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Final Evaluation
of the projects

Action Plan Training/Skills Building for 25 Least Developed Countries to assist with National Implementation Plan Development under the Stockholm Convention - GLO/04/G35 – PIMS 3055

and

Action Plan Skills Building for 15 Least Developed Countries to assist with National Implementation Plan Development under the Stockholm Convention Atlas Project no. 00048698 - PIMS 3545

Report Prepared

for

UNITAR, UNDP, GEF

by

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with input from

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DISCLAIMER

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to UNITAR, UNDP, UNEP, the GEF, or any of their Staff.

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Final Evaluation of the Projects

Action Plan Training/Skills Building for 25 Least Developed Countries to assist with National Implementation Plan Development under the Stockholm Convention - GLO/04/G35 – PIMS 3055
and
Action Plan Skills Building for 15 Least Developed Countries to assist with National Implementation Plan Development under the Stockholm Convention Atlas Project no. 00048698 - PIMS 3545

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Some 1,373 persons of the world's least developed countries (LDCs) and countries with economies in transitions have received skills building training by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) via three projects. *Strengthening Skills for Action Plan Development to Implement the Stockholm Convention: National Training Workshop (15 LDC)-* 376 participants (with two countries pending - Eritrea and DR Congo); *Strengthening Skills for Action Plan Development to Implement the Stockholm Convention: National Training Workshop (25 LDC) –* 741 participants; and *Strengthening Skills for Action Plan Development to Implement the Stockholm Convention: National Training Workshop (9 Swiss Supported Countries)* 256 participants.

The workshop schedules are set out at Annex E.

These action plan training and skills building projects were to assist these countries in developing sound NIPs whilst simultaneously contributing to capacity building and human resource development. The 25 LDC project document was signed May 2004, and implementation commenced in June 2004. Because of increased demand for such training, a second project was initiated. The 15 LDC project document was signed in 28 January 2006. The total budget of the first project was \$2,025,000 (excluding in-kind contributions). The total budget for the second project was \$1,450,000 (excluding in-kind contributions) funded by GEF and UNDP with co-financing provided by the Government of Switzerland. The Implementing Agency, in both cases, was UNDP and the Executing Agency, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).

The overall goal of the project(s) were to provide, over a period of 24 months (25 LDC project) and 20 months (15 LDC project), national-level training, and technical and financial support to countries that have signed and/or are Parties to the Stockholm Convention.

Not all 50 LDCs could be addressed by this project, just 40, with 38 being completed to date (see Annex E for training schedules). The decision on how many countries to include in the project(s) was set mainly by resource limitations but was also due to the fact that some countries were in a war situation / zone or war torn and/or due to the number of LDCs that were Signatories or

225 Parties to the Stockholm Convention. However, UNITAR, with financial support from the Swiss
226 Government, was subsequently able to provide skills building training workshops for an
227 additional nine developing countries and countries with economies in transition (Ghana; Cote
228 d'Ivoire; Mongolia; Georgia; DPR Korea; China; Thailand; Pakistan and, Kazakhstan.
229

230 It was deemed cost-prohibitive to undertake detailed follow-up evaluations by Consultants of the
231 training received in all 40 countries. Eight countries were therefore selected by UNITAR, and
232 the selection endorsed by the Project Advisory Committee. The countries that were evaluated
233 included: Asia – Cambodia, Laos, and Nepal; and, – Africa – Chad, Comoros, Madagascar,
234 Tanzania, and Uganda.
235

236 The field evaluation component was undertaken between June 9-22, 2008 (Asian countries) and
237 June 30 - August 6, 2008 (the five African countries) by two consultants; Mr. G. Victor Buxton
238 focusing on the Asian countries (Nepal, Bangladesh and Cambodia) and two English speaking
239 African countries (Uganda and Tanzania) and with responsibility also for methodology
240 development (in consultation with UNITAR staff), evaluation design (including questionnaire(s)
241 design) that flowed from a series of matrices that were subsequently used to create a summary of
242 findings and for a comparative and horizontal analysis of the evaluation data and final report
243 preparation. The second consultant, Dr. Eduardo R. Quiroga, conducted interviews in three
244 French-speaking African countries (Chad, Comoros and Madagascar) and provided input to the
245 principal consultant during the report preparation phase.
246

247 The TORs for the two Consultants are set out at Annex A. The list of persons met in each of
248 these countries is set out at Annex B. The list of documents reviewed is set out at Annex C. The
249 list of questions posed to both the beneficiaries and the project organizers and implementers is
250 set out at Annex D. The actual schedule of the UNITAR training workshops is set out at Annex
251 E. The list of the acronyms used in this Evaluation Report, the six Annexes, and the individual
252 country field reports (completed matrices) is set out at Annex F.
253

254 The detailed countries notes from the field visits are available through UNITAR.
255

256 The evaluation methodology focused on four components: the country participant's
257 (beneficiaries) perceptions, experience and feedback; the train-the-trainer component; the
258 assessment of the project(s) design / suitability / adequacy, including the management systems
259 and the engagement created at the national level; and, the evaluation of the outcomes achieved
260 vis-à-vis prior agreed performance indicators.
261

262 Due to the complexity of and multitude of inputs to the NIP development process, this evaluation
263 could not measure the complete impact of the training projects on NIP development. Similarly,
264 this evaluation is not considered to be an evaluation of the NIP program overall.
265

266 The two training projects appear to have been carefully designed reflecting state-of-the-art
267 knowledge and experience in developing country training. The peer review process of training
268 materials appeared also to have worked well. The pilot phase was a success in that it achieved its
269 goals both from the perspectives of UNITAR and the participating countries. Feedback from
270 both the peer review process and the pilots resulted in the remediation of the materials that the

271 subsequent countries received. UNITAR “senior fellows” (contracted consultants) with extensive
272 knowledge and experience in POPs and other chemicals issues were used for much of the
273 training. This appears to have worked very well also. The two project budgets (15 and 25
274 countries) were reportedly allocated and spent in accordance with the plan(s), the exception
275 being the train-the-trainers component that was not allocated as originally envisioned with the
276 funds for this purpose having been utilized for other components. IAs did not attend the
277 UNITAR training workshops but perhaps should have as there was little evidence of the
278 anticipated connectivity between the UNITAR training sessions and the NIP actions via the IAs.
279 The post training evaluation sheets could be strengthened and yielded little in the way of
280 information that could be used to improve future sessions. IAs could have given greater effort to
281 integrating this skills building project into their plans for creating the NIP in their client
282 countries. The UNITAR role seems to have been performed with both alacrity and competence.
283

284 From the perspective of the LDCs, the UNITAR project(s) were somewhat of a minor adjunct or
285 “add on” to the \$400-500 K US GEF POPs enabling project(s). With so little money allocated to
286 the country for this project (\$5,000), it was difficult for UNITAR to capture the needed attention
287 of the country to pursue the workshop organizational aspects thus increasing UNITAR’s
288 transaction costs. Nonetheless, the two project budgets (15 and 25 countries) were reportedly
289 allocated and spent in accordance with the plan(s). Other than the change in direction to not
290 undertake train-the-trainer sessions in each country (in the 25 LDC project), there were no
291 unforeseen adverse budgetary impacts. There was a perception of insufficient project funding
292 reported from UNITAR itself. For example, from time-to-time, UNITAR had to send more than
293 one representative to the training session (high level UNITAR participation requested and /or the
294 UNITAR Manager himself needed to better understand the efficacy of the emerging project
295 design etc.) and there were insufficient funds available for this purpose. Although there were no
296 adverse budgetary impacts per se, it was the feeling of both UNITAR and the countries that the
297 GEF funds provided for the 40 country project were insufficient.
298

299 The efficacy of the training provided by this project(s) and the potential future usefulness varied
300 amongst the beneficiaries and depended largely on the countries’ state of development and thus
301 core capacity (include level of computer literacy) to be built upon as well as the relation with the
302 Implementing Agency (IA) in the creation, and future delivery, of the NIP. The commitment of
303 the countries participating in this training project included direct involvement in order to provide
304 them directly with tools for the development of projects to support Stockholm Convention (SC)
305 implementation, based on the outcomes of the NIPs. This commitment was not met in some
306 countries. Government staff participation in the NIP creation varied from “fully engaged”
307 (example, Cambodia), to “limited engagement” (example, Bangladesh and Nepal). This
308 commitment failure in many instances was likely a reflection of lack of core (adsorption)
309 capacity and state of development but in some cases (Nepal) it could at least, in part, be due to
310 the IAs desire to reduce transaction costs; unfortunately, at the expense of building indigenous
311 capacity.
312

313 The conclusions from the post training session evaluation sheets indicated that the time allotted
314 to the workshop were too short. Participants felt that presentations had to be rushed, and
315 exercises could not be finalised. There was a need identified by beneficiaries for UNITAR
316 follow-up and support, including duplicating such workshops at the regional level but there were

317 no resources available for this request. Most of the beneficiaries indicated that the workshop
318 experience was very useful and the methodologies/techniques presented by UNITAR will be
319 applied to other areas beyond just chemicals management. UNITAR training although of a very
320 high quality, was of questionable usefulness for the creation of the NIP in countries where the
321 NIP was well advanced or even completed in draft form at the time of the training (examples,
322 Madagascar, Tanzania). However, the methodology did prove useful in upgrading the quality of
323 the NIPs and there is likelihood that the UNITAR training provided to those countries will,
324 nonetheless, bear fruit in the broader context of the sound management of chemicals.

325
326 In general, it is too early to assess whether there has been any evidence of translation of training
327 skills to other chemical management aspects. Many participants indicated that they intend to use
328 the newly acquired skills in future for chemical management activities, especially SAICM.

329
330 The greatest barrier and impediment observed pertaining to skill development and sustaining
331 results, was the lack of core capacity in many countries and in the case of the French-speaking
332 African countries, computer literacy and/or available of the needed computer programs
333 (software). One country that participated during the pilot phase (Cambodia), indicated that it
334 would have benefited more from the training if it had been trained on the use of the materials
335 (log frame) that UNITAR added later. For some, (example, some Tanzania NGOs) the training
336 materials were seen as being too complicated (they felt they lacked enough of a technical
337 background to properly absorb the training).

338
339 In many, if not most LDCs, there is either insufficient capacity as yet to implement fully
340 chemical management programs in the field (example monitoring industrial emissions for
341 dioxins and furans). The lead agencies do not have sufficient staff to properly address POPs and
342 other chemicals. Thus, many of the LDCs are heavily reliant on external expertise and will
343 remain so for the foreseeable future. This does not bode well for sustaining result. Where the
344 needed LDC capacity or emerging capacity is reported to exist, (example, Cambodia), the needed
345 operational funds are lacking, especially for needed training. LDCs (example Cambodia) also
346 noted problems with their inability to raise counterpart funding to meet GEF project
347 requirements.

348
349 In general, although there is clear evidence of under representation, there appears to be no
350 observed, or perceived, special problems of gender participation in LDCs although it was
351 conceded that the participation is perhaps less than desirable and Governments are undertaking
352 initiatives such as: a constitutional reference to the need for affirmative action; decisions to
353 assign additional University entrance consideration to females based on sex; and Government
354 decision (in several countries) to require 30% female in top Agency Executive positions;

355
356 This evaluation revealed an interesting paradox: UNITAR Skills training for Action Plan
357 building was provided to those being trained on the understanding that this would, firstly, help
358 them create their action plans. However, as noted, in a few cases (e.g. Madagascar, Tanzania,
359 Bangladesh), the NIPs and their proposed action plans, were well advanced (or they had even
360 completed the first draft) by the time the training was provided somewhat precluding this first
361 goal. Also, in the case of Nepal, UNIDO and the Government decided to use a National expert
362 and three international experts to create the NIP, a modus operandi that somewhat comprised the

363 UNITAR training (as per the primary project objective) since government staff are precluded
364 from the opportunity to applying and thus gaining practical experience on the application of
365 these skills. This was stated by some that were interviewed. Nonetheless, the UNITAR training
366 clearly added to the personal management capacity of the individuals trained and awareness of
367 the constituencies they represent but there were no plans observed (as yet, though this was
368 discussed) in any of the countries evaluated to sustain this capacity.

369
370 It was noted by some training beneficiaries that there was inconsistency between what IA
371 workshops suggested (example, UNIDO) and what UNITAR espoused during the training.
372 UNITAR has indicated that all of the IAs reviewed their draft training materials and therefore,
373 this should not have been an issue. These issues need to be explored by the GEF.

374
375 It was also noted (example, Bangladesh, African countries) that the LDCs are severely resource
376 constrained and require long advance notice to plan for training and even for such short
377 evaluation missions. This long advance notice requirement was not always met; especially in the
378 case of the evaluation missions, and UNITAR needs to pay greater attention to this aspect in
379 future.

380
381 Many countries recognized the needs (and existing shortfalls and deficits) for sustaining results
382 as set out in this report and would like further future assistance in this regard.

383
384 The post UNITAR training evaluation sheets solicited, for the most part, yes / no responses and
385 were thus of little follow up value. Training and upgrading of chemicals knowledge and skills is
386 a needed ongoing activity that needs to be institutionalized or sustainability of skill acquired are
387 at risk (likely to be lost in the foreseeable future).

388
389 In LDCs, there is often no single Ministry that has lead responsibility for chemicals management
390 (the exception is perhaps Tanzania where the Government designated Chief Chemist, situated in
391 the official Government laboratory has policy responsibility for chemicals). Nonetheless, in most
392 countries, there is either one Ministry or the Focal Point for POPs / SAICM that assumes the
393 chemicals coordination role.

394
395 Stakeholder engagement is a critical feature and a defining characteristic of a “healthy” chemical
396 management process. Most countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Madagascar,
397 Uganda and Tanzania) showed evidence of wide stakeholder engagement. Nepal was not able to
398 engage many of the stakeholders (especially government staff) in the detailed NIP preparation,
399 following the workshop, as espoused (and anticipated) during the UNITAR training. This may
400 have been due to a conflict with Implementing Agency (IA) decisions on how best to create the
401 NIP; core capacity issues or anticipated high transaction costs. The interviews could not ascertain
402 the root cause of this problem.

403
404 Sustaining chemicals management results and addressing emerging challenges requires that the
405 minimal infrastructure needed to carry out the needed project activities at the country level be in
406 place. In general, this minimal infrastructure is in place or the signs are hopeful. Guidance
407 offered by the UNITAR modules should be made to be consistent with the GEF and the IAs

408 otherwise differences are viewed by the UNITAR training participants as conflicting
409 information.

410
411 IA NIP-creation project-related concern or responsibility in relation to this project, appears to
412 have been without regard for concomitant capacity building and institutional strengthening yet
413 this is the fundamental thrust of the UNITAR training. There may thus be a conflict of basic
414 interests because a key IA interest is to get in, get out, create a good NIP at the least cost.
415 UNITAR's interest and key performance indicator is indeed capacity built and institutions
416 strengthened. The GEF needs to address this issue. Sustainability of training results and skills
417 built is perhaps the key shortfall of the training provided by UNITAR and needs to be a critical
418 consideration in future training undertakings.

419
420 A key measurement of effectiveness of training is when there is evidence that it has contributed
421 to the development objectives of a project or the country assistance strategy. There are three
422 dimensions in this regard that required examination: **Learning outputs**: Did training result in
423 acquisition of new knowledge and skills relevant to the achievement of SC objectives? The
424 conclusions reached in this regard is that all of the countries visited showed evidence of the
425 achievement in learning; **Workplace behavior outcomes**: Are trainees applying acquired skills in
426 the workplace in a manner likely to contribute to the achievement of SC goals? Based on
427 observed outputs Cambodia, Uganda, Tanzania and Madagascar are currently applying learned
428 skills in the workplace. Nepal was to some extent precluded this opportunity by the lack of direct
429 Government staff involvement in the preparation of the NIP following the workshop, Bangladesh
430 due to staff and other resource constraints, Chad and Comoros due to considerable structural
431 constraints in governance. (Chad because of security concerns aggravated by the oil boon and
432 Comoros as a result of significant economic management problems.); and, **Impact on**
433 **development capacity**: Is there evidence of improved institutional strength or enhanced
434 organizational performance as a result of the UNITAR training? The countries visited have not
435 as yet begun implementing their NIP and the observance of NIP implementation is what is
436 needed to arrive at a proper performance and institutional strengthening judgment.

437
438 There are many lessons learned from this evaluation. The most noteworthy are as follows:

- 439 ❖ Holding a one day meeting of the peer review group (as opposed to conference calls)
440 would have been a more effective and efficient means of obtaining the needed input.
- 441 ❖ Undertaking “pilots” is a very useful and “value added” exercise and should be included
442 where a large number of countries are to be trained.
- 443 ❖ Training to assist in NIP creation that arrives after the NIP is drafted is of little value in
444 this context. Such skills building projects need to be fast tracked by the GEF when such
445 a situation exists.
- 446 ❖ Post session evaluation sheets need to be carefully designed with more substantive
447 information requests and perhaps more time allocation for this component within the
448 workshop construct / agenda.
- 449 ❖ There should be no disconnection between skills building project(s) and the work with
450 the same countries in creating the NIP. This was not the case in several countries even
451 though the IAs are/were committed on paper to providing any needed follow-up to the
452 training.

- 453 ❖ IAs should be attending the UNITAR training workshops. Had IAs attended the UNITAR
454 training workshops (for their client countries), this would have provided a catalyst for the
455 needed integration (training and actual action plan creation).
- 456 ❖ The GEF needs to secure the needed linkage (coupling for consistency rather than
457 decoupling) of the guidance and training provided by UNITAR and all of the IAs. This
458 will not likely happen unless there is a GEF follow-up in this regard.
- 459 ❖ In many of the LDCs, especially the French-speaking African countries, there is little
460 point in teaching state-of-the-art data and other management techniques without first
461 providing the needed software and providing training on its use.
- 462 ❖ A key component of this evaluation relates to “who” and “how” the NIPs and action
463 plans were created in each country because this element underpins the translation of
464 training into both capacity and institutional strengthening. (We learn by doing). Having
465 action plans created by external (to government) Consultants undermines government and
466 institutional skills development efforts by UNITAR and others. If training provided is not
467 used, skills developed will soon be lost. There will be little to no benefits to be accrued
468 from the training if government staff are precluded from assuming a direct engagement
469 and leadership role, even if the IA transaction costs are likely to be high. This issue
470 needs to be addressed if cost/benefit considerations are to be taken seriously.
- 471 ❖ We know that broad stakeholder engagement fosters problem ownership, accountability,
472 sharing and team play, future cooperation and most importantly, sustainability of results
473 achieved. The lack of adequate and/or consistent engagement by government staff
474 (including all key Ministries) could be a reflection of the state of development, lack of
475 core capacity and other resource constraints. Close consideration needs to be given to
476 these problems during the course of project design and delivery, not just at the time of
477 final project evaluation.
- 478 ❖ If conflicts are to be avoided, UNITAR’s training materials must be made consistent with
479 the guidance / demands by the IAs.
- 480 ❖ The training function needs to be made part of the lead Ministry (for chemicals) within
481 the country (and others) organizational structure and be assigned a regular budget;
482 otherwise, any training provided by UNITAR, the IAs or the GEF will likely not be
483 sustained.
- 484 ❖ Recipient countries need to better understand this sustaining capacity risk (some already
485 do (example, the Ministry of Energy, Tanzania).
- 486 ❖ Lack of action on chemicals in LDCs should not be read as due solely to lack of political
487 will because for the most part, resources are severely constrained and many countries
488 priorities are: poverty alleviation; malaria control and other critical near term economic
489 issues. When viewed against poverty alleviation, ensuring food supply and addressing
490 health issues such as the high level of malarial deaths and AIDS, additional internal
491 Government funding allocations for chemicals management in many LDCs is not likely
492 to receive any elevated priority.
- 493 ❖ As an “add-on” project to a GEF project, UNITAR provided the training workshops but
494 had little, to no, connection with the actual creation of the NIPs. While UNITAR was
495 involved in development of the UNEP/WB interim NIP guidance and in some cases
496 served as the co-executing agency for NIP development, better integration of training for
497 delivery, and delivery, is clearly needed.

- 498 ❖ Better integration of the training provided by UNITAR and other implementation
499 activities of the IAs is also needed. The UNITAR project perhaps should have been a
500 part-of, rather than an “add on” to the GEF POPs enabling project. This would have
501 resulted in more timely cooperation and input from the LDCs.
- 502 ❖ Short notice missions (example, evaluation missions) are a recipe for disaster i.e. failed
503 logistics, knee jerk participation, insufficient time for interviews etc.
- 504 ❖ For countries like Bangladesh where attendance at training sessions is, reportedly,
505 dependent on incentives, it was suggested that even evaluation missions should allocate a
506 small amount in the budget to provide food and perhaps some incentives to cover their
507 often out-of-pocket travel costs and thus encourage individuals to participate.
- 508 ❖ One cannot successfully conduct a review of the adequacy of training materials 2.5 or
509 more years after the training and where there has been limited follow up (use) of the
510 materials and skills by government staff (example, Nepal) due to the modus operandi of
511 the IA.
- 512 ❖ Although under representation of women remains a concern, the root causes are often
513 education based and are being ameliorated over time. LDCs will not be able to respond to
514 gender issues in the same way, or in the same timeframe, as developed countries. Gender
515 equity issues must be kept both in perspective and in the context of the current state of
516 development of the country.
- 517 ❖ Insufficient resource allocations for training results in implementation difficulties and
518 less than optimum organization and perhaps participation (at the country level).
- 519 ❖ A more detailed consideration of anticipated workshop cost(s) needs to be given by the
520 GEF, taking into account the special situation and behavioural norms of participants in
521 the LDCs.
- 522 ❖ The specialized services provided by UNITAR can be a “value added” adjunct to GEF
523 training projects. However, many IAs see the provision of such training to be in their
524 responsibility domain so some turf sorting and delineation may be required by the GEF.
- 525

526 As to recommendations, the author’s views are as follows:

- 527 ❖ UNITAR training materials should be made to be consistent with all of the IA’s
528 requirements (i.e. include log frame analyses or other tools they request countries to use).
529 The IA’s requirements should also be made consistent amongst themselves, perhaps
530 through guidance from the GEF.
- 531 ❖ To enhance efficacy, and depending on the existing core capacity of a training targeted
532 country, computer software and associated training should be made part of the overall
533 training package.
- 534 ❖ Closer consideration needs to be given to the cost/benefit consideration in the selection of
535 countries for training. If a core capacity (the ability to comprehend and absorb) to
536 enhance does not exist, then there will be little if any benefits likely to accrue.
- 537 ❖ “Core capacity” (including computer literacy and availability of the software need to
538 implement the tools) should be a consideration in selecting those to participate in such
539 training and the actual design of the workshop. A longer training program is likely
540 required in the least developed of the LDCs (especially Bangladesh and the African
541 countries) if training needs to include the provision and use of the needed software.
- 542 ❖ Many considered the workshop time to be too short and therefore, a more careful
543 consideration needs to be given to the rate of absorption of the designated beneficiaries as

- 544 well as the fastest (most cost effective) rate of presentation of training materials. The time
545 needed for a workshop needs to be predicated upon current state of development and
546 existing core capacity in the country.
- 547 ❖ More careful attention needs to be given to who is to receive the training avoiding those
548 attending simply for the incentives and/or curiosity.
 - 549 ❖ Those to be trained should commit (and be enabled by the IA modus operandi) to the use
550 of the new skills in the near term. If this is not possible, then, there is no need for the
551 training.
 - 552 ❖ The GEF / UNITAR may wish to consider confining training to those that the country
553 confirms will actually be working on creating (or directly inputting through consultations
554 etc.) to the NIP (or in future, perhaps SAICM). The IAs must be made aware of this as
555 well.
 - 556 ❖ Where countries participate as “pilots”, and additional materials are subsequently added,
557 there should be some form of refresher training provided, if not by UNITAR, then by the
558 IA. The GEF will need to provide additional support if this is to occur.
 - 559 ❖ In order to address the sustainability issue, the training materials should include teachings
560 on contingency (sudden loss of capacity) and succession planning and sustaining
561 knowledge acquired from the training.
 - 562 ❖ Knowledge of chemicals management requires enhanced dissemination in almost all of
563 the LDCs visited (both inside Ministries and in other fora). There were no mechanisms
564 in place towards this endpoint. The Consultant introduced the concept of the informal
565 “brown bag” informal lunchtime seminars to spread information when country reps
566 attend UN meetings and other Conferences in several of the countries he visited and this
567 was enthusiastically received as, not only needed, but a “no-cost” option. This technique
568 should be further advocated by both UNITAR and the IAs.
 - 569 ❖ The level of involvement of those undertaking training and their involvement in the
570 creation of their NIP was outside UNITAR control or even influence. Where training of
571 LDCs is to occur in future, there needs to be some understanding with the country and the
572 IAs that the training received will be used and not be precluded via the utilization of non-
573 government consultants (international or domestic).
 - 574 ❖ UNITAR in cooperation with the GEF Secretariat may wish to give consideration to how
575 best to resolve such conflicts (use of contractors versus government staff) in the creation
576 of the NIP in guidance provided to developing countries.
 - 577 ❖ In countries where core capacity (including computer literacy) is weak and thus
578 transaction costs to the IA likely to be high, special funding consideration by the GEF
579 may be needed.
 - 580 ❖ Guidance provided to countries by both UNITAR and the IAs needs to be made
581 consistent.
 - 582 ❖ Training modules need to be customized i.e. not too advanced relative to the current
583 practices (incremental enhancement) and should take into account current (local)
584 management practices and constraints to the degree possible.
 - 585 ❖ Consideration should be given to including practical (local) examples and videos as part
586 of the training materials, (the notion being as requested by some beneficiaries “a picture
587 is worth a thousand words”).

- 588 ❖ A special module explaining how best to train-the-trainers and/or on establishing a
589 training unit, should be included in UNITAR’s guidance materials as this will strengthen
590 the potential for sustaining results.
- 591 ❖ IAs should make an effort to encourage the participation of women and UNITAR might
592 wish to include a module in future training programs pointing out the importance of the
593 participation of women in chemicals management.
- 594 ❖ As to gender equity issues, UNITAR may wish to consider creating a reference in their
595 training materials to the key role to be played by women (soft sell promotional materials
596 on enhancing female participation).
- 597 ❖ A greater effort needs to be put into the post training evaluation sheet design to create a
598 format that could facilitate future evaluations such as this.
- 599 ❖ Consideration needs to be given to creating a special case for the LDCs as they reportedly
600 cannot compete fairly for project funding with the more financially lucrative developing
601 countries such as China.
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605 **II. INTRODUCTION**

606

607 ***II.1 Background***

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609 In implementing the Stockholm Convention, governments are obligated to take measures to
610 eliminate or reduce the release of POPs into the environment. A basic and early requirement of a
611 country to fulfill these obligations is the preparation of a National Implementation Plan (NIP),
612 and associated Action or Implementation Plans within two years of ratification. Many of the 50
613 UN-designated Least Developed Countries (LDCs), however, lack the skills needed to
614 adequately develop the strategic approaches required in a manner, and to a degree, satisfactory to
615 the GEF Secretariat.

616

617 When and where such skills are lacking, experience has shown that the baseline NIPs from such
618 countries may: be inconsistent in terms of quality between countries; need strengthening in the
619 detail/quality required for the costed sets of interventions that are expected to result; contain
620 Action Plan objectives and targets that are somewhat unrealistic and/or inappropriate; have roles
621 and responsibilities for NIP implementation among stakeholders including sectoral ministries
622 that are not defined in sufficient detail; and require strengthening in terms of stakeholder
623 participation in the NIP process. A lack of skills development in LDCs in the area of project
624 planning/action plan development is a likely root cause for such outcomes.

625

626 These two projects (the original 25 country project and then the 15 additional country project)
627 are action plan training and skills building to assist these countries in developing sound NIPs
628 whilst simultaneously contributing to capacity building, human resource development and
629 institutional strengthening through skills building in project planning and management which, in
630 turn, will likely contribute to various other future efforts toward the sound management of
631 chemicals, for example SAICM.

632

633 The 25 LDC project document was signed in May 2004, and implementation commenced in June
634 2004. The project was extended into 2008 to allow for successful completion of Component IV
635 (described later) of the project, “Project Evaluation and Final Report”. The GEF accredited
636 Implementing Agency (IA) for the project is the United Nations development Programme
637 (UNDP) and the Executing Agency of the project is the United Nations Institute for Training and
638 Research (UNITAR).

639

640 Because of increased demand for such training, a second project was initiated and 15 additional
641 LDCs project document was signed in 28 January 2006, and implementation commenced in
642 March 2006. This project was again extended into 2008 for the same reason.

643

644 The project strategy was to commence with a “pilot” in five countries during which training
645 materials and training methodologies could be field tested then refined as needed before
646 continuing with the remaining countries. The primary target beneficiaries / target organizations
647 within the countries included: governmental organizations; civil society organizations (including
648 NGOs); women’s organizations and women’s groups; the private sector; academics, research and
649 “think-tank” institutions; professional groups and associations and perhaps trade unions.

650

651 The overall goal of the projects was to provide, over a period of 24 months (25 LDC project) and
652 20 months (15 LDC project), national-level training, and technical and financial support to
653 countries that have signed and/or are Parties to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
654 Pollutants (POPs) and have prepared and submitted GEF Enabling Activity proposals to
655 develop/strengthen skills to undertake project planning, including Action Plan development.

656

657 The more specific project objectives included:

- 658 ❖ Raising awareness among training recipients of relevant approaches to project and
659 strategic planning;
- 660 ❖ Ensuring training recipients are familiar with, and able to effectively use, key project and
661 strategic planning tools and methodologies;
- 662 ❖ Applying such action plan development approaches in the context of the Stockholm
663 Convention; and,
- 664 ❖ Sharing experiences and lessons learned between countries receiving the training, and
665 identifying possible country-driven follow-up activities.

666

667 Unfortunately, not all 50 LDCs could be addressed by this project(s) (just 40). This was due
668 mainly to resource limitations but also due to the fact that some countries were in a war situation
669 / zone or war torn and/or due to the number of LDCs that were Signatories or Parties to the
670 Stockholm Convention. However, UNITAR, with financial support from the Swiss Government,
671 was able to fund skills building training workshops for an additional nine developing countries
672 and countries with economies in transition bringing the total of countries trained to 48.

673

674 As part of the GEF requirements, all such project must be subjected upon conclusion to an
675 evaluation by one or more independent experts. The evaluation exercised was mobilized by
676 UNITAR in early 2008 with field work (country interviews) occurring between June 9 and
677 August 6, 2008.

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- The main objectives of this final project(s) evaluation are:
- ❖ To enhance organizational and development learning;
 - ❖ To strengthen the adaptive management and monitoring functions of future projects;
 - ❖ To play a critical role in supporting accountability for the achievement of the GEF objectives;
 - ❖ To enable informed decision-making;
 - ❖ To examine and promote cost-effective projects by examining and offering guidance on improving the sustainability of results achieved;
 - ❖ To promote gender equity; and,
 - ❖ To serve as a resource base and change agent where possible.

690 **II.2 Budgetary Considerations**

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The main input to project **GLO/04/G35 – PIMS 3055** (25 least developed countries project) was the in-kind national government(s) contributions to their respective NIP enabling activity. The total budget as per the project document was \$2,025,000 US (\$1,000,000US GEF and \$1,025,000US parallel financing). The total budget was funded by GEF and UNDP with co-financing provided by the Government of Switzerland. The NIP project itself also provided significant government input and infrastructure (eg. project committee and subcommittees on action plans, etc.) that are essential for the successful execution of this project.

700 The funding was allocated as per Tables #1 and #2 which follow.

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Table 1 - 25 Country Project (GLO/04/G35 - PIMS 3055)

Component (GEF portion in brackets)	GEF Budget (USD)	Other Sources (USD)	Total (USD)
Project development *		25,000*	25,000*
Project Coordination (5 days per country @\$800 per day)	100,000	40,000	140,000
International Experts (15 days per country @\$600 per day; and project evaluator's fees@\$6,000)	229,000	96,000	325,000
Administrative support (5 days per country @\$500 per day)	62,000	---	62,000
Training	185,000	375,000	575,000
Subcontracts: 25 project grants of 5000 USD per country ¹ (for local consultants, workshop costs)	125,000	---	125,000
Travel and DSA (\$7,000 per country, plus \$5000 additional travel/DSA stipend for Phase III Review Meeting and \$4000 for project evaluator travel)	184,000	24,000	208,000

Equipment	35,000	40,000	75,000
Training Material Development	0	350,000	350,000
Programme Support Costs (8%)	80,000	100,000	165,000
Total	1,000,000	1,025,000	2,025,000

Table 2 - 15 Country Project (Atlas Project no. 00048698 - PIMS 3545)

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Component (GEF portion in brackets)	GEF Budget (USD)	Other Sources (USD)	Total (USD)
Project development *	0	50,000*	50,000*
Project Coordination (5 days per country @\$800 per day)	60,000	120,000	180,000
International Experts (15 days per country @\$600 per day; and project evaluator's fees@\$6,000)	141,000	150,000	291,000
Administrative support (5 days per country @\$500 per day)	37,500	80,000	117,500
Training	121,500	150,000	271,500
Subcontracts: 15 project grants of 5000 USD per country ² (for local consultants, workshop costs)	75,000	---	75,000
Travel and DSA (\$9,000 per country, plus \$5000 additional travel/DSA stipend for Phase III Review Meeting and \$4000 for project evaluator travel)	144,000	---	144,000
Equipment	25,000	50,000	75,000
Training Material Development	0	50,000	50,000
Other/miscellaneous	40,000	52,500	92,500
Programme Support Costs (8%)	56,000	97,500	153,500
Total	700,000	750,000	1,450,000

709 * Swiss funding: costs for UNITAR staff in preparing GEF submission as well as project
710 document requesting funds from other sources (not included in the project total).
711

712 Each participating country was provided \$5,000 to organize the workshop logistics.
713

714 ***II.3 Project(s) Construct***

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716 The two projects utilized the same project construct, the only difference being that the second
717 project (additional 15 countries) did not require the pilot test phase. Nevertheless, the
718 description of the first project construct can illustrate the construct for both.
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720 Project **GLO/04/G35 – PIMS 3055** (25 least developed countries project) consisted of four
721 major components that are summarized in the following table.
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Table 3 – Project Construct

Component	Activities	Performance Indicators	Outputs Expected
Component I – Existing guidance and training materials	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Distribution of guidance and training materials to IA/EAs, POPs Secretariat, and other experts for peer review; 2) Provision to UNITAR of comments on materials; 3) Revision/adaptation of materials, if necessary; 4) Finalization of materials for use in “front-runner” countries 	Communication of feedback on guidance and training materials to UNITAR	Revised set of guidance and training materials.
Component II – Training/skills building in 5 front runner countries (LDCs) and Country-Level “Train the Trainers” Sessions	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> (Pilot the action plan training/skills-building workshop and country-level “train the trainers” sessions in 5 “front-runner” countries); 5) Completion of five Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs) comprising country workplans and budgets; 6) Provision of guidance and training materials to each country in advance of workshops; 7) Conduct 2-3 day action plan skills building/training workshops in each country; 8) Conduct “train-the-trainers” sessions at the country level; 9) Distribute preliminary evaluation questionnaires; 10) Provide in-depth follow-up assistance for each country, where 		<p>Reports on each training workshop; roster of trainers. Revised set of guidance and training materials for global use.</p>

	requested; 11) Distribute second evaluation questionnaire.		
Component III – Using the experience gained in Component II, undertake 20 action plan training/skills-building workshops	1) Revision of guidance and training materials based on lessons learned; 2) Complete 20 MOAs comprising country workplans and budgets; 3) Provision of guidance and training materials to each country in advance of workshops; 4) Conducting 2-3 day action plan skills building/training workshops in each country; 5) Distribution of preliminary evaluation questionnaires; 6) Provide in-depth follow-up assistance for each country, where requested; 7) Distribute second evaluation questionnaire		Reports on each training workshop.
Component IV – Project evaluation	Undertake evaluations (when by whom, how many)	Communication of feedback on projects – including lessons learned	Evaluation report.

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UNDP is the Executing Agency (EA) for the project(s) and the strategy consisted of three phases: (I) Review of Guidance and Training Materials, and Preparatory Work on Project Countries; (II) Action Plan Skills-Building and (III) Project Evaluation Meeting and Final Report. The intent of the second phase project was to train an estimated additional 300-500 NIP participants on action planning-related tools and approaches.

734 **II.4 Sustainability Considerations**

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The sustainability of the mechanisms created by the project was to be ensured in the following manner:

- ❖ The project was to directly involve the National Coordinating Committees (NCCs) in the countries for the development of the NIPs in all participating LDCs, thereby ensuring that the project benefits could be maintained by, and through, the activities of, such national committees. The NCCs were created but this action although potentially contributing to sustainability is not enough in and of itself. There are many other features noted in this

743 report that create the conditions needed for sustainability and in most of the countries
744 visited, these conditions are not in place or likely to be for the foreseeable future.

745 ❖ Trained personnel would now exist in project countries that were given project/action
746 planning skills and it was thought that these could now be applied to other
747 project/programme development activities, including the development of Stockholm
748 Convention implementation projects for GEF/other donors. This will be the case in some
749 countries but not those lacking the core capacities needed.

750 ❖ It was thought that the increased skills in project countries among NIP participants would
751 lead to better planned and executed projects and programmes, leading to greater
752 efficiencies and possibly synergies within and among projects. These improvements
753 were to demonstrably improve the ability of countries to reach project and programme
754 objectives, thus eliminating the need to repeat projects and strengthening environmental
755 protection through improved projects. This may be the case in some countries but
756 certainly not in all cases, especially where all of the inventories have been compiled by
757 non-government staff and the NIP prepared by non-government staff

758

759 Sustainability is perhaps the key shortfall of the training provided by UNITAR and needs to be a
760 critical consideration in future training undertakings, although the challenges of this as part of an
761 add-on project are recognised.

762

763 ***II.5 Replicability***

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765 The second (15 country) project was to build on the GEF-funded UNITAR/UNDP project Action
766 Plan Training/Skills Building for 25 Least Developed Countries designed to assist with National
767 Implementation Plan Development under the Stockholm Convention. The first project had
768 already provided insight into the replicability of the project at the time of commencement of the
769 second. Lessons learned in the first set of countries trained under that project implied, for
770 example, that the training could be applied at any point in the NIP project, including as an
771 informal review of an advanced draft of the overall NIP. In addition, the earlier drafts of the
772 UNITAR methodology was developed originally to assist countries in developing action plans
773 for priority topics of chemicals management as part of Swiss-supported projects to develop
774 Integrated National Programmes for the Sound Management of Chemicals. The guidance was
775 also adapted to assist countries to develop plans to implement the Globally Harmonised System
776 for Classification and Labelling of Chemicals; and to assist in risk management decision-making
777 on priority chemicals. The methodology for the project is clearly highly replicable and adaptable,
778 as it is intended for use by any interested country. However, it is of limited use in enabling the
779 creation of NIPs if it occurs after the NIPs are already completed so the value of the training
780 needs to be viewed from the broader sound management of chemicals context.

781

782 ***II.6 Country Selection for Evaluation***

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784 It was deemed cost-prohibitive to undertake detailed follow-up evaluation by Consultants in all
785 40 countries. Eight countries were therefore selected by UNITAR, and the selection endorsed by

786 the Project Advisory Committee. The countries evaluated included - Asia - Bangladesh,
787 Cambodia, and Nepal; and, Africa - Chad, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Uganda. This
788 selection was, reportedly, based on the following criteria: regional, linguistic, and programmatic
789 distribution; a good range of differing levels of development, training at an early or late stage of
790 NIP development (five and three respectively), and project distribution (six countries from the 25
791 LDC project and two countries from the 15 LDCs).
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
793 **II.8 Project(s) Management**

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795 Although UNDP was the GEF Implementing Agency for this project, UNITAR, was the
796 Executing Agency (in the driver’s seat) establishing the project management structures necessary
797 for the successful execution of both projects. The team leader was the UNITAR project
798 coordinator. An Advisory Committee to focus on coordination issues was established and was
799 chaired by the GEF Secretariat and included UNDP, UNEP, WB, FAO, UNIDO, donors and
800 other experts. UNITAR acted as the Secretariat. Those selected to be on the Advisory
801 Committee were those Agencies with direct responsibilities with regard to POPs; POPs funding
802 and / or POPs implementation at the international level.
803

804 The Project Coordinator (UNITAR) was responsible for insuring coordination with other
805 technical assistance activities addressing the implementation of the Stockholm Convention, as
806 well as keeping the advisory committee informed of the progress in implementing the project.
807

808 The committee was to meet at least three times (by teleconference): at the end of component I to
809 review the guidance and training material and ensure coordination in the 5 “front-runner”
810 countries; at the end of component II to ensure coordination in the further 20 countries; and to
811 take stock after completion of project activities. There have been just three Project Advisory
812 Committee meetings (April 2005; November 2005 and October 2006). This front-end loading of
813 the meetings was perhaps appropriate because this was when the input was most needed. It is
814 difficult to assess whether these were enough meetings but the suspicion, in the absence of any
815 observations to support a contrary view, is yes it was.
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817

818 **Figure 1: Project(s) Coordination Arrangements**



832 **II.9 Project(s) Expectations and Performance Measurement**

833 **II.9.1 Anticipated Risks**

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835 The risks identified for these projects were:

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837 **Major risks**

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- a. Governments participating in the project may not undertake the necessary follow-up work required to ensure that action plans are developed to the degree needed to prepare detailed, costed interventions. The risk is there, but it is acceptable because national governments are signatories and/or Parties to the Convention (and therefore should have a high level of commitment to its provisions); and there are numerous environmental NGOs and others in these countries monitoring the progress and participating in implementing the requirements of the Convention.

UNITAR was to manage this risk through regular communication with project countries, providing additional and continuing advice on action plan development prior to and after each country workshop. UNITAR was also available to evaluate action plans in full draft form (no such requests were made), and use the GEF network of IAs to assist in such evaluations.

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- b. The minimal infrastructure needed to carry out project activities at the country level may not be in place.

While there was this risk (and this was the case in one or more countries (examples Nepal, Bangladesh, Chad, Comoros, Madagascar)) support already provided for the NIP, as well as a modest grant provided through this project (linked to a Memorandum of Agreement between UNITAR and each project country outlining deliverables), was expected to provide adequate certainty that the project activities would be carried out at the country level.

862 **Minor risks**

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- a. An insufficient number of countries will sign up for the project. This was not the case.

UNITAR did not expect this to be the case (insufficient numbers), however. UNITAR contacted each potential participating country at a very early stage in the project to ensure that the services provided would be utilized to the fullest extent possible. However, the control over this feature (utilization of the training to be provided by UNITAR) rested with the IAs and utilization of training provided by UNITAR was not always the case.

- b. The necessary technical follow-up by the GEF IAs will not materialize in a timely manner consistent with each country's NIP development timeline.

877 *This risk was to be addressed, in part through regular meetings of the Project*
878 *Advisory Committee (PAC), chaired by the GEF and consisting of the GEF IAs. The*
879 *issue of coordination was placed on the agenda of the committee by the Secretariat*
880 *(UNITAR) and Chair for regular review and discussion, and to obtain IA commitment*
881 *to provide support.*
882

883 Section III.3.5 describes in more detail, the evaluators assessment of the responses to the risks
884 and unforeseen barriers and impediments.
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886 **II.9.2 End-of-project expectations**

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888 The end-of-project expectations were as follows:
889

- 890 a. Key NIP participants, including representatives of key ministries and stakeholders
891 outside of government in all participating countries will have been trained to use/ and/or
892 adapt a tested methodology for project planning/action plan development. *This was*
893 *achieved;*
894
- 895 b. Increased awareness of and capacities in project/action planning in approximately 40
896 LDCs. *This was achieved;*
897
- 898 c. NIPs and other Stockholm Convention-related Action Plans reflect improved project and
899 action planning capacities in recipient countries. *This appears to have been achieved but*
900 *was difficult to assess in situations where, reportedly, the IAs prepared the NIP with little*
901 *to no government staff engagement other than consultation and sign off on drafts;*
902
- 903 d. Participating countries integrate mutual lessons and experience into their respective
904 project and action planning processes. *This was achieved but many countries visited have*
905 *not as yet begun implementing their NIP;*
906
- 907 e. Recipient country priority NIPs interventions are clearly targeted, costed and presentable
908 to potential donors. *This was difficult to assess as UNITAR was not involved with this*
909 *aspect and the evaluators TORs did not include a critical review of NIPs;*
910
- 911 f. Internal (baseline) financial and human resource mobilization to address Convention
912 obligations will be strengthened. *This was difficult to assess as UNITAR was not involved*
913 *with this aspect and the evaluators TORs did not include a critical review of NIPs;*
914
- 915 g. Recipient country priority NIP interventions are realistic and achievable. *This was*
916 *difficult to assess as UNITAR was not involved with this aspect and the evaluators TORs*
917 *did not include a critical review of NIPs;*
918
- 919 h. NIP implementation roles and responsibilities, including coordination, are clearly
920 defined. *This was difficult to assess as UNITAR was not involved with this aspect and the*
921 *evaluators TORs did not include a critical review of NIPs; and*

922 i. An Action Plan Development Guidance and Training Package tailored for the needs of
923 countries addressing Stockholm Convention obligations, including associated supporting
924 materials (including CD-ROMs, exercises and project planning software) will also be
925 included. *This was achieved although in francophone Africa there were concerns*
926 *expressed about insufficient customizing of training packages.*
927
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929 **II.10 Evaluation Scope and Methodology**

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931 **II.10.1 Evaluation Team and Division of Work**

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933 As noted, although there are 40 countries in total covered by the two UNITAR training and skills
934 development project, due to travel and other cost considerations, it was decided to limit the field
935 evaluation scope to eight countries that were, nonetheless, deemed to be representative of the
936 entire group.
937

938 The field evaluation component was undertaken by two Consultants; one focusing on the Asian
939 countries (Bangladesh, Cambodia and Nepal) and English speaking African countries (Uganda
940 and Tanzania) and also with responsibility for methodology development (in consultation with
941 UNITAR and UNDP staff), evaluation design (including questionnaire(s) design) that will flow
942 from a series of matrices that will subsequently be used to create a summary of findings and for a
943 comparative and horizontal analysis of the evaluation data. The final report preparation was the
944 responsibility of the lead Consultant with review and comment by the second Consultant. The
945 second Consultant conducted interviews in three French-speaking African countries (Chad,
946 Comoros and Madagascar) and provided field data and reports to the principal Consultant during
947 the report preparation phase.
948

949 **II.10.2 Evaluation Methodology**

950
951 The evaluation methodology focused on four components:

- 952 1) the country participant perceptions, experience and feedback (Matrix#1);
- 953 2) the train-the-trainer component (Matrix #2);
- 954 3) the assessment of the project(s) design / suitability / adequacy including the management
955 systems and the engagement created at the national level (Matrix #3); and,
- 956 4) the evaluation of the outcomes achieved vis-à-vis prior agreed performance indicators
957 (Matrix #4).

958
959 1) The country experience and impacts (Matrices #1 and #4) were explored in detail through
960 country visits, and interviews with national-level key stakeholders that received the training. This
961 component included an assessment of:

- 962 ❖ the timing of the project as to where they were in the NIP development process;
- 963 ❖ the guidance and training materials;
- 964 ❖ the skills building workshops (structure and presentation);

- 965 ❖ the train-the-trainer workshops (structure and presentation);
- 966 ❖ comprehensiveness of stakeholder participation;
- 967 ❖ level (active or passive) of stakeholder engagement;
- 968 ❖ adequacy of who was trained and the numbers;
- 969 ❖ perceptions of new and additionally of capacity built;
- 970 ❖ views on institutionalization of capacity built;
- 971 ❖ evidence in support of capacity built;
- 972 ❖ collateral positive impacts;
- 973 ❖ barriers and impediments and how they were overcome;
- 974 ❖ views on training improvements (if any);
- 975 ❖ overall conclusions on the training provided;
- 976 ❖ gender participation observations;
- 977 ❖ country-specific perspectives on sustainability of results;
- 978 ❖ country perspective on lessons learned; and
- 979 ❖ country rating of the projects success relative to country expectations.

980

981 2 and 3) The train-the-trainer component (Matrix #2) and the assessment of the project(s) design
982 / suitability / adequacy including the management systems and the engagement created at the
983 national level (Matrix #3) was designed to focus on the efficacy and utilization of individuals
984 trained to be trainers. The evaluation of the project design / suitability / adequacy including the
985 management systems was based upon interviews with UNITAR staff in both Bangkok and
986 Geneva and included:

- 987 ❖ the responses to anticipated risks;
- 988 ❖ the identification of barriers and impediments and remediation measures taken;
- 989 ❖ assessment of the project design construct;
- 990 ❖ assessment of the project management and coordination mechanisms;
- 991 ❖ the level and nature of EA/IA engagement; and
- 992 ❖ assessment of the role played by UNITAR.

993

- 994 4) The overall evaluation of the success of the project(s) (Matrix #4) is based on the evaluation
995 (in-country interviews) with a particular focus on the observable outcomes / impacts
996 achieved taking into account prior agreed performance indicators including where possible:
997 ❖ measurable and if possible, quantifiable, indications of enhanced project management and
998 planning skills;
- 999 ❖ achievements relative to prior agreed performance indicators;
 - 1000 ❖ the utilization of the participatory performance framework;
 - 1001 ❖ gender participation;
 - 1002 ❖ sustainability and replicability of results achieved; and
 - 1003 ❖ lessons learned.

1004

1005 The questions posed (for all 8 countries) as well as UNITAR staff, are set out at Annex D.

1006

1007 **III. FINDINGS AND EVALUATION OUTCOMES**

1008 **III.1 Country Contexts**

1009
1010 To properly understand the training implications it is important to take into consideration, *inter*
1011 *alia*, where each of the countries were /are at regarding their NIP at the time of the training,
1012 which ones were fore-runners and who were the respective IAs and their modus operandi. This
1013 is important because the IA modus operandi not only affects the quality of the data (inventories
1014 etc.) and the NIP, but perhaps more importantly, the sustainability of results achieved, and the
1015 sustainability of the capacity built in each country for the sound management of chemicals in
1016 future. What follows is a brief summary of the situation (referred to as “context”) in each
1017 country. Each of the IAs for the LDCs that received UNITAR training is identified in the two
1018 tables at Annex E. What follows is a brief context description for each of the countries visited.
1019 This was most often obtained during the initial interviews with the senior officials in the lead
1020 Ministry or with the designated POPs focal point.
1021

1022 **III.1.1 - Bangladesh**

1023
1024 The UNITAR Skills Building workshop was held December 4-6, 2005. Bangladesh ratified the
1025 Stockholm Convention on POPs on March 7, 2007. A National Implementation Plan (NIP) was
1026 prepared under a GEF-funded project, by the Department of Environment (DoE), with the
1027 Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE) and the Bangladesh Power Development Board
1028 (BPDB) as the cooperating agencies. The first draft of Bangladesh’s NIP had already been
1029 completed seven months (April 2005) before the UNITAR training. However, Bangladesh’s NIP
1030 was under review (internal approval procedures) for a long time being accepted by the POPs
1031 Secretariat in 2007.
1032

1033 There were some 60 participants at the UNITAR training workshop (19 from MOEF/DoE and
1034 the remainder coming from the other co-implementing agencies (Bangladesh Power Board
1035 (PCBs) and the Department of Agriculture Extension (pesticides) and a wide assortment of
1036 constituencies). Only a small number (15) could be interviewed as part of this evaluation. The
1037 reasons: some were originally (and still are) located outside Dhaka and it was not feasible or
1038 possible to interview them; and, because of this time lag (evaluation occurring some 2.5 years
1039 after the training), it was noted that many workshop participants had changed posts or been
1040 assigned to other parts of the country.
1041

1042 Bangladesh Government staff indicated that, unfortunately, there are still no specific
1043 responsibility centre(s) within Government for curtailing emissions of POPs. This responsibility
1044 reportedly falls under the general mandate of MOEF to protect the environment but it was noted
1045 that there in no infrastructure / resources available for this purpose.
1046
1047

1048 **III.1.2 - Cambodia**

1049
1050 Cambodia was the first country to received training 19-21 October 2004, almost four years ago.
1051 Cambodia ratified the Stockholm Convention on 25 of August 2006. Cambodia's NIP was
1052 submitted May 3, 2007. The IA was/is UNEP.

1053
1054 Some interviewed in Cambodia noted that illegal trade of POPs pesticides in Cambodia is a
1055 major concern and mitigates against efforts to encourage integrated pest management (IPM).
1056 Some suspected sources of the illegal trade were noted: chlordane (from Thailand); DDT and
1057 other POPs as well (from Vietnam). Recently they noticed illegal POPs from China arriving via
1058 Vietnam.
1059

1060 **III.1.3 - Chad**

1061
1062 Chad ratified the Stockholm Convention on 23 May 2004. UNIDO was/is the executing agent for
1063 the POPs project (NIP creation). The UNITAR training workshop took place 5-6 April 2005.
1064 The participants were principally members of the Ministries of: Environment, Finance
1065 (Customs), Higher Education and Scientific Research, Agriculture, Planning, and several NGOs
1066 dealing primarily with consumers rights, promotion of veterinary health. Several activities were
1067 conducted prior to the preparation of the NIP.
1068

- 1069
- 1070 1. Preparation of inventories of chemical products at the national level (this was done based
1071 upon training provided by UNIDO) where the following groups were trained; pesticides
1072 (Min of Agriculture); PCBs (National Company of Water and Electricity – Ministry of
1073 Energy and Mines); D&F (led by a national consultant). Each group included a report on
1074 contaminated sites. Also, a national consultant conducted a Socio Economic Impact
1075 Study of the POPs effects on health and environment.
 - 1076 2. A workshop was carried out to identify priorities and objectives for training. This was
1077 followed by a validation workshop (Feb 2005).
 - 1078 3. Finally, the workshop for the preparation of action plans was conducted (April 05) under
1079 the direction of UNITAR. The following groups participated in the UNITAR training
1080 workshop: pesticides ([Min. of Agriculture); dioxins and furans (national consultant);
1081 PCBs (National Company of Water and Electricity– Ministry of Energy and Mines);
1082 Information-Education-Training – Communication-Exchange of information (national
1083 consultant); and, Contaminated sites (national consultant).

1084 The Principal Technical Advisor (national consultant) was responsible for reviewing and
1085 coordinating action plans under the direction of National Coordinator. The NIP was approved at
1086 the country level Sept. 2005. Although the NIP has not been implemented as a national effort,
1087 the PCB component has begun its own independent implementation within the framework of a
1088 regional project (the GEF-financed project led by Senegal which is the Regional Center for the
1089 Basil Convention for the Francophone Countries.) This was endorsed by the Chad-GEF focal
1090 point in March 2005. The first phase (2007-2008) has been completed. It dealt with re-
1091 inventorying the PCB in the country and preparing the action plan. Regrettably, for the other

1092 POPs chemicals, there is nothing upcoming in terms of financing possibilities, with the possible
1093 exception of another regional effort in capacity building run by UNIDO.
1094

1095 **III.1.4 - Comoros**

1096
1097 The Union of Comoros was one of the first countries to sign the Stockholm Convention on 22
1098 May 2001. The adoption of the Convention by the National Assembly took place in November
1099 2006 and its ratification in January 2007. UNITAR conducted the following training activities:
1100 the preparation of the national profile in 2005; this was followed by training key stakeholders
1101 (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Environment, henceforth (MAFE) to carry out
1102 inventories related to PCB, dioxin and furan and pesticides; and, finally, in 2007, a training
1103 workshop for preparation of the action plans.
1104

1105 Based on the UNITAR workshop, the NIP was prepared by a national team from key stakeholder
1106 organizations (MAFE and Min of Health) with the support of UNITAR senior fellows and staff
1107 and UNDP. A workshop for validation of the NIP was held in 2007 under the auspices of UNDP.
1108 Comoros now searching for financing to implement the NIP.
1109

1110 The following are the NIP chemicals with respective lead organizations: pesticides – MAFE –
1111 Directorate of Agriculture; and PCBs – National Company of Water and Electricity (Ministry
1112 of Energy); and dioxins and furans – MAFE – Directorate of Environment.
1113

1114 In the capital (Maroni) there is a National Coordination and Management Committee which also
1115 serves as the Focal Point for the Stockholm Convention. Each Island is represented by a
1116 Consultative and Coordination Committee with representatives of the Ministries of MAFE,
1117 Transportation and the Farmers National Union.
1118

1119 **III.1.5 - Madagascar**

1120
1121 Madagascar ratified the Stockholm Convention on August 3, 2005 and UNEP is the executing
1122 agency for the NIP. There was no national workshop for skill building prior to the elaboration of
1123 the NIP's first draft (March 2004). The NIP was prepared by a national team composed of
1124 members of the National Committee for Project Coordination led by the POPs focal point,
1125 following the guidelines of UNEP. Subsequently, UNITAR held a national workshop for the
1126 preparation of action plans for NIP (4-6 October 2006).
1127

1128 The UNITAR workshop provided guidelines to prepare national action plans. It focused on
1129 techniques needed to draft an action plan. Training materials were distributed covering the
1130 application of techniques such as: decision making trees, log frames, Gantt charts, performance
1131 indicators etc. Each participant during the workshop learned how to prepare an action plan
1132 associated with his/her domain. During the workshop, the following working groups were
1133 assembled in accordance with the various POPs categories and each with a lead organization:
1134 pesticides (Ministry of Agriculture); DDT (Ministry of Health); dioxin and furans (Ministry of
1135 Industry); PCBs (Ministry of Energy's Water and Electricity Distribution Co (JIRAMA));

1136 information and awareness raising (Ministry of Environment, Water, Forest and Tourism); and,
1137 capacity building (Ministry of Environment, Water, Forest and Tourism). Based on the workshop
1138 outcomes, the national team prepared the second draft of the NIP and sent it to a consultant for
1139 review after which it was submitted to UNEP for review and comment. On June 2008, the final
1140 version of the NIP was submitted to UNEP. It is anticipated that in August 2008 a national
1141 workshop will be convened to validate the NIP.

1142

1143 As reported by the focal point, the Ministry of Environment has requested UNIDO to finance the
1144 implementation of the NIP with particular reference to the last two components (information and
1145 awareness raising and capacity building). These components include a strategy to train trainers.
1146 UNIDO is now reportedly reviewing the financing. Implemented is anticipated to occur in 2009.

1147

1148 **III.1.6 - Nepal**

1149

1150 The Nepal Skills training Workshop was held on 18-20 May 2006. Nepal ratified the Stockholm
1151 Convention on October 13, 2006. The NIP was developed in late 2006 and early 2007, then
1152 submitted and approved by Government on March 21, 2007. At the time of the workshop, Nepal
1153 wished to proceed simultaneously with the development of their POPs action plan. They
1154 therefore used the occasion of the training workshop to undertake the actual developmental
1155 components of the future action plan. For the training experience, they created three working
1156 groups (pesticides, dioxin and furans and PCBs) and the participants in each group during the
1157 workshops were both the actual responsibility centres and other relevant stakeholders to the
1158 respective issues). Government staff interviewed indicated that Nepal utilized all of the key
1159 elements outlined in the workshop training sessions. For example, Nepal undertook a gap
1160 analysis and identified the legislative and regulatory shortfalls that needed to be addressed to
1161 address all of the obligations arising from ratification of the Stockholm Convention. They also
1162 identified the actions needed. While there was somewhat limited direct Government staff
1163 involvement in the preparation of the NIP details following the workshop, they feel they created
1164 their NIP themselves and profited greatly from the UNITAR training.

1165

1166 **III.1.7 - Uganda**

1167

1168 Uganda's UNITAR workshop was held November 23-25, 2005 (almost 3 years ago). Uganda
1169 ratified the Stockholm Convention on July 20, 2004 (before the training workshops). The IA for
1170 Uganda's NIP is UNEP. National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) Staff feel that
1171 they are developing the NIP themselves utilizing a National Consultant to manage task teams
1172 (composed of a wide range of stakeholders) for the inventory phase and with an international
1173 Consultant (the UNITAR senior fellow) to provide refresher training and additional guidance and
1174 advice as needed. The NIP is, reportedly, now ready in draft form with just one category
1175 requiring further input which is expected shortly. They expect submission and Secretariat
1176 acceptance of their NIP by early fall 2008. Uganda has a National; Coordinating Committee
1177 (NCC) composed of senior key Ministry officials; academics; NGOs; plus trade associations and
1178 other NGOs. The NCC does not engage in the details but rather focuses on product review and

1179 approval etc. The day-to-day management aspects falls to the POPs Project Coordination Unit
1180 (PCU) especially its head.

1181
1182 NEMA indicated that most of the individuals trained by UNITAR are very active and are
1183 providing input in one form or another first to POPs and now with their SAICM project. There
1184 were no train-the-trainers sessions held in Uganda. They feel the UNITAR training was an
1185 excellent empowering experience creating not only planning skills but also giving the full vision
1186 and creating for the first time the occasion for all of the key Ministries to work effectively
1187 together and this is now paying dividends with regards to SAICM as well. The only complaint
1188 was that \$5,000 was insufficient funds to organize and orchestrate the UNITAR training
1189 workshop.

1190
1191 It was reported that Uganda’s NIP has taken longer than initially expected due to the time needed
1192 to create the inventories. The benefits of the UNITAR training for Uganda identified were: a
1193 kick start; vision setting; clear mission statement and confidence to proceed; awareness raising
1194 inside and outside government; and, caused the creation of the correct structures (coordinating
1195 mechanisms).

1196

1197 **III.1.8 - Tanzania**

1198
1199 Tanzania ratified the POPs Convention in December 2004. Tanzania had completed the first
1200 draft of their NIP in advance of the UNITAR training. In fact, at the time of the workshop,
1201 Tanzania was at an advanced state of drafting of their action plans. Tanzania was the third
1202 workshop and this took place 17-19 January 2005. About 28 persons from a wide variety of
1203 stakeholder groups participated. The final version of the NIP was completed in December 2005.
1204 The UNTAR training assisted in strengthening the draft NIP. Staff noted that another (related)
1205 purpose of the workshop was to test UNITAR guidance and training materials for the project.
1206 As a frontrunner country, Tanzania tested UNITAR’s draft action plan training methodology and
1207 associated materials, and gave extensive feedback on the materials and training approach in
1208 general. UNIDO was the IA for the NIP.

1209

1210

1211 **III.2 Beneficiaries’ Perceptions and Assessments**

1212 **III.2.1 Training and Training materials**

1213
1214 Those interviewed were asked if the training materials provided were adequate and if not why
1215 not? Most indicated that they felt the UNITAR training experience was excellent (Nepal,
1216 Cambodia, Chad, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania, Uganda) and contributed significantly to
1217 their individual capacity for creating the action plan and even to the broader issue of the sound
1218 management of chemicals. Chad and Madagascar noted the lack of software (and needed
1219 training on its use) to utilize the Gantt chart training. A Cambodian NGO (pesticide advocacy
1220 group) that undertook the training indicated that the materials received during training were used
1221 in their subsequent training and awareness raising presentation aimed at farmers. Especially

1222 important was the knowledge pertaining to adverse impacts. However, some (example, Nepal),
1223 felt that, in retrospect, there were some shortfalls such as: a lack of focus during the training on
1224 sustaining newly acquired capacity, lack of consistency with UNIDO action plan creation
1225 directions, etc.

1226
1227 Bangladesh government staff noted that since this training occurred some 2.5 years ago and after
1228 the NIP had been prepared and there has been no opportunity since for any MOEF staff to utilize
1229 the skills in project preparation, (this was done on a “hit-and-run” basis by UNIDO staff) all
1230 MOEF/DoE staff indicated that they do not remember the training other than they thought it was
1231 good at the time. In general, the academics that undertook the training were able to put the
1232 training materials to immediate use and thought it was very useful as did the pesticide
1233 constituency (especially the updating on toxicity, fate and effects etc.). The laboratory
1234 participants (Bangladesh) said it increased their awareness but they have no equipment to
1235 analyze for POPs. Uganda emphasized how good and useful the exercises were (for example,
1236 how to do the inventories).

1237
1238 Chad noted that the tool kit for dioxin and furan analysis needed customization. For example, the
1239 tree varieties used as examples were of European origin. Chad, Comoros and Madagascar also
1240 noted the need for skill enhancement with the needed software (including the need for computer
1241 literacy training).

1242
1243 Cambodia noted that since they developed their NIP using UNEP guidance, they would have
1244 liked to have received training on log frames. (This was subsequently incorporated into the
1245 training materials.)

1246
1247 Tanzania noted that videos showing practical situations would have been very helpful in learning
1248 how to better recognize the problems and to show what needs to be done.

1249

1250 **Conclusions and Lessons learned with regard to training and the training materials,**

- 1251 ❖ Generally speaking most considered the training materials to be good to excellent.
1252 However, one cannot successfully conduct a review of the adequacy of training
1253 materials 2.5 or more years after the training and where there has been no follow up
1254 (use) of the materials and skills by government staff due to the modus operandi of the
1255 IA (Nepal - UNIDO);
- 1256 ❖ Consideration needs to be given to the training implementation requirements i.e.
1257 computer literacy training where needed, otherwise, the efficacy of the training
1258 provided is seriously undermined;
- 1259 ❖ UNITAR training materials should be consistent with all of the IA’s requirements
1260 (i.e. include log frame analyses or other tools they request countries to use). Better
1261 still, the IA’s requirements should also be made consistent perhaps through guidance
1262 from the GEF;
- 1263 ❖ Many expressed the view that the workshop time was too short and therefore, a more
1264 careful consideration needs to be given to the rate of absorption as well as the fastest
1265 possible rate of presentation of training materials. Similarly, a few (Tanzania, some
1266 NGOs) expressed the view that the materials were too complicated and they felt they
1267 lacked enough of a technical background to properly absorb the training. This also

- 1268 speaks to the issue of “core capacity” ability to comprehend and absorb) as a criterion
1269 for those to participate in such training;
- 1270 ❖ Consideration should be given to using both practical examples and videos as part of
 - 1271 the training materials, (the notion being “a picture is worth a thousand words”);
 - 1272 ❖ There is a need to take into account (in both the design and implementation of the
 - 1273 training materials), the gulf between those who have ready access to computers and
 - 1274 the internet and those who do not. This was especially problematic in the French-
 - 1275 speaking African countries visited;
 - 1276 ❖ Cambodia would have benefited more from the training if it had the materials that
 - 1277 UNITAR added later. Perhaps where countries participate as “pilots” and additional
 - 1278 materials are subsequently added, there should be some form of refresher training
 - 1279 provided if not by UNITAR then by the IA. The GEF will need to provide additional
 - 1280 support if this is to occur;
 - 1281 ❖ As will be seen later, some recognized the need for sustaining results and noted that
 - 1282 the training materials should include teachings on contingency (sudden loss of
 - 1283 capacity) and succession planning and sustaining knowledge acquired by the training;
 - 1284 ❖ Also, there is a need for UNITAR’s training materials to be consistent with demands
 - 1285 by the IAs; and
 - 1286 ❖ The post training evaluation sheets solicited, for the most part, yes / no responses and
 - 1287 were thus of little follow up value. A greater effort needs to be put into the post
 - 1288 training evaluation sheet design to create a format that could facilitate future
 - 1289 evaluations such as this.
 - 1290

1291 **III.2.2 Train-the-Trainers**

1292
1293 “Train-the-trainers” sessions at the country level for the five front-runner countries, as originally
1294 outlined in the 25 LDC project document, did not take place as planned. Instead, it was
1295 considered adequate for potential trainers learn the methodology by attending the national action
1296 plan skills building training. In addition, for the front-runner workshops, as well as some of the
1297 subsequent ones, a UNITAR senior fellow accompanied a UNITAR staff familiar with the
1298 methodology to be trained as a future trainer. Conventional train-the-trainer reportedly occurred
1299 only in Kiribati and Senegal.

1300
1301 In the case of Kiribati, because of their Island geography, it was not feasible to have all those that
1302 required training to attend the single UNITAR training workshop. It was therefore necessary to
1303 conduct further training sessions. The Kiribati project team decided who would be the trainers.

1304
1305 In the case of Senegal, after the UNITAR training, a country official conducted training sessions
1306 in other countries in the region as a UNITAR senior fellow. In these limited cases, the trainers
1307 were trained through attendance at the UNITAR skills building workshops. There were no
1308 specific train-the-trainers session devoted solely to this aspect.

1309
1310 Trainers were selected by a few countries by their own project teams without input on the
1311 selection from UNITAR. Thus, if there were any selection criteria, they were unknown to
1312 UNITAR.

1313
1314 It is difficult to determine precisely how many trainers were trained since there was little follow-
1315 up communication after the workshop sessions. However, the number is likely very low. It was
1316 not possible for either UNITAR or the evaluator to assess whether enough people were trained or
1317 the right people as the selection was made by the country. For the most part, the informed guess
1318 is that those that needed to be trained at the time of the training (may not be the same now) were
1319 trained.

1320
1321 **Conclusions and Lessons Learned on Training**
1322 Many countries now realize (especially after this evaluation) that training and upgrading of
1323 chemicals knowledge and skills is a needed ongoing activity that needs to be institutionalized.
1324 Participants for UNITAR training, in future, need to be more closely scrutinized in relation to
1325 future use. This implies a commitment not only on the part of the country but the IA as well.

1326
1327 In the context of training, there is a need to address the gulf between those who have ready
1328 access to computers and the internet and those who do not. Otherwise, the use of tools such as
1329 those provided through UNITAR training will remain theoretical and to the detriment of training
1330 results.

1331
1332 Lack of core skills, knowledge and capacity precludes training benefits. The training function
1333 needs to be made part of the organizational structure and have a regular budget otherwise any
1334 training provided by UNITAR, the IAs or the GEF will likely not be sustained. Recipient
1335 countries need to better understand this risk (some already do – example, the Ministry of Energy
1336 in Tanzania). Therefore, a special module explaining how best to train-the-trainers and/or how
1337 to establish and enable a training unit, should be included in UNITAR’s guidance materials.

1338

1339 **III.2.3 Stakeholder Engagement (national level)**

1340
1341 There is often no single Ministry that has lead responsibility for chemicals management in the
1342 LDCs (the exception is perhaps Tanzania where the Government designated Chief Chemist,
1343 situated in the official Government laboratory has overarching policy responsibility for
1344 chemicals). There was virtual unanimity amongst the participants that the training sessions were
1345 very successful in creating POPs awareness. However, the issue is whether this enhanced
1346 awareness has been translated into enhanced political will and this is difficult to answer. As was
1347 noted by many, lack of action on chemicals should not be read as necessarily lack of political
1348 will because for the most part, resources in LDCs are severely constrained and many countries
1349 priorities are: poverty alleviation; malaria control and other critical near term public health and
1350 economic well being issues. It was noted that the average life expectancy of males in many of
1351 the LDCs is age 50 (or even less) and the trend over the last few years due perhaps to malaria
1352 and AIDs is moving even lower.

1353
1354 In each country, the key Ministries (Environment, Agriculture, Health, Energy etc.) were
1355 engaged as well as the NGOs and this lead to enhanced awareness. In general, those that needed
1356 to be engaged were engaged. However, in some countries (both in Asia and Africa), there was
1357 little sign of private sector engagement and this is needed. We know that broad stakeholder

1358 engagement fosters problem ownership, accountability, information sharing and team play,
1359 future cooperation; and, most importantly, sustainability of results achieved. Perhaps, the most
1360 illuminating feature of the stakeholder engagement component of the evaluation relates to who
1361 and how the action plans were created in each country because this really translates training into
1362 both capacity and institutional strengthening. (We learn by doing).
1363

1364 In Nepal, the Government staff did not lead on the creation of the NIP, it was written by a
1365 national Consultant based on input from international Consultants hired by UNIDO. Maybe this
1366 was the most cost effective way of creating the NIP from UNIDO's perspective but it somewhat
1367 compromised the training provided to government staff by UNITAR. (Some of those
1368 interviewed indicated they had forgotten what the training was about since there was no occasion
1369 or opportunity to use the skills.) Furthermore, in Nepal, many of those interviewed (from a
1370 broad range of stakeholders) say they played little or no role whatsoever in NIP development
1371 following the workshop. However, staff from the lead Ministry (Environment, Science and
1372 Technology) did not agree with these observations and noted that the other Ministries and others
1373 had been invited to consultations during the NIP preparation exercise but did not show up.
1374 Probably, somewhere in the middle of these viewpoints is the reality. In other countries
1375 (examples, Cambodia, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania), it was the Government themselves that
1376 played, or are playing, the lead role on the creation of the NIP and creating the various action
1377 plans.
1378

1379 Conclusions and Lessons Learned on Stakeholder Engagement

1380 Broad stakeholder engagement is a critical feature and a defining characteristic of a “healthy”
1381 and sustainable chemical management process. Almost all countries showed evidence of wide
1382 stakeholder engagement. As discussed, Nepal was not able to fully engage the stakeholders in
1383 the NIP preparation following the workshop as espoused in the training. This may have been
1384 due to a conflict with IA decisions on how best to create the NIP, or, just a sign of a lack of inter-
1385 ministerial cooperation. If it was the latter, it was hoped that the creation of the NIP itself would
1386 enable such cooperation but this has not been the case. UNITAR in cooperation with the GEF
1387 Secretariat, may wish to give consideration on how best to resolve such conflicts in guidance
1388 provided to developing countries and on the rules of engagement.
1389

1390 When attempting to explore the problems in Nepal to more depth, it was reported that in Nepal,
1391 most of the time, stakeholder ministries and NGO organizations recommended, or sent, new
1392 people to each NIP-related meeting (no continuity of representation) and only a very few
1393 attended who had participated in the UNITAR training reappeared in even the subsequent IA-
1394 initiated training/workshops on POPs. The lack of adequate and/or consistent engagement could
1395 also be a reflection of the state of development, lack of core capacity and/or just simply resource
1396 constraints.
1397

1398 **III.2.4 Sustainability of Results (national perspectives)**

1399
1400 Sustaining chemical management results and addressing emerging challenges requires that the
1401 minimal infrastructure needed to carry out project activities at the country level be in place. In
1402 general, in the French-speaking African countries, various infrastructural elements were

1403 observed to be lacking (data collection, monitoring, enforcement etc). In general, in the Asian
1404 and the English-speaking African countries visited, this minimal infrastructure is in place or the
1405 signs are hopeful. For example, even Nepal with its current problems, noted that there are some
1406 remaining legislative / regulatory shortfalls, and the Ministry of Environment has developed new
1407 / draft legislation specifically on POPs that will ensure all of the SC obligations can be met. They
1408 indicate that this new legislation will give a special focus to unintentional POPs and PCBs. This
1409 is not likely to mean much as long as there is no capacity for monitoring or enforcement.
1410 Nevertheless, on a very positive note, and with regard to PCBs, Nepal reports that all of the
1411 detailed inventories have now been completed and for example, all of the utilities are now
1412 importing only mineral oil transformers.

1413
1414 In the case of Bangladesh, it was observed that there is no capacity as yet to implement programs
1415 in the field (example monitoring industrial emissions for dioxins and furans). It was also noted
1416 that the lead agency does not have sufficient staff to properly address POPs and other chemicals.
1417 The evaluator's sense is that DoE and the other agencies are very small and are heavily reliant on
1418 external expertise and will remain so for the foreseeable future. This does not bode well for
1419 sustaining training results.

1420
1421 Cambodia notes that it has the needed infrastructure but lacks operational funds, especially for
1422 needed training. They also noted their problems with their inability to raise counterpart funding
1423 to meet GEF project requirements. They feel there ought to be a special case for the LDCs so
1424 they can compete fairly with the more financially lucrative developing countries such as China.
1425 MoE staff asked that the evaluator to note and pass on the message to UNITAR that Cambodia
1426 very much wishes to be included in any new UNITAR GEF proposals for training.

1427
1428 Uganda noted that infrastructure is missing in several key areas (example, hazardous chemical
1429 disposal facilities; monitoring POPs both in the environment and in the population; and,
1430 addressing POPs legal issues).

1431
1432 Tanzania noted that in most cases the minimal infrastructure for chemicals management is not in
1433 place (for example, monitoring and enforcement are not as yet practiced for almost all of the
1434 POPs). However, when viewed against poverty alleviation, ensuring food supply and addressing
1435 health issues such as the high level of malarial deaths and AIDS addition internal Government
1436 funding allocation for chemicals management is not likely to receive any elevated priority.

1437
1438 In Comoros, the missing infrastructural elements are all reportedly referenced in the NIP.

1439
1440 In Madagascar it was observed that, with regard to DDT, although there may be sufficient
1441 personnel that could execute programs and become trainers, there are no legal procedures to
1442 regulate its use. In the regions, there are weaknesses particularly in the areas of training and
1443 extension. These appear to be structural conditions. The critical issue is that training and
1444 awareness raising at the farm level needs reinforcement. The Ministry of Industry has expressed
1445 the view that insufficient infrastructure has been installed for the proper management of
1446 chemicals.

1447

1448 Training is thus an ongoing requirement that underpins sustainability. With the exceptions of the
1449 Agriculture Ministries (pesticides) and sometimes Health Ministries (DDT for anti malaria
1450 campaigns) in most LDCs evaluated, there are no organizational chart references to training, no
1451 routine budget lines for training new staff on chemicals, no contingency plan for unexpected loss
1452 of capacity or any succession plans as trained staff retire or leave.

1453

1454 Almost all countries noted that these shortfalls are noted in their NIP.

1455

1456 **Conclusions and Lessons Learned on Sustaining Results**

1457 In all of the countries visited there was a recognition that the lack of contingency and succession
1458 plans as well as the institutionalization of routine training of new staff (the exception again being
1459 Agriculture ministries for pesticides) leaves them very vulnerable to capacity eradication due to
1460 normal staff turnovers. Sustainability of UNITAR and other training provided will remain at risk
1461 (not translate into institutional strengthening) until such time that training and upgrading of skills
1462 becomes incorporated into government structures and contingency and succession planning
1463 becomes a reality.

1464

1465 Training needs to be built upon a core and stable existing capacity. In the case of Bangladesh,
1466 Nepal and several other LDCs, core capacity does not as yet exist. Anticipating the sustainability
1467 of skills from a UNITAR workshop is thus premature where core capacity does not exist.

1468

1469 In Cambodia, with the exception of Agriculture, training is a recognized but unfunded need with
1470 insufficient priority due to competition for limited resources with very high priority issues such
1471 as poverty, alleviation, food security etc. Since training must be ongoing, there is a demonstrated
1472 need for train-the-trainer sessions in all countries. However, the budgetary requirements for this
1473 are recognized as a challenge. Many noted that training is urgently needed on the safe handling
1474 of chemicals. All of the LDCs visited acknowledged the need for routine training and noted that
1475 the train-the-trainer sessions are also needed as an enabling tool.

1476

1477 In the LDCs, the sustainability of training results will remain at risk as long as there are
1478 insufficient operating funds to at least facilitate occasional chemicals training projects including
1479 refresher courses. (Often there are funds to pay salaries of management staff but no funds to
1480 conduct training programs.)

1481

1482 From the perspective of sustaining training results, perhaps UNITAR's training modules
1483 themselves should include a session on sustaining results. Perhaps the GEF needs to consider
1484 some conditionality i.e. training will be provided providing the recipient country commits to take
1485 steps to sustain the capacity. This might include: refresher training; training of new staff; and,
1486 succession and contingency planning. The train-the-trainer module possibly via UNITAR could
1487 be the enabling tool.

1488

1489 In conclusion, UNITAR training was successful from the perspective of assisting many LDCs to
1490 create or polish their draft NIP but perhaps falls short on its longer term objective of contributing
1491 in a sustainable manner to the sound management of chemicals.

1492

1493

1494 **III.2.5 Gender Equity Considerations (national perspectives)**

1495
1496 In general, the level of female participation in NIP creation varied considerably due to country-
1497 specific history, culture and other factors. In Chad, the female participation was estimated to be
1498 just 1%. In Nepal, it was noted that there were no active programs to recruit or promote female
1499 participation. Ministries were asked to participate and they chose, based on expertise and
1500 responsibilities, whom to send without consideration of sex.

1501
1502 In Cambodia the situation was very different. It was reported that under past political regimes,
1503 women were denied an education and thus were not empowered to participate. Currently,
1504 women's education is increasing dramatically. Nevertheless, of the 80 staff of the Ministry of
1505 Environment in Cambodia, only 4 or 5 are women. To respond to this, the Ministry has created a
1506 "Gender Committee" who is, reportedly, working to enhance women's participation. It was also
1507 noted that in Cambodia women prefer (at least currently) to work in the marketplace rather than
1508 Government (more money).

1509
1510 Similarly, in Madagascar the participation of women was considered quite important and was
1511 estimated to be currently about 15%.

1512
1513 Many of the other LDCs (examples, Uganda, Tanzania) have affirmative action programs
1514 underway.

1515
1516 **Conclusions and Lessons Learned on Gender Equity**

1517 In many countries visited (examples, Uganda and Tanzania), it was conceded that female
1518 participation is perhaps less than desirable and the Government of Uganda, for example, has
1519 undertaken several initiatives to address this: a constitutional reference to the need for
1520 affirmative action; recent decision to assign additional University entrance consideration to
1521 females based on sex; and the recent Government decision to require 30% female in top Agency
1522 Executive positions. Other countries (example, Tanzania) also have government-sponsored
1523 affirmative action programs. The Universities in Tanzania have lowered entrance requirements
1524 for women to the science programs and offer special remedial training to those who need further
1525 training in order to be admitted.

1526
1527 It was observed that in Chad, only 5% of the women attend University thereby greatly reducing
1528 their potential for participation at the professional level in chemicals management.

1529
1530 In Madagascar it was noted the women have preferences for teaching, nursing and pharmacy and
1531 this is contributing to the lack of their engagement in chemicals management.

1532
1533 LDCs will not be able to respond to gender issues in the same way, or in the same timeframe, as
1534 developed countries. Awareness raising targeted to females might help but is unlikely, in and of
1535 itself to remedy the situation.

1536
1537 Gender equity issues must be kept both in perspective and in the context of the current state of
1538 development of the country. Nonetheless, the IAs should make an effort to encourage the

1539 participation of women and UNITAR might wish to include a module in future training programs
1540 pointing out the importance of the participation of women in chemicals management (it was
1541 noted that it is the men that spray the pesticides but the women who pick the fruit).
1542

1543 **III.3 Evaluation of Project(s) Design and Management**

1544
1545 The two projects appear to have been carefully designed reflecting state-of-the-art knowledge
1546 and experience in developing country training. UNITAR “senior fellows” (contracted
1547 consultants) with extensive knowledge and experience in POPs and other chemicals issues were
1548 used for much of the training. This appears to have worked very well.
1549

1550 **III.3.1 Budgetary Considerations**

1551
1552 The two project budgets (25 & 15 countries) were reportedly allocated and spent in accordance
1553 with the plan(s). However, in the first project (25 countries), there was a specific budget
1554 component planned for train-the-trainers although there was no separate budget line for this
1555 activity. Also, as noted, this activity only took place in a few countries (Kiribati and Senegal)
1556 and was undertaken in more of an internal country mode than was originally thought. Monies
1557 thought to be necessary for training of trainers were actually utilized in the broader context of the
1558 workshop costs and in training UNITAR senior fellows. Other than this change in direction,
1559 there were no unforeseen adverse budgetary impacts.
1560

1561 From the perspective of the countries, this training project(s) was, from the perspective of the
1562 recipient countries, somewhat of a non-descript and insignificant “add on” project to the \$400-
1563 500 K US GEF POPs enabling project(s). With so little money allocated to the country for this
1564 training project (\$5,000), it was difficult for UNITAR to capture the needed attention of the
1565 country to pursue the workshop organizational aspects. This increased UNITAR’s transaction
1566 costs.
1567

1568 There was also a perception of insufficient project funding reported from UNITAR itself. For
1569 example, from time-to-time, UNITAR had to send more than one representative to the training
1570 session (high level UNITAR participation requested and the UNITAR Manager himself needed
1571 to better understand the efficacy of the emerging project design etc.) and there were insufficient
1572 funds available for this purpose.
1573

1574 **Conclusions and Lessons learned regarding budgets**

1575 Although there were no adverse budgetary impacts per se, it was the feeling of both UNITAR
1576 and the countries (they received just \$5,000 US each to organize the training events) that the
1577 GEF funds provided for the 40 country project were insufficient. Perhaps accessing additional
1578 funds from the GEF enabling activity project was not possible.
1579

1580 Insufficient resource allocations for training results in implementation difficulties and less than
1581 optimum organization and perhaps participation (at the country level). A more detailed

1582 consideration of anticipated workshop cost(s) needs to be given by the GEF, taking into account
1583 the special situation and behavioural norms of participants in the LDCs.
1584

1585 **III.3.2 Training Materials and the Pilot Phase**

1586
1587 With regard to the training materials, UNITAR orchestrated a peer review of the workshop
1588 training materials (many of which had been created with earlier funding support by the Swiss
1589 government). The criteria used to select the participants in the peer review of materials were:
1590 leaders in the field; experience with POPs; experience delivering projects; experience in
1591 development and implementation at the international level; and, experience in training. The
1592 comments received were based on the reviewer’s preferences for training methodology and
1593 approach. In general, the requests to UNITAR were to simplify the training materials. There
1594 were also suggestions pertaining to the interactive exercises. The feedback was, reportedly, very
1595 useful. As a result of this feedback, it was decided to add a module to address decision trees.
1596 The training materials were subsequently revised accordingly and used in the pilot phase.
1597 However, during the implementation phase, further needs were identified and further
1598 adjustments made. All those interviewed expressed the viewpoint that the training materials were
1599 excellent with one exception where an NGO felt the material was too complicated.

1600
1601 To field test the training materials, UNITAR selected five pilot countries (Cambodia; Yemen;
1602 Tanzania; Gambia; and, Ethiopia). The criteria used for this selection were: countries with a
1603 good working experience in past; core capacity; expressed interest in participating in the pilot;
1604 observed competence; and, expectations of useful feedback. MOAs were signed with each
1605 country and were as comprehensive as required. Guidance and training materials were provided
1606 to each country in advance of the workshops. All workshops were three day sessions following a
1607 standard format. However, there were some variations in the program for Tanzania because they
1608 were in an advanced state of their NIP preparation at the time of the training. Some critical
1609 feedback was obtained via the pilots on the application of the methodology at the country level
1610 from a recipient’s perspective. They commented on the relevancy of the training materials to
1611 their country situation. (The training material was generic but using POPs examples.) (The
1612 purpose was to strengthen the training skill for NIP development.) The pilot phase appears to
1613 have proceeded precisely as per the plan.

1614 Conclusions and Lessons Learned on the Training materials and the Pilot Phase

1615 The peer review process of training materials appeared to work well but in retrospect, UNITAR
1616 observed that holding a one day meeting of the peer review group (as opposed to conference
1617 calls) would have been a more effective and efficient means of obtaining the needed input
1618 because it would have facilitated more interaction. A two day UNITAR retreat, which included a
1619 substantial session on the action plan development material (with UNEP participation), was also
1620 held during the 25 LDC project duration.

1621
1622
1623 The pilot phase also appears to have been a success in achieving its goals both from the
1624 perspectives of UNITAR and the participating countries. Across the board, the participants in
1625 the pilots reported that they found the experience to be excellent. Keeping in mind these five
1626 countries were volunteer “guinea pigs”, lessons learned here resulted in the valuable remediation

1627 of the materials that the subsequent countries received. Generally speaking, the results were a
1628 tightening up (removal of duplication); better focus of the working group exercises; improved
1629 time allocations for the various elements and interaction with participants. An example was the
1630 inclusion of log frame use training.

1631
1632 The lesson learned is that “pilots” are a very useful and “value added” exercise and should be
1633 included where a large number of countries are to be trained.
1634

1635 **III.3.3 Post Training Session Evaluations**

1636
1637 The UNITAR representatives providing the training passed to all participants, post training
1638 evaluation sheets, usually one pager requesting generally (but not always) a yes/no response to a
1639 series of very general questions. Keeping in mind that the post workshop evaluation is suppose
1640 to provide information in sufficient detail to facilitate adaptive management decision taking, this
1641 experience was not as useful as hoped. The evaluation sheets seemed poorly designed with too
1642 many yes / no responses that create more “feel good” responses than guidance on renewed
1643 pathways needed. A common comment was “not enough time for the workshop” suggesting the
1644 questions were not specific enough to generate the detail feedback that might have been useful.
1645

1646 *Conclusions and Lessons Learned on Post Workshop Evaluations*

1647 The conclusion and lesson learned is that post training evaluation sheets need to be carefully
1648 designed with more substantive information requests and perhaps more time allocation for this
1649 component within the workshop construct / agenda itself.
1650

1651 **III.3.4 Project Management and Coordination**

1652
1653 The Project Coordination Committee was created as envisioned and consisted of: the GEF
1654 representative (who acted as Chair); the IAs (UNIDO; UNEP; UNDP; WB).; UNITAR; and,
1655 FAO. Those on the Committee were those Agencies with direct responsibilities with regard to
1656 POPs; POPs funding and / or POPs implementation at the international level. Responsibilities
1657 and accountabilities of the participants appear to have been clearly defined. All of the IAs
1658 reportedly participated at the right level. The chairmanship (via the GEF) was reportedly
1659 effective as was the secretariat functions provided by UNITAR. Several telecons took place /
1660 were needed because, as usual, with busy staff / Agencies, meeting times needed to be adjusted
1661 frequently taking into account other ongoing commitments and events. Reportedly, there were
1662 many positive outcomes from these telecons. There were good discussions of lessons learned
1663 and how to improve various elements of the training and associated communications between
1664 UNITAR and the IAs.
1665

1666 *Conclusions and Lessons Learned on Project Management and Coordination*

1667 It is the view of the author that there was probably no better way of coordinating such a project
1668 other than the Advisory Committee route. As to the degree of participation in the Committee,
1669 some (GEF, UNEP, UNDP) were stronger than others both in terms of input provided and the
1670 level of active participation.

1671
1672 IAs did not attend the UNITAR training workshops but perhaps should have as this would have
1673 provided a catalyst for the needed integration (training and actual action plan creation). There
1674 thus seemed to be somewhat of a disconnect between this skills building project and the work
1675 with the same countries in creating the NIP even though the IAs were committed to provide any
1676 needed follow-up to the training. Perhaps IAs could have given greater effort to integrating this
1677 skills building project into their plans for creating the NIP in their client countries.
1678

1679 The lesson learned here is that creating the needed linkage between UNITAR training and IA
1680 guidance and follow-up will not happen with just participation on an Advisory Committee alone.
1681 GEF follow-up is needed in this regard. The GEF needs to secure the needed linkage (coupling
1682 rather than decoupling of the guidance and training provided by both UNITAR and all of the
1683 IAs).
1684

1685 **III.3.5 Response to Risks and Validity of Assumptions**

1686
1687 Section II.2.1 sets out the many risks identified in the project documents. In response to these,
1688 this evaluation revealed that:

- 1689 ❖ Although there was an initial concern that too few countries would sign up for the
1690 training, interestingly, almost all of the 50 UN-listed LDCs expressed an interest in
1691 receiving the UNITAR skills building training and 40 became part of the expanded
1692 project. The cut-off at 40 was based on the financial limitations imposed by the project(s)
1693 budget;
- 1694 ❖ Nevertheless, another nine training workshops were conducted by UNITAR, outside the
1695 auspices of this project, targeted to developing countries and countries with economies in
1696 transition, These were: Ghana (9-11 March, 2005); Cote d'Ivoire (2-5 August, 2005);
1697 Mongolia (16 -18 August, 2005); Georgia (15-16 December, 2005); DPR Korea (6-10
1698 March, 2006); China (15-17 March, 2006); Thailand (20 and 22 March, 2006);
1699 Pakistan (28-31 March 2006); and, Kazakhstan (29-31 March, 2006) with financial
1700 assistance provided by the Swiss Government;
- 1701 ❖ Governments (or the IAs it was not possible to precisely determine in all cases) did
1702 undertake the necessary follow-up work required to ensure that action plans were
1703 developed to the degree needed to prepare detailed, costed interventions. The training
1704 methodology likely helped to facilitate accurate costing. However, this was difficult to
1705 assess precisely since in many countries the costing was done by national or international
1706 consultants and not government staff;
- 1707 ❖ Regarding the determination of whether, after the training, the minimal infrastructure
1708 needed to carry out the needed project activities at the country level, in general, is in
1709 place ... this appeared to vary greatly between countries. In most LDCs there is
1710 insufficient infrastructure for data collection, monitoring and enforcement. Most also
1711 need training, either for upgrading or for new staff;
- 1712 ❖ Some countries (example Nepal) undertook the NIP creation using consultants with
1713 government officials reportedly having a limited role, other than oversight. A
1714 contributing factor could have been a lack of core capacity in Nepal to undertake this
1715 task. Training will not ameliorate this situation;

- 1716 ❖ In the cases of Cambodia, Comoros, Madagascar, Uganda, Tanzania, it was the country
1717 that was, reportedly, both fully engaged and occupying the driver’s seat;
1718 ❖ Based on those interviewed and the TORs for this evaluation, the evaluators were unable
1719 to assess whether the necessary technical follow-up by the IAs occurred in a timely
1720 manner consistent with each country’s NIP development timeline;
1721 ❖ The need to be able to response to ongoing NIP development questions was initially seen
1722 as a risk. In response, UNITAR developed an online help desk (FAQs) as well as an offer
1723 to respond to questions via direct email enquiries. The FAQs (responses) were to be
1724 based on workshop experiences. However, there was a surprising lack of response by
1725 LDCs to these initiatives (no questions asked of UNITAR). This could be due to the fact
1726 that LDC questions were, instead, directed to the respective IAs; or, many that undertook
1727 the training had little or no opportunity to use it in a practical sense during which the
1728 additional questions would likely arise;
1729 ❖ For the sound management of chemicals, generally speaking, it appeared that all of the
1730 stakeholders that needed to be engaged, were engaged. The participants were chosen by
1731 the countries and not UNITAR so this issue was difficult to asses without a more detailed
1732 analysis of the allocation of responsibilities within the country which was beyond the
1733 scope of the TORs for this evaluation.
1734

1735 Since many of those trained did not actually use the training, any unforeseen barriers and
1736 impediments were difficult to identify.
1737

1738 In the organizational phase for the workshops, countries were encouraged to provide female
1739 participation with a view to promoting gender equality. However, regarding what transpired,
1740 female participation, varied greatly between countries based on cultural consideration and also
1741 educational practices. Gender participation enhancement is reportedly currently under
1742 affirmative action programs in many countries and also under study by UNITAR.
1743

1744 ***Conclusions and Lessons Learned related to Perceived Risks***

1745 Perhaps the greatest barrier and impediment observed pertaining to skill development and
1746 sustaining results, was the lack of core capacity (including computer literacy in the French-
1747 speaking African countries).
1748

1749 It is too early to assess whether there has been any evidence of translation or transfer of training
1750 skills to other chemical management aspects. Many participants have indicated that they intend
1751 to use the newly acquired skills in future for chemical management activities, especially SAICM.
1752 Early evidence from both the Asian and African countries visited suggests that there has been a
1753 transfer of knowledge from the UNITAR training to other governmental Ministries (ie Energy –
1754 PCBs), programs and Universities (upgrading of curricula).
1755

1756 The level of involvement of those undertaking training and their involvement in the creation of
1757 their NIP was outside UNITAR control or even influence. Where training of LDCs is to occur in
1758 future, there needs to be some understanding with the country and the IAs that the training
1759 received will be used.
1760

1761 As to gender equity issues, UNITAR may wish to consider creating a reference in their training
1762 materials to the key role to be played by women (promotional materials on female participation).
1763

1764 **III.3.6 Evaluation of Role Played by UNITAR**

1765
1766 UNITAR's role in the project overall was the training material design and the workshop
1767 delivery. UNITAR also selected the countries, drafted the training materials, provided
1768 secretariat services for the steering committee; and, provided the liaison and coordination with
1769 the IAs. UNITAR designed the architecture for project oversight and management. There were
1770 no funds available for any kind of in-country follow-up. This was a job well done.

1771
1772 At the time of this evaluation, UNITAR had delivered 38 of the 40 workshops (two remained to
1773 be delivered). UNITAR reported that they are ready and waiting on the countries in order to
1774 complete these last two.

1775 Conclusions and Lessons learned on the role played by UNITAR

1776 The UNITAR role seems to have been performed with both alacrity and competence. Delivery
1777 delays are due to internal country political processes and not UNITAR's delivery schedule. The
1778 lesson learned is that the specialized services provided by UNITAR can be a value added adjunct
1779 to GEF training projects. However, it appears, based on somewhat oblique observations made,
1780 that many IAs see the provision of such training (as provided by UNITAR) to be in their
1781 responsibility domain so some turf sorting and delineation may be required by the GEF if
1782 UNITAR is to play a continuing training role.
1783
1784

1785 **III.3.7 Evaluation of the Role played in the project by the IAs.**

1786
1787 Since UNITAR is not an IA designated by the GEF, UNDP provided the IA function. In general,
1788 all of the IAs were supposed to ensure that additional, substantive POPs-related information and
1789 expertise were made available to each country. Based on interviews, this was, reportedly, either
1790 not done, or not done to an adequate degree. Some noted that this needed information was made
1791 available only to the government officials that participated in the international meetings but there
1792 was little or no subsequent circulation of this information within the country to the other
1793 stakeholders. There were also complaints from NGOs interviewed in this regard. Perhaps the
1794 role of the IAs versus the country government regarding information dissemination needs to be
1795 more clearly set out.

1796
1797 As per the project documents, IAs were also supposed to review action plan(s) drafts. For the
1798 most part, it appears as though action plans were created by the Consultants hired by the IAs (an
1799 exception being Cambodia who did their own). What role the IAs had in overseeing the work of
1800 their Consultants was not clear. This responsibility (creation and review of action plans) should
1801 have been assigned to the Country POPs leadership (and not just sign off). Although this would
1802 have been more time consuming (therefore costly), this was the required follow-up to embed the
1803 training.
1804

1805 UNITAR had, reportedly, offered to review and comment on draft NIPs prepared by, or in
1806 conjunction with, LDCs, but no such requests materialized from either the countries or their IAs.

1807

1808 **Conclusions and Lessons Learned regarding the participation of the IAs**

1809 Having action plans created by external (to government) Consultants undermines skills
1810 development efforts by UNITAR and others. If training is not used, skills developed will soon
1811 be lost. This issue needs to be addressed if cost/benefit considerations are to taken seriously.

1812

1813 Guidance provided by countries by both UNITAR and the IAs needs to be made consistent
1814 (some interviewed reported conflicting guidance with the IA-provided guidance taking
1815 precedence).

1816

1817 UNITAR training was of a very high quality but of questionable usefulness for the creation of
1818 the NIP. Training to assist in NIP creation that arrives after the NIP is drafted is of little value in
1819 this context. However, the methodology training was useful for strengthening the NIP and with
1820 likely collateral benefits for future endeavours. Such skills building projects need to be fast
1821 tracked by the GEF when such a situation exists.

1822

1823 There is likelihood that the UNITAR training provided will nonetheless bear fruit in the broader
1824 context of the sound management of chemicals.

1825

1826 As an “add-on” project to a GEF project, UNITAR had to provide the workshops but had little to
1827 no connection with the actual creation of the NIPs but, nonetheless, UNITAR guidance likely
1828 made a positive contribution. Better integration of the training provided by UNITAR and the
1829 implementation activities of the IAs is also needed.

1830

1831 **IV. EVALUATION of OBSERVABLE OUTCOMES**

1832

1833 ***IV.1 Post Workshop Evaluations / Feedback***

1834

1835 From the UNDP report, *Evaluation of the Action Plan / Skills Building project for the 25 least*
1836 *developed countries, December 2006*, four-hundred and sixty participants completed the
1837 evaluation forms for the UNITAR Action Plan Training/Skills Building Workshops, which took
1838 place between October 2004 and May 2006.

1839

1840 The following is a summary of the results obtained from the feedback forms.

1841 ❖ The overall rating for the Action Plan Training Workshops was “excellent” or “very
1842 good”, as reported by 82% of participants;

1843 ❖ As to what they liked most about the workshop, approximately 86% of the participants
1844 referred to the “training content” and/or “training approach”. The “educational skills of
1845 training experts” was also cited as an important feature of the workshop (indicated by
1846 more than 10% of the total answers submitted);

1847 ❖ The most frequent answers regarding the training content included: information/
1848 methodology provided on action plan development and/or project development; specific

- 1849 management tools/techniques provided, such as the GANTT chart; and, the Stockholm
1850 Convention and chemicals specific information shared during the workshop;
- 1851 ❖ The most frequent responses concerning the training approach included: the hands-on
1852 approach enhanced by group exercises, including the continuous development of an
1853 action plan throughout the training exercises; and, the participative approach of the
1854 training which offered many opportunities for discussions and deliberations, for example,
1855 in working groups, in plenary discussion sessions after each presentation, and during
1856 working group presentation/reporting;
 - 1857 ❖ As to what participants liked least was the notion of the workshops not having enough
1858 time;
 - 1859 ❖ As to the adequacy of the guidance and training materials, ninety-eight percent (98%)
1860 answered felt they were adequate but some also observed that it would have been more
1861 useful at the beginning of the development of the countries' NIP, and that more time
1862 would have been helpful in practicing the skills learnt;
 - 1863 ❖ Almost all participants (96 %) indicated that they would recommend the use of these
1864 training materials for other countries; and
 - 1865 ❖ The overarching conclusions from the evaluation sheets were that: the time allotted to the
1866 workshop was too short. (Participants felt that presentations had to be rushed, and
1867 exercises could not be finalised); there was a need for UNITAR follow-up and support,
1868 including duplicating such workshops at regional level; the workshop experience was
1869 very useful and the methodologies/techniques presented could likely be applied to other
1870 areas beyond just chemicals management; direct requests were made to the national
1871 executing agency for continuous follow-up or for increasing the scope of the stakeholders
1872 involved in the project; and, it would have been better (more useful) if the workshops had
1873 been held earlier in the process as work was already underway on some aspects covered.
1874

1875 ***IV.2 Changes in Project Management / Planning Skills***

1876
1877 Success measurement in this evaluation refers to the evaluation of project performance in
1878 relation to the indicators, assumptions and risks specified in logical framework matrices and
1879 other project documents.

- 1880
1881 As noted in the TORs, the planned results included:
- 1882 ❖ Key NIP participants, including representatives of key ministries and stakeholders
1883 outside of government in all participating countries will have been trained to use/adapt a
1884 tested methodology for project planning/action plan development;
 - 1885 ❖ Increased awareness of and capacities in project/action planning in 25 and 15 LDCs
1886 respectively;
 - 1887 ❖ NIPs and other Stockholm Convention-related Action Plans reflect improved project and
1888 action planning capacities in recipient countries;
 - 1889 ❖ Participating countries integrate mutual lessons and experience into their respective
1890 project and action planning processes;
 - 1891 ❖ Recipient country priority NIPs interventions are clearly targeted, costed, and presentable
1892 to potential donors;

- 1893 ❖ Internal (baseline) financial and human resource mobilization to address Convention
- 1894 obligations will be strengthened;
- 1895 ❖ Recipient country priority NIP interventions are realistic and achievable;
- 1896 ❖ NIP implementation roles and responsibilities, including coordination, are clearly
- 1897 defined; and,
- 1898 ❖ An Action Plan Development Guidance and Training Package tailored for the needs of
- 1899 countries addressing Stockholm Convention obligations, including associated supporting
- 1900 materials (including CD-ROMs, exercises, and project planning software) will also be
- 1901 included.

1902
1903 The following Table uses a logical framework matrix as the basis for assessing both training
1904 projects.

Table 4 - – Project(s) Performance Assessment

Result	Performance Indicators	Sources of Verification	Assumptions And Risks	Observations	Conclusions
Good project management in the field of chemicals management, and for Stockholm Convention implementation in particular.	<p>The NIP of each participating country is completed and submitted to the Conference of the Parties with appropriate action plans included.</p> <p>Countries' project proposals are of improved quality.</p> <p>Countries NIPs projects/programmes receive funding and technical support from donors.</p>	<p>COP reports.</p> <p>Report of consultations between UNITAR and project countries regarding develop of project/programme proposals or action plans in follow-up to NIP completion.</p> <p>GEF/UNDP/World Bank project databases.</p>	<p>Country commitment to strengthening chemicals management.</p> <p>Knowledge and experiences gained in countries are put into practice.</p> <p>Continued commitments of countries to complete NIPs.</p> <p>Country becomes Party to the Stockholm Convention.</p> <p>Stable staffing contingents in countries (minimal turnover of staff being trained).</p>	<p>All made this commitment.</p> <p>This has occurred in many but not all of the countries.</p> <p>This appears to be the case.</p> <p>All countries visited have become Parties or in process of ratification.</p> <p>This is not the case in most countries visited.</p>	<p>This has occurred in many but not all of the countries.</p> <p>Lack of core capacity and IA modus operandi have precluded this in some cases.</p> <p>No comment.</p> <p>No comment.</p> <p>Chemicals management is not the top priority in most LDCs.</p>
Skills and capacities are strengthened in undertaking project planning - including action plan development.	<p>Raised skills levels in LDCs that receive training are reflected in improved action plans/NIPs.</p> <p>Each participant completes a workshop evaluation form that reflects their state of knowledge both before and after the workshop.</p>	<p>Workshop reports and evaluation.</p> <p>NIPs with action plans.</p> <p>Project proposals resulting from NIPs/action plans.</p>	<p>High willingness of NIP participants to take part in action plan training.</p> <p>Countries willing to accept training as part of NIP development.</p> <p>NIP development is ongoing in participating countries.</p> <p>Participating countries integrate mutual lessons and experience into their respective project and action planning processes.</p>	<p>The willingness was there but not always for the right reasons.</p> <p>This was the case.</p> <p>This is the case.</p> <p>Little evidence to support that this has happened in many of the countries visited.</p>	<p>Some will undertake training regardless of area of responsibility.</p> <p>Training was seen as a minor add on to the bigger GEF enabling project.</p>
Increased awareness of the necessity of project/action planning among	Significant number of key NIP participants in each participating country	<p>Workshop reports and lists of participants.</p> <p>Completed sets of</p>	NIP participants have a high level of engagement in/commitment to the NIP.	In theory yes, and in some countries yes , but in many countries, no.	Many were not invited to engage to the degree they wished.

chemicals/POPs experts in 15 countries.	<p>have taken part in the skills-building workshop.</p> <p>Each participant completes a workshop evaluation form that reflects their state of knowledge before and after the workshop.</p> <p>Participating countries become Parties to the Convention.</p>	evaluation forms from each participating country.	<p>NIP coordination mechanism is operating effectively.</p> <p>Participant countries plan to develop proposals based on NIPs.</p> <p>Countries plan to become parties to the Convention.</p>	<p>Unable to assess.</p> <p>This appears to be the case.</p> <p>All countries visited are Parties or in process of ratification</p>	
Participating country NIP interventions are clearly targeted, costed and presentable to potential donors; and internal financial and human resource mobilization is improved.	<p>NIP objectives and targets comprise the focus of funding proposals to implement the Convention, approved by donors for financial and technical resource mobilization.</p> <p>Persons trained as part of project disseminate information on the planning approach to colleagues working on other chemical management issues</p>	<p>UNITAR and external follow-up/evaluation of the project.</p> <p>National-level meetings that discuss project/programme planning.</p> <p>Project proposals and letters of acceptance.</p>	<p>Capacity of central and local governments to ensure a timely and satisfactory implementation/execution of the projects.</p> <p>Willingness of other colleagues to receive lessons learned from project skills building participants.</p> <p>Participating countries have/are developing programmatic approach to chemicals issues.</p>	<p>Unable to assess.</p> <p>Unable to assess.</p> <p>This appears to be the case in some but not all LDCs.</p>	<p>No comment.</p> <p>No comment.</p> <p>Core capacity deficits remain a serious problem in many LDCs.</p>
An Action Plan Guidance and Training Package and Stockholm Convention-specific “companion” guidance are available for countries’ use.	The guidance has been translated and is available before the launching of the training workshop for the 15 LDCs in the UNITAR website.	<p>Project advisory committee meeting record.</p> <p>Convention-specific guidance.</p> <p>UNITAR website.</p>	<p>IAs/GEFSEC willing to provide comments.</p> <p>UNITAR has capacity to develop Convention-specific guidance.</p> <p>Project advisory committee meetings take place during project.</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p>	<p>Little evidence to bas a judgement via this evaluation.</p> <p>Feedback demonstrates clearly the “value added” nature of the UNITAR training.</p> <p>No problem here.</p>

1908

1909 **IV.3 Stakeholder Engagement**

1910

1911 Article 7(2) of the Stockholm Convention directly refers to consultation with stakeholders to
 1912 facilitate, *inter alia*, the development of implementation plans. The GEF has subsequently
 1913 confirmed stakeholder involvement as an important component of National Implementation Plan
 1914 development. In addition, UNITAR, in its work to assist countries with integrated chemicals
 1915 management, national profile development, priority-setting exercises and action plan
 1916 development, requires the direct participation in project structures of a wide range of

1917 stakeholders as a prerequisite.

1918

1919 As those involved in this project were intended to be those that are participating in the NIP
1920 development process, it was expected that a wide range of stakeholders in each LDC would
1921 participate. It was anticipated that stakeholder participation would be drawn from, key
1922 Ministries, and, *inter alia*: industry; environmental public interest organizations; public and
1923 children’s health organizations; consumers groups; and women’s groups. In addition to all
1924 relevant ministries within government, representatives of sub-national level governments, where
1925 appropriate, were anticipated to be project participants. *This was the case.*

1926

1927 It was anticipated that the Lead Agency identified at the national level for each NIP would also
1928 comprise the Lead Agency for this project. *This was also the case.*

1929

1930 Regarding stakeholder participation, the primary mechanism for stakeholder participation was to
1931 be through the NIP project committee in each country. This committee was to have been in place
1932 at the commencement of the project. *All report this to be the case but this was not an active
1933 mechanism in many countries;*

1934

1935 At the global level, a committee consisting of the UNDP, UNEP, UNIDO, FAO and the World
1936 Bank, along with the Government of Switzerland, was to be convened / invited to participate in
1937 the project. This committee was also to assist with project evaluation. *This Committee did
1938 participate in providing oversight to this project but did not participate in the evaluation;*

1939

1940 Regarding social and participation issues, the major predicted social/participation issue for the
1941 project was anticipated to be the possibility that, in some participating countries, stakeholder
1942 participation would not be as broad as in others. UNITAR with its long history of working with
1943 countries that involve stakeholders in projects, various means, including communication and
1944 sharing of experience between participating project countries, encouraged stakeholder
1945 participation to the fullest degree possible. *This was confirmed by the evaluators in that
1946 stakeholder participation was broad and not an issue.*

1947

1948 The core commitments of the countries participating in this project related closely to each
1949 country’s core commitment to the development of its NIP. The direct involvement of each NIP
1950 coordinating committee, and NIP secretariat including the NIP coordinators as recipients of the
1951 skills-building, was seen to be critical to ensure access to the training materials, and benefits
1952 from the transfer of skills to as wide a proportion of NIP participants as possible. This was not
1953 only to assist them in the effective completion of their NIP projects, but was also to provide them
1954 directly with tools for the development of projects to support Convention implementation, based
1955 on the outcomes of the NIPs. *This was not the case in some countries where government staff
1956 participation was “limited” (example, Bangladesh and Nepal).*

1957

1958

1959 **V. CONCLUSIONS**

1960

1961 A key measurement of effectiveness of training is when there is evidence that it has contributed
1962 to the development objectives of a project or the country assistance strategy.³ There are three
1963 dimensions in this regard that required examination:

1964

1965 (1) **Learning outputs**: Did training result in acquisition of new knowledge and skills relevant
1966 to the achievement of SC objectives?

1967

1968 The conclusion reached in this regard is that all of the countries visited showed evidence of the
1969 achievement in learning.

1970

1971 (2) **Workplace behavior outcomes**: Are trainees applying acquired skills in the workplace in
1972 a manner likely to contribute to the achievement of SC goals?

1973

1974 Based on observed outputs Cambodia, Uganda, Tanzania and Madagascar are currently applying
1975 learned skills in the workplace. Nepal was to some extent precluded this opportunity by limited
1976 direct Government staff involvement in the detailed preparation of the NIP following the
1977 workshop, Bangladesh due to staff and other resource constraints, Chad and Comoros due to
1978 considerable structural constraints in governance. (Chad because of security concerns aggravated
1979 by the oil boon and Comoros as a result of significant economic management problems.)

1980

1981 (3) **Impact on development capacity**: Is there evidence of improved institutional strength or
1982 enhanced organizational performance as a result of the UNITAR training?

1983

1984 The countries visited have not as yet begun implementing their NIP and the observance of NIP
1985 implementation is what is needed to arrive at a proper performance and institutional
1986 strengthening judgment.

1987

1988 What follows are conclusions relating to the more detailed aspects:

1989

1990 **V.1 Project Design and Project Management**

1991

1992 ❖ The two training projects appear to have been carefully designed reflecting state-of-the-
1993 art knowledge and experience in developing country training;

1994 ❖ The peer review process of training materials appeared also to have worked well;

1995 ❖ The pilot phase was a success in that it achieved its goals both from the perspectives of
1996 UNITAR and the participating countries;

1997 ❖ Feedback from both the peer review process and the pilots resulted in the remediation and
1998 upgrading of the materials that the subsequent countries received;

³ The above definition comes from: Using Training to Build Capacity for Development An Evaluation of the World Bank's Project-Based and WBI Training The World Bank 2008 . UNDP has similar definition. See UNDP. Results oriented Monitoring and Evaluation, New York, 1997

- 1999 ❖ UNITAR “senior fellows” (contracted consultants) with extensive knowledge and
2000 experience in POPs and other chemicals issues were used for much of the training. This
2001 appears to have worked very well also;
- 2002 ❖ The two project budgets (25 & 15 countries) were reportedly allocated and spent in
2003 accordance with the plan(s), the exception being the train-the-trainers component that
2004 was not allocated as originally envisioned with the funds for this purpose having been
2005 utilized for other components;
- 2006 ❖ As to the degree of participation in project oversight, some (GEF, UNEP, UNDP) were
2007 stronger than others both in terms of input provided and the level of active participation;
- 2008 ❖ Most of the beneficiaries interviewed considered the training materials prepared by
2009 UNITAR to be good to excellent;
- 2010 ❖ Some countries noted the need for software and training in the application of software in
2011 order to achieve the intended benefits from the UNITAR training;
- 2012 ❖ IAs did not attend the UNITAR training workshops but perhaps should have as there was
2013 little evidence of the connectivity between the UNITAR training session and the NIP
2014 actions via the IAs;
- 2015 ❖ The post training evaluation sheets were poorly designed and yielded little in the way of
2016 information that could be used to improve future sessions;
- 2017 ❖ IAs could have given greater effort to integrating this skills building project into their
2018 plans for creating the NIP in their client countries; and
- 2019 ❖ The UNITAR role seems to have been performed with both alacrity and competence.
2020

2021 **V.2 Budget**

- 2022
- 2023 ❖ The two project budgets (25 & 15 countries) were reportedly allocated and spent in
2024 accordance with the plan(s). Other than the change in direction to not undertake train-
2025 the-trainer sessions in each country, there were no unforeseen adverse budgetary impacts;
- 2026 ❖ From the perspective of the LDCs, this was somewhat of a minor adjunct or “add on”
2027 project to the \$400-500 K US GEF POPs enabling project(s). With so little money
2028 allocated to the country for this project, it was difficult for UNITAR to capture the
2029 needed attention of the country to pursue the workshop organizational aspects thus
2030 increasing UNITAR’s transaction costs;
- 2031 ❖ Although there were no adverse budgetary impacts per se, it was the feeling of both
2032 UNITAR and the countries (they received just \$5,000 US each to organize the training
2033 events) that the GEF funds provided for the 40 country project were insufficient; and
- 2034 ❖ There was also a perception of insufficient project funding reported from UNITAR itself.
2035 For example, from time-to-time, UNITAR had to send more than one representative to
2036 the training session (high level UNITAR participation requested and /or the UNITAR
2037 Manager himself needed to better understand the efficacy of the emerging project design
2038 etc.) and there were insufficient funds available for this purpose.
2039
2040

2041 **V.3 Project Outcomes / Impacts**

- 2042
- 2043 ❖ Some 1,373 persons of the world’s LDCs and countries with economies in transitions
- 2044 have received skills building training by the United Nations Institute for Training and
- 2045 Research (UNITAR) via the three projects: Strengthening Skills for Action Plan
- 2046 Development to Implement the Stockholm Convention: National Training Workshop (25
- 2047 LCD) – 741 participants; Strengthening Skills for Action Plan Development to
- 2048 Implement the Stockholm Convention: National Training Workshop (15 LCD) – 376
- 2049 participants (with two countries pending – Eritrea and DR Congo); and, Strengthening
- 2050 Skills for Action Plan Development to Implement the Stockholm Convention: National
- 2051 Training Workshop (9 Swiss Supported Countries) – 256 participants;
- 2052 ❖ The efficacy of this training and the potential future usefulness varied greatly amongst
- 2053 the beneficiaries and depended largely on the countries’ state of development and thus
- 2054 core capacity as well as the relation with the IA in the creation, and future delivery, of the
- 2055 NIP;
- 2056 ❖ The commitment of the countries participating in this project included direct involvement
- 2057 in order to provide them directly with tools for the development of projects to support
- 2058 Convention implementation, based on the outcomes of the NIPs. This commitment was
- 2059 not met in some countries. Government staff participation in the NIP creation varied
- 2060 from “fully engaged” (example, Cambodia, African Countries) to “limited” (example,
- 2061 Bangladesh, Chad, Comoros, Nepal);
- 2062 ❖ Commitment failure was likely a reflection of many factors: Bangladesh, the lack of core
- 2063 (adsorption) capacity and state of development; Chad due to internal security issues
- 2064 compounded by the oil boom; Comoros because of a governance crisis (economic
- 2065 management issues); and, Nepal, at least, in part, due to the IAs desire to reduce
- 2066 transaction costs but at the expense of building indigenous capacity;
- 2067 ❖ The conclusions from the evaluation sheets indicated that the time allotted to the
- 2068 workshop was too short. (Participants felt that presentations had to be rushed, and
- 2069 exercises could not be finalised);
- 2070 ❖ The beneficiaries indicated that the workshop experience was very useful and the
- 2071 methodologies/techniques presented by UNITAR will be applied to other areas beyond
- 2072 just chemicals management;
- 2073 ❖ There was a need identified by beneficiaries for UNITAR follow-up and support,
- 2074 including duplicating such workshops at regional level but there were no resources
- 2075 available for this request;
- 2076 ❖ UNITAR training, although of a very high quality, was of questionable usefulness for the
- 2077 creation of the NIP in many countries where the NIP was well advanced or even
- 2078 completed in draft form at the time of the training;
- 2079 ❖ A structural constraint in francophone Africa is the current state of the civil service.
- 2080 There is mounting evidence showing that the training needs for the public sector are
- 2081 overwhelming. Key issues include (i) the absence of institutional structures that
- 2082 encourage accountability transparency and information sharing, and (ii) low levels of
- 2083 salaries and delays in payment. This latter factor may be a consequence of (a) a serious
- 2084 lack of experienced professionals with management skills; and/or (b) the politicization of
- 2085 public administration institutions and an absence of merit-based systems. Against this

2086 background, UNITAR and other donor-sponsored-capacity building training is likely to
2087 have little overall influence i.e. not a major determinant. However, there could be
2088 strategic gains in certain countries arising from UNITAR training. For example, in
2089 Madagascar stakeholders interviewed have come to realize the linkages between the
2090 various chemicals Conventions: Basil, Rotterdam (PIC), Montreal Protocol, Stockholm
2091 (POPs). There are thus likely opportunities for cost sharing to enhance the benefits from
2092 investments in training. For example, stakeholders have become aware of the transfer of
2093 knowledge from UNITAR training and this transfer of knowledge goes beyond planning
2094 techniques. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture are in the process of considering
2095 transferring Integrated Pest Management from Agriculture to Malaria control in the
2096 Health Ministry. The special benefit is that IPM does not use DDT, it relies heavily on
2097 extension techniques and mass communication;

- 2098 ❖ With the exception of transference of knowledge to Universities, in many cases it is too
2099 early to assess whether there has been any evidence of translation of training skills to
2100 other chemical management aspects. Many participants have indicated that they intend to
2101 use the newly acquired skills in future for chemical management activities, especially
2102 SAICM. However, the Consultant for the French-speaking African countries noted that
2103 There is early evidence from Madagascar and Chad of the transference of skills from
2104 UNITAR training to the government programs and extension programs as well;
- 2105 ❖ The greatest barrier and impediment observed pertaining to skill development and
2106 sustaining results, was the lack of core capacity (and computer literacy in African
2107 countries) in many countries;
- 2108 ❖ One country (Cambodia) would have benefited more from the training if it had the been
2109 trained on the use of the materials (log frame) that UNITAR added later;
- 2110 ❖ For some, (example, Tanzania, some NGOs) the training materials were seen as being too
2111 complicated (they felt they lacked enough of a technical background to properly absorb
2112 the training);
- 2113 ❖ In many, if not most LDCs, there is either insufficient capacity as yet to implement
2114 chemical management programs in the field (example monitoring industrial emissions for
2115 dioxins and furans). The lead agency does not have sufficient staff to properly address
2116 POPs and other chemicals;
- 2117 ❖ Many of the LDCs are heavily reliant on external expertise and will remain so for the
2118 foreseeable future. This does not bode well for sustaining results;
- 2119 ❖ Where the needed LDC's core capacity is reported to exist, (example, Cambodia and
2120 some African countries (Madagascar, Tanzania, Uganda)), the needed operational funds
2121 are lacking, especially for needed training;
- 2122 ❖ LDCs (example, Cambodia) also noted problems with their inability to raise counterpart
2123 funding to meet GEF project requirements; and
- 2124 ❖ In general, there appears to be no observed, or perceived, special problems of gender
2125 participation in LDCs although it was conceded that the participation is perhaps less than
2126 desirable and Governments are undertaking initiatives such as: a constitutional reference
2127 to the need for affirmative action; decisions to assign additional University entrance
2128 consideration to females based on sex; and Government decisions to require 30% female
2129 in top Agency Executive positions. In one country reviewed in francophone Africa, the
2130 cultural expectations of women's role in society may need to be reconsidered so women's
2131 participation in society is acknowledged.

2132

2133 **V.4 Other Conclusions**

2134

2135 ❖ This evaluation revealed an interesting paradox. UNITAR Skills Training for Action
2136 Plan building was provided to those being trained on the understanding that this would
2137 firstly, help them create their action plans. However, a few were well advanced (or had
2138 even completed the first draft) by the time the training was provided somewhat pre-
2139 empting this first goal;

2140 ❖ In the case of Nepal, UNIDO and the Government decided to use a National expert and
2141 three international experts to create the NIP, a modus operandi that somewhat
2142 compromised the UNITAR training since government staff are precluded from the
2143 opportunity to apply and thus gain practical experience on the application of these skills.
2144 This was stated by some that were interviewed;

2145 ❖ The UNITAR training clearly added to the personal management capacity of the
2146 individuals trained and awareness of the constituencies they represent, but, there were no
2147 plans observed (as yet, thought this was discussed) in any of the countries evaluated to
2148 deploy mechanisms to sustain this capacity;

2149 ❖ It was noted that there was inconsistency between what UNIDO workshops suggested
2150 and what UNITAR espoused during the training. UNITAR has indicated that all of the
2151 IAs reviewed their draft training materials. These issues need to be explored by the GEF;

2152 ❖ It was also noted (example, Bangladesh) that the LDCs are severely resource constrained
2153 and require long advance notice to plan for training and even such short evaluation
2154 missions;

2155 ❖ Many countries recognized the need (and existing shortfalls and deficits) for sustaining
2156 results;

2157 ❖ The post training evaluation sheets solicited, for the most part, yes / no responses and
2158 were thus of little follow up value;

2159 ❖ Training and upgrading of chemicals knowledge and skills is an ongoing activity that
2160 needs to be institutionalized or sustainability if skill acquired are at risk (likely to be lost
2161 in the foreseeable future);

2162 ❖ In LDCs, there is often no single Ministry that has lead responsibility for chemicals
2163 management (the exception is perhaps Tanzania where the Government designated Chief
2164 Chemist, situated in the official Government laboratory has policy responsibility for
2165 chemicals). However, there is often a “lead Ministry” from the point of view of
2166 coordination or this is assigned to the POPs /SAICM Focal Point(s);

2167 ❖ Stakeholder engagement is a critical feature and a defining characteristic of a “healthy”
2168 chemical management process. Most countries showed evidence of wide stakeholder
2169 engagement;

2170 ❖ Nepal was not able to fully engage the stakeholders (especially government staff) in the
2171 NIP preparation as espoused (and anticipated) during the UNITAR training. This may
2172 have been due to a conflict with Implementing Agency (IA) decisions on how best to
2173 create the NIP; core capacity issues or anticipated high transaction costs;

2174 ❖ Sustaining chemical management results and addressing emerging challenges requires
2175 that the minimal infrastructure needed to carry out the needed project activities at the

- 2176 country level be in place. In general, (but not in all cases), this minimal infrastructure is
2177 in place or the signs are hopeful;
- 2178 ❖ Guidance offered by the UNITAR training modules should be made to be consistent with
2179 the GEF and the IA’s guidance, otherwise, differences are viewed by the UNITAR
2180 training participants as conflicting information;
 - 2181 ❖ IA NIP-creation project-related concern or responsibility in relation to this project,
2182 appears to have been without regard for concomitant capacity building and institutional
2183 strengthening; yet, this is the fundamental thrust of the UNITAR training;
 - 2184 ❖ There may be a conflict of basic interests because some (if not all) of the IA’s interest is
2185 to get in, get out, create a good NIP at the least cost. UNITAR’s interest is indeed
2186 capacity building and institutional strengthening. The GEF needs to address this issue;
2187 and
 - 2188 ❖ Sustainability is perhaps the key shortfall of the training provided by UNITAR and needs
2189 to be a critical consideration in future training undertakings.
- 2190

2191 VI. LESSONS LEARNED

- 2192
- 2193 ❖ Holding a one day meeting of the peer review group (as opposed to conference calls)
2194 would have been a more effective and efficient means of obtaining the needed input;
 - 2195 ❖ Undertaking “pilots” is a very useful and “value added” exercise and should be included
2196 where a large number of countries are to be trained;
 - 2197 ❖ Training to assist in NIP creation that arrives after the NIP is drafted is of no value in this
2198 context. Such skills building projects need to be fast tracked by the GEF when such a
2199 situation exists.
 - 2200 ❖ Post session evaluation sheets need to be carefully designed with more substantive
2201 information requests and perhaps more time allocation for this component within the
2202 workshop construct / agenda;
 - 2203 ❖ IAs should be attending the UNITAR training workshops. There was a disconnect
2204 between this skills building project and the work with the same countries in creating or
2205 “polishing” the NIP even though the IAs were committed on paper to providing any
2206 needed follow-up to the training. Had IAs attended the UNITAR training workshops (for
2207 their client countries), this would have provided a catalyst for the needed integration
2208 (training and actual action plan creation);
 - 2209 ❖ The GEF needs to secure the needed linkage (coupling rather than decoupling) of the
2210 guidance and training provided by UNITAR and all of the IAs. This will not happen
2211 unless there is a GEF follow-up in this regard;
 - 2212 ❖ A key component of this evaluation relates to “who” and “how” the NIPs and action
2213 plans were created in each country because this element underpins the translation of
2214 training into both capacity and institutional strengthening. (We learn by doing). There
2215 will be little to no benefits to be accrued from the training if the government staff are
2216 precluded from assuming a direct engagement and leadership role in this exercise even of
2217 the IA transaction costs are likely to be high;
 - 2218 ❖ Broad stakeholder engagement fosters problem ownership, accountability, sharing and
2219 team play, future cooperation and most importantly, sustainability of results achieved;

- 2220 ❖ It was reported that in Nepal, most of the time, stakeholder ministries/organizations
2221 recommended new people for each meeting and only a few who had participated in the
2222 UNITAR training reappeared in subsequent POPs events. The lack of adequate and/or
2223 consistent engagement by government staff could be a reflection of the state of
2224 development, lack of core capacity and/or resource constraints. Close consideration
2225 needs to be given to anticipating these problems during the course of project delivery, not
2226 just at the time of final project evaluation;
- 2227 ❖ Having action plans created by external (to government) Consultants undermines skills
2228 development efforts by UNITAR and others. If training is not used, skills developed will
2229 soon be lost. This issue needs to be addressed if cost/benefit considerations are to taken
2230 seriously;
- 2231 ❖ If conflicts are to be avoided, UNITAR’s training materials must be made consistent with
2232 the guidance / demands by the IAs;
- 2233 ❖ The training function needs to be made part of the lead Ministry (for chemicals) within
2234 the country (and others) organizational structure and be assigned a regular budget;
2235 otherwise, any training provided by UNITAR, the IAs or the GEF will likely not be
2236 sustained;
- 2237 ❖ Recipient countries need to better understand this sustaining capacity risk (some already
2238 do (example, the Ministry of Energy in Tanzania);
- 2239 ❖ Lack of action on chemicals in a LDCs should not be read as not necessarily a lack of
2240 political will because for the most part, resources are severely constrained and many
2241 countries priorities are: poverty alleviation; malaria control and other critical near term
2242 economic issues. When viewed against poverty alleviation, ensuring food supply and
2243 addressing health issues such as the high level of malarial deaths and AIDS addition
2244 internal Government funding allocation for chemicals management in many LDCs is not
2245 likely to receive any elevated priority;
- 2246 ❖ As an “add-on” project to a GEF project, UNITAR provided the training workshops but
2247 had little, to no, connection with the actual creation of the NIPs. Better integration of
2248 training for delivery, and delivery, is clearly needed. Better integration of the training
2249 provided by UNITAR and other implementation activities of the IAs is also needed;
- 2250 ❖ The UNITAR project perhaps should have been a part-of, rather than an “add on” to the
2251 GEF POPs enabling project. This would have resulted in perhaps more timely
2252 cooperation and input from the LDCs;
- 2253 ❖ Short notice missions (example, evaluation missions) are a recipe for disaster i.e. failed
2254 logistic, knee jerk participation, insufficient time for interviews etc.
- 2255 ❖ For countries like Bangladesh where attendance is dependent on incentives it was
2256 suggested that even evaluation missions should allocate a small amount in the budget to
2257 provide food and perhaps some incentives to encourage individuals to participate;
- 2258 ❖ One cannot successfully conduct a review of the adequacy of training materials 2.5 or
2259 more years after the training) and where there has been limited follow up (use) of the
2260 materials and skills by government staff due to the modus operandi of the IA (Nepal -
2261 UNIDO);
- 2262 ❖ LDCs will not be able to respond to gender issues in the same way, or in the same
2263 timeframe, as developed countries. Gender equity issued must be kept both in perspective
2264 and in the context of the current state of development of the country;

- 2265 ❖ Insufficient resource allocations for training results in implementation difficulties and
2266 less than optimum organization and perhaps participation (at the country level). A more
2267 detailed consideration of anticipated workshop cost(s) needs to be given by the GEF,
2268 taking into account the special situation and behavioural norms of participants in the
2269 LDCs; and
2270 ❖ The specialized services provided by UNITAR can be a value added adjunct to GEF
2271 training projects. However, many IAs see the provision of such training to be in their
2272 responsibility domain so some turf sorting and delineation may be required by the GEF.
2273

2274 **VII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 2275
- 2276 ❖ UNITAR training materials should be made to be consistent with all of the IA's
2277 requirements (i.e. include log frame analyses or other tools they request countries to use).
2278 Better still, the IA's requirements should also be made consistent amongst themselves,
2279 perhaps through guidance from the GEF;
- 2280 ❖ Training materials need to include software and software usage where computer literacy
2281 is an issue;
- 2282 ❖ Closer consideration needs to be given to the cost/benefit consideration in the selection of
2283 countries for training. If a core capacity (the ability to comprehend and absorb) to
2284 enhance does not exist, then there will be little if any benefits likely to accrue;
- 2285 ❖ Many considered the workshop time to be too short and therefore, a more careful
2286 consideration needs to be given to the rate of absorption of the designated beneficiaries as
2287 well as the fastest (most cost effective) rate of presentation of training materials. The time
2288 needed for a workshop needs to be predicated upon current state of development and
2289 existing core capacity in the country;
- 2290 ❖ "Core capacity" (including computer literacy) should be a consideration in selecting
2291 those to participate in such training and the actual design of the workshop. A longer
2292 training program is likely required in the least developed of the LDCs;
- 2293 ❖ More careful attention needs to be given to who is to receive the training avoiding those
2294 attending simply for the incentives and/or curiosity. The GEF / UNITAR may wish to
2295 consider confining training to those that the country confirms will actually be working on
2296 creating (or directly inputting through consultations etc.) to the NIP (or in future, perhaps
2297 SAICM). The IAs must be made aware of this as well;
- 2298 ❖ Those to be trained should commit (and be enabled by the IA modus operandi) to the use
2299 of the new skills in the near term. If this is not possible then there is no need for the
2300 training;
- 2301 ❖ Where countries participate as "pilots" and additional materials are subsequently added,
2302 there should be some form of refresher training provided if not by UNITAR then by the
2303 IA. The GEF will need to provide additional support if this is to occur;
- 2304 ❖ The training materials should include teachings on contingency (sudden loss of capacity)
2305 and succession planning and sustaining knowledge acquired by the training;
- 2306 ❖ The level of involvement of those undertaking training and their involvement in the
2307 creation of their NIP was outside UNITAR control or even influence. Where training of
2308 LDCs is to occur in future, there needs to be some understanding with the country and the

- 2309 IAs that the training received will be used and not be transposed through the utilization of
2310 non-government consultants (international or domestic);
- 2311 ❖ UNITAR, in cooperation with the GEF Secretariat, may wish to give consideration to
2312 how best to resolve such conflicts (use of contractors versus government staff in the
2313 creation of the NIP in guidance provided to developing countries);
 - 2314 ❖ In countries where core capacity is weak and thus transaction costs to the IA likely to be
2315 high, special funding consideration by the GEF may be needed;
 - 2316 ❖ Guidance provided to countries by both UNITAR and the IAs needs to be made
2317 consistent (some interviewed reported conflicting guidance with the IA-provided
2318 guidance taking precedence);
 - 2319 ❖ Training modules need to be not too advanced relative to the current practices
2320 (incremental enhancement) and should take into account current (local) management
2321 practices and constraints to the degree possible;
 - 2322 ❖ Consideration should be given to including videos as part of the training materials, (the
2323 notion being as requested by some beneficiaries “a picture is worth a thousand words”;
 - 2324 ❖ A special module explaining how best to train-the-trainers and/or on establishing a
2325 training unit, should be included in UNITAR’s guidance materials as this will strengthen
2326 the potential for sustaining results;
 - 2327 ❖ IAs should make an effort to encourage the participation of women and UNITAR might
2328 wish to include a module in future training programs pointing out the importance of the
2329 participation of women in chemicals management;
 - 2330 ❖ UNITAR may wish to consider creating a reference in their training materials to the key
2331 role to be played by women (promotional materials on female participation);
 - 2332 ❖ A greater effort needs to be put into the post training evaluation sheet design to create a
2333 format that could facilitate future evaluations such as this; and
 - 2334 ❖ Consideration needs to be given to creating a special case for the least developed
2335 countries as they reportedly cannot compete fairly for project funding with the more
2336 financially lucrative developing countries such as China.