



## **Reducing Conflicting water uses in the Artibonito River Watershed through the Development and Adoption of a Multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme**

**GEFSEC ID: 2929**

**PIMS No: 2890**

**UNDP Atlas Project No: 00063758**

**Final Evaluation**

**GEF-4 Strategic Programmes: IW SP3, LD SP 1**

**Evaluation time frame: from August 2009 to December 2014**

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**(Haiti and Dominican Republic Country Offices)**

## Table of Contents

Acronyms and abbreviations.....	3
GEF Project Summary.....	4
1.0 Executive Summary.....	4
2.0 Background.....	18
3.0 Project Overview.....	19
4.0 Mid-term Evaluation Findings.....	20
5.0 Purpose of the Final Evaluation and Methodology.....	22
6.0 Final Evaluation Findings.....	24
6.1 GEF Project Ratings.....	30
6.2 Project Finance and Co Financing.....	32
7.0 Current Situation Analysis .....	34
8.0 Recommendations.....	38
9.0 Lessons Learned.....	41

### **Annexes**

#### **Annex I: Documents Consulted**

#### **Annex II: Individuals Interviewed and Field Mission Schedules for Haiti and the DR**

#### **ANNEX III: Evaluation Consultant Code of Conduct and Agreement Form**

#### **Annex IV: GEF Rating Scales**

#### **Annex V: Project Logic Framework**

#### **Annex VI: Evaluation Questions**

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

APT	Association des Planteurs et Transformateurs de Platanna
BONFED	Le Bureau de l'Ordonnateur National Haïti
CATIE	Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza
CIAT	Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (H)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency (Currently Known as Global Affairs Canada)
CIP	Comité Interinstitutionnel de Pilotage (H)
CNIGS	Centre National de l'Information Géo-Spatiale (H)
CO	UNDP Country Office
DGODT	Dirección General de Ordenamiento y Desarrollo Territorial (DR)
DIM	Bi-national data and information management (DIM) system
CECI	Centre for International Studies and Cooperation
EU	European Union
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GTI	Inter-institutional Technical Working Group (DR)
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FUNDASEP	La Fundación de Desarrollo de San Juan, Azua y Elías Piña (DR)
INDRHI	Instituto Nacional de Recurso Hidráulicos (DR)
INRM	Integrated Natural Resource Management
ISAP	Integrated Strategic Action Programme
ITDA	Integrated Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis
IWRM	Integrated Water Resource Management
LPG	Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MDE	Ministry of the Environment (H)
MTR	Mid-Term Review
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAPA	National Action Plan for the Artibonito
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NIWAPS	National Integrated Watershed Action Plans
ONEV	Observatoire National de l'Environnement et de la Vulnérabilité (H)
PDLH	Programme de développement local d'Haïti (Local Haiti Development Programme) (H)
PIR	Project Implementation Reports
PROBINA	Bi-National Project to Rehabilitate the Artibonito River Basin
RUSLE	Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation
SAP	Strategic Action Programme (Plan)
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
SOFA	Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (H)
TDA	Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis
UCOPEDSA	Union des coopératives pour le développement de Saint Michel de l'Attalaye (H)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USD	United States Dollar

## PROJECT SUMMARY TABLE

Project Title:	<b><i>Reducing Conflicting water uses in the Artibonito River Watershed through the Development and Adoption of a multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme</i></b>			
GEF Project ID:	2890		<i>at endorsement (Million US\$)</i>	<i>at completion (Million US\$)</i>
UNDP Project ID:	63758	GEF financing:	<b>3,080,000.00</b>	<b>3,080,000.00</b>
Country:	Haiti & Dominican Republic	IA/EA own:	440,000.00	460,200.00
Region:	Caribbean	Government:	1,747,000.00	360,000.00
Focal Area:	Land Degradation & International Waters	Other:	4,993,000.00	5,200,000.00
FA Objectives, (OP/SP):	GEF-4 STRATEGIC PROGRAM(S): IW SP3, LD SP 1	Total co-financing:	7,180,000.00	6,020,200.00
Executing Agency:	Oxfam Quebec	Total Project Cost:	10,260,000.00	9,100,200.00
Other Partners involved:		ProDoc Signature (date project began):		August 2009
		(Operational) Closing Date:	Proposed: July 2013	Actual: Dec 2014

## 1.0 Executive Summary

This is the final evaluation report for the “***Reducing Conflicting water uses in the Artibonito River Watershed through the Development and Adoption of a multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme***”, herewith referred to as the Artibonito project. It was funded in part by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and managed by the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Country Offices (CO) in the Dominican Republic and Haiti with the Dominican CO ensuring the overall administration of the project. The project began in August 2009 with a planned closing date of July 2013 but through an agreed upon no-cost extension was actually completed in December 2014. The executing agency for this bi-national project was the Canadian Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) OXFAM-Quebec. The Ministry of Environment of both countries acted as the lead institutional partners.

The Artibonito<sup>1</sup> Watershed is the largest on the Hispaniola Island and is shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Between the two countries the Watershed occupies approximately 9,600 km<sup>2</sup> with an area of 6,800 km<sup>2</sup> on the Haitian territory, representing 25% of Haiti's total landmass. The Artibonito watershed is the largest hydro-graphic basin in Haiti.<sup>2</sup> It is also considered the most economically significant watershed on the island especially for Haiti as it is the country's most important area for agricultural production.<sup>3</sup>

Environmental degradation in the Watershed has been a constant challenge as too often land use patterns have been a poor fit for the Watershed's ecosystem. Unsustainable production practices in agriculture and other economic spheres, deforestation, poor water management practices and deficient road and canal infrastructure maintenance are among the many worrying practices contributing to the watershed's decline. Diminishing stream carrying capacity and water availability have been undermining the socio-economic benefits derived from the watershed. At the time of the project's inception the Péligre Dam with a capacity to produce 51 Megawatts (MW) of energy was already seeing its storage capacity reduced and output reduced to 23MW. In the past, irrigation practices posed no threat to the Artibonito Watershed as the volume of irrigation activity was manageable. With increasing competition for Watershed's water resource, unsustainable irrigation practices were becoming unacceptable.

The administrative systems and technical services on both sides of the border that have been in place to manage and protect the Watershed did not have the capabilities or resources to meet growing requirements. None of the technical ministries in either country was in possession of the necessary information, data or analytic capacity. There had been limited bi-national discussions between the countries regarding how to protect the Watershed. As the Government of Haiti began to place a greater emphasis on environmental issues Haiti UNDP began to provide support specifically in addressing systemic environmental concerns such as poor land management practices. Eventually this led to a focus on the Artibonito Watershed. At about the same time the Government of Haiti was beginning to develop a GEF project portfolio. Eventually the Dominican Republic CO was contacted regarding the situation in the Artibonito Watershed. There was an initial attempt to submit a project to the GEF that was to be implemented by the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO).<sup>4</sup>

Eventually the Artibonito project was formalised in July 2009, for a period of four years with Oxfam Quebec as the implementing partner. This was almost five years after the process began to develop a project. The total approved budget was \$10,260,000 USD with \$3,080,000 from GEF and US\$380,000 from the UNDP, and in-kind contributions of \$800,000 from the Government of the Dominican Republic; \$947,000 from the Haitian Government, \$200,000 from Oxfam, US\$60,000 from UNDP, \$150,000 from Helvetas, the Swiss NGO. Previously the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)<sup>5</sup> had supported the Bi-National Project to Rehabilitate the Artibonito River Basin (PROBINA). The success of the Artibonito project was contingent in good part on being able to build on the PROBINA project and its structure. There were discussions with CIDA to explore complementary funding and linkages between PROBINA and the proposed bi-national Artibonito project. The anticipated CIDA commitment was earmarked at \$4,643,000 and was considered critical to the Artibonito project's success.

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<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of this report the Spanish spelling for the Watershed will be used: Artibonito. Project documents refer to both Artibonito and Artibonite

<sup>2</sup> <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37818303>

<sup>3</sup> <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37818303>

<sup>4</sup> Project called the Integrated Management of the Artibonite International Watershed. Concept paper found on Internet but evidence of its implementation

<sup>5</sup> CIDA is now referred to as Global Affairs Canada that also is comprised of the former Department of Foreign Affairs.

The overriding development objective of the Artibonito project was to “***establish a bi-national framework for integrated management of the Artibonito Watershed to promote comprehensive, ecosystem-based reforms, demonstrations and investments, and establish the basis for long-term environmental functionality and socioeconomic stability.***” To achieve this objective, four key Outcomes would be worked towards:

**Outcome 1** would allow the Dominican Republic and Haiti to better understand the dynamics, national environmental, socio-economic situations, hotspots, scope and magnitude of the root causes of agreed upon transboundary problems through a participative Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis.

**Outcome 2** sought to formulate a Strategic Action Programme (SAP<sup>6</sup>) that prioritizes problems identified in the TDA and agreed-upon interventions, reforms, and priority investments to establish the basis of a strengthened government at the national and bi-national levels. As part of the SAP process, the elaboration of National Integrated Watershed Action Plans (NIWAPs), a data management and information system, as well as a monitoring and evaluation framework were also envisioned.

**Outcome 3** would focus on facilitating investments undertaken for innovative field demonstrations in sustainable agriculture, soil and water conservation practices and decentralized environmental management.

**Outcome 4**, the SAP and the NIWAPs were to be made viable through the design of sustainable financial mechanisms which support investment opportunities in environmentally friendly businesses, as well as better access to processing and markets which support sustainable practices and improvements in livelihoods.

The Artibonito project was expected to assist in identifying future development scenarios with the political and economic decision making and support and investments needed to improve the economy of the Artibonito Watershed through the increased availability and distribution of better and more appropriate environmental practices and services. An important objective would be to support key actors in both countries to understand the ecological limitations and opportunities of the Watershed through participatory processes based on the principles of integrated soil and water management.

An exhaustive Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the Artibonito<sup>7</sup> project was completed in April 2013 well after the actual mid-point of the project recommending a non-financial time extension until December 2014 and the establishment of a Work Plan or critical pathway for carrying out the remaining project activity. The MTR also made a lengthy number of recommendations to be implemented by a very small Artibonito project team in the remaining 20 months to programme. The project slowly wound down. After its completion the project’s director based in the Dominican Republic continued to put in volunteer time along with the inter-ministerial committees in both countries (Inter-institutional Technical Working Group (GTI) in the Dominican Republic and the Comité Interinstitutionnel de Pilotage, (CIP) to achieve the project’s main development objective of a formerly agreed to accord to jointly manage the Artibonito Watershed.

After numerous delays this final evaluation was ultimately carried out in March of 2016. Given the extensive scope covered by the MTR and the fact that it was carried out not too long before the

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<sup>6</sup> Terms Plan and Programme are often used interchangeably

<sup>7</sup> The spelling Artibonito will be used for Watershed to simplify the presentation of information

completion of the project, the original intent of this final evaluation was to focus mostly on understanding what was accomplished by the project in the post MTR period while providing a general sense of what the project had accomplished. In addition, the final evaluation was seen as an opportunity to provide a different perspective on the current perceptions surrounding the project and the Watershed. This would ensure the report would be as strategic as possible reflecting present thinking.

## **Evaluation Findings**

From its beginning, the Artibonito project faced incredible challenges that were most often beyond the control of the project team. These obstacles were present right through to the post-implementation period consistently having unwanted influences. Difficulties began with a grave diplomatic miscalculation that resulted in losing potential additional Canadian Government financial support that was counted upon. Additionally, the Programme de développement local en Haïti (PDLH),<sup>8</sup> an ambitious community development programme, was closed down by CIDA despite its strong performance negating possible programming synergy. When the Canadian assistance was not forthcoming the Artibonito project found itself in a situation of underfunding relative to its programming objectives. This condition would become a defining characteristic that would come across to many as a project being too ambitious given its modest means. The next major hurdle was the incredible earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 requiring Haitian Government departments to direct their focus to more immediate priorities for the better part of eight months. The timing could not have been worse for a complicated endeavour like the Artibonito project.

The period of June 2012 to July 2013 was noted for institutional instability as the project passed through several changes in environment ministers in each country and an election in the Dominican Republic. In fact, in five years there were five changes in environment ministers in Haiti and three in the Dominican Republic. Each ministerial change required exerting considerable effort to bring new decision makers up to speed on the project. It also meant the project had to adjust to a new ministerial vision. Sometimes the vision would be far from constructive. The Artibonito project did benefit from high level support but it would also be failed by the lack of good decision making based at the most senior level that had the best interest of the project and the communities along both sides of the border at heart. Beyond the issue of support, the need to create capacity at the political level was not fully understood during the design phase. The bi-national management of a watershed is a challenging undertaking requiring political tact and knowledge. From the beginning the Project required institutional guidance that embraced the notion that the Project was to assist in creating a long-term structure and vision that was multi-focal as opposed to serving project specific objectives. In the end, the Project was defined by the complexities and limitations of the institutional relations surrounding it.

Tension between the two countries built throughout the project's lifetime for a variety of reasons. In the latter years matters came to a boil as Haitian migrants flowed into the Dominican Republic, including into the Dominican side of the Watershed, in search of a better life. A Dominican Supreme Court decision led to many Haitian immigrants controversially losing their Dominican citizenship. This seriously degraded relations between the two countries. The worsening relations combined with other factors, such as

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<sup>8</sup> Implemented by the Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) was a local development programme working in five departments in Haiti including the Artibonito

multiple unilateral trade embargos levied by the Haitian government on key Dominican exports, to undermine the ultimate objective of the project, a signed agreement of a bi-national framework to facilitate the integrated management of the watershed by both governments. Despite all parties agreeing the document needed to be signed, including the Ministries of Economy, Agriculture and Environment of both countries, it somehow was never meant to be.

The project team, despite the worsening bilateral relations, worked hard and arguably successfully, maintaining communication between governments and ministries in the hopes of securing a signed agreement. As well, the evaluation process found that among project stakeholders there was a sage understanding of each other country's predicament and why the project was important to each other. However neither of these factors were enough in the end.

Neither government had any prior experience in managing a bi-national process towards achieving a water treaty. During its latter stages the project benefited from support from the GEF funded IWLEARN events that led to the Government of Mexico facilitating training and exchange experiences on how to approach the management of a bi-national water body. The Mexican assistance was well received. It also pointed out the degree to which serious institutional capacity building on international water management was required.

Throughout the project's lifespan political matters were consistently mixed up with technical watershed management issues impacting the ability to move the project's agenda. The political and technical had to be separated and unfortunately this never happened and ended up being perhaps the hardest lesson that was learned by project stakeholders when the ultimate project objective would not be reached.

Before its completion, the rate of inflation in Haiti reached 100% from what it was at the project's start date placing a heavy burden on the project team to carry out activities as described in the original project document. There were administrative challenges implementing a project by two COs even though the Dominican CO held overall administrative responsibility for a project subsequently implemented by Oxfam. In terms of the project team, although the project's director started in January 2011, it was not until the second semester of 2011 that the national coordinators for the Dominican Republic and Haiti were in place. This meant the Artibonito project was without the full complement of key staff for the first three quarters of the first year of operations. It only really began to be fully operational a year and a half after the expected start date. In the end, the Dominican national coordinator left his position after 24 months.

Despite these obstacles, the project largely delivered the agreed upon Outcomes with the exception of the signed agreement. The Artibonito grew to be a very complex project involving a broad sector of stakeholders from national level government departments down to local municipalities. The TDA was completed and developed in a participatory manner articulating an understanding of the Watershed and the fundamental problems it is facing. The TDA became an important source of information in the elaboration of the SAP and the NIWAPs that were also completed. Among other features the Dominican NIWAP proposed mainstreaming actions in both SLM and IWRM. Stakeholders, especially in Haiti, continue to benefit from the analysis of the TDA including the Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire (CIAT) of Haiti and the Haiti office of the Inter-American Development Bank. Although not formally endorsed, The SAP was approved by the technical committee of both governments and was used to form the basis of the drafted bi-national agreement, which was also approved. The SAP prioritized targeted actions to control sedimentation, improve governance, and capacity to make decisions based on international principles for bi-national water management. In terms of Outcome 4, the investment plans



for both countries detailed priority investments to increase ecosystem services and bi-national investments were integrated into the SAP. The NIWAP was completed for the Dominican Republic, approved and circulated. In Haiti the NIWAP was developed in draft form but never approved before the closing of the project.

At a technical level, capacities of institutions targeted by the project in the two countries were enhanced. The bi-national technical steering committee to oversee the project and the Bilateral **Mixed Commission Republic of Haiti and Dominican Republic**, responsible for the political dialogue between the nations, was able to be constructively involved in the project. It is a bi-national governance mechanism that includes a structure for the management of shared natural resources on the island. At this level stakeholders were very satisfied with the professional relations they were building with their counterparts in the other country. They were also very content in beginning to understand how to manage and programme activities in a border area. National-level decision-makers were learning about sub-watersheds and what is at stake on both sides of the border. The project was seen as being a positive extension of government activity on both sides.

The project was supported by very functional technical committees in both countries, the technical committee in the Dominican Republic and the CIP in Haiti. Stronger country level technical dialogue and coordination and improved ability to produce and manage information were achieved through coordination and guidance provided by the national committees. The relations building and learning between officials of the two countries facilitated by the project at all levels are looked upon very favourably. This opinion was shared equally at the Watershed level, at least in the Dominican Republic and national levels in both countries. Although there is no evidence of ongoing post-project dialogue, the Artibonito experience is relatively fresh with most key actors still following the project. In terms of sources of support for the project, members of both the technical committee in the Dominican and CIP in Haiti remain strongly in favour of the project and what it was trying to accomplish.

The watershed level management council in the Dominican Republic, known as the Consejo de Cuenca Alianza Artibonito<sup>9</sup>, that was set up through the project has been solidified and remains active in the post project period. It is comprised of government, private sector and NGO actors. The evaluation found no evidence that the Council that was set up on Haitian side was still operational. According to sources, the reason for the inactivity of the Haitian council is that the Ministry of the Environment (MDE) in Haiti does not have funds or transport to ensure the necessary follow up. Its Dominican counterpart has expressed a willingness to support the Haitian watershed council and enthusiastically endorses the idea of future bi-national relations at the level of the Watershed.<sup>10</sup>

While pilot actions on both sides of the border are considered to have been well executed producing tangible benefits, the timing of their implementation, initiated before the TDA was completed, and unconnected to other key project outputs such as the SAP that were expected to guide development activities in the Watershed leaves much to be desired. Commencing the pilot activity before the TDA was a project design feature that was decided upon before Oxfam Quebec assumed its responsibilities for the project. In the Dominican Republic, pilot activity sought to reinforce the capacity of local authorities to manage the Watershed through diverse sectors of intervention from successfully improving fire fighting capacity, reducing the number of solid waste sites from 27 to 14, undertaking institutional capacity

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<sup>9</sup> [www.alianzaartibonito.org](http://www.alianzaartibonito.org) or Facebook group Consejo de Cuenca Alianza Artibonito

<sup>10</sup> Website for the Consejo de Cuenca Alianza Artibonito <http://www.alianzaartibonito.org/>

analysis to carry out actions in support of the environment and reinforcing the office capacity of three Provincial Environmental Offices. The Plan Municipal de Ordenamiento Territorial led to the elaboration of three municipal plans. This coincided with another UNDP initiative to develop a guide for municipal planning that was published in May of 2016.<sup>11</sup>

In Haiti, two pilot projects were implemented in the Upper Artibonite area of the Watershed and were directly focused on addressing basic development needs. The Verrettes pilot project involved combating land degradation and improving land use planning through such means as reforestation and agroforestry. The Verrettes pilot project was cited for its success in demonstrating how to control extreme flooding and had success in establishing a number of nurseries in the project zone that are still operational. The Verrettes pilot project benefited from secondary funding from the Swiss NGO Helvetas. The pilot project in Saint Michel de l'Attalaye, focused on income generation supporting a series of value chain analysis, improved equipment, more hygienic food production practices, and building marketing capacities for off-farm products such as dry fruit, honey, liquors, and jams produced largely by women's cooperatives, Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA), Men nan Men, and Union des coopératives pour le développement de Saint Michel de l'Attalaye (UCOPEDSA) and the *Association des Planteurs et Transformateurs de Platanna (APTP)*. The Saint Michel de l'Attalaye activity built on an earlier intervention by the PDLH that provided support to the cooperatives. While the Saint Michel de l'Attalaye initiative would never be a logical first choice for a pilot project for the Artibonite project, it has shown the potential of becoming a valuable development symbol for the entire Artibonite Watershed and hence potentially highly significant over the long-term. It made good progress during the project period and the ongoing ambition of its principal implementers could lead it to greater heights.

There are issues with how the project was managed. Stakeholders felt that the project was administratively burdensome with too many formalities. Haitian stakeholders felt that the project relied too heavily on its highly engaged national coordinator and after his departure attention to details in Haiti seemed to fall off. Also it was not clear to Haitian stakeholders that when there was a problem who should they reach out to; Oxfam or the UNDP. There was also a perception that the core project team should have been larger in particular that once the Dominican project coordinator left he should have been replaced. In the case of Haiti, the project technically ended and the country coordinator's contract was not extended. In the Dominican Republic, the money ran out.

The project was also criticized for being action adverse focussing too much on workshops, organizing, research, meetings and other activities such as institutional analysis as opposed to field level interventions. In Haiti, it had been hoped that the project could have been associated with the 12 million Canadian dollars in programming that the PROBINA project provided. However this did not happen. The existing PROBINA Project was cancelled early and this created an enormous financial burden on the Project because the main budgetary support for the project disappeared. Office space, furniture, and vehicles were liquidated forcing the project director to exert considerable effort to provide a logistical foundation for the project. The lack of ground level activity is an issue but it is also a misconception. Many of the activities of the Project were meant to be the preliminary steps towards more substantive

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<sup>11</sup> [http://www.do.undp.org/content/dominican\\_republic/es/home/library/human\\_development/guia-metodologica-para-la-formulacion-del-plan-municipal-de-orde.html](http://www.do.undp.org/content/dominican_republic/es/home/library/human_development/guia-metodologica-para-la-formulacion-del-plan-municipal-de-orde.html)

actions. Also, it could be argued that these are less project management shortcomings and more likely a result of underfunding and managing expectations about what the project was expected to accomplish. In fact the Project did implement all its proposed interventions. Ideally on both sides of the border the project should have been able to make more technical support available to beneficiaries but again, on such a small budget, this was not possible. These project management issues had an impact but not to the same degree that the litany of external challenges like the earthquake had.

The fact that the project did not achieve its core objective of having a signed agreement has tainted the overall perception of the project which really should only be considered as being a success. This is regrettable given everyone agrees including the UNDP that supported Oxfam in its efforts to obtain a complete endorsement of the agreement.

The lack of a signed agreement is not the fault of the project team. Many stakeholders recognise the extraordinary effort made by the project team to facilitate the agreement process. The success in achieving the other objectives of the project should be judged on its own merits. An NGO driven project should never have been expected to take on the responsibility of facilitating international negotiations between two countries at a moment in time when relations between the two nations were at their worst. Yet once again, the project was able to facilitate what has been described as “high quality dialogue” between the two countries.

## GEF Project Ratings

<b>Evaluation Ratings:</b>			
<b>1. Monitoring and Evaluation</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>2. IA&amp; EA Execution</b>	<b>Rating</b>
M&E design at entry	S	Quality of UNDP Implementation	S
M&E Plan Implementation	S	Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	S
Overall quality of M&E	S	Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	S
<b>3. Assessment of Outcomes</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>4. Sustainability</b>	<b>Rating</b>
Relevance	R	Financial resources:	MU
Effectiveness	MS	Socio-political:	ML
Efficiency	HS	Institutional framework and governance:	ML
Overall Project Outcome Rating	S	Environmental :	ML
Impact	S	Overall likelihood of sustainability:	ML

(The obligatory GEF rating scores are detailed in Annex IV)

The GEF scoring system has a difficult time capturing the performance of the project. This has a great deal to do with the nature of the project and its history. The Project mostly achieved what it was expected to do except its ultimate objective yet even though all the pieces were in place to reach an agreement albeit after the project’s completion date. But it did not happen. This was a very important project that achieved a great deal and the parameters of this scoring system cannot capture this. A great deal of this scoring relates to the project’s strategy that saw programming elements being implemented simultaneously where normally GEF transboundary water projects work through an established protocol calling for the completion of the TDA followed by the development of the SAP. This is then concluded

with the NIWAP process and pilot project activity undertaken in the post TDA period. That the project was designed to have these undertaken concurrently had implications on the Project's efficiency and effectiveness.

In determining the scores a lot of varying elements had to be considered. For example in Haiti, an extensive amount of resources were dedicated to the development of the watershed management structure with lesser success than on the Dominican side. At the same time the performance of the national steering committees was considered a success including the integration of multiple ministries who most often strongly committed to the project. In Haiti, the Artibonito project was seen as one of the few projects in the country that had achieved such a strong level of integration of steering committee members in the project. In the end a number of variables such as these led to determining that overall the project had a "Moderately Likely" possibility of ensuring sustainability which really does not reflect the actual situation which in the end could be very favourable in terms of sustainability once an agreement is reached.

Moving forward there are many critical considerations that were highlighted during the field mission period of the evaluation. This includes:

- There is clear support within both Governments to sign a formal agreement. It is understood that not signing the agreement in April 2015 when the talks broke down was a mistake. This evaluation is seen in both countries as providing an opportunity to re-launch a formal process towards a signed formal agreement.
- Support for a well-managed watershed has been solidifying in each country. This was expressed by one high level stakeholder as a "permanent project" should be established to manage the Artibonito Watershed.
- The institutional interest in participating in the development of the Artibonito Watershed is widening in both countries while recognising that expanded engagement has been done through a formal structure with policy guidelines.
- The lesson learned was that governance was the overriding factor in managing land-use processes.
- As interest increases to intervene in the Watershed it will be necessary to establish appropriate structures at the national level in both countries for overseeing coordination in the Artibonito Watershed.
- Despite the worsening situation in the Watershed, studies supported by the project demonstrate that through proper water management a much higher level of development could be reached within the Watershed.

- There are funding opportunities available to follow up on the Artibonito project and there is interest in both countries in seeing this happen. There is strong motivation amongst stakeholders in having a multi-dimensional long-term programme developed as opposed to a project.
- In anticipation of a formal agreement there should be a focus on determining what each country can contribute in the immediate to make progress towards protecting the Watershed before international support in the form of another project.
- If there is a follow-up initiative in support of the Artibonito Watershed it should take a different approach in terms of its management structure and programming focus. There is a perception that a purely NGO driven initiative is no longer suitable. There will be a need for ground level activities but also high level institutional capacity building and the development of formal structures and relations.
- The social-economic circumstances are evolving within the Watershed and they are not very favourable. This is especially true on the Haitian side which invariably impacts the Dominican side.
- There are an endless number of needs that have to be addressed in the Watershed. It is a large area with some remote parts and an incredible amount of social and economic complexity. Even with a follow up multi-dimensional initiative to the Artibonito project there still will be a need for further interventions. Additional investments and development activity will need to be attracted to the Watershed in a coordinated manner.
- Stakeholders are in agreement that reaching a state of sustainable development in the Artibonito Watershed will be a long and challenging process. This is going to require considerable patience and the ability to establish a long-term vision and maintain it.
- There is a need for a continuation in the practice that the project established in placing a value on the use of science and research in the Watershed keeping in mind the more immediate desire of wanting to see more activity at the ground level.
- The current and long-term impact of climate change in the Watershed was expressed as a critical concern by a broad range of stakeholders and must figure prominently in all follow up actions.
- The groundwater component needs to be completed. Groundwater use is the most likely source of water under the climate change scenario.

## Recommendations

1. In the strongest possible terms this report recommends that the two countries re-establish dialogue towards signing a bi-national agreement to manage the Artibonito Watershed. There is a need to act on

the broad-based consensus that currently exists in support of a formal agreement. Given the favourable opinion that stakeholders have of the UNDP, the Country Offices in both countries should provide assistance in achieving a signed agreement. In the unlikely event it is deemed necessary, UNDP could consider recruiting a specialist with skills in transboundary resource negotiations and facilitation to assist in moving the process forward.

2. The Governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic should work towards establishing a Bi-national Water Commission according to international principles and practices. The starting point should be to review the agreed to bi-national governance framework that was part of the SAP which includes a negotiated structure for a Water Commission. The idea of working towards creating a Water Commission would provide an overarching objective for both countries. The Water Commission would be tasked with seeing the priorities set out in the SAP are realised, ensuring standards and good development practices are respected across the Watershed and attracting additional investments and coordinating development projects. However to ensure that its mandate remains as strictly focussed as possible, the Water Commission should not be an implementing body but rather a guiding force that facilitates development initiatives within the Watershed.

3. The long-term vision for the Artibonito Watershed must be agreed upon and established. A 100 year plan to be realised through a series of five or ten year strategies is reasonable. An alternative could be to match the plan to climate scenarios to the year 2100. The first strategy should be to implement the NIWAP in the Dominican Republic, endorse the SAP that includes plans to prioritise investments and priority locations for the coming ten years, and complete the NIWAP for Haiti. As these proposed investments were products of participative processes they should already have strong buy in. The 100 year plan would establish guiding principles for managing the Water Commission from one ten-year strategy to the next. These guiding principles would be informed by the SAP.

4. The Haitian and Dominican Governments should at the earliest possible date make a joint submission to the GEF for a new initiative in support of sustainable management of the Artibonito Watershed. It should have two overriding programming components: The first component is to be focused on field level activities in a select number of programming areas. Agricultural production in the broadest sense to include food processing and non-farm related income generating activities, energy production and water management should receive strong consideration. These suggestions are based on feedback provided during the evaluation mission. However the needs in the Watershed are more encompassing and that other priorities could also be considered. However, a programme that is overly charged should be avoided.

The second programming stream would be dedicated to building the Water Commission and corresponding institutional capacity of both governments at the national and local levels within the Watershed. It is possible and encouraged that the two components would have separate implementing agencies. For the creation of the Water Commission the Mexico Government could be approached to guide the process. Another option would be to contact representatives of the Canadian Government that has a long history in the area of management of international waters to determine its willingness to reengage in the Artibonito Watershed. Both governments must consider carefully the national level

structures that have to be in place to ensure that subsequent actions in the Watershed have the proper institutional support and guidance.

5. In addition to a new GEF supported Artibonito programming initiative, supplementary development projects should be attracted to the Artibonito Watershed to address specific development issues on each side of the border. This recommendation recognises that the long-term interests are best served through the cultivation of the broadest network of partners possible both within and between the two countries and internationally. Strong networking and relations building would provide each country the latitude to pursue their own specific development priorities within the Watershed while programming jointly when there was strong mutual interest. For Haiti, a supplementary project should focus on expanding forest coverage in the Watershed and introducing measures to reduce pressures on the Watershed's forests to produce charcoal for household use and sale in the Port au Prince area. In Haiti, the Green Climate Fund in connection with the French Development Agency has recently announced plans to develop a national watershed protection and agroforestry project. Part of this project's focus should be the Artibonito Watershed and decision makers in Haiti should encourage this. The Green Fund project will be operational long before a second phase of the Artibonito project is in existence. With a large portion of the population without access to electricity increasing the availability of clean sources of electricity and other forms of energy would seem to be an immediate priority for the Dominican Republic.

6. Both governments should determine what can be done through their own means to make improvements in the Watershed independent of an agreement and continued international funding. It is understood that the Haitian and Dominican governments do not have the same means. Nevertheless, every gesture towards improving circumstances in the Watershed should be encouraged. Private sector initiatives should also be encouraged provided proper environmental and social safeguards are respected.

7. Local capacity building in the Watershed should incorporate the desire expressed by both countries to see cross-border institutional relations developed at the watershed level. It is understood that circumstances in Haiti are more challenging and will require greater patience and attention to make cross border relations worthwhile. An immediate priority in building local capacity will be to reinforce the Watershed Management Councils in both countries with the most important priority revitalizing the Water Council in Haiti. The Watershed Management Councils would operate in coordination with but independently of the Watershed Commission. The Watershed Management Councils would focus on guiding and coordinating development activities on each side of their border. But like the Water Commission, the Watershed Management Councils are not implementing bodies.

8. While the Artibonito project was never seriously compromised by its administrative structures, there was nevertheless, room for improvement. For this reason new administrative arrangements for a second phase should be explored. One possible option would be to have the activities administered by each country.

9. The achievements with the women's cooperatives in Saint Michel de l'Attalaye should be retained and built upon in the new programming initiative. It is very logical to want to assist as many people as possible. However there has to be room, especially in the context of the Watershed to achieve other development objectives. With the cooperatives of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye there is an opportunity to

establish a comprehensive multi-dimensional example of sustainable development driven largely by the strong motivation and vision of the beneficiaries. Other development projects should also have a chance for replication and scaling up as this is as good opportunity to build on current capacity. Possible candidates would include coordinating with or directly supporting the GIZ reforestation project in Rio Libon and the Verrettes project supported through the Artibonito project. Support for the cooperatives of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye should also be the starting point for building a strong gender focus for the next phase of programming.

10) While there should be a strong emphasis on ground level action, moving into the next phase expanding on the research and studies of the first phase should have its place too. At the same time the valuable data and research generated during the Artibonito project such as the TDA should be actively employed to inform future decision making regarding the Artibonito Watershed.

11) Climate change considerations should be integrated into all aspects of the next programming phase. Of particular concern is bringing into stronger focus the question of ground water and its potential role in adapting to increasingly challenging climatic circumstances.

### **Lessons Learned**

- The Artibonito project should be viewed as an Introductory Project that has provided a good start and not be evaluated purely on the basis of what was or was not accomplished during the project's lifetime. Viable watershed management requires decades before having all the necessary structures, policies and practices in place. This is how the management of the Watershed should be approached philosophically.
- The Artibonito project should have followed the established procedures for GEF International waters projects and not have undertaken the TDA and SAP processes simultaneously. A completed TDA should establish the proper platform for introducing the SAP both politically and technically. Completion of the TDA also provides an early victory that can be celebrated between the countries further forging a productive working environment for the SAP process. Problems in approving the TDA will foreshadow problems in managing the more complicated and delicate SAP process.
- An NGO managed project should not be expected to contend with complicated government relations including inter-ministerial discord. This requires high level political oversight and on occasion strong resolve.
- Lack of political constancy in terms of support and guidance can compromise all projects but those of a bi-national nature will be especially vulnerable to this inconsistency.
- As seen with the project an ideal executing partner has the ability to maintain strong field level implementing capabilities while wielding influence and commanding the attention of the highest levels of government.
- It is important to hold project managers such as Oxfam Quebec to high standards. Projects should be judged on the basis of what they accomplish. However it is important to make judgments regarding project management with some recognition of all mitigating circumstances. The Project involved a broad number of sectors and multiple levels of government. It implicated a diverse range of personalities and



functioned in four spoken languages in a challenging implementing environment. In such a context it is difficult to judge a project through a simple analysis of satisfactory or not satisfactory. But it is possible to recognise when a project has benefited from a strong and dedicated project team as was the case of the Artibonito Project.

- The cooperatives of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye benefited from long-term support through its participation in two multi-year projects. The experience in Saint Michel de l'Attalaye demonstrates how the development process is slow and there are no easy victories. Even with capable and motivated project beneficiaries patience is always required. But slowly something special can emerge.

- There are processes such as the one to have both governments sign the bi-national agreement to manage the Artibonito Watershed that can become unnecessarily complicated and seem like a lost cause. The ideal circumstances may never arise but it may be possible to do what is necessary to make progress.

## 2.0 Background

The Artibonito Watershed is the largest on the Hispaniola Island and is shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The watershed occupies approximately 9,600 km<sup>2</sup> between the two countries with an area of 6,800 km<sup>2</sup> on the Haitian territory, representing 25% of that country's landmass. The Artibonito watershed is the largest hydro-graphic basin in Haiti.<sup>12</sup> The Artibonito is considered to be the most economically important watershed on the island with this being especially true for Haiti.<sup>13</sup> Until recently economic interests in the Watershed have operated with little coordination or formal recognition of each other's existence. The Artibonito Watershed serves as the centre of Haiti's agricultural production producing the vast majority of the country's rice and other crops such as roots, tubers, and sugarcane. The Watershed has been providing domestic water, facilitating energy production, and irrigation initiatives in support of what is considered the poorest region in the Dominican Republic. The Haiti side of the border is also very poor but relatively advantaged compared to other regions of the country. Estimates on the size of the population of Watershed vary but it is considered to be around 1.6 million with the vast majority living on the Haitian side.

The majority of the surface area of the watershed is located upstream from the Péligre Dam<sup>14</sup> comprised of: (a) the Northern Artibonite Haiti, which is the area between St. Michel de l'Attalaye to the border of the Dominican Republic Rio Libón and includes the Haitian Plateau Central and (b) the Dominican Artibonito that is divided into the "Artibonito," or the northern half of the Dominican watershed, and the "Macasias" which is the southern half of the Dominican portion of the watershed. The "downstream" environment is comprised of: (c) the areas adjacent to and below Haiti's Péligre dam referred to as the "Artibonite Bas" and (d) the "Fer-a-Cheval" sub-watershed, a long, narrow area originating in the Dominican Republic and extending through the municipality of Savannette reaching the Artibonite below the Péligre Dam at Mirabalais.<sup>15</sup>

Environmental degradation in the Watershed has been a constant challenge as too often land use patterns have been a poor fit for the Watershed's ecosystem. Unsustainable production practices in agriculture and other economic spheres, deforestation on the Haitian side; poor water management practices and inadequate maintenance of road and canal infrastructure are among the many worrying practices contributing to the watershed's decline. Diminishing stream carrying capacity and water availability have been undermining the socio-economic benefits derived from the watershed. At the time of the Project's inception the Péligre Dam with a capacity to produce 51 kilowatts of energy was already seeing its storage capacity reduced. In the past, irrigation practices posed no threat to the Artibonito Watershed as the volume of irrigation activity was manageable. Now with increasing competition for the Watershed's water resource unsustainable irrigation practices are now a concern.

The administrative systems and technical services on both sides of the border that have been in place to manage and protect the Watershed have never had the capabilities or resources to meet expectations. At

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<sup>12</sup> <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37818303>

<sup>13</sup> <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=37818303>

<sup>14</sup> The Peligre dam is the tallest in Haiti. It was constructed in the 1950's for flood mitigation and energy production purposes.

<sup>15</sup> GEF-UNDP-Oxfam 2013, Analisis Diagnostico Transfronterizo

the same time technical ministries in neither country have been in possession of the necessary information, data or analytic capacity. There had been limited relations between the countries regarding the Watershed. Prior to the project there had not been the necessary leadership towards establishing constructive dialogue or undertaking joint-actions to protect the Watershed.

In Haiti's not too distant past, there were no laws or environmental planning, no ministry, or well defined efforts to protect water resources in a systematic manner. Eventually the Government began to change its priorities placing a greater emphasis on environmental issues. Haiti UNDP began to provide support to the Haitian Government specifically in addressing systemic environmental concerns such as poor land management practices. Eventually this led to a focus on the Artibonito Watershed. At about the same time the Government of Haiti was beginning to develop a GEF project portfolio. The Dominican Republic CO was also contacted regarding the situation in the Artibonito Watershed. Dialogue began between the two countries with meetings held on both sides of the boarder regarding the Watershed. There was an initial attempt to present a project to the GEF to be implemented by the FAO. This never materialised. Eventually the project would launch with Oxfam Quebec as its implementer and the Ministries of Environment of both countries acting as the institutional partner.

The specific barriers identified during the project preparation phase to be addressed included: Absence of a bi-national governance framework; Fragmented natural resources policy and regulatory frameworks with poor enforcement mechanisms; Geographically limited management approaches and responses; Inadequate technology, knowledge, and capacity; Inadequate data and information for decision-making; Economic and financial barriers; Lack of valuation of ecosystem services; Limited access to adequate and appropriate financial resources and incentives; and Insecure land tenure.

### 3.0 Project Overview

Almost five years after the process began, the Artibonito project was formalised in July 2009. The total approved budget was \$10,260,000 USD with \$3,080,000 from GEF and US \$380,000 from the UNDP, and in-kind donations of \$800,000 from the Government of the Dominican Republic; \$947,000 from the Haitian Government, \$200,000 from Oxfam, \$150,000 from Helvetas, the Swiss NGO. Previously CIDA had supported the Bi-National Project PROBINA. The success of the Artibonito project was contingent in good part on being able to build on the basis created by PROBINA. There were discussions with CIDA to explore complementary funding and linkages between PROBINA and the new bi-national Artibonito project. The proposed CIDA commitment was earmarked at \$4,643,000. The CIDA commitment was parallel co-financing through on-the-ground activities and was not to provide budget support to the project management structure.

The aim of the ***“Reducing Conflicting water uses in the Artibonito River Watershed through the Development and Adoption of a multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme”*** was to assist Haiti and the Dominican Republic to improve the joint management of the Artibonito watershed through an ecosystem approach, and to work for the first time, in the high, medium and lower parts of the watershed through a comprehensive approach. The bi-focal initiative (International Waters – Land Degradation), sought to combine two approaches: sustainable land management (SLM) and integrated water resources management (IWRM). To achieve the objectives of the Artibonito project, four key

Outcomes were established:

**Outcome 1** would allow both countries (Dominican Republic and Haiti) to better understand the dynamics, national environmental situations, transboundary priorities and the root causes of socio-economic problems.

**Outcome 2** sought to formulate a Strategic Action Programme (SAP) through a Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis (TDA) as a means of agreeing on interventions, reforms, and priority investments to establish the basis of a strengthened government at the national and bi-national levels. The TDA of the watershed would enable both countries to better understand priority national and transboundary environmental issues and socio-economic root causes, and develop an agreed program of interventions. Through the formulation of the SAP, required priority interventions, reforms, and investments were to be agreed to with the hope of laying the foundations for improved watershed governance at bi-national and national levels. As part of the development of the SAP, National Integrated Watershed Action Plans (NIWAPS) were to be developed to support the implementation of a more comprehensive, ecosystem-based approach incorporating principles of IWRM and SLM. To assist this process, the project would establish a bi-national data and information management system as well as a monitoring and evaluation framework.

**Outcome 3** investments were to be programmed for innovative field demonstrations in sustainable agriculture, soil and water conservation practices and decentralized environmental management.

**Outcome 4** the SAP and the NIWAPs would be made viable through the design of sustainable financial mechanisms which support investment opportunities in environmentally friendly sectorial businesses, as well as better access to processing and markets which support sustainable practices and improvements in livelihoods.

The Artibonito project was expected to assist in the identification of future development scenarios and with the political and economic decisions and investments needed to improve the economy of the Artibonito Watershed through the increased availability and distribution of better and more appropriate environmental practices and services. A key goal was to support key stakeholders in both countries to understand the ecological limits of the soil and water resources and to develop, through a participatory process, a common vision of the future development of the Artibonito Watershed based on the principles of integrated soil and water management. There were also expectations regarding financial support for innovative pilot demonstrations to be carried out in sustainable agriculture, soil and water conservation practices, and decentralized environmental management.

## 4.0 Mid-Term Evaluation Findings

Well past the mid-point of its implementation, a MTR was completed in April 2013. The main focus of the MTR was to examine the following:

i) The adjustments/validity of the design and implementation of the project including the coherence among Outcomes;

ii) The scope of complying with the central purpose of establishing a joint management framework in the shared watershed through an ecosystem approach. Of particular importance was an analysis of the Project's progress towards the removal of barriers which justified the project itself;

iii) The value the Project added to the current initiatives that are already under way;

iv) Progress in the consolidation of the structure and capacities to make adoption and continuity of the plans and investments in the watershed viable. <sup>16</sup>

The MTR determined that two Outcomes: (Outcome 1) "Detailed analysis of the watershed for the prioritization of transboundary problems and the agreement on management objectives" and (Outcome 3) "Local economic and sustainable management demonstration projects for land and water resources" received more attention. To a much lesser degree, the MTR found progress made in relation to Outcome 2 (SAP/NIWAPs). In the case of Outcome 1, the biggest advances were seen as being made in the "biophysical characterization and the analysis of Governance, and to a much lesser degree in the socioeconomic characterization with little added value to contribute to the prioritization of problems." According to the MTR findings, the most progress had been made in Haiti. The positive advances achieved at the time of the MTR were seen as:

i) In the updating and generation of homologated information between countries on biophysical aspects, and produced through strong participation of national institutions.

ii) the project positioning in the institutions – at the local and national levels – who although they work at different rhythms and capacities, are adopting the approach the reaching the expected results; this positioning has led to a network of organizations and bodies in which the finalization of the TDA can progress, and at the same time, design the NIWAPs and SAP.

iii) experiences in managing soils and options for the use of agricultural products combined with the strengthening of local organisations.

iv) Prioritization of the topic in the bilateral agenda.

The MTR concluded that the least progress had been made in the following four areas:

i) Administration, planning system, monitoring and evaluation and coordination with the implementing Agency (UNDP);

ii) Weak communication strategies and coordination at the national level that is required when working with different bodies and organizations that are key for the political positioning of the project and its goals.

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<sup>16</sup> Mid-Term Evaluation of the Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Bi-National Artibonito River Basin Through the Development and Adoption of a Multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme for UNDP and GEF completed by Tania Ammour April 2013

iii) The added value in technical aspects, and through the accompaniment of the political process and national strategies (for example the land-use management, governing systems for watershed management).

iv) Weaknesses in efforts to generate information in the economic/financial and social realms (at the level of ecosystems, ecosystem services, and livelihoods) should be emphasized; so as to provide convincing arguments for decision-making.<sup>17</sup>

A key finding of the MTR was that since the project began the problems confronting the Watershed had not only continued but the effects of climate change and the global economic crisis had extenuated the negative factors influencing the watershed's degradation. For the MTR this heightened the appreciation of the relevance of the Project. Extreme weather events in the programming zone intensified at the same time as the number of Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic began to increase. A growing demand for water, high poverty levels, and food insecurity in the border area persisted and were further complicated by environmental degradation, the very problems the project was seeking to address.<sup>18</sup> Despite these challenges, the MTR concluded that before its completion the project had positioned itself to achieve its core Project Outcomes and Objectives.

The MTR made an exhaustive number of recommendations on both short and long-term matters. The most important recommendation that was agreed to by stakeholders was the no-cost project extension to December 2014. Unfortunately the project team was so scaled back by the time the recommendations were made there was little capacity to act on many of the more specific ones. The number of recommendations was inappropriate also for the budget of the project and the point of the Project in its life cycle. In response to the MTR the project team in collaboration with UNDP produced a critical pathway that described areas of action towards completing the project's mandate with expected timelines. The pathway also detailed a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) strategy and management level activities to be completed on reporting practices and an array of financial matters.<sup>19</sup>

## **5.0 Purpose of the Final Evaluation and Methodology**

In March of 2016, the field work for the final evaluation of the Artibonito project was carried out. At its commencement the objective of the evaluation was to carry out an assessment of the project's performance compared with expectations set forth in its logic model and results framework. In practical terms the purpose was to understand in an impartial manner where and why the project had or had not succeeded. The MTR, completed less than two years prior to the completion of the project, was highly detailed in its analysis and recommendations. It paid attention to many of the multitude of smaller activities such as workshops and research that the project supported. For the final evaluation there was no point in retracing areas covered by the MTR in considerable detail. As well, given that the project had

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<sup>17</sup> Mid-Term Evaluation of the Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Bi-National Artibonito River Basin Through the Development and Adoption of a Multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme for UNDP and GEF completed by Tania Ammour April 2013

<sup>18</sup> Mid-Term Evaluation of the Reducing Conflicting Water Uses in the Bi-National Artibonito River Basin Through the Development and Adoption of a Multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme for UNDP and GEF completed by Tania Ammour April 2013

<sup>19</sup> Critical Pathway Artibonito 29-7-13 Project Document: Work plan for post Mid-term Evaluation period

already been closed for over a year it was felt that a very specific approach was required for the final evaluation.

The final evaluation was guided by the evaluation questions presented in Annex VI that cover the core issues of relevancy, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. As per GEF requirements, section 6.1 provides scores against GEF Ratings Scales for the questions of relevancy, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability as well as the quality of the programme's M&E system. In addition to the core evaluation questions in Annex VI the following questions were expected to guide investigation covering the April 2013 to December 2014 period:

- 1) Have all activities outlined in the Critical Pathway for the four Components been completed and if not, why?
- 2) What were the factors that contributed to the success and failure in completing activities in the aftermath of the MTR?
- 3) What MTR recommendations received the most attention in this last programming period and which ones less attention and why?
- 4) At its conclusion what did you see as the most critical successes of the programme and why?
- 5) At its conclusion what did you see as the most important challenges still facing the Artibonito Watershed (environmental, economic, and social)? How do you think the project did in addressing these issues?
- 6) Did the project's extension provide the necessary time to correct programming shortcomings? In hindsight was the time extension the correct course of action to take?
- 7) Where there any other benefits, unexpected or otherwise, obtained through the time extension?
- 8) In terms of follow up to the programme do you have any recommendations to be made? In other words, are there any gaps or critical needs that the programme was not able to address? Are there practical and cost efficient measures that could be implemented?

While these questions and the core question in Annex VI remained important, in the Inception Report it was noted that the final evaluation report had to be useful and able to provide a learning platform that could inform subsequent programming activity in the Artibonito Watershed. The final report had to have a strong practical orientation in any recommendations to be made. For this reason during the field phase of the evaluation the focus of the evaluation had to be adjusted. Stakeholders were as motivated to discuss issues surrounding the project, in particular, the failure to have an agreement signed, as project results. For stakeholders this unresolved matter has a high level of importance. A signed agreement is seen as being able to facilitate many positive actions in relation to the Watershed.

One of the other focuses agreed to in the inception Report, looking at the ability to act on the recommendations of the MTR, was not acted on to a great degree. The reality was it would have been a mistake to have been too fixated on the MTR. The scaled back size of the project team and financial

resources of the project, the limited amount of time available to do anything other than to take care of the most essential of responsibilities, made any serious advancement on the recommendations impossible.

## **6.0 Final Evaluation Findings**

From its beginning, the Artibonito project faced incredible challenges that were most often beyond the control of the project team. These obstacles were present right through to the post-implementation period consistently having unwanted influences. Difficulties began with a grave diplomatic miscalculation that resulted in losing potential additional Canadian Government financial support that was counted upon. Additionally, the local development programme PDLH on the Haiti side was closed down by CIDA despite its strong performance negating the possibility of programming synergy. When the Canadian assistance was not forthcoming the Artibonito project found itself in a situation of underfunding relative to its ambitious programming objectives. This condition would become a defining characteristic of the project that would come across to many as being too ambitious given its modest means although this was not necessarily a fair assessment. The next major hurdle was the incredible earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 requiring Haitian Government departments to scramble and direct their focus to more immediate priorities for the better part of eight months. The timing could not have been worse for a complicated endeavour like the Artibonito project.

The period of June 2012 to July 2013 was noted for institutional instability as the project passed through several changes in environment ministers in each country and an election in the Dominican Republic. In fact, in five years there were five changes in environment ministers in Haiti and three in the Dominican Republic. Each ministerial change required exerting considerable effort to bring new decision makers up to speed on the project. It also meant the project had to adjust to a new ministerial vision and sometimes the vision would be far from constructive. The Artibonito project did benefit from high level support but it would also be failed by the lack of good decision-making at the most senior levels that had the best interest of the project and the communities along both sides of the border at heart. Beyond the issue of support, the need to create capacity at the political level was not fully understood during the design phase of the Project. The bi-national management of a watershed is a challenging undertaking requiring political tact, and strong backing and knowledge. From the beginning the project required institutional guidance that embraced the notion that the project was to assist in creating a long-term structure and vision that was multi-focal as opposed to serving project-specific objectives. In the end, the project was defined by the complexities and limitations of the institutional relations surrounding it.

Tension between the two countries built throughout the Project's lifetime for a variety of reasons. In the latter years matters came to a boil as a result of a Dominican Supreme court decision that reversed citizenship to several generations of Haitian migrants. The decision inflamed animosity related to ongoing migration issues. In addition, Haiti unilaterally blocked the importation of a number of Dominican products. This led to a serious degradation in political relations between the two countries. The worsening relations combined with internal issues within the Dominican government, and other difficulties began to undermine the achievement of the ultimate objective of the project, a signed agreement of a bi-national framework to facilitate the integrated management of the watershed by both governments. Despite all parties agreeing the document needed to be signed, including the Ministries of



Economy, Agriculture and Environment of both countries it somehow was never meant to be. There were cancelled meetings and logistical difficulties at critical moments. The actual process of having the Ministries of Environment, Agriculture, and Economics of each government sign an agreement in the same room was a challenge. There are differing opinions about these smaller matters and whether or not they really played a role in the failure to sign the agreement.

The project team, despite the worsening bilateral relations, worked hard and arguably successfully to maintain communication between governments and ministries in the hopes of securing a signed agreement. The evaluation process found that among project stakeholders there was a sage understanding of each other country's predicament and why the project was important to each other.

It was pointed out by project stakeholders that despite the conflict between the countries the issue of the environment has never been area of contention. There is consensus that action including joint action on the environment is needed. This is just one of many positive elements that the evaluation identified that could assist in creating a good context for the eventual signing of an agreement and building relations between the two countries on the Watershed.

Neither government had any prior experience in managing a bi-national process towards achieving a water treaty. During its latter stages the Project benefited from support from the Government of Mexico in providing training and facilitating an exchange of experiences on how to approach the management of a bi-national water source. The Mexican assistance was well received but it also pointed out the degree to which serious institutional capacity building beyond the scope of the project was required.

Throughout the project's lifespan political matters were consistently mixed up with technical watershed management issues impacting the ability to move the project's agenda. The political and technical had to be separated and unfortunately this never happened and ended up being perhaps the hardest lesson that was learned by project stakeholders when the ultimate project objective would not be reached.

Before its completion, the rate of inflation in Haiti reached a 100% from the project's start date placing a heavy burden on the project team to carry out activities as described in the original project document. There were administrative challenges implementing a project by two COs with overall administrative responsibility with the Dominican CO and subsequently implemented by Oxfam. In terms of the project team, although the project's director started in January 2011, it was not until the second semester of 2011 that the national coordinators for the Dominican Republic and Haiti were in place. This meant the project was without the full complement of key staff for well over the first year of its existence and only really began to be fully operational a year and a half after its expected start date. In the end, the Dominican national coordinator left his position after 24 months.

At the field level, the project was situated where many programming areas were difficult to reach and overall the Watershed is a complicated implementing environment. The Haitian presence inside the Dominican Republic is very evident. The border between the two countries has to be crossed to be understood. One can travel through slightly hilly areas winding down roads moving between the two countries. It is essentially unprotected with poor infrastructure and low and ineffective means of

communication. Field work requires considerable resources on roads that were impassable during the rainy season.

Despite these obstacles, the project largely delivered the agreed upon Outcomes. The project is by and large viewed positively by stakeholders in both countries despite concern regarding the lack of an agreement. It grew to be a very complex project involving a broad sector of stakeholders from high level central government down to municipalities. The TDA was completed and developed in a participatory manner articulating an understanding of the Watershed and the fundamental problems it is facing. The TDA was an important source of information in the elaboration of the SAP and the NIWAPs that were also completed. Among other features the Dominican NIWAP proposed the mainstreaming actions in both SLM and IWRM and presented a climate change scenario. Stakeholders, especially in Haiti, continue to benefit from the analysis of the TDA including CIAT of Haiti and the Haiti office of the Inter-American Development Bank. The SAP was cleared by the bilateral technical committees but was not officially endorsed by both governments. In addition, the language for a bi-national declaration was also agreed upon. The SAP prioritised actions to control sedimentation, improve governance, and capacity to make decisions based on international principles for bi-national water management. In terms of Outcome 4, the investment plans for both countries were integrated into the SAP. The NIWAP was completed for the Dominican Republic and circulated to stakeholders. In Haiti the NIWAP was developed in draft form but never approved before the closing of the Project.

At a technical level, capacities of institutions targeted by the project in the two countries were enhanced. The bi-national commission to oversee the project, the Bilateral Mixed Commission Republic of Haiti and Dominican Republic, was able to be constructively involved in the project. It is a bi-national governance mechanism for the management of shared natural resources on the island. It would hold two meetings a year at which the focus was often to study the motions from the two country level committees and approve them. At this level stakeholders were very satisfied with professional relations they were building with their counterparts in the other country. They were also very content by the fact they were able to begin to understand about how to manage programme activities in a border area. National level decision makers were learning about sub-watersheds and what is at stake on both sides of the border. The project was seen as being an extension of government activity. This is the perception in the Dominican Republic and should be viewed as being highly complementary.

The project was supported by very functional technical committees in both countries. The GTI in the Dominican Republic was both accommodating and instrumental in facilitating the project's management unit. The members of the CIP in Haiti also supported the land degradation analysis process, but the project was not successful in motivating the government to formally activate the previously dormant CIP. In terms of sources of support for the project, members of both the GTI and CIP remain strongly in favour of the project and what it was trying to accomplish. The inter-institutional working groups (irrigation, energy, forestry, etc.) were successful in identifying the future competing water interests and also to prioritize investments for the Watershed Investment Programme.

Stronger country level technical dialogue and coordination and improved ability to produce and manage information were achieved through coordination and guidance provided by the national committees. The relations building and learning between officials of the two countries arranged by the project at all levels

are looked upon very favourably. This opinion was shared equally by local officials at the Watershed and national levels. Although there is no evidence of ongoing post-project dialogue between the two countries regarding the Watershed, the Artibonito experience is relatively fresh with most key individuals still following the project. It should be noted that overtures and an exchange of documents occurred between both countries in April 2016 with commitments to re-establish dialogue.

The watershed level management council in the Dominican Republic, known as the Consejo de Cuenca Alianza Artibonito, that was set up through the project has been solidified and remains active in the post-project period. It provides a mechanism to follow up on the NIWAP on the Dominican side. The information that the Dominican Council has access to through the TDA and SAP represents a unique opportunity. The Dominican Watershed Council was incorporated as a non-profit association holding regular board meetings. It is comprised of government, private sector and NGO actors such as the la Fundación de Desarrollo de San Juan, Azua y Elías Piña (FUNDASEP). The project was greatly appreciated in the Dominican area of the project zone and was seen as an opportunity to collaborate with international partners where such occasions are very rare. The evaluation found no evidence that the Watershed Council that was set up on Haitian side was still operational. According to sources, the reason for the inactivity of the Haitian councils is the Ministry of the Environment (MDE) does not have financial resources or transport to ensure the follow up. During the evaluation its Dominican counterpart expressed a willingness to support the Haitian council and enthusiastically endorsed the notion of future bi-national relations at the Watershed level.<sup>20</sup>

The pilot project activity supported by the Artibonito project poses a challenge from an evaluation standpoint: While pilot actions on both sides of the border are considered to have been well executed producing tangible benefits, the timing of their implementation, initiated before the TDA was completed, and unconnected to key project documents such as the SAP that were expected to guide development activities in the Watershed, is problematic.

The focus of the pilot projects reveals the different developmental priorities on the two sides of the border. In the Dominican Republic, pilot activity sought to reinforce the capacity of local authorities to manage the Watershed through diverse areas of activities from successfully improving fire fighting capacity, reducing the number of solid waste sites from 27 to 14, undertaking institutional capacity analysis to carryout actions in support of the environment and reinforcing the office capacity of three Provincial Environmental Offices. The Plan Municipal de Ordenamiento Territorial (Municipal Land Use Plan) led to the elaboration of two municipal plans (Hondo Valle y Juan Santiago small mountainous communities) and the possibility that the model produced by the project for municipal planning could contribute to national guideline. This involved promoting a territorial organization plan in accordance with Dominican environment and municipal laws to contribute to reducing land degradation in the watershed. Working with the Direccion General de Ordenamiento Territorial (DGODT), the project provided the cartography from the TDA, and worked with DGODT to develop a methodology for territorial organization for small municipalities, developed a Municipal Development Plan, and began the process of zoning and establishing a legal framework. DGODT continues the process following the close

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<sup>20</sup> Website for the Consejo de Cuenca Alianza Artibonito <http://www.alianzaartibonito.org/>

of the project with the Watershed Council with counterpart funding from the European Union and with the Dominican Fondo MARENA, a conservation network.

In Haiti, the two pilot projects were implemented in the Upper Artibonite area of the Watershed and were directly focused on addressing immediate development needs. The Verrettes pilot project involved combating land degradation and improving land use planning through such means as reforestation and agroforestry. The Verrettes pilot project was cited for its success in demonstrating how to control extreme flooding and had success in establishing a number of nurseries; soil and water conservation structures, and demonstrated how municipal government involvement in an agroforestry scheme could have positive consequences. The Verrettes pilot project benefited from secondary funding from the Swiss NGO Helvetas. The pilot project in Saint Michel de l'Attalaye, focused on income generation supporting a series of value chain analysis, improved equipment, introducing improved hygienic standards, providing technical assistance and building marketing capacities of off-farm products such as dry fruit, honey, liquors, and jams produced largely by local women's cooperatives: Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA), Men nan Men, and Union des coopératives pour le développement de Saint Michel de l'Attalaye (UCOPEDSA) and *Association des Planteurs et Transformateurs* de Platanna (APTP). The Saint Michel de l'Attalaye activity built successfully on a previously successful project administered by Oxfam Quebec for CIDA PDLH. While the Saint Michel de l'Attalaye initiative would never be a logical first choice as a pilot project for the Artibonito project, it has shown the potential of becoming a valuable development symbol for the entire Artibonito Watershed and hence highly important over the long-term. It made strong gains during the Artibonito phase and the ongoing ambition of its principal implementers could lead it to greater heights. The cooperatives want to improve profitability while pursuing an adherence to the principals of a total integrated system of production, an ecosystem approach, where all forms of waste such as mango peels will be assessed in terms of how they can be used to generate income. While the market has been responding well to their products the cooperatives want to undertake more market studies. The cooperatives also want to become more legitimized or formal with legal recognition. They are also attracting interest from groups across the Watershed hoping to replicate or simply learn from their success.

There are issues with how the project was managed. The administrative management of the project was executed as described in the Project Document. The project operated out of the Ministries of Environment of each country and maintained two satellite offices in Hinche, Haiti and Elias Piña on the Dominican side. There were strong technical advantages to this arrangement but strong financial challenges. For an NGO execution, it was an asset to be able to operate from within the ministries with the increased possibility for coordination was enhanced. Despite this close relation, the Environment Ministries did not feel ownership of the process often complaining about their "visibility" associated with the project. Regardless, the relationships cultivated greatly facilitated the execution of the project.

Stakeholders feel that the project was administratively burdensome with too many formalities. Haitian stakeholders felt that the project relied too heavily on its highly engaged national coordinator and after his departure attention to details seemed to fall off. Also it was not clear to Haitian stakeholders that when there was a problem who should they reach out to, Oxfam or the UNDP. There was also a perception that the core project team should have been larger and in particular, once the Dominican

project coordinator left he should have been replaced. However, there simply was not enough funding available in the management category and co-financing at the right times to facilitate a larger staff. At the end of the project in December 2014, the Project team made the effort to finalise the SAP agreement after the close of the technical portion of the project. The Haiti coordinator left in December 2014. January to April 2015 was expected to be exclusively for administrative matters but the project team continued to push for a bi-national agreement.

The project was also criticized for being action adverse focussing too much on workshops, organizing, research, meetings and other activities such as institutional analysis as opposed to field level interventions. In Haiti, it had been hoped that the project could have been associated with the 12 million Canadian dollars in programming that the PROBINA project provided. However this did not happen. The existing PROBINA Project was cancelled early and this created an enormous financial burden on the Project because the main budgetary support for the Project disappeared. Office space, furniture, and vehicles were liquidated forcing the project director to exert considerable effort to establish a logistical foundation for the project. The lack of ground level activity is an issue but it is also a misconception. Many of the activities of the Project were meant to be the preliminary steps towards more substantive actions. Also, it could be argued that these are less project management shortcomings and more likely a result of underfunding and managing expectations about the project was intended to accomplish. In fact the project did implement all its proposed interventions. On both sides of the border the project should have been able to make more technical support available to beneficiaries but again, on such a small budget, this was not possible. These project management issues had an impact but not to the same degree that the litany of external challenges like the earthquake had.

The fact that the project did not achieve its core objective of having a signed agreement has tainted the final opinion of many regarding the project. The project team and the UNDP worked to see the agreement signed but there were too many variables beyond their control to ensure an agreement would be signed. All stakeholders agree that the lack of a signed agreement is not the fault of the project team recognizing the extraordinary effort made by the project team to facilitate the agreement process. The success in achieving the other objectives of the project should be judged on its own merits. As one stakeholder said, everyone should be content with the fact the project was able to create a baseline of information in the Watershed zone. An NGO driven project should never have been expected to take on the responsibility of facilitating international negotiations between two countries at a moment when relations between the two nations were at their worst. Yet once again, the project was able to facilitate what has been described as “high quality dialogue” between the two countries.

The Artibonito project was very important but there was and continues to be a considerable amount of interest in pursuing different types of development and some of which is not necessarily in the best interest of the Watershed from a sustainability standpoint. For example, due to a lack of involvement of the two Ministries of Planning in coordinating the public and private sector opposing water interests such as the Dos Bocas (Electricity and Irrigation), El Corte and Pedro Santana (Energy) Joca (irrigation and energy) have been allowed to compete for water and with the Libon and L’occienne sub-watersheds where mining interests are exploring for precious metals. The project did achieve a mapping of these interests and a bi-national dialogue as part of the SAP development process. While the project clearly improved

inter-sector coordination by the ministries of planning this could not overcome the more single-project mindset and competing interests found in the technical ministries.

## 6.1 GEF Obligatory Project Ratings

Evaluation Ratings:			
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	Rating	2. IA& EA Execution	Rating
M&E design at entry	S	Quality of UNDP Implementation	S
M&E Plan Implementation	S	Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	S
Overall quality of M&E	S	Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	S
3. Assessment of Outcomes	Rating	4. Sustainability	Rating
Relevance	R	Financial resources:	MU
Effectiveness	MS	Socio-political:	ML
Efficiency	HS	Institutional framework and governance:	ML
Overall Project Outcome Rating	S	Environmental :	ML
Impact	S	Overall likelihood of sustainability:	ML

(The obligatory GEF rating scores are detailed in Annex IV)

The GEF scoring system has a difficult time in summarizing the performance of the project. This has a great deal to do with the nature of the project and its history. It mostly achieved what it was expected to do except its ultimate objective of a signed agreement even though all the pieces were in place to reach an agreement albeit after the project's completion date. This was a very important and successful project but the parameters of the GEF scoring system cannot properly capture this. A great deal of this scoring relates to the project's strategy that saw programming elements being implemented simultaneously where normally with GEF transboundary water projects there is an established protocol for the completion of the TDA followed by the development by the SAP. This is then concluded with the NIWAP process and with pilot project activity undertaken in the post TDA period. That the project was designed to have these undertaken concurrently had implications on the project's efficiency and effectiveness.

In determining the scores a lot of varying elements had to be considered. For example in Haiti, an extensive amount of resources were dedicated to the development of the watershed management structure with lesser success than on the Dominican side. On the Haiti side an exhaustive stakeholder analysis was undertaken to define stakeholder groups. Under the auspices of CIAT, Haiti does have a national regulation for watershed committees. The Project found that the CIAT regulation calls for an extensive level of representation down to the micro-watershed level which was not practical for the large Artibonito watershed. In the end a structure was finally developed with provincial level actors instead of stakeholder groups. However efforts to encourage Haitian ministries to commit resources to the

watershed management structure failed. At the same time the performance of the national steering committees in both countries was considered a success including the integration of multiple ministries who most often strongly committed to the project. In Haiti, the Artibonito project was seen as one of the few high profile projects that achieved a strong level of integration of steering committee members in the project. A number of variables such as these led to determining that overall the project had a ``moderately likely`` possibility of ensuring sustainability. This really does not reflect the actual situation which in the end could be very favourable in terms of sustainability depending on whether an agreement is signed and implemented.

Also in relation to effectiveness, the project established a forum in each country where most of the information on proposed activities in the Watershed was exchanged. Prior to the project, information was not shared on an inter-sector basis. Lacking such a vehicle for information sharing as interest in the Watershed grows could be detrimental. The project had identified potential conflicts in future water utilization between the energy and water sectors. The project would overcome specific challenges such as gathering information on soil standards. The project had to create the capacity for analysis within government bodies hiring the Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza (CATIE) to provide instruction on multivariate data management and organized with co-financing from the Global Mechanism several bi-national workshops between the Ministry of Environment of the Dominican Republic and Centre National de l'Information Géo-Spatiale (CNIGS) drawing enough information from different Geographic Information Systems to satisfy the Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE). Haiti lacked valid information about soil texture which cost the project additional resources to take the required soil samples. The samples had to be transported and processed in the Dominican Republic. The soil example demonstrates effectiveness and thoughtfulness but also places the spotlight on the difficult circumstances in which the project was operating. Soil sampling should not require such resourcefulness.

In terms of efficiency, the bi-national steering committee meetings were cancelled in 2013 and 2014 due to civil strife or political differences. This had a definite negative effect on the project as high level politicians did not see each other for almost two years. This did not demonstrate the level of commitment necessary to achieve a bi-national agreement. During those two years, the Annual Operation Plan was approved by each national technical committee. Eight changes in Ministers across both countries in four years created problems in continuity and put an additional burden on a small staff in re-coordinating project activities. The period of October 2011 to August 2012 was particularly unproductive in the Dominican Republic when a new vice minister of soils and water refused to support the project. Conversely, the period beginning in August 2012 to the close of the project was particularly productive with the new Minister and Vice Minister of soils and water. With the new management structure, the project was able to recover lost time and accelerate the delivery of products.

As already noted there are many complexities related to sustainability. The Dominican Ministry of Environment involved the Ministry of Planning and Vice Ministry of International Cooperation in the management of the political process associated with the project. This added key institutional stakeholders with a longer-term vision that is not project specific. During the evaluation mission to the Dominican Republic it was very apparent that these two institutional bodies could be called upon to

continue efforts in the Watershed and in particular, ensuring the agreement is signed. In April 2016, the Vice Ministry requested the SAP documents as a first step to re-start dialogue between the two countries.

The process of preparing the political sector for the dialogue on water is a key element of sustainability. An unexpected opportunity was presented to the project's director that saw Ministry officials sent to a regional IWLEARN workshop on transboundary policy to give a joint presentation. At that forum, they were able to begin to establish relations with members of the Mexican Government who offered their technical assistance in educating both countries on how to manage the political and technical processes related to a large watershed. The Artibonito project Director was also able to establish a relationship with IWLEARN's director. That relationship led to an effective line of communication between the project, IWLEARN, and other GEF projects. The relations established between the Mexican Government and the two countries provide potentially one of the most important foundations towards sustainability.

The working groups that contributed to the effort have addressed some levels of sustainability. The energy working group added the ministries of energy and mines to the working groups. The new Energy and Mining Ministry is working in the Dominican Republic to secure investment to the hydroelectric facilities and mining concerns. This is an indication that in the later phases and post-project investments in the Watershed Investment Plan (outcome 4) were starting to be explored. A declaration by the Dominican Ministry of Energy and Mines in April 2016 quoted project documents on the value of mineral and water assets in the Watershed and their importance in the government's programme.

Because both countries are involved in an electoral process, the theme of the Artibonito has not been a high level of priority since the close of the project. This should change by August of 2016 with the change in administration in the Dominican Republic and hopefully at some point in the near future in Haiti.

The watershed investment plan presents the need for hydrologic measuring, especially in Haiti where there is no hydrometric infrastructure at any appropriate scale. The deeper issue is paying for the measurements on a regular, at least biennial basis. The Artibonito project completed the baseline assessment of the water quality in the Dominican Republic portion of the watershed since the MTR. Because of claimed budget shortfalls within Instituto Nacional de Recurso Hidráulicos (INDRHI), the project needed to cover the cost of analysis. This does not appear to be sustainable. The governments did not produce the cash co-financing promised that was discussed in the Project's Project Implementation Reports (PIR) documents.

As noted earlier, the Dominican pilot project to develop a process of territorial organisation in the Dominican Republic was not completed. However, after the close of the project, the watershed management council and the DGODT continued the process. In May of 2016, the DGODT published a methodological guide with the support of other donors including the UNDP. This process created a framework for future land use planning.

## **6.2 Project Finance and Co Financing**

There were no serious concerns cited by any stakeholder regarding the project's financing. No major stakeholder in the project such as the UNDP Haitian or Dominican Republic Governments raised major financial issues such as funds not being dedicated to the most pertinent of activities. There was a regret



that more resources were not directed towards field level activity but this is seen as being more of a design issue if it could be described as such. The project really did what it needed to do in terms of completing the TDA that would facilitate ground level actions. The desire for more concrete action reflects the reality of the situation where there are many pressing needs in the Artibonito watershed.

Inflation in Haiti was a critical issue that placed a further stress on the limited funds of the Project. As has been pointed out in other sections of this report, it is felt that the project team did a very good job of making ends meet with limited financial capabilities. The pressure of high levels of inflation only made matters more difficult for the project team.

Mistakes were made by non project team members that cost the project access to additional funding to facilitate field level activities. This funding especially on the Haitian side would have resulted in a very different project provided the funds led to successful activity. That these extra funds never materialized ended up playing into the misconception that the project was not very active at the field level. The additional Canadian funding through PROBINA could have greatly changed the impact of the Artibonito Project.

Project Title:	<b><i>Reducing Conflicting water uses in the Artibonito River Watershed through the Development and Adoption of a multi-focal Area Strategic Action Programme</i></b>			
GEF Project ID:	2890		<i>at endorsement (Million US\$)</i>	<i>at completion (Million US\$)</i>
UNDP Project ID:	63758	GEF financing:	<b>3,080,000.00</b>	<b>3,080,000.00</b>
Country:	Haiti & Dominican Republic	IA/EA own:	440,000.00	460,200.00
Region:	Caribbean	Government:	1,747,000.00	360,000.00
Focal Area:	Land Degradation & International Waters	Other:	4,993,000.00	5,200,000.00
FA Objectives, (OP/SP):	GEF-4 STRATEGIC PROGRAM(S): IW SP3, LD SP 1	Total co-financing:	7,180,000.00	6,020,200.00
Executing Agency:	Oxfam Quebec	Total Project Cost:	10,260,000.00	9,100,200.00
Other Partners involved:		ProDoc Signature (date project began):		August 2009
		(Operational) Closing Date:	Proposed: July 2013	Actual: Dec 2014

## 7.0 Current Situation Analysis

As it is close to a year and a half since the project was officially closed it is important to take stock of the current situation in both countries bringing to light matters that require stronger focus:

There is clear support within both Governments to sign a formal agreement. It is understood that not signing the agreement in April 2015 when the talks broke down was a mistake. Currently, there is only narrow evidence of non-support for a formal agreement. On the Dominican side where the main obstacles to signing were found, there is support in key ministries and in higher political echelons to see an agreement signed. It was mentioned that there is now a Presidential will to support an agreement. A variation on the following sentiment was expressed on numerous occasions in both countries: “sign the agreement and make it operational”.

This evaluation is seen in both countries as an opportunity to re-launch a formal process towards a signed agreement. A signed agreement should lead to clear rules that would ensure the agreement is respected. Many stakeholders feel that the Artibonito Watershed should be the platform for the two countries to learn how to constructively collaborate together. What is sought is a system that is fool proof in terms of not being vulnerable to political change, staff rotation and attrition. There could be other initiatives that can contribute to creating this. For example, in Haiti le Bureau de l’Ordonnateur National (BONFED) mission is to ensure the implementation of cooperation programmes financed by the European Development Fund. BONFED will soon fund a bi-national management study.

Support for a well managed watershed has been solidifying in each country. This was expressed by one high level stakeholder as a “permanent watershed project” should be established. One of the more interesting notions expressed by Dominican stakeholders was that the main beneficiaries to protect the Watershed should be the people in Haiti even if the actions originate in the Dominican Republic. This sentiment recognises that stability in Haiti is in the best interest of both countries. The lack of basic services on the Haiti side in the Watershed concerns everyone. A follow up initiative to the Artibonito Project should be able to proactively facilitate investments in basic services on the Haiti side. As one Dominican stakeholder said, “if there are no basic services what is the point? It has to lead to something.” For the foreseeable future there will be disruptions on the Haiti side. This is not easy to plan for in the context of securing a bi-national agreement. It is understood that Haitian problems can create challenges on the Dominican side of the border. In terms of the Dominican side, without services, especially energy and irrigation it is not felt there would be the necessary buy-in into the concept of shared responsibility to manage the Watershed. This is most markedly true in investing in studying the aquifer and the future use of groundwater under the present climate change scenario.

The institutional interest in participating in the development of the Artibonito Watershed is widening in both countries while recognising such participation has to be done through a formal structure. This includes the new Ministry of Mining and Energy in the Dominican Republic and its Haitian counterpart. During the evaluation interest was expressed regarding energy development, mining opportunities, expanded agricultural production and developing tourism on the Dominican side within the Watershed boundaries. The Haitian Government is very interested in diversifying its energy potential at the level of the Watershed. Mention was made of the possible construction of a very ambitious bi-national dam at Dos Bocas that could be operated in tandem with the Péligre dam. This is a long-term possibility, a 15 to 20-year project. At the same time Dominicans are keenly interested in hydroelectric facilities at El Corte

and Pedro Santana. It speaks to the different visions that exist for the Watershed that will have to be managed collectively and reconciled.

As institutional interest increases it will be necessary to establish appropriate structures at the national level in each country to coordinate activities in the Watershed. It is not clear that model of having the Ministries of Environment act as the lead government department in each country as was the case during the Artibonito project is the best way forward. An open and constructive discussion has to take place about the proper governmental structures for subsequent actions in the Watershed. At the lower levels the optics are less complicated. All local government agencies should have the opportunity to see their capabilities reinforced to allow them to improve the services they provide within the Watershed. Obviously improving the capacity of certain local government departments over others will have to be prioritized.

Despite the worsening situation in the Watershed, studies supported by the project demonstrate that through proper water management a much higher level of development could be reached within the Watershed. There is 72,401m<sup>2</sup> of water in the Watershed which is a considerable amount of water. However, in addition to poor water management practices there is a lack of infrastructure to monitor water use and establish parameters for its management. On the Haiti side there is no ongoing water measurement capacity and the Dominican Republic has the capacity but does not have the budget to support regular monitoring. Neither country has the budget to cover recurring costs. The ADT and the SAP point out a lack of Hydrometrics stations in Haiti to record data on water levels and flow rates and to reconcile these with the Dominican National Hydraulic Institute. Regardless of what other development objectives are to be considered, this type of water related capacity has to be among the most immediate priorities for the Watershed.

There are funding opportunities available to follow up on the Artibonito project and there is interest in both countries in seeing this happen especially for a multi-dimensional programme. For GEF the priorities are defined by each country. However, in a recent GEF meeting held in Trinidad and Tobago it was determined that a priority must be placed on supporting actions in the Caribbean focused on improving the management of international waters. This would appear to make the Artibonito Watershed a high priority. Other funding sources are available for actions in Haiti such as the Green Climate Fund and the Least Development Fund, and Adaptation Fund. The European Union given the focus of the BONFED might present another funding possibility.

While waiting for the momentum towards a signed agreement to reach its final objective, there should be a focus on determining what each country can do to make progress towards protecting the Watershed without the support that comes with an internationally funded project. The Government of Haiti remains a transition government hence in the immediate future it will be difficult to know what can be expected in terms of long-term support for the Watershed. This situation may or may not provide an opportunity to sign an agreement. It is felt by some that nothing will be possible while others feel acting on the interest of the Watershed offers an opportunity for the transition Government to be proactive on an issue, the environment, where there is no really contentious issue stopping the two countries from coming together. There are also existing platforms. The draft SAP exists. There are also bi-national agreements on agriculture, environment and planning. There is also the mixed bilateral commission.

These agreements and platforms could be used to encourage collaboration regarding the watershed. The Dominican Government would certainly have more capability to dedicate resources to the Watershed and based on the findings of the evaluation there appears to be motivation to take concrete action.

If there was a follow up initiative to the Artibonito Project it should take a different approach. There is of course a need for ground-level activities but a focus on much higher level institutional capacity and relations building as well. There is a perception that a purely NGO driven initiative is no longer suitable for a number of reasons related mostly to the international complexity of the Watershed. A new initiative could for example work through the two Watershed Management Councils with the support of a partner such as Oxfam Quebec to implement ground-level activities. A second level of intervention to build an administrative structure that is jointly supported by both countries to coordinate actions in the Watershed is also required. The capacity-building experience undertaken in outcome 2 in coordination with IWLEARN and with the Mexican Government in providing training and exposure on how an international water source can be managed was positively received and in the end very instructive. It is this type of high-level support on institutional matters that is desired by both countries. Following along these lines would create an entirely different dynamic and potentially stimulate new forms of interest.

There are an endless number of needs that have to be addressed in the Watershed that were prioritized in the SAP and articulated in the Watershed Action Plan for the Dominican Republic but the process was incomplete for the Haiti Watershed Action Plan. It is a large area with remote parts and an incredible amount of social and economic complexity and because of this even with a well-funded follow up multi-dimensional initiative to the Artibonito project there still would be considerable needs throughout the Watershed. Additional investments and development activity will need to be attracted to the Watershed in a coordinated manner that can develop at different paces and objectives. The SAPs and NIWAPS should guide actions into the foreseeable future. Helvetas was in the process of phasing out of the area prior to the pilot project. As a result of the project, the organisation added additional projects and a permanent presence in Verrettes and also on the border in Sabanette. This has translated into over a million USD in additional resources beyond the original investment made by Helvetas. Yet the entire Verrettes effort was programming in only 5% of the total area targeted by the pilot project. This puts the challenges faced in the Watershed in perspective at least on the Haitian side.

Existing positive development experiences should be prioritized for scaling up and replication. The four cooperatives of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye have established collective objectives for themselves and if they could be reached it would serve as a model for the entire Watershed in terms of sustainable development, good business and marketing practices, and respect for safety and sanitary standards related to agriculture and food processing. With additional support the cooperatives of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye should be able to realise their goals of penetrating new markets including international ones, gaining some form of certification perhaps under a scheme such as Global Gap <sup>21</sup> which is not very common in Haiti, and working with the Haitian government to establish food inspection facilities in the Watershed that could serve other food processing operations within the Watershed. Seeing the

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<sup>21</sup> GLOBAL G.A.P. is the **world's leading farm assurance programme**, translating consumer requirements into certified Good Agricultural Practice for both agricultural products and off farm food processing operations. See [http://www.globalgap.org/uk\\_en/who-we-are/about-us/history/](http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/about-us/history/)

cooperatives reach these heights would be an incredible gain for the entire Watershed on both sides of the border. The work of GIZ in Rio Libon in the field of agroforestry could be a focal point for synergy. This project is looked upon with respect by stakeholders in Haiti although the evaluation field mission schedule did not allow for time to visit the Rio Libon area.<sup>22</sup>

The social-economic circumstances are evolving within the watershed and they are not very favourable. This is especially true on the Haitian side which invariably impacts the Dominican side of the watershed. The risks associated with this have to be acknowledged and addressed. Haitian migration into the Dominican Republic is increasingly problematic. Deforestation remains a major problem on the Haitian side and the gains made on the Dominican side to regenerate forest coverage could be compromised as trees are now being cut in some cases by Haitian migrants to meet needs on the Haitian side. Pro-active and successful actions are required urgently to manage and protect the Watershed to promote more sustainable, predictable and encouraging circumstances throughout the Watershed. If not, the intervention parameters could be increasingly prioritized towards addressing issues surrounding national security, conflict and responding to emergency circumstances. This is the fear of some stakeholders that were interviewed.

Unless Haiti changes the fuel sources used in cities such as Port au Prince, it will be impossible to guarantee the development of the forest cover in the Watershed. The economic pressures to supply fuelwood to Haitian cities are simply too attractive and actors are working to meet that demand on both sides of the border. This is a complex matter that cannot be dealt with simply through actions within the Watershed.

Stakeholders are in agreement that reaching a state of sustainable development in the Artibonito Watershed will be a long and challenging process. This is going to require considerable patience if one country is not able to progress as quickly as the other. On the Dominican side investments in promoting the use of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) began in the late 1980s. This led to a serious reduction on the pressure placed on forest for charcoal. Today the forested area of the Dominican Republic has increased to 28.5% compared to less than 3% coverage in Haiti<sup>23</sup> and has led to a 40,000 Hectare increase in forest cover in the Dominican portion of the watershed.<sup>24</sup> The contrast in forest coverage between the two countries is visible in the Artibonito Watershed. In Haiti the cooperatives of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye and their successful food processing activities are an example of the long-term commitment that is required. After two successive projects with strong local partners and good project management substantive success was achieved. Yet further technical and financial support is still required to make the Saint Michel de l'Attalaye experience a truly strong development impact.

The people of Haiti and the Dominican Republic have a complicated relationship with a long history. This is in the background in every discussion regarding the two countries. It will therefore take a great deal for everyone to look beyond the more complicated aspects of this relationship. However as pointed out earlier, the natural environment has never really been a point of contention between the two countries

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<sup>22</sup> Please note that the project integrated information from the GIZ funded Caracterizacion de la provincial de Dajabon y de la Provincia de Elias Piña, in addition to the Agenda Ambiental for each province. The GEF project completed the Caracterizacion for the entire watershed by doing the same document for the San Juan Province and by updating the information for Elias Piña and Dajabon. This was accomplished through the DR Pilot Project.

<sup>23</sup> <http://info.drillinginfo.com/liquefied-petroleum-gas-what-you-may-not-know/>

<sup>24</sup> GEF-UNDP 2013 Mapa y estudio de cambio de cobertura 1996 a 2013, Proyecto Binacional Artibonito, 2013

and hence the Artibonito Watershed might create a platform for contributing to a new type of relationship between the two countries.

There is a need for a continuation in the practice that the project has established in placing a value on the use of science and research in the Watershed keeping in mind the more immediate desire of wanting to see more practical activity at the ground level. One priority will be to make the best use of existing studies such as the research on soil quality that the project supported and can now serve as a point of reference. It is also important to benefit from other studies. For example there is a private sector study by Solera Energy on the hydroelectric capabilities within the Watershed that has not been made available to the public for proprietary reasons. Also on the Haitian side, there is a study underway supported by the UNDP looking at the challenges related to mounting micro hydro projects.<sup>25</sup> On the Dominican side there are many people who do not have electricity in their homes yet there is considerable energy potential including hydroelectric and biomass sources. This is documented in the SAP.<sup>26</sup> A focus in the Watershed should be placed on maximizing hydro potential as it is the best energy option to facilitate the scale of development required in the Watershed.

One of the most important aspects of the water management regime in the Artibonito is groundwater. An alternate GEF project was under design during the formulation of this project. That project never materialized. The GEF project did not have resources to work within the groundwater regime. That regime is the key to sustainability given the climate change scenario presented in the Dominican management plan. Recent droughts due to El Niño have seen indiscriminate well drilling with no regulatory framework in either country. The groundwater aspects are not present in the bi-national or the national documents. This has to be addressed.

The current and long-term impact of climate change in the Watershed is seen as being very worrisome by a broad range of stakeholders and must be accounted for in all follow up actions. Local actors such as members of the Watershed Management Council and local government officials on the Dominican side describe vividly the current impact of climate change. In the Verrettes project zone on the Haitian side activities were implemented under difficult circumstances including a dry period that killed sugarcane production. The fear of many is that these harsh circumstances will become the norm for the Watershed. The climate change scenario presented in the Dominican Watershed Management Plan documents changes in climate patterns and describes the future scenario to 2100, which is alarming.

## **8.0 Recommendations**

1. In the strongest possible terms this report recommends that the two countries re-establish dialogue towards signing a bi-national agreement to manage the Artibonito Watershed. There is a need to act on the broad-based consensus that currently exists in support of a formal agreement. Given the favourable opinion that stakeholders have of the UNDP, the Country Offices in both countries should provide assistance in achieving a signed agreement. In the unlikely event it is deemed necessary, UNDP could consider recruiting a specialist with skills in transboundary resource negotiations and facilitation to assist in moving the process forward.

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<sup>25</sup> The UNDP micro hydro study is expected to be available in June of 2016

<sup>26</sup> [Strategic Action Plan, UNDP-GEF 2014.](#)

2. The Governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic should work towards establishing a Bi-national Water Commission according to international principles and practices. The starting point should be to review the agreed to bi-national governance framework that was part of the SAP which includes a negotiated structure for a Water Commission. The idea of working towards creating a Water Commission would provide an overarching objective for both countries. The Water Commission would be tasked with seeing the priorities set out in the SAP are realised, ensuring standards and good development practices are respected across the Watershed and attracting additional investments and coordinating development projects. However to ensure that its mandate remains as strictly focussed as possible, the Water Commission should not be an implementing body but rather a guiding force that facilitates development initiatives within the Watershed.

3. The long-term vision for the Artibonito Watershed must be agreed upon and established. A 100 year plan to be realised through a series of five or ten year strategies is reasonable. An alternative could be to match the plan to climate scenarios to the year 2100. The first strategy should be to implement the NIWAP in the Dominican Republic, endorse the SAP that includes plans to prioritise investments and priority locations for the coming ten years, and complete the NIWAP for Haiti. As these proposed investments were products of participative processes they should already have strong buy in. The 100 year plan would establish guiding principles for managing the Water Commission from one ten-year strategy to the next. These guiding principles would be informed by the SAP.

4. The Haitian and Dominican Governments should at the earliest possible date make a joint submission to the GEF for a new initiative in support of sustainable management of the Artibonito Watershed. It should have two overriding programming components: The first component is to be focused on field level activities in a select number of programming areas. Agricultural production in the broadest sense to include food processing and non-farm related income generating activities, energy production and water management should receive strong consideration. These suggestions are based on feedback provided during the evaluation mission. However the needs in the Watershed are more encompassing and that other priorities could also be considered. However, a programme that is overly charged should be avoided.

The second programming stream would be dedicated to building the Water Commission and corresponding institutional capacity of both governments at the national and local levels within the Watershed. It is possible and encouraged that the two components would have separate implementing agencies. For the creation of the Water Commission the Mexico Government could be approached to guide the process. Another option would be to contact representatives of the Canadian Government that has a long history in the area of management of international waters to determine its willingness to reengage in the Artibonito Watershed. Both governments have to consider carefully the national level structures that have to be in place to ensure that subsequent actions in the Watershed have the proper institutional support and guidance.

5. In addition to a new GEF supported Artibonito programming initiative, supplementary development projects should be attracted to the Artibonito Watershed to address specific development issues on each side of the border. This recommendation recognises that the long-term interests are best served through

the cultivation of the broadest network of partners possible both within and between the two countries and internationally. Strong networking and relations building would provide each country the latitude to pursue their own specific development priorities within the Watershed while programming jointly when there was strong mutual interest. For Haiti, a supplementary project should focus on expanding forest coverage in the Watershed and introducing measures to reduce pressures on the Watershed's forests to produce charcoal for household use and sale in the Port au Prince area. In Haiti, the Green Climate Fund in connection with the French Development Agency has recently announced plans to develop a national watershed protection and agroforestry project. Part of this project's focus should be the Artibonito Watershed and decision makers in Haiti should encourage this. The Green Fund project will be operational long before a second phase of the Artibonito project is in existence. With a large portion of the population without access to electricity increasing the availability of clean sources of electricity and other forms of energy would seem to be an immediate priority for the Dominican Republic.

6. Both governments should determine what can be done through their own means to make improvements in the Watershed independent of an agreement and continued international funding. It is understood that the Haitian and Dominican governments do not have the same means. Nevertheless, every gesture towards improving circumstances in the Watershed should be encouraged. Private sector initiatives should also be encouraged provided proper environmental and social safeguards are respected.

7. Local capacity building in the Watershed should incorporate the desire expressed by both countries to see cross-border institutional relations developed at the watershed level. It is understood that circumstances in Haiti are more challenging and will require greater patience and attention to make cross border relations worthwhile. An immediate priority in building local capacity will be to reinforce the Watershed Management Councils in both countries with the most important priority revitalizing the Water Council in Haiti. The Watershed Management Councils would operate in coordination with but independently of the Watershed Commission. The Watershed Management Councils would focus on guiding and coordinating development activities on each side of their border. But like the Water Commission, the Watershed Management Councils are not implementing bodies.

8. While the Artibonito project was never seriously compromised by its administrative structures, there was nevertheless, room for improvement. For this reason new administrative arrangements for a second phase should be explored. One possible option would be to have the activities administered by each country.

9. The achievements with the women's cooperatives in Saint Michel de l'Attalaye should be retained and built upon in the new programming initiative. It is very logical to want to assist as many people as possible. However there has to be room, especially in the context of the Watershed to achieve other development objectives. With the cooperatives of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye there is an opportunity to establish a comprehensive multi-dimensional example of sustainable development driven largely by the strong motivation and vision of the beneficiaries. Other development projects should also have a chance for replication and scaling up as this is as good opportunity to build on current capacity. Possible candidates would include coordinating with or directly supporting the GIZ reforestation project in Rio Libon and the Verrettes project supported through the Artibonito project. Support for the cooperatives



of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye should also be the starting point for building a strong gender focus for the next phase of programming.

10) While there should be a strong emphasis on ground level action, moving into the next phase expanding on the research and studies of the first phase should have its place too. At the same time the valuable data and research generated during the Artibonito project such as the TDA should be actively employed to inform future decision making regarding the Artibonito Watershed.

11) Climate change considerations should be integrated into all aspects of the next programming phase. Of particular concern is bringing into stronger focus the question of ground water and its potential role in adapting to increasingly challenging climatic circumstances.

## **9.0 Lessons Learned**

- The Artibonito project should be viewed as an Introductory Project that has provided a good start and not be evaluated purely on the basis of what was or was not accomplished during the project's lifetime. Viable watershed management requires decades before having all the necessary structures, policies and practices in place. This is how the management of the Watershed should be approached philosophically.
- The Artibonito project should have followed the established procedures for GEF International waters projects and not have undertaken the TDA and SAP processes simultaneously. A completed TDA should establish the proper platform for introducing the SAP both politically and technically. Completion of the TDA also provides an early victory that can be celebrated between the countries further forging a productive working environment for the SAP process. Problems in approving the TDA will foreshadow problems in managing the more complicated and delicate SAP process.
- An NGO managed project should not be expected to contend with complicated government relations including inter-ministerial disaccord. This requires high level political oversight and on occasion strong resolve.
- Lack of political constancy in terms of support and guidance can compromise all projects but those of a bi-national nature will be especially vulnerable to this inconsistency.
- As seen with the project an ideal executing partner has the ability to maintain strong field level implementing capabilities while wielding influence and commanding the attention of the highest levels of government.
- It is important to hold project managers such as Oxfam Quebec to high standards. Projects should be judged on the basis of what they accomplish. However it is important to make judgments regarding project management with some recognition of all mitigating circumstances. The Project involved a broad number of sectors and multiple levels of government. It implicated a diverse range of personalities and functioned in four spoken languages in a challenging implementing environment. In such a context it is difficult to judge a project through a simple analysis of satisfactory or not satisfactory. But it is possible to recognise when a project has benefited from a strong and dedicated project team as was the case of the Artibonito Project.

- The cooperatives of Saint Michel de l'Attalaye benefited from long-term support through its participation in two multi-year projects. The experience in Saint Michel de l'Attalaye demonstrates how the development process is slow and there are no easy victories. Even with capable and motivated project beneficiaries patience is always required. But slowly something special can emerge.
- There are processes such as the one to have both governments sign the bi-national agreement to manage the Artibonito Watershed that can become unnecessarily complicated and seem like a lost cause. The ideal circumstances may never arise but it may be possible to do what is necessary to make progress.

## Annex I

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GEF (2005): Integrated Management of the Artibonite International Watershed. Concept Paper

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Maps produced by the Artibonito project focussed on the Watershed

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#### Project Logic Framework

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UNDP (2005) Project Concept Integrated Management of the Artibonite international Watershed Project Document (PRODOC)

UNDP (2012) Project-Level Evaluation Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP Supported, GEF-Financed Projects

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UNDP (July 29 2013) Critical Pathway Artibonito project Document: Work plan for post Mid-term Evaluation period

UNEP 2012: The UN-Water Status Report on the Application of Integrated Approaches to Water Resources Management.

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#### Web Pages:

<http://www.alianzaartibonito.org/>

<http://info.drillinginfo.com/liquefied-petroleum-gas-what-you-may-not-know/>

<https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/13536.html>

## Annex II

### **Additional Individuals Interviewed and Field Mission Schedules for Haiti and the Dominican Republic**

#### **(Additional Individuals)**

Robert Crowley Bi-National Project Coordinator (Director) Oxfam Quebec

Claudia Adames Ministry of the Environment Dominican Republic

Lyes Ferroukhi GEF Regional Technical Advisor - Ecosystems & Biodiversity UNDP Panama Regional Service Centre

Matilde Mordt UNDP Sustainable Development Team Leader UNDP Panama Regional Service Centre

Haiti

Mme Martine Therer, Deputy Programme Director, Haiti Country Office UNDP

Monique Pierre-Antoine Management Support Unit, Haiti Country Office UNDP

Yves-Andre Wainright, Programme Manager, Environment and Energy Unit, Haiti Country Office UNDP

Louis Butteau, Member of Minister of Cabinet, Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development

Pierre Karly, Jean Jeune, Assistant Director General, Permanent Representative of the Worldwide Metrological Organisation

Paul Duret, National Coordinator, Technical Secretary CIAT

Dominican Republic

Luis Humberto Vargas, Adviser, Ministry of the President, Dominican Republic

**AGENDA Misión Dean Pallen**  
**Evaluación Final Proyecto ARTIBONITO**  
**03 al 11 de marzo, 2016 SEMANA 1: 03 al 06 de marzo en República Dominicana**

Hora	JUEVES 03	VIERNES 04	SÁBADO 05	DOMINGO 06
8:00 am	Ma. E. Morales/ Carolina Beras (PNUD)		Visita a campo piloto dominicano (Provincia Elías Piña) Se prevén reuniones con Directores provinciales de Elías Piña (Fernán González, miembro junta directiva consejo de cuenca) y de San Juan (Pedro Beato, caracterización ambiental y agenda ambiental provincia San Juan). Los Alcaldes de Restauración (Donaciano de la Cruz, Hondo Valle, Beneficiario de un plan de ordenamiento Territorial), Luis Minier, Comendador, o Cayetano Cubilete, El Llano, miembros del consejo de cuenca. Wilma Duval, FUNDASEP, miembro de la junta directiva, consejo de cuenca.	Regreso a Santo Domingo
8:30 am		Ex directores GTI Minist. Ambiente: Pedro García y Juan Filpo/ Directora GTI: Dominga Polanco (Minist. Ambiente)		
9:00 am				
9:30 am	Reunión briefing con Luciana Mermet/ Iván Gzlez. (PNUD)			
10:00 am	Jacqueline Sánchez (PNUD)	Grupo focal con miembros del comité técnico (Lugar a definir) Vice Ministro Coop. Int. Ministerio de Economía		
10:30 am				
11:00 am	Desplazamiento a Ministerio Ambiente	Almuerzo		
11:30 am	Vice Ministra Coop. Int., Minist. Ambiente:			
12:00 pm	Patricia Abreu (Minist. Ambiente)			
12:30 pm	Almuerzo			
1:00 pm				
1:30 pm				
2:00 pm	Vice Ministro de Suelos y Aguas: José Alarcón (Minist. Ambiente)	Planificación y Desarrollo: Inocencio García (MEPyD)		
2:30 pm				
3:00 pm	Coordinador Binacional OQ –Robert Crowley Revisión de la lista de información de respaldo (documentos técnicos; mapas...) del proyecto	Desplazamiento a CMB		
3:30 pm		Comisión Mixta Bilateral: Roberto Martínez (CMB)		
4:00 pm		Ida a Provincia Elías Piña		
4:30 pm				
5:00 pm				

Nom et Prénom	Institution/organisme	Fonction/Rôle dans l'institution/organisme
Dominique J. J. J. J.	MOE/OSE	Cadre Tech.
Tidiane Basse	OXFAM-QUEBEC	Conseiller Technique Suivi-Evaluation Et Appui
Margina Fleury	SOFIA	Coord.
Desland Marianne	Annoncé	Coord.
Saint Louis Josette	Atpp. (Coopérative)	Coord.
Aurélien Heblen	COOPÉD SA	Président
Joseph Siméon	COOPÉD SA	Ag. Gestion
PHAROS Sheni	Conseiller technique en Transformation OXFAH.	Spécialité de Développement durable, Unité Environnement et Énergie
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J. Claude PERRARD	Mairie SMA	Maire Adjoint 37894412
Darius Rodard	Mairie SMA	

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1- Rosa M. Bautista Guerrero

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**Mission d'évaluation du projet binational  
de réduction des risques de conflits  
liés aux utilisations de l'eau  
dans le bassin-versant du fleuve Artibonite  
par le développement et l'adoption  
d'un Plan d'Action Stratégique multifocal**

Agenda

**Lundi 7 mars : rencontres avec partenaires basés aux environs de l'aéroport**

8 :30	Atterrissage en provenance de la République dominicaine	
8 :30 – 9 :15	Briefing de sécurité	Logbase
9 :30 – 11 :00	Comité technique de pilotage du projet : ing. Astrel JOSEPH, agr. Pierre Karly JEAN-JEUNE, agr. Max MONDESIR, agr. Yves-André WAINRIGHT et Oxfam-Quebec, agence de mise en œuvre : Patrick NICOLAS, Andrée GILBERT	Local du Ministère de l'Environnement, Clercine
11 :00 – 12 :30	Cadres techniques du MARNDR concernés par le projet dont direction des Infrastructures	MARNDR, Damien
12 :30 – 13 :30	Lunch	A déterminer
13 :45 – 14 :30	Jocelyn LOUISSAINT, ex-consultant au projet	FAMV, Damien
14 :30 – 15 :30	Ministre de l'Agriculture/Directeur Général du Ministère et Directeur de Cabinet du Ministre	MARNDR, Damien
16 :00	Aménagement à hotel	

**Mardi 8 mars : rencontre avec partenaires basés à Pétion-Ville et Port-au-Prince**

7 :30 - 8 :30	Ing. Moise JEAN-PIERRE, Point focal Opérationnel GEF	Direction changements Climatiques, Berthé, Pétion-Ville
9 :00 – 10 :00	Mr. Yves-Robert JEAN, Directeur Général du Ministère de la Planification	MPCE, Bourdon
10 :15 – 11 :15	Ing. Marc-Antoine ARCHER, ex-conseiller du Ministre à la Sécurité Energétique en présence de Ing. Marc-André CHRYSOSTOME, coordonnateur Cellule Energie MTPTC	Cellule Energie du MTPTC, Bourdon
11 :30 – 12 :30	Mme Michèle ORIOL, coordonnatrice du CIAT / Mr. Marc Raynal, conseiller au CIAT	CIAT, Canapé-Vert
12 :30 – 13 :30	Lunch	A déterminer
13 :45 – 15 :15	Cadres techniques du Ministère de l'Environnement (dont ONEV) et du CNIGS	MdE, Pacot
15 :30 – 16 :30	Ministre de Environnement et son directeur de Cabinet / Directeur Général du Ministère	MdE, Pacot

**Mercredi 9 mars : visite de terrain à St-Michel de Latalaye**

7 :30 - 9 :30	Trajet de Hotel à la localité dans le département de l'Artibonite	
9 :30- 16 :00	Visite des réalisations et entretiens avec UCOODEPSA, SOFA, ATP, Men nan Men, CASECs et autres parties prenantes	St-Michel de Latalaye
16 :00 – 17 :00	Trajet de St-Michel de Latalaye à un hotel sur la Côte des Arcadins	
	Nuit dans Hotel sur Côtes des Arcadins	

**Jeudi 10 mars : visite de terrain à Verrettes**

7 :30 – 8 :30	Trajet de Hotel à Verrettes	
8 :30 – 13 :30	Visite de terrain et rencontres avec les parties prenantes : agr. Isma JEAN-MICHEL (Helvetas), Comité de bassin-versant et autres parties prenantes	Commune de Verrettes
13 :30 – 15 :00	Trajet de retour à Pétion-Ville	
15 :00 – 16 :00	Amb. Léon CHARLES, coordonnateur du Secrétariat technique de la Commission mixte haïtiano-dominicaine	Bureau de la Commission Mixte
17 :00 – 18 :00	Senior Management du PNUD	A déterminer

**Vendredi 18 mars : debriefing**











9 :00 – 10 :15	Debriefing	MdE, Pacot
10:15 – 11 :15	Trajet vers aéroport	

**PROJET DE RECONSTRUCTION DE L'INFRASTRUCTURE ET D'EXPANSION DE L'ACCES A L'ENERGIE  
(PRELEN)**

**CELLULE ENERGIE/ PNUD-GEF**

08 Mars 2016

**LISTE DE PRESENCE**

NOM & PRENOM	TITRE	INSTITUTION	TELEPHONE	EMAIL	SIGNATURE
1- CHARYSOSTOME Hare-Aube	Conseiller	CE/MTPTC	3604-8702	machyartene52@yahoo.fr	
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7- Jean Steffen	Consultant	CE/MTPTC	4858 8249	steffenj@toftout.com	
8- Hargrove Marie Pascale	Directrice adjointe	PNUD	4746 4635	marie.pascale.hargrove@pnud.org	
9- Dean Fallon	Consultant	PNUD	613 565-0660	dean.fallon@pnud.org	
10- Charles Teilhard	Consultant	MTPTC/CE	3757-3369	teilhardc@toftout.com	
11-					

## ANNEX III: EVALUATION CONSULTANT CODE OF CONDUCT AND AGREEMENT FORM

### Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

### Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form<sup>27</sup>

#### Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

**Name of Consultant:** Dean Pallen

**Name of Consultancy Organization** (where relevant): \_\_\_\_\_

**I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.**

Signed at *Ottawa* on *March 2016*

Signature: *Dean Pallen*

<sup>27</sup>[www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct](http://www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct)



## Annex IV GEF Obligatory Ratings

<p><b><i>Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&amp;E, I&amp;E Execution</i></b></p> <p>6: Highly Satisfactory (HS): no shortcomings  5: Satisfactory (S): minor shortcomings  4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS)  3. Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): significant shortcomings  2. Unsatisfactory (U): major problems  1. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe problems</p>	<p><b><i>Sustainability ratings:</i></b></p> <p>4. Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability  3. Moderately Likely (ML): moderate risks  2. Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks  1. Unlikely (U): severe risks</p>	<p><b><i>Relevance ratings</i></b></p> <p>2. Relevant (R)  1.. Not relevant (NR)</p> <p><b><i>Impact Ratings:</i></b></p> <p>3. Significant (S)  2. Minimal (M)  1. Negligible (N)</p>
<p><b><i>Additional ratings where relevant:</i></b></p> <p>Not Applicable (N/A)  Unable to Assess (U/A)</p>		

## ANNEXE V: MARCO LÓGICO DEL PROYECTO (PROJECT LOGIC MODEL)

	Indicadores Objetivamente Verificables				
<b>Metas</b>	<i>Asegurar la estabilidad, integridad y funcionalidad del ecosistema, y la continuidad de servicios ecosistémicos que sustenten beneficios globales y medios de vida sostenibles en la cuenca binacional del río Artibonito.</i>				
Objetivos/ Productos	Indicador	Línea base	Objetivo	Fuentes de verificación	Supuestos
<b>Objetivos del Proyecto:</b>  <i>Establecer un marco binacional para el manejo integrado de la cuenca del río Artibonito para el 2012, que promueva reformas detalladas basadas en el ecosistema, demostraciones e inversiones, y establecer las bases para la</i>	Un Programa de Acción Estratégico Binacional (PAE) para el manejo sostenible de la cuenca del Artibonito aprobado en los altos niveles (IW SO 1 SP 3).	Ausencia de un marco amplio de planificación y manejo de la cuenca para la cooperación regional en el manejo del Artibonito. Nunca antes se han implementado intervenciones a nivel de cuenca. Los esfuerzos para abordar la degradación ambiental han sido fragmentados y finalmente no sostenibles.	<p>Un marco viable de manejo y gobernanza que vincule estrategias y preocupaciones nacionales de desarrollo con prioridades regionales ya identificadas, sustentado por una visión conjunta, factible y de largo plazo, para el desarrollo y manejo sostenibles de la cuenca del Artibonito es aprobado por ambos países.</p> <p>La ratificación del PAE en los Ministerios y Secretarías relevantes, agencias del gobierno y grupos claves de usuarios de los recursos en el trimestre 13.</p>	<p>Informe de la conferencia ministerial para la adopción del PAE.</p> <p>Registro de la aprobación del PAE en ambos países.</p> <p>Evaluaciones a mediados y a fines del período.</p>	<p>Contar con el compromiso político para enfrentar conjuntamente la degradación ambiental del Artibonito.</p> <p>Ambos países están dispuestos a trabajar conjuntamente dentro de un marco de gobernanza y manejo de cuenca.</p> <p>Estabilidad política y social continuada en ambos países.</p> <p>Ausencia de eventos de desastres</p>

<i>funcionalidad ambiental a largo plazo y la estabilidad socioeconómica.</i>	Aumento del flujo de agua dulce (m <sup>3</sup> /seg) en la presa de Péligre	Deforestación extensiva y prácticas agrícolas dañinas en la parte alta de la cuenca han resultado en erosión severa de la tierra y sedimentación de los cursos de agua, así como la reducción del flujo.  Línea base: flujo de agua dulce = 45m <sup>3</sup> /seg.	Flujo de agua dulce: no decrece respecto del nivel actual de 45 m <sup>3</sup> /seg, y óptimamente aumente a 65 m <sup>3</sup> /seg para satisfacer necesidades futuras de la población.		naturales catastróficos o de gran escala (huracanes, inundaciones o enfermedades) que destruyan inversiones o cobertura adicional.
	Aumento del área bajo cobertura forestal permanente (ha) en toda la cuenca.	Línea base: Área bajo cobertura forestal en el Artibonito (niveles de 1999): 120,000 ha.	Área bajo cobertura forestal permanente:  RD: incremento por encima de la línea base, a través de nueva cobertura en unas 20,000 ha para 2030 y 40,000 ha para 2050.  Haití: incremento del área bajo nueva cobertura en unas 30,000 ha para 2030 y en 60,000 ha para 2050.		
	Diversidad ecosistémica (incremento del área con cobertura de especies forestales nativas).	Especies forestales nativas prácticamente extirpadas o altamente amenazadas en algunas áreas de la cuenca (se determinará la línea base durante el ADT).	20% de las nuevas áreas bajo cobertura se reforestarán con especies nativas (meta a ser refinada durante el ADT).		
	Reducción en la carga de sedimentos (toneladas/ha/año) en la presa de Péligre.	Línea base: carga de sedimentos en la presa de	Reducción en 50% de la carga de sedimentos en la presa de Péligre, de 120 toneladas/ha/año a 60		

		<p>Péligre: 120 toneladas/ha/año (2006).</p> <p>Las líneas base y metas de las subcuencas se validarán durante el proceso de ADT.</p>	toneladas/ha/año para 2030.		
	Los beneficiarios en las áreas de proyectos piloto reportan una mejora en los estándares de vida debido a un mayor acceso a los servicios ecosistémicos y de un nivel de comercio en las áreas de demostración.	<p>Acceso limitado a agua para uso doméstico y productivo.</p> <p>84 familias en comunidades objetivo en RD con acceso a agua potable (Las Lagunas).</p> <p>Productores de maní, tubérculos y frutas venden alimentos procesados en casa o no-procesados en los mercados locales.</p>	<p>1900 familias con acceso a agua potable proveniente de 2 sistemas de abastecimiento y una fuente tubular en el trimestre 8.</p> <p>2,000 productores en 8 asociaciones con acceso mejorado a mercados, para el trimestre Q12.</p>	<p>Encuestas de campo y registros de producción elaborados por agencias ejecutoras y sus extensionistas locales.</p> <p>Encuestas a actores.</p> <p>Registros provenientes de los negocios agrícolas.</p>	
<b>Resultado 1.</b> Un análisis detallado de los asuntos de la cuenca, proporciona una base sólida para la priorización de los problemas transfronterizos y para el acuerdo en	Un Análisis Diagnóstico Transfronterizo (ADT) completo y aprobado.	<p>Información biofísica y socio-económica sobre la cuenca desactualizada e incompleta; inadecuado entendimiento de los problemas transfronterizos, sus causas raíz socio-económicas e impactos fundamentales.</p>	<p>Aprobación del ADT por los Comités Nacionales Interministeriales y por el Comité Directivo Binacional para fines del trimestre 7, incluyendo:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Caracterización biofísica y socio-económica completa de la cuenca y las áreas costeras adyacentes;</li> <li>- Análisis institucional, legal y de políticas a nivel</li> </ul>	<p>Documento final del ADT.</p> <p>Informes de los análisis realizados como parte del ADT.</p> <p>Actas de reuniones y registro de la aprobación por el Comité Inter-ministerial y el Comité Directivo Binacional.</p>	<p>La cooperación entre los múltiples grupos de trabajo, técnicos y científicos, se mantiene a través del proceso de ADT.</p> <p>Los presupuestos nacionales para los Ministerios involucrados no serán reducidos significativamente.</p>

torno a objetivos de manejo.			<p>nacional y comparativamente;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Análisis de los requerimientos para mejorar las cadenas productivas de valor y el acceso a los mercados;</li> <li>- Análisis de cadenas causales identifican claramente las causas raíz de los principales problemas y prioridades para la intervención del PAE.</li> </ul>	<p>Informes trimestrales, PIRs, evaluaciones de medio término y final.</p> <p>Información disponible en las páginas web de PNUD, páginas web del proyecto y páginas web de los gobiernos nacionales.</p>	<p>Los países y los propietarios de la información acuerdan aportar datos e información, y ponerlos a libre disposición.</p>
	Modelo preciso de disponibilidad de los servicios ecosistémicos de abastecimiento para la población futura, escenarios demográficos y escenarios de cambio climático desarrollados.	Ausencia de información consolidada sobre la demanda futura de agua, alimentos, madera y otros servicios ecosistémicos, teniendo en cuenta la población proyectada y la demanda y disponibilidad de agua, así como los escenarios de cambio climático.	Una proyección a 50 años de la demanda y disponibilidad de madera, agua y suelo, estratificada por décadas para la población futura, teniendo en cuenta escenarios de migración y los impactos del cambio climático para el trimestre 7.	<p>Documento final del ADT.</p> <p>Informes de los análisis realizados como parte del ADT.</p> <p>Información publicada.</p> <p>Información disponible en las páginas web de PNUD, páginas web del proyecto y páginas web de los gobiernos nacionales.</p> <p>PIR.</p>	
	Plan de participación de actores clave habilita el diálogo efectivo, entre los actores en las partes alta y baja de la cuenca.	Ausencia de mecanismos que faciliten la comunicación entre áreas distantes de la cuenca o entre ambos lados de la frontera.	Primer diálogo de actores consolidado que facilita el desarrollo de estructuras de gobernanza que proporcionan un foro para		

			abordar aspectos relevantes de los actores de todas las regiones geográficas de la cuenca, relativos a manejo de la tierra, intercambios y servicios ecosistémicos para el trimestre 6.		
<b>Resultado 2.</b>  Programa de acción estratégico y mecanismo binacional de gobernanza para el manejo sostenible de la cuenca del Artibonito, negociado y aprobado por ambos países	Planes de Acción Nacional de Manejo Integral de Cuencas (PANIC) que transversalicen efectivamente los enfoques de MST y MIRH, aprobados a nivel de Ministros (AS OE3; DT OE1).	Ausencia de un plan nacional de manejo integrado de cuenca acordado o armonizado para el Artibonito, que se haya desarrollado nacionalmente. Hasta la fecha, las intervenciones han sido fragmentadas, sitio específicas y ampliamente descoordinadas. Las acciones específicas a nivel nacional para el manejo de la cuenca son limitadas en ambos países. Los enfoques de MST e MIRH no están plenamente transversalizados dentro de los procesos de planificación nacional.	Los PANICs incorporan factores socioeconómicos y biofísicos para generar herramientas robustas de planificación que habiliten de manera efectiva a cada país para actualizar políticas de uso de la tierra, adoptar reformas de MIRH, incorporar los enfoques del MIRH y MST dentro de los sectores productivos, y facilitar el diálogo entre los actores (agencias, municipalidades, sector privado, sector bancario, etc), aprobados en el trimestre 9.  Los PANICs incluirán una evaluación de la factibilidad de las acciones propuestas y serán compatibles con los PAN- UNCCD.	Planes nacionales de manejo integrado de cuenca.  Referencias a los PANICs en los planes sectoriales relacionados en ambos países.  Aprobación del PANIC por SEMARENA (RD) y el MdE (H).  PIR, evaluaciones de medio término y final.	Contar con el compromiso y el interés de los grupos de actores claves.
	Acuerdo sobre un marco de gobernanza binacional para apoyar	Los esfuerzos de línea base para colaborar en aspectos o	Marco de gobernanza binacional permanente	Acuerdo firmado por ambos países, sobre la	Contar con el apoyo político para los

	la implementación del PAE, que será operacional para el final del proyecto (AI PE3).	áreas específicas del manejo de la cuenca del Artibonito no han sido comprensivos ni han resultado en una iniciativa funcional binacional para la efectiva cooperación, acción y manejo conjunto de esta cuenca hidrográfica compartida.	acordado para la implementación del PAE, con compromisos institucionales claramente definidos, en el trimestre 15.	estructura y el mandato de un marco de gobernanza binacional. Documentos que detallen las estructuras de gobernanza, roles y responsabilidades. Evaluaciones de medio término y final.	esfuerzos de desarrollo binacional.  Ambos países acuerdan establecer una estructura de gestión pública conjunta.
	Comités nacionales interministeriales y Comité Directivo binacional establecidos y fortalecidos (AI PE3).	Existen comités intersectoriales nacionales (GTI en RD y CIP en Haití). Las capacidades de dichos comités requieren ser fortalecidas a través su participación en el proceso ADT/PAE.	El GTI y el CIP participan plenamente en el proyecto, con capacidades fortalecidas para monitorear el proceso ADT/PAE para la futura implementación del PAE, en el trimestre 4.	Informes de los Comités nacionales y binacional.  Evaluaciones de las capacitaciones.  Informes trimestrales, PIR.  Evaluaciones de medio término y final.	No se producirán cambios imprevistos estructurales o gubernamentales en los comités trans-sectoriales.
	Información actualizada disponible en la base de datos binacional y en el sistema de manejo de información, mantenidos a través de la cooperación de los organismos especializados en ambos países. (DT PE1)	Ausencia de información y sistemas de manejo de información, y socialización de información restringida entre ambos países. La información existente está dispersa entre diversas instituciones.	Sistema de manejo de información binacional desarrollado y plenamente operacional, el cual facilita el acceso a información para la planificación y toma de decisiones en la cuenca entre ambos países en el trimestre 14.	Inventario de hardware y software.  Documento con protocolo y estándares del sistema de manejo de información. Productos SIG.  Sistema de manejo de información con datos e información de ambos países.	Los países y los propietarios de la información acuerdan contribuir aportando datos e información, poniéndola disponible de manera continua y oportuna.  Las instituciones técnicas apoyan los objetivos del

				Cartas de acuerdo, Memorandos de Entendimiento con instituciones técnicas para asistencia técnica y acceso a información.  PIR, evaluaciones de medio término y final.	proyecto y colaboran con sus resultados.
	Aumento en el % de nivel de conciencia sobre la importancia de los enfoques MST e MIRH para lograr alcanzar las necesidades de desarrollo de los diferentes sectores y grupos de actores.	<p>Los proyectos medianos GEF/PNUD LDC-SIDS del portafolio del proyecto global realizará una encuesta del nivel de conciencia sobre el MST a nivel nacional.</p> <p>El nivel de conciencia a ser documentado durante la fase de inserción del proyecto a través de un estudio de línea base del nivel de conciencia.</p> <p>Se reconoce en ambos países que el nivel de conciencia sobre, y la necesidad de, los enfoques MIRH y MST es limitado a servicios de pequeño alcance y unidades especializadas dentro de los ministerios. Los usuarios de los recursos en gran medida desconocen los principios de manejo integrado de tierra y agua.</p>	<p>Alto nivel (&gt;80%) de respuestas en las encuestas sobre el nivel de conciencia en los actores relacionados al gobierno y a las ONGs y un 50% del público en general demuestra un aumento del nivel de conciencia en el trimestre 16.</p> <p>Materiales informativos y actividades de construcción del conocimiento desarrollados, que responden a las necesidades de los actores de la cuenca, desde las autoridades municipales hasta los pequeños agricultores con limitada escolaridad, ONGs y OCBs en el trimestre 8, y ampliamente extendidos en el trimestre 14.</p>	<p>Resultados de las encuestas del nivel de conciencia a nivel de cuenca estratificados a nivel de agencia. Datos tomados dos veces, en el trimestre 2 y el trimestre 15.</p> <p>Materiales informativos.</p>	Todos los grupos meta en la encuesta del nivel de conciencia responden activa y honestamente a las preguntas de la encuesta.



			En base a un proyecto de ACDI, también se abordará el sistema de educación básica en el trimestre 4.		
<b>Resultado 3:</b>  Proyectos demostrativos de economía local y manejo sostenible de los recursos de tierra y agua a nivel local proporcionan modelos para su escalamiento y replicación, y la implementación temprana del PAE	TIR positivos en las inversiones desarrolladas en el marco de los proyectos modelo demostrativos y las carteras de inversiones.	Ausencia de inversiones locales sistematizadas que apoyen mejoras en los sistemas productivos para los mercados locales en armonía con los valores del paisaje.	Un TIR positivo de las inversiones locales en agricultura sostenible, manejo de ganado y actividades forestales (proyectadas).  Una cartera con TIR positivo de un 5% por sobre los costos administrativos y la inflación.	Análisis económicos para establecer una línea base.  Auditorías independientes.  PIR, evaluaciones de medio término y final.	Tasas de inflación nacional estables entre un 4-6% durante el periodo de implementación del proyecto.  Ausencia de eventos climáticos catastróficos o enfermedades (patógenos que afectan cultivos, ganado o plantaciones forestales) que implicarían un retroceso en los sistemas productivos.  Participación continua y activa de los grupos de actores claves.
	Marcos de gobernanza ambiental mejorados a nivel local en apoyo a los actuales procesos de descentralización en la República Dominicana.	Marco institucional divergente e ineficiente de manejo de la tierra y agua a nivel local en la RD  Debilidades técnicas y financieras significativas en los gobiernos municipales y en las representaciones locales de agencias responsables del manejo de tierra y agua.	Un marco de gobernanza para el manejo de tierra y agua institucionalmente fortalecido y descentralizado, y capacidades fortalecidas que conduzcan a un entorno administrativo y regulatorio favorable.  Exploradas posibilidades de replicación en Haití.	Informes de avance de la puesta en marcha del proyecto piloto de gestión pública en RD.  Evaluaciones de medio término y final.	Los niveles poblacionales no experimentan ningún cambio radical en las micro-cuencas piloto.
	Aumento en el área bajo MST (nuevas tierras con cobertura permanente en la forma de plantaciones forestales, y árboles) a través de proyectos demostrativos (DT PE1).	Las actividades productivas son inconsistentes con la topografía y funcionalidad ecosistémica local, resultando en erosión y degradación severa de la tierra,	Para el trimestre 12, el área dedicada a cobertura forestal permanente habrá aumentado en un 5% (árboles, plantaciones forestales) en los proyectos piloto, incrementando de	Encuestas en el terreno, SIG, registros de producción de las agencias ejecutoras y sus extensionistas locales	

		<p>y amenazas a los medios de vida rurales.</p> <p>Evidencia anecdótica indica que existe declinación de la fertilidad del suelo y nivel de producción en los cultivos.</p> <p>El área con cobertura permanente de árboles y plantaciones forestales en los sitios piloto es de 12,061 ha.</p> <p>Ausencia de una metodología o mediciones de línea base de la erosión en los sistemas productivos locales.</p>	<p>39% a 44% la cobertura, asumiendo que no surgen otras pérdidas significativas. Las metas son:</p> <p>1,720 ha reforestadas o rehabilitadas con forestería sostenible y sistemas agroforestales o para protección, aumentando el área con cobertura permanente a 13,781 ha:</p> <p>(Haití:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 500,000 árboles maderables plantados en 450 ha para cosecha sostenible y protección.</li> <li>- 120,000 frutales y plantas de café plantados en 500 ha, con fines de producción.</li> </ul> <p>RD Hondo Valle:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 50,000 plantas de café bajo sombra plantadas para rehabilitar 200 ha de cafetales.</li> <li>- 35,000 frutales plantados para establecer sistemas agroforestales en más de 145 ha</li> <li>- 100,000 árboles maderables en 90 ha para cosecha sostenible y protección</li> </ul>	<p>Estadísticas económicas nacionales; informes de desarrollo.</p>
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			<p>RD Las Lagunas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 35,999 frutales plantados para establecer 84 plantaciones agroforestales en más de 145 ha.</li> <li>- 100,000 árboles maderables plantados en 90 ha para cosecha sostenible y protección.</li> </ul> <p>990 ha de sistemas de conservación de suelos establecidos en Haití y RD (500 ha en Haití; 490 ha en RD).</p> <p>Metodología probada y línea base establecida para medición de la erosión en los sitios piloto. Mientras la meta es reducir la erosión en un 50% en la cuenca, esto será validado o ajustado a través de los proyectos piloto.</p>	
	No existen asociaciones de usuarios del agua en las áreas piloto. Hay una comprensión limitada de las oportunidades para mejorar las opciones de uso eficiente del agua.	Cuatro asociaciones formadas en Haití y en la RD, cubriendo 12 secciones (5 en Haití y 7 en RD).	<p>Estatutos de establecimiento de las asociaciones.</p> <p>Minutas de las reuniones</p>	Incremento en el número de asociaciones de usuarios del agua en funcionamiento.
	Aumento en el número de hogares rurales involucrados en	0 familias conectadas para abastecer la cadena de	900 productores comercializando a través de	Certificación orgánica.

	<p>actividades ambientalmente sanas y económicamente sostenibles en el área de los proyectos piloto (DT PE 1).</p>	<p>productos frutales orgánicos y tubérculos.</p> <p>En general las actividades económicas no son económicamente beneficiosas ni ambientalmente sostenibles, resultando en una disminución de los ingresos y un aumento de los niveles de pobreza dentro de la población de la cuenca.</p>	<p>nuevas cadenas de abastecimiento en el trimestre 12.</p> <p>6000 familias han registrado relaciones comerciales a través de 4 agro-negocios mejorados y certificados en el trimestre 12.</p> <p>750 familias resultan beneficiarias de 12 km de rutas reparadas en el trimestre 8.</p>	<p>Registros de la empresa empaquetadora de frutas y de los negocios productores de jarabe de azúcar en Saint Michel de l'Atalaye.</p>	
<p><b>Resultado 4:</b> Capacidades incrementadas para movilizar recursos a largo plazo en apoyo a los resultados del PANIC y PAE, promoviendo el MIRH y medios de vida sostenible.</p>	<p>Planes de Inversión de Cuenca determinan los objetivos financieros y las metas para la implementación del PAE e inversiones en el terreno que aumenten la cobertura del Artibonito (AI PE3; DT PE1).</p>	<p>Ausencia de programas estratégicos de inversión para los sectores productivos vinculados con las proyecciones de largo plazo para aumentar la cobertura efectiva y la cosecha de agua en la cuenca.</p> <p>Planificación de inversiones parcial en RD y el sector cafetero Haitiano sin acuerdos sobre las inversiones para establecer metas de expansión de largo alcance.</p> <p>Estudios de Mercado para frutas y vegetales completos para Haití, sin acuerdo sobre metas de largo plazo.</p> <p>Los sectores energía y ganaderos no cuentan con</p>	<p>Planes de inversión (a ser integrados dentro del PAE) que promuevan el MST y el MIRH y aumenten la cobertura a través de árboles, pasturas y plantaciones de frutales a través del desarrollo económico de la producción cafetera, forestería, manejo de ganado, fruticultura, agricultura, energía e infraestructura de transporte.</p> <p>Para cada sector, metas de expansión, un análisis de vacíos financiero, y un plan de acción para la expansión del sector ambientalmente</p>	<p>Planes de Inversión en la Cuenca aprobados por grupos encargados a nivel sectorial.</p> <p>Planes sectoriales referenciados a los PANICs en planes sectoriales relacionados en ambos países.</p> <p>Metas para beneficios ambientales mencionadas en el PAE.</p> <p>PIR, evaluaciones a mitad y al final del periodo.</p>	<p>Habilidad de los actores a nivel sectorial para alcanzar acuerdos de metas de expansión de medio y largo plazo.</p> <p>Continuidad de la voluntad en los gobiernos para mantener las inversiones en el desarrollo rural en balance con las demandas de las necesidades de desarrollo urbano políticamente significativas.</p>

		información consolidada ni metas de largo plazo para inversiones.	sna en áreas biofísicamente apropiadas de la cuenca.		
Opciones para incrementar el acceso de los productores rurales a facilidades de crédito formal son determinadas para apoyar la implementación del PAE (DT PE1).	<p>Capacidad limitada para la movilización de recursos a largo plazo y escaso acceso de los productores a créditos para prácticas de manejo sostenible de la tierra y agua.</p> <p>Variadas experiencias en cooperativas con pequeños negocios y sectores inmobiliarios. Los préstamos agrícolas se han descapitalizado con grupos de ingreso similares a aquellos del Artibonito.</p>	<p>Un plan para mitigar los riesgos asociados con préstamos agrícolas desarrollado y presentado a los financistas en el trimestre 14, construido en base a las lecciones aprendidas.</p> <p>Planes de inversión en la cuenca proporcionan la base para financiar la implementación del PAE y acciones en el terreno dentro de la cuenca para el trimestre 14.</p> <p>Mecanismos financieros y recursos para apoyar el plan de inversión identificado para el trimestre 13.</p>	<p>Plan de inversión en la cuenca aprobado.</p> <p>PIR, evaluaciones a mitad y al final del periodo.</p>	<p>El valor de las monedas nacionales, la inflación, y las tasas de interés se mantienen dentro de niveles predecibles.</p> <p>El sector privado acepta su responsabilidad en el financiamiento del MST.</p> <p>El gobierno y las instituciones claves comprometerán los recursos necesarios para mantener los esfuerzos más allá de la vida del proyecto.</p> <p>Alto interés de parte de donantes para apoyar la implementación del PAN y del PAE.</p> <p>La inflación se mantiene dentro del 4-6% durante el periodo de</p>	
Monto de financiamiento comprometido recibido desde los gobiernos nacionales e internacionales y desde fuentes privadas en apoyo a las acciones detalladas en el plan de financiamiento (en \$US).	Acciones financiadas específicamente a través de presupuestos gubernamentales cuyo porcentaje de apoyo basado en las necesidades de la cuenca es subestimado y reconocido como muy bajo en comparación con las necesidades, tal como fue reconocido por RD en el	Compromisos financieros iniciales para apoyar la implementación del PAE de todas las fuentes, de un 20% del valor de la brecha financiera, tal como fue expresado en el plan de financiamiento para el periodo 2012-2016.	<p>Cartas de compromiso de los donantes.</p> <p>Estadísticas económicas nacionales; informes de desarrollo.</p> <p>Propuestas de proyectos desarrolladas.</p>		

		<p>Informe de Desarrollo Humano del 2008.</p> <p>Apoyo bilateral de aproximadamente 40 millones USD, desde 2009 al 2011 comprometido para la cuenca de Artibonito.</p>	<p>Incremento en el presupuesto del gobierno destinado a apoyar actividades sostenibles en la cuenca de un 20% sobre la base del año 2008 en dólares US en el trimestre 16.</p> <p>Aumento en la actividad de donantes bi y multilaterales para apoyar al Artibonito de un 20% sobre la base del año 2008 en el trimestre 16.</p>	<p>PIR, evaluaciones a mitad y al final del periodo.</p>	implementación del proyecto.
	% aumentado en la cantidad de fondos y en la diversidad de las fuentes de financiamiento (DT PE1).	<p>Fondos para acciones en el terreno a través de 2 fuentes reconocidas:</p> <p>Los gobiernos desembolsan fondos para el desarrollo de acciones en el Artibonito, pero éstas no responden a ningún plan de inversión a largo plazo.</p> <p>El porcentaje de contribución de éstas con relación a las necesidades de la cuenca no se conoce.</p> <p>Apoyo bilateral comprometido para la cuenca del Artibonito de aproximadamente 40 millones de USD desde el 2009 hasta el 2011.</p>	<p>Al menos dos nuevos mecanismos financieros que se suman a los presupuestos gubernamentales o proyectos financiados por donantes para financiar inversiones en el terreno determinadas como factibles para la implementación del PAE para el trimestre 14.</p>	<p>Cartas de compromiso de los donantes.</p> <p>Estadísticas económicas nacionales; informes de desarrollo.</p> <p>Propuestas de proyecto desarrolladas.</p> <p>PIR, evaluaciones a mitad y al final del periodo..</p>	



## ANNEX XI: PREGUNTAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EVALUATION QUESTIONS)

Criterios de evaluación – Preguntas	Indicadores	Fuentes	Metodología
Relevancia: ¿Cómo se relaciona el proyecto con los objetivos principales del área de interés del FMAM y con las prioridades ambientales y de desarrollo a nivel local, binacional, regional y nacional?			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cómo apoya el proyecto el área focal de aguas internacionales y manejo sostenible de la tierra y las prioridades estratégicas del GEF?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existencia de una clara relación entre los objetivos del proyecto y el área focal aguas internacionales y manejo sostenible de la tierra del GEF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Estrategias y documentos del área focal aguas internacionales y manejo sostenible de la tierra del GEF.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas con personal del PNUD y del proyecto.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cómo el proyecto apoya las prioridades ambientales y de desarrollo a nivel nacional?</li> <li>• Cuál ha sido el nivel de participación de los interesados en el diseño del proyecto?</li> <li>• El proyecto toma en consideración las realidades nacionales (marco de políticas e institucional) tanto en su diseño como en su implementación?</li> <li>• Cuál ha sido el nivel de apropiación de los interesados en la implementación del proyecto?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grado en que el proyecto apoya las estrategias nacionales de manejo sostenible del medio ambiente.</li> <li>• Apreciación de interesados clave con respecto al nivel de adecuación del diseño e implementación del proyecto a las realidades nacionales y capacidades existentes.</li> <li>• Coherencia entre las necesidades expresadas por los interesados nacionales y el criterio PNUD-GEF.</li> <li>• Nivel de involucramiento de funcionarios gubernamentales y otros socios en el proceso de diseño del proyecto.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Estrategias de Desarrollo de los países.</li> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Socios e interesados clave del proyecto.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas con personal del PNUD y del proyecto.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existen vínculos lógicos entre resultados esperados de del proyecto y el diseño del proyecto (en términos componentes del proyecto, elección de socios, estructura, mecanismos de implementación, alcance, presupuesto, uso de recursos, etc.)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nivel de coherencia entre los resultados esperados y el diseño de la lógica interna del proyecto.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Interesados clave del proyecto.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas con interesados clave.</li> </ul>



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Es la duración del proyecto suficiente para alcanzar los resultados propuestos?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nivel de coherencia entre el diseño del proyecto y su enfoque de implementación.</li> </ul>		
•	•	•	•
<b>Efectividad: ¿En qué medida se han logrado los resultados y objetivos previstos del proyecto?</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ha sido el proyecto efectivo en alcanzar los resultados esperados?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ver indicadores en el marco de resultados estratégicos/marco lógico del proyecto.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Reportes de avance trimestral y anual.</li> <li>• Equipo del proyecto e interesados clave.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas con interesados clave.</li> <li>• Entrevistas con el equipo del proyecto.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cómo se manejaron los riesgos y supuestos del proyecto?</li> <li>•Cuál ha sido la calidad de las estrategias de mitigación desarrolladas?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integridad de la identificación de riesgos y supuestos durante la planeación y el diseño del proyecto.</li> <li>• Calidad de los sistemas de información establecidos para identificar riesgos emergentes y otros “issues”.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Reportes de avance trimestral y anual.</li> <li>• Equipo del proyecto, PNUD e interesados clave.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Qué cambios pudieron haberse hecho (de haberlos) al diseño del proyecto para mejorar el logro de los resultados esperados?</li> </ul>	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Datos colectados durante la evaluación.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de datos.</li> </ul>
<b>Eficiencia: ¿El proyecto se implementó de manera eficiente en conformidad con las normas y los estándares internacionales y nacionales?</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Se utilizó o necesitó el manejo adaptativo para asegurar un uso eficiente de los recursos?</li> <li>• Han sido utilizados como herramientas de gestión durante la implementación del proyecto el marco lógico, los planes de trabajo o cualquier cambio realizado a estos?</li> <li>• Han sido los sistemas financieros y contables adecuados para la gestión del proyecto y para producir información financiera precisa y a tiempo?</li> <li>• Han sido los reportes de progreso precisos y puntuales? Responden a los requerimientos de reporte? Incluyen los cambios por manejo adaptativo?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disponibilidad y calidad de los reportes financieros y de progreso.</li> <li>• Puntualidad y adecuación de los reportes entregados.</li> <li>• Nivel de discrepancia entre el gasto planeado y el ejecutado.</li> <li>• Cofinanciamiento planeado vs. actual.</li> <li>• Costo en función de los resultados alcanzados en comparación con los costos de proyectos similares de otras organizaciones.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Equipo del proyecto.</li> <li>• PNUD.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas claves.</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ha sido la ejecución del proyecto tan efectiva como fue propuesta originalmente (planeado vs. actual)?</li> <li>• El cofinanciamiento ha sido según lo planeado?</li> <li>• Los recursos financieros han sido usados eficientemente? Han podido haberse usado más eficientemente?</li> <li>• Han sido las adquisiciones realizadas de manera que se haga un uso eficiente de los recursos del proyecto?</li> <li>• Cómo ha sido usado el enfoque de <i>gestión basada en resultados</i> durante la implementación del proyecto?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cuán adecuadas han sido las opciones seleccionadas por el proyecto en función del contexto, la infraestructura y el costo.</li> <li>• Calidad del reporte de gestión basada en resultados (reportes de progresos, monitoreo y evaluación).</li> <li>• Ocurrencia de cambios en el diseño del proyecto o en el enfoque de implementación cuando ha sido necesario para mejorar la eficiencia del proyecto.</li> <li>• Costo asociado al mecanismo de <i>delivery</i> y estructura de gestión, en comparación con otras alternativas.</li> </ul>		
<b>Sostenibilidad: ¿En qué medida hay riesgos financieros, institucionales, socioeconómicos o ambientales para sostener los resultados del proyecto a largo plazo?</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Han sido integrados <i>issues</i> de sostenibilidad en el diseño e implementación del proyecto?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidencia/ calidad de la estrategia de sostenibilidad.</li> <li>• Evidencia/ calidad de las acciones llevadas a cabo para asegurar la sostenibilidad.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Equipo del proyecto.</li> <li>• PNUD.</li> <li>• Socios.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• El proyecto aborda adecuadamente los issues de sostenibilidad financiera y económica?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nivel y fuente de soporte financiero a ser provisto en el futuro a sectores y actividades relevantes después del término del proyecto.</li> <li>• Evidencia de compromiso de socios internacionales, gobiernos y otros interesados para apoyar financieramente sectores/actividades relevantes luego de la finalización del proyecto.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Equipo del proyecto.</li> <li>• PNUD.</li> <li>• Socios.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existe evidencia de que los socios del proyecto darán continuidad a las actividades más allá de la finalización del proyecto?</li> <li>•Cuál es el grado de compromiso político para continuar trabajando sobre los resultados del proyecto?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Grado en que las actividades del proyecto y los resultados han sido asumidos por las contrapartes.</li> <li>• Nivel de soporte financiero a ser provisto por los gobiernos, una vez termine el proyecto.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Equipo del proyecto.</li> <li>• PNUD.</li> <li>• Socios.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas.</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cuáles son los principales desafíos que pueden dificultar la sostenibilidad de los esfuerzos?</li> <li>• Se han abordado durante la gestión del proyecto?</li> <li>• Qué potenciales medidas podrían contribuir a la sostenibilidad de los esfuerzos logrados por el proyecto?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cambios que podrían significar desafíos al proyecto.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Equipo del proyecto.</li> <li>• PNUD.</li> <li>• Socios.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas.</li> </ul>
<b>Impacto: ¿Hay indicios de que el proyecto haya contribuido a reducir la tensión ambiental o a mejorar el estado ecológico, o que haya permitido avanzar hacia esos resultados?</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Se prevé que el proyecto alcance su objetivo de establecer un marco binacional para el manejo integrado de la cuenca del río Artibonito?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Avances en la elaboración del Programa de Acción Estratégico Binacional (PAE) para el manejo sostenible de la cuenca del Artibonito.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentos del proyecto.</li> <li>• Equipo del proyecto.</li> <li>• PNUD.</li> <li>• Socios.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Análisis de documentos.</li> <li>• Entrevistas.</li> </ul>



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