



STRENGTHENING OF CAPACITIES FOR SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS

PIMS 3414 (Atlas Project ID 46489)

HAÏTI

GEF / UNDP

TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

MAIN DOCUMENT / FINAL VERSION

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i. Opening page

| |
|---|
| Title of UNDP supported GEF financed project |
| Capacity Building in and Mainstreaming of Sustainable Land Management in Haiti |
| UNDP and GEF project ID#s |
| PIMS 3414 Atlas Project ID 46489 |
| Evaluation time frame and date of evaluation report |
| February 2012 |
| Region and countries included in the project |
| HAITI |
| GEF Operational Program/Strategic Program |
| OP 15 / SO 1 |
| Implementing Partner and other project partners |
| UNDP |
| Evaluation team member |
| PATRICK DUMAZERT |
| Acknowledgements |
| Thanks to all members of the team of UNDP Environment and Energy Unit in Haiti for the support they provided to the realization of the mission, and to the staff of different ministries and NGOs that gave part of their time to the interviews required for this investigation. |

ii. Executive Summary

Project Summary Table

| |
|---|
| AGENCY'S PROJECT ID: 3414 (Atlas Project ID 46489) |
| GEFSEC PROJECT ID: |
| COUNTRY: Republic of Haiti |
| PROJECT TITLE: Capacity Building for Sustainable Land Management |
| GEF AGENCY: UNDP |
| OTHER EXECUTING AGENCY (IES): |
| DURATION: Three years |
| GEF FOCAL AREA: Land Degradation |
| GEF OPERATIONAL PROGRAM: OP 15 |
| GEF STRATEGIC PRIORITY: SO 1 |
| STARTING DATE: July 2008 |

| FINANCING PLAN (US\$) | |
|---------------------------------|------------------|
| GEF PROJECT/COMPONENT | |
| Project | 479,000 |
| PDFA | 21,000 |
| Sub-total GEF | 500,000 |
| Co-financing | |
| GEF Agency (UNDP) | 150,000 |
| Government | 1,655,000 |
| Bilateral | 175,000 |
| NGOs | |
| FAO | |
| Sub-Total Co-financing: | 1,980,000 |
| Total Project Financing: | 2,480,000 |

Brief Project Description

The long-term sustainable development of Haiti demands that land degradation trends and issues be addressed as a matter of priority in order to ensure ecosystem integrity and functionality and thereby the sustainability of agricultural production, rural livelihoods, and hydroelectric energy production.

The long-term goal of the project is to contribute to global benefits through the promotion of Sustainable Land Management initiatives that will enhance and maintain ecosystem productivity and ecological functions through capacity building in and mainstreaming for SLM.

The objective of the project is to create an enabling environment for SLM by developing capacities within appropriate government and civil society institutions/user groups and mainstreaming into government planning and strategy development to halt and where feasible to reverse desertification processes in Haiti.

The project has 4 outcomes: i) SLM principles are mainstreamed into national policies, plans and legislation; ii) Capacity building for SLM is enhanced through training and inter-sectoral approaches; iii) Capacities for knowledge and awareness for SLM strategies and options are developed including by development of Land Information Systems and land tenure assessments; and, iv) Resource mobilization in support of SLM is enhanced and an Investment Plan is developed.

The lead executing agency will be the Ministry of Environment in close collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture. The project will receive high level guidance and oversight from the SLM Steering Committee (SC).

A Project Management Unit will be established to execute the project. The total budget of the project is US\$2,480,000 of which US\$ 479,000 would be the GEF increment.

Evaluation Rating Table

| CRITERIA | RATING |
|---|--------|
| Relevance with respect to UNDP cooperation and GEF global objectives in Haiti | R |
| Relevance with respect to Haitian public policies framework | R |
| UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation / execution | MS |
| Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation | U |
| Effectiveness & Efficiency | MS |
| Overall results (attainment of objectives) | MU |
| Sustainability | ML |

Summary of conclusions, recommendations and lessons

■ Main conclusions

Project Design and Formulation. The situational analysis of the PRODOC (2006) describes the phenomenon of the LD in Haiti, and its diverse kinds of “root causes”, but presents an oversimplified diagnostic that tends to equal LD with extreme poverty and high population growth, failing to take into account both the existence of small farmers tailored solutions, and the existence of external pressures that yield to adverse behaviors in spite of long term self-interests of the rural families.

The assessment of the causality chain shows that the overall objective which aims to contribute to the reduction of the central problem i.e. land degradation (LD), is coherent with the diagnosed problem. The specific objectives, however, does not directly address the factors by themselves, but the institutional barriers that constraint the effectiveness of actions.

Unfortunately, the removal of barriers does not lead to the overall objective unless policies are translated into action, unless the capabilities effectively carry out these actions and unless the actions are actually based on valid models.

The PRODOC did not contain all the necessary elements to play an effective role as a master document during the execution phase, for two major reasons: it was not adjusted to the new institutional context when the project started after 2 years, and because of its incompleteness and inaccuracies, which therefore left a large responsibility to the PMU with the execution, as well as to the instances on charge of the implementation and supervision.

The Haitian public sector, having ratified the Convention in 2006, already had generated, at this time, several important public programmatic documents positioning the theme of the DT, since different angles, but its capacity of execution was very reduced because of the own human and financial weaknesses of every institution, and even more because of the reluctances of the various actors involved to work together in a unique frame, this common political framework being lacking until the NAPCD is duly completed and approved.

However, the interpretation of potential risks in the PRODOC is superficial and it cannot be found in it a strategy to carry on with the project, in case the expected arrangements would not occur. The institutional arrangements were not planned in the PRODOC and stakeholders are just mentioned (without taking into account their changes in the latency period which elapsed after the submission of the first proposal of project in October, 2006), the rest of the constituency of the project being to be built during the execution.

Respect to the involvement of stakeholders, except the MoE, the other public institutions declared to have not been involved in the formulation, nor to be informed about its existence, when approved. For both main national institutions (MPCE and MARNDR), no mention is made in the PRODOC of their installed capacity and institutional necessities, or even about the modality of their participation in the project, unless as beneficiaries of the

planned trainings. They are not taken into account for the mainstreaming, nor as co-performers of the actions in the component 3.

The partnership planned around SLM was not reduced to specific directions of three main ministries. Autonomous public institutions, projects, other ministries, academic institutions, and diverse not governmental actors of the rural development and the preservation of natural resources were also anticipated. The PRODOC contains however no realistic analysis of their capacity to assume these roles or of their needs of strengthening for it, although it was planned to hire consultants at the need.

Project Implementation. For the dynamism of the UNDP – EEU and other comparative values this agency was the most appropriated for the implementation of the SLM project, albeit, due to the originality of its concept and to the complexity of its context, the project needed a strong and original support and supervision that should have been provided since its first steps, and that the UNDP - CO was not able to provide. The regional UNDP / GEF unit located at UNDP - RCLAC was not either able of supplying a strong external supervision, even when the project still had a RTA on duty, particularly in the initial phase. The UNDP - CO did not invest direct institutional resources in a M&E oriented to the results, while it received part of the GEF financing for it. Neither did the regional UNDP / GEF unit.

With such a limited technical follow-up, it is impossible to talk about "risk management". The PRODOC contained however a detailed plan of M&E in which were established the flows of information, methods of data mining and periodicity, as well as the persons in charge of the production of the information and its primary users, first of all the Steering Committee. The reports of supervision were drafted (PIR, QPR, AR) but they did not reflect the problems in time, or did not reflect them at all. In spite of this, the QORs provided to the supervising team (RTA and EU responsible) some perception about the little progress of the activities on behalf of the PMU. Observations were formulated, with a roadmap for its Director, but their indications had very little translation into acts.

The participation of each of the actors was divided up and specific to the actions they were supposed to participate, due to the lack of a committee within which they could have planned and acted as a whole. The M&E was not effective and consequently there was no feedback at ministry level, thus no participation possible at this level too. Nor was incorporated any SC, so the participation of the public and private actors in the implementation was limited to the status of beneficiaries of some activities, and none of them reached an understanding of the whole project.

The evaluation of the effective expenditure by source of funding, indicate that, in the whole life of the project, the real contribution of the UNDP was 100,000 USD and not the planned 150,000. It is true that the in kind contribution from the PAGE project also is a contribution from the UNDP, although recorded in another account. But it cannot be classified at the same time as governmental contribution (in kind co-financing) and as a proper contribution of the UNDP.

The total expenditure registered in ATLAS as the effective GEF contribution for the SLM project, is 455,076.87 USD that is 95 % of the planned commitment. As for the contribution supposed by AECL, it was understood by mistake as being in cash, but according to the appendices of the PRODOC, it was an in-kind co-financing.

With respects to in-kind co-financing, the institutional arrangements planned during the formulation of the reviewed budget of the definitive PRODOC were not put in practice, and that the SLM project was practically obliged to reduce its level of aims and expenditure to the amount planned in its first version. No written explanation can be found about it. According to the budget planned in the signed PRODOC, the SLM project appeared to be a medium-sized project which implied that 2/3 of the results should have been obtained thanks to governmental action. It was in reality a small-sized project, swelled artificially by an unrealistic expectation about the governmental counterpart.

Project Results and Sustainability. The reviewing of outputs leads to the conclusion that the objectives had been only partially obtained, because there was an accumulation of delays in each component, which gave rise to temporal gaps between the delivered products, especially since certain activities needed products from the other activities, what led to an accumulation of the delays.

Since products were partially obtained, it is inevitable that the expected outcomes are not totally reached. As a general conclusion, it can be stated that the products of the project thus stay altogether strikingly below what was planned, what yielded little advances as for the expected results. Nonetheless, the SLM project yielded interesting contributions and it is necessary to use them, and especially it is necessary to continue the effort with better means and arrangements.

The synthesis of the politico-institutional situation in relation to LD in Haiti (the baseline), is that there is a diversity of approaches or, more exactly, a diversity of policies and public actions related with LD, some coinciding with the objectives of preservation, others which can be oriented to it and some others with divergent approaches. There are also those who ignore the DT as problem, even if their objectives can suffer the consequences from it, as succeed with the installation of industrial parks in the lowlands. Public and private actions related with LD, take place in different levels, with little connection between them, with a diversity of overlapping mandates, what is unavoidable, but with few functional authorities with intersectorial and interinstitutional mandates to organize complex actions with common objectives.

The changes which occurred in the last five years in the institutional context in relation to SLM are however significant, although not attributable to the project, not only in the "macro policies" documents, but also in some sectorial policies with the SLM aims. In general, policies from the traditional sectors of agricultural development, or less conventional and more cross-sectoral but with a main anchor in the productive sector (such as PNSAN), have an explicit affinity with SLM, although their main objectives are others.

LD is a real concern, felt by various sectors of opinion, directly or indirectly, but the specific approach of the UNCCD has not been sufficiently appropriated. However, the objective remains valid, it is necessary to develop means of achieving it, taking into account the lessons learned from the SLM project.

■ **Lessons and Recommendations**

- A. To ensure the quality of the situational analysis as well as a correct reading of the risks involved.
- B. To develop a proper ex - ante evaluation of the capabilities of involved organizations, and their institutional needs and incorporate it as a comprehensive operational plan.
- C. To ensure additional support and supervision, because the PMU is designed initially to implement the project in the ideal scenario, but not to facing a non-optimal situation.
- D. Annual supervision reports must point out the strategic issues that deserve corrective responses, and not those of the order of micro-management. UNDP – CO and the regional UNDP / GEF unit should invest directly institutional resources in an M&E systemic approach oriented to results, both at national and regional levels.
- E. As the project did not reached completely its planned outcomes, the sustainability of partial results obtained in spite of this, depends directly on the continuity of the actions themselves.
- F. The opportunity of this continuity is given by UNDP's institutional support to MoE, i.e. by the PAGE project.
- G. It should be necessary to insure also other substantive activities such as organizing training sessions, establishing a national system of information, and incorporating SLM principles for decision-making and national interventions.

- H. There are plans being next to be implemented from the UNDP - EEU partners that might be an opportunity to warrant continuity.
- I. Additional lines of activity are: Resume NAPCD formulation and undertake a draft investment plan.
- J. To perform a full environmental regulation recognized by all stakeholders, the MoE requires cross-cutting policy documents and professional staff and skills trained in a broad conception of the problems of land use.
- K. To achieve a full normative approach in environmental regulation it is necessary to understand the diversity of economic rationalities of their direct users, which can only be learned in the field, with the direct agents of land use.
- L. The development of training modules is a step in this direction, but it will be necessary to ensure the inclusion of the formation process into local development interventions.
- M. It is as well recommendable to continue in the implementation of a comprehensive information system, which should operate at four levels.
- N. Cartographic analysis tools are important to the institutional normative approach to SLM, there is a need to work at a closer scale.
- O. It is urgent to take advantage of the phase of international harmonization of NAPs to resume the interrupted process and link it to the previous recommendation.
- P. Address the issues of land tenure and its institutional enforcement is a priority because it is the basis of the problem, building an effective policy and going around with effective measures.
- Q. Respect to legal framework of land management should be adopted concrete action policy providing that nothing should be done without peasant families, major users of the lands.
- R. Do not pretend to solve the problem of land as a prerequisite for SLM. Harmonization should instead focus on a large corpus of standards.
- S. The central aspect of SLM to Haiti requires promoting the empowerment through professional training, oriented to give an eclectic approach centered on perennial species in general and trees in particular.
- T. Provide solutions for two types of situations that occur predominantly in Haiti (60% of land in intensively used areas and the remaining 40% under dry hillsides and other sites generally used in a "mining" way by many families).
- U. It is necessary to continue the development of models of land use based on trees cropping and exploitation of woodlands, according to biogeographic characteristics.
- V. To harmonize the wood - charcoal with the objectives of SLM should be considered as a priority to increase the share of supply of wood for various uses which comes from human grown trees.
- W. The SLM approach must include innovative alternatives, such as the comestible *Jatropha*, other more specific to certain soils (shaded coffee, fruit), and others.
- X. The question of changes in the mode of operation is broader and covers agricultural activities in general, as for example the case of vetiver (*Chrysopogon zizanioides*) in areas of intensive farming in the upper basin of Cavaillon.
- Y. The approach by Territorial Planning must actually be part of the entire SLM, but it needs for this to be fed adequately by local experimentation. The CIAT has to be that the LD becomes a central concern in planning land use.
- Z. Working under watersheds concept consistently with the objectives of SLM requires that all investments in degraded forest areas at risk are made by the farmers themselves and in their interest, so as to ensure ownership and sustainability.

iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations

| | |
|------------------|---|
| AECI | Spanish Agency of International Cooperation (currently AECID) |
| AR | Annual Report |
| CC | Climate Change |
| CDR | Combined Delivery Report |
| CIAT | Inter-ministerial Committee for Territorial Planning |
| CIDA | Canadian International Development Agency |
| CIMATE | Inter-ministerial Council on Territorial Planning and Environment |
| CIP | Inter-institutional Steering Committee |
| CNIGS | National Center for Geo-Spatial Information |
| CONATE | National Council for Territorial Planning and Environment |
| CPAP | Action Plan of the Country Programme (UNDP) |
| DDA | Departmental Direction of Agriculture |
| DDE | Departmental Directorate of Environment |
| DFS | Department of Forests and Soil Conservation (MARNDR) |
| DSE | Department of Soils and Ecosystems (MDE) |
| EAP | Action Plan for the Environment |
| ECLAC | Economic Commission For Latin America and the Caribbean |
| EEU (UNDP – EEU) | Environment and Energy Unit (of UNDP) |
| FAMV | Faculty of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine |
| FAO | United Nations Food and Agriculture |
| GBR | Results Based Management |
| GEF | Global Environment Fund |
| GIS | Geographic Information System |
| GTZ | German Cooperation (currently GIZ) |
| IADB | Inter-American Development Bank |
| IFS | Integrated Finance Strategy |
| INARA | National Institute of Agrarian Reform |
| LADA | Land Degradation Assessment in Dry lands |
| LCD | Fight against Land Degradation |
| LD | Land Degradation |
| LIS | Land Information System |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MARNDR | Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development |
| MoE | Ministry of Environment |
| MPCE | Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation |
| MSP | Medium-Sized Project |
| NAPA | National Action Plan for Adaptation |
| NAPCD | National Action Program to Combat Desertification |
| NCSA | National Capacity Self-Assessment |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organizations |
| OBC | Organization Based on the Community |
| PAGE | Program Management Support for Environment |
| PARD | Action Plan for Recovery and Development |
| PIR | Project Implementation Review |

| | |
|--------------|--|
| PMU | Project Management Unit |
| PNIA | National Plan for Agricultural Investment |
| PNSAN | National Plan for Food and Nutritional Security |
| PRODOC | Project Document |
| PRSP | National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction |
| QOR | Quarterly Activity |
| QR | Evaluative Question |
| UNDP - RCLAC | UNDP Regional Center for Latin America and the Caribbean |
| RTA | Regional Technical Assistant |
| SC | Steering Committee |
| SLM | Sustainable Land Management |
| SNU | UN System |
| TA | Technical Assistant (National) |
| TE | Terminal evaluation |
| UAT | Territorial Planning Unit (MPCE) |
| UNCCD | United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDP | Program of the United National Development |
| UNDP - CO | Country Office, UNDP |
| UNDP – EEU | UNDP Environment and Energy Unit |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment |
| UNIQ | University Quisqueya |
| UN-ISF | United Nations - Integrated Finance Strategy |
| UTSIG | Geographic Information System Processing Unit |
| WFP | World Food Program |
| WMGP | Watershed Management General Policy |

1. Introduction

▪ Purpose of the evaluation

In accordance with UNDP-GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full and medium-sized country projects supported by UNDP with GEF and other financing should undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation.

The Terms of Reference set out the scope, methodology, content, timing and team composition expectations for a Terminal Evaluation (TE) of the Capacity Building in and Mainstreaming of Sustainable Land Management in Haiti Project (PIMS # 3414). The purpose of the evaluation is to:

- Assess overall performance against the project objectives as set out in the Project Document and other related documents
- Assess project relevance to national priorities, as well as UNDP and GEF strategic objectives
- Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the project
- Critically analyze the implementation and management arrangements of the project
- Assess the sustainability of the project interventions
- Document lessons and best practices concerning project design, implementation and management which may be of relevance to other projects in the country and elsewhere in the world.

▪ Scope & Methodology

The evaluation will cover six major criteria: **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, results, sustainability and impact.**

Project performance will be measured based on the Project Logical Framework, which provides clear performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification.

The list of Evaluative questions provided by the ToRs was organized by criteria and distributed to different type of sources: documental, executors, beneficiaries, other stakeholders.

▪ Structure of the evaluation report

The present report provides a systematic answer to each of the Evaluative Questions (EQ) formulated in the TORs. The answers are organized according to the three mayor dimensions of the evaluation: 1) the conception or the programmatic intention, i.e. the design and formulation, 2) the implementation processes, and 3) the results obtained (outputs and outcomes), along with their consequences (impacts, where there is evidence of them).

The next chapter provides a brief Project description and development context, which contains basic data related to project start and duration, the description of the core problem it pretended to address, its logic structure of objectives at different levels, baseline indicators, main stakeholders and expected results.

Below, the main findings chapter is divided in three sections that reflect the three dimensions of the TE.

The first section deals with the assessment of Project design and formulation, starting with the review of the situational diagnostic and barriers assessment, which accuracy is the logic cornerstone of the whole proposal, followed by the analysis of the logframe and results matrix, of the project. To put the causality chain in its institutional context, assessments are made of both programmatic guidelines the intervention should have taken into account, that are the UNDP and GEF plans in the country and the national policies framework. This leads to the review of the assessment of risks and crucial assumptions at all levels of the log frame and the eventual lessons taken from other relevant projects. This section ends with the description of the designed institutional arrangements and planned stakeholder participation.

The second section of the evaluation focuses on the implementing agency comparative advantage (UNDP – CO and the regional GEF / UNDP unit as a partner), then analyzes the difficulties of the process of support and supervision, and then assess the quality of the M&E system (design and implementation) and the use of eventual feedbacks from it, i.e. the quality of adaptive management. On the other hand, the evaluation focusses on the executive agency (the MoE) and its several kind of partners, from closer (MARNDR, MPCE) to the more distant, first describing them and their roles in the project, and thus assessing the institutional arrangements made on the way to facilitate their participation, including the linkages with other projects. This section ends with the evaluation of financing and co-financing aspects, taking into account the close relation between co-financing and participation.

The third section of the evaluation focusses primarily on the specific difficulties met during the execution and then on the obtained results, following the causality chain, the logical order of components and not in the arbitrary order of the objectives of the PRODOC, because the arisen difficulties are logically connected one to the other, and can thus be understood better by following the implicit causality which binds them. It starts from the outputs that are evaluated according to the fixed objectives, then from the point of view of their contribution to the level of expected outcomes. As transversal requirements, are evaluated too the country ownership and the mainstreaming success of the project, and specifically the kind of changes occurred in the national policy context related with SLM purposes, which appears to be an independent shift in the baseline, not attributable to the project but significant for the sustainability of its reduced outcomes.

Finally, the main report closes with a section of conclusions and recommendations. Conclusive judgments are divided by the same three sections of the findings, while the recommending section contains the following topics: corrective actions for the design, implementation and M&E, actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project, and proposals for future directions.

2. Project description and development context

■ Project start and duration

The Project, formulated during year 2006, started in July 2008 but the inception workshop, which marks its actual kick off from the point of view of national institutions, was held only in November 2008. After the earthquake in January 2010, the project was "put in standby" for 6 months. In the administrative practice, he really started again only in September, but the extra time which was granted to it was of 6 months only. It was closed on December 31st, 2011. Nonetheless, some unfinished activities were endorsed to another UNDP project of institutional support to the MoE, to be executed in the first semester of 2012.

■ Problems that the project sought to address

The long-term sustainable development of Haiti demands that land degradation trends and issues be addressed as a matter of priority in order to ensure ecosystem integrity and functionality and thereby the sustainability of agricultural production, rural livelihoods, and hydroelectric energy production.

The long-term goal of the project is to contribute to global benefits through the promotion of Sustainable Land Management initiatives that will enhance and maintain ecosystem productivity and ecological functions through capacity building in and mainstreaming for SLM. The objective of the project is to create an enabling environment for SLM by developing capacities within appropriate government and civil society institutions/user groups and mainstreaming into government planning and strategy development to halt and where feasible to reverse desertification processes in Haiti.

▪ **Immediate and development objectives of the project**

Objective: To contribute to reversing land degradation trends through the creation of an enabling environment for SLM by developing capacities within appropriate government and civil society institutions/user groups and through mainstreaming SLM considerations into government planning processes in Haiti.

The project has 4 outcomes: i) SLM principles are mainstreamed into national policies, plans and legislation; ii) Capacity building for SLM is enhanced through training and inter-sectoral approaches; iii) Capacities for knowledge and awareness for SLM strategies and options are developed including by development of Land Information Systems and land tenure assessments; and, iv) Resource mobilization in support of SLM is enhanced and an Investment Plan is developed.

According to the PRODOC, the SLM project had four substantive outcomes. Confusion is introduced by the mention of a fifth one which is actually the budget line that registers the fixed costs of operation of the management unit (PMU), including the budget assigned to the M&E. As it has been dubbed as "Knowledge Management for the Adaptive Management", reason why the PMU and supervision missions tended to classify under this concept some studies produced during the project, especially when they were at charge of the officials of the PMU instead of hired consultants.

▪ **Baseline Indicators established**

| Objectives | Baseline indicators |
|---|---|
| Objective of the Project: | National development plans do not prioritize SLM issues Senior decision-makers are not committed to SLM issues Few NGOs and CBOs promote SLM but efforts are isolated and fragmented |
| Outcome 1: SLM principles are mainstreamed into national policies, plans and legislation | NAP does not exist. No NAP monitoring SLM considerations are not reflected in sector policies; sectoral policy documents that address some desertification issues under development, but fragmented New Decree for Environmental Management issued in 2005 does not fully incorporate SLM considerations |
| Outcome 2: Capacity building for SLM is enhanced | Staff at relevant government agencies is inadequately trained in SLM. SLM options are not practiced by rural communities which have poor capacity; training programs are developed covering various technical requirements by bi-lateral agencies and other donors, but do not necessarily promote SLM options in a comprehensive manner Training in GIS limited to one or two specialized agencies; use of GIS in planning poorly understood Comite Interinstitutionnelle de Pilotage exists but has not yet effectively tackled SLM issues |
| Outcome 3: Capacities for knowledge and awareness for SLM strategies and options are developed | There is little understanding of these planning tools, and no LIS exists Information on land use and land degradation is very fragmented. |

| Objectives | Baseline indicators |
|---|---|
| | <p>Land ownership and rights not well defined</p> <p>Computerized land information system does not exist.</p> <p>The impact of fuel wood harvesting on watersheds not fully understood; intensification of upland agriculture is planned without adequate consideration for SLM</p> |
| Outcome 4: Mobilization of Resources is improved | <p>No MTIP exists</p> <p>Donor interest in funding projects that address the issue of land degradation exist, and targeted projects under development in some regions of Haiti</p> <p>No MTIP monitoring</p> |

▪ Main stakeholders (as designed in PRODOC)

The key Stakeholders identified in this project include government ministries, private sector groups, civil society bodies and resource users.

The Ministry of Environment (MoE) mandate and responsibilities are directly or indirectly related to sustainable land management. It will be the lead Executing Agency and will house the Project Management Unit (PMU).

The Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) also has mandates and responsibilities along with the MoE in natural resources management. The MARNDR intervenes in watersheds management and as well as in soil conservation and restoration.

Other institutions concerned by the topic of land management are the Direction of Natural resources, the Services of Parks and Forests, water resources in the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Institute for Agrarian Reforms, the Center for Agricultural Research, and scientific and academic communities.

The Ministry of Planning (MPCE) has a clear mandate for land use planning. Its Division of Remote Sensing and GIS (UTSIG) will have an important role in the project in providing satellite imagery for mapping and monitoring, and in providing assistance to resource managers and regulatory bodies who use remote sensing imagery.

The University, through the various Faculties of Agriculture, especially the State Faculty of Agronomy (FAMV) and Quisqueya University (UniQ) will have a central role in capacity building for SLM.

The various civil society groups, local NGOs and community based organizations (CBO) will be integrated into the project as beneficiaries and also as resource persons. The Ministry of Education and Professional Training (MENPT) will work in close association with the University to include SLM components into their curricula for training of primary and secondary school teachers. The MENPT will help in awareness rising on SLM in its various environmental workshops.

The Ministry of Interior will benefit from appropriate human resources to develop SLM guidelines to be incorporated into the conditions of development permits granted by the various municipalities to carry out sound land management policies at local level.

▪ Expected Results

The project will have four outcomes and 16 outputs as follows (PRODOC, 64)¹:

¹ In the whole report, the references to the PRODOC are accompanied by a number which refers to the paragraph sequential numeration.

Outcome 1: SLM principles are mainstreamed into national policies, plans and legislation.

Total cost: USD 567,000; GEF request: USD 42,000; Co-financing USD 525,000

Output 1.1 National and local capacities to integrate SLM principles into macroeconomic development policies and planning to achieve the MDGs and PRSP enhanced

Output 1.2 Regulatory frameworks harmonized

Output 1.3 National Action Plan for UNCCD completed

Outcome 2: Capacity building for SLM is enhanced *Total cost: USD 580,000; GEF request: USD 100,000; Co-financing USD 480,000*

Output 2.1 Training in integrated land information systems/GIS/ remote sensing at national and regional levels delivered

Output 2.2 Training of farmers, NGOs and CBOs in SLM and incorporation of gender sensitization into SLM activities accomplished

Output 2.3 Capacities for restoration and management of degraded mountain ecosystems enhanced

Output 2.4 Expertise in environmental/natural resource economics developed

Output 2.5 Interdisciplinary skills and inter-sectoral approaches enhanced

Outcome 3: Capacities for knowledge and awareness for SLM strategies and options are developed *Total cost: USD 940,000; GEF request: USD 200,000; Co-financing USD 740,000*

Output 3.1: Participatory assessments and status report of the sustainability of land use systems in a pilot area undertaken

Output 3.2 Land Information Systems (tools, guidelines and manuals) and sharing of Knowledge on SLM developed

Output 3.3 Land ownership, tenure and property rights of lands in a pilot area assessed

Output 3.4 Impacts of fuel wood consumption on ecosystem sustainability in a pilot area evaluated

Output 3.5 Productivity and sustainability of upland farming by adopting SLM in a pilot area improved

Outcome 4: Mobilization of Resources is improved. *Total cost: USD 65,000.00; GEF request: USD 25,000; Co-financing USD 40,000*

Output 4.1 An Investment Plan developed

Output 4.2 Resource mobilization Plan prepared

Outcome 5: Adaptive Management and Learning. *Total cost: USD 307,000; GEF request: USD 112,000*; Co-financing: USD 195,000*

Output 5.1 Project implemented in a cost-effective manner in accordance with agreed work plans and budgets;

Output 5.2 Monitoring and Evaluation Plan provides inputs for robust adaptive management;

Output 5.3 Lessons learned from the project captured and disseminated.

* Includes M&E Budget

Note: this is a clear example of the confusion caused by the registration of management costs as if they were another substantive objective, while actually they should be distributed in each real objective, if the budget was elaborated by activity. Consequently, in the same section of the PRODOC, four outcomes are announced and then five appear in the list.

3. Findings

3.1 Project Design / Formulation

▪ Accuracy of the situational and barriers assessment

The initial situation diagnostic belongs to the collection of assessments related to the description of soil erosion in Haiti and the explanation of its causes. Among them, there is consensus on the existence of the problem and its consequences, not necessarily on its manifestations, of which there is no specific and even less accurate and localized measurements. The immediate factor of soils erosion commonly reported is the effect of water, which connects soil protection and SLM to watershed management, without necessarily being synonymous. However, both its causes and modalities are diverse, and even on the first there is no consensus.

The concept that prevails in the PRODOC is related to the set of analyzes available at this time (in 2006) in Haiti. The phenomenon of land degradation (LD) is considered "the most overwhelming environmental problem in the country" (PRODOC, 6) and a measure is provided: "an estimated 30 M tons/year of top soil are lost due to soil erosion, although the hot-spot areas of erosion have not yet been determined"(PRODOC, 11)².

The consequences of LD are considered from two perspectives: the loss of crop yields and increased risk of silting and flooding in the valleys, causing the loss of effectiveness of dams and irrigation systems, or their destruction, and a permanent threat to the road network and urban fabrics, which are mainly located in the plains. In conclusion "Land degradation is also considered as one of the primary causes of many environmental problems facing Haiti, with consequent impacts on the economic well-being of the population" (PRODOC, 11).

Its direct causes are classified in three types: i) inappropriate cultivation practices (unsustainable agriculture), ii) deforestation and iii) land tenure modalities. Although each of these factors has its own nuances, and there is no estimation of their respective contributions to the phenomena, the interpretation of the PRODOC tends in a sole direction: the poverty of the rural population and its rapid growth.

Behind the spread of inappropriate cropping and cattle rising practices, are mentioned at once inadequate extension systems, lack of connection to markets of the rural population and lack of access to credit (PRODOC, 27-28), i.e. a set of classical variables of agricultural development. However no mention is made about the many situations in which Haitian peasants set up intensive agroforestry systems, thus guaranteeing the reproduction of fertility and soil conservation in their farm.

Deforestation is attributed to various factors, including the excessive extraction of commercial timber in the mid-20th century, but the diagnostic seems to ignore that deforestation is an old phenomenon of exploitation, dating back to colonial times, and accelerated early in the 19th century, when the Haitian government self-financed by selling concessions to foreign companies. However the main cause in the last decades is attributed to logging for various domestic purposes (firewood, coal, construction) and therefore linked to population growth and the search for alternative income by rural dwellers which farm incomes are increasingly insufficient. Nonetheless, there are sources that provide some mitigation to this argument. For example this one, wrote before the project began, but after the PRODOC: "It is therefore necessary to qualify and put to its rightful place the role of logging for coal in the process of deforestation..."(INESA / PAGE, 2008).

The third root cause mentioned, refers to both the lack of legal certainty which prevails over the occupation of land in most cases (due to the high cost of registration and lack of effectiveness of the land tenure conservation system, as well as the lack of cadaster in most of the country), as well as the split of tenure by a mode of inheritance which give access to

² Annual soil losses are calculated at 36.6 million tons, and 6% of the land area is impacted by irreversible erosion (zero soil left remaining) (PNUE, 2010).

land to all the beneficiaries instead of giving preferential access to the most suitable in order to maintain the property intact. These factors are stated to be an obstacle to the execution of investments for soil conservation by the occupants. However, in the table summarizing the arguments of the chapter, the concept is substituted by another, with quite a different meaning: the inaccurate planning of land use, thus introducing a forth root cause, not developed in the diagnostic.

Behind the direct causes, the diagnosis of the PRODOC pointed out two underlying factors: the extreme poverty and high population growth, and established how the consequences mentioned above (loss of productivity and destruction) have a feedback effect on poverty, thus closing the vicious circle. As for population growth, it must be admitted that in the past it was mainly absorbed by urban marginality belts and by emigration, but the most recent disaster, the earthquake of January 2010, launched a massive return to the countryside, which makes even more relevant, if possible, the objectives of environmental protection and SLM in particular.

However, some generalizations may be overly simplistic. There are factors of peasants' behavior that become indirect drivers of LD and are much more concrete. As prominent examples it is worth to mention the sharp reduction in coffee areas (11% of agricultural land) in the 80': plantations damaged by a cyclone have not been restored since small producers have little interest in a culture that generate a significant income mostly to the collectors and the state, although the coffee, in adequate conditions of culture is an agricultural speculation with large positive effects on SLM. Similarly, many fruit trees in the farms, including non-commercial quality of mango very well valued by the pigs, were turned useless, causing their cut and its adverse consequences for soil protection, after the mass slaughter of these animals in response to a threat of swine fever that would have affected US economic interests.

To complete this review of the interpretation of the situation established in the PRODOC, should also be mentioned the **diagnosis of the institutional and legal situation**, which clearly reflects a fragmentation of roles and overlapping competencies³, as well as a legal framework profuse and ineffective at a time, and a policy framework that is "outdated and needs to be substantially revised" (PRODOC, 24). Under these conditions of lack of cohesion of legal and institutional responses, mainstreaming is a task that goes far beyond the simple alignment of the objectives of existing policies with the requirements of the SLM. What is needed is a coherent policy, institutional and legal framework, what can be a logical inconsistency for the effectiveness of effect #1, especially for the lack of sufficient institutional resources to address this task.

With respect to the problems of land tenure and planning of land use, sometimes mutually confused, they are not addressed in the institutional analysis. This is indeed a complex issue but it has been thoroughly investigated by the INARA, with funding from FAO and IADB (INARA / FAO / IADB - 1997).

Conversely, the diagnosis goes further and indicates a crucial factor to obtain concrete results of the project (but that is clearly not addressed in the proposal, as discussed in the next section): the complexity of the situation at the local level, due to three factors: the wide variety of non-state actors that respond to extremely diverse mandates, the low capacity of central institutions for action in the field and the complex overlapping of competencies of local governments, transferred to them without the corresponding capabilities.

Once the diagnostic was concluded, a mention was made of the **barriers** which limit or prevent the action and that the project should seek to eliminate or at least to reduce. The first of these refers to the absence of a diagnosis quantifying "technical capacities with respect to the ability of the institutions to perform specific roles or functions related to natural resources or sustainable land management".

³ "The responsibilities for land management practices and related issues lie with a number of agencies, often without any coordination mechanism"(PRODOC, 22).

The lack of diagnosis is a barrier that is not overcome by component 2, which provides a menu of training: use of automatic mapping tools and environmental economics, assuming a diagnosis already made. In fact, what needs to be diagnosed is the state of art of the causes and solutions to LD that already shape the vision of the stakeholders at all levels, in order to design the content of a training plan.

Echoing the findings related to deficiencies at the local level, is reaffirmed as a second barrier the importance to have "appropriate trained personnel within NGOs and community based associations" in order to implement the recommended actions by UNCCD "especially at local level ... due to lack of technology" (PRODOC, 34)⁴. This barrier refers to the issue of pilot actions, which has not been solved.

The third barrier refers to the "weak financial capacity of public institutions to commit budget funds, and difficulties in mobilization of additional external funds and in orienting these towards the promotion of sustainable land use systems, (which) translates into insufficient financial support at the local level, (though) financial mechanisms, such as credit instruments or other incentives, (that) are necessary to enable farmers" (PRODOC, 35). The project could not aim to fill this gap, due to its small budget, but may help to raise funds in the future.

- **Analysis of LFA/Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)**

This section deals with a set of evaluative questions aimed to know whether the project proposal presented a logic sequence responding to the previous situation analysis – and specifically to the barriers – and whether it brought an added value to all statements already advocated in Haiti to face the problem of soil erosion. Was it the most accurate action to be done with the available resources? The response is presented effect by effect, ensuring consistency with the overall objective.

As the central problem is land degradation (LD), the overall objective which aims to contribute to its reduction, is coherent with the diagnosed problem. The specific objectives, however, does not directly address the factors by themselves, nor the indirect factors, but the barriers that constraint the effectiveness of actions: The lack of cohesion of legal and institutional responses; the lack of a precise diagnosis of the necessities of capacity building; the need for analytical tools and references; the need for a long-term financing mechanism.

From this perspective, the overall objective responds to the problem as it was formulated, while the effects address the barriers and (in part) the institutional diagnosis, but **the removal of barriers does not lead to the overall objective unless policies are translated into action, unless the capabilities effectively carry out these actions and unless the actions are actually based on valid models.**

This assumption implies concrete qualified action, as suggests the indicator "Productivity and sustainability of upland farming by adopting SLM in a pilot area improved" of the overall objective. Failing this kind of actions, the contribution of the SLM project is focused only at the institutional level, and thus remains at the end of the project, at best, as an increased capability, but without any real change in the mentioned indicator.

Outcome 1: SLM principles are mainstreamed into national policies, plans and legislation. Expected results, expressed by their indicators, are those one would expect from a mainstreaming process, leaving also part of the task to a document to be articulated by the country, under guidelines of the UNCCD. To influence policies, a political arrangement is required, that supplies technical and decision making. This can be difficult to reach through a project, and should in this case to be well focused and rely on a sound method and a good institutional framework. Contributing to the higher goal will thus depend on the ability of government to put in practice guidelines of sectoral policies, which depends on the results of the objective of component 2 (i.e. outcome 2).

⁴ "Technicians at the ground level often have limited training in ecosystem functions, planning procedures, and in impact assessment" (PRODOC, 35).

For example, if land use planning⁵ is directed towards the reduction of utilization in areas not considered suitable for agriculture, it will have few synergies with the actions of other ministries responsible for the support to farmers, or on social practices in the watershed. On the contrary, if it favors the dissemination of good practices like those which intensive small farmers have already set up in different zones of the country, using farming systems, tree and livestock that contribute to the reversion of land degradation and even to improve them, it will have more opportunity to contribute to changing social practices. Public actions in relation to domestic use and commercial timber should be subjected to the same criterion.

The other major limitation faced by national capacity, even "enhanced" to contribute in some measure to the impact of the project lies in the limited presence and capacity of the state in local levels of government and local authorities. The local public administration does not have knowledge or tools or means to intervene effectively on the theme of land management in general and especially of SLM. This was mentioned in the diagnosis but not addressed in the proposal.

Outputs 1.1 - 1.2: The integration of SLM into national policies, macroeconomic and development was supposed to come from "national and local capacity," without more precisions. The incidence on public policy requires lobbying techniques appropriate to each socio-political context, but the keys consist in identifying the "opinion leaders" and other persons which are accredited as sources of the ideas to be adopted. As noted by the international consultant at the beginning of the project⁶, this was a too big task, which could be considered only with a strict restriction in the selection of targeted policies. The same argument applies to the impact on the regulatory framework that must at the end of the journey be harmonized with the programmatic one⁷.

Output 1.3: The formulation of the NAPCD had to follow a predetermined methodology, supposed to be without difficulty, but in fact it was at the crossroads of two complex and unresolved problems: one of a technical nature: on the basis of what materials, practical evidences, learned lessons, should it be formulated?. And a political one: how to ensure the adoption by the authorities? The first problem calls to the critic of the project's internal logic already mentioned: Either the relevant data for any particular combination of local situations specific to Haiti already existed, thus why not start by making the state of art? Either they did not exist, thus in this case it was first necessary to produce them, which automatically located the outcome 2 in a dependent logical position, in the expectation on the results of outcomes 2 and 3.

Outcome 2: Capacity building for SLM is enhanced. Capacity building is not precisely defined (in agreement with the diagnosis). Through the indicators used in the latest version of PRODOC, it can be deduced that trained personnel should come from national and local administrative bodies, but it had to involve rural communities too⁸, and their contents should

⁵ The Planning of land use: (MPCE role, contribution of expected result # 3) should not be limited to a set of norms enacted by the state. It is not enough to have instruments of spatial analysis to define regulations on land use that will apply to land users of any kind. It is also necessary to be able to produce concrete and durable changes in practices, in spite of the diversity of rationalities to which they obey.

⁶ "My personal opinion on this is that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to integrate SLM principles into national policies, plans, etc. except at those points in time at which the government decides to revise individual policies plans, etc. The project has not yet determined if any policies, plans, etc. will be revised during the life of the project", Comments and Recommendations on the Log frame of the Capacity Building and Mainstreaming of Sustainable Land Management in Haiti Project - Roy Hagen, January 2009.

⁷ "Furthermore, the whole output is extremely vague. The specific legal and regulatory constraints were not identified during project preparation. So the identification of specific needs must be added as an additional activity", Roy Hagen, informal note.

⁸ Number of professionals in the principal national and local agencies responsible for environment and lands qualified to deal with SLM; Training programs and awareness raising programs for local communities are being implemented in a financially sustainable manner and cover a range of technical requirements and alternative practices.

be characterized by the introduction of spatial analysis tools⁹. They should manage to be functional at different scales and thus could facilitate cross-sectoral approach. In fact, according to the latest indicator for this purpose, it was not just "training", but also the practical operation of inter-sectoral coordination mechanisms¹⁰.

The contribution to the overall objective in any case depends on training contents, and policy directions set for a plurality of solutions tailored to the diversity of local conditions. But these contents were not determined in advance, the general orientation in the PRODOC was mainly oriented to cartographic analysis tools.

A general problem, which could affect the achievement of results of this project component, was that there was "no evident overall assessment of capacity development needs for SLM conducted during the project preparation". It was expected that the "NCSA process will provide key information in this regards"¹¹. In absence of it, "it would be important to be able to target accurately the training in order to ensure greatest impact." But the project did not really have the time or ability to do elaborate such assessment. This same observation applies to the activities planned for this component, which relate to different dimensions of social capital.

The core theme is to assess whether technical tools are needed, such as economic analysis and mapping, operated by a small number of technicians and managers and known for some of the managers or a change of vision in a critical mass of people in a group of national and local structures is required. Additionally it is worth to determine on the basis of what sources the formative content is established.

Product 2.1: "Training in integrated land information systems/GIS/ remote sensing at national and regional levels delivered", refers to a type of training oriented to the use of automatic mapping tools. The statement is very similar to that of the product 3.2 with which it could merge. Applies to it the same recommendation of the international consultant¹². This classification error in the log frame is due to the beneficiaries of these formations, which are defined as "Train staff from MoE, MARNDR and MPCE in LIS, LMIS, GIS tools".

The problem raised by this distinction is that it reduces a priori the interest of public servants technical to a very sharp training, focalized on the tools which insulated impact on the institutional system related to SLM will be low. This theme is comparable to that of the 2.5 product on which it is stated that the SLM approach essentially means an intersectoral and integrative approach. Nothing is said about it in the PRODOC, but it was necessary to ensure that it was not one more training among others, but the focus of all training activities.

This conduces to another issue: on what sources are the formative contents for capacity building made up? The recommendation was that "the training here could focus on the diffusion/training of the results of a knowledge management review of best practices/ lessons learned".

This point raises the crucial question of the relationship between the technical content of training and knowledge management (effect 3). Again, the log frame appears to be flat (all the outcomes at the same level) but actually there is a causal relationship between them. It appears that the results of the outcome 3 are, at least partially, the basis upon which the

⁹ Number of staff trained in GIS and land information systems.

¹⁰ An effective inter-sectoral mechanism for SLM meets regularly and is effective and is sustainable.

¹¹ Comments added by the RTA on the recommendations of the international consultant. In fact it seems that there was confusion about the respective roles of the projects on this aspect, since, according to the PRODOC « the MSP will provide the NCSA with capacity assessment and capacity building on SLM. The NCSA will benefit from information collected in terms of; needs, gaps constraints analysis, root causes analysis and opportunities for capacity building to combat land degradation" (PRODOC, 76).

¹² "One will need to ensure that one identifies real information needs. I'm not sure that the lack of a LIS poses a real barrier to SLM. What are the LIS needs of those few who have the means, the motivation and the mandate to make a difference? And who can ensure the sustainability after the project of any land information system to be developed?" Id.

capacity building process (outcome 2) is to be based, while the results of the two inputs are necessary for outcome 1, as seen before.

Output 2.2: The analysis of the potential demand for training "SLM field operators - the projects and NGOs working in the field" should have been made in advance, thereby delaying the initial schedule, according to which training activities should have been achieved mainly during semesters 2 and 3 (thus during the year 2009). Moreover, "one should pay strong attention to the pilot sites need". In this sense, the international consultant put in evidence, even for this product which does not mention it explicitly, the importance of defining specific fields of application of the contents of the project ("pilot sites").

The question of pilot sites thus arose early in the project execution. It was clearly foreseen in the concept of the formulation mission, but did not receive the same support from other parties, which eventually results in the fact that "nothing is said about pilot sites in the PRODOC under implementation modalities/process. Pilot sites/ pilot areas are mentioned repeatedly but obliquely in the logframe". In some products, the pilot sites are considered explicitly in the PRODOC, in others they are implicit.

Product 2.3: "Capacities for restoration and management of mountain ecosystems enhanced", is of the products specifically related in the PRODOC with the concentration in one or more pilot sites. As such, it should be part of outcome 3, which focuses the approach of the pilot sites. The international consultant recommended concentration in sites other than those with high density of peasant agriculture, best known, for those areas heavily used, often in a "mining way", for wood and cattle, which problematic is very poorly known, and also suggested a possible solution which coincides with the current trend¹³.

Output 2.4: The trainings in use and practical applications of environmental economics should have also been based on concrete situations¹⁴. The RTA in charge of the project stated this idea by suggesting that "links need to be established with the Artibonite project when it starts up".

Outcome 3: Capacities for knowledge and awareness for SLM strategies and options are developed. This aims to develop and disseminate innovative tools for analysis and territorial planning, with concrete local applications as a pilot, incorporating relevant information about land use, rights and land access¹⁵. All of this should be targeted at local levels that may influence land use practices. The aim was to go even beyond and to propose actions based on best practices in similar contexts, as evoked by the fourth indicator¹⁶.

Once installed information systems, it would still be necessary to rely on skills to use them for analytical purposes, including the construction of synthetic zoning for sectoral policies. This is assumed by the indirect effect indicator that measures how far the knowledge has been put in practice, through three projects or programs, to be formulated within the framework of the project.

Product 3.1: "Participatory assessments and status report of the sustainability of land use systems in a pilot area undertaken". The concentration in pilot sites coincides with the recommendation for the product 2.3. The product 3.4 (Impacts of fuel wood consumption on ecosystem sustainability in a pilot area evaluated) could have joined them, taking into account that "The focus should be on the over-harvest and not on consumption. It should focus on the

¹³ "Much of them with over 2000 mm of rainfall per year should have a high potential for sustainable production of wood products. Semi-arid lower elevations could be managed for biofuels, charcoal/wood fuels and other wood products".

¹⁴ "Watershed / hydrological values may be one of the most important aspects to quantify." Id.

¹⁵ Innovative tools for SLM such as land functionality analysis (land-use planning), integrated assessment and LIS have been adapted to local and national needs, and are functional in places; 100% of agricultural and forest land uses in the pilot area have been digitized and are integrated into a computerized land information system; Information on land ownership and rights including public and private lands and protected areas in a pilot area are developed and utilized for land use planning.

¹⁶ At least 3 project proposals and/or programmes on forest conservation and sustainable farming practices formulated by MoE and MARNDR are using the information generated by the MSP.

degraded mountain ecosystems where very little seems to be known about the land use systems"¹⁷.

Product 3.2: "Information Systems (tools, guidelines and manuals) and sharing of Knowledge on SLM developed ". The international consultant's recommendation also applies to this product, regards to the need to carry on LIS analyzes in the concrete situations of working insertion of trainees, as a product of the training process, to promote self-development. But this required a variety of pilot where the tools could be applied.

Product 3.3: "Land ownership, tenure and property rights of lands in a pilot area assessed". It includes the recommendation for the selection of pilot actions, which are explicit in the statement of the product. According to the observation added by the RTA "definitely this will be done in the pilots".

Thus it can be appreciated how all three measures of outcome 3 were related to the issue of choice of pilot sites to organize their work. The unresolved issue, however, was whether all studies should focus on the same pilot sites, versus separately and scattered.

Product 3.5: "Productivity and sustainability of upland farming by adopting SLM in a pilot area improved". Still regarding the pilot sites, "this product is in total contradiction with the activities. The activities result only in a paper report while the product calls for actual improvements in the sustainability of the agricultural systems in a pilot area". This reflects the hesitation which prevailed on this issue during the formulation.

Moreover, the international consultant recommends the selection of sites to focus on operating systems sustainable tree cover in all its forms. This was correct and justified ex-post, but the argument about agricultural areas¹⁸ was too categorical.

Another option could have been to focus in place with intense erosive practices among the farming systems, with intensive monocultures like vetiver (*Chrysopogon zizanioides*)¹⁹, or in situations of tree cropping insufficiently combined with other crops to reach enough soils coverage. In fact the choice of the pilot would depend on the partnership that the project may have established.

Outcome 4: Mobilization of Resources is improved. The formulation of a funding strategy should logically derive from the existence of a policy and indicative plans, which are then to be funded. Achieving this goal would imply therefore that the government has adopted policies oriented to SLM and, first and foremost, the NAPCD.

But the design of this result is actually to the process, not the product. This provides a sequence of steps of institutional diagnostic, following a design which was disclosed to professionals and officials from the Caribbean region in 2008 in St. Lucia.

The formulation process involves dialogue and effective coordination within the donor community, in which UNDP should exercise leadership (with FAO and WFP, within the UN) and the entire international cooperation.

The IFS development is in a process of many actors, following an established method. However, again it should be considered its content and specific sequence. In this case, it is recommendable that the guidelines of NAPCD should be well defined and their costs accordingly estimated, before completing the formulation of the Strategy. Again the issue is of the temporal sequence of the actions.

¹⁷ This orientation was given to the study related to this product, although without the pilot actions.

¹⁸ "Haiti has a long and rich history of extension and testing of soil conservation, agroforestry, farming system improvements. It is not at all clear what this project could contribute on a pilot site that is new and innovative in the agricultural sector. It is also not clear how this would be funded or what implementation modalities would be used". Id.

¹⁹ The vetiver plant is known as an excellent medium for soil retention, as used for hedgerows. Nonetheless, its commercial use requires the total dig up of the plants (the essential oils are extracted from the roots) thus causing severe damage to the soils, which remains temporarily nude after the harvest until the next and violent rains contribute to erode it again. As Haiti is the first producer of vetiver in the World, this gives an idea of the importance of this suggestion.

- **Relevance with respect to UNDP cooperation and GEF global objectives in Haiti**

In this section, the project rationale is related with the overall programming of UNDP and the UN system cooperation in general (UNDAF). As the assessment covers the entire project cycle, this represents a period of six years, which is particularly long, especially in Haiti, given the dynamics of changes in this country, hence the importance of including these changes in the analysis.

Project formulation, in 2006, relies on the document "Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) launched in 2003, which was replaced by the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) presented in July 2004, a multidimensional development plan of more than \$1.1 billion with 4 thematic groups to deal with protection and rehabilitation of the environment. The ICF recognizes that sustainability of economic recovery efforts is threatened by the advanced deterioration of the environment", but the recommended strategy is to "actively promote the replacement of wood as the primary source of energy to fight the deterioration of land and natural resources, and to improve risk and disaster management".

As the project began in mid-2008, its implementation coincides with a programmatic phase based on normative documents, such as the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-11²⁰ and UNDAF 2009-11, both discarded since the earthquake.

The UNDP Strategic Plan has been replaced by the CP - UNDP 2009-11, according to which the "UNDP will assist the Ministry of Environment in its efforts to reverse the degradation of the environment and natural resources of Haiti. It will provide advice and support advocacy initiatives to increase preparedness and *raise awareness of sustainable land management* and climate change, with a focus on socio-economic development and food security". Different with respect to the previous document, there is no more concern for the SLM approach. The related Action Plan (CPAP 2009-11), does not provide different elements of this theme, and is limited to support environmental management in general.

The documents reflect the situation which prevails in reality: in the middle of the past decade, environmental issues were quite secondary in the overall strategy of the UNDP in Haiti, but its Environmental Unit (EU) had a great job to promote them even "inside the house". UNDP adopted a leading role in the process of the ICF regarding the focal spot of the environment, particularly by funding with own resources a significant investment in an institutional support project to MoE extended in time, the PAGE, which allowed to formulate a portfolio of projects, many of them financed by the GEF. This finding provides thus sufficient support to the qualification of "**Relevant**" to the project, although it would be more accurate to qualify it as "Pertinent", which is an absolute criterion, while the relevance is a scale criterion, which would probably be set at a middle level, if compared with other priorities of UNDP – CO. Post-earthquake programmatic documents confirm this valuation.

Similarly, in the UNDAF 2009-11, environmental protection was conceived in terms of management of natural hazards. The UN system planned to operationalize its joint framework by supporting government institutions and communities, in collaboration with civil society and international partners.

To this end, the UN system proposed to provide "a technical and financial support for capacity building of national and local environmental management. Capacity planning and management of the Ministry of Agriculture will also be strengthened ... The effort will also be on strengthening cross-sectoral coordination". The related target was that "National institutions respond effectively to natural disasters and ensure lasting fight against environmental degradation and natural resource conservation." At least, the proposed

²⁰ The UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-11 considered a "substantive support will be offered in combating land degradation and desertification (including through the Drylands Development Centre); water governance and resource management; biodiversity and ecosystem services for development; chemical management; and energy service delivery, among others. In the case of land degradation and biodiversity conservation, UNDP will continue to mobilize GEF and other funding in its capacity as an implementing agency of the GEF".

strategy included the following statement: "Strategies to control land degradation and sustainable management of water resources, developed and implemented".

After the earthquake, the UNDAF 2009-11 was replaced by the Integrated Strategic Framework of the UN System in Haiti, and (UN-ISF 2010 - 11) which contain no specific action on the issue of the environment in general or of land degradation.

With respect to SLM, the GEF approach in Haiti pretends to address the issues of land degradation directly related to biodiversity and climate change. To do this, the following type of action is considered: Promotion of activities for implementation of the plan of operation and marketing of sustainable timber resources, promotion of watershed development to diversify sources of income, Promotion of protection activities and soil conservation. These guidelines inspired the SLM project.

- **Relevance with respect to Haitian public policies framework**

The analysis is made by documentary exegesis, providing a scheme for evaluating the expected effects in terms of mainstreaming, and the evolution of its baseline.

For policies in force at the formulation of the project, the general framework is the NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION (PRSP 2008-10), which contained the following mention related to the theme of land degradation: "Because of tree felling and clearing of marginal land made by people, 25 of the 30 major watersheds in Haiti are now bare (DSM 1999) and strongly affected by soil erosion". Among the suggested guidelines, the fight against LD and the sustainable management of biodiversity are only indications, without explanation of their contents.

As for the international normative framework and its applications in Haitian law, the International Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) signed by the Government of the Republic of Haiti in 1994 was ratified by the Parliament in 1996. Although the National Plan to Combat Desertification (NAP-LCD) had not yet been developed in Haiti in 2006, there was already a set of sectoral policies with potential close relations to LD and desertification: action plan for water management, national population policy, sectoral policy for watershed management, action plan for risk management and natural disasters, etc. (NAPA, 2006).

Of these, the sector policy of MARNDR for watershed management (WMGP, 1999), which seems to have had little applicability in practice, contains however an approach that fully coincides with SLM aims. It is important to mention its main features (the inclusion of farmers' constraints, integrated planning, territorial accountability), as they were already for the project a very useful framework to which he could have referred.

Some of the most relevant WMGP guidelines are the inclusion of farmers' constraints in the definition and implementation of measures against LD, the concern for a revitalization of rural communities, incentives for recapitalization of farms and sustainable alternatives to non-agricultural employment in rural areas. This orientation sets clearly the inability to put the conservation goals at such a higher level that would lead to the exclusion of rural populations or to presuppose their absorption by the industrial sector.

Integrated planning at all administrative levels requires that "watershed management actions must integrate sectoral planning of agriculture, which was included in an integrated development program, combining strategies from all sectors". This framework is precisely that which is lacking in the country, but the orientation shows clearly the direction to be taken by actions like the SLM project.

On the other hand, the responsibility for watershed management entrusted to local authorities at each administrative level (communal section, commune, department, country) is an application of the principle of decentralization. However, this innovative design has not yet been supported by the necessary resources for its implementation, because the arrangement of administrative responsibilities and staffing resources corresponding to different levels of public administration depends on a bill which has not yet been passed up to now.

In conclusion, the WMGP clearly stated that "management must be both protective and productive. The actions do not necessarily need to be focused in the most degraded areas. Rather, there must be an agricultural potential for return on investment of interventions. Interventions should help to reach a self-financing. For each production, we must encourage the development of a complete and consistent market chain..." This concept, written in 1999, is fully consistent with the concept of SLM, and should therefore have remained at the center of the mainstreaming and training process.

Elaborated in the same year, but from the MoE side, the Action Plan for the Environment (EAP, 1999) provides the framework for planning actions of environmental management. Sustainable management of natural resources, including soils, appears to be one of the national priorities. The EAP has ten programmatic areas of intervention, among which three are related closely to the fight against LD. These are: (i) Strengthening the management capacity of the environment, (ii) Energy for Sustainable Development, (iii) Watershed management strategy.

The most important and recent normative document related to SLM is the decree that sets the national policy of environmental management, (MoE decree of October 2005), which "provides a new framework and structural arrangements and regulation for sustainable development" (PRODOC, 21), thus filling the gap created by the absence of an organic law of the MDE (formulated but not yet approved up to date).

Despite its low applicability (its regulation and corresponding procedure have not yet been developed), the October 2005 decree reveals the concept about environmental issues prevailing among opinion makers. With respect to the combat to LD, the following guidelines must be stressed: need for a policy of LCD (Art.97), development of sustainable agriculture (Art.98), validity of a normative and vertical approach (Art.100, 101). In terms of land planning, the decree assumes the principle of territorial responsibility (Art.32), consistent with the decentralization policy.

To close this brief review of the normative documents existing at the time of the project formulation, should also be mentioned the National Action Plan (NAPA, 2006) whose most significant connection with the SLM approach is the recognition that, in different territories, can be found diverse traditional or innovative farming practices with great potential of CC adaptation and which should be promoted as measures to combat LD. The list of practices does not interest here, but the principle itself, that is the enhancement of traditional practices of national importance in the actual context.

These findings provide sufficient support to the qualification of "**Relevant**" to the project, either at sectoral and global policy level. Nonetheless, the same observation made above about this criterion should apply. Literally, the combat to LD is highly pertinent for the country, although it has not been given the relevance it deserves.

■ Assumptions and Risks

Risks and assumptions made (i.e. "the risks that occur external events which may affect performance and the probability that the assumptions may not be realized" were superficially appraised in the logframe. Only one global risk is appreciated in the PRODOC, which would be the same for any project: that of political instability.

There was also a set of transversal assumptions, fully justified, but that were not accompanied by measures to be taken should they not be realized:

- Willingness of other institutions to collaborate, and share information: it was an imperative condition, and it was essential to foresee an instance to which resort in the event it would not manifest.

- Investment in M & E system will be realized: although it depended partly on the PMU initiative, which had a budget for this, information systems like that SLM requires SLM cannot be temporary construction, in charge of a project, but rather a complex and permanent institutional arrangement. Its implementation depended on the same institutional factors that

could threaten the execution of project components, and then the M&E system could not function as an instrument for current management.

- The level of public investment in information systems on land and LD will continue: apply the same considerations that for the previous assumption, precisely because the M&E system should be coupled with information systems on earth and DT.

- Local communities will engage in the project. This expression could refer equally to local authorities as to village groups. In view of the pilot, this was a prerequisite, but the non-realization of this assumption would only be felt if these actions were undertaken (actually they were not).

To conclude, will be analyzed the specific assumptions for each level of the logical framework. At the overall objective level, stand three: i) Continued political support for SLM, ii) Socio-political stability, and iii) All relevant productive sectors, and government authorities understand, and remain committed to prioritizing SLM. In fact, the commitment of sectors and authorities would rather have been considered as a product of the action of the project and support from UNDP - EEU, and it was not logical to consider it as an independent variable.

For Outcome 1, the assumed conditions were: the "motivation of authorities and planners" (in different sectors); "financing of NAP-LCD and other actions from the budgets of sectoral institutions on the implementation". It is fair to assume that the allocation of public funds confirms government willingness, but one must consider that public funds are allocated to actions, and that the NAPCD is not a concrete action but (potentially) a program. Support to its content through the financing of different sectors will depend on the involvement of these to planned actions. It is therefore a possible consequence of the project (should it be able to carry on with the completion of the NAP) and not a condition.

For Outcome 2, they were: the availability of basic cartography, the involvement of national and local government, political willingness to involve NGOs and CBOs participation. Assumptions for this outcome appear to be a mix for central and local level. Once again, there was no response strategy, should they not be realized.

For Outcome 3, there is a crucial assumption about the willingness of cooperation from other institutions, and another more specific about government's commitment to strengthen land tenure and its conservation at a time, and contribute to knowledge management. This assumption is based on a correct but insufficient reading of issues that may affect the activities of this component, which may be explained by the ambiguous definition of the component itself, in which it is difficult to appreciate the role that should play the pilot on the ground.

Finally, in the case of the Effect 4, the willingness of donors is considered, which also may depend on political stability, leaving aside another substantive condition: Has the NAPCD reached a sufficient level of programmatic development to be fundable?

As a conclusion, the estimation of potential risks was superficial and it cannot be found in the PRODOC a strategy to carry on with the project, in case the expected arrangements would not occur. The institutional arrangements were not planned in the PRODOC and stakeholders are just mentioned (without taking into account their changes in the latency period which elapsed after the submission of the first proposal of project in October, 2006), the rest of the constituency of the project being to be built during the execution.

- **Lessons from other relevant projects (e.g., same focal area) incorporated into project design**

With respect to past actions of UNDP in the environmental theme, the SLM project was the first project funded by GEF in Haiti, while the projects incubated with PAGE support had not yet begun at its formulation, so there were no relevant lessons "from inside".

In 2007 was published the global evaluation of NAPCD. An exhaustive review of projects of cooperation in environmental issues was also available since 2008, but it came too late to influence the formulation of the SLM project.

Nevertheless, two general references to bilateral donor interventions were done in the formulation. One of them to « several very important projects that are both baseline and counterpart funding to on-the-ground investments in agriculture, grazing, forestry, infrastructure improvements, and capacity building... channelled through the Government and NGO sector by both CIDA and GTZ » (PRODOC, 44). Local projects, although guided by an integrated approach to agricultural development in the watershed meet the priorities expressed by residents and not the ecosystemic criteria, like LD.

The other reference was to the UNDP-GEF bi-national PBF-B initiative Integrated Management of the Artibonite International Watershed, which aimed at “promoting comprehensive, integrated ecosystem-based reforms, demonstrations and investments for the sustainable management of a strategic international watershed” (PRODOC, 47).

- **Planned stakeholder participation and management arrangements**

Except the MoE, executing institution of the project, the other public institutions consulted by the mission (DBV-MARNDR, DAT-MPCE) declared to have not been involved in the formulation, nor to be informed about its existence, when approved. It is however possible that they sent a state employee to the inception workshop - it was not possible to verify this because the appendix C of the report of the aforementioned workshop is missing of the version which was put at the disposal of the evaluation. Be that as it may, the lack of ascending administrative communication made that we do not find institutional memory on this matter.

For both main national institutions (MPCE and MARNDR), no mention is made of their installed capacity and institutional necessities, or even of the modality of their participation in the project, unless as beneficiaries of the planned trainings. They are not taken into account for the mainstreaming, nor as co-performers of the actions in the component 3. Actually, the MoE had the capacity implicitly supposed only as far as it had really appropriated the execution of the PAGE and PRIGE projects.

However, the partnership planned around SLM was not reduced to three main ministries, or to specific directions of MPCE and MARNDR. Were also anticipated other directions of the same ministries (i.e. the Direction of Natural resources, the Services of Parks, Forests and Water Resources of the MARNDR), as well as autonomous public institutions (INARA), projects (Artibonite project), other ministries (MENPT), academic institutions (Faculty of Agronomy – FAMV, and Quisqueya - UniQ university), and diverse not governmental actors of the rural development and the preservation of natural resources (Centers for the Agricultural Research).

In this set of actors, universities occupied a special place in the initial conception of the project, because they had to "provide the formations, researches and studies according to the specific demands generated by the activities of the project" and, at the same time they had to be beneficiaries of some training. The PRODOC contains however no realistic analysis of their capacity to assume these roles or of their needs of strengthening for it, although it was planned to hire consultants at the need. The FAMV even had to organize internally to get involved massively in the project, to prepare modules of formation, to give lectures, to prepare educational materials...

In the same sense, the organizations of the civil society must be involved at the same time as beneficiaries and as resources persons, until become the heralds of the SLM in the country. There was either no evaluation ex - ante of their capacities, which should have been based at least on a temporary list of the possible involved organizations. In the eventual possibility of the experimental actions, the participation of rural communities and state employees of the local governments was also foreseen, and must be insured "during the preparatory phase".

SLM project is essentially a development of the normative, institutional and informational framework of Haitian society related to social practices that impact on land degradation. It therefore requires that the actors involved, which are potentially numerous,

can agree on a single vision about LD, according to the diversity of biophysical and socioeconomic conditions that interact with it. This vision should be reflected in a distribution of institutional roles around common goals, and various modalities of working together with civil society.

To achieve this, the PMU should facilitate that execution might involve the ministries, organizing their own internal mainstreaming and training process, coordinating with the decentralized levels, etc. An initial diagnosis of their ability and interest in the topic had thus to be done.

The choice of institutions identified is correct, because they are entitled with a mandate in their respective fields: DSS-MDE, DBV-MARNDR, DAT-MPCE. The coordination is also entrusted to the MoE, institution that builds its capacity through various actions supported by UNDP and IADB. Besides being the host of the PMU, the MoE is involved in "policy and strategic implications of analyses of the economic and financial viability of land management systems" and should play a key role in the mainstreaming of the approach SLM in national policies and plans²¹.

Apart from the MoE, the institution host of the project, other public institutions consulted (DBV-MARNDR, DAT-MPCE) reported not being involved in the formulation, or informed of the existence of the project at its approval. (It is possible that they sent an officer to the inception workshop, but this was not possible to verify, as the Appendix C of Workshop' report is missing from the version that was made available to evaluation. In any case, the lack of administrative communication upward results in little institutional memory about it. The PRODOC did not contain any analysis of their ability, and they appear to be mentioned for the first time in the Stakeholder Involvement Plan.

The MPCE is associated with component 2, specific aspects of spatial planning and mapping management related to it. In this case, the concrete form of planned participation was the involvement of UTSIG, a specialized unit in cartographic production, located under the supervision of MPCE, whose role is to provide satellite imagery for mapping and technical assistance for their use. Its staff was included in training plans. MARNDR, in the meanwhile, was involved in the PRODOC as one of the beneficiaries of trainings.

In both cases (MPCE there MARNDR), no mention is made of installed capacity, institutional necessities, or even the mode of participation in the project, except as beneficiaries of the training provided. They are not included in the mainstreaming or as 'co-deliver' of actions in component 3.

Administrative arrangements in the PRODOC were limited to establishing that "the lead executing agency will be the Ministry of Environment in close collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture," which gave to it a more organic role than the MPCE, a more passive beneficiary, but without specifying on what basis would be built this collaboration, especially as the two institutions have asymmetric roles in the components of the project. The MARNDR, President and protagonist of agricultural development, should have a major role on the SLM.

Participation of MPCE was specified in the revised version of PRODOC, approved in August 2007. The problem that arose then is that the changes introduced in response to comments from the GEF Secretariat, were made in the budget and logical framework, but not in the text. Meanwhile, the UTSIG became an autonomous body attached to the MPCE, named CNIGS. Its involvement has been discussed and agreed, as evidenced by the letter of its director, attached to the PRODOC as of support for co-financing, which was established in the new version to 300,000 USD.

²¹ « The MoE will play an important role in the mainstreaming of SLM concerns into national plans, strategies and programs. The MoE will be the lead Executing Agency and will house the Project Management Unit (PMU). The officers in the Division of Soils and Ecosystems will receive training in the application of SLM guidelines and criteria and in the multiple concepts of ecosystem services », (PRODOC, 78).

It should be noted however that the reformulation of co-financing, in response to requests from the GEF Secretariat, introduced an additional inconsistency, because the text of PRODOC, has not been modified to take account further changes, especially regarding the arrangement with this institution that had recently been founded with more autonomy than the administrative unit that preceded it.

3.2 Project Implementation

■ UNDP comparative advantage

As noted in previous chapter, the positioning of LD has been rather superficial in key normative documents of the UN System and UNDP, and in general the environmental theme has not been raised as he deserved. The UNDP - EEU, however, had the ability to elaborate, in the second half of the past decade, a portfolio of projects in the environmental theme, and even to support with its core financing an institutional support project to MoE, the PAGE, which major achievement was to be the main incubator of this portfolio.

It was difficult to find, among the various cooperation agencies, one that had more comparative advantages for the environmental theme in general, partly for being a multilateral organization, with a better positioning for "advocacy" with public institutions, and partly because within the UN system, UNDP is the only one that shows the level of generality sufficient (compare with other such as FAO and UNEP) to address a subject as integral as SLM.

The previous statement does not mean that the situation "go it alone" that characterized the action of the UNDP – EU is positive to pursue the general environmental objectives of CPAP. It is appropriate to point out the lack of inter-agency working, particularly with FAO and UNEP, as an additional limitation to further the objectives of the LDC.

■ UNDP - CO and Implementing Partner (the regional GEF / UNDP unit) implementation / execution, coordination, and operational issues

Facing a situation characterized by numerous difficulties of execution, to which it has to be added the six months stand by following the earthquake, an adequate "mix of support and supervision"²² would have been essential for the proper functioning of the project. To evaluate the quality of this support and supervision, the mission reviewed successively: the strategic and tactical implication of the MoE and the UNDP - CO in the management of the project, the supervision and technical support from the regional GEF / UNDP unit, the M&E as a whole, the participation of stakeholders in a broad sense, and the co-financing in its different forms.

The UNDP - CO was not able to implement a close technical follow-up which would have allowed the PMU to fill the gap of information and strategic guidance in which it had to operate since the beginning of the project. The UNDP - EEU was insufficiently staffed to give an intensive technical support to the SLM project. Moreover, SLM is a new and complex theme, in which there is not enough accumulated experience, either locally and internationally. The existing staff was insufficient in front of the diversity and number of projects to be followed, and overwhelmed in a lot of administrative responsibilities.

This gap of support and supervision was not filled by a kind of "Global Operational Plan" (it would have been necessary to elaborate one in the preparatory phase), nor by a permanent technical support at least during the first months, to help in the conformation of the first arrangements with the other involved actors²³.

²² This expression intends to translate the French concept of "encadrement".

²³ The Inception report was supposed to play this role: "An Inception Report will be prepared immediately following the Inception Workshop and submitted within 3 months of the project implementation. It will include a more detailed narrative on the institutional roles, responsibilities, coordinating actions, and feedback mechanisms of project related partners. In addition, a section will be included on progress to date on project establishment and start-up activities and an update of any changed external conditions that may affect project implementation" (PRODOC, 119). However, given the schedule and the accumulated delay at the beginning to the completion of the

Moreover, the PMU was reduced to one person (its director, during the first ten months, until the hiring of the national TA in May 2009, which is an additional reason for which a strong technical support on behalf of the implementing institutions would have been suitable at the beginning.

The regional GEF / UNDP unit nor was able to supply a strong external supervision, even when the project still had a RTA on duty, particularly in the initial phase. The supervisions of the RTA were annual and ex - post, on line with the elaboration of the PIR²⁴.

Furthermore, since September 2010, that is at the same moment where the activities where effectively resumed, after the working conditions damaged by the earthquake had been restored, the project did not count any more on the RTA follow-up, and up to now there is little institutional memory about it within the regional bureau. The mission of an international consultant during the first quarter of 2009 would have been able to satisfy partially the obvious need of support of the project, but its mandate was limited to the elaboration of a proposal of "Guidelines".

Appropriate support would have been able to help the PMU to develop a stronger incidence on the institutional levels at which its staff had difficulties to reach alone. With such a limited technical follow-up, it is impossible to talk about "risk management". The difficulties indicated in the additional report of the international consultant were shared by the RTA and by the Director of the project, but this was not followed by measures to improve the situation.

These findings provide sufficient support to the qualification of **"Marginally Satisfactory"** to the process of coordination and supervision by the implementing agency (UNDP – CO) and its partner at regional level.

■ **Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation**

All the problems mentioned in the previous item are related with the design and lack of functioning of a sound M&E system. The PRODOC contained however a detailed plan of M&E in which were established the flows of information, methods of data mining and periodicity, as well as the persons in charge of the production of the information and its primary users, first of all the Steering Committee.

It was stated that the Inception Report²⁵ would establish the modalities of its functioning. In the practice, the Plan was not elaborated, and the SC was never shaped. The system of M&E was designed to function with 5 flows of information with their respective evaluative moments, defined in the PRODOC.

(1) Quarterly Operational Reports: "Short reports outlining main updates in the project progress will be provided quarterly to the local UNDP Country Office and the UNDP-GEF regional office by the project team. These will also be submitted to all members of the Steering Committee". They have fueled a quarterly monitoring process to support the UNDP office in order to detect early problems and find solutions²⁶.

Inception Workshop, it was implausible that this document can serve as a guide for the project, especially as it has to be developed by PMU itself, without any external support.

²⁴ Furthermore, since September 2010, that is at the same moment where the activities where effectively resumed, after the working conditions damaged by the earthquake had been restored, the project did not count any more on the RTA follow-up, and up to now there is little institutional memory about it within the regional bureau.

²⁵ Will be prepared immediately following the Inception Workshop and submitted within 3 months of the project implementation. It will include a detailed First Year/Annual Work Plan divided in quarterly time-frames detailing the ... meetings of the Project Steering Committee. The report will also include the detailed project budget ... including any monitoring and evaluation requirements to effectively measure project performance during the targeted 12-month time frame.

²⁶ "The *Periodic Monitoring of Implementation Process* will be undertaken by the UNDP Haiti Country Office through quarterly meetings with the project proponent, or more frequently as deemed necessary. This will allow parties to take stock and troubleshoot any problems pertaining to the project in a timely fashion to ensure smooth implementation of project activities. The Project Coordinator in conjunction with the UNDP-GEF extended team will be responsible for the preparation and submission of the following reports that form part of the monitoring process."

(2) Annual reviews. The MoE will complete an annual review of the project following the current UNDP/GEF format for Annual Project Review (APR)/Project Implementation Review (PIR). A project Terminal Report will be prepared by the Forestry Service and submitted through the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development to the UNDP CO assessing the delivery of inputs, the achievement of the project objectives and the project's impact/results²⁷.

(3) Annual surveys. "The MoE will work with the GSU and the UNDP Haiti Country Office to complete two annual surveys that each respond to two of the compulsory indicators, which are (a) a compulsory indicator at the Objective level of public awareness regarding sustainable land management; and (b) a compulsory indicator for Portfolio Outcome 1 that requires a survey of a group of land users to determine the percentage that is satisfied with available technical support".

(4) Midterm review and final evaluation. "One external mid-term review (MTR) will be performed after 18 months and a final evaluation will be conducted during the last three months of the project. Each review will consist of a three-week evaluation and will be conducted by one international consultant working with one national consultant. The focus of the MTR will be to make mid-term corrections to better achieve the project objective and outcomes during the remaining life of the project".

(5) Technical Reports. A set of technical reports "will be scheduled as part of the Inception Report, the project team will prepare a draft Reports List, detailing the technical reports that are expected to be prepared on key areas of activity during the course of the Project, and tentative due dates".

The PRODOC indicates that "the Logical Framework Matrix provides *performance* and *impact* indicators for project implementation.... These will form the basis on which the project's Monitoring and Evaluation system will be built" (PRODOC, 109). And then referred to optional indicators, but not defined them, except by establishing that some will come from the NAPCD process and others from the NCSA²⁸.

Indicators of higher level have not been used as the M&E has worked only in the flows of short periodicity, based on administrative data: Quarterly activity reports (QOR) and Annual supervisions reports (PIR and AR), which are based on performance indicators, but not related to strategic objectives, which observation should be based on less frequent but more complex studies.

The **baseline** was limited to the section included in the diagnosis of PRODOC. There had no actualization in spite of the changes occurred in the two years that have elapsed until the beginning of the project (mid-2006 to mid-2008). Nonetheless, the Baseline is based on a dynamic concept: the initial description of the situation includes the strategies of other actors, and it is expected that together they will make a contribution to change the situation, against which should be assessed the contribution of the project.

In the budget was planned a financing to execute the plan of M&E, broken in its main topics. The total amount of 62,000 USD was divided between 36,000 USD for external evaluations and 15,000 for audits, there remaining only 11,000 USD for all other actions, which had to be done within the functions of the PMU and with its own budget operation (which thus became judge and jury in the most sensitive aspect of management, which can be qualified as a design error). Of these, 3,000 USD are allocated for training workshops, and

²⁷ This structure is initially built on the PMU, which is the manager who was to perform personally report templates. "The PMU will use the Form as (a) a basis for the annual review of project progress, achievements and weaknesses; (b) as a basis for planning future activities; and (c) to feed into the UNDP Haiti Country Office-wide reporting and planning. The UNDP Haiti CO will forward this information to the GSU by 15th July of each year".

²⁸ The project's M& E System will also include indicators from NAP and NCSA and other convention or principal initiatives in order to mainstream country reporting as much as possible. To do so, the MoE and UNDP Haiti Country Office will work closely with stakeholders to avoid overlap and contradictions thereby enabling stakeholders to participate in the results of the project.

there were 5.000 USD for the biannual survey, which was clearly insufficient and 3,000 USD for operating costs (field visits).

The effective expenditure on this budget item was null, save the TE, partly because the activities actually realized were those which cost was already included in institutional expenditures.

UNDP did not invest direct institutional resources in an M&E oriented to the results, while it received part of the GEF financing for it. Neither did the regional GEF / UNDP unit. More proactivity in M&E could have helped the PMU to develop greater capacity of incidence on institutional levels to which its staff had difficulties accessing by itself.

These findings provide sufficient support to the qualification of **“Unsatisfactory”** to design and process of implementation of the M&E.

- **Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management**

The 2 first information flows provided data based on administrative supervision and reporting. SLM project was supervised by reduced, not "well-developed" PIRs²⁹. The reports of supervision were drafted (PIR, QOR, AR) but they did not reflect the problems in time, or did not reflect them at all. The annual revisions did not indicate strategic problems which would deserve corrective answers, because the indicated problems belonged to micro-management, the kind of problems to which it is necessary to give immediate answers, and not to wait for an annual revision.

The **PIRs** contain an analytical section oriented to the RBM (Challenges and difficulties in project start-up and implementation, and lessons-learned), which is conceived to report “any technical and managerial challenges or constraints you encountered during the project start up and implementation for the reporting period, as well as mitigation measures, which you applied”.

However, only a small part of the contents of this section in the three PIR is consistent with this instruction. Most comments address relevant technological issues, which would be better placed in an outcome analysis. Moreover, most of the themes reported in 2009 were repeated in 2010, with the exception of two, newly introduced: a critical concept related to the charcoal value chain, seen from an urban perspective, and the importance of articulating the solutions provided by SLM with the strengthening of value chains for products of the soil.

Based on the analyzes in this section of the PIR, it was possible to request "the assistance you would need from your respective CO, Regional Centre and Regional Centre of Excellency to overcome these difficulties" but this supposed to argue it with solid reasons, and not just reflections about various aspects of the country's reality, that the actions of the project were expected to contribute to change.

Annual revisions do not reported on strategic issues which would have needed corrective response, because the type of problems reported are of the order of micro management, which must give immediate answers, and not wait for an annual review. For example, in PIR 1 (2008 - 2009), the item "administrative challenges and limitations" attributed the delays to insufficient logistics support from PAGE. However, the constraints for the execution of training activities, studies and pilot on the ground, were at different levels, and only marginally could be invoked the lack of logistical support. Anyway, if the appreciation of the PIR in 2009 was correct, the project has already suffered from these limitations for one year at time of report, and even during a second year, since there are literally the same limitation on vehicle use of PAGE under "administrative challenges and limitations" of PIR 2 (2009-2010).

²⁹ The first one was written on time by the director, but approved by the head of the UNDP – EU only 6 weeks later, and shortly after by the ATR. The second PIR was submitted after 5 weeks, not reviewed by the UNDP – EU and approved by the ATR few days later. The third was signed jointly by the three parties, but after 6 weeks by the head of the regional GEF / UNDP unit because the project had no more RTA.

In the third PIR (2010 - 2011) the section "administrative challenges and limitations" the following judgment can be read: "a weak administrative support on behalf of the national counterparts which were supposed to provide in-kind contributions" and, consequently, "the execution of the jointly planned strategic activities was often delayed or adjourned". Even in this case, it is necessary to notice that this kind of observation, ex – post, even though they reflect a real situation, do not constitute an adequate management of the risk, because the kind of problems that are reported should not wait one year to be solved.

Actually, the constraints for the execution of the activities of training, studies and local pilot actions, were situated at various levels, and only in a marginal way we could call at their expense upon the lack of logistic backup. Be that as it may, if the appreciation of the PIR of 2009 was just, the project would have already suffered from these limitations during one year at the time of this first annual report, and even during the second year, because the same limitation due to the restrictions on the use of the vehicles of PAGE appears literally mentioned under the section "administrative challenges and limitations" of the second PIR (2009 - 2010).

The **QORs** provide a very compact but exhaustive narrative of the activities realized in the considered period. They are however descriptive, and do not contain value judgment on the state of progress, nor an understanding of the difficulties of execution.

They do not contain indicators. They are only a brief listing of actions. They allow the UNDP - CO to review the progress of various projects. When one has problems running, they are subject to a tripartite meeting, but this would be able to analyze problems, based on advances reported in the QOR.

In spite of this, the QORs provided to the supervising team (RTA and EU responsible) some perception about the little progress of the activities on behalf of the PMU. Observations were formulated, with a roadmap for its Director, but their indications had very little translation into acts.

The last available QOR (July - September 2011) includes a final comment on the indicators of higher level, the only one of the whole series: "As for the two major project targets (i) NAPCD validation and (ii) SLM practices applied in communities: (i)The NAPCD has not been approved by the parliament, yet. (ii)The target that at least 60% of communities are dedicated to SLM agricultural practices has not been reached yet. The project will close in December 2011. Required follow-up activities are in the process of being incorporated into the UNDP PAGE programme".

Again there is an attempt to introduce evidence relating to the assessment of effects and do not monitor the actual management.

The **Annual Reports** have two significant differences in relation to the PIRs, an additional (use of the matrix of results) and breaking is done by year - calendar, as well as CDR³⁰, which reports financial execution (unfortunately, not according to the results, but according to expenditure headings, as usual in financial management) while the PIR are by fiscal year EU. In fact, it would be better a single time step, keyed to the year of the project. In order to work with a single instrument, institutions shall have in place an accounting system able to transform the reports by project their own schedule.

Annual reports 2008 and 2009 were not provided. The 2010 report refers to the second half of the year. Contributions about the outcomes of the project are included. The narrative of achievements, as it is not compared with the expected goals, yields an impression of progress in all the outcomes that is overly optimistic.

The comparison with the intended targets was introduced in version 2011, but conversely, there is a simplification of information about the execution. Such topics as: Are we

³⁰ The international stakeholders (UNDP and the GEF Secretariat) operate their annual planning cycle with two different timetables: the year of the calendar for the first one, and the North American fiscal year (July to June) for the second (and thus for the regional GEF / UNDP unit which takes care of the regional supervision).

on track to achieve all targets?, Constraints and Opportunities encountered?, Location of the identified risks?, are replaced by "Lessons Learned". Another major change, the AR of 2011 refers only to the three targets of the outcome 1 of a logical framework, and there is no reporting about the rest of the project.

The main problem, however, lies in the content, in which takes data from processes initiated to replace the lack of results. For example, to affirm that the preparation process has been started by hiring a consultant to perform the translation in Creole NAPCD is not a measure of an expected result. Neither is the launching of a consultancy to develop training modules in SLM. Both are just activities. Thus the ARs do not inform about the situation of desired outcomes, not even about their own evolution, out of the scope of the SLM project (i.e. the evolution of the baseline).

- **Executive agency (MoE) comparative advantage**

The main execution agency designated in the PRODOC, the MoE³¹, was recognized as weak, with little power and little budget, but this Ministry³² has the mandate to propose policies and standards on natural resources in general, which also coincides with the concept that dominates the action, centered on a normative approach and regulatory rather than concrete actions.

However, the private uses of land may be changed not only from restrictive standards or incentive-type environment, but also by other entities and regulatory standards, which sectoral mandate has other purposes, like the Ministries of productive sectors.

However, the coordination capacity of the MoE with other sectors is low, either because of human and financial weaknesses, either because environmental issues may have to confront other priorities at government level, and even because it results impossible for all involved sectors to work together in a unique normative framework, because it doesn't exist: there is no single policy for SLM, hence the importance of the NAPCD). This situation exacerbated by the organizational culture in the Executive and in society in general, marked by rivalry and lack cooperation. This feature also applies to external projects, insofar as they are themselves inserted in this culture, which may curb the search for synergies between them.

To manage its mandate and overcome this contradiction, the MoE should not have beard alone the executive role. It should have installed a SC with the other stakeholder which implies not only consider them as beneficiaries, but this has not occurred.

As the logistical support of PAGE was serving as in-kind contribution from MoE, and since the PAGE is executed by UNDP, it was obviously more practical to locate the PMU near the center of decision. In this case, the concept of NEX applied partly because in practice the officer at the MoE relied on UNDP for micromanagement. Moreover, the PMU was transferred to UNDP physically, and also the conduction itself.

Since there was no SC, the leadership of MoE did not have to be exercised, although it would have been strengthened by sharing the conduction of the project. By transferring it to the UNDP it could not developed its capacity. It should thus be concluded that was the appropriate agency to lead the execution for institutional reasons, but it was necessary to support it in this task.

- **Stakeholders involvement and Adaptive Management (changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation)**

The participation of each of the actors was divided up and specific to the actions they were supposed to participate, due to the lack of a committee within which they could have

³¹ The MoE will be directly responsible for the timely delivery of inputs and products and for coordination *with all other executing agencies*.

³² The Ministry's implementing capacity remains limited. Its technical and financial resources are too weak for any substantial impact to take place.

planned and acted as a whole. The actors were instrumented, and generally little active, because the project itself was so.

MoE. Even in the case of the MoE, legal executor of the project, the participation was uneven during the period of execution. The Director of the Soils and Ecosystems Unit was replaced twice (in October 2008 and September 2009), what has obviously damaged the continuity of the institutional appropriation. The M&E was not effective and consequently there was no feedback at ministry level, thus no participation possible at this level too. Nor was incorporated any SC, so the participation of the public and private actors in the implementation was limited to the status of beneficiaries of some activities, and none of them reached an understanding of the whole project.

Regardless of this change, the DSE is responsible as a supervisor and officer of a large number of environmental projects, with minimal means and insufficient qualified personnel. Although the project is in charge of an autonomous unit, the beneficiary institution should manage the administrative, logistics, offices, etc., that is a set of contributions demonstrating its commitment for supporting the intervention.

MARNDR. This ministry is the second government entity that should have occupied a privileged position with regard to participation in SLM project. But it did not succeed. The Department of Forests and Soil Conservation (known as the Directorate of Watershed), main division of the Ministry concerned by SLM was not involved until later, its director having knowledge of the existence of the project that 'on the occasion of a consultation conducted as part of work on the legal system (second half 2010). Other studies in the SLM project, including the results of short missions (Prosopis, Nem, Vetiver), were not shared with the ministry, which usually demands this type of work.

DFS - MARNDR considers the environmental issues are crosscutting, while the MoE has a sectoral approach. The normative approach to establish how to exploit the soil without degrading them is mostly belongs to Agriculture scope, which enforce the importance of involving this Ministry far beyond what has been done with the participation of three technicians at a training workshop for four days and the opportunity to make contributions to a study (that of the legal system).

Should be added to the list the direction of Livestock (not interviewed during the TE), which should also be part of the stakeholders, because it is heading an important program of intensification of feeding practices animal, focused on the use of tree species, with a great potential of positive impacts on the use of the hills.

However, the foreseen partnership around SLM was not limited to the three key departments or specific directions heretofore mentioned. Were also supposed to participate other directions of the same ministries³³, autonomous public institutions³⁴, projects³⁵, other ministries³⁶, academic institutions,³⁷ and various non-governmental rural development and conservation of natural resources³⁸.

INARA. The autonomous institute, administratively dependent of MARNDR, established in 1987 and which all positions are budgeted, making it a reliable partner, has no

³³ Other institutions are the Direction of Natural resources, the Services of Parks and Forests, water resources in the Ministry of Agriculture.

³⁴ The National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INARA).

³⁵ Linkages should be made with Artibonite which will have several pilots, both of the project itself and with CIDA. According to the RTA: "Linkages to the CIDA project would be good as they are doing a lot of work on the ground".

³⁶ The Ministry of Education and Professional Training (MENPT) will work in close association with the University to include SLM components into their curricula for training of primary and secondary school teachers. The MENPT will help in awareness raising on SLM in its various environmental workshops. The Ministry of Interior will benefit from appropriate human resources to develop SLM guidelines to be incorporated into the conditions of development permits granted by the various municipalities to carry out sound land management policies at local level.

³⁷ The University, through the various Faculties of Agriculture, especially the State Faculty of Agronomy (FAMV) and Quisqueya University (UniQ) will have a central role in capacity building for SLM.

³⁸ The Center for Agricultural Research.

actions in land reform, because it is not in the agenda in the country since 1995, but has a great responsibility in security of tenure, which consists in the identification of goods, people and rights, thus creating the basic conditions for SLM. Its director has participated in the Inception workshop and professionals of the Institute attended two workshops as part of the development of the proposed law for the modernization of rural land. In the second workshop was founded the sub-sectoral table for rural land management, which brought to an end the development of the mentioned bill.

MPCE. The MPCE may be involved in 3 different forms of intervention in SLM: i) the participation of its senior management in the CIP, ii) by the active presence of the DAT technicians in training activities and consultations conducted studies for the development of the project, i.e. as the beneficiary, and iii) delegation through its autonomous institute, the CNIGS, in this case as a collaborator and co-financer (in kind).

The first form took place only once in the project (mid 2008), because the CIP has stopped working since. The second was done first by the involvement of DAT in the consultations conducted by the office AGROCONSULT in charge of drafting the first version of the NAPCD, then the participation of three technicians during the first part of the LADA GIS Workshop (August 2011), and two of them during the practice session the second week.

The third had several phases: in the first version of the PRODOC, the existence of UTSIG was only mentioned superficially. In the final version, the newly created CNIGS passed to co-financer in kind project, with the commitment to provide its expertise and access to the base map for the process of leadership training.

CNIGS. In practice, the agreement with the SLM project was discussed late in the second half of 2009. He had to start taking effect in early 2010, but most of its staff, including its director, died in the earthquake. The recovery was slow, his involvement as a trainer has finally given way to a beneficiary position. In August 2011 has made possible the training activity involving four technicians CNIGS, with the support of a Cuban center, specialized in this tool.

CIAT. As the CIAT was not created until late 2010, his involvement was not included in the PRODOC, but its functions are in part created by the Interministerial Council Decree of October 2005 (CIMATE, which has never been up), except that it was finally established as a dependency of the Prime Minister's office. Its responsibilities in relation to land planning, in the heart of decision-making process, are far beyond the scope of SLM, but the fact that SLM could eventually be considered as part of the criteria of land planning process would be a major success for the project. CIAT has also a privileged line of work regarding land tenure, its specialized staff has participated in several working sessions as part of the development of the bill in the first quarter of 2011. Two specialists from CIAT, one FAO consultant, then participated as beneficiaries on training GIS-LADA in August 2011, and the Workshop on Concepts and Methods of Preparation of IFC in September 2011.

FAMV. The faculty of State University (assumed to be custodian of professional learning promoted by the Madian Salagnac project³⁹) had a special vocation to be involved in the project, as it was provided in the PRODOC. In fact, a strategic alliance has been attempted in the second half of 2009, and a memorandum of agreement was even signed in December. Following the earthquake, it was not materialized. The FAMV finally participated in the second half of 2010, in the person of consultant to the study "Assessment of the impacts of the exploitation of timber in Haiti", then as the beneficiary with the participation of an assistant-teacher in the environmental economics training in 2011 (which was responsible for an analytical report of the workshop content). There was therefore no institutional participation, of FAMV leaders, who have finally shunned the project.

³⁹ A unique style project that succeeded in providing professional training along with a durable relationship with rural populations involvement in a specific zone, during a couple of decades.

UNIQ. The PMU had a preference to involve public actors, but the trainings were open to private entities. The Quisqueya University, whose faculty of Environmental Economics is naturally interested in SLM issues, and which provides much of the civil servants in the environmental field, participated as a beneficiary through the assistance of a researcher-teacher in the GIS-LADA workshop as well as the workshop on Concepts and Methods of Preparation of IFC.

- **Partnership arrangements (with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region)**

The MoE had several roles. One of them was to host "an autonomous unit, after participating in the director's selection"⁴⁰. Another was that of providing financial resources for this management unit, which was planned to do with the financing of PAGE. The operating conditions of the project were ultimately provided by PAGE.

The MDE had the supposed ability only to the extent that it had real ownership of the execution of PAGE. This is indeed what was implicit in the quantification of co-financing according to its sources, it is estimated at 675,000 USD, a sum that covered more than the contribution in kind that the MoE, or the PAGE on behalf of it, could bring.

In fact, according to GEF concept of co-financing, this is not limited to in-kind contributions actually recorded. It includes the activities of the co-financing institution even if they are not executed with the project, but insofar as they contribute in other ways the same goals of SLM. This is the case of PAGE that acts in two ways, by co-financing in kind in the classical sense, and as a broader support to the MoE⁴¹.

To conclude, the three central institutions had no major incentive to coordinate with each other the project implementation, given the disparity of their roles. Conversely, the PRODOC assigned to them (document that certainly was not compulsory for them) the mandate to participate into a project Steering Committee (SC)⁴². In the preparatory phase, no evidence was encountered that the three institutions had established contacts to set up a forum for executive coordination of the project which about to begin.

Although the PRODOC, in the quoted paragraph, establishes a clear difference between the foreseen project SC and the Interinstitutional Steering Committee (CIP), in practice it seems that the major stakeholders (PMU, DSE-MoE, UNDP - EEU), have relied on the operation of the second to perform the functions of the executive coordination.

The CIP was an inter-institutional mechanism for consultation and technical coordination initiative for recovery of degraded lands, in place since 2005 and which included Entities of Public Administration (Ministries of Environment, Agriculture, Planning, Finance), Cooperating Agencies (UNDP, Canadian International Cooperation Agency (CIDA) and the German Cooperation Agency (GTZ)), NGOs working in the field of Natural Resource Management (Helvetas (Swiss NGO), World Vision, Pan American Development Foundation (PADF)). It thus corresponded closely enough to the figure established by October 2005 decree under the name of CONATE, but was never formalized as such.

It was expected to function as the technical advisor of the project⁴³. The PRODOC itself created the confusion between the two bodies, by establishing guidelines as to its composition and its mode of operation, as if it were an ad hoc structure created for its own needs⁴⁴, which

⁴⁰ "The Project Management Unit (PMU) will play a key role in project execution. It will be attached to the Ministry of Environment and will be headed by a Project Manager (PM)" (PRODOC, 102).

⁴¹ The same would have applied to the PRIGE project, that institutional support to MoE from IADB, but the bank was never informed of the existence of the SLM project.

⁴² "The project will receive high level guidance and oversight from the SLM Steering Committee (SC). The SC will be composed of the Ministries of Agriculture, Interior, Planning and the UNDP Resident Representative and will be chaired by MoE. The SC will normally meet twice a year but may meet exceptionally as needed" (PRODOC, 101).

⁴³ "The CIP will act as the technical advisory group and will provide technical support to the project", (PRODOC, 101).

⁴⁴ The CIP "will be composed of individuals from government, civil society and donor agencies who are selected on the basis of their competence in their respective fields. The CIP will meet quarterly during the first year of the project and every six months thereafter. The CIP members will review the quarterly, six-monthly and annual

was a design error. The CIP was even commended with functions in donor coordination and consultations in general in creating synergies between different ministries⁴⁵, i.e. a series of assignments that were those of the PMU. To have bet much on this collective inter-institutional body was not happy, because in practice it has almost stopped functioning at the time of the SLM project began.

This situation not only affected the SLM project, but also the finalization of the NAP-LCD, which promotion was the major attribution of the CIP⁴⁶.

Among non-governmental actors, universities occupied a special place in the original project design, as they had to "provide training, research and consultancies based on required inputs, as specified in project activities" and, at the same time be receiving some capacitation. The PRODOC does not contain a realistic assessment of their ability to do so, nor of their capacity requirements for this, but it was planned to hire consultants as needed ("resource persons will be contracted as necessary"). The FAMV was even supposed to organize internally to be involved heavily in the project, to prepare training modules, giving courses, preparing teaching materials, etc.⁴⁷

Similarly, organizations of civil society should have been involved both as beneficiaries and as resource persons, to become heralds of SLM in the country⁴⁸. There was no ex - ante evaluation of their capabilities, which should have been based at least on a provisional list of possible organizations involved. Previewing the pilot actions, the participation of rural communities and local government officials was also planned, which should be provided "during the preparatory phase."

■ Gender sensitivity

The SLM project is not the object of any gender sensitivity analysis along the PRODOC. As regards to gender sensitivity, the PRODOC don't make any reference to it in whatever of its parts, except one mention in the design of the output 2.2, which is labeled: "Producers' capacitation, NGOs and CBOs in SLM and incorporation of gender awareness in SLM activities", which contains a specific activity 2.2.3: "To lead a workshop on gender differentiation and SLM". According to the Final report elaborated by the PMU, the mentioned activity takes part of unimplemented activities.

In the PIR 2010 - 11, in the section "gender relevance" it is pointed out that nobody of the PMU were women, while the other questions relative to gender received as answer "does

progress reports, the technical reports of international and national consultants and technical documentation that results from specific products, particularly under Outcome 3: Knowledge Management" (PRODOC, 101).

⁴⁵ "The CIP is also expected to play an important coordinating role through regular continuing donor meetings and consultations" (PRODOC, 82), et "The CIP will play an important role in the creation of synergies between various ministries, institutions and civil society groups and will tap specialist resource people from these institutions for the various training courses and workshops. It will also identify and integrate traditional knowledge of SLM into SLM guidelines" (PRODOC, 84).

⁴⁶ "The CIP will serve as a steering mechanism for the NAPCD. The CIP will also act as the inter-ministerial committee for this proposed MSP, thereby ensuring that programmed activities related in particular to capacity building and mainstreaming are truly catalyzed throughout all relevant government agencies and civil society organizations" (PRODOC, 41).

⁴⁷ "The State Faculty of Agriculture will set up an internal steering committee as soon as project is approved for funding. All academics in the relevant fields will be called upon to contribute in the project activities. Most Faculties are already running courses related to SLM, and will be actively involved in SLM knowledge sharing through training workshops, short courses, preparation of modules, preparation of booklets, flyers etc. Some University environmental economists will be trained to carry out economic and financial analyses of the different land use systems. They will then be able to impart their knowledge to other stakeholders and students" (PRODOC, 83).

⁴⁸ "The various civil society groups, local NGOs and community based organizations (CBO) will receive training on project proposal preparation and assistance in formulating SLM Projects for donors or the UNDP/GEF Small Grants Program. They will also contribute to traditional knowledge sharing in reviews, workshops and meetings" (PRODOC, 85).

not apply". When quantified the participation to the realized training workshops, a participation of women of 9 % is evidenced.

- **Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector**

Besides the public institutions which were explicitly part of the project or which were finally treated as beneficiaries - not stakeholders fullest sense - the SLM project should be coordinated with ongoing projects that have been installed capacity to carry out field activities compatible with the SLM approach. To that extent, it could establish collaborations with "community groups, private sector entities, and local governments".

Because the foreseen relationship with the Pedernales project (UNDP executed, funded by AECI), has not been possible, and other environmental projects of the Unit had not started or were completed in the meantime, the pilot actions contemplated could not be completed. The PMU tried to compensate this situation by seeking to build relationships with other projects. This was the case with the DEED project (USAID) in Montrouis. Unfortunately, the DEED project did not continue in the area where the SLM was able to go, and has concentrated on the north coast area in which the SLM project would have had major logistical difficulties if he had to accompany him.

There are over a hundred Haitian NGOs working with the support of international NGOs and other donors, in relation to rural development and environmental protection. Several of them, certainly could have been partners of the SLM project, but usually they have unfulfilled funding requests, the project could not solve.

The only identified case of relation with an NGO was to support Chibas for organizing the first conference between potential actors in the chain of exploitation and development of *Jatropha curcas*, one of great options to give to dry dells an intensive and protective use at a time, which produces cattle feed (using edible species), heating oil and wood. However, the NGO Chibas was not involved nor informed of the available lines of work of SLM project.

Other NGOs, or research organizations administering development activities, have provided consultants for the studies commissioned by the project. This is the case of AGROCONSULTING (responsible for the first version of NAP-LCD) and GREF, which has developed the *Analysis of the legal and institutional framework related to SLM*. In both cases, the actors have experienced of the SLM project only the part concerned by their contributions, and have not had access to the final document, not to talk about participation. This situation carries on with the contract still in force for the development of training modules.

Regarding the "community groups, private sector entities, local governments ", they were not interviewed during the mission but there is sufficient credible evidence in the reports of the project itself, to state that it has not worked with local authorities. They could have been involved only to the extent that pilot activities in the field would have been launched, which was not the case.

To conclude, it should be stressed that the participation of each actor was compartmentalized to the specific reason for why he participated. By extension, this applies to those who sell a service, while being capable of more meaningful participation. These potential stakeholders were not involved throughout the project cycle, and there was no option to address all relevant SLM issues in a coherent way with them.

In fact, the execution was not bound by a comprehensive operational program nor was object of an intense support especially at the beginning of the project. The M&E was not effective and therefore there was no feedback, thus no possible participation at this level.

The changes with respect to the initial goals, did not respond to feedbacks (so they were not in strictly sense adaptative changes), but rather due to design weaknesses.

- **Project Finance**

According to the final version of the PRODOC, the SLM project should be granted by three sources of cash funding: the contribution of the FEM (479,000 USD), the actual co-

financing of the UNDP on core funding - or Track funds - (150,000 USD) and a contribution of 175,000 USD on behalf of the AECL.

The evaluation of the effective expenditure by source of funding, indicate that the contribution of the UNDP Track funds reached practically the planned level in first year of the project. Conversely, during the second year (it means the year of the project, which lasts in fact on one and a half year because of the suspension of 6 months), the contribution was 40 % only in relation in the planned budget. Finally, during the third year, the contribution amounted to 66 % of the planned amount. As a result, in the whole life of the project, the real contribution of the UNDP was 100,000 USD and not the planned 150,000. It is true that the in kind contribution from the PAGE project also is a contribution from the UNDP, although recorded in another account. But it cannot be classified at the same time as governmental contribution (in kind co-financing) and as a proper contribution of the UNDP.

The total expenditure registered in ATLAS as the effective GEF contribution for the SLM project, according to our calculations⁴⁹, is 455,076.87 USD that is 95 % of the planned availability (on the basis of 479,000 USD). As for the contribution supposed by AECL, it was understood by mistake as being in cash, but according to the appendices of the PRODOC, it was an in-kind co-financing.

With respects to in-kind co-financing, the major observations from GEF Secretariat to the first version of the project (October 2006) concerned the level of in-kind co-financing by the Government, considered too reduced to reflect the - supposed - real relevance of SLM in Haiti. Total co-financing in the initial version amounted to 230,000 USD, which was almost 25% of the total amount, for a project of 1.0 M USD. In the new version, the co-financing was increased up to 2/3 of the total, while this increased to 2.5 M USD, whereas the cash financing requested remained the same.

The major adjustment consisted in considering two strong institutional contributions received by the MoE, one from the IADB (estimated at 500,000 USD, the source being the PRIGE project, an institutional support to the MoE which total amount was 5 million USD), and the other one resulting from the UNDP itself through the project of institutional support to the MoE (estimated at 675,000 USD). Additionally, a hypothetical quantification was made of the contribution of the CNIGS, in the form of maps and of satellite images, for an amount of 300,000 USD. The own institutional contribution of MoE was downscaled to 180,000 USD instead of 230,000 initially). Total amount of in-kind co-financing was finally set at the level of 1,655,000 USD.

As the financing of the PAGE project (still on-going) proceed exclusively from track funds of the UNDP, it is necessary to differentiate between the cash contribution of UNDP to the SLM project (104,300 USD) and the contribution of PAGE, not registered into the account of the project, but estimated at the level of 200,000 USD (according to the PIR on 2010 - 11) which was an in-kind contribution in the classic sense. The PAGE supported concrete activities of the SLM project and, at the same time, financed a large range of activities of the MoE, activities which may contribute broadly to the objectives of SLM, but not necessarily being co-executed together, that is to say a co-financing in the sense of GEF.

This kind of co-financing in GEF sense, does not represents a means of operation for the project, but the actors who provide them have to establish a partnership with the project. This did not occur, because the project did not establish any collaboration with other projects generated by the PAGE and there is no evidence that the guidelines of SLM were useful for the other actions of the MoE, within the DSE itself or with other directions. This finding coincides with the restricted participation of other actors, above mentioned.

⁴⁹ In spite this should be a "hard" data, our calculations intervene because some costs engaged in 2012 on the transitory account have to be added to the registered amount at December 31, 2011. These additional costs are estimations because the mission was informed about rounded values in two of the three cases (the third one being the present TE contract).

In the case of the institutional support from the IADB to the MoE, there was no working relation with the SLM project and the office of the bank at Port au Prince never received any information about the existence of the project, and the planned co-financing and partnership did not exist. The last PIR confirms this information.

With respect to the participation / co-financing of the CNIGS, it was also smaller than planned. The effective participation of some professionals as beneficiaries in training activities came along with a contribution in cartographic basic materials, which was valued in the PIR at 100,000 USD.

As for the contribution of AECID, it was foreseen to be based on the collaboration with a project of territorial planning, specifically in its activities of cartographic planning, financed by the Spanish cooperation and executed by the UNDP. This forecast was based on a facsimile of a letter of approval signed by the AECl of Port au Prince in 2006, for common activities with the EU of UNDP generally (not specific for the SLM project, indeed). THE AECl (which turned into AECID in the meanwhile) was never informed about the existence of the SLM project.

Generally speaking, it can be stated that the institutional arrangements planned during the formulation of the reviewed budget of the definitive PRODOC were not put in practice, and that the SLM project was practically obliged to reduce its level of aims and expenditure to the amount planned in its first version. No written explanation can be found about it.

According to GEF definition and the budget planned in the signed PRODOC, the SLM project was a medium-sized project (MSP) which implied that 2/3 of the results should have been obtained thanks to governmental action. But the shift from 1 million USD in the original version to 2.5 million USD in the revised one was actually based on an unrealistic expectation about the governmental counterpart, so the project appears to have been artificially swelled to a MSP.

Besides the fact that the shift in the proportion between financing and co-financing, from half and half to 1/3 - 2/3, is surprising for a poor country, it led inevitably to an unrealistic plan, unless the PMU had been able to convince the other actors to leave aside their own plans in order to organize themselves in function of the SLM objectives. For that purpose, it would have been necessary to have a concrete action plan to be proposed to all actors (such as that of the NAPCD, to which however the project had to contribute). It was difficult to obtain that the other actors accept that their collaboration implied to assume part of the costs of this learning. It was not thus possible to count effectively on these co-financing / partnerships.

SUMMARIZED TABLE OF CO-FINANCING

| Co-financing (type/source) | UNDP own financing (mill. US\$) | | Government (mill. US\$) | | Partner Agency (mill. US\$) | | Total (mill. US\$) | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------|----------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|--------|-----------------------|---------|
| | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual | Planned | Actual |
| Grants | | | | | | | | |
| • In-kind support | | | 1.655.000 | 400.000 | | | 1.655.000 | 400.000 |
| - MDE | | | 180.000 | 100.000 | | | | |
| - PAGE (MDE) | | | 675.000 | 200.000 | | | | |
| - PRIGE (MDE) | | | 500.000 | 0 | | | | |
| - CNIGS | | | 300.000 | 100.000 | | | | |
| • Other (cash) | 150.000 | 104.300 | 0 | 0 | 175.000 | 0 | 325.000 | 104.300 |
| Loans/Concessions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Totals | | | | | | | 1.980.000 | 504.300 |

3.3 Project Results and Sustainability

- **Resume of the execution process**

Having started with one and a half year of delay with regard to the initial forecasts, the SLM project was not able to take advantage, for the execution of the component 3, of the synergy planned with the Southeast project, also executed by the UNDP with a financing of the AEI, nor that of the project Artibonite (PBF-B initiative: Integrated Management of the Artibonite International Watershed). Nevertheless, the AEI had suited in the co-financing of the project, as stated in the annexes of the first version of the PRODOC in 2006, and the collaboration with the Artibonite project was planned in the core text of the PRODOC.

Besides the temporal gaps, the relations between projects can be made complex by the personal positions and the differences of conception between their respective managers. It seems to have occurred in the case of the missed relation with the Southeast project. Other taken contacts, which would have been able to succeed, finally not became a reality following a decision of the counterpart to concentrate in a zone where the SLM project could not accompany it (case of the project DEED, which gave up the zone of Arcahaie).

The project was thus characterized by a weak capacity of articulate with the other initiatives that the too short run time did not allow to compensate, in spite of the efforts of the PMU. The search for new partners occupied the energy of the management team during its first effective year (year 2009, because it had been necessary almost all the second half-year 2008 to set up institutionally the project). However, by turning to actors of the civil society, which have little capacity of financing, it generated demands which could not be satisfied.

The trainings planned under component 2 were consequently reduced to those who could be procured locally or internationally and provided already standardized knowledge. Those who must be brought by institutional actors - and not individual consultants, (whose execution supposed a strong partnership with the CNIGS and the FAMV) implied longer negotiations. When they should have become a reality, the earthquake obliged to resume everything in zero a half-year later. Thanks to the not planned contribution by CEPALC and by LADA, were finally feasible the only two activities of training of the project, in 2011, that is very late regarding to the schedule, and without needing contributions of the component 3.

With respect to component 1, it would be more accurate to speak about total inactivity rather than about delay. In mainstreaming, play completely the weakness of the logical framework, in the sense that the well-founded references and the developed capacities are an asset to be able to influence the public policies, although being not sufficient. It is necessary to build the incidence on a political strategy to convince the opinion makers in the various sectors of the society. This would have required an external support to the PMU.

In the absence of other tools, the mainstreaming had to be based on the NAPCD, which was supported by the GTZ / GIZ and PAGE / UNDP. The MoE, having realized a validation workshop of the NAPCD draft in 2009, formulated afterwards doubts on the weakness of the proposal, but without having been able, until now (February 2012), to produce guidelines to rethink this essential component of the NAPCD. The PMU having no capacity to be listened to without an intervention of higher institutional level, the execution of this component of the project was practically paralyzed.

Finally, the component 4 had to intervene logically only once the political and programmatic contents were well enough defined. However, according to the last guidelines, the elaboration of the IFS became a more precise process allowing setting up an analysis of situation. It constitutes a good measure of the situation post-project in sensibility to SLM within a dozen of official documents, but as it was currently on-going at the time of the mission, it was not possible to use it adequately for this evaluation process. However, a communication with the consultant in charge of the study confirms that no effect of the project is visible in this particular field of the intervention.

Besides the combination of the logical and external factors, in a transverse way, but having especially harmed the execution of the components 2 and 3, the slow rhythm of

execution of the activities generally is attributable to the weak capacity of management of the PMU within the national office of UNDP. This point was clearly recognized by the project team as being an additional handicap, because of the saturation of the administrative processes in the CO, what requires on behalf of the persons in charge of the various units and projects a considerable time spent "to promote their cases". Conversely, the lack of financing cash was not a direct factor that might explain the delay of the activities.

- **Effectiveness & Efficiency (outputs level)**

During the first quarter 2009, were drafted the "Guidelines for the promotion of sustainable management of lands in Haiti", and then, with national consultants, two studies under component 3: "Analysis of the legal and institutional framework concerning SLM", the only one of the 6 studies realized under the project to be officially validated by the MoE (in May, 2009, final version published in August, 2010) and, finally, a "Diagnosis of the Information systems related to lands utilization" (concluded in November, 2009).

During the 2nd half-year 2009, was discussed a draft agreement with the FAMV, who would take care of certain activities of training. Signed in December, the agreement never entered in execution. The Protocol was resumed in 2011, which allowed some participation of the FAMV at the workshop on Economy of the Environment in association with the CEPAL. Also an agreement had been signed with the CNIGS the execution of activities of the component 2, but this institution was decimated by the earthquake.

The activities of the PMU focused on the search for partners for the execution of the pilot actions, as the first conference of the actors of the network of *Jatropha curcas*, in June, 2009, which was the opportunity to promote the development of perennial crops in mountainous zones, as a sustainable activity contributing to SLM. In September, 2009, was realized a "Exploratory Visit of the Forest of Mangrove swamp of Boulard (Arcahaie)" and, in October, 2009, a "Mission of evaluation of the durability of the approaches of exploitation of *Prosopis* (*Prosopis juliflora*) in the agricultural systems in dry zone of the region of Bainet (southeast)".

In June, 2010, was realized a mission "Towards the popularization of the culture of vetiver in the mountainous lands of Arcahaie: An eco-industrial approach of management of lands" and, in July, 2010, a mission of "Identification of best practice in SLM, in particular by the adoption of the culture of *Nem* (*Azadirachta indica*) and the other ligneous species, in the Peninsula of the South".

In the second half-year 2010, two studies for the component 3 were elaborated: the "Study on the Productivity and the durability of farming in mountainous regions" (November, 2010) and the "Evaluation of the impacts of the overexploitation of wood in Haiti" (December, 2010).

In 2011, two studies under component 3 were published, thus completing a total of 6 studies for the whole project: the "Detailed inventory of the current use and the degradation of lands" (in January, 2011) and the "Analysis of the land tenure system and SLM in Haiti" (April, 2011). Considered as a contribution to the mainstreaming of the approach SLM in the Haitian normative framework, was also elaborated a "Draft of law for the modernization of the rural land tenure system" (April, 2011).

Also in 2011, two training courses (component 2) were realized, the first one with the support of the CEPALC: Training on tools of environmental economics, applied to the SLM and to the adaptation to the climate change (30 professionals, 4 days, in June 2011); and the second one with the cooperation of the CNIGS: Training on the tools of GIS and Land Degradation Assessment in Drylands (LADA), (30 professionals, 5 days, August, 2011), followed by a practice for half of them, named: Training on the elaboration of the Database of the lands degradation in Haiti, by the application of the questionnaire Wocat QM (15 professionals, 10 days, August, 2011).

The last activity of the SLM project, a workshop on the Concepts and Methods of Elaboration of the Integrated Financial Strategies for SLM, took place in September 2011. The project having closed December 31st, 2011, the remaining liquid assets were transferred on a passing account of the UNDP, and the PAGE project has been in charge of following two current contracts, which have not ended at the time of the evaluation yet: Elaboration of the modules of training in SLM (component 2), and Elaboration of the IFS (component 4).

The reviewing of outputs led to the conclusion that the objectives had been only partially obtained, because there was an accumulation of delays in each component, which gave rise to temporal gaps between the delivered products, especially since certain activities needed products from the other activities, what led to an accumulation of the delays.

Consequently, the outputs obtained were those which might be reached in spite of these conditions: even if the concrete actions at local level were missing, the studies which respond to the specific objectives of component 3 were feasible, once identified the appropriate consultants. Something similar occurred with the trainings: the most punctual ones, which involved external teachers, once organized were easier to manage than a complete plan of formation articulated with local actions.

With respect to the activities of mainstreaming, they supposed inputs at the same time adequate (like the studies) and disseminated (what was not the case), and a capacity of lobbying among public administration, but the PMU was not prepared to play this role. In the long run, the activities of formation could contribute to this assimilation, but this could be reached well beyond the horizon of the project, especially if we consider the limited scope of the effectively granted trainings.

These findings provide sufficient support to the qualification of **“Marginally Satisfactory”** to the consecution of expected outputs through the execution process, in the sense that the obtained outputs were good, but the proportion of them related to the scheduled ones was insufficient, although variable from each component.

- **Overall results (attainment of objectives)**

Since products were partially obtained, it is inevitable that the expected outcomes were not totally reached. The effectiveness at outcomes level will be examined successively for each of the components.

1) Mainstreaming. Except the advance in the discussion of a bill about land tenure, which content do not reflect a consensus between the parts, there had no contributions to policies related directly or not with SLM. In each of the six produced studies, several elements can be useful for the formulation of SLM-oriented policies, but they haven't been disseminated, nor taken into account by the actors for whom they could be useful. The "Guidelines" (HAGEN R., 2009) are a considerable contribution in this direction, but they were not resumed, discussed and enriched, even less officially released. The importance given to the land tenure is justified because it is a sound problem, but the proposal (ANDRE VICTOR J., 2011) does not make consensus on crucial matters (administration of state lands? rural exclusivity?). There was no improvement in the content of the NAPCD after April 2009, date in which it was the object of a workshop of validation, as a product of PAGE. The last version of April 2009 is very poor in its propositive part. It has not been completed with the support of the SLM project.

2) Institutional capacities. A punctual workshop may be a good introduction to some concepts for those who benefited from it, but the institutional learning would suppose the systematic application of the concepts combining local data, tools, support and use by the actors. The tools of cartographic analysis are important for the institutional normative approach of SLM, but it is necessary to work at large scale to be able to integrate local factors and the microdiversity of territory and soils.

It would be expected that at the level of the CIAT the SLM approach becomes a central concern in the planning of the use of the territory. It was not possible in the first year of

existence of the CIAT, and then the project closed. The project contributed to human capacities in a rather punctual way along the chain of the information system that has to feed the land planning (LP), but the core of the LP itself was not approached.

3) References and information. The cartographic and in situ study of 4 watersheds and the participative realization of 2 case studies, leading to key recommendations for a SLM policy (PERSONNA Y.R., 2011) is a noticeable contribution, but it would be necessary to extend this kind of studies to the rest of the country and to draw the propositive part of the NAPCD from their conclusions.

The analysis of the legal framework related to SLM (ANDRE VICTOR J., 2010) is deep, but that of the institutional aspects is summary. The focus at local level is missing. It would have been necessary to deepen on the institutional situation and to specify the local diversity of the institutional and sociocultural characteristics of the management of the land property. The complementary study realized on land tenure system (PIERRE LOUIS S., 2010) does not go further on this crucial aspect for SLM conditions.

Regarding the Information system on territory and soils, the study realized (ZEPHYR J., 2009) show deep limitations, and the elaboration of the Database on the degradation of lands in Haiti introduced within the framework of the workshop on LADA training is the beginning but is sharply insufficient.

Although the study on the use of the wood (LOUISSAINT, J., 2010) was not realized in a zone where would have coincided the diverse actions of the project, it had real local roots. However it should be necessary to indicate that the choice of a zone with a forest cover higher than the average of the country, made the realized calculations do not supply extrapolables estimations for different biogeographic zones.

It cannot be talked about improvement of mountain farming systems, when the project had no concrete interventions in this direction. The study carried out on this subject (BELLANDE A., 2010) showed however in which point the productive systems in these ecosystems have a big at the same time economic potential and of preservation of natural resources.

4) Financial resources. The IFS formulation process is still on-going at the time of the TE. However, the normal programmatic logic was not respected because it would be logic to formulate first the policy) (the internationally approved expression of which would be the NAPCD), then a plan of investment and, as a third step, a strategy to mobilize resources according to this plan which would answer this policy. As there is no expressed policy, there is either no investment plan. This undermines partially the logic of a plan of mobilization of resources, even though the formulation of the latter is an opportunity to carry on with some aspects of the policy neglected up to now.

As a general conclusion, it can be stated that the products of the project thus stay altogether strikingly below what was planned, what yielded little advances as for the expected results. Several factors which combine mutually can explain this situation, starting from the weakness in the design, enforced by an insufficient appreciation of actors' limitations and especially the voluntarism in planning, unsuitable for this weakness and for these limitations. The conditions of execution of the project, and the weakness of the support and supervision it benefited, without minimizing the purely external factors, finished to enforce this situation.

Nonetheless, the SLM project yielded interesting contributions and it is necessary to use them, and especially it is necessary to continue the effort with better means and arrangements. These findings provide sufficient support to the qualification of **"Marginally Unsatisfactory"** to the consecution of outcomes, because in this case the lack of outputs is to be cumulated with the logic weaknesses of the design stressed in the previous chapter.

- **Country ownership**

The synthesis of the politico-institutional situation in relation to LD in Haiti (the baseline), is that there is a diversity of approaches or, more exactly, a diversity of policies and

public actions related with LD, some coinciding with the objectives of preservation, others which can be oriented to it and some others with divergent approaches. There are also those who ignore the DT as problem, even if their objectives can suffer the consequences from it, as succeed with the installation of industrial parks in the lowlands.

The analysis of the situation of the support and supervision by the Haitian state in relation in LD, show that beyond the consensus on the causes, the public and private actions related with LD, take place in different levels, with little connection between them, with a diversity of overlapping mandates, what is unavoidable, but with few functional authorities with inter-sectorial and inter-institutional mandates to organize complex actions with common objectives.

Facing this situation, the guiding principle of SLM is that to reach the aimed outcomes (the preservation and the improvement of lands as a basic public good) it is necessary to impulse effectively coherent and synergic actions at all levels. Among the public actions which have potentially compatible objectives with the preservation of lands, 7 approaches can be found out:

1) A certain conception of land planning as a mechanism of synthesis of territorial analyses with informative capacity at the Council of Ministers level, fed itself by thematic monitoring observatories, specialists on charge with the analysis of data and production of partial syntheses (as the ONEV, etc.), themselves fed by spatial analyses, as those produced by the CNIGS. The latter, in his turn, bases itself on diverse sources from sectorial institutions.

Echoing the revealed and recommended trends in (ANDERSON WHITE T. & JICKLING J. L., 1995) LP is the first field of public action which is prioritized in the SLM project. This explains the place given to trainings like the SIG-LADA, the focus being set on normative action and public planning. This approach aims to introduce the SLM as an additional "layer" in data processing and analyze which have to feed the territorial planning. It covers information systems. The Diagnosis elaborated within the project (ZEPHYR J., 2009) contributes to the understanding of the institutional system and suggests how to improve it.

2) The second approach, already experimented for decades and which remains, although without enough means to impact at a sufficient scale is the "watershed management" (WSM) model who includes a varied range of physical investments to control water circulation (as the mini-dams and other works of retention or infiltration).

There are enough lessons set – but not necessarily learnt by all actors, and generally little divulgated, about the specific conditions in which this mode of intervention is viable: when it is coordinated with users' rationalities and included in a set of the other practices for the management of soils fertility. Large scale works like canals-at-level, not only aggravates the problem when they are not maintained, or when they are badly made, but moreover they inhibit the recourse to alternative actions on these same lands, thus being lost for the traditional users.

Although the stake in coherence of the actions resulting from various approaches, (which should include the disclosure of the committed errors so that they do not repeat) is an important guideline of the SLM, the project did not play this role. No products were elaborated which focus this critical aspect of the problem, but it is possible that the modules of formation (currently elaborated) integrate some contents following this path.

3) The third approach is about differentiated agricultural policies. It pretends to promote such kind of protective intensification that is capable to avoid the impact of rains and streaming on superficial layer of soils, there where the land tenure makes it possible. The aim is to solve at least parts of the land tenure problem but at the same time to promote integrated techniques for soils fertility management, everywhere where it is possible, using a proper set of different techniques according to the height, the exposure and the nature of soils.

Although the main axis of the project is about norms, land use regulations and planning (the main purpose being to enforce institutional capacities in the broad sense, what

includes the normative and legal corpus), and although the main stakeholder is the MoE, the references generated by the studies result mainly from the field of the agricultural development or from the field of trees culture and sustainable management of the diverse kind of forests and woodlands (cattle raising problematic is missing completely). That is to say in the field of the MARNDR and Universities.

They are two complementary approaches that coincide in a fundamental point: the most important actors of SLM are the producers, the users of soils, and a great majority of them being family farmers, as well as many women alone with a family to feed. The approaches which do not count on the survival logics of this range of actors, which are not situated with them in their plots of land and their grazing itineraries, only can have a secondary role.

The agricultural intensive approach is patent in (BELLANDE, A. 2010), which explains that in certain parts of the countryside had existed intensive systems since generations but they are weakened by the agricultural crisis, due to the unprotected exposure to imported goods produced in higher productivity conditions. Producers have thus "to increase to the sawing of fruit trees, and mainly of breadfruit, to survive. The preservation of the tree cropping systems can be guaranteed only by external interventions which would allow increasing the levels of the food-producing systems and cattle rising which are associated to them". The author thus pleads with good reason for "an outside contribution of capital (vegetative material, equipment, finance), of information and appropriate technical references (agronomic research, technical training, search for new products and markets)". That is to say a specific menu of agricultural development, friendly with peasants' interests, and coherent with SLM principles.

On the other hand, the approach of the forest development in the most degraded zones can be found in the "Guidelines" (HAGEN R., 2009): "priority must be also given to the development of initiatives aiming at the exploitation of the large surfaces of savanna and pasture, as potential experimental zones, and their integration in a SLM system. The productive utilization of these ecosystems can be considered under forest production and the production of biofuels from perennial crops". However, it turns out that these areas generally coincide with the state land, are used privately but without titles, except the speech transmitted over several generations, and are undivided between multiple legal successors.

It is thus logical to simultaneously address the issue of land rights and policies for better management of SLM. As the first objective cannot wait for the second, it is necessary to work on practical solutions, as CHIBAS does.

The document "Detailed inventory of the current use and land degradation" (PERSONNA Y.R., 2010), although directed primarily to the diagnosis, provides guidance in this same direction. Notoriously lacking in its contributions is the importance of taking into account the intensification of livestock of poor families.

4) The PMU early considered as one of its mandates to contribute to the solution of the land tenure problem. To contribute, he did through two studies (ANDRÉ VICTOR J., 2010) and (ANDRÉ VICTOR J., 2011).

In Haiti the land is almost totally under private use, but up to 40% of it was given by the State in temporary usufruct to individuals, and over time has remained undivided, with a lot of "owners" claiming for their rights, because of the custom of informal transmission of these use rights. In a similar situation is also the recognized private property, itself split by successive inheritances without registration, due to high transaction costs.

In the last one, the obstacle to a peasant managed SLM reveals especially when the conflicts surge, whereas in the first one the obstacle is permanent, because on these lands considered as belonging to nobody take place the most destructive practices, including the transfers of fertility towards the own plots, generally close to farmers' houses. The orientations of the study and the act aforementioned do not take enough into account this dimension of the problem.

5) The management of water keeps a narrow relationship with WSM and with the intensification of farming, cattle rising and trees cropping.

6) The adaptation to climate change (CC) also keeps a narrow relationship as well with water management and with productive changes in farming, cattle rising and trees cropping.

These last two themes (water management and CC) despite the importance of their consistency with the SLM approach were not addressed in the project.

7) To complete this quick review, a mention must be done of policies that meet objectives different than environmental protection, but make deliberately a option with regards to the sustainable use of lands. This option can be expressed as this: the surplus of peasant population will go to the industrial parks with a low remuneration for their work, and a new wave of reforestation rethought as an economic and land speculation should take their place. (BELLANDE A., 2010) evokes the same argument, but it is not present in the other studies.

▪ Mainstreaming

The changes which occurred in the last five years in the institutional context in relation to SLM are however significant, although not attributable to the project.

After the earthquake, the DSNCRP was replaced by the "Action Plan for Recovery and Development" (APRD - 2010), which considers the WSM within the framework of the environmental foundation, within a complete approach, harmonic with the SLM aims: "for that purpose, the projects of WSM, of reforestation and soils preservation must be designed in association with rural communities and will have to harmonize the needs of the farming and the imperatives of the environmental protection".

More recently even, it can be find in the document "Environmental Orientations to be reflected in the general statement of policy of the Prime Minister" (TOUSSAINT J.R., 2011), 3 strategic lines relevant for SLM: increase the forest cover, increase the energy efficiency of the charcoal sector, and stepping the recovery of degraded ecosystems.

In this unofficial document, revealing of the intentions of policy concerning environment, is established that "to increase the potential of natural resources by the increase of the forest cover and popularize rational methods of management of natural resources, we plan a national forest program on the long term as the body of an initiative of re-establishment of the vegetative cover in Haiti, and the development of the sector of healing plants used by communities".

The second strategic line is to "increase the energy efficiency of the charcoal sector while promoting alternative options based on renewable energies (Aeolic, Solar...). Emphasis will be placed on promoting alternatives to the use of wood energy and promoting renewable energy".

The third line is "Increasing the potential of natural resources by work-intensive labor in watershed stabilization, establishment and management of protected areas, the extension of rational methods for the management of natural resources and rehabilitation of the coastal environment."

After the "macro policies" documents, the evaluation focusses on the changes in the coherence of some sectorial policies with the SLM aims.

Recently was formulated an Agricultural Development policy (MARNDP, 2010 - 2025), which affirms to be "worried about the environmental protection and the natural resources" but provides no other precision nor indicates the actions in touch with this objective, if it is not the indication of an "approach by watersheds, going from the summit down to the sea and promoting the interaction between downstream and upstream".

The PNIA (2011) in its Rural Infrastructure Development Section, Appendix 1 - component of watershed management and forestry is a key text, which contemplates the Acceleration of watershed management in the humid mountains and semi - humid,

decentralization of watershed management in a perspective of sustainable local development and revitalization of CIAT.

Finally, the updating of the PNSAN (March 2010) also mentions the importance of managing natural resources, including soils and waters that are the basic factors of agricultural production, stresses the need for reforestation, strengthening of agro forestry, forest protection and decentralized change towards the use of domestic fuels, and recognizes the problem of land tenure limiting reforestation and watershed protection.

In general, policies from the traditional sectors of agricultural development, or less conventional and more cross-sectoral but with a main anchor in the productive sector (such as PNSAN), have an explicit affinity with SLM, although their main objectives are others.

As a general conclusion, it should be stated that LD is a real concern, felt by various sectors of opinion, directly or indirectly, but the specific approach of the UNCCD has not been sufficiently appropriated.

However, the objective remains valid, it is necessary to develop means of achieving it, taking into account the lessons learned from the SLM project. The following recommendations go to this direction.

- **Sustainability and Impacts**

As stated before, the project did not succeed in completing the expected outcomes but contributed to each of them. Sustainability in this case is directly related to continuity of the actions themselves, because the efforts initiated, although valuable, remained below what was expected to ensure that the SLM is placed at the heart of recovery and developing policies.

The occasion of this continuity is part of UNDP's institutional support to MoE, thanks to the PAGE, as suggested in a follow-up note from the PMU to the PAGE, which details the pending activities: "Given that some targets of the project have not been met, and pending activities deserve to be finalized, arrangements must be planned within the EEU for the incorporation of these activities in the various projects under implementation or in pipeline. In this sense, the next steps are as follow:

| OUTPUTS | LINES OF WORK TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE PAGE, ACCORDING TO THE LAST NOTE OF PMU |
|---------------------------|--|
| 1.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.5 | Achieving the validation workshops for the Guidelines and the thematic studies on SLM and their publication on the UNDP website or in print version; |
| 1.2 | Give continuity of the process of approval and publishing of the draft law on the harmonization of legal and regulatory framework related to SLM; |
| 4.2 | Give continuity to the process of developing the Integrated Finance Strategy for SLM, (already committed), and to the establishment of a dynamic for resource mobilization and partnership development for project continuity; |
| 2.2 | Give continuity to the process of developing tools and training manuals in SLM (already started); |
| 2.2 | Implementation of training sessions for organizations or groups of farmers on issues related to the restoration and management of degraded mountain ecosystems, to gender mainstreaming in SLM, and the development of SLM projects; |
| 2.3 | Preparation and execution of pilot SLM projects in sites that have been identified across the country, particularly through the SNAP project or the Green boundary project; |
| 3.2 | Give continuity to the process of establishing a national information system on land use in Haiti; |
| 2.1 2.4 2.5 | Implementation and monitoring of a mechanism for incorporating the principles of SLM in the main national tools for inter and cross-sectoral decision-making and intervention. |

According to the note for continuity quoted before, it is possible to finish giving a public status to the papers elaborated by the project and to disclose them (activity # 1) and even to further develop the proposed land tenure law (activity # 2). In addition, the activities # 3 and # 4 are already under contract. This therefore provides some of the required continuity. But this is not enough because it would also be necessary to ensure the activities # 5-8. These require greater management activity, which will put pressure on the capacity of PAGE.

For activity # 5, it should also be noted that the contract with AZ ERICE only provides materials development, not to give training to a specific audience. That is to say that no sustainability of the training process is guaranteed.

In the previous list, two additional lines of action should be added, the first being the culmination of the core aim of the SLM project, and the second its translation into tangible achievements in the landscape. They are:

| | |
|-----|-------------------------------------|
| 1.3 | • Resume NAPCD formulation |
| 4.1 | • Undertake a draft investment plan |

The formulation of the NAPCD, is to be given the higher priority, required to give coherence to the whole set of undertaken efforts, and to facilitate the incorporation of most of the objectives of SLM in policies outside the environmental “sector”. As for the Investment Plan it should be the logical continuity of the NAPCD, because a policy without means remains a dead letter. The plan should also precede the finalization of the IFS.

With regards to the social or political risks that may threaten the sustainability of project outcomes, the partners consulted during the mission coincided on the fact that the country is rather in a good time with regard to the priority given to the environment, with the replacement in 2011 of the public servants, who installed a professional team aware to these themes.

Respect to the involvement of *stakeholder to allow for the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained*, it should be noted that the dramatic consequences of the earthquake first, and then climate change, tend to increase interest and concern for environmental protection among a wide range of public actors.

Institutions that were beneficiaries of the activity of training workshops have interest that they continue. Otherwise, the benefits per se are not tangible, because the project provided primarily tools and references, which are converted into profits only if the policies and plans take them into account accordingly.

The theme of the LD is a real concern, felt by various sectors of opinion, but the specific approach of the UNCCD has not been sufficiently considered.

However, it has to be admitted that large segments of opinion in the country remains sensible to the conception summarized as the approach 7 in a previous section of this chapter). This approach is clearly associated with the vision of country development that presents a major opinion maker like the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of West, main chapter of the National Chamber of the same name. This perspective can be partly attributed to the lack of information and opportunity to dialogue with experts. Indeed, this kind of dialogue was not among the concerns of the SLM project.

In any case, it should not be underestimated the echo that this approach has in other sectors that have shown a great capacity to influence policy in the country. As a concrete example, let us recall that the study “Environmental Vulnerability in Haiti” (G. Smucker & al., USAID - 2006) was carried out “following a directive from the U.S. Congress calling on USAID to develop a plan for the reforestation of areas vulnerable to erosion in Haiti, which pose a significant risk to health and safety of persons”. Such a concern also seems consistent with the economist approach previously mentioned (the “approach #7”), as results from the

coincidence between the promotion of reforestation to the more humid north and the development of industrial parks in the plains of the same region.

The above arguments yield thus to a balanced conclusion respect to the future of the SLM approach. On one hand, the *legal frameworks, policies, and governance structures and processes* should tend to improve, due to internal and global context. However, the weight of the opposite trend, reported above, recognizing the relevance of the problem of environmental degradation, but considering wrong solutions, should not be underestimated.

The situation thus requires more technical know-how and more non-governmental participation- The capabilities exists, but they will be employed in other fields of action if a SLM policy (including the NAPCD) does not take a concrete and legitimized form. These findings provide sufficient support to the qualification of “**Moderately Likely**” to the perspective of sustainability.

4. Conclusions, Recommendations & Lessons

4.1 Conclusions

▪ 1) Project Design and Formulation.

The **situational analysis** of the PRODOC, written in 2006, covered the phenomenon of the LD in Haiti, and its diverse kinds of “root causes”: i) inappropriate cultivation practices (unsustainable agriculture), ii) deforestation and iii) land tenure modalities. In the two first “causes”, it present an oversimplified diagnostic that tends to equal LD with extreme poverty and high population growth, failing to take into account both the existence of small farmers tailored solutions, and the existence of external pressures that yield to adverse behaviors in spite of long term self-interests of the rural families.

With respect to the third root cause mentioned, it refers to both the lack of legal certainty which prevails over the occupation of land in most cases, as well as to the split of tenure due to a mode of inheritance which give access to land to all the beneficiaries instead of giving preferential access to the most suitable in order to maintain the property intact. Nonetheless, the diagnostic appears to make some confusion while evoking, by the same token, the inaccurate planning of land use, thus introducing implicitly a forth cause.

The diagnostic also dealt with the institutional capacity to tackle with the problem, which is described as a fragmentation of roles and overlapping competencies, as well as a legal framework profuse and ineffective at a time, and a policy framework that is "outdated and needs to be substantially revised". This situation affects both private behaviors (through the lack of incentives to the securitization of land tenure) and the administrative capacity of the state to guarantee the land tenure security.

Additionally, whatever be the accuracy of the arguments based on agricultural and logging practices there is some logical gap between this diagnostic and the related proposal, which is mainly oriented to environmental regulations which imply a shift in the institutional responsibility (in a simplified way, from MARNDR to MoE). The gap is filled by the concept of barriers that define the last instance roots as some institutional constraints and lack of instruments for public intervention.

The assessment of the causality chain shows that the overall objective which aims to contribute to the reduction of the central problem i.e. land degradation (LD), is coherent with the diagnosed problem. The specific objectives, however, does not directly address the factors by themselves, nor the indirect factors, but the barriers that constraint the effectiveness of actions: the lack of cohesion of legal and institutional responses; the lack of a precise diagnosis of the necessities of capacity building; the need for analytical tools and references; the need for a long-term financing mechanism.

The performances (or outcomes) obtained being situated in the field of institutionality, and more specifically some of the aspects identified as being barriers in the SLM, do not lead

inevitably to the impact, defined as an effective reduction of LD in a definite space of the country, and still less in a mayor proportion a the total country.

The reason of this ensues from the situation described in the initial diagnosis: the direct factors of the LD, and the possible improvements, are the productive or destructive actions of the users of the ground (mostly producers in strict sense, but also those rural inhabitants which use common goods with extractive methods), on which the public interventions (agricultural extension, standards of wooden extraction and forest by-products, or territorial planning in a broad sense), have only little efficiency in the current conditions of the institutional system in relation to SLM.

From this perspective, the overall objective responds to the problem as it was formulated, while the outcomes address the barriers and (in part) the institutional diagnosis, but the removal of barriers does not lead to the overall objective unless policies are translated into action, unless the capabilities effectively carry out these actions and unless the actions are actually based on valid models.

Nonetheless, this conclusion only affects the coherence with the overall objective and its respective indicators, but no minimizes the relevance of the specific outcomes by themselves.

The design of the four outcomes has a weakness in the sense that the different outcomes present a causality chain between themselves, as the products of some should be the inputs of others.

As a consequence, the contents planned for the formations were reduced to two themes which it was possible to grant without waiting for the generation of the local references, at least for starting. At the same time, the PRODOC repeated the importance of the concrete actions at ground level, to produce the diverse references planned by the component 3 and the activities of training themselves, as far as they also went to local staffs of diverse kinds of actors.

In all cases, the diagnostic ends without providing orientations on the contents to be given to the actions. Thus, it was up to the PMU to create these missing references, by building specific assessments, reflections and existing proposals to define the contents of its actions. It had to define what policies had to be influenced, what contents to be given to the formations, and what direction to be given to the creation of references and capacities. Nonetheless, it was a short project, the ambitions of which, in particular with respect to the mainstreaming, supposed that the data and the existing studies were already well known by the stakeholders, to translate them in a training plan at every level, and influence, that way, the public policies.

As a general conclusion of this first part, it can be stressed that the PRODOC of the SLM project did not contain the necessary elements to play an effective role as a master document during the phase of execution, for two major reasons: it was not adjusted to the new institutional context when the project started, 2 years after it was redacted, and because of its incompleteness and inaccuracies, what thus left a large responsibility to the PMU with the execution, as well as to the instances on charge of the implementation and supervision.

With respect to the importance given to the SLM in the main normative documents of the UN system and the UNDP in Haiti, the positioning of LD theme, except in the UNCCD itself, has been superficial, and tended to become more blurred after the earthquake, leaving place for what was considered the mayor priorities of the reconstruction and the recovery of the country. The SLM project, and the UNDP - EEU in all its actions, thus had a pioneer role on this vital theme for Haiti 's development, which could be qualified as an "inside mainstreaming".

The Haitian public sector, having ratified the Convention in 2006, already had generated, at this time, several important programmatic documents positioning the theme of the DT, since different angles, but its capacity of execution was very reduced because of the own human and financial weaknesses of every institution, and even more because of the reluctances of the various actors involved to work together in a unique frame, this common political framework being lacking until the NAPCD is duly completed and approved. This

situation is aggravated by an organizational culture marked by the lack of cooperation between institutions.

The **interpretation of potential risks** is superficial and it cannot be found in the PRODOC a strategy to carry on with the project, in case the expected arrangements would not occur. The institutional arrangements were not planned in the PRODOC and stakeholders are just mentioned (without taking into account their changes in the latency period which elapsed after the submission of the first proposal of project in October, 2006), the rest of the constituency of the project being to be built during the execution.

Respect to the **involvement of stakeholders**, except the MoE, the institution host of the project, the other public institutions consulted by the mission (DBV-MARNDR, DAT-MPCE) declared to have not been involved in the formulation, nor to be informed about its existence, when approved. For both main national institutions (MPCE and MARNDR), no mention is made in the PRODOC of their installed capacity and institutional necessities, or even about the modality of their participation in the project, unless as beneficiaries of the planned trainings. They are not taken into account for the mainstreaming, nor as co-performers of the actions in the component 3.

However, the partnership planned around SLM was not reduced to three main ministries, or to specific directions of MPCE and MARNDR. Were also anticipated other directions of the same ministries (i.e. the Direction of Natural resources, the Services of Parks, Forests and Water Resources of the MARNDR), as well as autonomous public institutions (INARA), projects (Artibonite project), other ministries (MENPT), academic institutions (Faculty of Agronomy – FAMV, and Quisqueya - UniQ university), and diverse not governmental actors of the rural development and the preservation of natural resources (Centers for the Agricultural Research).

In this set of actors, universities occupied a special place in the initial conception of the project, because they had to "provide the formations, researches and studies according to the specific demands generated by the activities of the project" and, at the same time they had to be beneficiaries of some training. The PRODOC contains however no realistic analysis of their capacity to assume these roles or of their needs of strengthening for it, although it was planned to hire consultants at the need.

In the same sense, the organizations of the civil society must have been involved at the same time as beneficiaries and as resources persons, until become the heralds of the SLM in the country. There was either no evaluation ex - ante of their capacities, which should have been based at least on a temporary list of the possible involved organizations. In the eventual possibility of the experimental actions, the participation of rural communities and state employees of the local governments was also foreseen, and must be insured "during the preparatory phase".

▪ 2) Project implementation process.

It was difficult to find, among the various cooperation agencies, one that had more comparative advantages for the environmental theme in general, partly for being a multilateral organization, with a better positioning for "advocacy" with public institutions, and partly because within the UN system, UNDP is the only one that shows the level of generality sufficient (compare with other such as FAO and UNEP) to address a subject as integral as SLM.

Nonetheless, due to the originality of its concept and to the complexity of its context, the SLM project needed a strong and original support and supervision that should have been provided since its first steps.

The UNDP - CO was not able to do a close technical follow-up which would have allowed the PMU to fill the gap of information and strategic guidance in which it had to operate since the beginning of the project. The EU of UNDP - CO was insufficiently staffed to give an intensive technical support to the SLM project. Moreover, SLM is a new and complex theme, in which there is not enough accumulated experience, either locally and

internationally. The existing staff was insufficient in front of the diversity and number of projects to be followed, and overwhelmed in a lot of administrative responsibilities. This gap of support and supervision was not filled by a kind of "Global Operational Plan" (it would have been necessary to elaborate one in the preparatory phase), nor by a permanent technical support at least during the first months, to help in the conformation of the first arrangements with the other involved actors.

The regional GEF / UNDP unit was not either able of supplying a strong external supervision, even when the project still had a RTA on duty, particularly in the initial phase. The supervisions of the RTA were annual and ex - post, on line with the elaboration of the PIR.

The UNDP - CO did not invest direct institutional resources in a M&E oriented to the results, while it received part of the GEF financing for it. Neither did the regional GEF / UNDP unit. Appropriate support would have been able to help the PMU to develop a stronger incidence on the institutional levels at which its staff had difficulties to reach alone. With such a limited technical follow-up, it is impossible to talk about "risk management". The difficulties indicated in the additional report of the international consultant were shared by the RTA and by the Director of the project, but this was not followed by measures to improve the situation.

An additional problem is that both international stakeholders (UNDP and the GEF Secretariat) operate their annual planning cycle with two different timetables: the year of the calendar for the first one, and the North American fiscal year (July to June) for the second (and thus for the regional GEF / UNDP unit which is in charge of the regional supervision).

The PRODOC contained however a detailed plan of M&E in which were established the flows of information, methods of data mining and periodicity, as well as the persons in charge of the production of the information and its primary users, first of all the Steering Committee. It was stated that the Inception Report would establish the modalities of its functioning. In the practice, the Plan was not elaborated, and the SC was never shaped. The system of M&E was designed to function with 5 flows of information with their respective evaluative moments, defined in the PRODOC. In the budget was planned a financing to execute the plan of M&E, broken in its main topics. The effective expenditure was null on this item, until the present TE, partly because the activities actually realized were those which cost was already included in institutional expenditures.

The reports of supervision were drafted (PIR, QPR, AR) but they did not reflect the problems in time, or did not reflect them at all. The annual revisions did not indicate strategic problems which would deserve corrective answers, because the indicated problems belonged to micro-management, the kind of problems to which it is necessary to give immediate answers, and not to wait for an annual revision. The QORs provide a very compact but exhaustive narrative of the activities realized in the considered period. They are however descriptive, and do not contain value judgment on the state of progress, nor an understanding of the difficulties of execution.

In spite of this, the QORs provided to the supervising team (RTA and EU responsible) some perception about the little progress of the activities on behalf of the PMU. Observations were formulated, with a roadmap for its Director, but their indications had very little translation into acts.

The participation of each of the actors was divided up and specific to the actions they were supposed to participate, due to the lack of a committee within which they could have planned and acted as a whole. Even in the case of the MoE, legal executor of the project, the participation was uneven during the period of execution. The Director of the Soils and Ecosystems Unit was replaced twice, what has obviously damaged the continuity of the institutional appropriation. The M&E was not effective and consequently there was no feedback at ministry level, thus no participation possible at this level too. Nor was incorporated any SC, so the participation of the public and private actors in the implementation was limited to the status of beneficiaries of some activities, and none of them reached an understanding of the whole project.

According to the final version of the PRODOC, the SLM project should be granted by three sources of **cash funding**: the contribution of the FEM (479,000 USD), the actual co-financing of the UNDP on core funding - or Track funds - (150,000 USD) and a contribution of 175,000 USD on behalf of the AECl.

The evaluation of the effective expenditure by source of funding, indicate that, in the whole life of the project, the real contribution of the UNDP was 100,000 USD and not the planned 150,000. It is true that the in kind contribution from the PAGE project also is a contribution from the UNDP, although recorded in another account. But it cannot be classified at the same time as governmental contribution (in kind co-financing) and as a proper contribution of the UNDP.

The total expenditure registered in ATLAS as the effective GEF contribution for the SLM project, is 455,076.87 USD that is 95 % of the planned commitment. As for the contribution supposed by AECl, it was understood by mistake as being in cash, but according to the appendices of the PRODOC, it was an in-kind co-financing.

With respects to in-kind co-financing, the major observations from GEF Secretariat to the first version of the project (October 2006) concerned the level of in-kind co-financing by the Government, considered too reduced to reflect the - supposed - real relevance of SLM in Haiti. Total co-financing in the initial version amounted to 230,000 USD, which was almost 25% of the total amount, for a project of 1.0 M USD. In the new version, the co-financing was increased up to 2/3 of the total, while this increased to 2.5 M USD, whereas the cash financing requested remained the same.

Nonetheless, the co-financing in GEF sense does not represents a means of operation for the project, but the actors who provide them have to establish a partnership with the project. This did not occur, because the project did not establish any collaboration with other projects generated by the PAGE and there is no evidence that the guidelines of SLM were useful for the other actions of the MoE, within the DSE itself or with other directions. This finding coincides with the restricted participation of other actors.

Generally speaking, the institutional arrangements planned during the formulation of the reviewed budget of the definitive PRODOC were not put in practice, and that the SLM project was practically obliged to reduce its level of aims and expenditure to the amount planned in its first version. No written explanation can be found about it.

According to the budget planned in the signed PRODOC, the SLM project appeared to be a medium-sized project which implied that 2/3 of the results should have been obtained thanks to governmental action. It was in reality a small-sized project, swelled artificially by an unrealistic expectation about the governmental counterpart.

Besides the fact that the shift in the proportion between financing and co-financing, from half and half to 1/3 - 2/3, is surprising for a poor country, it led inevitably to an unrealistic plan, unless the PMU had been able to convince the other actors to leave aside their own plans in order to organize themselves in function of the SLM objectives. For that purpose, it would have been necessary to have a concrete action plan to be proposed to all actors (such as that of the NAPCD, to which however the project had to contribute). It was difficult to obtain that the other actors accept that their collaboration implied to assume part of the costs of this learning. It was not thus possible to count effectively on these co-financing / partnerships.

▪ 3) Project Results and Sustainability.

The reviewing of outputs leads to the conclusion that the objectives had been only partially obtained, because there was an accumulation of delays in each component, which gave rise to temporal gaps between the delivered products, especially since certain activities needed products from the other activities, what led to an accumulation of the delays.

Consequently, the outputs obtained were those which might be reached in spite of these conditions: even if the concretes actions at local level were missing, the studies which respond to the specific objectives of component 3 were feasible, once identified the

appropriate consultants. Something similar occurred with the trainings: the most punctual ones, which involved external teachers, once organized were easier to manage than a complete plan of formation articulated with local actions.

With respect to the activities of mainstreaming, they supposed inputs at the same time adequate (like the studies) and disseminated (what was not the case), and a capacity of lobbying among public administration, but the PMU was not prepared to play this role. In the long run, the activities of formation could contribute to this assimilation, but this could be reached well beyond the horizon of the project, especially if we consider the limited scope of the effectively granted trainings.

Since products were partially obtained, it is inevitable that the expected outcomes are not totally reached. As a general conclusion, it can be stated that the products of the project thus stay altogether strikingly below what was planned, what yielded little advances as for the expected results. Several factors which combine mutually can explain this situation, starting from the weakness in the design, enforced by an insufficient appreciation of actors' limitations and especially the voluntarism in planning, unsuitable for this weakness and for these limitations. The conditions of execution of the project, and the weakness of the support and supervision it benefited, without minimizing the purely external factors, finished to enforce this situation. Nonetheless, the SLM project yielded interesting contributions and it is necessary to use them, and especially it is necessary to continue the effort with better means and arrangements.

The synthesis of the politico-institutional situation in relation to LD in Haiti (the baseline), is that there is a diversity of approaches or, more exactly, a diversity of policies and public actions related with LD, some coinciding with the objectives of preservation, others which can be oriented to it and some others with divergent approaches. There are also those who ignore the DT as problem, even if their objectives can suffer the consequences from it, as succeed with the installation of industrial parks in the lowlands.

The analysis of the situation of the support and supervision by the Haitian state in relation in LD, show that beyond the consensus on the causes, the public and private actions related with LD, take place in different levels, with little connection between them, with a diversity of overlapping mandates, what is unavoidable, but with few functional authorities with inter-sectorial and inter-institutional mandates to organize complex actions with common objectives. Facing this situation, the guiding principle of SLM is that to reach the aimed outcomes (the preservation and the improvement of lands as a basic public good) it is necessary to impulse effectively coherent and synergic actions at all levels.

The changes which occurred in the last five years in the institutional context in relation to SLM are however significant, although not attributable to the project.

After the earthquake, the DSNCRP was replaced by the "Action Plan for Recovery and Development" (APRD - 2010), which considers the WSM within the framework of the environmental foundation, within a complete approach, harmonic with the SLM aims: "for that purpose, the projects of WSM, of reforestation and soils preservation must be designed in association with rural communities and will have to harmonize the needs of the farming and the imperatives of the environmental protection".

More recently even, it can be find in the document "Environmental Orientations to be reflected in the general statement of policy of the Prime Minister" (TOUSSAINT J.R., 2011), 3 strategic lines relevant for SLM: increase the forest cover, increase the energy efficiency of the charcoal sector, and stepping the recovery of degraded ecosystems.

After the "macro policies" documents, the evaluation focusses on the changes in the coherence of some sectorial policies with the SLM aims. In general, policies from the traditional sectors of agricultural development, or less conventional and more cross-sectoral but with a main anchor in the productive sector (such as PNSAN), have an explicit affinity with SLM, although their main objectives are others.

As a general conclusion, it should be stated that LD is a real concern, felt by various sectors of opinion, directly or indirectly, but the specific approach of the UNCCD has not been sufficiently appropriated. However, the objective remains valid, it is necessary to develop means of achieving it, taking into account the lessons learned from the SLM project. The following recommendations go to this direction.

4.2 Recommendations and lessons

- **Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project**
 - A. When formulating projects, it is important to ensure the quality of the situational analysis, of which depends necessarily the logic of the project, as well as a correct reading of the risks involved, which should lead to a strategy to operate the project, in case the expected arrangements would not occur.
 - B. This specially includes having a proper ex - ante evaluation of the capabilities of involved organizations, and their institutional needs, which allows to properly establishing their mode of participation in the project, and incorporate it as a comprehensive operational plan, which would be the navigation map of the PMU.
 - C. Facing a situation characterized by many difficulties in the executions, it is thus essential for the smooth running of a project to ensure additional support and supervision, because the PMU is designed initially to implement the project in the ideal scenario, but not to facing a non-optimal situation.
 - D. Annual supervision reports must point out the strategic issues that deserve corrective responses, and not those of the order of micro-management. To address these problems, which must receive immediate solutions, there must have a line of communication and constant technical monitoring. The UNDP – CO and the regional GEF / UNDP unit should therefore ensure technical monitoring sufficient to allow the PMU to operate in solving identified problems and facing the unexpected ones, and should invest directly institutional resources in an M&E systemic approach oriented to results, both at national and regional levels.
- **Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project**
 - E. As the project did not reached completely its planned outcomes, the sustainability of partial results obtained in spite of this, depends directly on the continuity of the actions themselves, because the efforts initiated, although valuable, have fallen short respect of what was expected to ensure that the SLM remain placed at the heart of policies for recovery and development.
 - F. The opportunity of this continuity is given by UNDP's institutional support to MoE, i.e. by the PAGE project. This is foreseen in a follow-up note to the PMU to the PAGE director, where pending activities are detailed. Giving support to the proposal of continuity submitted to PAGE by the PMU at the close of the project, it is possible to give a public status to the documents (of the studies) and to disclose and even further develop the proposed land law, and continue with the activities of developing training modules, and formulation of the IFS.
 - G. But this is not sufficient and it should be necessary to insure also other substantive activities such as organizing training sessions for organizations or groups of farmers, monitoring the process of establishing a national system of information, and the development and piloting of a mechanism for incorporating SLM principles in the main inter-and cross-sectoral tools for decision-making and national interventions. These require greater management activity, which will put pressure unduly on the ability of PAGE.
 - H. As for the development and implementation of pilot SLM projects, which has not been possible during the project, it seems that current conditions are more favorable in the

sense that there are plans being next to be implemented from the UNDP - EEU partners that might be an opportunity to warrant continuity, but it will take as a strong dose of proactivity on the part of management to achieve the PAGE.

- I. To the list already submitted to PAGE, it should be added two additional lines of activity, the first being the culmination of the logic of SLM and its translation in the second tangible achievements in the landscape. They are: Resume NAPCD formulation and undertake a draft investment plan.

- **Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives**

- J. To perform a full environmental regulation recognized by all stakeholders, the MoE requires cross-cutting policy documents elaborated by consensus. It needs for this purpose professional staff and skills trained in a broad conception of the problems of land use.
- K. To achieve a full normative approach (thus assumed by the whole government) in environmental regulation, it is not enough to value the goods and ecosystem services for the society, it is necessary to understand the diversity of economic rationalities of their direct users. This can only be learned in the field, with the direct agents of land use.
- L. The development of training modules is a step in this direction, but it will be necessary to ensure the inclusion of the formation process (not included as part of the actual arrangement with PAGE for the culmination of pending activities) into local development interventions, in order to reach a meaningful participation of local actors.
- M. It is as well recommendable to continue in the implementation of a comprehensive information system, which should operate at four levels: the sectoral and local generators of information that are incorporated into a mapping treatment system by the 2nd level (by CNIGS or another entity delocalized but attached to it), which feeds the analyzes of the various observatories (3rd level) that finally converge in the cell that develops integrated technical proposals (CIAT, 4th level) for decision-making level of government. SLM must be introduced in this system consistently at all levels. The project, with its training capacity, worked at levels 1 (WOCAT Questionnaire), 2 (LADA workshop) and 3 (Workshop on Environmental Economics). It did it in a dotted form, when the process requires an accompanying much more consistent over time.
- N. Cartographic analysis tools are important to the institutional normative approach to SLM, there is a need to work at a closer scale, with a major level of details to take into account the micro diversity of soils, lands and territory, that leads to articulate general objectives with locally very specific tools.
- O. It is urgent to take advantage of the phase of international harmonization of NAPs to resume the interrupted process and link it to the previous recommendation. To conclude a cycle in the formulation of NAPCD is a priority to give coherence to the whole, and to facilitate the incorporation of most of the objectives of SLM policies outside the environmental "sector". As for the Investment Plan it should be the logical continuity of the NAP, because a policy that does not have means results a dead letter. The plan should also precede the finalization of the IFS.
- P. Address the issues of land tenure and its institutional enforcement, is a priority because it is the basis of the problem, but it should be done in two ways: by providing building an effective policy to solve both the problem of preserving property rights and generalization of these rights in the face of a chaotic situation de facto; by going around as much as possible by measures agreed with the state and individuals to make viable the various proposals of the previous line.
- Q. Most important aspects about the legal framework of land management have been addressed in the study FAO / IDB in 1999, now being reissued by CIAT, and it should be adopted concrete action policy from its statements. The main recommendation being that nothing should be done without peasant families, major users of the lands.

- R. It is recommended on this very complex theme a pragmatic position: do not pretend to solve the problem of land as a prerequisite for SLM. Harmonization should instead focus on a large corpus of standards: - Agricultural intensification and dies, - Development of alternative products and derivatives wooded, - Land Use and Watershed Management, - Environmental protection, - Water Management...
- S. The central aspect of SLM to Haiti revolves around the perennial species in general and trees in particular. As this theme is at the crossroads of several disciplines and thus unlikely to spontaneously find common ground between different types of professionals, we must promote the empowerment through professional training, oriented to give an eclectic approach.
- T. It is recommendable to provide solutions for two types of situations that occur predominantly in Haiti (in addition to the remaining forests, which represent only 2% of the territory and must be subject to specific conservation policies):
 - The already intensively used areas (60% of land used), with productive trees in the compound fields, its coffee-growing areas, etc. ... In this case it is necessary to reverse the degradation of intensive production systems with the existing SLM at place. Changes in the use of dry hills must be accompanied by alternatives for fertility management and animal husbandry in these intensive parts of the productive systems.
 - The courses and other sites generally used in a "mining" way by so many families, more or less wooded copse and deforested areas (the remaining 40%). It should include the intensification of livestock from poor families, and for this reason it will be adequate to include the corresponding direction of MARNDR.
- U. It is necessary to continue the development of models of land use based on trees cropping and exploitation of woodlands, according to biogeographic characteristics, including the strengthening of the dendroenergetic production (firewood and wood charcoal). This contradicts the widespread point of view that assume the correct solution from an environmental perspective would be to promote the substitution of wood and coal to gas, especially in cities, because this design, besides its economic cost in imported inputs, denies the economic importance of the current chain of wood and charcoal. This is one more reason to improve it instead of trying to fight it.
- V. To harmonize the wood - charcoal with the objectives of SLM should be considered as a priority to increase the share of supply of wood for various uses which comes from human grown trees, alone or in combination with other uses of the land, thus increasing the total supply, which has the greatest impact on reducing land degradation, because it can be more fully disclosed. This is not the only thing to do, but it is that needs to be done on a larger scale to obtain the greatest impact on the consequences of DT in Haiti.
- W. The SLM approach must include innovative alternatives, such as the comestible *Jatropha*, other more specific to certain soils (shaded coffee, fruit), and others that involve a change in the operating mode of species already used, as in the case of Bayahonde (*Prosopis juliflora*), etc..
- X. The question of changes in the mode of operation is broader and covers agricultural activities in general, as for example the case of vetiver (*Chrysopogon zizanioides*) in areas of intensive farming in the upper basin of Cavaillon, where different stakeholders, included in a project supported by French cooperation and in which participates the FAMV and MARNDR, generate accurate references to the LD and its measurement, according to various soil conditions and use. In general, alternative approaches combining soil conservation and income generation, in logged areas so extensive, are interesting solutions to combine action and research training at the local level.
- Y. The approach by Territorial Planning must actually be part of the entire SLM, but it needs for this to be fed adequately by local experimentation (level 1 information system) and to the extent that the highest level of information synthesis has assumed the overarching

objective of the SLM, beyond the "sectoral" mandate of MoE. The effect at the CIAT has to be that the LD becomes a central concern in planning land use.

- Z. In general, to work inside the concept of watersheds by minimizing the negative effects or the risk of failure, and consistently with the objectives of SLM requires that all investments in degraded forest areas at risk are made by the farmers themselves and in their interest, so as to ensure ownership and sustainability.

5. Annexes

List of persons interviewed

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Evaluation Question List

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| Project design |
| Where project's objectives and components relevant, according to the social and political context? |
| Were the project's objectives and components clear, practicable and feasible within its time frame? |
| Were the capacities of the executing institution(s) and counterparts properly considered when the project was designed? |
| Were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated in the project design? |
| Were the partnership arrangements properly identified and roles and responsibilities negotiated prior to project approval? |
| Were counterpart resources (funding, staff, and facilities), enabling legislation, and adequate project management arrangements in place at project entry? |
| Were the project assumptions and risks well-articulated in the PIF and Project Document? |
| Are the stated assumptions and risks logical and robust? And did they help to determine activities and planned outputs? |
| Do the project objectives conform to agreed priorities in the UNDP country programme document (CPD) country programme action plan (CPAP), and UN Development Assistance framework (UNDAF)? |
| Were externalities, (i.e. effects of climate change, global economic crisis, etc), that are relevant to the findings taken into account? |

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| Mainstreaming |
| Was the project concept in line with development priorities and plans of Haiti? |
| Were the relevant representatives from government and civil society involved in project implementation, including as part of the project steering committee? |
| Was an intergovernmental committee given responsibility to liaise with the project team, recognizing that more than one ministry should be involved? |
| Has the government enacted legislation and/or developed policies and regulations in line with the project's objectives? |

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| Project Implementation |
| Was the chosen executing agency for project execution suitable, given the project design? |
| Was there an appropriate focus on results by the implementing and executing agencies? |
| Was IA & EA supervision adequate? |
| Were managing parties responsive to significant implementation problems (if any)? |
| Gender issues been taken into account in project design and implementation? |
| Was quality technical support provided in a timely manner to the project team? |
| Is there candor and realism in supervision reporting? |
| Monitoring and evaluation |
| Is the M&E plan well-conceived? |
| Is it articulated sufficient to monitor results and track progress toward achieving objectives? |
| Were baseline conditions, methodology and roles and responsibilities well-articulated at project start-up. |
| Was the M&E Plan sufficiently budgeted and funded during project preparation and implementation? |
| Are there indicators provided in the Project Document and were they effectively used for measuring progress and performance? |
| Were progress and financial reporting requirements/ schedules complied with, including the |

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| timely delivery of well-developed monitoring reports (PIRs)? |
| Were follow-up actions, and/or adaptive management, taken in response to monitoring reports (PIRs)? |
| Were PIR self-evaluation ratings consistent with the MTE and TE findings? If not, were these discrepancies identified by the project steering committee and addressed? |
| Were changes made to project implementation as a result of the recommendations from the Midterm review? |
| Adaptive Management |
| If changes in planned project outputs and activities were extensive, did they materially change the expected project outcomes? |
| Were the changes brought on due to weaknesses in the initial project conception or due to changes in the social, political and/or environmental circumstances in the project area? |
| Were the project changes articulated in writing and then considered and approved by the project steering committee? |
| Stakeholders |
| Did the project involve the relevant stakeholders through information sharing and consultation and by seeking their participation in project design, implementation, and M&E? |
| Did the project consult with and make use of the skills, experience, and knowledge of the appropriate government entities, non-governmental organizations, community groups, private sector entities, local governments, and academic institutions in the design, implementation, and evaluation of project activities? |
| Were the perspectives of those who would be affected by project decisions, those who could affect the outcomes, and those who could contribute information or other resources to the process taken into account while taking decisions? |

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| Co- Financing |
| Is there sufficient clarity in the reported co-financing to substantiate in-kind and cash co-financing from all listed sources? |
| Have the reasons for differences in the level of expected and actual co-financing been made clear and are the reasons compelling? |
| Was externally funded project components well integrated into the GEF supported components? |
| Did the extent of materialization of co-financing have an effect on project outcomes and/or sustainability? |
| Is there evidence of additional (to the originally committed) leveraged resources that have been committed as a result of the project? (leveraged resources can be financial or in-kind and may be from other donors, NGOs, foundations, governments, communities or the private sector). |



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| Outcomes at local level |
| Is it possible to identify and define positive or negative effects of the project on local populations? |
| Is there evidence that the project outcomes have contributed to better preparations to cope with natural disasters? |
| Sustainability |
| Are there financial risks that may jeopardize the sustainability of project outcomes? |
| Has a mechanism been installed to ensure financial and economic sustainability once GEF assistance ends? |
| Are there social or political risks that may threaten the sustainability of project outcomes? |
| What is the risk for instance that the level of stakeholder ownership (including ownership by governments and other key stakeholders) will be insufficient to allow for the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained? |

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| Do the various key stakeholders see that it is in their interest that project benefits continue to flow? |
| Is there sufficient public/stakeholder awareness in support of the project's long-term objectives? |
| Do the legal frameworks, policies, and governance structures and processes within which the project operates pose risks that may jeopardize sustainability of project benefits? |
| Are requisite systems for accountability and transparency, and required technical know-how, in place? |
| Are there ongoing activities that may pose an environmental threat to the sustainability of project outcomes? |
| Impacts |
| a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements. |

Annex G: Evaluation Report Clearance Form

ANNEX G: EVALUATION REPORT CLEARANCE FORM

(to be completed by CO and UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and included in the final document)

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| Evaluation Report Reviewed and Cleared by | |
| UNDP County Office | |
| Name: <u>Yves Jamont Jr Duflon</u> | |
| Signature: <u></u> | Date: <u>17-08-2012</u> |
| UNDP GEF RTA | |
| Name: <u>Akihito Kono</u> | |
| Signature: <u></u> | Date: <u>20/08/2012</u> |