. While the UNDP-CO acknowledged that they, too, would have preferred to conduct the TE before the close of the project, they informed us that they "had had delays in the procurement process." While that may well have been the case, some self-knowledge should be displayed and they could have planned and started the procurement six months before the project was due to close. Such self-knowledge is not uncommon and is displayed among their UNDP-CO colleagues around the world.
156. **Length of project.** Even if the project had run optimally for its full length of 60 months, the circumstances of the northern Albertine rift forests are such that it would have been exceedingly challenging to have any impact. As it was, the curtailed project length – for all the reasons discussed in this report – did not allow any aspect of the project to flourish. The time frame of effective implementation – a period just over two years – was simply insufficient. For example, the project did not have time to test whether the CFM can work in these circumstances.
157. **Monitoring is essential.** This may appear to be stating the obvious, however, if the monitoring processes had been adequate the inefficiencies (including timely delivery as well as cost effectiveness) of this project would have been minimized. This has been illustrated on a number of occasions through this report.
158. **Unintended consequences.** There were a number of unintended consequences of the project but, first, we wish to point out two that we found in the project area:
- a. The privatisation of land through the 1995 Constitution has had the unintended consequence of accelerating deforestation. As owners of the land, people have to make economic decisions about the use of the land. When weighing up the potential profits from rice production (estimated at UGX 800,000/ha/year) and either gaining nothing from a patch of forest or UGX 70,000/ha/year from the UNEP-GEF PES project, people are making the reasonable decision to harvest the forest and invest in agriculture. In

summary, then, the privatisation of land resulted in the acceleration of deforestation. Of course, the intention of privatisation of land was not to accelerate deforestation; on the contrary, privatisation of land most often leads to stewardship and responsibility.

- b. The advent of oil exploration has led to land speculation in the area – but particularly in the areas surrounding Hoima. Landowners, seeing the potential opportunity, have sold their land to speculators. Before doing so, they cash in whatever they have on their land, including clearing all the forest. Again, it was not the intention of the oil companies to cause accelerated deforestation.

159. With regard to the project's unintended consequences:

- a. The unexpected timing of the termination of the project that was demanded by GEF has also led to accelerated deforestation. Without an appropriately exit strategy in place, people who had become rather dependent on the support of the project felt abandoned. This led the project to make promises and build expectation that funding from REDD+ will be soon forthcoming. Only four months after the termination of the project, when the TE took place, private forest owners are becoming impatient. Apparently, some have already cut their forests or at least cleared parts of them (although this was not actually verified over the course of the field visit by the TE team). Accelerated deforestation would be a tragic unintended consequence of the project's poorly planned and implemented termination. Of course, GEF might level the accusation that the project had a six-month no-cost extension in which to plan and implement an appropriate exit strategy. And while that may be true, it would indicate a lack of understanding of the socio-political and administrative circumstances of Uganda in 2012.
- b. The re-focusing of the project that took place after the internal review of 2009 and the MTE in 2010/2011 meant that the support to the CFRs and the NFA was stopped. This decision was largely based on two factors. First, GEF funding is supposed to be incremental and the activities supported by the project should have been part of NFA's usual work. Second, when the project was designed, the project was supposed to deal with strategic issues while the project partners and co-financers were to be based "on the ground". However, because the project's gestation was so long, the partners and co-financers had either completed their work (and if their focus was deforestation, it could be justifiably argued that they had failed because the rate of deforestation was not abated by the time this project started its work) or their interest had waned and they had left. Therefore, it was argued that the project best stop its work with NFA and "go to the people" and "the corridors". The flawed assumption to this reasoning was that NFA had the capacity to do its "usual work" and the unintended consequence of this decision was that the deforestation in the CFRs has continued unabated. [Of course, there are complexities to this situation, as indicated in Section 3.1, involving political imperatives, the breakdown of law and NFA's own institutional failures – all of which would have contributed, in combination, to deforestation.]

160. **Managing expectations.** As is indicated by the above example, building expectation and then not delivering on promises can result in profoundly damaging consequences. Expectations must be managed in an appropriate way.
161. **UNDP should work to invest in those organizations that are continuing the foundations that the project built.** UNDP and GEF have invested a large amount of funding into the area. As described in the section on Sustainability, there are many questions about whether the activities and impacts that the project had had will continue into the future, and about whether one of the key outputs of the project – the Strategic Plan – will be implemented. However, there are structures that now exist: the district authorities, the NARCG, the CFM groups and PFOAs. We recommend that if UNDP is interested in shoring up its investment, it should find mechanisms to continue to support these people and organizations. One mechanism, particularly to support the CFM groups and PFOAs that were established over the course of the project, is to have a targeted call-for-proposals under the Small Grants Programme (SGP).
162. **Recommendations regarding management response.** We strongly recommend that the management response focus on the lessons learned from the project – both those indicated above but also those that appear in the project’s Final Report – and to indicate, in management terms, how UNDP-CO will adopt these lessons learned and incorporate them into the country programme as well as immediate projects such as that which is currently under development for Kidepo.
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Conservation of the Biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda

GEF Project ID: 1175

PIMS 449

Atlas Award 00043885

Atlas Project No: 0051397

**Terminal Evaluation, November 2012
Volume 2: Annexes (Draft)**

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Annex 1 Terms of Reference

Background

The Conservation of biodiversity in Albertine Rift forests of Uganda project aimed to conserve and manage rich biodiversity forests in the Albertine Rift allowing sustainable development for all stakeholders. Specifically the project focuses on 4 outputs namely: (i) An overall conservation and management strategy for the Albertine Rift Forested Protected Area (PA) systems in place and functioning; (ii) Central Forest Reserves (CFRs) are strengthened and provide conservation and sustainable management of forest resources; (iii) Forest connectivity maintained within the northern corridor and (iv) Incentives for community based forest conservation initiatives in place and functioning. This project is implemented by World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in collaboration with the Ministry of Water and Environment, National Forest Authority, World Conservation Society and 5 Districts of the Albertine rift namely Bulisa, Masindi, Hoima, Kibale and Kyenjojo (and the newly created District of Kyegegwa). The project has a total budget of US\$ 11,350,000 including US\$ 3,395,000 from GEF and US\$ 7,955,000 from co-financing for duration of 5 years from 2007 to 2012.

In accordance with UNDP and GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full and medium-sized UNDP support GEF financed projects are required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation. These terms of reference (TOR) sets out the expectations for a Terminal Evaluation (TE) of the Project entitled (PIMS 494) Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda Project.

It is upon this background that UNDP wishes to recruit a team of two individual consultants to undertake this evaluation exercise in line with the detailed ToRs provided.

Duties and Responsibilities

Objective and scope:

The TE will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP and GEF as reflected in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF Financed Projects.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming.

- The Time frame to be covered by the terminal evaluation is September 2007 (Signing of Project Document) to June 2012 (Operational closure of project).
- Geographical coverage Republic of Uganda with a focus on the Northern Albertine Rift region.

- Thematic coverage is Biodiversity conservation.
- Findings, lessons learned and recommendations.

The key Evaluation Questions will address (refer to Annex C). Specifically the Evaluation Questions include:-

- An analysis of how efficiently programme planning and implementation were carried out.
- Achievement of results and if not, progress made.
- Project relevance in addressing identified problems.
- Usefulness of the results and benefits.
- Sustainability of results and benefits.
- Comparative advantage for UNDP (role played by Country Office in development and implementation of the project).
- Role played by the project in capacity development (human and institutional capacity).

Evaluation approach and method:

An overall approach and method for conducting project terminal evaluations of UNDP supported /GEF financed projects has developed over time. The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact, as defined and explained in the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects. A set of questions covering each of these criteria have been drafted and are included with this TOR (fill in TOR Annex C) The evaluator is expected to amend, complete and submit this matrix as part of an evaluation inception report, and shall include it as an annex to the final report.

The evaluation must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts, in particular the GEF operational focal point, UNDP Country Office, project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders.

The evaluator will review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – incl. Annual APR/PIR and other Reports, project budget revisions, midterm review, progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other material that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluator for review is included in Annex B of this Terms of Reference.

In addition, interviews with key informants and stakeholders will be held. Questionnaires, Focus Group Discussions, Interviews, Field visits, Observations, Participation of partners and Benchmarking should be used.

Project finance/Co-finance:

The Evaluation will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. Results from recent financial audits, as available, should be taken into consideration. The evaluator(s) will receive assistance from the Country Office (CO) and Project Team to obtain financial data in order to complete the co-financing table below, which will be included in the terminal evaluation report.

Mainstreaming:

UNDP supported GEF financed projects are key components in UNDP country programming, as well as regional and global programmes. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project was successfully mainstreamed with other UNDP priorities, including poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender. In addition, the evaluation will be included in the country office evaluation plan.

Impact:

The evaluators will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings that should be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.

Conclusions, recommendations and lessons:

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of conclusions, recommendations and lessons.

Implementation arrangements:

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP CO in Uganda. The UNDP CO will contract the evaluators and ensure the timely provision of travel (including per diems) arrangements within the country for the evaluation team. The Project Implementing partner will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluators team to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits, coordinate with the Government etc.

Evaluation timeframe:

The Evaluation timeline is indicated below including a total of 25 Working Days.

Evaluation criteria and ratings:

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework which provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their

corresponding means of verification. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary. The obligatory rating scales will be used. A useful table to include in the evaluation report is set out below.

Specific tasks:

In addition to the above, the Team Leader is responsible for the following:

- Review of documentation to be provided by the project (implementation/evaluation reports).
- Conducting fieldwork together with the national consultant and interview of stakeholders, national and local Government officials, and communities (especially private forest owners) to generate authentic information and opinions.
- Writing and compilation of the information and reports as needed.
- Responsibility for presentation of key findings highlighting achievements and constraints, and making practical recommendations to decision makers and stakeholders.
- Finalization of the Terminal Evaluation Report.

List of documents to be reviewed by the evaluators:

Reference Materials:

- Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda Project Document
- Quarterly and Annual Project performance Reports
- Project Implementation Review (PIR) Reports
- Project Monitoring Evaluation Tracking Tools (METTs)
- Project M&E Plan
- Final Project Mid Term Review Report
- UNDP GEF Evaluation Report Format
- UNDP Quality Criteria for Evaluation Report
- Ethical Code of Conduct for Evaluation in UNDP
- The Evaluation Policy of UNDP
- United Nations Evaluation Group Standards for Evaluation in the UN (2005)
- Norms of Evaluation in the UN system
- Any other relevant documents (to be identified)
- Guidelines for Ratings
- Terminal Evaluation Sample Report Outline

Annex 2 Summary of project results by outcome and output

It is usual to present the project's final logframe in the Terminal Evaluation. However, two things significantly hindered this terminal evaluation: i) the project had already closed and the project retained little focus on the logframe (to the extent that the amended version following the MTE was not approved by the NPSC and adopted by the project, and ii) because all the project staff (including the TA and NPM) had moved onto other demanding jobs, we failed to secure their assistance in producing a completed logframe (even for those aspects of the project that remained relevant). Nonetheless, we are including the logframe as it stands following our attempts to fill it ourselves (see below).

Summary of project achievements by Outcome and Output, relative to the performance indicators from the baseline at the start of the project and the targets.

Outcome	Output	Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	Status, EOP
Goal. The diversity of the Albertine rift forest resources is conserved and provides sustainable benefits to all stakeholders					
Long term Objective (Purpose). The system of protected areas in the north Albertine Rift forests is strengthened and consolidated, effectively conserving globally significant biodiversity		1. Rates of deforestation in the Albertine Rift have decreased by 50% of baseline levels by EOP	The annual rate of deforestation ranges from 1.0-1.9%	Deforestation rate of 0.5 – 0.95 %	The rate of deforestation increased from 5,400 ha/year (2000-2006) to 8,300 ha /year by EOP.
		2. Populations of key indicator species are maintained or increase in the Albertine Rift forest reserves by EOP	Data on chimpanzees from 1999 (Bugoma, Kasato, Kagombe) and 2000 (Budongo) show highest density of 1.90 Individuals / km ² in Bugoma and a lowest of 0.71 individuals / km ² in Kagombe		Key species (elephants and chimpanzees) densities; elephants appear stable while chimpanzees, appear to be declining (e.g. chimpanzee density estimates are down from 1.9 to 1.24 individuals/km ² in Bugoma CFR, and from 0.71 to 0 individuals/km ² in Kagombe CFR in 1999 and 2010 respectively. But are stable in Kihoro at 1.9 individuals per sq km and Itohya at 2.1 individuals per sq.km with Bugambe - Ruzira and Rwebikondo having 0.27 and 0.42 individuals per sq km. Current data also indicates baboons having the highest encounter rates (12.45

Outcome	Output	Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	Status, EOP
					individuals/km) followed by black and white colobus monkeys (7.4 individuals/km), with the red-tailed monkeys following on (4.9 individuals/km) and the Uganda Mangabeys (4.2 individuals/km).
		3. Eleven forest reserves have revised management plans under implementation by EOP	FMPs for the CFRs in the project area had been prepared and submitted for approval (pre-project realization)		Most FMPs were still not approved by Government, and minimally funded, although one (Budongo CFR) was approved in early 2012
		4. The area of Albertine rift forests under conservation management is increased by 89,916 ha by EOP			
Outcome A. An overall conservation and management strategy for the Albertine Rift forested protected area system in place and functioning	Output A2: Stakeholders supported to develop an overall regional strategy for the Albertine Rift forested PA system through sharing lessons, data and information	5. Integrated conservation and management strategy for the Albertine Rift forests developed and under implementation by EOP	Strategic planning framework for Albertine Rift 2004-2030 drafted (in 2003) but no subsequent action in Planning Unit 1	Strategic plan in place and being implemented	A draft Strategic Plan for the northern Albertine Rift (Planning Unit 1) produced
		6. 50% of key stakeholders are actively involved in managing the Albertine rift forests by EOP	The key stakeholders have been identified, but there was		Multiple stakeholders (NFA, UWA, CSWCT, WCS, JGI, Central government ministries, Local governments, CSOs, CBOs and

Outcome	Output	Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	Status, EOP
			no coordination between stakeholders in managing the forests of the northern Albertine rift		Local community) involved in the Strategic planning process
	A3: Monitoring and evaluation frameworks for the Albertine Rift protected area system developed	7. Independent evaluation confirms that by EOP, monitoring systems for biodiversity and socio-economic situations are fully established in the AR forests and collected data is being fed into management decisions	No systematic socio-economic or biodiversity monitoring information available		Monitoring and evaluation framework for the Albertine Rift forests produced
Outcome B. CFRs are strengthened and provide conservation and sustainable management of forest resources ¹	Output B4: Forest Management Plans for CFRs developed with applied scientific information	8. Area of CFR under sustainable management increases by 80% by EOP	FMPs for the CFRs in the project area had been prepared and submitted for approval (pre-project realization)	FMPs approved but no or minimal funding for their implementation allocated by Government	most FMPs were still not approved by Government, and minimally funded, although one (Budongo CFR) was approved in early 2012
	Output B1: Biodiversity and forest resources in the CFRs inventoried	9. Biodiversity monitoring indicates numbers of key species in Central Forest Reserves (CFRs) remains the same or increases by EOP	Data on chimpanzees from 1999 (Bugoma, Kasato, Kagombe) and		Key species (elephants and chimpanzees) densities; elephants appear stable while chimpanzees, appear to be declining (e.g. chimpanzee density estimates are down from 1.9 to 1.24

¹ The indicator ‘**Capacity of the Forest Authority to manage forests improved**’ is dropped as capacity building of the NFA is not a target of the project, which focuses more on capacity building of private forest owners.

Outcome	Output	Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	Status, EOP
			2000 (Budongo) show highest density of 1.90 individuals/km ² in Bugoma, lowest of 0.71 individuals/km ² in Kagombe		individuals/km ² in Bugoma CFR, and from 0.71 to 0 individuals/km ² in Kagombe CFR in 1999 and 2010 respectively. But are stable in Kihoro at 1.9 individuals per sq km and Itohya at 2.1 individuals per sq.km with Bugambe - Ruzira and Rwebikondo having 0.27 and 0.42 individuals per sq km
	Output B4: Forest Management Plans for CFRs developed with applied scientific information	10. Eleven participatory forest management plans for CFRs with areas greater than or equal to 3,000 ha developed and under implementation by EOP			
Outcome C. Forest connectivity maintained within the northern corridor		11. 10% of the total forest area outside protected areas in the project sites is demarcated for conservation purposes and recognised by stakeholders by year 3, 30% by year 5	Corridor not determined		Corridor occupying an area of 15,576 ha has been determined, consisting of a savannah/woodland species corridor of 19,919 ha. Of the total area of forest corridors identified, only 3,269 ha was fully stocked tropical forest: 4,336 ha was depleted tropical high forest and the rest non-forest.
		12. Wildlife incidences in corridor increases by 30% by EOP	Baseline data not available		Current data indicates baboons having the highest encounter rates (12.45 individuals/km) followed by black and white colobus monkeys (7.4 individuals/km), with the red-tailed monkeys following on (4.9 individuals/km) and the Uganda Mangabeys (4.2 individuals/km)

Outcome	Output	Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	Status, EOP
	Output C2: Local land use plans developed and implementation initiated with increased awareness of planning values	13. More than 50% of the communities are aware of the value of the northern corridor for conservation purposes by EOP	The concept of a 'corridor' is new to the communities in the project area and a baseline could thus be interpreted as 0% of the community aware of the value of the corridor		
		14. All four districts approve land use plan processes and start to implement plans by year 5	No land use plans		??? Three LLUPs were developed for three corridor areas in Kibaale District
Outcome D. Incentives for community based forest conservation initiatives in place and functioning	Output D1: CBNRM approaches promoted for the maintenance of forest resources on private lands	15. Two-fold increase in income being generated for local communities from non-timber forest resources by EOP	Baseline data not available		
	C3 Local authorities, communities and private land owners supported to develop Private Forest Management Plans	16. Communities sign at least 10 forest management plans and start implementation by EOP			
	Output D2: Collaborative Forest	17. Increase in at least 40% of community groups benefiting	Precise baseline data not available. However,		

Outcome	Output	Indicator	Baseline	EOP target	Status, EOP
	Management (CFM) approaches promoted in CFRs	from conservation processes (by EOP)	moderate number of community groups are already benefiting from conservation processes under the 9 CFM agreements		

Annex 3 Summary of Terminal Evaluation Schedule including Field Visit

Date	Activities
24 Sept	Signature of contract
	Collection and review of documents Initial contact with PMU and request for documentation; correspondence with TA
04 – 07 Oct	Meeting with UNDP-CO for Orientation Meeting Working on and delivery of Inception Report
23 – 25 Oct	Meeting at WWF offices, Kampala; UNDP and WWF present – kick-off meeting; Meeting with Project Manager, James Okiria, WWF
29 Oct	Meeting with UNDP-CO (Environment & Energy Team)
31 Oct	Meeting with Representatives, NFA
01 Nov	Meeting with Commissioner of Wetlands and Director of Environmental Affairs, Ministry of Water and Environment Meeting with Jane Goodall Institute
02 Nov	Coordination with National Consultant re field expenses
05 Nov	Travel to Masindi Meeting with DEO, Masindi Meeting with Private Forest Owner, Masindi Meeting with Acting Range Manager, NFA-Masindi Travel to Hoima via Private Forest Owner's sites and various CFRs
06 Nov	Meeting with DEO, Hoima Meeting with District Planner and PSC member Meeting with CSWCT Travel to Kibaale
07 Nov	Meeting with Kibaale District (group discussion); meeting with PFO; meeting with Sub-County (Chair) & members of PFO Association.
08 Nov	Meeting with CFM group and PFO, Travel to Kyenjojo
09 Nov	Meeting with Kyenjojo District personnel (DFO, DNRO, DEO); travel to Fort Portal; writing; meeting with TA from ARF project
10 Nov	Travel to Kampala

11-21 Nov	Preparation of draft report Meeting with representative for REDD+ development, FSSD, MWE Meeting with representatives from WCS
22 – 26 Nov	Editing draft report Preparing Presentation for Findings Validation Meeting
26 Nov	Findings Validation Meeting, UNDP

Annex 4 List of People Interviewed

Name	Position and Organization
James Okiria	Formally NPM for CBARFP, WWF Uganda Country Office
Thomas Otim	Conservation Manager, WWF Uganda Country Office
David Duli	Country Director, WWF Uganda Country Office
Daniel Omodo	Programme Analyst, Energy and Environment, UNDP
Mugisha Polly Akankwatsa	M&E Specialist / Team Leader UNDP Management Support Unit, UNDP
Onesmas Muhwezi	Team Leader, Energy and Environment, UNDP
Levi Etwodu	Ag. Director Natural Forests, NFA
Fiona Driciru	Coordinator Forest Partnerships, NFA
Mafabi Paul	Ag. Director Env. Affairs, MWE
Dr. Panta Kasoma	Executive Director, Jane Goodall Institute
Simon Akwetaireho	REDD Project Manager, Jane Goodall Institute
Keith Bitamazire	Chairperson, Albertine Rift Private Forest Owners Conservation Association (ARPFOA)
Nsiimire William	Senior Environment Officer, Masindi DLG
Nuriat Tumanye	Ag. Range Manager/ Budongo Systems, NFA
Nyangoma Joseline	District Environment Officer, Hoima DLG
John Williams Byakagaba	District Planner, Hoima DLG
Rev. Elisha Kyomya	Former Ass. Minister of Environment and\Tree Planting, Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom
Balikuddembe Louis	District Natural Resources Officer, Kibaale DLG
Animate Kashemire	Senior Env't Officer, Kibaale DLG
Kyamuhondire Wilson	District Forestry Officer, Kibaale DLG
Mugenzi Sam	Forest Ranger, Kibaale DLG
Businge Daniel	Environment Officer, Kibaale DLG
Kisembo Prisca	Forest Supervisor, NFA
Amos Kabwijamu	Private Forest Owner, Kyebando PFOA
Bigirwenkya Peter	Chairperson, Kyebando PFOA
Rugaba Gabiel	Vice chairperson, KPFOA
Senkubuge Vincent	Secretary, KPFOA
Jane Bagwa	Member, KPFOA
Kyamanywa Peter	Chairperson LC III, Kyebando LLG
Nakhaima Sebastian	Forest Supervisor Kyebando, NFA
George Tusabomu	District Planner, Kibaale DLG
Edward Karali	CDO, Kiryanga Subcounty

Katende Denis	Community monitor, CSWCT
Byaruhanga Diadone	Chairperson / Community Monitor, Kiryanga PFOA
Nsungwa Leticia	Councilor, KDLG
Baryamujura Jovan	MS, CSWCT
Sunday Eric	Subcounty chief, Pachwa Subcounty
Rwesememreza Micheal	Chairperson, Pachwa Linda Ebyobuhangwa Association
Alinda Julius	Secretary, PLEA
Isingoma Raphael	CDO, Pachwa subcounty
Mugisha M. Charles	District Natural Resources Officer, Kyenjojo DLG
Luke Patrick Onzima	District Forestry Officer, Kyenjojo DLG
Bigabwa Julius	District Environment Officer, Kyenjojo DLG
Sam Mugume	Minister for Environment, Tooro Kingdom
Dezi Irumba	Coordinator Natural Resource Management, CARE Uganda
Andrew Grieser Johns	Former Technical Advisor, PMU
Rachael Musoke	Commissioner, Forestry Sector Support Department
Charles Byaruhanga	Senior Forestry Officer, Forestry Sector Support Department
Dr Alastair McNeillage	Country Director, Wildlife Conservation Society
Dr Grace Nangendo	GIS Officer, WCS
Dr Andy Plumptre	Director, Albertine Rift Program, WCS
Miguel Leal	REDD+ Officer, WCS

People who attended the Validation Meeting held on 26 November 2012

Name	Position and Organization
Paul Mafabi	Acting Director DEA, MWE
Levi Etwodu	Acting Director Natural Forests, NFA
Simon Akwetaireho	REDD+ Project Manager, JGI
Panta Kasoma	Director, JGI
Francis Ogwal	UNCBD Focal point, NEMA
Thomas Otim	Conservation Manager, WWF
James Ateker Okiria	Former National Project Manager, WWF
Daniel Omodo MacMondo	Programme Officer/E, UNDP
Onesmus Muhwezi	Team Leader EE, UNDP
Janesta Atuhairi	UNDP
Lilly Ajarova	Director, CSWCT
Denis Mugagga	MFPED
Stuart Williams	Lead Consultant, TE for CBARF project
Stephen Khaukha	National Consultant, TE for CBARF project

Annex 5 List of Documents Reviewed and Documents Produced by Project

5.1 Documents produced by the Project, by Outcome

Outcome	Document
A: conservation and management strategy	Strategic Plan for Northern Albertine Rift of Uganda (2011 – 2020)
	Monitoring and Evaluation Framework: Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda (2008 – 2013)
	An Assessment of Sustainable Financing Options to support conservation of the Northern Forest corridor of the Albertine. Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine Forests of Uganda Project, Wildlife Conservation Society, Kampala, December 2009.
	Murchison-Semliki Landscape: Feasibility Study for REDD, May 2010
	Kibaale District Environment Action Plan (DEAP)
	Kyegegwa District Environment Action Plan (DEAP)
	Kyenjojo District Environment action Plan (DEAP)
B: CFRs strengthened	Murchison-Semliki Land cover map, 2010
	Mapping output: land cover analysis of the north Albertine Rift, WCS, 2009
	Mapping output: forest cover change in the north Albertine Rift, WCS, 2009
	Mapping output: wildlife corridors in the north Albertine Rift, WCS, 2009
	Potential forest corridor map, August 2010
	Biodiversity surveys of Bugoma Forest Reserve, smaller Central Forest Reserves and corridor forests south of Bugoma)
	Forest inventories undertaken under the EU-funded Forest Resources Management and Conservation Project, National Forestry Authority, Kampala before the commencement of the Project
	Forest Management Plans for CFRs developed under the EU-funded Forest Resources Management and Conservation

	Project, National Forestry Authority, Kampala before the commencement of the Project
	Masindi District Environment Ordinance (Draft)
	Hoima District Environment Ordinance (Draft)
C. Forest connectivity	Identifying potential corridors for conservation in the Murchison-Sumuliki Landscape, WCS, June 2010
	Baseline survey of the eco-social situation of the Albertine Rift forest areas around Bugoma and the corridor between Bugoma and Budongo CFRs, AAH, September 2009
	Social economic values of corridor forests in the Albertine Rift forests of the Murchison-Semliki landscape. Wildlife Conservation Society, April, 2011
	Local land use plan: Rwengeye-Kyamurangi
	Forest conservation communication strategy, April 2010
	Baseline awareness survey assessment report, July 2010
	Guideline for the preparation of forest management plan
	Forest management plan: Kabwijamu Forest
	Forest management plan: Bamutura Forest
	Forest management plan: Kiryanga Group
	Forest management plan:
D. Incentives for community-based forest conservation	The effectiveness of CFM as a means of engaging local communities in forest conservation – lessons learned from Uganda. Updated June 2012
	Report on the hands-on training in bee-keeping for participants from Kyebando Subcounty, Kibaale District. Bunyangabu Bee-keepers Community, August 2011

5.2 Other documents reviewed by the Evaluation Team

Akwetaireho, S., J. Ujhazy & A. Plumptre (2009) *An assessment of the sustainable financing options to support conservation of the Northern Forest Corridors of the Albertine Rift*. Wildlife Conservation Society, Kampala, Uganda

Eilu Gerald (2012) Lesson learned report: Conservation of biodiversity in the Albertine Forests of Uganda Project. WWF Country office, Kampala, June 2012

GEF (2007) Request for CEO endorsement: Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forest Areas of Uganda

GEF Evaluation Office. GEF Evaluation Office Ethical Guidelines, 2007

GEF Evaluation Office. Guidelines for GEF Agencies in Conducting Terminal Evaluations, 2008

GEF Evaluation Office. The GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy, 2010

GoU/UNDP (2007) Conservation of Biodiversity in Albertine Rift Forests in Uganda, Updated Project Document, Feb 2007

Jacovelli Paul (2006) Forestry Resources Management and Conservation Programme. EDF Project No. 8 ACP UG 030. Final Report 2002-2006

Leal M. E., S. Akwetaireho, G. Nangendo and A. Plumptre (2011) Murchison-Semliki landscape: Feasibility study for REDD. Wildlife Conservation Society, May 2011

Ministry of Water and Environment (2011) REDD Preparedness Preparation Proposal for Uganda: Submitted to the Forest Partnership Carbon Fund, May 2011

Ministry of Water and Environment (2012) Strategic Plan for the Northern Albertine Rift of Uganda, 2011-2020. Edited by Andrew Grieser Johns Kampala, Uganda

Nampindo S., J. Ujhazy, and A. Plumptre (2011) Public – private sector financing mechanisms to support sustainable management of forest corridors in the Murchison – Semliki landscape. Conservation of biodiversity in the Albertine Rift forests of Uganda Project, Wildlife Conservation Society, Kampala

Project Annual Reports

Project Annual Workplans

Project Implementation Report (PIR), 2011

Republic of Uganda (1995) The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda

Republic of Uganda (2010) National Development Plan (2010/11 – 2014/15). National Planning Authority, Kampala www.npa.ug

Steve Amooti Nsita (2008) Forestry Resources Management and Conservation Programme (FRMCP), Final Project Report for the period October 2006 to December 2008

Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2012) 2012 Statistical Abstract.

UNDP (2002) Guidelines for outcome evaluators: monitoring and evaluation companion series No. 1

UNDP (2006) The evaluation policy of UNDP

UNDP (2007) Minutes of LPAC meeting on the project “Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine forests of Uganda held on 12th Dec 2005

UNDP (2009) Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and evaluation for Development Results

UNDP (2011) Evaluation Guidelines for GEF-Financed Projects: Version for External Evaluators, March 2011

UNDP Evaluation Guidelines for GEF-Financed Projects: Version for External Evaluators, March 2011

UNDP/WWF (2009 e) Annual Performance Report 2009: Conservation of biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda Project

UNDP/WWF (2008) Annual Progress report 2008: Conservation of biodiversity in the Albertine Rift forests of Uganda.

UNDP/WWF (2009 a) Minutes of the first National Project Steering Committee meeting, April 30 2009

UNDP/WWF (2009 b) Minutes of WWF/UNDP meeting 27th August 2009

UNDP/WWF (2009 c) Minutes of the second National Project Steering Committee meeting, September 29 2009

UNDP/WWF (2009 d) Project Implementation Report 2009: Conservation of biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda Project

UNDP/WWF (2009) January – April 2009 Quarterly progress report 2009: Conservation of biodiversity in the Albertine Rift forests of Uganda

UNDP/WWF (2010) Mid-term evaluation report: Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine Forests of Uganda Project.

UNDP/WWF (2012) Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda Project: End of Project Report

UNEG (2005) Norms for evaluation in the UN system

UNEG (2010) UNEG Quality checklist for Evaluation report

UNEG (2005) Standards for evaluation in the UN system

WCS (2010) Assessment of corridors in the Murchison–Semliki landscape. Conservation of Biodiversity in the Albertine Forests of Uganda Project, Kampala, Feb 2010

WWF 2009 Report of the Strategic Planning Workshop held at Kijungu Hill Hotel 03-04 Dec 2009

WWF (2008) Conservation of biodiversity in the Albertine Rift forests of Uganda: .Scoping for Project Inception Report 2008

WWF (2009) Proposed revision of project logframe (version 19.11.09)

WWF (2011) Report on the hands on training in bee-keeping for participants from Kyebando Subcounty, Kibaale District, August 2011

WWF Project Annual Reports: Conservation of Biodiversity in Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda Project, Kampala

WWF Project Annual Workplans: Conservation of Biodiversity in Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda Project, Kampala

WWF Project Implementation Report (PIR), 2011: Conservation of Biodiversity in Albertine Rift Forests of Uganda Project, Kampala

Annex 6 List of assets transferred at end of project

The PM presented the sustainability plan and recommendations for the institutions to whom project assets would be given, dependent upon their roles in taking over project activities. Below is PMU's proposal on assets disposal that was later adopted in principle by the project board.

Vehicles

- UAA 845N (Land cruiser) – MWE
- UAA 843N (Pick up) – Kyenjojo DLG (Natural Resources Department)
- UAA 846N (Pick-up) – Kibaale DLG (Natural Resources Department)
- UAA 844N (Pick up) – Hoima DLG (Natural Resources Department)
- UAA 622N (Suzuki) – Remain with WWF Country Office for support of NARCG activities

Motorcycles

The 6 motorcycles that are with partners should remain with them to continue activities. Partners with motorcycles are:

- NFA (Forest Supervisor, Kiryanga),
- Tooro Kingdom,
- Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom,
- CSWCT (habitat monitors),
- Kibaale DLG (Forest Ranger) and
- one at WWF UCO.
- The two motorcycles at PMU will be given to NFA (Kagadi sector) and Kyenjojo DLG (Natural Resources Department)

Office furniture

6 desks, 6 chairs, 6 guest chairs. These to be shared between the districts of Kyenjojo, Hoima and Kibaale

Miscellaneous equipment to be passed on to the new UNDP project at WWF - UCO

- Inverter + batteries
- 2 GPSs
- LCD projector and

- Water dispenser –.

Desktop computers

- 2 to WWF
- 3 to be shared between the districts of Kyenjojo, Kibaale and Hoima

Laptops

- 3 laptops – no proposals made and therefore, MWE together with UNDP to decide on the beneficiaries of these items – they were eventually retained by MWE


Computer peripherals


- Scanner – to Kyenjojo DLG
- 2 printers: Colour printer to UNDP project at WWF – UCO and black and white printer to Kibaale DLG
- Photocopier – to Hoima DLG

Others:

- Conference table and chairs – to WWF UCO
- Safe – to new UNDP project at WWF - UCO
- Filing cabinets – destroyed during transportation to Kyenjojo
- Book shelves – to Kyenjojo DLG
- Desk telephones and handsets – to be determined
- Loud speaker – to Kyenjojo DLG

Annex 7 Map of Semliki – Murchison Landscape





Annex 9 Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and: respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant	Stuart Williams
Name of Consultancy Organization (if relevant)	-

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at: Kampala, Uganda On: 02 December 2012

Signature



Name of Consultant	Stephen Khaukha
Name of Consultancy Organization (if relevant)	-

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at: Kampala, Uganda On: 02 December 2012

Signature

