Report No: ICR00005009

#### IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (ICR)

#### IDA-H8980, TF-15910, TF-54463, TF-94033

ON A

#### GRANT FROM THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY TRUST FUND

#### IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$ 7.0 MILLION

AND

#### AN IDA GRANT

#### IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 2.0 MILLION

#### (US\$ 3.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

#### AND

#### A GRANT FROM THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY TRUST FUND

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$ 11.64 MILLION

#### TO THE

#### Democratic Republic of Congo

#### FOR THE

NATIONAL PARKS NETWORK REHABILITATION PROJECT (PREPAN) July 31, 2020

Environment, Natural Resources & The Blue Economy Global Practice Africa Region

#### CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective Dec 31, 2019)

Currency Unit = US\$

CDF 1687 = US\$1

0.0006 US\$ = CDF 1

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Jean-Christophe Carret Regional Director: Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez Practice Manager: Africa Eshogba Olojoba Task Team Leader(s): Raymond Sinsi Lumbuenamo ICR Main Contributor: Juha Antti Kalevi Seppala

#### ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Additional Financing
African Parks Network
Nyabirehe Pygmy Association
Country Assistance Strategy
Cost-benefit assessment
Convention on Biological Diversity
Congo Basin Forest Partnership
Congolese franc
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Commission in Charge of Central African Forests (Commission des Forêts d'Afrique Centrale)
Country Partnership Framework
Conservation trust fund
Democratic Republic of Congo
Economic Rate of Return
Environmental and social impact assessment
Environmental and social management plan
European Union
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
Frankfurt Zoological Society
Gross domestic product
Global Environment Facility
Global Environmental Objective
Geographic information system
German Agency for International Cooperation (Gesellschaft für technische
Zusammenarbeit)
Grievance Redress Mechanism
Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (Institut Congolais pour la
Conservation de la Nature)
Indigenous Peoples
International Development Association
Itombwe National Reserve
Lomami National Park
Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism (Ministère de
l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme)
Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en
République démocratique du Congo)
Not applicable
National Park
Official Development Assistance
Operational Risk Assessment Framework

PA	Protected area
PAR	Support project for ICCN reform ( <i>Projet d'appui à la réforme de l'ICCN</i> )
PARAP	Support Program for the Protected Area Network (Programme d'Appui au Réseau
	des Aires Protégées – PARAP)
PDO	Project Development Objective
PF	Process Framework
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PNFoCo	National Forest and Nature Conservation Program (Programme National Forêt et
	Conservation)
PMU	Project Management Unit
PP	Procurement Plan
PREPAN	National Parks Network Rehabilitation Project (Projet de Réhabilitation du Réseau
	des Parcs nationaux)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC	Project Steering Committee
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
SCD	Systemic Country Diagnostics
SDR	Special Drawing Right
TBD	To be determined
ТоС	Theory of Change
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WWF	Worldwide Fund for Nature

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#### **BASIC INFORMATION**

#### **Product Information**

Froduct mormation	
Project ID	Project Name
P083813	DRC GEF Financing to PREPAN Project
Country	Financing Instrument
Congo, Democratic Republic of	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category

#### **Related Projects**

Relationship	Project	Approval	Product Line
Supplement	P127437-DRC GEF Financing to PREPAN Project	02-Apr-2009	Global Environment Project
Organizations			
Borrower		Implementing Agency	/

**ICCN** 

Democratic Republic of Congo

#### **Project Development Objective (PDO)**

#### Original PDO

To enhance the capacity of the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN) for management of targeted protected areas.

PDO as stated in the legal agreement

To enhance the Project Implementing Entity's capacity to manage targeted Protected Areas.



#### FINANCING

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
World Bank Financing			
P083813 IDA-H8980	3,000,000	3,000,000	2,762,489
P127437 TF-54463	280,000	237,321	237,321
P127437 TF-94033	7,000,000	6,999,899	6,999,899
P127437 TF-15910	11,636,363	11,636,363	11,632,698
Total	21,916,363	21,873,583	21,632,407
Non-World Bank Financing			
Borrower/Recipient	19,500,000	0	0
GERMANY: KREDITANSTALT FUR WIEDERAUFBAU (KFW)	136,500,000	0	0
Total	156,000,000	0	0
Total Project Cost	177,916,363	21,873,583	21,632,407

### **KEY DATES**

Project	Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	<b>Original Closing</b>	Actual Closing
P083813	12-Dec-2013	30-Jun-2014	20-Feb-2012	31-Dec-2018	31-Dec-2019

#### **RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING**

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
12-Dec-2013	0	Additional Financing
26-Dec-2013	0	Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
		Reallocation between Disbursement Categories
14-Dec-2018	2.46	Change in Results Framework
		Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
		Change in Implementation Schedule
		Other Change(s)
22-May-2019	2.46	Change in Legal Covenants
		Other Change(s)



#### **KEY RATINGS**

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Modest

#### **RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs**

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	18-Dec-2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0
02	25-May-2010	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0
03	31-Oct-2010	Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	0
04	30-May-2011	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0
05	13-Dec-2011	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0
06	06-Jul-2012	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0
07	05-Mar-2013	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0
08	27-Sep-2013	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	0
09	26-Apr-2014		Moderately Unsatisfactory	0
10	25-Nov-2014		Moderately Unsatisfactory	0
11	11-Jun-2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	.50
12	20-Dec-2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	.66
13	21-Jun-2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	.88
14	27-Jan-2017	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	1.44
15	07-Sep-2017	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	1.68
16	23-Apr-2018	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.68
17	18-Dec-2018	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	2.46
18	05-Jul-2019	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	2.65



#### SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors	
Major Sector/Sector	(%)
	(70)
Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry	100
Other Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry	100
Themes	
Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3)	(%)
Private Sector Development	100
Jobs	100
Urban and Rural Development	28
Rural Development	28
Land Administration and Management	28
Environment and Natural Resource Management	72
Renewable Natural Resources Asset Management	53
Biodiversity	46
Landscape Management	7
Environmental policies and institutions	19

### ADM STAFF

Role	At Approval	At ICR
Regional Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Hafez M. H. Ghanem
Country Director:	Marie Francoise Marie-Nelly	Jean-Christophe Carret
Director:	Inger Andersen	Ede Jorge Ijjasz-Vasquez
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Task Team Leader(s):	Paul Jonathan Martin	Raymond Sinsi Lumbuenamo
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#### I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

#### A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

#### Context

1. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the most biologically rich country in Africa, and one of the most important centers of biodiversity in the world. It harbors the second largest rainforest in the world, and the largest in Africa. DRC ranks fifth in the world for plant and animal diversity, and first in Africa for numbers of mammals and birds. It is also endowed with rich mineral resources, has the potential to be self-sufficient in agriculture, and could produce enough hydroelectric power to satisfy not only its own needs but those of most of the rest of the continent. However, poor governance, armed conflict and political turmoil have resulted in economic decline, and the country is now one of the poorest nations in the world. At the time of appraisal, there were seven national parks and 57 nature and hunting reserves in the DRC, most of which had become 'paper parks', i.e. parks in name only with no or little facilities or infrastructure in place to effectively manage them.

2. The Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN), a semi-autonomous institute under the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism (MECNT), is responsible for nature conservation and rehabilitation of protected areas. One of the major challenges for ICCN was to secure an operating budget and of satisfactory investment for the coming years. In 2011, ICCN spent US\$32.6 million on conservation (US\$ 21.4 million on operating costs and US\$ 11.2 million on investment costs). Of this budget, 88% was funded by external partners for operations and 100% for investment. As an anecdote, in 2012 ICCN was allocated US\$1 million in the national budget, of which it received US\$ 18,000, highlighting the need to secure a long-term sustainable funding strategy.

#### Sectoral context at the time of appraisal

#### For the country:

3. The Government of DRC developed since 2002 a reform agenda for the forest and nature conservation sector. This agenda aimed at removing the legacy of past mismanagement and at setting the stage for sustainable management of its natural resources' endowment. It was reflected in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) adopted in 2006. It was also an important pillar of the Government's Reconstruction and Recovery Program (2004) and Governance Contract (2007). Although this reform agenda made good progress since 2002, notably through a legal review of logging contracts leading to a significant reduction in the area under concession management, its achievements were still fragile. They required further political support and capacity building.

4. In order to bridge the gap between good policies on paper and lack of capacity in the field, the government prepared a National Forest and Nature Conservation Program (PNFoCo). The long-term objective of the PNFoCo was to contribute to more sustainable and equitable management of DRC's forests. Within the PNFoCo, ICCN was responsible for nature conservation and rehabilitation of protected areas. The PNFoCo was a multi-donor sector-wide program. The



World Bank was to support the PNFoCo in close coordination with other donors, through a series of initiatives including the National Parks Network Rehabilitation (PREPAN) project.

5. The PREPAN project also matched priorities at the regional level. It built on the political commitment expressed in the Brazzaville Treaty on Conservation and Sustainable Management of Forests, signed in 2005 by the Heads of State of nine central African nations including the DRC, and implemented through the Commission in Charge of Central African Forests (COMIFAC). The project also fit within the framework of the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) launched by the United States in 2002 and supported by 32 public and private partners. The CBFP focuses on 12 landscapes of high biodiversity value, five of which fall wholly or partially within the DRC. Finally, the project was coherent with the UN Millennium Development Goal No 7 (Environmental Sustainability) and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to which DRC is a signatory.

#### For the Bank:

6. The rationale for the Bank's assistance to DRC at the time of appraisal was outlined in the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)<sup>1</sup> of December 2008. The CAS built upon three of the five pillars of the PRSP. Its key objectives were: (i) promotion of good governance and consolidation of peace; (ii) achievement of sustained and shared economic growth and (iii) improved implementation of poverty alleviation programs. The forest reform agenda, which included the rehabilitation of protected areas and support to indigenous peoples, was an integral part of the PRSP and the CAS. This objective continued through the current CPF 2013-2016<sup>2</sup>. The project was consistent with key elements of the CAS, with respect to natural resource management, community-driven development, and improved governance and institutional strengthening. The project fell within the framework of the sector-wide forest and nature conservation program, and it complemented a package of Bank assistance to the sector.

7. Under CAS Pillar 2 "Consolidate macro-economic stability and growth", the Bank would support efforts to achieve high, sustained, and shared economic growth by helping to (i) improve natural resource management in the forestry sector through support to government policies and agencies for enforcement of strong environmental standards for logging and the involvement of communities in monitoring forestry activities and (ii) ensure that economic growth is not achieved at the expense of the long term environment damage. Under Pillar 2, PREPAN resided under output 2.2.1.2. *Restructure the Forest Sector*: ICCN and NGO partnerships strengthened to rehabilitate protected areas.

8. **For the Global Environment Facility (GEF)**: The project was approved as part of GEF-3, and continued over GEF-5 as a new project for the GEF, though for the Bank the two projects were treated as one single project comprising of the parent project (P083813) and additional financing (P127437). The GEF-3 project was designed to address the objectives of the GEF Operational Program 3: Forest Ecosystems. It was consistent with the objectives of this Operational Program by supporting threat remediation activities at selected Protected Area (PA) sites of high global significance and promoting the broad-based participation of local communities in activities undertaken in and around selected PAs. The project continued to be in line with the subsequent GEF-4 strategic objectives for biodiversity (Strategic Objective 1: Catalyzing Sustainability in Protected Area Systems). For GEF-5, the project was consistent with the goal of the GEF biodiversity focal area, which was the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and the maintenance of ecosystem goods and services. In particular, the project continued to align with the Strategic Objective #1 of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> 41474-ZR

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> There is currently no approved CPF for DRC. The next CPF is expected for FY21.



biodiversity focal area, which was to improve the sustainability of protected area systems. At appraisal, the overall project context therefore reflected two phases of the GEF (GEF-3 and GEF-5) in support of DRC's protected areas network.

#### Theory of Change (Results Chain)

9. The concept of Theory of Change (ToC) was not explicitly mentioned in the project documents or Project Appraisal Document (PAD). However, the ICR developed the following theory of change/results chain mapping to address the specific challenges in the targeted protected areas of DRC. In post-conflict DRC, there were several threats and barriers to the conservation of globally important biodiversity that were to be addressed by this project:


- (i) the government agency charged with administering PAs lacked institutional capacity at all levels;
- (ii) priority PAs faced specific threats that had to be addressed in the short and medium term in order to preserve their ecological integrity; and
- (iii) the PA system was insufficient to protect adequate samples of the DRC's globally significant biodiversity in the face of anticipated post-war development pressures.

10. The three components of this project were designed to address each of these threats. Although all national parks and protected areas in the DRC were in a crisis, the ICCN's program focused on the ten most important, accessible, and threatened PAs that had been prioritized based on a set of biological, socioeconomic, and feasibility criteria. This aimed to avoid dispersion of efforts, and to increase the chance of achieving greater impact in the key-sites. The overall ICCN strategy was to move upwards each protected area and its buffer zone from its current status to the next, at each five-year interval. This essentially meant three consecutive waves of progress over a total 15 years. Eventually, within about 15 years all protected areas and their buffer zones would come under sustainable management.



#### The World Bank

DRC GEF Financing to PREPAN Project (P083813)





11. The project was originally intended to support two of the prioritized ten protected areas, and their buffer zones, i.e. the Garamba National Park (NP) and the Mikeno Sector of the Virunga National Park. At the time, most biodiversity projects in DRC were still for "emergency" support, aimed at stemming the rate of biodiversity erosion until more stability was secured and substantial resources were mobilized. The GEF funding was designed to enable ICCN to move from this "crisis management" mode to a more stable mid- to long-term management strategy mode. For Garamba and Virunga, the proposed GEF intervention was necessary if these two parks and their flagship biodiversity were to be rescued from the war-related and postwar threats. Subsequently, the AF (i.e. the GEF-5 project) added support to a third PA (Kahuzi Biega NP), technical studies for further expansion of the PA system as well as support to the establishment of a Conservation Trust Fund (CTF).

#### **Project Development Objectives (PDOs)**

12. According to the Grant Agreement, the PDO and the Global Environment Objective of the Project<sup>3</sup> is "to enhance the Project Implementing Entity's capacity to manage targeted Protected Areas." <sup>4</sup>.

#### **Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators**

13. At the time of approval, the expected outcome *Capacity of the ICCN for management of targeted protected* areas *enhanced* was measured with the following four indicators:

**PDO Outcome Indicator 1**: ICCN is able to execute its budget and produce regular financial reports.

**PDO Outcome Indicator 2**: ICCN produces regular monitoring and evaluation reports, which include data on social impacts.

**PDO Outcome Indicator 3:** Five key bio-indicator species (rhinos, giraffes, gorillas, elephants, hippos) remain stable compared with baseline at start of project in targeted protected area.

**PDO Outcome Indicator 4:** Number of [4] technical studies and [number of] [4] stakeholder consultations conducted by ICCN to support the expansion of the national PA system.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For GEF purposes, the "Project" refers to both the original GEF-3 (P080813) and the AF in GEF 5 (P127437).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The PAD gives two slightly differently worded versions of the PDO (i) in the main text and results framework annex as:

<sup>&</sup>quot;enhanced ICCN capacity for management of targeted protected areas" with a footnote that the ICCN is the Project Implementing Entity; and (ii) in the data sheet as: "to enhance the capacity of the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN) for management of targeted protected areas." which was the one used in the Operations Portal and thus in the Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs).



#### Components

# <u>Component 1: Support to Institutional Rehabilitation (At appraisal GEF: US\$1.3 million). (GEF additional financing of US\$0.24 million, IDA additional financing of US\$0.75 million). Actual \$5.12 million</u>

14. This component consisted of the provision of equipment, technical assistance and training, and financing of operating costs to support the long term capacity rehabilitation of ICCN by: (i) rebuilding functional financial and administrative management capacity, including in the field of procurement; (ii) strengthening its capacity for coordination among conservation stakeholders, communication and awareness campaigns, monitoring and evaluation, and social impact management; and (iii) contribution to the development of a sustainable funding strategy.

## <u>Component 2: Support to National Parks (At appraisal GEF: \$4.5 m). (GEF additional financing of US\$4.0 million, IDA additional financing of US\$0.75 million, KfW parallel financing of US\$26 million). Actual US\$8.19million</u>

15. This component consisted of the provision of equipment, technical assistance and training, financing of operating costs, and carrying out of works, to support rehabilitation of the Garamba National Park and the Virunga National Park's Mikeno sector', by: (i) restoring the Project Implementing Entity's site-level basic human and material capacity; (ii) strengthening partnerships with non-governmental organizations; (iii) protecting and stabilizing the populations of key flagship species; (iv) supporting local consultations, participatory processes and increased local participation in income generating activities, such as hunting zone management and ecotourism, as well as other community development activities; and (v) monitoring of safeguards and implementation of mitigation measures under the project.

#### Component 3: Technical Studies and Consultations (At appraisal GEF; \$1.2 m). Actual US\$0.44million

16. This component consisted of the provision of equipment, technical assistance and training, and financing of operating costs, to strengthen ICCN's capacity to identify potential new PAS by: (i) technical studies, data analysis, stakeholder consultations and participatory mapping at the national level; and (ii) in consultation with national and international NGOs as well as university organizations, studies, consultations, and participatory mapping in two pilot areas. During additional financing, funds were used to support critical technical initiatives needed for ICCN to continue efforts to manage and extend the DRC's protected area network, particularly in support to Lomami and Itombwe parks.

#### <u>NEW Component 4: Okapi Fund Establishment and Capitalization (GEF AF \$7.4m, IDA AF \$1.5m, KfW (parallel) co-</u> <u>financing of \$19.2m). Actual US\$7.8 million</u>

17. This component was introduced under the GEF-5 AF for the establishment of the CTF, the "Okapi Fund".

#### B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)

18. Additional Financing (AF) of an additional IDA grant of SDR 2.0 million (US\$ 3.0 equivalent) and a GEF-5 grant of US\$11.64 million were approved by the Board of the World Bank in November 2013. Of this, Components 1 and 2 received funds to expand existing activities to enhance capacity of ICCN for management of PAs. Component 4 was added to the original design to make operational a CTF, building on work under Component 1, which provided analytical support to



ICCN to investigate establishing a Trust Fund for National Parks, which in turn came from work the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) had presented in 2007. Component 3 remained unaffected by the AF. The closing date was also extended to December 31, 2018.

19. A restructuring was conducted in 2018 to amend the legal agreement to update the conditions that must be met for capitalization of the Okapi Fund to occur; the original conditions reflected an incorrect view of how the Fund would function. A final restructuring was needed to amend the legal agreements to remove several unnecessary disbursement conditions for the capitalization (there in insufficient time to do both in the same restructuring). The extension was to also allow additional time for ICCN to support the operational costs of the Okapi Fund in 2019.

#### **Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets**

20. The PDO remained the same with the first June 2013 restructuring and with the AF.

21. In the June 2013 restructuring, PDO Outcome Indicator 1 was changed to "ICCN able to execute the budget received from both the Government and the project and produces annual financial reports on overall execution in accordance with international accounting standards" and PDO Outcome Indicators 2 "ICCN produces regular monitoring and evaluations reports, which include data on social impacts" and 3 "Number of technical studies and stakeholder consultations conducted by ICCN to support the expansion of the national PA system" were dropped.

22. At AF restructuring, PDO Outcome Indicator 1 was further changed to "ICCN publishes annual internal audits covering all funds managed by ICCN in accordance with international accounting standards.". A new outcome target was added: "Percentage of overall conservation ODA for the DRC directed to the Okapi Fund" under a new Component 4.

#### **Revised Results Indicators**

23. During the AF restructuring, several new results indicators were introduced:

- Percentage of ICCN staff that have a written job description and are evaluated on its basis (Comp. 1)
- ICCN publishes all agreements, contracts and protocols entered into with its public and private partners for the financing of all centralized or decentralized ICCN operations (Comp.1)
- Areas brought under enhanced biodiversity protection for Virunga, Garamba and Kahuzi-Biega.
- Botanical gardens producing a satisfactory annual report and business plan [each year] (Comp. 2d)
- Project supports necessary studies for establishment of at least 2 new PAs (Comp. 3) Percentage of disbursements programmed by the Okapi Fund Board actually made (Comp. 4)

#### **Revised Components**

24. Though a breakdown of the Component 2 to cover the two national parks was implied from the beginning, for clarity, support to individual National Parks under Component 2 were given their own sub-components as follows in the June 2013 restructuring:

Sub-Component 2.1: Support to Virunga National Park

Sub-Component 2.2: Support to Garamba National Park



25. Additional new sub-components were introduced during the AF:

Sub-Component 2.3: Additional Priority PAs [Kahuzi-Biega National Park] [AF]

Sub-Component 2.4: Support to the Botanical Garden System [AF]

26. This sub-component aimed to aid by developing business plans and limited investments for revenue-generating activities through ecotourism to DRC's four botanical gardens to strengthen ICCN's financial situation.

**Component 4:** Okapi Fund Establishment and Capitalization (GEF additional financing of US\$7.4 million, IDA additional financing of US\$1.5 million, KfW parallel financing of US\$ 7.4 million and EUR 15 million)

27. A significant portion of the AF was to go toward the establishment of a conservation trust fund, the Okapi Fund, in order to help ensure long-term sustainable financing of the country's park network.

**Sub-Component 4.1:** Okapi Fund Establishment (IDA additional financing of US\$0.1 million).

28. This sub-component sought to legally establish the fund as a charity under UK law and seek recognition as a foreign charity with legal capacity to operate in the DRC.

**Sub-Component 4.2:** Okapi Fund Capacity Building (IDA additional financing of US\$1.4 million, KfW parallelfinancing of US\$1 million).

29. This new sub-component was designed to build the capacity of the Fund's directors, members, and staff to effectively set up and administer the fund.

**Sub-Component 4.3:** Okapi Fund Capitalization (GEF additional financing of US\$7.4 million, KfW parallel financing of US\$18.2 million)

30. The fund was structured as a hybrid fund, US\$14.8 million of which was to be endowed capital with another US\$10.8 million of endowed capital that can be accessed if earnings in the financial markets are not adequate to generate a pre-determined annual amount of funding (exclusively from KfW), for a total of US\$25.6 million. This sub-component's disbursement was subject to the condition that the Okapi Fund can legally receive funds.

#### Table 1: Reallocation of funds.

Component name	Cost at appraisal (US\$ millions)	Revised cost at June 2013 restructuring (US\$ millions)	Revised cost at GEF-5 AF restructuring (US\$ millions)
1. Support to Institutional Rehabilitation	1.3	2.6	3.59
2. Support to National Parks	4.5	3.9	8.65



3.: Technical Studies and	1.2	0.5	0.5	
Consultations				
4. Okapi Fund	N/A	N/A	8.9	
Establishment and				
Capitalization				
Total	7.0	7.0	21.64	

#### **Other Changes**

31. Component 1 was reallocated for ICCN to be able to ensure the viability of its administrative and financial management unit until the close of the project. For Component 2, the reallocated funds resulted in a reduction of funds to Virunga and maintenance of funding for Garamba National Park. With Component 3, a few low-priority investments such as the identification of new protected areas were removed to increase funding for other major activities. Project activities in Obenge and Lomami National Parks, supporting ICCN in working with local communities, were maintained.

32. As the expected overall implementation period of the project with the AF was expected to be from April 2, 2009 to December 31, 2018, i.e. just under 9 years and 9 months, an interim ICR was not prepared at the time as is requested for AF that will extend the implementation period over 10 years.

#### Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

33. The creation of the CTF supported the PDO and preparatory work for the CTF was introduced already in the original project design. The AF was regarded as more cost-efficient as opposed to preparing a wholly new project for the CTF. The Fund was envisioned to support Component 2 by provision of funding to newly established parks. This would have materialized after 2-3 years of return on investment on the fund capital.

#### II. OUTCOME

#### A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

#### Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

#### 34. Relevance is rated high.

35. **The PDO remains relevant.** The rationale for the Bank's assistance to DRC at the time of appraisal was outlined in the CAS of December 2008. This CAS built upon three of the five pillars of the PRSP adopted in 2006. The forest reform agenda, which included the rehabilitation of protected areas, was an integral part of the PRSP and the CAS. The Government's National Program on Environment, Forests, Water and Biodiversity called for the development and management of a network on protected areas with international standards. This objective continued through the current CPF 2013-2016, in place until end of FY17. The next CFP is planned for FY21, and the underlying Systemic Country



Diagnostic (SCD) continues to call for improving the governance of the natural resources sector as a key for the country's economic and social development. The project was consistent with key elements of the CAS, with respect to natural resource management, community-driven development, and improved governance and institutional strengthening.

36. Consistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity's (CBD) Strategic Plan, the goal of the GEF's 6<sup>th</sup> biodiversity strategy (2014-2018) was to maintain globally significant biodiversity and the ecosystem goods and services that it provides to society. The goal of the current GEF-7 biodiversity focal area strategy (2018-2022) is to maintain globally significant biodiversity in landscapes and seascapes. To achieve this goal, GEF investments will contribute to the following three objectives:

- BD-1: Mainstream biodiversity across sectors as well as landscapes and seascapes;
- BD-2: Address direct drivers to protect habitats and species; and
- BD-3: Further develop biodiversity policy and institutional frameworks.

37. At closing, under these GEF-7 biodiversity objectives, PREPAN remained relevant with regards to biodiversity objective BD-1.

#### **B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)**

#### Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

#### PDO Outcome: Capacities of the ICCN for management of targeted protected areas enhanced

38. According to the PAD, the project aimed to enhance ICCN's overall capacity in the field and at national level. The project would also strengthen coordination among partners, help rehabilitate two priority national parks and their buffer zones, help develop constructive relationships with local communities and provide support for the expansion of the existing protected areas network. However, this "enhanced capacity" was not fully described.

39. The institutional capacity of ICCN headquarters in Kinshasa was improved with capacity building in human resources management (training of HR managers and, including for the first time, adoption of personnel performance management tools), development of financial management and procurement capacity and development of its first administrative manual and creation of an internal audit unit. A new computerized accounting system and asset management system was installed and training for its use provided. An ICCN website<sup>5</sup> was developed and launched. The project funded several official missions of the General Directorate of ICCN to participate in sessions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, CITES and UNFCCC. The project also funded the organization of meetings of the Coalition for Conservation in Congo (CoCoCongo) platform for advocacy of conservation activities. The project also paid for the purchase of vehicles for ICCN use including three minibuses, two pick-ups and a vehicle for the use of ICCN Director General. PREPAN also supported the preparation of regulatory texts for 14 NPs. But overall capacity building at ICCN central level was modest beyond these achievements based on interviews and evidences provided by ICCN in their completion report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> https://www.iccnrdc.org/index.html



40. As part of efforts to improve relations with local communities and indigenous peoples, the project supported the construction of 23 houses for the Pygmy community around Virunga NP in Nuabirehe. Equipment and uniforms were provided for 300 community guards. School tuition fees were paid for 176 Pygmy children as well as uniforms provided. The project helped with the legal requirements for the creation of the Nyabirehe Pygmy Association (APN); completion of the boundary work on the acquired land and registration and obtaining of legal documents (cadastres and land titles) with the authorities concerned. The project provided medical equipment to a health center, which will benefit both the local community and the Pygmy population. In Garamba, the project strengthened the capacities of the Community Conservation Committees to better monitor, document and produce and disseminate reports on governance of natural resources, local development and conflict management. Environmental education was also provided to 8,000 people from the community. The project provided support to the running of a dispensary for the benefit of the local community and the families of the park staff. In Kahuzi-Biega NP, the project financed a process to ameliorate the conflicts in the area and seek redress for the hardships experienced by the indigenous peoples (IPs) following the creation of the park leading to the Bukavu declaration.

41. Capacity in the NPs was strengthened by training of guards, provision of basic infrastructure and vehicles as summarized below in Table 4. The Virunga Foundation was created in 2013 and continues to manage the NP. ICCN entered into delegated management contracts with Frankfurt Zoological Society (ZSL) in May 2010 and African Parks Network (APN). However, the contract with APN was delayed until July 31, 2011. The major Component 2 investments in both Garamba NP and in Virunga NP, were delayed and occasionally interrupted by outbreaks of civil strife and poor security conditions. The first disbursement on the contract with APN in Garamba NP did not take place until February 2012, several years later than initially planned. APN also had a long-term concession with ICCN which allowed them to operate the park, but it expired in late 2013. APN was thus for a while operating in a "legal void". Towards the end of 2014, a long-term concession agreement was finally signed between ICCN and APN. FZS completed the bulk of their planned investments in Virunga NP and exited the park and project by early 2014 – partially due to the civil strife in the area. This left \$400,000 remaining, which was planned to be disbursed to benefit Pygmy populations. Progress for allocation of land to Pygmy communities was stalled in late 2014 due to slow action by the local government of North Kivu province.

Virunga NP	Construction of 7 houses for park rangers.				
	• Training of 50 eco-guards, rations and operational costs (including fuel) for 35 eco-guard				
	GIS system and maps for Mikeno sector.				
	<ul> <li>Procurement of electric fence for 54km perimeter for the Mikeno sector.</li> </ul>				
	<ul> <li>Construction of 23 houses for Pygmy indigenous peoples.</li> </ul>				
Garamba NP	<ul> <li>Training provided for 80 park staff. Rations and fuel provided.</li> </ul>				
	Housing (3 blocks) for park guards built.				
	Hangar for a helicopter built.				
	<ul> <li>300 km of paths and 5 new airstrips were opened</li> </ul>				
Kahuzi-Biega NP	Construction of 5 houses in Tshivanga,				
	<ul> <li>Construction of 3 patrol posts in Tshibati, Musenyi and Madiri.</li> </ul>				
	<ul> <li>Construction of 5 houses of eco-guards in in Itebero.</li> </ul>				

#### Table 2: Strengthening of National Parks.



	<ul> <li>Construction of 6 bungalows in Tshivanga.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Development of the park headquarters in Tshivanga.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Purchase of 5 pick-ups and provided maintenance to strengthen surveillance.</li> </ul>
Botanical	<ul> <li>Construction of 10 cottages at the Botanical Garden Kisantu.</li> </ul>
Gardens	<ul> <li>Building a tent equipped for the Botanical Garden of Kinshasa.</li> </ul>

42. **PDO Outcome Indicator 1:** ICCN publishes annual internal audits covering all funds managed by ICCN in accordance with international accounting standards. (AF) **Target partially achieved**.

43. Internal audits have been produced and shared with the Bank and development partners, such as KfW, but they have not been "published" and made public. Thus, the indicator is only partially achieved. As there is no quantitative target to evaluate, a result of 50% is given to indicate the audits were done but not published. Publication would have signaled that ICCN was committed to transparency, and thus lack of publication carries with it more weight than just missing of a step in the process.

#### 44. Linked intermediate indicators:.

- Percentage of ICCN staff that have a written job description and are evaluated on its basis. **Target partially achieved**.
- ICCN publishes all agreements, contracts and protocols entered into with its public and private partners for the financing of all centralized or decentralized ICCN operations. **Target partially achieved**.

45. A performance management system was introduced at ICCN (General Management, Garamba NPKahuzi-Biega NP. Virunga NP, Lomami NP, Salonga NP, Kundelungu NP, Upemba NP, Itombwe Reserve, the Okapi Wildlife Reserve, Kinshasa and Kisantu Botanical Gardens, the Ngiri Triangle Reserve, the Lomako Yokokala Wildlife Reserve as well as the Bili Uere reserve and hunting area) with a performance bonus, which encouraged staff to achieve the strategic objectives. Job evaluations were done when there was funding for performance bonuses in 2015 and 2016 from external sources but not in 2017-2019. Contracts and agreements have been shared with the Bank but not published. Thus, the indicator is only partially achieved. The same comments on the lack of publication from the PDO indicator also apply here.

46. **PDO Outcome Indicator 2:** Five key bio-indicator species (rhinos, giraffes, gorillas, elephants, hippos) remain stable compared with baseline at start of project in targeted protected areas. (Phase 1 and AF) **Target partially achieved** 

47. Based on the reports<sup>6</sup> reviewed, the populations of gorillas are gradually stabilizing with Virunga reporting an increase of Gorillas from 92 (2011) to 127 (2017). Garamba reported an increase of Giraffes: 79 (2007), 22 (2012), 42 (2014) and 47 (2017), but this may be due to their movement in and out of the park. The continuous decline in elephants and hippos from poaching remains alarming. Elephants in Garamba declined from 3,696 (2007) to 1,181 (2017) and in Virunga remained at an estimated 300-400 individuals, as elephants were not monitored due to their migratory tendencies. Hippos in Garamba declined dramatically from 2,814 (2012) to 860 (2014) and 1,400 (2017) due to poaching by guerilla groups as they did in Virunga after an initial recovery with 1208 (2010), 1454 (2013), 2406 (2015) and 1843 (2017) individuals. After 2008 no rhinos had been counted in Garamba. Additional efforts to improve security (to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Garamba NP Aerial Survey Report, April 2017 and Virunga NP Flagship species report 2018



discourage armed guerilla groups and poachers) in protected areas and food security through agricultural micro-projects in its surroundings are needed to save wildlife in general, and elephants in particular. However, the stabilization of these species was in hindsight clearly beyond the scope of this project, and reports of poaching and park rangers being ambushed and killed continue -- as recently as April 2020 when 12 park rangers and civilians were attacked and killed by armed rebels.

#### 48. Linked intermediate indicators:

- Increasing METT score for Virunga (Mikeno sector) Target fully achieved<sup>7</sup>.
- Increasing METT score for Garamba. Target fully achieved.
- Increasing METT score for Kahuzi-Biega Target not achieved.
- Areas (ha) brought under enhanced biodiversity protection in Virunga (Mikeno Sector) **Target not** achieved.
- Areas (ha) brought under enhanced biodiversity protection in Garamba Target not achieved.
- Areas (ha) brought under enhanced biodiversity protection in Kahuzi-Biega. Target not achieved.
- Botanical gardens producing a satisfactory annual report and business plan. Target fully achieved.
- Project supports necessary studies and investments for establishment of at least 2 new PAs. Target fully achieved.

49. METT scores for Garamba increased from 39 (baseline) to 60 (2015) to 68 (2018). Virunga scores increased from 39 (baseline) to 59 (2015) but no METT review was conducted in 2018 as the activities in the park had already ended and funds were being channeled for IP support activities. Kahuzi-Biega gained a METT score of 72 (2015) and 68 (2018) and Lomami<sup>8</sup> a score of 60 in 2018. The two botanical gardens (Botanique de Kisantu and Kinshasa) produced annual reports that were deemed satisfactory to the Bank.

50. Studies and reports were conducted for the establishment of the Lomami National Park (LNP) and Itombwe National Reserve (INR). Both were formally established. For the INR, the project supported a socio-economic study. The study supplemented existing data on the reserve in order to modify the Minister's order on the new limits of the official classification of this reserve but also to map the indigenous peoples living in this forest. The Governor of South Kivu issued a decree 6/026 / GP / SK on 20/06/2016 to formalize the boundaries of the reserve and thus formally create the reserve. The LNP was created formally through the decree 16/024 on July 19, 2016 by the Prime Minister. The project supported a major study on the Resettlement of Obenge Populations, which allowed ICCN to better understand the current situation and needs of the local communities and advocate for improvements in community infrastructure, for example. The resettlement plan served as a guide for the resettlement of local communities living in Obenge, a landlocked village within the boundaries of the Lomami NP.

51. **PDO Outcome Indicator 3:** Percentage [25%] of overall conservation ODA for the DRC directed to the Okapi Fund. (AF) **Target not achieved.** 

52. The Okapi Fund was successfully registered as a charity in the United Kingdom on November 28, 2013<sup>9</sup> and operationalized with the issuance of a Prime Minister's decree as explained earlier in the document and capitalized on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> It should be noted that no METT analysis was done in Virunga in 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Lomami's METT score was not part of the results framework.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/08794664

December 31, 2019. The Fund is currently operational with a capital of EUR 14 million and US\$ 7.4 million. However, as the Fund was only operationalized (i.e. authorization to operate in DRC and signature of accords between the Government and the Fund to receive funds from the World Bank) on the last day of the project, no funds – ODA or otherwise—have yet to be directed to the Fund, save for the initial committed capital. Whereas there is potential for the Fund achieve its intended purpose and disburse funds in the future, there are already reports of friction between ICCN and the Fund in allocation of assets for the use of the Fund, for example.

#### 53. Linked intermediate indicators:

• Percentage of disbursements programmed by the Okapi Fund Board actually made. Target not achieved.

54. As the Okapi Fund was only operationalized and capitalized on the day the project closed, no disbursements were made prior to project closing. However, it should be noted that the Fund is now operational and has the potential to play an important role in helping national parks in DRC get the funding they are currently lacking after investment income so allows.

#### Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating

55. **Efficacy is rated Modest**. The project succeeded in supporting some increase in capacity of ICCN (though the documentation of this via publication of reports, audits and contracts was not achieved), but there is very little tangible evidence of how this capacity building manifested itself beyond some improvement in administrative functions. The project also saw increase of the METT scores in some parks as well as mixed results with stabilization of key target species populations. The Okapi Fund was successfully established and capitalized but as this was achieved only to the end of the project (i.e. on December 31, 2019), there was no time for it to provide the support envisioned. However, there is an expectation for the Fund to start disbursing funds in 2-3 years in support of protected areas in the country, but this cannot be verified ex ante.

#### **C. EFFICIENCY**

#### Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

56. No efficiency analysis was done for the Original GEF-3 Project as "economic benefits from improved management of protected areas and conservation of biodiversity were hard to assess, especially in the case of DRC due to limited reliable data." According to the PAD, economic benefits generated by the project "would result partly from the value that the international community assigns to biodiversity in DRC". They would also result from improved long-term availability of natural resources and ecotourism, but "will depend on progress in several areas that fall beyond the scope of the project". However, a GEF incremental cost analysis was prepared per the requirement for GEF financed projects. This GEF incremental cost analysis was recalculated at the time of the AF and the GEF alternative provided financing that catalyzed funding from other donors. Despite the delay in setting up the Okapi Fund, due to the involvement of the GEF/World Bank, the Fund was capitalized and the GEF alternative has amounted to US\$133 million (compared to US\$135 million at



the time of the AF approval). By investing an incremental US\$11.6 million for the GEF alternative through the Project, the GEF leveraged an additional US\$15.5 million from Germany to support the Okapi Fund, US\$2.8 million from IDA, and US\$0.9 million in NP revenues from those supported by the Project for a total investment of US\$37.9 million. The incremental value added in the GEF alternative with comparison to the baseline is provided in Table 5 below and the full assumptions and estimations are presented in Annex 4.

#### Table 3: Baseline and Incremental Funding (US\$) (at Project Completion)

	Government	Forest Investment Program (FIP)	GEF-3	GEF-5	IDA	Other	Total
Baseline	2,380,000	41,757,788	0	0	0	50,500,000	94,637,788
Incremental	925,781	0	6,999,899	11,632,698	2,767,489	15,542,461	37,868,328
Total	3,305,781	41,757,788	6,999,899	11,632,698	2,767,489	66,042,461	132,506,116

57. In 2014, an Economic Analysis, including a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that estimated Net Present Value (NPV) and Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was carried for the approval of the additional financing (AF). The assumptions and estimations are presented in Annex 4, along with the re-calculated CBA at completion. At the time of the approval of the AF, the project's EIRR over a 20-year period was estimated at 18 percent, and, using a discount rate of 10 percent, it was estimated that an NPV of US\$8.67 million would be generated for the economy. At closing, based on its achievements and incurred costs and expected future benefits and costs as described in the previous section, the development impact of the Project was recalculated and the EIRR, over the same timeframe as for the AF (20-years), is estimated to be 11 percent. Using the same discount rate as the one used for the AF (10 percent), the NPV is estimated to be US\$0.96 million. Had we used a 6.5 percent rate of discount, that is consistent with the World Bank Guidance for discount rate for Economic Analysis (based on Ramsey formula, see next paragraph), the NPV would be US\$7.23 million which is closer to the NPV estimated at the time of the AF. Note also, that this 6.5 discount rate is larger than the 6 percent rate used, as per World Bank Guidance, for the CBA of projects that generate global co-benefits for the environment, as it the case for this project.

58. While this latter estimates are below the ones calculated at the time of the AF, they are still remarkable given the difficult environment in which the Project operates which (i) makes the running costs of the parks significantly higher due to the need for more intensive and extensive patrolling of the area to reduce poaching and other illegal activities in the NPs; (ii) reduces the number of visitors to the parks due to lack of security, which was intensified during many of the years in which the project was implemented due to the conflicts in the NPs areas, and other exogenous impacts such as the Ebola outbreaks; and (iii) delayed the operationalization of the Okapi Fund. Considering the principles of welfare economics, based on the Ramsey formula, the discount rate may be taken as twice the expected long-term average growth rate in per capita income An ERR of 11 percent is considerable, however, in the context of the country as its real GDP per capital annual growth rate has been 3.25 percent for the years of project implementation (from 2014 to 2017, the latest year for which there is data).

#### Implementation efficiency



59. Overall design and implementation efficiency experienced some shortcomings. The design of an AF to build on the parent Project was deemed efficient in terms of continuing to build the ICCN capacities rather than starting a new project. Though the design was straightforward, it was overly optimistic, however, as it expected that the Okapi Fund would be operational by September 2014 but that did not happen until December 2017. Thus, the Project required a one-year extension of the closing date established at the time of the AF to allow for additional time for the Okapi Fund to be capitalized. This delay meant that the Okapi Fund revenues that were expected to support the two NPs starting in 2015 will not be available until 2022 or 2023 and the forgone opportunity of other contributions that were, at the time of the AF, expected to be directed to the Fund. The project spanned over 10 years, although only one additional year of what was expected at the time of the AF, which is not exceptional given the country circumstances during project implementation, especially the operating conditions in the eastern DRC were extremely challenging due to breakouts of violence by armed groups as well as outbreaks of Ebola.

60. While in terms of overall costs, there were no cost overruns, there was a significant increase of the funds used for Component 1 (more than 40 percent higher), while the expenditures for setting up the Okapi Fund were significantly lower (more than 75% lower) and the amount to support the NPs was about the same as the estimated at the appraisal of the AF (3 percent lower). ICCN struggled to carry out procurement tasks in a timely manner, and due to lack of organization, contracts were signed with delays.

61. **Efficiency is rated Modest**. The Project experienced implementation inefficiencies, especially the prolonged delay in establishing of the Okapi Fund, that required a one-year extension and costed the project in revenues and forgone opportunities for donor funding. However, there were no cost overruns and the ERR and NPV estimated at completion, although at 11 percent and US\$0.96 million, lower than those estimated at the AF appraisal, they are still remarkable given the difficult environment in which the project operates. Furthermore, an ERR of 11 percent is considerable, however, in the context of the DRC. Ultimately, three years of the project was needlessly spent on waiting for a decree to be issued by the Government to allow the Okapi Fund to operate in the country, which negatively impacts overall efficiency.

#### D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

62. Due to the Efficiency rating being Modest, Efficacy being Modest and Relevance High, the ICR Guidelines would advise to rate the overall outcome **Moderately Unsatisfactory** because of the Modest Efficacy rating (Substantial or higher Efficacy needed for Moderately Satisfactory overall outcome rating).

#### E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

#### Gender

63. The objectives of the project did not specifically target gender aspects but did support stakeholder engagement of rural populations to increase participation in decision-making processes, access to community infrastructure and social services and support to alternative livelihoods provided by the project. The purchase of medicines for the Nagera Health Center (PNG) was a success, given the high number of women beneficiaries who use it (more than 3,000 women per year).



#### **Institutional Strengthening**

64. Component 1 targeted specifically the strengthening of institutional capacities at ICCN. Whereas the Bank would usually ask for an independent project management/implementation unit to be established, with the PREPAN project, the project was to be managed from within the ICCN itself, relying on –for the most part—ICCN staff. Early on, it was noted that with capacity very low at ICCN, several key tasks would need to be conducted with outside support. Throughout the project, ICCN capacity was augmented in terms of financial and administrative management, the establishment of a procurement unit, the improvement of knowledge (administrative and financial management, environmental and social safeguards in the process of learning, training eco-guards, etc.) and the support provided to the staff performance system. However, this support was, for the most part, externalized, with external support provided for monitoring and evaluation, procurement, safeguards and financial management. In addition, the EU provided support for the institutional reform of ICCN until November 2011 and KfW paid for a financial management consultant. An international social development expert provided a training program to reinforce ICCN's conservation role. An externalized procurement consultant provided training to ICCN's procurement unit. How much of this increased capacity remains at ICCN is difficult to determine and the indicators provided in the results framework only give an indication as to the increased capacity of ICCN. Furthermore, even these indicators provided were not achieved.

#### **Mobilizing Private Sector Financing**

65. The establishment of the Okapi Fund allows for a vehicle to receive private sector funding going forward. Towards the end of the project, no private sector financing had materialized in the Fund. However, the project has been instrumental in mobilizing and leveraging private sector financing to National Parks that were supported, especially Virunga. This was so successful that project funding was reallocated to other uses after other funding sources, including visitor fees, was found to more than adequately cover the operation of the park. Overall the share of funds from ecotourism continue to be low.

#### **Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity**

66. The project did not have a direct poverty reduction goal, but communities surrounding the PAs are indirectly expected to benefit from increased visitor flows as well as corporate social responsibility -type initiatives that the parks are planning with increased budget available. For example, in Virunga, hydropower is being promoted by park management to increase energy access to local communities and provide opportunities for productive activities.

#### **Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts**

67. As mentioned in the efficacy section, the project supported the construction of 23 houses for the pygmy community around Virunga NP. However, the ICR mission observed that the houses were only partially occupied, and several pygmies voiced dissatisfaction with the houses as, although well-constructed, were reportedly uncomfortably hot inside. Furthermore, several pygmy community members said they preferred sleeping on the bare ground and not on the



concrete floor of the houses. The houses are owned by a pygmy association and even if the houses did not meet expectations of many IP community members, the association could lease empty houses out to other local community members or use them for housing a school, shop or pharmacy, for example. However, the houses also create a possibility for conflict with local villagers, as the houses are more attractive than many seen in the non-IP community and can lead to elite capture within the IP community.

#### **III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME**

#### A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

68. **Realism of objectives:** Many NPs in the country were facing crises of biodiversity loss due to institutional weaknesses, lack of adequate funding and conflict-related threats. Open conflict and security concerns as well as the free movement of several of the key indicator species in and out of the parks (mainly elephants and giraffes) made the hopes of conducting reliable counting of the key indicator species unrealistic. ICCN and MECNT sought to replace ad-hoc funding with more sustainable funding strategy, through ecotourism promotion and creating of the CTF. As the majority of the steps needed to establish the Okapi Fund had already been completed at time of the AF, the Fund was expected to be operational and capitalized towards the end of 2014, i.e. approximately one year was given assuming the necessary decree to enable the Fund to operate in the country would be issued without complications. As the decree to operate ultimately took another three years, achieving the objectives under Component 3 were not realistic in the timeframe envisioned.

69. **Simplicity of Design**: The design of the project itself was straightforward and did not impact negatively the achievement of the objectives. However, as was noted above, the challenge of operating in an open conflict environment, which also included the emergence of Ebola<sup>10</sup> in 2017 and 2018-2020, led to a more complicated implementation than the simple design had anticipated.

70. **Results Framework**: The results framework adopted during preparation set out to reflect achievement of ICCN's improved capacity for management of targeted PAs. However, the indicators chosen were not flowing logically, and there was a disconnect with the intended objectives and the indicators formulated to lead towards them. An attempt to improve them was carried out at mid-term. As mentioned above, the use of key indicator species abundance was not a very useful indicator. The METT tool provided a reasonable way to evaluate the overall improvement over time in management of a single park but was less useful in measuring conservation results or comparing across parks<sup>11</sup>.

71. **Risks**: Risks of the project were rated as Substantial during preparation. Identified high and substantial risks included political instability and armed conflict in Eastern DRC, insufficient participation in consultations by local communities, lack of procurement and financial management capacity at ICCN. Fraud and corruption

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> https://www.who.int/health-topics/ebola/#tab=tab\_1

METT Handbook – A guide to using the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT). WWF 2016.



were not identified as major risks at appraisal but was highlighted as risks in the AF project paper, though perceived more as something possibly related to the operation of the Okapi Fund.

#### **B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION**

#### Factors subject to government and/or implementing entities control

72. **Commitment and leadership**: Weak budgetary support from the Government hampered successful implementation. 91% of ICCN's budget comes from external sources<sup>12</sup>. This lack of support manifested itself in low salaries and poor morale, and externally funded performance bonuses were relied on to improve performance. The inconsistent and weak efforts to produce required monitoring reports from the beginning to 2016 showed a lack of commitment *by ICCN* to take seriously the monitoring and reporting commitments required by the World Bank. Partially this was due to genuine lack of capacity, but also reflected low motivation when such additional work was given to government staff rather than hiring dedicated staff. Secondly, the general lack of support to ICCN from the Government, as exemplified above, led ICCN to experience serious difficulties in securing core operational funding to carry out their functions. For these reasons, the Bank supported reallocating an important amount to Component 1 to sustain ICCN, pending resolution of longer-term funding challenges for the institution.

73. **Legislation and regulations**: The critical component of the Okapi Fund introduced as part of the AF restructuring rested on strong support from the Government in passing the required decree to allow the fund to operate in DRC. Initially, there existed confusion as to who would be able to issue the decree -- the President or the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's consent was proving more difficult to obtain an electoral year. General elections were originally scheduled for November 27, 2016, but were delayed with a promise to hold them by the end of 2017. The delays in obtaining the decree was clearly communicated on several occasions to the Government and included the support of World Bank management to eventually resolve. The decree<sup>13</sup> was finally issued on December 4, 2017 allowing for the remaining tasks in the set-up of the Fund to resume.

74. **Fiduciary**: Based on an assessment of ICCN Financial Management (FM) capacity during pre-appraisal, a project FM unit was set up in ICCN. FM support was initially provided by an external consultant and this consultant was later appointed as the Finance Director at ICCN which was an important achievement that allowed progress to be made in improving ICCN's financial management procedures. Recruitment of internal and external auditors, however, were concluded almost two years after the approval of the project. In general, financial management was poorly administered, with low responsiveness and poor-quality financial reports that had to be sent back for revisions. The last financial report from the project was from September 30, 2019. Reasons for the poor performance are partly due to low motivation, stemming from differences in government staff and consultant pay as well as availability of "motivation" payments for ICCN staff.

<sup>12</sup> https://www.iccnrdc.org/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Decree 17/017



75. **Safeguards**: ICCN capacity on safeguards was hampered by staff turnover and delays in hiring staff, resulting in delays in the preparation of safeguard instruments. For example, for Involuntary Resettlement, it took more than a year for ICCN to submit acceptable upgraded safeguard frameworks. In the end of 2015, the project finally engaged a full-time environmental specialist consultant, for the first time since the project initiated. As a result, better attention started being paid to environmental safeguard issues and these were being reported on to the Bank. There were initial delays in recruiting the national social development specialist as the one recruited resigned to take a country director position at an international NGO in the country. Both the project's social and environmental safeguard specialists were unfortunately no longer with the project in early 2017 (one because of his sudden and unexpected death, the other because of termination for unethical behavior). The replacement of the national social development expert remained pending after almost one year. Reporting on safeguards compliance left room for improvement.

76. **Monitoring and evaluation**: The project had deficiencies in monitoring and reporting of progress to the Bank. Project implementation was downgraded in March 2014 to Moderately Unsatisfactory in the Implementation Status Report (ISR) due to "lack of compliance with key technical requirements of project implementation", including reporting on safeguards compliance, progress reports and poor reporting on monitoring indicators. The first progress report was not provided until February 2014. Progress reports for the second half of 2015 (submitted in April 2016) included "no updates", despite extensive interactions with the project team on this point. The World Bank, at that point, suggested ICCN hire a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) expert. In early 2017, M&E was downgraded to Unsatisfactory in the ISR because although being reported in the progress report for the first time in several years (for first half of 2016), the quality of the data provided continued to be poor. After the M&E expert was hired, M&E generally improved.

#### Factors subject to World Bank control

77. **Adequacy of supervision:** The Bank carried out regular supervision with Task Team Leader (TTLs) based in Washington DC until the retirement of the second TTL, following which the TTL responsibility moved to the country office for the last year of implementation. The first TTL was responsible for the preparation and implementation support until late 2012. A co-TTL (also Washington-based) was involved from late 2015 to mid-2017. Following initial delays in progress, the Task Team started to hold weekly meetings with ICCN, as they were holding in the first year of the project. Travel to North Kivu province was at times restricted due to conflict, so missions to the field could not always be undertaken, which impacted negatively the efficiency of support. World Bank safeguards specialists were not always available to participate in missions, which was unfortunate as ICCN was also having considerable difficulty in recruiting their own Environment and Social specialists.

78. **Adequacy of reporting:** ISRs were submitted biannually, except for the last year (2019), when only one ISR for the project was submitted in July 2019. Altogether 18 ISRs were submitted. Missions were summarized in extensive Aide Memoires with tables of agreed actions summarized in annexes.

#### Factors outside the control of government and/or implementing entities



79. **Conflict and instability:** The Eastern DRC is a region which suffers from armed conflict by various rebel groups, including the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the March 23 Movement (M23). In the North Kivu region for example, during the MTR, visits to Gramaba NP were not possible due to the security situation. At MTR, it was agreed to restructure the project to discontinue working in the Virunga NP, in an area of active warfare in late 2012. The M23 Movement and the Congolese army fought sporadically throughout the project implementation period between 2012 and 2013 in the project implementation area. In addition to the human toll of these acts of violence, rebel groups regularly engage in poaching using automatic weapons.

#### IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

#### A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

#### M&E Design

80. **M&E design** was relatively straightforward, though it was difficult to establish outcome indicators that would adequately measure increase in capacity at the ICCN, as capacity is mostly qualitative and difficult to measure or beyond the scope of the project – for example ICCN having sufficient operating budget provided by the Government. The indicators measuring ICCN's capacity were revised during mid-term to aim for more qualitative means to measure capacity, which included financial management capacity and transparency.

81. The indicators on stability of animal populations were problematic for two reasons. Firstly, as previously noted, key indicator species population stability does not contribute to increasing ICCN capacity for management of protected areas, but rather to the METT score. Also, such indicators are now widely recognized to be not very useful because of the tremendous difficulties measuring reliable values and the difficult of interpreting changes and attributing any measured changes to any specific influence. Also, there is ambiguity about when a NP can move from one "METT category" to another as this was not fully explained in the PAD. The METT categories given in the monitoring manual were 1= (0-35), 2= (36-75) and 3= (76-100). However, it was not clear what score a park would need to achieve in order to be considered having achieved "enhanced biodiversity protection". As explained earlier, the METT score is better at measuring relative improvement of a single PA and they are not fully comparable across multiple PAs. Also mentioned earlier, METT scores may have been better placed as PDO level indicators, where stabilized species populations would have fed into the METT score and further towards the PDO. Equally, at AF stage, the introduction of support to botanical gardens and studies for establishment of new NPs did not logically flow to the PDO outcome of stability of species populations.

#### **M&E Implementation**

82. M&E was a challenge from the beginning and thus a results indicator for M&E reporting was introduced. After the first year of implementation, ICCN had prepared an acceptable monitoring and evaluation matrix that was agreed with the task team and ICCN was producing quarterly financial reports. However, the project was not producing progress



reports. The first proper monitoring report was received in February 2014 covering progress up to June 30, 2012. A project operations manual was finalized in November 2014, but the accompanying monitoring manual was not completed until June 2015. The monitoring manual provided detailed indicator tracking sheets. An M&E consultant was hired in 2017 by ICCN to improve monitoring.

#### **M&E Utilization**

83. Though the M&E outcome and results indicators were revised twice during the lifetime of the project, the main challenges of measuring improved institutional capacity and meaningfully utilizing the data from the national parks on population stability remained. It was evident that ICCN was failing in reporting on the indicators meant to measure enhanced capacity, but even with the lack of progress, there was no meaningful way to foster change or provide course corrections, as ICCN was both struggling with lack of operational budget and weak institutional buy-in. For the NPs, the METT scores were done at the beginning and in 2015 and 2018. However, the project itself could not have provided much in terms of concrete leverage to boost falling species numbers, as the reasons had to do with complex socio-economic challenges around the park, difficulty in conducting population counts and the free movement of animals to and from the parks.

#### Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

84. Due to the shortcomings with the M&E design and substantial shortcomings in the monitoring and reporting over several years of the project, owing to institutional lack of capacity and urgency as well as the difficult working environment in an area with ongoing conflict and Ebola outbreaks, the quality of M&E is rated **Modest**.

#### **B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE**

85. The project was categorized Category A. Six safeguard policies were triggered:

- OP/BP 4.01 Environmental assessment
- OP/BP 4.04 Natural Habitats
- OP/BP 4.10 Indigenous Peoples
- OP/BP 4.11 Physical Cultural Resources
- OP/BP 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement
- OP/BP 4.36 Forests

86. Although the project was rated Category A, the project was more akin to technical assistance with institutional strengthening and support for the management of national parks. Category A was designated due to ICCN having little experience and capacity to implement and monitor social management programs, such as those required by the safeguards instruments Although there were no known breaches in environmental and social safeguard compliance by the project, taking into account that the project was operating under extremely difficult



circumstances and with the lapses in monitoring, especially with regards to the Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM), it is always possible that some shortcomings ended up not being reported. A GRM was not required at the time of project preparation, and a GRM was not requested from ICCN until 2017. IP and local communities had contacted ICCN regarding grievances in Lomami, Kahuzi-Biega NP and Virunga and a functioning GRM mechanism was "reportedly" in place, but no comprehensive list of complaints and their resolution had been received from ICCN during or at the end of the project. The resolution the of a complaint communicated by MONUSCO in 2010 was not documented clearly in the ISRs; although the commission set up by ICCN did not uncover human rights abuses by park rangers, the parallel investigation by the American Bar Association did. This was followed up by the task team on several occasions, but ultimately was put to rest without a clear resolution, as it was not a direct consequence of the project nor within the project boundary. Another incident of a fatality of a Pygmy in the Kahuzi-Biega was investigated and, though unfortunate, was not linked to the activities of the project. It must be stressed that the project was operating in a region of open conflict, where human rights violations were unfortunately commonplace.

87. The project environmental risk was substantial due to the absence of an environmental specialist to supervise activities and help ICCN implement environmental safeguards instruments. In fact, under component 2 "support to national parks" the project financed activities related to construction of social infrastructure, as well as rehabilitation of key park infrastructure, that required the presence of an environmental specialist in the project to minimize negative impacts.

88. As highlighted in previous sections, financial management was strengthened thanks to continuing reforms put in place by FINORG, a firm contracted under the project by KfW. However, there was a lapse in renewing the contract for over half a year at one point and FM was generally poorly administered. Procurement had been satisfactory with the assistance of the Central Coordination Office of the Ministry of Finance (BCECO), which also provided training to ICCN's future procurement unit. At mid-term, the passage of procurement responsibility from BCECO to the project took place. A procurement specialist was finally engaged in January 2013 and the transition from BCECO to own-managed procurement capacity was completed. As with FM, procurement lacked coordination but fared better due to support from BCECO or staff that moved from BCECO to ICCN.

#### C. BANK PERFORMANCE

#### **Quality at Entry**

89. As the project was more about technical assistance to ICCN and the NPs, what was key was the establishment of the right indicators to track progress from the capacity building activities, which would flow from the results indictors to the PDO indicators and to the achievement of the PDO. The PDO outcome indicators chosen in the beginning did not flow very logically, except the first one measuring ICCN's capacity to execute its budget and produce regular financial reports. The indicators were sharpened at Mid-Term. The resulting revised indicators flowed better, but for example the METT scores could have been considered PDO level outcome indicators, keeping the stable key species populations as results indicators. It is always difficult to select indicators for something that is essentially qualitative, such as increased capacity.



Another issue was providing support to national parks in an environment where there was armed conflict ongoing. However, the choice of the target parks was given based on the biodiversity values and choosing areas with less risk of conflict would have done a disservice to this important aim.

#### **Quality of Supervision**

90. The project was supervised remotely from Washington with two implementation support missions per year, except for the final year of implementation. Implementation support missions resulted in ISRs and Aide Memoires, which were shared with the Government. Due to the fragile security situation in Eastern DRC, implementation support missions could not always be undertaken in the field. For the MTR, a mission was undertaken in November 2012. It was agreed to restructure the project, reallocate resources between components, and improve the indicators. Increased support to ICCN was planned to be provided by the project through the expected restructuring to provide further assistance for some fundamental capacity gaps in ICCN.

#### Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

91. Bank performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory** due to some ambiguous indicators and shortcomings in logical flow of results to outcomes provided during the preparation of the project, which were, however, improved at mid-term and the shortcomings in the provision of environmental and social safeguards support to join supervision missions.

#### D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

92. At the end of the project, capacity at ICCN is better than it was at the beginning of the project, but the degree of improvement can be debated, as –even though there was not a PIU established– much of the increased capacity was achieved with external support which has since discontinued. The agency remains poorly funded, but the capacity on the ground in the targeted PAs has been demonstrably improved, with for example Virunga now having a stable flow of funds to carry out its operations. With continuing conflict from rebel groups, periodical emergence of viral diseases such as Ebola, the gains at the national parks can be delicate. Reports of park rangers again being ambushed and killed at the time of writing of this report underline the precarious nature of progress made in eastern DRC.

93. The main positive outcome of the project was the creation and operationalization of the Okapi Fund. This was fully achieved at the very end of the project and is operational with enough capital to operate. In the future, the Okapi Fund, after having accrued investment income from its invested capital over the next 2-3 years will be able to hopefully provide funding for struggling protected areas, including Lomami and Itombwe. The decisions on where the funds will be allocated will play a big role in determining the positive development outcome as will the good-faith efforts of the Government and ICCN towards the Fund, for example in terms of continuing political and material support. As mentioned earlier in this



report, although the situation with the IPs ended up with houses having been built, the end result is mixed at best and the long-term benefits remain to be seen.

#### V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

94. **Sustainability of a project can be compromised if the project is relying on highly paid consultants** working alongside government salaried staff, even if the project tries to ensure cohesion and transfer of capacity and knowledge by functioning from within a government agency without a separate Project Management Unit (PMU). Indeed, this project set out to do things differently from many other projects in DRC, where the implementation was trusted to the management team in the ICCN General Directorate and not a separate PMU. The intention was to capture the increased capacity achieved via the project in the ICCN itself as opposed to a PMU which would dissolve after the closure of the project and with loss of the expertise gained. However, in reality, an underfunded agency providing government-salaried staff to work on a project may face low morale and eventual brain drain when comparing to colleagues being employed by other projects offering highly competitive salaries. Thus, the recommendation is to consider the relative benefits of the PMU model in extremely fragile and low capacity environments and build mechanisms to transfer capacity to the agency while acknowledging that the PMU model may not achieve broad transfer of capacity but that the success of the project in itself may result in positive outcomes as well as improved processes, tools and administrative functions.

95. **Supporting IPs, as part of a broader approach to engaging with communities around a protected area is commendable.** Whereas it may be straightforward to identify pressing needs of the general population (e.g. jobs, schools, improved water sources, clinics and medical services), the needs of IPs need more consideration. From the lessons learned from this project, this is a very delicate matter, which must be approached carefully. A thorough mapping of the desires and expectations should be carried out and carefully documented. When these expectations are documented, the project should find a culturally appropriate way to deliver them, making sure that the process is free from elite capture. Engaging with social scientists who are knowledgeable of local customs and needs is critical. This project succeeded in constructing 23 houses for the Pygmy community, which have the potential to provide them with housing and sites for commerce or education, but it was not evident that the needs of the community were fully served with the houses, as many voiced their reservations about moving into them.

96. **Map out the process to establish a Conservation Trust Fund (CTF) and identify possible political bottlenecks.** As summarized by a recent review of CTFs by the Conservation Finance Alliance (www.conservationfinancealliance.org), CTFs may slightly overperform relative benchmarks, while still falling short of their own target returns<sup>14</sup>. However, as the Okapi Fund was only operationalized on the very last day of the project, there is no past performance to measure. In this project, the technical process of setting up the CTF was carried out commendably. The fund was set up in the United Kingdom as a registered charity in late 2013. The challenges materialized in the political process, which was critical in getting the CTF

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https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57e1f17b37c58156a98f1ee4/t/5ef0c0503153d0544b9cd8e8/1592836179269/CTIS+201 8+report+FINAL.pdf



operational in the country, for which the decree was not issued until late 2017. Thus, as a lesson learned, when a major component of a project is contingent to the passing of legislation, this presents a major risk to the development outcome if there is not a clear pathway to achieving the passage of the legislation with strong political buy-in. In the case of PREPAN, this risk almost materialized, and it was only on the last day of implementation, and after several extensions, that the Okapi Fund was finally capitalized. In future projects that might carry a CTF component, it is strongly advised to ensure that there is strong government buy-in from the beginning before embarking on a component which is so highly reliant on a political process.

97. Take security concerns into account at project design and plan accordingly. DRC, as a Fragility, Conflict and Violence affected country poses many challenges for both preparation and implementation stages of projects. In the Eastern part of DRC, the various challenges facing natural resources management or biodiversity conservation projects range from poaching, smuggling to illegal charcoal production. Sometimes these activities are conducted by villagers in surrounding communities but may also be carried out by armed guerillas or militias. Armed gangs target park guards from time to time. The Virunga NP has been called "the most dangerous conservation projects in the world"<sup>15</sup>. This is exacerbated with unique circumstances to DRC where progress is hampered by unique diseases that thrive in the human-wildlife nexus such as Ebola, not to mention common burdens including malaria. The project had to suspend field missions during the most violent periods and obtaining monitoring data from the field proved difficult, at least partially due to the deteriorated security situation. Using local NGOs in the field may be relied on for monitoring when missions cannot be conducted due to security concerns but sending local experts can only be used when the security situation is still relatively safe. Use of drones for conducting wildlife surveys may be considered or relying on videoconferencing solutions when reaching out to field staff stationed in an area not otherwise accessible. However, DRC is one of the most extreme cases of field-based risks, and until the overall security situation in the country improves, any recommendation given here to mitigate the risks may not yield better results.

 $<sup>^{15}\,</sup>https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/24/twelve-rangers-among-16-killed-in-ambush-at-drc-gorilla-park$ 



## **ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS**

#### A. RESULTS INDICATORS

#### A.1 PDO Indicators

**Objective/Outcome:** ICCN institutionally strengthened to better manage the park network

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Publication of internal audits	Yes/No	Ν	Ν		Ν
		15-Nov-2013	27-Jun-2019		31-Dec-2019

**Comments (achievements against targets):** 

As per the monitoring manual: ICCN publishes all agreements, contracts and protocols concluded with its public and private partners for the financing of all centralized or decentralized operations of ICCN.

Result: at least some internal audits have been carried out and sent to the Bank (as well as other key partners such as KfW and the European Union), but the indicator is not met as the audits have not been published as required by the monitoring manual.

Since 2015 ICCN has had all accounts audited for the following parks: Kahuzi Biega, Lomami, Salonga, Virunga, Garamba, the Okapi Wildlife Reserve, the Kundelungu Complex and Upemba by a reputable international accounting firm and that the reports of these audits are available at ICCN.



Objective/Outcome: Selected national parks better managed

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct project beneficiaries	Number	0.00 15-Nov-2013	13511.00 27-Jun-2019		8410.00 31-Dec-2019
Female beneficiaries	Percentage	0.00	35.50 29-Dec-2017		25.00

**Comments (achievements against targets):** 

Number of beneficiaries according to Completion Report for year 2016.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Stable bio-indicator species populations in Garamba and Mikeno	Yes/No	Y 12-Mar-2009	Y 27-Jun-2019		N 31-Dec-2019
Stable Rhino populations in Garamba National Park	Yes/No	Y 12-Mar-2009	Y 27-Jun-2019		N 31-Dec-2019
Stable Elephant populations in Garamba National Park	Yes/No	Y 03-Dec-2009	Y 27-Jun-2019		N 31-Dec-2019



Stable Giraffe populations in Garamba National Park	Yes/No	Y	Υ	Y
		03-Dec-2009	27-Jun-2019	31-Dec-2019
Stable Hippo populations in Garamba National Park	Yes/No	Y	Y	Ν
		03-Dec-2009	27-Jun-2019	31-Dec-2019
Stable Elephant population in	Yes/No	Y	Y	Y
Virunga National Park (Mikeno Sector)		03-Dec-2009	27-Jun-2019	27-Jun-2019
Stable Gorilla populations in	Yes/No	Y	Υ	Υ
Virunga National Park (Mikeno Sector)		03-Dec-2009	27-Jun-2019	27-Jun-2019

**Comments (achievements against targets):** 

Methodology for inventories of species is adapted to the type of habitat: in savannah as in Garamba and Virunga, inventories and monitoring of large mammals are carried out by aerial support (planes), while at K-B NP which is a mountainous forest park, the methodology used is that of line of transects. These inventories are carried out by teams of national biologists (masters, doctorates, etc.) supported by the expertise of consultants from ICCN partner universities (University of Kinshasa, University of Kisangani, Catholic University of Louvain, Mèse, etc.).

1. Garamba (Source: Garamba NP Aerial Survey Report, April 2017):

- Rhinos: After 2008 no rhinos have been counted in Garamba.

- Elephants: 3,696 (2007), 1,847 (2012) 1,718 (2014) to 1,181 (2017). Due to continued poaching, the number of elephants has continued to decrease dramatically.



- Giraffes: 79 (2007), 22 (2012), 42 (2014) and 47 (2017).

- Hippos: Dramatic reduction since 2,630 (2011), 2814 (2012), 860 (2014), 1,400 (2017) due to poaching by guerilla groups.

2. Virunga (Virunga NP Flagship species report 2018)

- Gorillas: 92 (2011), 100 (2012), 101 (2014), 107 (2015), 127 (2017)

- Hippos: 1208 (2010), 1454 (2013), 2406 (2015), 1843 (2017). Decline due to poaching by armed militias.

- Elephants: 347 (2010). Estimated number 300-400 due to migration of individuals on the savannah.

3. Kahuzi-Biega

- Gorillas: 180 (2010), 139 (2011)

Objective/Outcome: Okapi Fund established and capitalized

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
	Percentage	0.00	0.00		0.00
Fund		15-Nov-2013	27-Jun-2019		31-Dec-2019

**Comments (achievements against targets):** 

Fund is established and capitalized, but no funds have yet to flow through the fund as it was only capitalized on the last day of project implementation. However, Fund is operational and the outcomes can only be assessed after 2-3 years after the return from investment income can be disbursed to Protected Areas in DRC.



# A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

**Component:** Support to Institutional Rehabilitation

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
ICCN staff evaluated on basis of Percentage job descriptions	Percentage	0.00	100.00		100.00
	15-Nov-2013	27-Jun-2019		31-Dec-2019	

**Comments (achievements against targets):** 

Result: 100% (2015), 100% (2016), 0% (2017), 0% (2018). Source ICCN completion report.

Performance bonuses were paid by KfW until the second quarter of 2016, which required staff evaluations. Since then, no funding has existed to support the performance bonuses and hence no evaluations have been conducted.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion		
Publication of ICCN management agreements	Yes/No	N 15-Nov-2013	N 26-Jun-2019		N 31-Dec-2019		
Comments (achievements against targets):							



Contracts and management agreements have not been published for public access although ICCN has circulated key documents to the Bank and development partners. The intent of this indicator was to measure how eell ICCN provides key information to the public on agreements that are in place for management of key protected areas.

## **Component:** Support to National Parks

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Increasing METT scores for project PAs	Number	50.00 12-Mar-2009	59.00 27-Jun-2019		61.00 31-Dec-2019
METT Score for Virunga National Park (Mikeno Sector)	Number	39.00 12-Mar-2009	58.00 27-Jun-2019		58.00 27-Jun-2019
Mett Score for Garamba National Park	Number	39.00 12-Mar-2009	60.00 27-Jun-2019		68.00 31-Dec-2019

Comments (achievements against targets):

2018 METT review:

Garamba 68, Itombwe 48, Kahuzi-Biega 68, Lomami 60.

Virunga did not complete 2018 METT review as funds were used to complete construction of Pygmy village.



Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Areas brought under enhanced biodiversity protection (ha)	Hectare(Ha)	0.00 12-Mar-2009	0.00 27-Jun-2019		0.00 31-Dec-2019
Area under enhanced protection (Virunga-Mikeno Sector)	Hectare(Ha)	0.00 12-Mar-2009	0.00 27-Jun-2019		0.00 31-Dec-2019
Area under enhanced protection (Garamba National Park)	Hectare(Ha)	0.00 12-Mar-2009	0.00 27-Jun-2019		0.00 31-Dec-2019

**Comments (achievements against targets):** 

Achieving enhanced biodiversity protection as per the indicator would have required a Protected Area to transition from one METT category to another. The METT categories are 0-35, 36-75 and 76-100. No PAs were able to make the transition.

Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Target	Completion
Yes/No	N 15-Nov-2013	Y 27-Jun-2019		Y 31-Dec-2019
		easure es/No N	easure N Y	easure Target



The two gardens (Botanique de Kisantu and Kinshasa) produced annual reports that were deemed satisfactory to the Bank.

## **Component:** Technical Studies and Consultations

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Reports/investments for 2 new Yes/No PAs	Yes/No	Ν	Y		Υ
	15-Nov-2013	31-Dec-2019		31-Dec-2019	

**Comments (achievements against targets):** 

The studies relating to the establishment of two new NPs, Lomami and Itombwe, were prepared, i.e. (i) Resettlement Action Plan for the population of Obenge in Lomami National Park and (ii) socio-economic study at the Itombwe Na-turelle Reserve (RNI),

# Component: Okapi Fund Establishment and Capitalization

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion	
Percentage of planned Okapi Fund disbursements made	Percentage	0.00 15-Nov-2013	0.00 27-Jun-2019		0.00 31-Dec-2019	
Comments (achievements against targets):						



Okapi Fund only became operational and was capitalized towards the very end of the project. Thus no disbursements were made prior to closing of project. However, the Fund will be in a position to start disbursing after it has accumulated sufficient return on its investments in 2-3 years, after which it can start supporting Protected Areas in DRC.



# B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome To enhance the Project Impleme	nting Entity's capacity to manage targeted Protected Areas.
Outcome Indicators	<ol> <li>ICCN publishes annual internal audits covering all funds managed by ICCN in accordance with international accounting standards.</li> <li>Five key bio-indicator species (rhinos, giraffes, gorillas, elephants, hippos) remain stable compared with baseline at start of project in targeted protected areas.</li> <li>Percentage of overall conservation ODA for the DRC directed to the Okapi Fund.</li> </ol>
Intermediate Results Indicators	<ol> <li>Percentage of ICCN staff that have a written job description and are evaluated on its basis.</li> <li>ICCN publishes all agreements, contracts and protocols entered into with its public and private partners for the financing of all centralized or decentralized ICCN operations.</li> <li>Increasing METT score for Virunga (Mikeno sector)</li> <li>Increasing METT score for Garamba.</li> <li>Increasing METT score for Kahuzi-Biega</li> <li>Areas (ha) brought under enhanced biodiversity protection in Virunga (Mikeno Sector)</li> <li>Areas (ha) brought under enhanced biodiversity protection in Garamba.</li> </ol>



	<ul> <li>8. Areas (ha) brought under enhanced biodiversity protection in Kahuzi-Biega.</li> <li>9. Botanical gardens producing a satisfactory annual report and business plan.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>10. Project supports necessary studies and investments for establishment of at least 2 new PAs.</li> <li>11. Descente on of diskurster entergramment hurther Olegai Fund.</li> </ul>
	11. Percentage of disbursements programmed by the Okapi Fund Board actually made.
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)	<ul> <li>Component 1: Support to Institutional Rehabilitation <ul> <li>Capacity on administrative procedures within ICCN strengthened (training of HR managers).</li> <li>New computerized accounting system and asset management system installed and training provided.</li> <li>Support to preparation on regulatory texts for 14 NPs in DRC.</li> <li>Website for ICCN prepared.</li> <li>Provision of long-term consultants.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Component 2: Support to National Parks <ul> <li>Virunga NP:</li> <li>Construction of 7 houses for park rangers.</li> <li>Training of 50 eco-guards, rations and operational costs (including fuel) for 35 eco-guards.</li> <li>GIS system and maps for Mikeno sector.</li> <li>Procurement of electric fence for 54km perimeter for the Mikeno sector.</li> <li>Construction of 23 houses for Pygmy indigenous peoples.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



The World Bank DRC GEF Financing to PREPAN Project (P083813)

Garamba NP
<ul> <li>Training provided for 80 park staff. Rations and fuel provided.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Housing for park guards built.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Hangar for a helicopter built.</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>300 km of paths and 5 new airstrips were opened</li> </ul>
Kahuzi-Biega NP
<ul> <li>Construction of 5 houses in Tshivanga,</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Construction of 3 patrol posts in Tshibati, Musenyi</li> </ul>
and Madiri.
• Construction of 5 houses of eco-guards in in Itebero.
<ul> <li>Construction of 6 bungalows in Tshivanga.</li> </ul>
• Development of the park headquarters in Tshivanga.
<ul> <li>Purchase of 5 pick ups and provided maintenance to strengthen surveillance.</li> </ul>
Botanical gardens:
<ul> <li>Construction of 10 cottages at the Botanical Garden</li> </ul>
Kisantu.
<ul> <li>Building a tent equipped for the Botanical Garden of</li> </ul>
Kinshasa.
Component 3: Technical Studies and Consultations
<ul> <li>The project produced the following studies relating to the</li> </ul>
establishment of two new NPs, Lomami and Itombwe, i.e. (i)
Resettlement Action Plan for the population of Obenge in
Lomami National Park and (ii) socio-economic study at the
Itombwe Nature Reserve (RNI).
<ul> <li>Support was also provided to assess the existing network of</li> </ul>
protected areas in the DRC, two outboards and 10 bikes were
purchased for PN Lomami while solar panels were purchased
to light up the park management facilities of the Itombwe
Reserve.



Component 4: Okapi Fund Establishment, Operations and Capitalization
Fund operational and capitalized.



#### ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

# A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name	Role
Preparation	
Paul Jonathan Martin	Task Team Leader(s)
Laurent Debroux	Sr Natural Resources Mgmgt Specialist, co-TTL
Giuseppe Topa	Lead Forestry Specialist, co-TTL
Kankonde Mukadi	Consultant
Mohammed Arbi Ben-Achour	Sr. Social Scientist
Mohammed A. Bekhechi	Lead Counsel
Aissatou Diallo	Finance Officer
Robert Robelus	Safeguard Specialist, Consultant
Gerhard Tschannerl	Procurement Specialist, Consultant
Philippe Mahele	Procurement Specialist
Gilles Veuillot	Sr Counsel
Jean-Charles Kra	Sr Financial Mgmt Specialist
Gayatri Kanungo	Consultant
Ernestine Ngobo-Njobo	Language Program Assistant
Supervision/ICR	
Raymond Sinsi Lumbuenamo	Task Team Leader(s)
Guy Kiaku Kindoki, Clement Tukeba Lessa Kimpuni, Jean- Claude Azonfack	Procurement Specialist(s)
Bertille Gerardine Ngameni Wepanjue	Financial Management Specialist
Virginie A. Vaselopulos	Team Member
Aurore Simbananiye	Team Member
Africa Eshogba Olojoba	Team Member
Jacqueline Beatriz Veloz Lockward	Counsel



Lucie Lufiauluisu Bobola	Team Member
Pablo Cesar Benitez Ponce	Team Member
Richard Everett	Social Specialist
Joelle Mudi Nke	Team Member
Joelle Nkombela Mukungu	Environmental Specialist

# B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Dreiget Cuelo		Staff Time and Cost		
Stage of Project Cycle	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs		
Preparation				
FY04	.750	10,278.01		
FY05	5.806	34,388.53		
FY06	8.926	84,575.71		
FY07	9.692	93,099.23		
FY08	7.092	80,754.58		
FY09	9.925	49,605.33		
Total	42.19	352,701.39		
Supervision/ICR				
FY10	11.222	90,463.26		
FY11	7.335	55,894.73		
FY12	7.300	46,189.83		
FY13	3.588	39,133.95		
FY14	12.184	82,727.81		
FY15	4.532	40,996.61		
FY16	12.230	79,834.26		
FY17	16.280	143,669.11		
FY18	31.790	192,834.95		



FY19	20.289	110,686.78
FY20	18.268	99,512.77
Total	145.02	981,944.06



## ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components	Amount at Approval (US\$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)	Percentage of Approval (US\$M)
Support to Institutional Rehabilitation	1.30	5.12	394
Support to National Parks	4.50	8.19	182
Technical Studies and Consultations	1.20	.44	37
Okapi Fund Establishment and Capitalization	0	7.80	0
Total	7.00	21.64	309.00



## **ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS**

No efficiency analysis was done for the Original Project as, according to the PAD, economic benefits from improved management of protected areas and conservation of biodiversity were hard to assess, especially in the case of DRC due to limited reliable data. The PAD highlighted that the main economic benefits generated by the project would result partly from the value that the international community assigned to biodiversity in DRC. They would also result from the improved, long-term availability of natural resources (fuel wood, water, soil protection) that were essential for local livelihoods in the buffer zones of the two protected areas initially supported by the Project. The PAD also stated that benefits from eco-tourism were potentially significant but would depend on progress in several areas that fell beyond the scope of the project, including security and infrastructure. An incremental cost analysis was prepared per the requirement for GEF financed projects which was re-estimated at the time of the AF and is being recalculated at completion in Section C below.

In 2014, an Economic Analysis, including a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that estimated Net Present Value (NPV) and Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was carried for the approval of the additional financing (AF). The assumptions and estimations are presented in Section A below, along with the re-calculated CBA at completion. This annex also assesses the design and implementation efficiency of the project in Section B below.

#### A. Economic Analysis

#### **Benefits and Costs**

At the time of the AF, it was identified that the project would primarily help protect directly two national parks totaling 1.09 million hectares, both directly and by setting up the Okapi Fund. Also, through its community development activities, it would contribute to the development of communities surrounding the park. The economic costs of the project identified at that time were composed of: (i) the full base cost of the project activities without taxes US\$14.64 million, excluding the amount of the Okapi Fund, and, for the post project period, an investment amount per year equivalent to the last year investment by the project or US\$1.8 million per year; (ii) the incremental recurrent costs estimated to cost around US\$1 per hectare after the completion of the AF, equivalent to US\$1.09 million per year; (iii) the opportunity cost of preserving 1.09 million hectares of ecosystems although no amounts were included for this as data was unavailable due to the difficult operating environment.

For the re-calculation of the NPV and EIRR at completion, the same cost methodology was applied as the one used for the AF but using the actual information from project implementation. Thus, the economic costs included were the following (see details in Table A4.1): (i) the full base cost of the project activities without taxes during the implementation period of the Project (2009-2019) that amounted to US\$14.24 million (slightly below the estimate at the time of AF) and for the post project period (2020-2023) an amount equivalent to what was invested in the NPs per year during the lifetime of the Project or US\$0.4 million (which is a more realistic amount of investment than the actual during the last year of investment by the Project which was US\$0.01 million); and (ii) the incremental recurrent costs, based on the actual operating cost for Virunga (of US\$12 per hectare per year) which was prorated for the other two parks based on their corresponding area and the number of rangers they employ for their surveyance or US\$2.5 per hectare for Garamba and US\$3.1 per hectare for Kahuzi-Biega. As in the case at the time of AF



estimation, no opportunity cost of preserving the ecosystem was included due to the lack of data given the difficult operating environment.

								2020-
	PV	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2033
Costs		-14.24						
Project investments	-12.89	-6.03	-2.24	-1.80	-0.62	-3.53	-0.01	-4.94
Recurrent costs	-25.43	0.00	-0.34	-0.34	-0.34	-0.34	-0.34	-90.59
Total Costs	-38.32	-6.03	-2.58	-2.14	-0.97	-3.87	-0.36	-95.52
Benefits								
Revenues from ecotourism*	9.26	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.58	0.14	0.14	37.73
Okapi Fund revenues**	3.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	14.52
Conservation benefit***	26.89	0.00	0.53	1.06	1.57	2.07	2.57	79.41
Total Benefits	39.27	0.02	0.55	1.08	2.15	2.22	2.71	131.65
Net Benefits	0.96	-6.01	-2.03	-1.07	1.18	-1.66	2.35	36.13
ERR	11%							

Table A4.1: Cost-Benefit Analysis at Completion (2014 – 2033)

Specific assumptions, for the calculation of economic benefits of the Project at the time of the AF included the following: (i) revenues from ecotourism that is a direct use economic value reflected in what the tourists pay for visiting the NP based on the assumption that Garamba's revenues remained steady and that Kahuzi-Biega was able to generate similar revenues by year four of the project; (ii) revenues from the Okapi Fund, which is an indirect benefit reflected in the willingness to contribute to this trust fund for conserving the park, and disbursed to the protected areas assumed at US\$0.88 million annually (or a 3 percent return) in perpetuity; (iii) benefits that accrue to communities surrounding the parks through the community conservation activities, although these benefits were not quantified at that time as the exact activities had not been defined.; (iv) the conservation values of the parks estimated to be a total economic value (TEV) of US\$37.2 million and of US\$30.4 million for Kahuzi-Biega and Garamba correspondingly,<sup>16</sup> that prorated by the AF's contribution to the parks' operating budget for the next five years (22 percent of Garamba's and 54 percent of Kahuzi-Biega's), the project hence claimed to be ensuring US\$6.7 million of Garamba's TEV, and US\$20 million of Kahuzi-Biega's and that the TEV would diminish at a rate of 2 percent per annum in the absence of the increased protection the financing affords (estimated deforestation and poaching rates in the parks in the absence of effective protection) as the AF's marginal contribution to the conservation of the parks.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> The conservation values of the Garamba and Kahuz-Biegai NPs had not been assessed, however, a WWF study of 2013 (https://c402277.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/publications/611/files/original/The\_Economic\_Value\_of\_Virunga\_National\_Park\_LR.pdf? 1375288396) assessed the economic value of Virunga National Park. It determined a total economic value (TEV) of US\$48.9 million a year for the park under present circumstances, including direct-use values (such as fisheries, hydro-electric power, but excluding tourism, which was dormant at that time), some indirect values (such as water supply and erosion control but not including carbon sequestration and forest conservation), and no non-use values (the future use of the park's resources). Thus, the TEV for Garamba and Kahuzi-Biega were extrapolated from the current TEV for Virunga on a per hectare basis and thus Kahuzi-Biega would generate a TEV of US\$37.2 million, and Garamba US\$30.4 million.



For the re-calculation of the NPV and EIRR at completion, the same methodology was applied as the one used for the AF, with some adjustments to reflect actual implementation of the Project. Traditional CBA is customarily restricted to the Project activities that generate benefits for which an economic value – intended as welfare gain accruing to the society as a whole – can be clearly identified and measured. This usually comprises investment components that have benefits that could be expressed in monetary terms, and excludes the funds for technical assistance (TA) because of the difficulty to value the outcomes of these activities. While a significant part of the Project funding has supported TA activities, the CBA done at the time of the AF appraisal comprised all components, including TA. For the CBA at completion, we have kept that methodology not only for the sake of comparison purpose but also because the objective of the TA supported by the Project was to improve the capacity of ICCN to manage targeted protected areas. Also, as the recalculation of the NPV and EIRR at completion is an assessment of the whole project (not only the AF), the CBA at completion also includes the benefits of helping protect the Mikeno Sector of the Virunga Park that was initially supported by the Project. Thus, in the re-calculation, the economic benefits of the project are composed of the following (details in Table A4.1):

- (i) Revenues from ecotourism based on a) the actual revenues for the parks during project implementation. For the Mikeno Sector these corresponded to the revenues for Virunga prorated for the corresponding area of the Mikeno Sector, no revenues for Garamba as it was closed for tourism during project implementation, and revenues for Kahuzi-Biega based on the number of visitors it received); and b) projected revenues based on the expected number of visitors for each of the parks. For 2020, only for two months for the Mikeno Sector and Kahuzi-Biega as they closed in March due to the COVID-19 Pandemic and none for Garamba as it had not opened for tourists yet and a gradual increase of visitors during the following years up to a 50% increase in the number of visitors in 2033 taking as reference the number of visitors for Virunga in 2017 which was the year with more stable operation since the Project started implementation;
- (ii) Revenues from the Okapi Fund that will start disbursing to the NPs assumed at \$0.69 million annually in perpetuity. This amount is smaller to the one considered at the time of the AF as it only includes the return on the actual contributions to the Fund to date (US\$7.4 and 14 million euros); and
- (iii) The conservation values of the parks as estimated at the time of the AF as there is no more recent assessment of their TEVs at this time. These estimates are also on the conservative side as they do not include several indirect economic benefits of the NPs such as the carbon sequestration and forest conservation benefits that also provide global environmental benefits.

Although there were benefits that accrued to communities surrounding the parks through community conservation and other project activities (such as the housing built for the Pygmy population), these benefits were not included in the analysis due lack of data because of the difficult operating environment.

## Results

At the time of the AF, based on the assumptions listed above, the project's EIRR over a 20-year period was estimated at 18 percent, and, using a discount rate of 10 percent, it was estimated that an NPV of US\$8.67 million would be generated for the economy. At closing, based on its achievements and incurred costs and expected future benefits and costs as described in the previous section, the development impact of the Project was recalculated and the EIRR, over the same timeframe as for the AF (20-years), is estimated



to be 11 percent. Using the same discount rate as the one used for the AF (10 percent), the NPV is estimated to be US\$0.96 million. Had we used a 6.5 percent rate of discount, that is consistent with the World Bank Guidance for discount rate for Economic Analysis (based on Ramsey formula,), the NPV would be US\$7.23 million which is closer to the NPV estimated at the time of the AF. Note also, that this 6.5 discount rate is larger than the 6 percent rate used, as per World Bank Guidance, for the CBA of projects that generate global co-benefits for the environment, as it is the case for this project.

While the ERR and NPV at completion are below the ones calculated at the time of the AF, they are still remarkable given the difficult environment in which the Project operates which (i) makes the running costs of the parks significantly higher than what was estimated at the time of AF appraisal due to the need for more intensive and extensive patrolling of the NP areas to reduce poaching and other illegal activities; (ii) reduces the number of visitors to the parks due to lack of security, which was intensified during many of the years in which the project was implemented due to the conflicts in the NPs areas, and other exogenous impacts such as the Ebola outbreaks and the COVID-19 Pandemic; and (iii) delayed the operationalization of the Okapi Fund. Considering the principles of welfare economics, based on the Ramsey formula, the discount rate may be considered as twice the expected long-term average growth rate in per capita income, thus an ERR of 11 percent is considerable in the context of the DRC as the annual growth rate for its real GDP per capita has been 3.25 percent on average during the project implementation period (from 2014 to 2017, the latest year for which there is data).

## **B.** Design and Implementation Efficiency

Overall design and implementation efficiency experienced some shortcomings. The design of an AF to build on the Original Project was deemed efficient in terms of continuing to build the ICCN capacities rather than starting a new project. It was optimistically expected in the AF, however, that the Okapi Fund would be operational by September 2014. The authorization for the Fund to operate in the country took until December 2017 and only after that the follow-up steps to capitalize it were completed. Thus, the Project required a one-year extension of the closing date established at the time of the AF to allow for additional time for the Okapi Fund to be capitalized. The Fund was finally capitalized with the GEF and KfW funding in early 2020. This delay meant that the Okapi Fund revenues that were expected to support the two NPs starting in 2015 will not be available until 2022 which is also reflected in the lower PV of that reduced the NPV calculation at closing as presented in the Economic Analysis section above. There was also the forgone opportunity of other contributions that were, at the time of the AF, expected to be directed to the Fund. The project spanned over 10 years, although only 1 additional year of what was expected at the time of the AF, which is not exceptional given the country circumstances during project implementation, especially the operating conditions in the eastern DRC were extremely challenging due to breakouts of violence by armed groups as well as outbreaks of Ebola.

While in terms of overall costs, there were no cost overruns, there was a significant increase of the funds used for Component 1 (more than 40 percent higher), while the expenditures for setting up the Okapi Fund were significantly lower (more than 75% lower) and the amount to support the NPs was about the same as the estimated at the appraisal of the AF (3 percent lower).

#### C. Incremental Cost Analysis

The Original Project, included an incremental cost analysis as per the requirement for GEF financed



projects. This incremental cost analysis was recalculated for the approval of the AF. The baseline scenario at the time of the AF was defined by: (i) Biodiversity assets and natural habitats of local, regional and global importance that are under increasing threat, with some species close to extinction, and degradation of wildlife and natural habitats possibly reaching an irreversible stage, but with insufficient national ability to protect them; (ii) Slowly improving, but still severely limited ICCN capacity to implement conservation efforts in areas under its remit, and to coordinate the activities of an increasing numbers of external partners. A lack of institutional capacity is limiting the sustainability of ICCN's efforts, as conservation is an isolated sub-sector dominated by individual externally-driven projects. (iii) ICCN's funding is unreliable and depends to a large extent on unpredictable donor contributions.

The baseline financing at the time of approval of the AF was an update of the baseline project supported through earlier GEF financing. As a result, the baseline is ongoing and currently active projects. The estimation for the baseline financing for this project, i.e., the financing that will be directed to sustain the PA system of the DRC over the lifetime of the additional financing (five years) was estimated at US\$71.9 million and included the following: (i) the Government's in-kind contribution of US\$2.4 million, (ii) existing support from other donors for conservation-related activities of US\$50.5 million, and (iii) resources from the Forest Investment Program of US\$19 million.

The GEF Alternative, i.e., the baseline scenario plus the incremental costs, and was predicated in that the GEF contribution was in effect catalyzing investment and leveraging the partner contribution as other donors had signaled that they were reluctant to engage in setting up the Okapi Fund without the involvement of the GEF/World Bank. The GEF alternative was estimated at US\$135 million. By investing an incremental US\$11.6 million for the GEF alternative through the AF, the GEF was leveraging an additional US\$45.5 million from Germany (of which US\$19.5 m would support the Okapi Fund and an associated contribution in the estimated amount of US\$26 million to support the national parks system), US\$3 million from IDA, and US\$3 million from the government of DRC, thus enabling a total investment of US\$63 million. In addition, the Okapi Fund was expected, provided sound financial management and efficient disbursements, to be an attractive conduit for future donor financing of conservation in the DRC.

The same assumptions as the ones used for the baseline scenario at the time of the AF were used for the re-calculations at project completion. The baseline financing at project closing includes the ongoing and active projects directed to sustain the PA system of the DRC during the implementation period of the AF (2014-2019). This amounts to US\$94.6 million (compared to US\$71.9 million at the time of the AF approval) and includes the following: (i) the Government's in-kind contribution of US\$2.4 million (same as at the time of AF), (ii) support from other donors for conservation-related activities of US\$50.5 million (same as at the time of AF), and (iii) resources from the Forest Investment Program (financing implemented by the Improved Forested Landscape Management Project-P128887) of US\$41.8 million (see Table A4.2).

Despite the delay in setting up the Okapi Fund, due to the involvement of the GEF/World Bank, the Fund was capitalized and the GEF alternative has amounted to US\$133 million (compared to US\$135 million at the time of the AF approval). By investing an incremental US\$11.6 million for the GEF alternative through the Project, the GEF leveraged an additional US\$15.5 million from Germany to support the Okapi Fund [and an associated contribution in the estimated amount of US\$26 million to support the national parks system], US\$2.8 million from IDA, and US\$0.9 million in NP revenues from those supported by the Project for a total investment of US\$37.9 million.



# Table A4.2: Baseline and Incremental Funding (US\$) (at Project Completion)

		Forest					
		Investment					
		Program					
	Government	(FIP)	GEF-3	GEF-5	IDA	Other	Total
Baseline	2,380,000	41,757,788	0	0	0	50,500,000	94,637,788
Incremental	925,781	0	6,999,899	11,632,698	2,767,489	15,542,461	37,868,328
Total	3,305,781	41,757,788	6,999,899	11,632,698	2,767,489	66,042,461	132,506,116



## ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

The ICR was shared with the Government and KFW prior to finalization and incorporates comments received.



#### **ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (IF ANY)**

- PREPAN Completion Report. ICCN. April 2020.
- PREPAN Internal Supervision Mission Report. June 2018.
- ISR reports Nos. 3-18
- Aide Memoires.
- PREPAN Project Operation Manual November 2014.
- PREPAN Monitoring Manual. June 2015.
- Project progress report 2015 (June 2016)
- Project progress report 2012 (February 2014)
- Project progress report 2/2016 (February 2017)
- Aerial Survey Report. Garamba National Park. April 2017.
- Rapport sur les Fiches Indicateurs 2015, 2016, 2017. December 2017.
- METT study final report. July 2015.



#### **ANNEX 7. SUMMARY OF RESTRUCTURINGS**

# Table 4: First restructuring

Initial Indicators	D=Dropped C=Continue N=New R=Revised	Revised Indicators
Global Environmental/Project Developr	nent Objective	25
ICCN able to execute its budget and produce regular financial reports	R	ICCN able to execute the budget received from both the Government and the project and produces annual financial reports on overall execution in accordance with international accounting standards
ICCN produces regular monitoring and evaluations reports, which include data on social impacts	D	-
Five key bio-indicator species (rhinos, giraffes, gorillas, elephants, hippos) remain stable compared with baseline at start of project in targeted protected areas.	С	Note: ICCN will revise the field methodology for collection of data, particularly for elephants in Virunga, and record in the project's Operational Manual
Number of technical studies and stakeholder consultations conducted by ICCN to support the expansion of the national PA system.	D	-
Intermediate Results Indicators		
All indicators remain unchanged.	С	More details will be added in project operational manual better defining each indicator and how its data are to be collected and evaluated.

# Table 5: Changes introduced with Additional Financing.

Revisions to	o the Results Framework	Comments/ Rationale for Change
PDO/GEO		
PAD	Change	



Enhance the capacity of ICCN for management of targeted protected areas	Continued	n/a
PDO indicators		
PAD	Change	
	New: Direct project beneficiaries	Mandatory corporate results indicator
ICCN able to execute the budget received from both the Government and the project and produces annual financial reports on overall execution in accordance with international accounting standards	ICCN publishes annual internal audits covering all funds managed by ICCN in accordance with international accounting standards	Indicator was changed to facilitate measurement and interpretation, and to eliminate redundancies with basic project requirements
Five key bio-indicator species (rhinos, giraffes, gorillas, elephants, hippos) remain stable compared with baseline at start of project in targeted protected areas	Continued	Not all species are monitored in each park, depending on the species' presence
	<u><b>New</b></u> : Percentage of overall conservation ODA for the DRC directed to the Okapi Fund (Comp. 4)	Indicator was introduced to measure the Okapi Fund's fundraising success, management soundness, and ability to communicate its successes
Intermediate Results indic	ators	
PAD	Change	
	<u>New</u> : Percentage of ICCN staff that have a written job description and are evaluated on its basis (Comp. 1)	Indicator was added to measure improvements in human resource management
	<u>New</u> : ICCN publishes all agreements, contracts and protocols entered into with its public and private partners for the financing of all centralized or decentralized ICCN operations (Comp.1)	Indicator was added to measure funding transparency, financial management, and ICCN's capacity to lead and coordinate its partners
ICCN securing sufficient funding for basic budgeted activities for 3 years post project (Comp. 1)	Dropped	Indicator was not measurable and depended on state budget allocations out of the control of the project
A strategy on sustainable financing mechanisms for the national PA system is developed (Comp. 1)	Dropped	The development of the Okapi Fund was itself the financial mechanisms strategy, so the indicator was not deemed very informative



Increase in management	Continued: Change in METT score in each	Indicator disaggregated for each of
effectiveness in the three	protected area	the three PAs
selected PAs and buffer zones		
(Comp. 2)		
	New:	Indicator disaggregated for each of
	Areas (ha) brought under enhanced	the PAs, and in line with World
	biodiversity protection in Virunga (Mikeno	Bank Core Sector Indicators (at the
	Sector)	time of restructuring)
	Areas (ha) brought under enhanced	
	biodiversity protection in Garamba	
	Areas (ha) brought under enhanced	
	biodiversity protection in Kahuzi-Biega	
Increased use by local people	Dropped	Indicator was unclear and not
of community infrastructure in		measurable
targeted protected areas		
(Comp. 2)		
Implementation of	Dropped	Satisfactory implementation of
environmental and social		safeguard measures was a legal
safeguards in two selected PAs		requirement of the project and not
is satisfactory (Comp. 2)		an appropriate indicator
	New: Botanical gardens producing a	Indicator was added to account for
	satisfactory annual report and business	new sub-component
	plan [each year] (Comp. 2d)	
	New: Project supports necessary studies	Replaced an ineffective indicator
	for establishment of at least 2 new PAs	for Component 3 suppressed
	(Comp. 3)	during the Restructuring in June
		2013
	New: Percentage of disbursements	Indicator added to measure
	programmed by the Okapi Fund Board	effectiveness of Okapi Fund
	actually made (Comp. 4)	management and ability of targeted
		han aftered as the market accord from the

beneficiaries to make sound funding proposals and absorb financing