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## **Terminal Evaluation of the ‘Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho’ project**



This Terminal Evaluation is for the Lesotho SLM project, implemented from 2009 to 2014.

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## Project overview

### Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho

- UNDP project IDs: 00063046; PIMS 3044; GEF ID: 3372
- Evaluation carried out from November 2014 – March 2015
- GEF Operational Program/Strategic Program: Land Degradation
- Implementing Partner: Ministry of Forests and Land Reclamation
- Evaluation team: Jessica Troni and Molupe Matsumunyane

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Project Summary Table

The key Project details as indicated in the project document are as follows:

Project Title:	Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho			
GEF Project ID:	PIMS 3044		<u>at endorsement (Million US\$)</u>	<u>at completion (Million US\$)</u>
UNDP Project ID:	00063046	GEF financing:	US \$1,724,500	1,724,500
Country:	Lesotho	IA/EA own:	US \$300,000	350,000
Region:	SA	Government:	USD2,370,000	
Focal Area:	Land Degradation	GTZ:	USD2,025,000	0
FA Objectives, (OP/SP):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SLM model and techniques ready for national implementation</li> <li>- Local and national capacity for adapting and scaling up proven SLM models and techniques in place.</li> <li>- SLM Policy Enabling Environment</li> </ul>	Total co-financing:	USD 4,695,000	
Implementing Agency	UNDP	Total Project Cost:	US \$ 6.394,500	
Executing Agency:	Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation			
Other Partners involved:		ProDoc Signature (date project began):		September 2009
		(Operational) Closing D Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho ate:	Proposed: January 2014	Actual: December 2014

### Project Description

The **goal** of the 'Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho' project is for sustainable land management in Lesotho to provide a strong base for sustainable development while providing a range of global benefits to the region (Project Document). The **objective** of the project is to *'build capacities for sustainable land management (SLM) in appropriate government and civil society institutions/user groups in Lesotho and SLM mainstreamed into government planning and strategy development.'* This meant the

development of a knowledge management network, and the development of the techniques, approaches, capacity and strategy for up scaling successful SLM in support of national biodiversity conservation, food security and poverty reduction strategies.

Three project outcomes are intended to achieve the stated objective:

Outcome 1: Proven, strengthened, participatory, replicable models and techniques that successfully overcome current institutional and governance barriers to SLM are to be ready for national implementation;

Outcome 2: Adequate local and national capacity for adapting and upscaling proven SLM models and techniques are in place;

Outcome 3: SLM Policy Enabling Environment of enhanced awareness, dialogue, understanding and analysis of SLM best practices at resource user, community, local government, non-governmental organization (NGO) and national government levels across the country is to be reflected in the relevant policies, strategies and programs.

## Evaluation Rating Table

Evaluation Ratings:			
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	rating	2. IA& EA Execution	rating
M&E design at entry	U	Quality of UNDP Implementation	MS
M&E Plan Implementation	MU	Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	MU
<b>Overall quality of M&amp;E</b>	<b>MU</b>	<b>Overall quality of Implementation / Execution</b>	<b>MS</b>
3. Assessment of Outcomes	rating	4. Sustainability	rating
Relevance	R	Financial resources:	ML
Effectiveness	MS	Socio-political:	MU
Efficiency	U	Institutional framework and governance:	ML
<b>Overall Project Outcome Rating</b>	<b>MS</b>	Environmental :	ML
		<b>Overall likelihood of sustainability:</b>	<b>ML</b>
Impact			
Environmental Stress Reduction	M		
Poverty reduction	M		
<b>Progress towards stress/status change</b>	<b>M</b>		
<b>Overall project results</b>	<b>MS</b>		

## Summary of findings

### *The range management governance model*

The project is premised on the idea that sustainability of rangeland management is likely to involve giving more control to the users of the land. The main issues (and risks) at the outset of the project was to establish a 'harmonised working relationship with regards to range resources' An implicit assumption is that participatory means

of developing management plans would increase ownership of the plan, help to set fair rules for all which would promote maintenance of the system through self-regulation and community enforcement.

The model contained elements around geographical and environmental mapping; formation and formalisation of Grazing Associations (GAs) and user groups for range management; rotational grazing scheme; voluntary brush control; measures to reduce numbers of livestock; Income Generating Activities (IGAs); and capacity development. In some respects, there was nothing new compared to other schemes that had been tried before. The difference seems to be in how these elements were combined and sequenced to make the model work. Specifically, the first plank of the strategy was to generate environmental information on which to base the range management plans in order to ensure their achievability and to promote consensus. To support this proposition there were measures to help reduce livestock numbers. The second plank was to build social capital (cohesion). In addition, lessons learned from other projects were that community members need to see the benefits of a scheme before they invest in it, and the IGAs were a useful way to deliver immediate benefits as well as to reinforce group dynamics. The trainings, farmer to farmer learning and Project Implementation Forum were other tools used to develop a group identity and collaboration between stakeholder groups. The third plank was to formalise the groups in order to provide legal backing in enforcing the group dynamics.

### ***Relevance***

The project is highly relevant to Lesotho. 60% of Lesotho's land is comprised of rangelands. The most poverty stricken communities live in mountain areas and land is under intense pressure due to heavy soil erosion and overgrazing. Rangeland management has been a policy priority for more than 30 years in Lesotho. The main thrust of the project was to identify a replicable model for range management. Whether this was in fact achieved is questionable. The informants to the evaluation were not able to easily identify the model described above. The project could have been better designed to address key policy questions, as explained in paragraphs 73 to 76 on the theory of change developed during project formulation and Recommendation 8.

The project management team's vision to base the implementation plan on objective and verifiable information, was a good initiative. These studies included the rangeland inventory, which was terminated due to high costs, the area mappings and the socio-economic baseline survey. The findings were certainly relevant to the project strategy but they were not used in any distinguishable way. The project targets were revised a year into the project and identified on the basis of existing, documented experiences with GAs over the last 30 years, which begs the question as to why these targets had not been set appropriately in the first place.



## ***Effectiveness***

The findings suggest that there are mixed results. There have been some gains on Outcome 1 and a very important gain on Outcome 3 but it is difficult to draw conclusions about the quality and impact of Outcome 2 in relation to the community level trainings. A limited amount was done to change hearts and minds at the national level.

On Outcome 1, it was reported that seven GAs were registered by April 2014, representing a coverage close to or just over the project target of 40,000 hectares under SLM. Registration is no indication of membership levels nor active participation, for which there is limited data. There are reports of some confusion among GA members in the understanding of how the model was supposed to work, which undermined community participation in it.

The model relies on pasture improvement benefits to reinforce the community buy-in into the scheme. From the documented evidence and community narratives that the evaluators heard, the record here seems to be fairly good. Quantitative estimates of brush control are harder to come by, but a field mission in 2013 estimated that brush control was underway in most of the GAs, and that about 23.0 ha out of more than 80.0 ha of range land had been cleared of brush.

There is some evidence that the Project enabled some level of conflict resolution. The community narratives indicate improved relations between Councillors and Chiefs through active association with the GA. Coordination between the three pillars of the governance model (community groups, chiefs and councillors) seemed to have improved with the establishment of the District Project Implementation Forum (PIF), a consultative forum for dealing with the management and development issues which was instituted and managed jointly by the Chiefs, Councillors and GAs.

A number of households benefited from the Income Generating Activities (IGAs). These activities have shown promising potential to diversify livelihoods. Some surprising but welcome unintended consequences came about, such as the pooling of own resources by communities following on from the initial project support. Even with the failure of some of the IGAs, communities reported willingness to invest their own resources into trying again. Community ambition to expand the IGAs was also evidence in some communities. The IGAs would prove to be important drivers of social cohesion. The evaluation team found out from the communities that IGAs provided a reason for the grazing associations to come together regularly to discuss their livelihoods as a group. However, it is noteworthy that the project design did not provide funds for IGAs. GoL funds came mid-way in the life of the project to support the IGAs, complemented by analytical studies which were funded by the project.

The main challenges to the implementation of the model appears to have come from poor relations between Chiefs and Councillors and a lack of consistent or coordinated extension support to communities by MFLR and MoAFS on the IGAs. Particularly woeful experiences were around the pigs and the water harvesting for irrigation. In the 2014 socio-economic study which carried out interviews among over 170 households, it was reported that the majority of respondents specify the chief acting alone closely followed by the chief acting together with the Councillor. The conclusion drawn at this stage is that more time and continued support is needed to make the model work effectively in developing cooperation between stakeholders and shared sense of ownership and responsibility. The process will require patient investment. Implementation from Maseru was acknowledged in project reports as being an oversight in the design of the project which ultimately affected implementation progress.

There is scant information on the scale of activity, not to mention effectiveness, related to reduction of livestock (increasing livestock-off), introduction of improved livestock varieties or supplementary feeding, yet these elements would be critical in developing an achievable rotational grazing plan. This is symptomatic of a lack of workable project strategy (Theory of Change), leading to the project focusing on parts of the 'system' without a plausible way of connecting these parts to deliver the project objective.

On Outcome 2, the results fell far short of the intention reflected in the Project Document which was to address a key barrier relating to conceptual and technical capacities to implement and support the model, as well as scale it up. Most, if not all, of the training was carried out with communities, but the evaluators were not able to establish with certainty how many people were trained, neither was there any information about the quality of the trainings and the impact on actual range management behaviours. The project strategy contained in the Project Document had programmed a substantial training action plan aimed at central and community government staff and parliamentarians.

On Outcome 3, a Country SLM Investment Framework (CSIF) was produced (though it remains to be institutionalised) and the project supported the integration of SLM in two national policies, i.e., a) Range Management Policy, approved by Cabinet in 2014, and b) Soil and Water Conservation (awaiting approval by the Cabinet). The National Range Resources Policy is particularly important in future efforts to support the continuation and scale up of this model.

A 2-day National SLM Conference was held in May 2014 opened by the Minister of Forestry and Land Reclamation, and drawing participation of 150 research scientists, University students, practitioners from civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations and government institutions. Apart from influencing policy, the

conference was meant to create a platform for knowledge sharing of SLM issues at national and regional level. As a result, a knowledge sharing platform, and a "book of proceedings - full papers" for this conference was posted to UNDP Lesotho website to further share and disseminate SLM information. The question remains as to the extent to which this connected with policy makers and the associated policy-influencing value of it.

### ***Efficiency***

The findings suggest that management efficiency was low for a variety of reasons including under-staffing of the management team, poor project design leading to time-intensive project re-design, a lack of strategic planning; implementation from Maseru making support to communities expensive and not very effective; lack of delegation of activities to competent agencies; and lack of coordination of extension services at the community level.

Expenditures on project management turned out to be far higher than planned because of the field missions that MFLR undertook to the field for community sensitisations, trainings, supervision of IGAs and environmental monitoring. The other large difference between budget and realized expenditure is on Outcome 2, where expenditure was 65% lower than planned implying an under-delivery of the training planned for policy-makers in Maseru.

The co-financing plan amounted to \$4.65 million, made up of contributions from GoL, GTZ and UNDP. The actual co-financing was just under 20% of the planned amount, due to the project starting later and missing the synergies with the GIZ contribution as well as the contribution from GoL being lower than expected, though it did finance what proved to be an important element of the range management model: the IGAs. Thus the GoL funding was well blended with the GEF grant. Leveraged financing was secured from the GEF Small Grants Programme, the communities themselves and from NEPAD and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) Global mechanism. Co-financing plus leveraged financing amounts to just over \$1 million over the 4 years of project implementation.

### ***Sustainability***

The findings indicate that sustainability is possible but that it needs continued support. Institutional sustainability is possible though not yet achieved. The exit plan recommended that MFLR continue to support the communities and scale up its support to operationalizing and maintain community group structures and range management plans. Training at the national level was limited as was the involvement from other ministries in the PSC meetings, so it is difficult to assert that this project has built capacities or political will for SLM.

Social sustainability is possible but not yet achieved. Many IGAs are now being promoted and expanded by the communities themselves because they see the benefits of improved pasture but reports in the later years of project implementation still document cases of conflicts between chiefs and communities.

Financial sustainability will need the government to continue to support this system, which seems plausible given the recent approval of the National Range Management Policy. If the project experience shows anything, it is that fielding staff to work intensively with communities is critical in getting this model to work. With de-concentration of staff, it should be possible to keep costs lower, but that in itself will probably require a re-think of the incentives given to staff to relocate.

### ***Impact***

On the question of environmental and poverty impacts, the findings are inconclusive. Taking the land degradation indicators together, the story appears to show that land degradation and biological productivity have been reversed by some measures, but that other factors, such as rainfall, are likely to have influenced results. And the measure showing an increase of vegetative cover may be because invader species frequency has increased. And forage production increased in areas that lacked functional grazing associations, so there does not seem to be an apparent relationship between these changes and the SLM interventions.

The results of the socio-economic survey undertaken in 2014 show that on average the situation in the SLM pilot project area is showing signs of poverty *increases* and the poverty gap getting wider. This decline in income status suggests that there are other influencing factors on the project communities. The socio-economic study reported poverty statistics disaggregated by gender but there was no analysis as to reasons for this poverty gap, neither does the information appear to have been used in a particular way by the project, for example in any methods of gender targeting. Poverty seems to be strongly associated with women and the gender gap is widening. The factors explaining the widening poverty gap should be understood in order to inform future programming in this area.

### ***Results and monitoring and evaluation***

Out of 18 Outcome indicators, 8 have been achieved, with 7 not achieved (though 4 of these were unachievable in any circumstance as they were beyond the scope of the Project) and a further 4 without conclusive evidence of achievement for various reasons. The project seems to have been most successful in delivering Objective and Outcome 1 targets, with weak results for Outcomes 2 and 3, though a very big achievement on Outcome 3 was the approval of the National Range Resources Policy in 2014, which was facilitated by the Project. One other notable achievement on Outcome 3, was the development of CSIF (though not institutionalised yet) which

was welcomed and supported by the Government, and the Ministry of Development Planning is sourcing funds for its implementation. On Outcome 2 the Project largely lost sight of the strategy in the Project Document and there were no indicators to track it.

More broadly, the results framework did not reflect the underlying (unidentified yet somehow implicit) Theory of Change. This represents a missed opportunity to generate monitoring data that would have been useful to policy makers. There was an inadequate staffing on M&E with project staff allocated to this for less than half of the project duration.

## **Summary of conclusions**

The innovation of the model probably comes in the work undertaken to base the grazing plans and permits on measured environmental conditions, as well as the establishment of the IGAs which provided an important driver for communities to bind together as a group. Therefore, on the question as to whether this project identified a new governance model for range resources management, the answer is probably no but that success of the model (which was pre-existing in some areas) in environmental and social terms may have been made more likely through those two innovations.

Grazing control in the Lesotho context of the many villages, cattle, and pressures on land use is extremely complicated as the grazing plans show, and an authority to provide overall coordination, arrive at operational consensus and enforce the rules is needed. The traditional system of chiefs seems to be as strong as it always has been, but there is no operational alternative today. The system of local government still needs considerable efforts to build up to make it effective. But for now, Chiefs should be co-opted constructively to avoid them become obstructers of change.

The link between the GAs/user groups and reversal of land degradation is inconclusive. On the one hand, a range of communities reported better pastures from the brush control activities. On the other hand, the scientific information shows that the correlation between pasture improvement and the presence of the GAs is weak. There may be other factors to explain the incongruence that is not being captured such as mismatch between the areas where the transects were placed and the pasture areas referred to by communities.

Given the supposed link between the effective working of the GAs and SLM in the rangelands, it may be too soon to say whether the project succeeded or failed in its ultimate objective of improving SLM. This is because GAs take time to settle in and because of dynamic and unpredictable forces such as the willingness of the

communities themselves to take up the responsibility of continuing with range management and IGAs.

### *Strengths*

There are promising elements of innovation that, if nurtured and replicated, could offer some positive lessons learned, such as the conflict mediation workshop and the Project Implementation Forums. These need to be institutionalized and developed further in order that they may develop their full potential in the advancement of the participatory management and planning processes. The mapping exercises to establish environmental conditions as the basis of the grazing management plans was a pioneering initiative and provides experience of how to do this, which is relevant to the National Range Resources Management Policy.

Some surprising but welcome unintended consequences came about, such as the pooling of own resources by communities following on from project support, and the creation of connected social groups. Even with the failure of some of the IGAs, communities were willing to invest their own resources into trying again.

There are some interesting advancements on Outcome 3 on policy development. But the main SLM policy, the CSIF, needs institutional embedding if it is not to remain a strategy on paper. Follow-on work is urgently needed. The recommendation on creating an institutional body for SLM interests seems particularly relevant to Lesotho and the inter-connectedness between its economic and environmental challenges.

### *Weaknesses*

There was a lack of a well-understood model at the field level and centrally which led in many cases to the disengagement of stakeholders. This can be seen from the lack of leadership by the Chiefs in many of the incipient GAs as well as the continuing conflicts. The lack of clarity ultimately undermined project implementation progress.

Service delivery to communities was weak mainly due to a lack of coordination between the MFLR and MoAFS and the lack of a consistent presence in the field. If the GAs are to work, which requires a dual strategy of community empowerment and development of mutual understanding and trust between all actors, they will need continued and consistent support and facilitation.

The work streams on policy engagement, national level trainings, toolkit development, knowledge management and strategy communications would have benefitted from a stronger, unified concept. Meaningful capacity development was not achieved by the project at the Central government level and results fell far short

of the vision and intention of the project strategy as contained in the Project Document. The work under Outcome 1 to develop the model may have overwhelmed the time availability of the project team to manage the other aspects of the project.

## **Summary of recommendations**

14 recommendations are put forward organised in five areas: i) Promoting better coordination and collaboration between ministries; ii) Improving the performance of ministry staff; iii) SLM Policy development iv) Developing the range management governance model; and v) Improving management efficiency. A summary of the recommendations is presented as follows:

### Promoting better coordination and collaboration between ministries

**1. Constitute a Strategic Investment Programme Board.** It is clear that better ways must be found to engage other ministries for cross-government learning and strengthened policy making. The CSIF's primary recommendation is to legally establish a Programme Investment Board as the key inter-sectoral coordination mechanism at central government level. Useful collaborations might be forged with the Ministry of Economic Development & Planning to enable policy and investment linkages of SLM to wider economic planning, for example, in issues around market access.

**2. Establish a programmatic approach to dual-focused project steering committee meetings.** This would be another way to strengthen cross-government collaboration and learning on SLM-relevant initiatives. Ministries would come together to discuss the strategy, intended results, implementation challenges and possible solutions for a range of projects. Separate, management/logistical discussions could be taken on a separate day by the project Implementing Partner.

**3. Incentivising ministry staff to work with the project** through non-monetary incentives, given the limitations present in civil service salary pay-scales and difference in relation to private sector market rates. This strategy should be considered a sustainability strategy as institutional support makes or breaks a project.

### Improving the performance of ministry staff

**4. Consider how ministry staff time is used.** A greater de-concentration of ministry staff would deliver better support service to communities and help to support continuation of these GAs. This essentially means a change of role to a more facilitative, supervisory role and a direct implementation role.

**5. Develop training standards for communities.** This would comprise standardised training materials, Standard Operating Principles for organising these such as where best to hold the training events, how to develop a blended service mix of formal training and farmer to farmer learning and evaluation methodologies.

#### SLM Policy development

**6. Use the CSIF as a platform to mainstream SLM** in the next iteration of the National Strategic Development Plan, which is due to end in 2016/7. The starting point would be putting in place a process for institutional coordination, for which there are two possibilities and one recommendation in the CSIF. In addition, the CSIF contains a schedule of activities, some of which could serve to build awareness and political will to support the implementation of the new National Range Resources Management Policy.

**7. Policy needs should frame the efforts on knowledge management and project data monitoring.** This needs attention from the very start. What are the needs and what is the strategy? It is suggested that sub-contracting responsibility for managing this work to a policy specialist would be necessary in order to draw in the necessary expertise and in order for the policy component to receive the necessary attention from the start. This would also enable a stronger link to be made between detailed design and field implementation, results and policy processes, thereby helping to maximise the project's relevance to GoL. Getting an adequate management team in place from the start is an investment in project success.

**8. Structure the monitoring exercise from the point of view of the policy questions that need answering** in order keep the exercise contained, focused and cost effective. The role of gender differences and different impacts on women and men should be central line of enquiry given the wide gender disparity in Lesotho. The monitoring system developed could try as far as possible to involve communities. It should be approached from an experimental perspective to keep the enquiry objective and open to all ideas.

#### Developing the range management governance model

**9. Develop evaluative case studies** on the different models under operation and success factors, in order to inform policy decisions on the choice of implementation strategies regarding range management. Given the wide gender disparities, the different roles of men and women and impacts on men and women should be explored.

**10. Support the continuation of the district-level project implementation forums** which have had good feedback in bringing all relevant parties together. These could be an important mechanism to provide communities with an additional



avenue for voice and accountability and to provide a platform for Community Councillors to begin to build a profile. These could be important mechanisms to begin carving out new roles for chiefs. Empowering communities may ultimately be insufficient to break away from the traditional model without a parallel effort to build local government authority and mandate on local development planning processes.

**11. Develop an engagement strategy with the Chiefs** since they are a critical part of the range management system while the new system of democratic governance phases in, which could be a 10 year medium term prospect. Even with a well-functioning local government system, it will be important to carve out a niche role for the chiefs as they are likely to continue commanding the loyalty of the communities. It is likely that more support for the changing development planning system can be secured from the Chiefs if they see themselves as moving with the change, rather than being left behind.

**12. Community empowerment is part of the solution.** Farmer to farmer learning blended with more conventional training should be continued because it is through capacity development that faith in alternative management methods, and in particular quantitative measurements of environmental conditions can be accepted as the basis for range management planning. In addition, motivation to participate in monitoring exercises can be fostered. Supporting CSOs and NGOs would be central to this, perhaps by engaging them in areas where they are already working.

#### Improving management efficiency

**13. Develop cost-output benchmarks that can be used for budget planning and control.** A better understanding of costs (and benefits) of different implementation strategies can inform project design and ultimately lead to better value for money implementation as well as better results.

**14. Training workstreams** should be sub-contracted to a professional training organisations, working closely to develop the materials and the training plan, possibly by establishing a partnership with the Lesotho civil service training institute. By professionalising the task, it would be possible to establish quality standards and to develop methodologies to measure capacity development.

#### **Lessons learned**

13 lessons learned are offered, the eight main ones are set out as follows:

1. The basis for project design should be a theory of change so that a clear strategy for connecting and sequencing outputs to deliver the intended targets is developed. This requires understanding clearly the policy questions that the project needs to address at the correct level of intervention. This project set out to address the land

degradation problem *via* the mechanism of community-owned range management processes, but the problems with the currently operating systems were never really identified preventing the emergence of a unified concept and the effective targeting of the project resources. The lack of a properly thought out concept was one of the main reasons for the underachievement of the project.

2. Using existing information will help to design better projects and avoid re-design once implementation starts, which is costly in management time. If design is based on experience, identifying SMART indicators should be easy to do. Benchmark experiences are plenty in Lesotho, yet the project design was wildly optimistic in the way it had set its targets, setting up the project to fail.

3. The IGAs seem to have been instrumental in promoting community cohesion and may therefore be considered as an integral part of a community-based range management strategy. The bigger immediate barrier is technical know-how and management skills and integrated service delivery. For longer-term growth potential, access to credit and markets will be a constraint.

4. It is well understood that communities need to see benefits accruing to them from their investment of time in group range management scheme. But whether the group management schemes work on the basis of voluntary time is also a question of relative benefits, recognising that there is an opportunity cost of time. There are other models under implementation, such as the cash for work scheme for herder boys (a figure of the equivalent of \$83 for 20 days was mentioned) and the range rider model (voluntary). These alternatives should be monitored to inform future programming.

5. The management team was too thinly spread and this negatively affect project results. Getting an adequate management team in place to cover all bases may be seen as costly, but with the right people in place, it is an investment in project success.

6. Implementation would have worked better had it been based on a meaningful partnership model, delegating authority to competent agencies within and outside the private sector where the expertise and experience lies. This would also have incentivized more meaningful participation of other ministries in the PSC meetings. The role of government in this area of work is best served in a facilitative and supervisory role, setting standards, coordinating and promoting dialogue.

7. Work to implement the GA system should be carried out from the field in order to make the funds go further and crucially, to provide a better service to communities. Delays in placing of Government extension staff in the project area to train and guide the association members was a challenge, and was acknowledged in project reports

as being an oversight in the design of the project which ultimately affected implementation progress.

8. The land degradation issue in Lesotho needs a sustained, longer-term effort that approaches the problem from an integrated systems perspective. This means that it requires the effective inputs from a multi-disciplinary team of implementing partners to work in their respective expertise and ideas, calling for effective coordination. The disciplines that SLM needs to cover include agriculture, livestock management, veterinary services, energy, water, marketing, economics, institutional development, training, and transport. This implies the need for larger programmatic projects. Small budgets can still be useful but should be focused on delivering results in niche areas with working connections to the bigger whole.

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

CA	Conservation Agriculture
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resources Management
CO	Country Office
CSIF	Country SLM Investment Framework
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DRRM	Department of Range Resources Management
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
GA	Grazing Association
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GoL	Government of Lesotho
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
IGA	Income Generating Activity
KM	Knowledge Management
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LHDA	Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
LULUCF	Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry
MDTP	Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Project
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFLR	Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation
MoAFS	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MRA	Managed Resource Area
MTE	Mid-Term Evaluation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa Development
NRM	Natural Resources Management
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PELUM	Participatory Ecological Land Use Management
PMU	Project Management Unit
PIMS	Project Information Management System
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PM	Project Manager
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RTA	Regional Technical Adviser (UNDP)
SIDS	Small Island States
SLM	Sustainable Land Management
SGP	Small Grants Programme
TA	Technical Adviser
TE	Terminal Evaluation
ToC	Theory of Change
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Development Assistance Agency

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose of the evaluation

1. Terminal evaluation (TE) is a requirement for all full-sized UNDP-supported GEF-financed projects. Project evaluations assess the efficiency and effectiveness of a project in achieving its intended results. They also assess the relevance and sustainability of outputs as contributions to medium-term and longer-term outcomes. TE provide a comprehensive and systematic accounting of performance at the end of the project cycle, considering the totality of the effort from project design, through implementation to wrap up, also considering the likelihood of sustainability and possible impacts. Evaluations for GEF projects include the following complementary purposes:

- To promote accountability and transparency and to assess and disclose the extent of project accomplishments;
- To synthesise lessons that can help to improve the design of future programming efforts;
- To contribute to the overall assessment of results in achieving GEF strategic objectives aimed at global environmental benefits.

2. The target audience for a terminal evaluation is GEF Operational Focal Point, project partners and beneficiaries, UNDP at country, regional and HQ levels, UNDP Evaluation Office, GEF Secretariat and GEF Evaluation Office. This TE follows the mid-term evaluation which was completed in February 2013.

## 1.2 Scope & Methodology

### *Scope*

3. The evaluation was structured using criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact, as defined and explained in the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects. A set of questions covering each of these criteria was drafted and is included in Annex 10

4. An assessment of project performance was carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework. Ratings for the evaluation criteria have been provided; ratings scales are provided in Section 3.8.

5. The evaluation methodology has been designed to provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The approach followed a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government

counterparts, in particular the GEF operational focal point, UNDP Country Office (CO), project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders. The original scope of the TE is set out in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (Annex 5).

6. An important part of the evaluation was a field mission to Semonkong, and Makhoalipane Community Council, see Annex 6 for the mission itinerary. The evaluators have reviewed all relevant sources of information, such as the Project Document, project reports – including annual monitoring reports, project budget revisions, midterm review, progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team provided to the evaluators for evaluation is included in Annex 9 of this terminal evaluation report. The limitation of the data and methodology have been clearly set out together with the implications for interpretation of the results.

### *Methodology*

7. The ToR clearly presented different tasks for the evaluation team which need to be completed over the course of the four different stages of the evaluation (inception, data gathering, data analysis, reporting and dissemination). The main tasks and activities follow in the next sections.

#### *A. Inception Phase*

##### *Preliminary documentation review*

8. A literature review was conducted in preparation for the evaluation. This included documents which are summarized in Annex 9. The desk review allowed the evaluation team to clarify the context around the Project, to identify the evaluation questions and the information gaps to be closed during the evaluation mission.

##### *Preparation of the evaluation questions matrix*

9. On the basis of the initial documentation review, an evaluation questions matrix was developed, see Annex 10 for details. The evaluation questions matrix is a key tool for data collection and analysis. The matrix describes the key questions, data collection methods and information sources. It follows the evaluation criteria structure set out by UNDP: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. The evaluation matrix sets out relevant qualitative and quantitative indicators that will be used as a measure of success. The evaluation questions matrix will collect information relating to the implementation progress towards the project targets as well as qualitative information on output-based progress.

## *Inception report*

10. Based on the preliminary literature review, an inception report was prepared, reflecting the understanding of the assignment and incorporating a detailed work plan for the mandate. This draft inception report was submitted for comments on 26 November 2014. A final inception report was submitted for final approval on 2 December 2014.

### B. Data collection phase

11. Both primary and secondary data was collected. The evaluation was undertaken using a combination of techniques and data sources, including:

- Documentary analysis of all relevant project documentation;
- Field visits
- Semi-structured interviews with stakeholders and partners;
- Where possible to organise, focus Group Discussions with Implementing partners and Government of Lesotho (GoL).
- Follow-up emails and calls where necessary.

12. Five core themes/components were covered by the evaluation, following the ToR:

- A. Relevance: the extent to which the planned activities were suited to local and national development priorities and organizational policies, including changes over time
- B. Effectiveness: the extent to which an objective has been achieved or how likely it is to be achieved. Includes results: the positive/negative and foreseen/unforeseen changes to and effects produced by a development intervention to date.
- C. Efficiency: the extent to which results have been delivered with the least costly resources possible, also called cost effectiveness or efficacy
- D. Sustainability: the likely ability of an intervention to continue to deliver benefits for an extended period of time after completion. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially and socially sustainable.
- E. Impact: environmental and social.

13. Table 1 sets out the evaluation criteria and sub-criteria/issues that have been explored. The evaluation matrix in Annex 10 sets out a number questions under each evaluation sub-criteria.:

**Table 1 Evaluation criteria and sub-criteria**

<b>Evaluation criteria</b>	<b>Evaluation sub-criteria/issues</b>
A. Relevance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relevance to Lesotho</li> <li>• Theory of Change</li> <li>• Evidence-based design</li> </ul>
B. Effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Successes</li> <li>• Challenges</li> <li>• Partnerships</li> </ul>
C. Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation process</li> <li>• Financial management</li> <li>• Quality of Implementation support</li> </ul>
F. Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country ownership</li> <li>• Mainstreaming results</li> <li>• Sustainability drivers and constraints</li> <li>• Catalytic role</li> <li>• Stakeholder interaction</li> </ul>
E Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Livelihoods Impact</li> <li>• Environmental impact</li> </ul>

14. The evaluation has examined and assessed the perspectives of the various stakeholders. Primary and secondary data was collected using the evaluation matrix in Annex 10. The matrix defines a disaggregated set of questions to be covered by the TE in relation to each of the five project components and associated issues.

15. Following approval of the inception report by the CO, the consultants followed the data collection plan to collect primary data using the developed data collection instruments. Key informant interviews (with identified stakeholders) and focus group discussions (mainly with the communities) was employed to collect primary data.

16. Four days of community consultations were scheduled covering seven villages from 5 to 9 January. A limited form of stratified sampling was organized according to a cross section of villages representing high, medium and low implementation progress. This enabled the evaluators to collect data from across a range of experiences in order to inform the analysis of barriers and the effectiveness of the project in piloting a community-based range management model. The selection of the villages for consultations was done by UNDP and the MFLR. The lines of enquiry followed the evaluation questions matrix, see Annex 1. A de-brief was held with UNDP management and a group of Directors and technical officers from Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation (MFLR).

17. The evaluation team carried out national level consultations between the 19 to 21 January. A group discussion was organised with Ministry of Agriculture and Food



Security (MoAFS) to discuss the draft findings of the evaluation. Individual-level interviews were also organised with officers from Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), Ministry of Environment and the NGO PELUM. The list of national stakeholders that provided inputs to the evaluation is contained in Annex 7.

### C. Data Analysis and Interpretation

18. This stage included the comprehensive analysis of quantitative and qualitative data on implementation progress as measured by the results framework outcome targets. The extent of output delivery was also assessed, as well as the degree to which this was necessary for implementation progress towards the Outcome targets. The review team verified the data through cross-reference of documents and triangulation of interviews.

19. To report implementation progress against the Project results framework, the evaluation team used the table contained in Annex 1. Section 3.8 contains the overall ratings summary for the project objective and outcome targets and each of the project components (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact).

### D. Reporting and Dissemination Phase

#### ***Draft Report Synthesis***

20. The consultants have compiled a comprehensive final report to the highest professional standards and in accordance with UNDP Guidelines for Project and Programme Evaluation. The evaluation report articulates findings and provide clear, recommendations with responsibilities; and annexes on Terms of reference, list of interviewees, instruments and bibliography. The report was delivered to the UNDP CO for stakeholder review and feedback. Comments were then incorporated into the report by the consultants before finalization of the TE report.

21. This evaluation report includes a chapter that sets out the evaluation findings, which are presented as statements of fact based on analysis of the data, structured around the evaluation criteria set out in Table 1. Variances between planned and actual results have been explained as well as factors affecting the achievement of results.

22. The evaluation report includes a chapter providing a set of conclusions, recommendations and lessons. The conclusions present logical judgments based on the findings, going beyond the findings to identify priority issues and underlying problems relevant to the subject and purpose of the evaluation. They provide a balanced picture of both the strengths and the limitations of the project, grounded in the country context and based on a views of a cross section of stakeholders. The

recommendations are relevant, supported by evidence, realistic and actionable by stakeholders in Lesotho. They will be designed to inform the project's exit/sustainability strategy. They also have wider relevance to future programming efforts.

### **1.3 Structure of the evaluation report**

23. The report starts with Section 2 setting out a description of the project, the environmental and institutional problems it intended to address, the project targets such as they were at project-end, the project location and the main project stakeholders. Section 3 contains the substantive evaluation, starting off with setting out the centre piece of the project: range management governance model, followed by an evaluation using the five main GEF evaluation criteria; relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. In addition a sub-section on results and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) discusses the effectiveness of the M&E plan.

24. Section 3.8 presents a summary of project ratings, which is further explained in Annex 1. Section 4 contains the conclusions drawn on the results, strengths and weaknesses, based on the findings. Following on from the findings and conclusions, Section 5 contains 14 recommendations organised in five areas: i) Promoting better coordination and collaboration between ministries; ii) Improving the performance of ministry staff; iii) SLM Policy development iv) Developing the range management governance model; and v) Improving management efficiency. Section 6 offers 12 'lessons learned' for future programming. There are 11 annexes which support the evaluation findings and methodology.

## 2. Project description and development context

### 2.1 Project description

25. The **goal** of the Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho project is for sustainable land management in Lesotho to provide a strong base for sustainable development while providing a range of global benefits to the region (Project Document). The **objective** of the project is to *'build capacities for sustainable land management (SLM) in appropriate government and civil society institutions/user groups in Lesotho and SLM mainstreamed into government planning and strategy development.'* This meant the development of a knowledge management network, and the development of the techniques, approaches, capacity and strategy for up scaling successful SLM in support of national biodiversity conservation, food security and poverty reduction strategies.

26. By building a proven, replicable SLM model for Lesotho and strengthening the capacity and knowledge needed for its subsequent use across the country, implementation of this project is expected to make a direct contribution to the Kingdom's Poverty Reduction Strategy, to its Food Security Policy and to the fulfilment of its National Action Programme in response to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

27. Three project outcomes are intended to achieve the stated objective:

- Proven, strengthened, participatory, replicable models and techniques that successfully overcome current institutional and governance barriers to SLM are to be ready for national implementation;
- Adequate local and national capacity for adapting and upscaling proven SLM models and techniques are in place;
- SLM Policy Enabling Environment of enhanced awareness, dialogue, understanding and analysis of SLM best practices at resource user, community, local government, non-governmental organization (NGO) and national government levels across the country is to be reflected in the relevant policies, strategies and programs.

28. The project was financed with a grant of USD1.72 million from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and planned co-financing of USD4.69 million. The Implementing Partner was the Ministry of Forests and Land Reclamation (MFLR), with no delegation of implementation responsibilities.

29. The project was approved by the GEF in May 2009. The Project Document was signed by the Government of Lesotho (GoL), represented by the MFLR in September 2009. The inception workshop was held in March 2010, attended by over

50 delegates from the different Ministries and representatives from the Community. The project was scheduled to conclude at the end of December 2013, and then extended to December 2014.

30. At the time of project commencement (2010) and right up until project closure (2014) there was no supporting policy for an approach of allocating user rights over grazing lands. Though there have been a myriad of policies and legislation dating back to 1980 which recognise the problem of land degradation and urging action on the issue, rangelands remained under a communal tenure system, based on a historic assertion that access to land was a birth right in Lesotho. The Lesotho Constitution and Vision 2020 advocate for the protection of the natural and cultural environment, though the National Strategic Development Plan, which guides Vision 2020, does not contain much of a reflection of SLM principles.

31. UNDP country assistance priorities in Lesotho are set out in the current Country Programme Document (CPD), which is an integral part of the UN Lesotho Development Assistance Plan (LUNDAP) 2013-2017. The CPD responds to the LUNDAP OUTCOME #2: By 2017 Lesotho adopts environmental management practices that promote a low-carbon climate-resilient economy and society, sustainably manages natural resources and reduces vulnerability to disasters. The CPD programme strategy is to support Lesotho in addressing three key areas that lie at the core of the development challenge - *capacities, coordination and collaboration* - in each of the three pillars of sustainable development: economic, social and environmental.

32. The Project clearly follows the guidance of GEF's Operational Programme 15 (which funds it), particularly Strategic Priority One, "*targeted capacity building for sustainable land management*." Part of the UNDP/GEF Least Developed Country (LDC) and Small Island States (SIDS) Targeted Portfolio Approach for Capacity Development and Mainstreaming of Sustainable Land Management, this project is executed nationally through the MFLR. The Project Management Unit (PMU) is situated within the Department of Range Resources Management (DRRM) at the MFLR.

33. It is part of the GEF TerrAfrica's Strategic Investment Program (SIP) for SLM in Sub-Saharan Africa, contributing to the SIP's Goal of reducing land degradation in Lesotho. In addition, it will contribute to the SIP's Development Objective of phases I and II, in supporting Lesotho in designing, implementing and managing suitable SLM policies, strategies and on-the-ground-investments, and supporting efforts to pursue a programmatic approach to SLM scale-up. The SLM project intended to build capacity towards SIP Intermediate Result 1: *SLM applications on the ground are scaled up in country-defined priority agro-ecological zones*; Result 2: *Effective and inclusive dialogue and advocacy on SLM strategic priorities, enabling conditions, and delivery mechanisms established and on-going*; and Intermediate Result 4: *Targeted*

*knowledge generated and disseminated; monitoring and evaluation systems established and strengthened at all levels.*

34. The Project was expected to make a direct contribution to the GoL Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), its Food Security Policy and to the fulfilment of its National Action Project in response to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

## **2.2 Problems that the project set out to address**

### *2.2.1 The environmental challenge*

35. The Rangelands are of important ecological, economic and cultural value. 60% of Lesotho's land is comprised of rangelands. The economic benefits come from growing and selling livestock and derivative products (meat, milk, draught power, transport, wool), as well as harvesting range resources. The rangelands are an important source of water, the so-called 'white gold'. Rangelands are equally important for social functions and rituals and traditional medicine.

36. Livestock is the major user of primary production in rangelands, and in recent times it has been a major driver of degradation. Degradation of land and vegetative cover is also a result of complex interactions between poverty, population growth, pressure on land for settlements and crop production, inappropriate ploughing practices, lack of security of tenure which discourages fallow grazing land, uncontrolled wildfires, lack of rotational grazing rules, lack of enforcement and political dominance of groups or individuals. In addition, dam construction is shifting populations to replacement lands, further increasing pressure on rangelands.

37. While rangelands are decreasing in size, livestock numbers on the other hand are increasing. For example, livestock population in excess of carrying capacity by 30% was revealed by a project assessment of landscape monitoring by satellite imagery and ground. Large areas of Lesotho (mainly 2200-2900m in elevation) have been subjected to heavy grazing pressure for decades, and display evidence of dominance by several unpalatable species, including *Chrysocoma ciliate*, *Leucosidea sericea*, *Hyparrhenia hirta*, *Aristida congesta*, *Euryops spp*, *Passerina montana*. Livestock management is therefore a key strategy in sustainable land management. The Project Document explains the range-resource complex, which the Project was designed to address, as the following:

38. Reduced ground cover due to over-grazing (over-stocking) and fuel collection causing:

- wind and water erosion of soils;

- declining soil fertility affecting pasture productivity, woody biomass and biodiversity;
- variable stream flows and off site sediment deposition within and beyond Lesotho.

39. There are a large number of factors which affect the estimate of net primary production (NPP), or grazing capacity, including rainfall, soil type, soil moisture, plant cover, plant functional type, wind, relative humidity, temperature and radiation. Climate change affects all these factors through prolonged drought, erratic rainfall, early and late frosts and changes in the distribution of species which favours the establishment of bush. The ecological processes which drive landscape change and monitoring of the degradation problem need to be better understood.

40. Lesotho is the upper catchment for three countries that share the Orange Senqu river: South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. Land degradation in the catchment area therefore impacts wetlands and perennial rivers which affects downstream countries.

### *2.2.2 The institutional challenge*

41. Despite numerous attempts, institutional barriers such as weak management capacities and coordination continue to obstruct efforts to adopt effective sustainable land management practices and action. As a result, land degradation continues to impoverish local livelihoods and to impose broader environmental costs on the region beyond Lesotho's borders. The Project Document set out the institutional challenge as comprising three main barriers.

42. The primary barrier to SLM in Lesotho is the lack of proven, replicable governance models for the management of natural resources by contemporary community institutions. Indigenous models of management by traditional authorities have been superseded by economic, political and institutional change. The new local authorities, the Community Councils, have no institutional model for Natural Resources Management (NRM). They lack governance mechanisms that could organise and empower resource users as resource managers at the truly local level. This institutional vacuum is a serious barrier to SLM that requires urgent attention.

43. The second barrier is the lack of local and national capacity to adapt and scale up such models as they emerge. This is a threefold capacity constraint, and it exists at two levels: that of resource users and their local institutions (Community Councils) and that of GoL staff. The first dimension of the capacity barrier concerns the conceptual ability to embrace community-based institutional approaches to SLM. The second dimension of the capacity barrier concerns the relevant human resources: natural resource users in their local institutions, and the GoL staff who should support them. The third dimension of the capacity barrier is operational: once

resource users, local authorities and GoL have a conceptual grasp of viable SLM approaches and how they are meant to work, they must still develop an operational understanding and project in order to replicate these models across Lesotho.

44. The third barrier to achieving SLM and the corresponding goals of Lesotho's Poverty Reduction Strategy is the lack of active debate and exchange of ideas in the sector. The nation lacks any force or agency to stimulate and circulate technical and, especially, institutional thinking across the country about how to make SLM work at scale.

## **2.3 Project targets**

45. The project was scaled down early on. During the project inception workshop stakeholders agreed that the project scope was too large in terms of area of coverage (250,000ha), given the budget and timeframe. Targets were reduced, see section 3.7 for details. The pilot area originally covered seven Community Councils but was downsized to one Community Council - Mokolometsane - and eventually to a larger area on Makhoalipana Council following delimitation of new Council boundaries. Table 2 sets out the project indicators. Table 3 in Section 2.3 sets out the four sub-areas to the Makhoalipana Council, and the chieftainships in each of the sub-areas.

Table 2 Project Results Framework (2014)

<b>Objective</b>	10% Improvement in socio economic baselines
	By project end point, at least 50% of the project pilot area registers reduction in land degradation of 10%
	By project end point, at least 50% of the project pilot area registers an increase in biological productivity of 10%
<b>Outcome 1</b>	By the end of PY 3, at least 40,000 ha under direct SLM (project pilot area).
	By project end point, at least 80,000 ha impacted by up-scaling.
	By the end of PY 3, at least one community NRM institution has been created with devolution of management functioning and institutionally robust.
	By project end point, community NRM institutions functional across the project pilot area.
<b>Outcome 2</b>	By the end of PY 2, an assessment of the technical tools being used for land management in Lesotho has been conducted and recommendations made for updating where required.
	By the end of PY 3, at least two dissemination sessions have taken place spreading SLM success stories within Lesotho
	By the end of PY 3, a National Dialogue has been convened and the importance of the promotion of SLM has been acknowledged by relevant stakeholders.
	By the end of PY 3, Parliamentarians have begun to create national visibility of SLM expenditures and advocate for increases.
	By project end point, technical personnel, resource users and NGOs understand and promote SLM in their day to day activities
<b>Outcome 3</b>	By the end of PY 3, an inter-sectoral mechanism for the coordination of SLM activities has been established and is functional.
	By the end of PY 3, a Knowledge Management Strategy for SLM finalised.
	By project end point, SLM Knowledge Management System institutionalised and functional.
	By the end of PY 2, SLM integrated into at least 2 government sectoral policies.
	(2) By the end of PY 3, SLM integrated into one national-level planning document
	By project end point, SLM integrated into Maseru District plan or inputs provided for next planning window opportunity.
	(4) By project end point, there has been a 10% improvement in the score obtained on the TerrAfrica Composite Index Scorecard which measures the enabling environment for SLM
	By project end point, at least 15% of Community Council activities have SLM content or relevance.
	By project end point, at least 5% of Community Council funding is dedicated to SLM.
	(3) By project end point, at least 0.6% of recurrent national budget is SLM related.



## 2.3 Project location

46. The project focused on the high altitude cattle post. Mountain areas were the chosen emphasis of the project because it is the agro-ecological zone of greatest national and global importance, as well as a catchment for regional rivers, and where Lesotho's poverty is at its worst. Maseru district was selected because it offers a good cross-section of the relevant environmental, economic, social and institutional issues such as land degradation; catchment areas for water supplies, social, demographic and land use change resulting from economic growth and urbanization; declining traditional institutions; the challenges of HIV/AIDS; and deepening mountain poverty.

47. The pilot area originally covered seven districts including the Community Councils of Likalaneng (A03), Nyakosoba (A04), Rapoleboea (A05), Ribaneng (A12), Semonkong (A13), Mokolometsane (A14), and Telle (A15). The project was downsized to one Community Council - Mokolometsane - and eventually to a larger area on Makhoalipana Council following delimitation of new Council boundaries.

48. Table 3 shows the four sub-areas in Makhoalipana Council and the chieftainships in these sub-areas. The project was operational only in a few chieftainships and a few villages within those chieftainships, shown in Table 4. Table 5 show the villages in each chieftainships in the Mokolometsane sub-area by way of showing the density of administrative boundaries which has implications for the complexity of the range management system. Mappings of chieftainships and villages within those chieftainships were also carried out by the project for the other two sub-areas in Makhoalipana Council (though Rapoleboea mappings were not availed to the evaluators). It should be noted that the project reports were unclear about where the project was operating before and after the changes in administrative boundaries, with a good many villages referred in project reports not being part of the final list of villages included in Table 4.

Table 3 Makhoalipana Council, sub-areas and chieftainships

	Makhoalipana Community council			
	Sub areas			
	Mokolometsane	Telle	Semonkong	Makheka (Rapoleboea)
Chieftenships	Tebesi (Boreipala)	Nchela	Pallang	Fochane
	Nthapo	Elia	Sechache	Chadwick
	Seng	Tsutsulupa	Tsenekeng	Mantsa
	Hlabathe	Salemone	Faralane	Likhameng
	Daniele	Tsekiso		Mahlomola
		Masienyane		Chechane
		Samuele		Ramosebo
		Leeba		Mphafolane
				Thabo Letsie
				Moseme
				Keloke

Table 4: Project boundary: GAs and villages

Grazing Association	Area Chief	Village Name	# of Household
<b>Ramosebo</b>	Ha Ramosebo	Matsatseng	10
	Ha Chechane	Mokoallong	34
	Ha Mantsa	Ha Mantsa	31
<b>Ha Elia</b>	Ha Elia	Ha Elia (Meeling)	11
	Ha Mphafolane	Ha Mphafolane	73
<b>Rapoleboea</b>	Ha Fochane	Ha Mateu	31
	Ha Mahlomola	Ha Mahlomola	44
<b>Ha Tsokotsa</b>	Ha Tsokotsa	Ha Tsokotsa	53
	Ha Lerumonyane	Ha Lerumonyane	52
<b>Tsenekeng</b>	Tsenekeng	Ha Rasefale	35
<b>Ha Nthapo</b>	Ha Nthapo	Mpatana	<b>16</b>
<b>Ha Seng</b>	Ha Seng	Moeaneng (Ha Seng)	43
<b>Boreipala</b>	Boreipala	Ha Tlhabi	30
Ha Taniele	Ha Taniele	Motse-Mocha (Ha Taniele)	26
Hlabathe	Hlabathe	Ha Lekhetho	41
	Hlabathe	Hlabathe Moreneng	26

Table 5 Villages in the chieftainships of the Mokolometsane sub-area.

Ha Nthapo	Ha Seng	Ha Tebesi	Ha Taniele	Hlabathe	Ha Abele
Phororong	Ha Moroke	Ha Labane	Masianokeng	Ha Libete	Ha Tšele
Phatlalla	Ha Suthang	Ha Sebusi	Motse Mocha	Ha Rankibolane	Sekhutlong
Mpatane	Try Hoek	Ha Tlhabi	Sethamane	Ha Mohloka	Ha Hlabana
Polateng	Khilibithing	Ha Qolane	Masaleng	Hlabathe	Khatebeng
Khubetsoana	Ha Mokoroane	Lifateng	Sebala Makhulo	Ha Kobeli	Thaba Khubelu
Try Hoek	Ha Letšoara	Ha Lebitsa	Mpatane	Songoanyane	
Moeling	Thabang	Ha Emile	Joala Bobe	Ha Khomo	
Ha Peiso	Ha Mohapinyane	Ha Lebamang	Sekhutlong	Tlokoeng	
	Sekhutlong	Nkoeng		Mokoallong	
	Ha Lekulana	Ha Mphunyetsane		Ha Lekhetho	
	Ha Motšoane			Ha Sekhotsoa	
	Ha Kubeletsane			Ha Mokotjana	
	Lekhalong ha Ntjana			Ha Motenalapi	
	Ha Seng				
	Ha Khoboko				
	Masianokeng				
	Ha Lebohang				
	Ha Mahlako				
	Moeaneng Ha Seng				
	Ha Lekula				
	Ha Litokelo				
	Ha Setipe				
	Tiping				

## 2.4 Main stakeholders

49. The Implementing Partner was Ministry of Forests and Land Reclamation (MFLR). The main stakeholder groups were the communities, Chiefs and Councillors. The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) would also have a key interest in the project with regards to the activities on IGAs and then conservation agriculture.

### **3. Findings**

50. This section is structured as follows: an introduction that sets out the baseline grazing control practice and the range management model piloted by the project, then a findings section that is structured according to the following evaluation criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. In addition a sub-section on Results and Monitoring and Evaluation discusses the effectiveness of the M&E plan.

#### **3.1 ‘The model’**

51. The following two sub-sections discuss the characteristics of the rotational grazing scheme practiced for the last 30 years as well as the basic proposition and elements of the range management model piloted by the Project.

##### **3.1.1 Baseline grazing control practice**

52. Over the last 30 years, different rotational grazing schemes have been tried based on the principle of community management. What follows is an explanation of the common elements.

53. Rangeland resources are divided into summer and winter grazing areas. Grazing pattern is divided along these lines:

- ‘A’ – high mountain cattlepost summer grazing area;
- ‘B’ – Lower mountain cattlepost winter grazing area;
- ‘C’ – Mountain village areas, foothill and lowlands village winter grazing areas.

54. Herds of livestock move with change of seasons between the ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ grazing areas (transhumance pattern). Historically, they have migrated to the summer grazing ‘A’ areas from October to April, and they spend winter months in the ‘B’ and ‘C’ areas. Control of this movement is initiated by a livestock owner’s application for grazing permit to the cattlepost area, where a site is identified before allocation by the Principal Chief. In principle, the Principal Chief may not restrict grazing to livestock belonging to people under his/her jurisdiction only, in line with traditional practice enshrined in the statutes (the Laws of Lerotholi, 1939). Every citizen is entitled to be issued with summer grazing permit anywhere irrespective of village of residence. This means that any one cattlepost area may have livestock from divergent areas of origin (villages). Herds of livestock follow different routes to different summer grazing areas and livestock movements criss-cross across the entire mountain landscape, causing soil erosion along their seasonal migration routes.

55. Historically, management of the rangelands was vested in the Chiefs. The Local Government Act of 1997 brought in democratically elected community councils that are envisaged to take over the grazing control function, as well as control of natural resources and environmental protection. The new National Range Resources Policy (2014) intends to implement a system of district and national grazing associations which is overseen by MFLR.

### **3.1.2 The range management model piloted by the project**

56. The evaluators found it difficult to piece together what ‘the model’ was and how it differed from the baseline experiences of rotational grazing schemes. A ‘model draft document’ was produced in November 2011 which presented the range of challenges facing grazing management and the elements that the strategy would need to include, but it was unclear how the project intended to combine and sequence these elements into a unified concept that would improve on the baseline. This lack of understanding of what the SLM model being tested by the project was, or whether the model had been identified that could be scaled up, was reflected in the informant interviews.

57. The project is premised on the idea that sustainability of rangeland management is likely to involve giving more control to the users of the land. This is particularly important given the challenges in launching a new system of local government, and the remoteness of many of the villages. Though Community Councils now have the legal mandate to lead SLM management, they lack the resources and the local agents to do the detailed work of SLM on the ground. Recent research more generally shows that allocating grazing rights to user groups fosters cooperation, facilitates mutual decision-making and collective accountability, and the security of tenure provides an incentive to invest in conservation activities (Nthohi et al, 2013).

58. The Project Document and subsequent meeting notes explain that the model was essentially the institutional mechanics of how communities work with community councils and chiefs to implement the range management plans. The main issues (and risks) was to establish a ‘harmonised working relationship with regards to range resources’ (PSC meeting minutes). However, the methodology for getting the group to work more harmoniously was not explicitly set out in any of the documents. The diagram in Annex 3 is taken from the SLM model draft document and shows the different inputs that were deemed necessary to make the group system work more harmoniously but the strategy for how it all connects together is missing. A missing strategy has meant in practice that not all the outputs were directed or implemented in the most effective way to deliver the model nor the project objective. It also meant that there were gaps in the indicator framework to measure the change.

59. The issue of participation is implicitly assumed to be the best way to implement a rotational grazing plan but the reasons for supporting a participatory model are never really explained. It is possible that a participatory means of developing management plans would increase ownership of the plan, help set fair rules for all, thereby promoting the maintenance of the system through self-regulation and community enforcement, presumably lowering the costs of range management. Linked to this, the membership fee was a key tool to promoting ownership (by investing own resources). Another implicit assumption is the voluntary nature of the participatory model based on the concept that gains to the individual would accrue from collective action. But this proposition is probably harder to achieve without concerted action to reduce livestock numbers, given the livestock and population densities in the highlands of Lesotho. In addition, lessons learned from other projects are that community members will stay engaged in Grazing Associations (GAs) if it generates benefits to them, which suggests a period of intensive support is needed to get the model working. The Learning Mission in 2013 visited GAs in Boreipala, Tsenekeng, Nthapo, Daniele, Rapoleboea and Hlabathe reporting the difficulties involved in getting a participatory, voluntary model working.

60. From closer analysis of the project documentation as well as referring to the research papers presented at the SLM conference, there would appear to be three key planks to making the group work more effectively in the Lesotho context. One is building social capital (cohesion), the other is introducing the legal backing to enforce the group dynamics and the third is environmental information on which to base the range management plans to ensure their achievability and to promote consensus around technical information (rather than have political interests dominate)<sup>1</sup>. As the Range Management Policy was only introduced after the project had all but completed, the model necessarily had to focus on two of the three planks: building social capital and practical achievability. The evaluators have anecdotal evidence of the extent to which social capital had been built (through the community consultations) but the project results framework by the end of the project did not include any indicators to reflect this.

61. The legal nature of the system is important in order to be able to lawfully support the institutional change process. It establishes a system of property rights over what is communal lands, where previously land access was seen as an entitlement, it legally mandates grazing associations to be the primary implementers of range management and it provides backing to the system of coordination and penalties. However, the legal framework – the National Range Resources Management Policy was approved only in 2014. One informant to this TE made the point that the

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<sup>1</sup> There are experiences in Lesotho to show that when the size of the grazing land is too small for the livestock population, this forces inconsistencies in practicing and enforcing rotational grazing, leading to the ineffectiveness of the plan (Rantlo, 2014).

“software cannot be implemented without the hardware in place”. It is unclear from available information the extent to which the lack of a legal framework to support sustainable use grazing management models may have weakened the empowerment of communities and the effectiveness of the community-led model in this project, recognizing also the length of time that it takes to change behaviours and perceptions.

62. The following characteristics of the governance model can be discerned from the project documentation:

- Geographical and environmental mapping;
- Formation of GAs and user groups for range management;
- Registration of the grazing association; Constitutions and by-laws developed;
- A rotational grazing scheme established;
- Voluntary brush control;
- Livestock registration;
- Culling of unwanted stock;
- Introduction of improved breeds;
- Introduction of supplementary feeding;
- Income generating activities (IGAs);
- Project Implementation Forum established;
- Trainings.

63. The IGAs, PIFs and trainings would prove to be important drivers of social cohesion. The elements designed to support livestock numbers reduction (culling and improving the breeds) would seem to be particularly important to ensure the achievability of the rotational grazing scheme. And the formalization of the GAs crucial to connecting the GAs to the legal framework (National Range Management Policy approved by Cabinet in 2014).

64. What is left unsaid is the critical role of the chiefs in convening, mediating and enforcing what is an extremely complex rotational grazing system (see Annex 2 for details). In the November 2012 PIF, recommendations were made that all challenges be reported to Principal Chiefs so that they could intervene by holding of *lipitso* (public meetings), and that follow-up meetings were to be held by all Principal Chiefs; to protect cattlepost areas against transgressors and to control summer grazing areas which were used by the whole of Makhoalipane Community Council. Whilst the system of local government is not yet fit to take up the mantle of planning and implementation, and to gain the respect and trust of the community, the Chiefs are an unacknowledged yet critical part of the model.

65. The model did not cover the ‘fuel’ part of the range-resource complex. The community consultations did not raise fuel as being an issue and the stakeholder validation meeting confirmed this as a non-issue. It was explained to the evaluators that the woody shrubs that are removed are used for fuel. Other narratives relating

to deforestation can be found in policy documents such as 2008 Forestry policy and the Country SLM Investment Framework (CSIF) which asserts that “Over-harvesting of woody biomass for fuel, burning of the rangeland and the almost total absence of tree planting has greatly reduced the biomass of Lesotho’s vegetation cover and has contributed to the highly degraded status of Lesotho’s soils (prone to erosion by water and wind)”

66. The model was widened in 2013 to include conservation agriculture (CA) for some communities, as the ‘disproportionate’ focus on rangeland was found to be problematic (4 SC meeting minutes). Project documentation reveals an interchangeability between the terms used to describe community organisations: GAs, user groups or NRM groups. This reflects a broader deliberation about whether it is more appropriate to develop a framework for livestock management exclusively, or for Natural Resource Management more broadly (Mission report, July 2011). From an environmental point of view, given the emerging importance of agriculture in the rangelands and its influence on environmental system dynamics, it seems to make sense to include it in future range management schemes.

67. Connected to this issue of widening the concept too much, there was a concern expressed during the stakeholder validation meeting that the IGA part of the model was disproportionately taking up too much time and weight in project efforts, distracting attention from the main thrust of the model which was grazing control. The evidence tend to show the opposite: that the IGAs were a key means of building economic empowerment and social cohesion, which would help to make the group management system work more effectively. It is noteworthy to add that the project design did not provide funds for IGAs. GoL funds came mid-way in the life of the project to support the IGAs, complemented by analytical studies which were funded by the project.

## **3.2 Relevance**

68. This section discusses the relevance of the project to Lesotho, the adequacy of the theory of change, and the extent to which the design and implementation strategy were evidence-based. The findings show that the SLM issue is still highly relevant to Lesotho but that the project could have been better designed to address the key policy questions.

### **3.2.1. Relevance to Lesotho**

69. The project is highly relevant to Lesotho. 60% of Lesotho’s land is comprised of rangelands. The most poverty stricken communities live in mountain areas and land is under intense pressure due to heavy soil erosion and overgrazing. The main issues are the following:



- Technical measures to address land degradation are well-known and proven but not replicated across the country;
- Alternative livelihoods have failed to deliver benefits of large enough magnitude to convince people to switch;
- Support services for rural livelihoods do not respond to community priorities and service delivery is fractured.

70. The GoL has long been concerned about the degradation of the rangelands and a variety of legal measures have been put into place to control grazing and reduce the number of livestock on the rangelands. A National Forestry Policy was approved in 2008 and a revised Range Management Policy in 2014, with a draft Soil and Water Conservation Policy waiting for Cabinet approval. Over the last 30 years a range of different models and approaches have been tried in order to try to manage the rangelands more effectively. The means and capacities to replicate them at scale seems to be one the main constraint to reversing the problem.

### **3.2.2 Theory of Change**

71. The theory of change (ToC) can be seen at two levels, the first is the community-based governance model (Outcomes 1 and 2) and the second the policy level (Outcome 3). The ToC is not well developed for any of the three Outcomes.

72. For Outcomes 1 and 2 ('the governance model'), the baseline situation is described in the Project Document as being one of degraded, communal lands requiring a model of community management linked to the new systems of decentralised local government. The three pillars of the governance model are therefore the grazing associations/user groups, the Community Councillors and the Chiefs. The theory of change seems to start from the proposition that if a participatory governance model can be shown to work in reversing land degradation, then the authorities could replicate this across the country (though brave assumptions have to be made in order to make this causal connection). The barriers that need to be addressed are i) changing perceptions and awareness about what is possible to do ii) having the capacity and empowerment to change the way the range is managed and iii) having the operational knowledge about how to replicate the approach. The ToC is very much focused on empowering the community groups as the lever for change, given the remoteness of many villages<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> The Project Document explains that the Community councils are 'not a very local form of government' in that many are responsible for areas of several hundred square kilometres comprising several dozen villages each, and that it would therefore be unrealistic to expect that they would be able to reach down to the local level to support the development process, at least in the short-term.

73. In a general sense, the problem analysis and the strategy developed to address this is correct. But the activity-output-outcome connections on how to bring this about were missing. For example, the original project design did not include an IGA component, even though this turned out to be an important part of the model. From the available information, a plausible ToC would be the following:

1. Outcome 1: Collective action will improve the rangelands.
2. Outcome 2: Building social cohesion and developing the legal mechanisms are the main ways of developing effective collective action
3. Inputs necessary to create a strong linkage between collective action and the quality of the rangelands are environmental and livestock carrying capacity information in order to develop achievable rotational grazing plans; and value-chain, services such as extension advice (for supplementary feeding, introduction of improved breeds, brush control, trainings), facilitation support (for registration, development of GA by-laws); and market infrastructure (including livestock registrations).

74. Because these are *theories* of change, they need to be tested. The project results framework would need to include indicators to track each of these Outcomes. The range of assumptions should be made explicit and the most important ones tracked. The project indicators covered environmental degradation (point 1 above), but no indicators to track points 2 or 3. An approach such as this would enable learning from experiences (and avoiding repeated mistakes) and progression in SLM policy development and implementation.

75. An evaluative case study approach would have enabled a more nuanced theory of change to be developed for future programming. The Project Document recognises that *'Lesotho has almost a quarter of a century of experience with Grazing Associations, and while these structures have only operated in a limited number of areas, they have tested and proven the social acceptability and sustainability of this kind of group action and are well known across much wider areas'*. Successful models seem to exist such as in Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) project. Boreipala, which was included in the Project already had a well-functioning GA and the condition of its grassland was deemed good (Annual report, 2011). There are others like Boreipala that were mentioned during informant interviews. The question is therefore more nuanced: why do some grazing associations work well and others do not? And what solutions was this project trying to find to address some of the problems of the existing initiatives. The 2010 study tour to the Moteng and Malefilone MRAs was an attempt at such learning, but the learning did not seem to input into any identifiable theory of change for the SLM project.

76. For Outcome 3 – the policy related outcome, the theory of change is weaker still. The Project Document asserts that the primary challenge in Lesotho is not technical, but institutional. SLM technical methods and models are known, it is the implementation of these in a sustained manner over time that is the main problem. The proposed response was to develop a knowledge network because a lack of knowledge sharing was identified as a barrier to the uptake of SLM. The connection between a proposed SLM knowledge network and the institutional problem is never really made explicitly although there is a suggestion that by developing a force for change and by stimulating active debate and exchange of ideas, that this will help to promote institutional change in Lesotho. This makes a number of dubious assumptions, for example, that there are a sufficient number of influential actors outside of government that could be engaged in such a network, and that awareness in government is the main barrier to change over the course of implementation. The Project changed focus to developing cross-ministerial coordination processes and SLM-related policy development in Lesotho, which is more appropriate to the institutional challenge in Lesotho.

77. At the inception workshop the decision was taken to prioritise Outcomes 1 and 2 for financial and capacity reasons; Outcome 3 therefore got left behind. An alternative strategy (theory of change) could have been for the policy-adjusted focus of Outcome 3 to have provided the framework to identify the essential data needed for monitoring, from a policy-requirements perspective, thus helping to frame the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities, the strategic communications requirements, as well as providing the framework for the training schedule planned under Outcome 2. This would have required an expansion of the management team.

78. The weak theory of change meant that the correct indicators were not identified and therefore the 'change' in development conditions was not correctly measured for elements of Outcome 1 (the institutional change) and Outcomes 2 and 3. More information is presented in Section 3.7 on Results, Monitoring and Evaluation.

79. The risks and assumptions at project design were correctly identified but they were not comprehensive. Risks related to the opposition of Chiefs to engage in a project that they might have perceived as ultimately aiming to divest them of their power were highlighted in the stakeholder analysis in Project Document, but this was not reflected in the risk analysis. The lack of comprehensive risk analysis undermined implementation progress. For example, the scientific information on range quality and carrying capacity was one element of the model that would enable it be achievable (assuming that other parts of the model such as livestock reductions took place). The associated risk (which seems to have materialised) is that the environmental information would in fact not be used for operational management leading to continuing conflict which in fact transpired. Or perhaps the level of consultation when delineating the boundaries was not given due weight during the

mapping process<sup>3</sup>. The point is that if risks can be accurately identified *in relation to the theory of change*, then it should be relatively easy to design a strategy to address the risks and incorporate them into the project design. For example, an engagement strategy for Chiefs could have been developed as a key plank in the development of the model.

80. Table 6 presents a short critique of the risk and assumptions analysis included in the Project Document.

Table 6 Critique of the risk/assumptions table included in the Project Document

Risk/assumption	Probability/impact	Mitigation	Outcome
The new local government system has high levels of support and legitimacy which is necessary for it to serve as the basis for proposed SLM approach. There is a risk that this support will decline if results are not forthcoming	Low	The project will cultivate national support for the local government council through the TerrAfrica supported National SLM Dialogue process through which a CSIF (Country Strategic Investment Framework for SLM) will be formulated. Funds for financing the CSIF will be mobilized to complement the results delivered by the project. Outcome 4 will ensure that this project delivers on time and within budget.	The assumption made is that the local government system was necessary for the project, which contradicts the rationale for the project which was that a community-based model was needed because local government would not have the necessary reach to implement the grazing control system. The connection between the risk and project results is unclear.  The connection between the mitigation measure proposed (the CSIF) and local government is also unclear.
Lesotho has very high incidents of HIV/AIDS. This might reduce participating institutions' human resource and skill levels below critical thresholds	Medium	The project will collaborate with organizations and agencies dealing with HIV and AIDS to incorporate HIV education in its project strategy. In addition, it will include HIV AIDS in the gender strategy to ensure that it has a plan to deal with reduced personnel (if that indeed happens).	The risk is valid but the mitigation measure was outside the bounds of the project. One important linkage not mentioned is that all activities in the grazing model are based on voluntary efforts. There is no recognition in any of the reports of the HIV/AIDS issue and the impact it could have

<sup>3</sup> The Project Document states that "Resource users will develop or enhance management systems that acknowledge the central importance of ecological parameters in determining the character and intensity of permitted resource uses, drawing on both indigenous and imported technical knowledge. These parameters are generally well known, as are the critical relations between resource harvesting and grazing practice, ecosystem health and livelihood benefits".

Risk/assumption	Probability/impact	Mitigation	Outcome
			on the viability of a voluntary labour approach.  In addition, this project did not have a gender strategy.
SLM requires long-term investments in good practices, sometimes with no immediate returns in the short-term. There is a risk that the local economy may fail to provide returns on investment on improved SLM (in cash or kind) thereby reducing incentives for the resource users to continue their commitment to SLM	Medium	The project will explore the potential of linking SLM to carbon finance by assisting communities to identify SLM activities that can yield carbon credits and facilitating links to carbon markets, particularly through REDD and LULUCF. In addition, the government baseline is addressing issues of alternative income generating activities that improve livelihoods in a sustainable manner.	The risk is valid but the mitigation measure proposed is unrealistic in the project timeframe. The IGAs have proved a better motivator of community action.
Knowledge management is highly dependent on all groups and agencies willing to provide and use information. If this does not happen, the knowledge will either be incomplete or not used in the management processes	Medium	The project will raise awareness of the importance of knowledge management in improving land management in Lesotho, particularly through the TerrAfrica led National SLM Dialogue process. The inter-agency SLM coordination group will provide an avenue for collating and disseminating SLM information and knowledge.	Knowledge management for what and for whom? And how is it useful for the project strategy. This risk is not clearly defined.  A key element in the model was the geographical mapping which was supported by the project.
There is a risk that the principals and other chiefs are unwilling to co-operate	Medium	The project includes an activity to engage the chiefs directly to raise their awareness on the importance of SLM in the local economic growth, and therefore the development of their people.	The risk is valid, but the Project Document did not include an engagement strategy. During the project implementation, the Project Implementation Forum was a useful activity in this regard..

81. There was no real analysis of the assumptions implicit in the Project strategy, probably because an appreciation of how the logical framework was supposed to

work (sequencing of outputs leading to outcomes and sequencing of outcomes leading the objective) was missing.

### 3.2.3 Evidence-based design

82. The Project started sensibly by reviewing best practice in Lesotho to inform the project implementation approach. For example community mobilisation was prioritized above a more technocratic approach of management data gathering for SLM (livestock numbers, grazing capacity, vegetation condition etc.) on the basis that insufficient time on community mobilization and outreach has negatively affected results in the past.

83. The project was premised on the idea that it would scale up existing community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) models, which were piloted by the Maloti Drakensberg Transfrontier Conservation and Development Project (MDTC), a \$15 million, GEF-funded project in operation from 2002 to 2007, supported by the World Bank. The project had promoted the reformulation of selected grazing associations as Managed Resource Associations (MRAs) that would bring together organized groups of resource users, such as livestock owners, medicinal plant collectors and handicraft makers, to manage natural resources on behalf of, and with the legal authority of, Community Councils (Project Document, p 15). This idea was jettisoned by the project management because the Council did not have a budget to pay for monitoring officers; the natural resources management plans were complex for Councils to implement; and Councils proposed bye-laws that have never been gazetted. Nevertheless, the Project did widen the concept to include income-generating activities (IGAs) and, in later years, conservation agriculture, as these were deemed to be important elements determining land degradation.

84. The study tour of policy-makers to Namibia proved useful in identifying lessons learnt to reinforce the model such as the importance of income generating activities to take pressure off the rangelands, as well as the need for programmatic policy approaches to SLM. The 2010 study tour to two successful MRAs highlighted the importance of well-functioning institutions at the community and government level for sustainability, continued support over time as well as long-standing problems that continue to be relevant today. Sehlabathebe GA provides another case study material<sup>4</sup>. It is not clear, however, how the learning was incorporated into the range management model design.

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<sup>4</sup> Early examples of GAs shows that community-based models can work if they have the right institutional support and leadership. Sehlabathebe GA (first set up in the 1980s) which was being revived, was “*established some time ago and working reasonably well until 1998 when the problems started. The association appears to be well capacitated in terms of grazing and livestock management and breeding, but lacks the support it needs from its chieftainship, local government institutions and security services*”. Principal issues identified

85. The Project Document included activities for core baseline research including a range inventory to establish the basis for rangelands management. It turned out that the rangeland inventory was very costly and was terminated by the PSC in December 2010 because of serious 'draining of the budget'. The Team later visited the Department of Land Use Planning who expressed their willingness to participate on GIS modelling, which did later lead to the areas mappings, though, as mentioned above, it is unclear how this contributed to the project strategy.

86. A second research activity was the socio-economic study which was meant to establish the human economic conditions prior to implementation of the pilot and would be used to determine the changes the intervention had had on the population post Project implementation. This was an excellent initiative but also represents a somewhat missed opportunity for experimental evaluation using the project area and control groups to clearly assess the impact of the project on poverty status of the communities involved. Instead, the assessment was done for the community council as a whole without any disaggregation of data to the communities included in the project. There is also an additional issue that the baseline study was done for the original project areas encompassing seven community councils while the 2014 follow-on study was for the smaller area of the Makhoalipane Community council. That problem may not have had too great an impact as the sampling methodology was random on both occasions and therefore, with a large enough sample, the same representative range of households would be expected under both studies.<sup>5</sup> The other side of the missed opportunity was to assess changes in social cohesion from the project efforts and the reasons why.

87. The revised project targets were identified on the basis of existing, documented experiences with implementing GAs over the last 30 years, which begs the question as to why these targets had not been set appropriately in the first place (Section 3.7 has more details).

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by the GA are poor marketing infrastructure, lapsed commitment of government officials and community members to the GA, theft and the inability to enforce regulations.

<sup>5</sup> The 2010 study interviewed 267 households in seven community councils while the 2014 study interviewed 170 households in one community council. Methodology: data collected in August 2014 for 2 weeks. A roughly 50% distribution of female and male-headed households were sampled. Sampling method was to select households using fixed intervals with random start. The target in 2010 was to select 10% of all households in the selected villages; and in 2014 the target was to select 20% of villages and to interview 15% of households in selected villages. The 2006 Population census village list released by Bureau of Statistics was used as a guide for sampling the number of households per village.

### 3.3 Effectiveness

88. The following sections presents the successes achieved for each of the project Outcomes and a discussion on the main challenges. The section concludes with an assessment of the partnership strategy followed to deliver the project results as well as the level of stakeholder interactions. The findings suggest that there are mixed results. There have been some gains on Outcome 1 and a very important gain on Outcome 3 but that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the quality and impact of Outcome 2 in relation to the community level trainings. A limited amount was done to change hearts and minds at the national level.

#### 3.3.1 Outcome 1

89. A major undertaking at the start was first to map out the area, which had never been done before, in order to base the governance model on clearly delineated boundaries and to establish the management system on objective environmental data such as vegetation cover, plant species distribution and carrying capacity for livestock in each area, as well as ecosystem mappings (position of wetlands for example), current land use and disputed areas. This represents a significant departure from conventional management approaches. The last national rangeland inventory was undertaken in 1981-1986, and the area was known only in broad terms, namely, that it was under the administration of three Principal Chiefs (Matsieng, Ramabanda and Tebang) and under each of these were several Area Chiefs, and consisted of a single constituency with several council electoral units. The clear boundaries between these units were only vaguely known and several areas of disputed boundaries existed among the chieftainships. At present the Makhoalipane Community Council is the only Council in Lesotho with a detailed map at chieftainship level in which all the biophysical factors have been mapped such as:

- Administrative units such as Community Council and Area Chief boundaries.
- Current land uses such as crop fields, grazing lands, and cattlepost huts,
- Disputed areas
- Natural features such as rivers, wetlands, springs, nature reserves, forests, indigenous trees, and tourist attractions spots

90. Figures 1 and 2 show the mappings of chieftainships in the four sub-areas of the Makhoalipane Community Council. Annex 2 sets out the land use maps, the rotational grazing plan and the sustainable grazing capacity calculations developed for two of four sub-areas of Makhoalipane Council (Semonkong and Mokolemetsane), as well as a map of the summer grazing areas for Makhoalipane Council. Rotational grazing plans for the Makheka (Rapoleboea) sub-area of the Community Council was not availed to the evaluation team. It is unclear to what extent the actual rotational grazing plans were based on this information.



Figure 1 Mapping of Chieftenships of a) Mokolometsane b) Telle and c) Makheka.

a)



b)



c)





Figure 2 Summary map of chieftainships in Makhoalipane Community Council



91. By April 2014, it was reported that seven GAs were registered. Registration, though, is no indication of membership levels nor range management activity. Two of the communities the evaluators visited pointed out that there was a general confusion about the roles that each should play, leading to difficulties in managing the GA and low attendance of management meetings. The same community also reported that GA membership was in decline because they were promised compensation which they were still waiting for. In another community, participation was low because scarcity of time meant that other activities took priority. Again the issue of payment for brush control was suggested in order to enable communities to prioritise this over other productive activities. The lack of understanding about how the model is supposed to work underscores the issue of the need for training and consultation needed with Chiefs and Councillors, first to carve out respective rules and to deliver one, coherent story to the community, and secondly to build support for the model, bringing together the chiefs, Councillors and communities to discuss and agree the mutual accountability structure going forward.

92. The GAs registered were as follows:

Table 7 GAs registered and hectares of land associated with the GAs.

GA	Date formed	Land under GA 9ha)
<b>Boreipala</b>	2011	8,059.2
<b>Nthapo</b>	2012	2,027.2
<b>Ha Seng</b>	2012	5,220.4
<b>Hlabathe</b>	2011	2,430.9
<b>Ts'enekeng</b>	2011	2,079.0
<b>Rapoleboea</b>	?	13,089.0
<b>Tsokotsa</b>	?	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>32,905.70</b>

93. The fluctuations in GA membership is to be expected for a new scheme where it takes time for the benefits to become apparent. The key issue is that the model relies on pasture improvement benefits to reinforce the community buy-in into the scheme. The record here seems to be fairly good from the documented evidence and community narratives. During the community consultations, several communities reported pastures as having improved, which provided incentives to continue the brush control activities, though the commitment to this varied widely between GAs (monthly in one and weekly in another). Documentary analysis reveals that at Ha Hlabathe and at Ts'enekeng communities started using most of the land which they considered to be shrubland and useless for grazing after removing shrubs. There were reports that after a long time farmers observed palatable plant species growing in just one season, meaning an increase in forage availability. This meant that the GA could see the benefits derived from compliance with reserved grazing practice. The improved pastures have resulted in their animals (especially sheep and goats) breeding better quality livestock and producing superior quality wool and mohair. Importantly, the informants were able to make the nexus between the improved ranges and pastures and the corresponding improvement of the livestock. Quantitative estimates of brush control are harder to come by. A field mission in 2013 estimated that brush control was underway in most of the GAs, and that about 23.0 ha out of more than 80.0 ha of range land had been cleared of brush.

94. In addition, new knowledge was gathered and new techniques were tried. For example, local communities found that uprooting the shrubs and lining them as strips along the slope traps soil as much as stone lining. They adopted this approach to help prevent soil erosion after uprooting the invader species as well as helping grass to grow.

95. There is some evidence in the project documentation that the Project enabled support to conflict resolution. The killing of a chief in Boreipala caused tensions for more than six months and prompted UNDP to send in conflict management specialists. A special workshop was held, attended by over 30 people. Mediation by the Project Officers to enable talks to continue between these communities was seen as a positive development by the people, including the Principal Chief, under whose jurisdiction the two communities fall. The community narratives (Annex 8) indicate improved relations between Councillors and Chiefs through active association with the GA.

96. Coordination between the three pillars of the governance model (community groups, chiefs and councillors) seemed to have improved with the establishment of the District Project Implementation Forum, a consultative forum that brought together the Chiefs, Councillors and community. This was piloted only three times but shows potential to grow into a more substantial mechanism. The project reports are a little confusing about when the PIFs were held. In one place, the first PIF is reported as being January 2014, and in other reports what seems also to be a PIF was held at the beginning of 2012. What is clearer is that these consultations events were considered useful in developing collaborative ways of working. No PIF meetings were held in 2011 due to pending elections held in October after a number of postponements.

97. A number of households benefited from the IGAS, though the final number is difficult to establish from the documentary evidence. The reports show that in 2012 bee-keeping boxes, pigs, chickens and equipment for tree nurseries and vegetation production were distributed to a total of 387 beneficiaries. In addition, CA planters were distributed to 13 beneficiaries at Hlabathe (though not mentioned during the site visit for this evaluation) as well as two animal-drawn conservation agricultural planters. These activities are showing potential. Field research carried out in 2013 revealed that those who have sold some eggs managed to realize 2,000.00 Maloti (USD180) at a price of 1.00 Maloti per egg. Likewise, pigs generated some revenue of between Maloti 2,000.00 and 6,000.00 per animal (USD180-545). This is considerable income for rural Lesotho, or any other rural area in Southern Africa. The experience of the evaluators visiting Hlabathe in early 2015 is that chickens indeed worked well for one community member, but she could not tell us how many chickens she had sold, indicating a need for basic business management skills. Community ambition to expand the IGAs was also evident in some communities. In Ramosebo, the group planned to expand production from 11000 seedlings to 20,000. And in Tsenekeng, community ambition was to produce construction poles from trees planted.

98. Some surprising but welcome unintended consequences came about, such as the pooling of own resources by communities following on from the formation of the

user groups and initial funding for the IGAs. Even with the failure of some of the IGAs, communities were willing to invest their own resources into trying again. In one community the evaluators visited, it was reported that a burial society was formed as a result of the interactions made inside the grazing association. And crucially, the evaluation team found out from the communities that IGAs provided a reason for the grazing associations to come together regularly to discuss their livelihoods as a group.

99. The outputs produced over the course of four years were as follows:

### **Outcome 1 outputs**

2010 study tour: 'Moteng Managed Resource Area (MRA) in Botha Botha and 'Malefiloane Managed Resource Area in Mokhotlong, to learn about successes and challenges – 2 MRAs offered as good practice in the Project Document.
District Implementation Forum formed and convened three times.
Sensitisation <i>lipitso</i> (public meetings) in the project area. A total of 2041 people attended
SLM mappings for the 4 sub-areas of Makhoalipana Community Council
3 model workshops convened
12 user groups reps went on a study tour: taken to Ts'ehlanyane and Malibamats's.
International study tour to Namibia and findings incorporated into the SLM model.
Baseline data collected. A total of 447 people participated in 17 village areas. Information collection covered areas of governance, legislative structures, livelihoods and challenges such as lack of marketing facilities, roads and extension services, as well as boundary disputes.
User groups formed and constitutions developed
Income generating activities (IGAs) identified, researched and piloted
With the assistance of FAO, representatives of the 8 registered grazing associations were introduced to Conservation farming, provided with seeds, equipment and received on site instruction

### **Challenges**

100. Multiple challenges were reported in the sensitisation meetings at the start of the project, such as:

- Prevalence of conflicts between the Community Councils and Chiefs;
- Mismanagement of trespass fines collected by Councils from rangelands and abuse by livestock owners;
- Poor law enforcement to protect *leboela* (reserved grazing areas);

- Poor handling of income generating activities that would otherwise reduce pressure on the grazing lands;
- Lack of knowledge by Councillors and members of communities on good range management practices.
- Stock theft and equipment theft.

101. It is unknown to what extent any of these issues have been resolved by the model piloted though, certainly, some of these challenges do still remain. A case study analysis in a few sites could have explored these issues and tracked progress based on relevant indicators. Challenges that the project reported over the course of implementation were as follows:

- Perception challenges, for example, rangeland improvement of the rangeland seen as a threat to their animals.
- Party political divisions<sup>6</sup>
- Community relations with chiefs<sup>7</sup>
- Lack of support from Ministry staff (transport issues? Implementation from Maseru?)<sup>8</sup>
- People not sticking to set-aside rules<sup>9</sup>
- Animals died because the IGA group members lacked the necessary skills and technical guidance<sup>10</sup>
- Vandalism of equipment.

102. Reports from the early months of project implementation highlighted that there was little interest of councillors and chiefs in attendance of public gatherings. The

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<sup>6</sup> In January 2012, the killing of a Chief of Ha Nthapo by the neighbouring community of Ha Tebesi (Boreipala), cause tensions for at least the first half of the year. Grazing permits to Boreipala were reported to be withheld by the Principle Chief. In other monitoring reports, it was recorded that internal political conflicts hamper the organization of associations; and lead to poorly attended local meetings. Other problems reported were on-going chieftainship disputes in Hlabathe, where members do not attend monthly meetings and where low moral was reported and and range management plans are therefore not implemented.

<sup>7</sup> In other areas like Ha Thabo Letsie, local authorities are not committed in community developments as they are the reason Lipitso fail.

<sup>8</sup> MoAFS has only two vehicles for the entire district, down from 21 at one time. The District Extension Officer reported the problem on shortage of transport which may have delayed taking some of their activities to village level.

<sup>9</sup> At Ha Hlabathe two meetings were held to restructuring of the GA due to problems in people not keeping to grazing set-asides.

<sup>10</sup> For example, in Rapoleboea piggery farm, 20 pigs distributed and 15% died. In another estimate, 292 chickens were distributed but 41% died due to diseases and lack of support from extension officers. Training had been received after animals had been distributed. Other problems were as follows: Hawks snatched a large number of chicks; no access to feed supply for pigs; and some farmers could not afford constructing proper pigsties.

district level Project Implementation Forums, which were intended to bring all parties together to discuss issues, appears to have been successful in attracting attendance from the three major stakeholder groups: communities, chiefs and councillors. This represents progress. However the process to set up a well-functioning community management system has not been linear, and in all cases there have been set-backs and great difficulties before breakthroughs were found. Ramosebo is a case in point. A 2013 mission report suggesting giving up on this GA, but it eventually succeeded and seems now to be working. Non-linear progression is to be expected given the fundamental change in the power balance that the new decentralised management systems brings with it as well as the need to prove to communities that this is a system that will benefit them.

103. The baseline started out as grazing controlled by the Chiefs with little community involvement<sup>11</sup>. The evidence coming from the project reports suggests that the project achieved some progress in moving the baseline model to a community-owned practice with coordination and oversight from the Chiefs. But the difficulties of changing to more modern management practices should not be underestimated. The recent decentralisation of planning power represents a significant paradigm shift from traditional ways of management. It was reported that Chiefs felt their powers being eroded, particularly around impoundment of livestock that trespass on *leboela* (reserved grazing area), and collection of trespassing monies. Project reports throughout implementation up until 2014 highlight some of the difficulties in moving the range management system to a more participatory-led approach, such as:

- In 2012: *“At Masienyane, the gathering was a complete failure and the possible reason was that the chief might have not disseminated information to the community members as a result of her absence since there was a workshop held at Semonkong for chiefs on the same day that the Pitso was to be held at Ha Masienyane. Furthermore, the failure at Mahlako and Auplaas might have been due to the chiefs and councillors failing to organize because villagers claim to have not heard of such lipitso”*.
- In 2013: *“in Tsenekeng there is still no good working relationship between the community, the Councillor and the Chief. When the grazing was opened up, the association was not informed. In Ha Tsokotsa, it works well with grazing opening decision made jointly by the three sets of stakeholders. Brush control*

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<sup>11</sup> The starting point in the arrangement management system is that Principle Chiefs control the cattlepost while the village chiefs control the village grazing areas. The Area chiefs are divided into mini grazing areas which are rotationally used by livestock owners. Cattlepost areas can also be sub divided into smaller grazing areas if approved by the Principal Chief in charge. Each and every cattlepost grazing area is allocated for certain Area chief, except Mphatšoenyane grazing area which is a special area for the Head of State.

*was reported as not being significant except in the case of Tsenekeng, and it suggests providing incentives for this activity”.*

- In 2014: inconsistent positions with regards to issuing of grazing permits, with Council withholding them, and the Chief getting blamed by the communities for doing so. This confusion hinders rangeland management as rotation does not proceed according to plan and undermines the agreed system, enabling some farmers to take advantage of the hiatus.

104. In the 2014 socio-economic study which carried out interviews among over 170 households, it was reported that the majority of respondents specify the chief acting alone closely followed by the chief acting together with the Councillor, and then the Chief acting together with the Community. The conclusion therefore drawn at this stage by the TE team is that more time and continued support is needed to make the model work effectively in developing cooperation between stakeholders and shared sense of ownership and responsibility. The process will require patient investment. The MTE included a recommendation on reaching out to the Principal Chief, as a champion for the model but this was not followed through partly because there was little time and resources to implement the recommendations.

105. The gaps in coordination could be felt on a policy and implementation level. In one GA that was visited by the evaluators (Hlabathe) we found that the Ministry of Forestry, with its Famine relief programme, pays herders to remove brush in a cash for work scheme. This may undermine the GA model which is based on voluntary land management (in return for better grazing benefits later on). It is arguable whether, in the end, it might be necessary to introduce additional incentives to keep the brush control going if the level of benefits to the individual are not seen to compensate for time spent on this activity. This much was indicated to the evaluators in the community consultations. So the issue would boil down to the relative returns for time spent on brush control versus other productive activities. In cases where relative returns seem lower, (perhaps because IGAs and crop production seem more important), engagement on brush control may well decline.

106. Other problems in coordination were around the inconsistency of the model being promoted. For example, cash was given to the trainee range riders, which community participants working on the construction of water tanks for irrigation found out about, and then downed tools to express dissatisfaction that some other group had been given cash while they had received food. The Forum was unanimous that government policy be followed (food not cash), and not that of UNDP, for sustainability. This confusion might have been avoided had there been a consistent field presence of extension staff. Implementation from Maseru was acknowledged in project reports as being an oversight in the design of the project which ultimately affected implementation progress.



107. There is scant information on the scale of activity, not to mention effectiveness, related to reduction of livestock (increasing off-take), introduction of improved livestock varieties or supplementary feeding, yet these elements would be critical in developing achievable rotational grazing plan, which would be a determinant of potential effectiveness. This is symptomatic of a lack of workable project strategy (ToC), leading to the project focusing on parts of the 'system' without a plausible way of connecting these parts to deliver the project objective.

108. For livestock registration, the precursor to livestock off-take, the information presented in the project documents is inconsistently reported. What is known is that as of September 2012, out of a target of 7,000 animals for that winter season, 1344 were marked. The following challenges were reported, which shows: i) the perception issues prevalent among communities ii) the barrier posed by Chiefs in some areas and iii) lack of coordination by ministries:

- Low turn-up by farmers in bringing their animals to assembly points. Some came to assure themselves that animals survived the branding, contrary to rumours that were circulated in the area.
- Chiefs were slow in mobilising people.
- Stock register booklets were not updated regularly, resulting in some animals coming for marking only to be returned.
- Unavailability of the Anti Stock-theft Police for marking operations.

109. The stakeholder validation meeting convened for the presentation of TE findings reported that the IGAs were centrally driven, rather than demand-led. This approach carried obvious risks of sustainability at the level of personal motivation to make these activities a success as well as risks of matching the IGA to the suitability of the environment, a particular concern for the highlands in Lesotho. This can be illustrated most clearly with the bee-keeping pilots which mostly failed and ultimately showed suitability to be restricted to specific valley areas where natural beehives occur such as Rapoleboea.

110. Water tank construction for irrigation purposes did not go according to plan. Shortages of sand for construction of all water tanks was reported, as well as low turn up by community members for the work, leading to slow progress. An inspection report in December 2013 details the implementation progress on this element of the project. Of 6 water tanks, only one was operational. One at Nthapo had to be destroyed and started again because the wall thickness was too thin, there was poor reinforcement and there was no proper spacing between stones. In summary, eight water tanks were planned, and at the time of the evaluation, seven were yet to be completed. Technical information with regards to size, capacity and cost of the tanks as well as the number of families that would benefit from the irrigation or the projected benefits in terms of additional tonnes of crop production per season was

not available. In addition, the strategy to involve local people in the project by expecting them to collect materials may have been counterproductive. When supply of materials became too difficult (because of distance), people became demoralised and lost interest in the project. Supervision of this activity was done by MFLR officers living in Maseru, bringing in local people. This is likely to have been better managed by MoAFS, the competent authority on irrigation projects, and whose practice it is to sub-contract these types of water projects out.

111. The IGAS had mixed results. In addition to many of the animals dying through lack of training guidance, other problems reported were as follows:

- Tsenekeng beekeeping project which had allocated 16 beehives but distributed only five. The supply of bees was also a problem. And the beehives had missing components. Training was carried out for some members of the GA but training manuals not provided.
- Insufficient clarity of the way the rotational chicken and pig 'pass on' model was supposed to work.
- Limited markets in which to sell the products of the IGAs.
- Lack of medicines to treat the animals
- Lack of management and administration skills amongst GAs members skills

### **3.3.2 Outcome 2**

112. Most, if not all, of the training was carried out with communities. Training was offered to resource user group committees based on needs identified from the structured questionnaire administered during the user group mobilisation and formation field exercises in 2011. Table 9 sets out the trainings provided from the available information in reports. Due to the absence of training reports, the evaluators have not been able to establish with certainty how many people were trained. A 2013 UNDP mission report also found that they could not verify the numbers trained in field reports with consultations with communities. The conclusions reached are therefore that there were lots of trainings following a demand-led approach, but that there is no verifiable data on the numbers trained (for example workshop reports), neither is any information about the quality of the trainings (materials are not available and no post-training workshop evaluations were carried out) and their impact on actual range management behaviours.

113. The question raised by some informants is also whether training is the best or only way to learn among communities. Local study tours which have enabled farmer to farmer exchanges were reported as being very useful and were perceived by the farmers interviewed as most effective for learning and sharing new technologies and innovations. A combination of the two methods would therefore be warranted. There was also a suggestion for clustered village training where more people could have accessed the training, rather than holding the training events in Semonkong, which

lies at a fair distance (2 hours by car on a rough road) from some of these communities. It was noted that the range riders training was satisfactorily attended because training was held at village level.

114. The project strategy contained in the Project Document also provisioned for a substantial training action plan aimed at central and community government staff and Parliamentarians, delivering one training event per year<sup>12</sup>. This was left too late and did not take place.

115. The project finalized the SLM toolkit in 2014. The expectation was that it guide extension officers and communities to sustainably manage their resources. But as the toolkit was produced towards the end of the project, the dissemination (training) strategy could not be developed in time. Planned differently, this could have provided the content for the trainings planned at central level. This represents another missed opportunity. This task was carried out through team working sessions with designated staff from the MFLR: three staff from Forestry, four from range resources management, and one from soil and water conservation. No evidence could be found about consulting with other stakeholders groups on the development of these guidelines.

116. It can only be concluded from the above that results fell far short of the intention reflected in the Project Document which was to address the second main barrier relating to conceptual and technical capacities to implement and support the model, as well as scale it up. This may be because the work under Outcome 1 to develop the model may have overwhelmed the time availability of the project management team to focus on the other aspects of the project, though, similar to the IGAs, these aspects could have been influential in building the social capital needed to make the models work. A paper presented at the SLM conference by Bulane shows how trainings that bring together different parties (Chiefs, Communities including herders, Community Councillors) and are carried out in a participatory manner can play a vital role in promoting coordination, mutual understanding and improving community relations. Unfortunately, this does not seem to have been the methodology followed in at least some of the project sites. One report mentioned that trainings in Ramosebo were attended by Chiefs and Councillors who then disseminated the learning to communities.

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<sup>12</sup> Technical training was to cover the following topics:

- Review the meaning and content of NRM and SLM, indigenous knowledge and indicators; western scientific techniques and management models;
- Legal and institutional training on Lesotho's new local government system; environmental legislation; land use planning and management;
- gender issues in SLM;
- SLM and HIV/AIDS.

117. Outcome 2 outputs were the SLM Toolkit and the following trainings and study tours:

Table 8: List of trainings and study tours carried out during project implementation

#	Training	Date	Where (GA)	Topic	# people participated
4	IGAs	2011	Semonkong	Chickens, pigs and vegetable production	30
5	User group management	2011	Semonkong	Range management, forestry, conservation, grazing association management, bookkeeping, communication and leadership	100
6	Conservation agriculture	2011	Maseru District extension staff	Conservation agriculture	20
7	Project planning and writing	2012	LIPAM	Project planning and writing	60
8	User group management	2012	Semonkong	Training GAs' committees on management of Grazing Associations (GAs)	10-15 at each site (9 sites)
9	Construction of water tanks	2012	At each site (9 sites)	Construction of water tanks	10-15 at each site (9 sites)
10	SLM	2012	GAs at the sites	Introduction to range management; fire management; wetlands protection, range management issues	466
11	CA training	2012	Maphutseng, Mohale's Hoek	23 farmers were taken on a conservation agriculture study tour at Growing Nations, Maphutseng in Mohale's Hoek. Some participants of the tour were selected after the study tour train other farmers on CA. MoAFS with the support of FAO and CARITAS (NGO) also held two training sessions for farmers at project pilot site. So 80 farmers were selected, and received FAO sponsored inputs	80
12	Tree nurseries	2012	Semonkong	Establishment of tree nurseries	?32
13	Bee keeping	2012	Tsenekeng, Hlabathe, Tebesi	The Bee Colony ; the hive; tools, protective gear; miscellaneous equipment; how to start and develop strong bee colonies; management of hive and brood chamber; pests and diseases; swarm prevention and control ; hive division; creation of nucleus colonies (nucs); supering and	24

				management of honey supers; harvesting; outlook on winter preparation	
14	Range management and wetland protection	Sep-Oct 2012	Boreipala, Daniele, Hlabathe, Nthapo, Tsenekeng, Tsokotsa, Rapoleboea	SGP – funded. Facilitation team: SLM project officer, DRRM, Maseru district MFLR staff.	225
15	Wetland management	Nov-12	Pretoria, South Africa	Legislation impacting on wetlands, abiotic and biotic factors impacting on it and basic tools to delineate wetlands.	4
16	Conflict management	Apr-13	Semonkong	Develop skills on dispute resolution	32
17	Range monitoring	2013	SLM Project area	Inspection of rangelands, inventory, grazing plans; Methodology (sampling procedure, reconnaissance survey, detailed vegetation survey); Practicals (demonstration and implementation of methods); Rangeland observations, selecting sites observations, practicals; Grazing control (range regulations, grazing permits, receipt books) Rehabilitation of rangelands, wetlands protection).	20
18	Agriculture	2013	Semonkong	MoAFS with the support of FAO and CARITAS (NGO) also held two training sessions	80
19	Pig production	2013	Rapoleboea	Provide farmers with necessary skill and knowledge of general piggery management as an alternative source of livelihood which can improve their household standard of living. Pig sty plan, b. Breeds and their characteristics (large white, land race, duroc), c. Selection of pig for breeding, d. Breeding, e. Lactating Sow and Piglets management, f. Management of piglets, e.g. pig feeds.	25
20	Beekeeping	2013	Semonkong	The exercise involved upgrading beehives by inserting wire in trays and monitoring of farmers who had been allocated bee hives to trap bees.	24
21	Crop and animal production	2013	Semonkong	Piggery management: selection, construction of pig sty, feeding, pig husbandry, disease management.	25

2	Training of riders	2011	SLM project area	12 days of training for three groups in each area: rangeland inspection, sampling techniques, range inventory, range rehabilitation, legal framework, wetland protection.	184
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### 3.3.3 Outcome 3

118. The Project Document noted that inadequate sharing of knowledge on SLM by MoAFS, MFLR and government more generally was recognized as a greater barrier to overall SLM uptake in Lesotho than the development of SLM techniques, making the knowledge management component of critical importance to the long-term success of the project. According to the project strategy, a number of Knowledge Management (KM) activities were expected to commence soon after project inception. The KM strategy intended to address the full spectrum of the SLM upstream and downstream challenges, recognizing the need for integrated policy implementation.

119. Implementation progress on this outcome started in 2012 with the development of a CSIF road map, though serious progress did not start until 2013. A Country Strategic Investment Framework for SLM was prepared in 2013. It kicked off in 2012 with an SLM stakeholder forum, which culminated in the formation of a country team with the membership as follows: MLFR, MoAFS, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Local Government, of Trade, of Energy, Meteorology and Water Affairs, and of Finance, UNDP, FAO, GIZ, Serumula Development Association, Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM). NEPAD/TerrAfrica collaborated in the development of the CSIF, mobilizing the UNCCD Global Mechanism. They both supported the CSIF process on cost benefit analysis and financial diagnostic studies, respectively. Terms of reference of what became the lead consultant for CSIF were widened, with the advice of NEPAD, to incorporate other pertinent studies (Ecosystem, technical, institutional and policy diagnostic studies).

120. The project supported the integration of SLM in two national policies, i.e., a) Range Management Policy, approved by Cabinet in 2014, and b) Soil and Water Conservation (awaiting approval by the Cabinet). On the latter, the project supported the policy formulation with a workshop late 2012 and 2013 (though minutes were not availed to the evaluators).

121. The National Strategic Development Plan (2012-2016) makes no mention of SLM but that is as expected as it was produced before the project started implementation on Outcome 3. There is the potential to use the CSIF to mainstream SLM into the next iteration.

122. In an attempt to create dialogue and share experiences on SLM nationwide, the project organized the National SLM Conference in May 2014. The content for discussion of the SLM dialogue was generated through the CSIF (Lesotho Strategic Investment Framework) formulation, which also identified the key stakeholders to be involved in the National Dialogue. The Minister of Forestry and Land Reclamation opened the conference. The two-day conference, themed “Sustainable Land Management in Sub-Saharan Africa: Increasing Land Productivity”, drew participation of 150 research scientists, University students, practitioners from civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations and government institutions<sup>13</sup>. Countries represented at the conference included Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Uganda among others. The representatives shared experiences and lessons from SLM projects implemented in their respective countries. The question remains as to the extent to which this connected with policy makers and the associated policy-influencing value of it. Among the informants the evaluation team talked to, reaction to the SLM dialogue seemed lukewarm at best.

123. The knowledge products developed by the project were technical reports, but nothing of note was produced on the way of strategic communications or public information value. The mid-term evaluation (MTE) recommended the recruitment of a KM officer, but this was deemed unnecessary and an information officer from MFLR was assigned to the job.

124. The outputs produced over the course of four years were as follows

### **Outcome 3 outputs**

SLM stakeholder forum held and SLM country team formed.
Country Strategic Investment Framework (CSIF) road map was developed
Three documents produced out of the CSIF process were: i. Lesotho-Sustainable Land and Water Management-Strategic Investment Programme (L-SLWM-SIP) - Programme, ii. L-SLWM-SIP Diagnostic Analyses and Annexes, and iii. L-SLWM-SIP Support Tool..
News article prepared on best practice
A Conservation Policy was prepared by MFLR in conjunction with other stakeholders
Analysis and synthesis of bottlenecks & opportunities which highlight priority SLM interventions were included as part of LSLWM-SIP (Lesotho Sustainable Land and Water Management Strategic Investment Programme, formerly known as CSIF)

<sup>13</sup> A total of twenty four papers were presented during this conference under four sub-themes; policy and institutional/governance frameworks supportive of SLM (inclusive of value chain), climate smart improvement of ecosystems (biodiversity, forestry, rangelands, wetlands and dry-land cropping), landscape monitoring as a tool for sustainable land management and mainstreaming gender and capacity building in up-scaling SLM techniques.

Assessment of landscape monitoring was done through satellite imagery and ground-truthing to track processes of land cover change nationally
Local Authorities workshop held to review legislation as the basis for mainstreaming SLM into national policies.
2-day SLM Conference held.
Video on SLM interventions in Lesotho produced.

### 3.3.4 Partnerships and stakeholder interactions

124. The main partnerships have been with MoAFS in the support of the IGAs. The project partnered with FAO on the issue of CA through trainings.

125. Work with Serumula (local NGO) on user group formation was also reported, though not mentioned again except in conjunction with the activities of another programme: the GEF-funded project working with the Orange-Senqu River Commission (ORASECOM) which was also working with GAs together with Serumula. Notably, Serumula was applauded for the IGA activities it supported at Tsenekeng (under ORASECOM), including the construction of a community hall in the area. Caritas (an international NGO) became a partner on supporting pilots on conservation agriculture in at least one village that the evaluators visited. NGOs (PELUM) were partners in a more limited sense as a member of the Project Steering Committee (PSC) or as attendees to key project workshops such as those to develop the model in 2011. The intention was to recruit an NGO to work directly with the Grazing Associations on IGA (a recommendation from the MTE) but this did not transpire; the reason given was that NGOs did not have enough capacity to take this role on.

126. A fruitful partnership was formed with the GEF Small Grants Programme (SGP), which came to support the IGAs. A total of M388,000 was secured from SGP which was combined with M708,000 from GAs for improved wool production.

127. The project success was premised (during design stage) on the active participation of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), but it did not work out this way. High costs of working through CARE (presumably management costs) were given as the reason for the decision not to engage the NGO CARE as an implementing agency. Also, there was a view that contracting CSOs for implementation was not a sustainable strategy because of their reliance on donor funds which is a risk to sustainability. The counter-argument is that CSOs are critical to effective development of community-led approaches and they should be supported by government to complement government service delivery.



128. The development of the model took place in a consultative fashion. Model development included data collection in order to capture communities' perspectives on the management of their natural resources and their means of livelihood. A total of 447 people participated in 17 village areas. Information collection covered areas of governance, legislative structures, livelihoods and challenges such as lack of marketing facilities, roads and extension services, as well as boundary disputes. In addition, there were three model development workshops in 2011, which were well attended with some 60 stakeholders, including Principle Chiefs, Community Council members, staff from MFLR, MoLG, MoAFS and Ministry of Environment and Tourism, as well as some NGOs.

129. Selection criteria were agreed for inclusion of communities. The selection criteria were around interest to participate, number of associations in the area, geographical representativeness of the natural resource complex and the presence of no conflicts, reflecting a lesson learned from the Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CNRM) project (USAID-supported from 1992 to 1995) that foisting the grazing association idea on communities without any interest to participate has met with failure. But crucially, these selection criteria did not include presence of degraded land (Annual report, 2011). Reversal of land degradation is the ultimate measure of success to demonstrate that the governance model piloted by the project works and should therefore have been included. Further on in the annual report 2011, the rangeland status, grass yield, stocking rate and grazing capacity at Ha Taniele and Boreipala was reported as being good, implying that grazing management plans were already being implemented, which begs the questions as to why these areas were included in the communities.

130. Sensitisation meetings were held at the start of the project, which attracted over 2000 people (2010 Annual Report), with further sensitisations later on in the Project, however it is difficult to identify the concrete number and coverage of sensitisations from the project reports. Table 9 sets out the available information extracted from project reports.

Table 9: Indicative range of sensitisations and coverage

GA	Villages included	GA	Villages included
Mokolemetsane		Telle	
Boreipala	Ha Tlhabi	Elia	Khubetsoana,
	Tebesi		Moeling,
Nthapo	Mpatana		Motse Mocha,
Ha Seng	Moeaneng (Ha Seng)		Ha Mphafolane
	Ha Lekhetho		Nchela
	Hlabathe Moreneng		Liphokoaneng
Hlabathe			Tsutsulupa
Taniele	Motse-Mocha (Ha Taniele)		Elia
Semonkong			Pakiso
Tsenenkeng	Ha Rasefale		Rampeo
	Lepae		Fochane
	Lesala		
		Ha Salemone,	Ha Lebelo,
Ha Phallang	Ha Sechache	Ha Masienyane	
Makheka (Rapoleboea)		Ha Samuele	Lentiti
Rapoleboea	Ha Mateu		Koloti.
	Ha Mahlomola		Polateng
	Ha Andrease	Likaleng	
	Ha Tsokotsa		Likaleng
	Ha Moseme		Marabeki
	Ha Ramosebo		Sekolopata
	Ha Thabo Letsie	Ribaneng	
	Letsunyane		Thusong
	Likolobeng		Lebona
Tsokotsa	Ha Tsokotsa		Ramabanta
	Ha Lerumonyane	Nyakosoba	
Ramosebo	Matsatseng		Ngopetsoeu
	Mokoallong		Likatseng
	Ha Mantsa		Khanyetsi
		Others	
			Khubetsoana
			Moeling

131. PSC meeting records show that the meetings could have been better attended by ministries outside of the MFLR. A typical composition of PSC members towards the middle of the project comprised of around 5-6 MFLR staff, 2-3 UNDP staff, and 2-3 staff from other ministries. Section 3.4.1 has the details.

### 3.4 Efficiency

132. This Section discusses the efficiency of project implementation, which is to say the delivery of project outcomes at minimum cost, from the perspective of seven factors: i) the quality of project management ii) the impact of the government coordination mechanisms; iii - vi) the quality of District-level implementation; Implementing Partner execution; UNDP Implementation oversight support; adaptive management and vii) the impact of the technical inputs into the project strategy. This Section also discusses the quality of financial management.

133. The findings suggest that management efficiency was low for a variety of reasons including gaps in the management team, poor project design leading to time-intensive project re-design -and resources initially being spent outside the original project boundary-, a lack of strategic planning; implementation from Maseru making support to communities expensive and not very effective; lack of delegation of activities to competent agencies; and lack of coordination of extension services at the community level leading to a wasteful use of resources.

#### 3.4.1 Implementation process

##### *Quality of project management*

134. The project team had a staff complement of six, as follows:

##### Based at MFLR

- Project Manager;
- Project Officers (2): one hired by UNDP and another from staff of Range Management Division—focuses on field level pilot implementation;
- Finance/Admin. Officer has been with the project since inception;
- Technical Advisor, as agreed during Tripartite Review Meeting 2012.
- Two Drivers

##### Based at UNDP

- Programme Assistant;
- UNDP UNV Project Monitoring Officer : A second UNV has been on duty since Oct. 2012;
- UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Advisor (South Africa).
- UNDP Head of Energy and Environment Unit ( overall strategic oversight and monitoring )

135. The Project Manager reported into the PSC. There was no Project Director for much of the project implementation phase. The head of DRRM was requested to be focal point for the project in the last year of the project.

136. There were some disruptions in implementation due to staff turnover. The project manager (PM) stayed until 2014, so that provided stability in the implementation process. UNDP took over responsibilities in the last few months of the project implementation as it was not deemed efficient to recruit someone for what amounted to project wrap-up. There were three changes in M&E officer. The first change was taken on by the UNDP UNV until 2012, thereafter the second M&E officer was competitively recruited but left after a year. The third Project Monitoring Officer joined the project in November 2013 to date. Coming to the Project Officer, the first was competitively recruited and lasted until April 2012 (due to health reasons); UNDP then recruited the second officer, who left in July 2014. A third project officer was selected from within the Ministry. The Technical Adviser (TA) started in 2012, midway through the project.

137. According to the GEF Technical Advisor (email correspondence January 2013 and as per review of monitoring reports) an important aspect affecting the implementation and the monitoring was a decision not to hire a Technical Advisor at the start of the project. It was reported that bundling the role of the PM and TA in one person had weakened the capability of the individual to function effectively either as PM or TA; this problem had been exacerbated by the absence of the project officer. The requests for technical input from the project had instead been directed at the UNDP Regional Technical Adviser who was not in a position to help given her oversight role, rather than a direct implementation role.

138. Results-based management was a key consideration for the team, as witnessed by the many hours of management time dedicated to revising the Results Framework. The weaknesses in designing the project results framework meant that much 'airtime' was given to the issue of amending indicators and targets. Revisions were first proposed at the inception workshop, discussions continued for the first year of steering committee meetings, and a special workshop was held in February 2011. More time spent on re-designing the project inevitably means there was less time to discuss substantive issues on implementation progress. The project management team, supported by MFLR, implemented a fully participatory process to revise the targets. Unfortunately, the project was scaled down 10 months after the implementation starting in March 2010, but during that time data collection efforts such as mapping exercises and community sensitisation were carried out for the original project areas, representing a leakage outside of the project boundaries, and commensurately less funding to reach the project targets. This is a clear example of how weak design can significantly affect project delivery and achievement of project Outcomes.

139. It is also a pity that, though much attention was given to identify achievable targets, the strategy to deliver the project results was not better thought through. For example, the decision to leave Outcome 3 (policy) behind meant that there was no time left to develop a process to institutionalise the CSIF, risking that it remains a strategy on paper. The Toolkit was initiated very late in the day yet that would have provided some of the content for the national level trainings. Without a dissemination strategy, there is also a risk that the toolkit will have a limited impact on capacities. The root cause of these issues may well be that the management team was inadequately staffed to cover the different components of the project, forcing choices to be made about the priorities to address. That decision, whilst logical under those constraints, was not the efficient solution, notwithstanding the possible challenges in identifying competent professionals in the market place to take this work on.

140. In addition, work processes were reported as being slow. A project secretary might have been useful to handle logistics for the activities, such as bookings for the officers, organizing events (e.g. PSC), accommodation and meals. This would have freed time for the Manager, but most importantly for the Finance and Administrative Officer who handled a heavy load of finance and administrative issues all on his own.

141. Budget control at the level of sticking to the annual work plan was good and disbursement rates were therefore high (though it is not known whether budget revisions were made and the size of the revision, due to information not being available). The desire to make efficiencies were certainly brought up as a consideration in the PSC meetings. The issue of per diem costs was first brought up by the PSC in August 2011, over year into the project. The issue of deployment of field officers was raised one year later. Deployment finally happened in August 2013. Effective budget control should have highlighted the issue of project funds being inefficiently spent much sooner together with action taken to address the leakage.

142. Reporting was good on the whole. PSC meetings were held quarterly. A regular and therefore large number of monitoring reports were produced. The PSC meeting minutes in particular reflected in detail the issues discussed. Substantive issues on results management were discussed as well as the more operational matters, notwithstanding the strategic management deficiencies mentioned above. However, reports were of poor communication among the project team members. For example, the team did not have regular project staff meetings (these should, ideally, be weekly), which may have led to a lack of team spirit among the SLM officers. Neither was there a monthly activity schedule prepared which would have enabled planning, promoted motivation and a shared sense of purpose.

143. Monitoring visits were carried out at least annually and monitoring reports are available from both MFLR and UNDP. The extent to which these were acted upon is unclear. The annual reports used a coding system to communicate the status of

different activities, though not applied to implementation progress towards the project targets.

144. Document management could have been better. Many documents for this evaluation were not easily retrieved and had to be tracked down from different places; many were not dated and some were a repeated version and it was unclear which the final version was. The key point here is that if technical reports are not easily accessible, there is more chance that they will be forgotten, or that work is duplicated, leading to an inefficient spending of funds. Creating document retrieval systems also helps to create and instil a learning culture within an organisation which is especially important for governments.

145. The MTE was carried too late to maximize its utility to the project. UNDP and GEF M&E Policies and Procedures stipulate that any full-size project must undergo an independent MTE at the mid-point of project implementation. The MTE was *initiated* at mid-point (in May 2012) but was not completed until February 2013, which left the project with less than a year to implement the recommendations. Taking into account the need for UNDP to develop its management response and for the PSC to consider the information, decisions on the adjustments to the strategy would have needed a minimum of two months to decide on the adjusted implementation strategy. In the event, it took a further 7 months for a technical audit to be completed, leaving 4 months until operational closure (according to original closure timing).

#### *Government coordination*

146. One of the serious concerns raised by the MTE was the lack of coordinated approach from various entities and organisations that have a stake in the integrity of national lands. There were no formalised structures for collaboration between staff from MFLR and MoAFS to ensure coordinated service delivery to communities, and project monitoring reports reveal at some points a reluctance on the part of MoAFS to engage at the field level. An important part of effective range management is coordinating and integrating extension services (learning services) involving conversations about agriculture, range management and water management—integrated service delivery. The lack of coordination in support services to communities was therefore a critical weakness in the implementation of the model.

147. At the national level, cross-government coordination is widely agreed to be a problem in Lesotho. The mission report for the study tour to Namibia raises the issue in Lesotho of ‘considerable governmental and donor fragmentation in the sector and missed opportunities for collaboration’. Projects are probably the key coordination mechanism in Lesotho. PSC meeting records show that the meetings were not well attended by ministries outside of the MFLR. Observations from informants to the TE was that there were too many MFLR representatives present

which may have been off-putting to other ministries; that jargonistic language was used which excluded others not of the same ministry and that not enough was done to create an inclusive environment for exchanges of views and development of a shared understanding of the SLM agenda during the PSC meetings. This created an environment in which some delegates felt that the input expected of them was only to rubber stamp issues already decided. Inclusivity of different PSC members could have been fostered by inviting contributions to get a better shared understanding of each stakeholder interest and perspective on the Project. Delegating authority for implementation of project activities to competent agencies would also have incentivized more meaningful participation of other ministries in the PSC meetings.

148. Adaptive management through learning and iterative planning was one of the functions of the PSC, which was set up to guide the development of the project and provide intra/inter-sector guidance and oversight to the overall project implementation (Project Document 2009, p 31). However, due to its weak convening power, the PSC was not able to perform a knowledge sharing and institutional learning role.

#### *District level implementation*

149. At the inception workshop it was decided that two project officers would spend 17 days per month in the field with the PM spending 10 in the field. The implementation arrangements at the project site were very thin, dependent on the officers coming from Maseru on an irregular basis. There were reports about serious delays in implementation and work stalling when the supervision was absent (SLM project officer interview Nov 21, 2012), as well as being expensive due to the level of DSAs needing to be paid. The general view, recorded time and again in project reports, was that posting the project officers in the field would have provided a better service and support to communities. In August 2013, the project officer re-located to the field. And by the end of the project, there were an additional two Range Technical Officers and one for Conservation, as well as existing forestry representative. Visits were typically one extension officer per GA per month.

150. The philosophy underpinning the project implementation was that the PMU would not take lead in implementation, rather it would facilitate the relevant technical staff of the departments/ministries involved to take on project activities, which would be part of their regular work. However, complaints that MFLR District staff were not effectively included or motivated were recorded in monitoring reports. Coordination with MoAFS is also below what would be expected for effective implementation.

#### *Quality of Implementing Partner execution*

151. It would be fair to say that the quality of implementation could have been better for the following reasons:

- Too much money spent on travel and per diems when better service delivery would have been provided from officers located in the field, closer to the communities;
- Lack of sufficient oversight of the IGAs because of poor coordination with competent agencies;
- Insufficient delegation of authority to other agencies for example, construction of water harvesting tanks to MoAFS;
- The project strategy and implementation thereof was not based on or draw on findings of the technical reports.
- Lack of a strategy to deliver Outcome 2 (which was supposed to be wider than the community level trainings);
- Weak data collection and information management;
- Lack of a strategy to deliver a communications campaign.

152. Much of the technical work was undertaken by MFLR staff. There is no data on the time spent producing the outputs, for example the output costs for trainings and technical reports prepared, preventing a comparison with private sector alternative approaches. This kind of comparison would be a useful one to make for the GoL itself in order to inform its norms and ways of working. MFLR staff might have been better assigned to the facilitation of, and technical support to, the GAs. Technical assignments might have been outsourced and the MFLR would therefore have had the time to take on a supervisory role. This sort of implementation strategy might have improved and speeded up project progress.

153. The lack of a project focal point within the Ministry was a big oversight. A project focal point should have been established to provide the coordination with MFLR policies and practices and to provide feedback/report to the management of the Ministry, for example, in ways to better engage ministry staff in the project. This resulted in the project manager having to engage in the coordination meetings at Ministry, reducing his time to manage the project.

154. The intention was for the NGO CARE to have been the implementing partner for this project, but this proposal was jettisoned because they were thought too expensive. Because of this, there was no capacity assessment done for the MFLR during the project design phase, so an implementation strategy to minimise risks was not be developed.

### *Adaptive Management*



155. There are two main examples of adaptive management to highlight. The revision of the targets which was done through a fully participatory process and on the basis of evidence of what is realistic to achieve in the Lesotho context. The second was the hiring of the TA who led the knowledge management and the CSIF development processes while the Project Manager focused on the implementation of the pilot activities in the communities.

156. The MTE, initiated in May 2012, identified a number of areas that needed attention in order to put the project back on track. It revealed that about three quarters of the budget (or slightly more) had been spent by mid-term; meaning that although the MTE report made a series of recommendations, there was no budget to support the recommendations. The MTE suggested a technical audit for the project, to help identify the best use of the remaining funds to consolidate impacts, which was completed by September 2013. In this exercise, four outputs and nine activities were prioritised by the consultant and the PMU. Some were implemented and some were not due to a combination of reasons. For others there is no information. A tracking process for this exit plan would have been a helpful management device to lead the project to a successful close.

#### *Quality of UNDP implementation support*

157. The UNDP had an oversight role to the project, however at certain points during project implementation the UNDP had a direct implementation role such as on M&E and on project management, due to gaps in the project team after the project manager left. The technical inputs from the UNDP Regional Technical Adviser (RTA) support seems to have been particularly called on in the early stages of the project before the TA joined the team.

158. Aside from the regular quarterly PSC meetings, the CO and PM team met once a month during the four year period, providing a limited form of guidance. There does not appear to have been a call from the project team for more UNDP involvement nor does there appear to have been any great effort on the part of UNDP to offer a greater involvement. There would have been opportunities for more regular meetings such as bi-weekly UNDP programme meetings and the UNDP retreats. Perhaps more should have been initiated by UNDP to share information on UNDP work processes with project staff and to help with strategic planning, particularly in the early stages of project implementation where it really matters, in order to set the project off on the right foot. Financial controls should have been better managed through cross referral to the project accounts (i.e. too much being spent on project management) as well as better coordinated with the implementation plans. Spending of funds in this way without a commensurate impact on results was a key risk that should have been caught early on in the implementation process.

159. One important input from UNDP was the fielding of a conflict management specialist to help the project manage the matter of the killing of a Chief of Ha Nthapo by the neighbouring community of Ha Tebesi (Boreipala), which caused tensions for at least six months. There was a risk that the principal and other chiefs were unwilling to co-operate. Conflict management training sessions were held for the leaders. UNDP's support helped to diffuse the situation and ultimately move the project along.

160. The implementation modality was Assisted National Implementation Modality which encompassed a Direct Payments Modality and procurement carried out by UNDP. Annual monitoring missions were carried out and the presence of the RTA at particular points in time was reflected in various reports. The UNDP RTA was also responsible for fielding a mission to carry out a technical audit, following the MTE.

### *Technical inputs*

161. The number of consultancies were kept to a minimum in order to keep costs down. PSC minutes shows efficiencies being made such as in-house compilation of existing information and mixes of private consultancy and public sector effort to convene meetings and consultations. However, a number of inefficiencies have been noted. The consultancies did not seem to contribute to the project strategy nor shed light on implementation progress towards target delivery. For example:

- Mapping reports were carried out and the purpose was not entirely clear since, from the documentary analysis, the information did not appear to feed into the project strategy, in particular basing the grazing plans and permits on the carrying capacity for each grazing area. In addition, there is a paucity of information relating to the effectiveness of efforts to reduce livestock numbers.
- It is not clear how the UNCCD monitoring report contributed to project monitoring system.
- The M&E consultancy to revise the project results framework was seemingly unnecessary (there was already a results framework in operation), and was in fact terminated after the first draft report.
- The socio-economic study missed an opportunity to structure its assessment around an experimental methodology designed to compare the 'with project' results to the 'without project' results, producing instead a general picture of poverty status for the area as a whole, rather for the areas where the project specifically worked.
- The IGA barrier report was technically sound but was not used to progress the project strategy. The top 5 IGAS which were recommended were not the ones

that were implemented, by and large, and pig husbandry (which failed as an IGA) was not even in the list of 20 possible IGAs<sup>14</sup>.

- The vegetation study had been taken but was stopped by the PSC before completion.
- The range inventory was terminated before completion.

162. The amount spent on technical consultancies was relatively low (USD81,000). The issue is more in the missed opportunities to show substantive innovation, though this is also a consequence of a very limited budget which prevented a bolder attempt at developing and evaluation an improved grazing management model. Overall, the vision to design the implementation strategy on the basis of evidence and best practice was commendable but the vision lacked the technical expertise and implementation approach to effectively tie it into the project strategy.

### 3.4.2 Financial management

163. Expenditures against planned budget are shown in Table 10. Outcome 4 is Project Management. This is far higher than planned for at Project Document stage, mostly because of the field missions that MFLR undertook to the field for sensitisations, trainings, supervision of IGAs and environmental monitoring. Project expenditure, in most cases exceeded budgeted amounts because expenses such as vehicle repairs and fuel turned out to be higher given the terrain in which the vehicles operate. Other expenses such as *per diems* also tended to be higher than budgeted because of the distances between project sites, making it impossible to work on two sites in one or two days. Days planned for one site would end up being extended because it would be unwise to leave a site without accomplishing the objective. Some of these expenditures could equally have been accounted for under the substantive outcomes and the project management figure could have been far smaller. But this does not negate that there are still some important efficiency questions on the implementation process to be answered such as the decision to field project officers permanently stationed in Maseru.

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<sup>14</sup> Six priority IGAs were prioritised on the basis on the most promising opportunities from the perspective of value chains, with another 14 for additional consideration at a later time. The priority IGAs were the following:

1. Wool and mohair production, including breeding, extension and vet services;
2. Rangeland management services: nursery planting, seeding, forestry, fodder;
3. Node-based tourism: food, artists, crafters, cultural performers, guides, special interests;
4. Horticulture production;
5. Seed and potato production;
6. Poultry

164. The other large difference between budget and realized expenditure is on Outcome 2, where expenditure was 65% lower than planned, reflecting an under-delivery of training planned for policy-makers in Maseru.

Table 10 Expenditure outturns compared to the planned budget at project approval.

	GEF grant	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total	% difference on planned budget
<b>Outcome 1</b>	877,500.00	232,488.00	126,488.00	109,745.00	52,309.00	127261	648,291.00	26%
<b>Outcome 2</b>	478,500.00	-	45,770.00	30,034.00	42,080.00	48019	165,903.00	65%
<b>Outcome 3</b>	196,000.00	-	34,773.00	78,418.00	55,745.00	348	169,284.00	14%
<b>Outcome 4</b>	172,500.00	156,214.00	224,411.00	270,774.00	299,357.00	62501	1,013,257.00	-487%
	1,724,500.00	388,702.00	431,442.00	488,971.00	449,491.00	238129	1,996,735.00	

165. Annual cumulative delivery rates have been high, ranging from 76% in 2011 to 98% in 2013, showing a high standard of annual work planning (though it is unknown whether there were budget revisions nor the size of those revisions). The disbursement modality was Direct Payments, which provides strong financial controls. The question was more the implementation strategy behind the disbursements (*per diems*) which was inefficient largely from the standpoint of cost relative to service provision to communities. In other words, the financial control strategy is not just the mechanical business of processing payments but it needs to cross-refer to implementation progress for all components of the project. The implementation strategy should have been changed far sooner.

166. The co-financing plan amounted to \$4.65 million, made up of contributions from GoL, GTZ and UNDP. The actual co-financing was just under 20% of the planned amount. The SLM project experienced a lapse of time between the original concept and the actual start date. By the time the project was signed, the GTZ project was out of sync with activities and planning; thus, the synergies were not realized. Hence realised co-financing is lower than planned. In addition the contribution from GoL was lower than expected, though it did finance what transpired to be a key element of the range management model: the IGAs. Thus the GoL funding was well blended with the GEF grant. Leveraged financing was secured from the GEF SGP, the communities themselves and from NEPAD and the UNCCD Global mechanism. Co-financing plus leveraged financing amounts to just over \$1

million over the 4 years of project implementation. Table 11 compares the actual amounts co-financed and leveraged compared to the plan at project approval.

Table 11 Co-financing and leveraged financing

	Planned (USD)		Actual (USD)		
Co-financing					Leveraged cash financing
	cash	in-kind	cash	in-kind	
GoL	1,970,000	400,000	100,000	400,000	
UNDP	300,000		300,000		50,000
GTZ	2,025,000				
Communities					60,000
GEF SGP					33,600
NEPAD					30,000
Global mechanism					30,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,295,000</b>	<b>400,000</b>	<b>400,000</b>	<b>400,000</b>	
<b>Total cash and in-kind</b>	<b>4,695,000</b>		<b>800,000</b>		<b>203,600</b>

167. The project was audited for the years ending 2010, 2012 and 2013. It received a positive assurance opinion in the years 2010, 2012 and 2013, though in 2013 the issue of attendance sheets for trainings not having been signed and the usage of vehicle and fuel consumption not being properly monitored were raised as anomalies.

168. The review of donor-funded NRM projects 1980-2010 contains a useful summary of the projects that have been implemented in this sector since 1980 – 14 in total, ranging from 2.5 to 27.7 million (USAID 1986 – 1992). Whilst there is data on the grant amount (and other useful information)<sup>15</sup>, no data was included on the number of hectares covered, allowing the calculation of some simple benchmarks for cost effectiveness to be developed. The evaluators tried to access such information from MFLR to no avail. It is suggested that the development of benchmarks of this kind to help future programming may be extremely useful.

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<sup>15</sup> For example, that it took the CRNM project a minimum of 8 years to establish *meaningfully functioning* grazing management institutions. The following timelines were suggested; organisational development (1-3 years); organisational capacity building for self-sustainability (3-5 years).

### **3.5. Sustainability**

169. This Section discusses the prospects of project sustainability from four key angles: i) the level of country ownership of the project objective and the implementation process ii) the extent to which UNDP country priorities were reflected in the project iii) the factors affecting the sustainability of project results and iv) the catalytic impact of the project in promoting SLM. The findings indicate that sustainability is possible but that it needs continued support.

#### **3.5.1 Country ownership**

170. The GoL has been concerned about the degradation of the rangelands for a long time. Relevant policy documents date back to 1980 with the Range Management and Grazing Control Regulations and the 1985 Range Management Policy, which recognise the problem of land degradation and urging action on the issue, though the problem was that the rangelands remained under a communal tenure system, based on a historic assertion that access to land was a birth right in Lesotho. The Lesotho Constitution and Vision 2020 advocate for the protection of the natural and cultural environment, through the National Strategic Development Plan, which guides Vision 2020, does not contain much of a reflection of SLM principles.

171. The National Range Resources Management Policy was approved by Cabinet in 2014, after a process of more than two years of the draft policy sitting with Cabinet. Facilitation of the process to approve the policy was supported by the project. Next steps will be the development of legislation for its enforcement and application such as the revision of the Land Management Act and the Range Management and Grazing Control Regulations. This is an important policy because it establishes a three tier structure to guide the development of effective strategies to combat land degradation: National, district and community level grazing associations, as well as other measures such as harmonizing legislation and developing new instruments such as implementation of a payment for ecosystem services scheme. Nevertheless, at the time of project commencement (2010) there was no supporting policy for an approach of allocating user rights over grazing lands. It is unclear to what extent this affected the project outcomes.

172. The Project also supported the development of two other important policies: the CSIF and the draft soil and water conservation policy. The first was completed and was submitted to Ministry of Development Planning to be included in the national strategic development plan but is not embedded institutionally and needs further support to tie it into policy development in Lesotho, and the second is now with Cabinet for approval.

173. The SLM Country Team was an attempt to secure coordination on SLM issues with the ultimate objective of producing the CSIF. From the documentation, the SLM Country Team seems to have met three times. The follow-on (policy implementation) process is now needed.

174. The GoL is Party to several regional and international commitments such as the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UN Convention on Wetlands (RAMSAR); the UN Convention to Combat Desertification among others.

175. The level of co-financing support as an indicator of government commitment was a fraction of that committed at project approval stage (20%). Together with the lack of enabling policy at the start of the project suggests that there might have been limited support for this project overall. The lack of a Project Director in MFLR for much of the project also suggests a lack of strategic leadership. MFLR was fully represented at the PSC meetings.

176. The Project is well aligned to the mandate of UNDP in Lesotho, being aligned to areas such as capacity development, coordination and collaboration, and gender and in the CPD Focal Area 2: *Sound Environmental Management for Sustainable Development*, the Project was also well aligned to the intention to improve the governance of environmental issues and the establishment of an SLM model to improve livelihoods and resilience.

### **3.5.2 Mainstreaming results**

177. UNDP-supported GEF-financed projects should be aligned with UNDP country programming, and as such, the Objective and Outcomes of the project should align with UNDP country programme strategies.

178. UNDP country assistance priorities in Lesotho are set out in the current Country Programme Document (CPD), which is an integral part of the UN Lesotho Development Assistance Plan (LUNDAP) 2013-2017. The CPD responds to the LUNDAP OUTCOME #2: By 2017 Lesotho adopts environmental management practices that promote a low-carbon climate-resilient economy and society, sustainably manages natural resources and reduces vulnerability to disasters. The CPD programme strategy is to support Lesotho in addressing three key areas that lie at the core of the development challenge - *capacities, coordination and collaboration* - in each of the three pillars of sustainable development: economic, social and environmental.

179. *Capacity-development* is planned in the areas of skill development in leadership, collaboration, project management and technical skills; institutional transformation, with focus on strengthening organizational structures and

processes, performance and incentive systems; and (iii) system-wide enabling environment. *Coordination* will address inter-ministerial coordination and leadership on key government-wide initiatives, such as decentralization and climate change, as well as cross-cutting issues of HIV/AIDS, gender and disaster risk management; and wider stakeholder coordination across governance institutions, civil society and private sector. Supporting *collaborative* capacities will bring new consensus-building behaviours into forums dealing with contested issues, introducing and strengthening the use of tools for good process, such as stakeholder analysis and joint process design. Emphasis will be placed on addressing gender across all programmes.

180. The Project was well aligned to the mandate of UNDP in Lesotho, being aligned to areas such as capacity development, coordination and collaboration, and gender and in the CPD Focal Area 2: *Sound Environmental Management for Sustainable Development*, the Project was also well aligned to the intention to improve the governance of environmental issues and the establishment of an SLM model to improve livelihoods and resilience.

181. As discussed in section 3.3.1, a few positive results on the issue of the development of the SLM model and the development of enabling policies were achieved. More could have been achieved with better project design, a better management structure, and a better level of strategic planning. There is nothing in the documentary evidence about the effect of the project on capacity development, as the relevant indicators were taken out. And the gender issue does not seem to have been reflected in any of the planning documentation that were availed to the evaluators, which is a significant weakness in aligning this project to UNDP priorities, especially given that the gender-poverty gap seems to have widened in the Makhoalipane Community Council. Regarding environmental impacts (further explained in Section 3.6.1) the evidence is inconclusive with communities reporting increases in pasture lands, but the scientific information showing mixed results and lack of correlation between the presence of GAs and reversal of land degradation.

### **3.5.3. Sustainability impacts and drivers**

182. The main drivers of sustainability as put forward by the Project Document were i) effective range management governance models ii) political will to implement SLM and commitment to the decentralisation process iii) social acceptance and iv) financial resources to support the community management model.

183. The Project Document sets out the following factors that would ensure sustainability:



1. *The ecological sustainability will follow from the improved governance of communal rangelands.*

184. The results are inconclusive on the question of whether an improved governance model is in fact being implemented in the seven registered GAs supported by the project. Attribution of the environmental improvements (reflected in ecological measurements which are explained in Section 3.6) to the project is not justifiable in some cases as improvements were recorded even where community action was problematic. So there must be other factors influencing land degradation, though the studies did not attempt to explore the question.

2. *Institutional sustainability will require ongoing national policy and resource commitment to the new decentralized system of local government – which is judged likely given the resources and political capital that have already been invested in this system. It will require political will at local levels, too. Different interest groups must be convinced of the benefits they can achieve by collaborating with the new SLM and local government models rather than undermining them. One of this project's tasks will be to facilitate the emergence of this conviction.*

185. Sustainability is possible though not yet achieved. The project's premise was to strengthen community management of range resources, as key implementing partners of Community councils. This will require a long-term process of capacity development, which the project has made some headway on. The exit plan recommended that MFLR continue to support the communities and scale up its support to operationalizing and maintain community group structures and range management plans. The rangeland policy has been approved by Cabinet which includes important provisions for SLM which should strengthen the case for continuation of institutional support. Training at the national level was limited as was the involvement from other ministries to the PSC meetings, so it difficult to assert that this project has built capacities or political will for SLM. The original results framework had included two perception based indicators ('composite index' and a 'knowledge and attitude measurement tool') designed to reflect capacity development, but were taken out as they were deemed too difficult to monitor.

186. In the question of institutional sustainability, the evaluators would also add to this the ability of government to coordinate different stakeholder groups in the implementation of SLM, for which a mechanism beyond the project life was not established.

3. *The social sustainability of this project's outcomes is assured by the relative familiarity of the concept of group action by resource users in the environmental governance of their local landscapes. The social viability of this sort of initiative is promoted by Lesotho's comparative social homogeneity, and by the fact that women commonly serve as public representatives and office holders in local institutions for resource management and other kinds of local governance. The greatest social strain in the proposed initiatives will come from the declining role of*

*chiefs as they are replaced – legally, at least – by Community Councils. As MFLR and the MDTP have learned, sensitive facilitation and negotiation by field staff are necessary to assure social sustainability in such circumstances. This is a real but manageable challenge.*

187. Sustainability is possible but not yet achieved. Many IGAs are now being promoted and expanded by the communities themselves because they see the benefits of improved pasture but reports in the later years of project implementation still document cases of conflicts between chiefs and communities and the evaluators also heard of incidences where there was a lack of leadership for SLM by the Chiefs. Chiefs are part of the solution, they are not the problem. Ways need to be found to engage them constructively and to help better define their role, otherwise they will become obstructers. PIFs and coordination mechanisms like this should be supported, as mentioned in the exit strategy.

*4. The financial sustainability of the project's outcomes is assured by the very low recurrent cost implications of the anticipated SLM model. Resource user groups or associations can function with minimal infrastructure, being voluntary groups that meet and work in their own acknowledged self-interest. The model does depend on the financial sustainability of the entire new local government system, and specifically of the Community Councils under whose authority user groups would operate. Given the importance that the Government of Lesotho ascribes to the new system, this aspect of financial sustainability can be viewed with some confidence.*

188. Sustainability will need the government to continue to support this system, which seems plausible given the recent approval of the National Range Management Policy. The experience of the project is that recurrent costs have been high, but that is largely because of the decision to implement from Maseru. Difficult terrain and harsh winters have also meant that lengthy time is needed to set up functional GAs. With de-concentration of staff, it should be possible to keep costs lower, but that in itself will probably require a re-think of the incentives given to staff to relocate.

IGAs as subsistence models with low levels of local trading of produce can work well with the appropriate technical support. But expansion will require marketing infrastructure and capacity development, which will be costly.

189. The environmental risk comes from a break-down in the model (the GAs do not work in performing their role in range management) meaning that land degradation continues unabated. At the PIF Meeting held in November 2012, and noting that the project life will end in 2014, the way forward was mapped as follows:

1. Exchange visits between GA should continue;
2. Capacity building be done through training by extension staff;
3. Advanced GAs should assist newly formed GAs;
4. GAs' quarterly meetings should be budgeted for by MFLR, MoAFS and MoLG;

5. An umbrella structure for joint activities by all GAs be set up, and it should establish a fund for contributions by all GAs.

190. The essence of these messages were contained in the draft exit plan.

#### **3.5.4. Catalytic role**

191. The catalytic role of the Project can come about through the production of a public good, meaning the information or methods which can be implemented by others; the demonstration effects of the project to communities, technical staff and policy-makers; and the replication of the model through knowledge transfer (for example within GoL), trainings at the community level or the at the level of extension staff, with the ultimate effect of expansion of good practice. One can only conclude that the catalytic effect of the project was limited for a number of reasons: there seemed to be limited awareness by Government staff or in the communities of what the model was in the first place (beyond the constituent parts); the training programme was only partly implemented and there is no information on changes in perceptions or behaviours; and the information on replication beyond the Project boundaries is missing (even though one of the objective indicators set out to measure this).

### **3.6. Impact**

192. This section is divided into a discussion of environmental impact and impact on poverty, based on the extent to which the project targets were reached. The findings are inconclusive on both counts.

#### **3.6.1 Environmental impact**

193. The three main land degradation indicators are i) changes in the vegetative cover of rangelands, ii) changes in forage production and iii) changes in the species composition of the rangelands. Taking the land degradation indicators together, the findings are inconclusive. The environmental indicators appear to show that land degradation and biological productivity was reversed by some measures, but that some of this reversal may have been due to an increase in invader species. Forage production increased between 10% and 12% between 2010 and 2014, with the highest changes in areas that lack functional grazing associations, so there does not seem to be an apparent relationship between these changes and the SLM interventions. Rainfall may have also influenced results.

194. In 2010, the fraction of land covered by vegetation (a proxy indicator for land degradation) ranged from low to moderate 45.5-77%. The baseline study<sup>16</sup> showed that some areas (Nthapo, Hlabathe, Tsekiso, and Salemone) have a high level of degradation with vegetation cover of above 65%, and bare patches of soil occupying 28.5% of the land. In 2014, there was a fair amount of improvement in vegetation cover, ranging from 65-84.7% and bare patches of soil occupying 16% of the total area, which is indicative of high stability and low level of land degradation. This improvement in overall site stability is attributed by MFLR to a number of factors which include: establishment of grazing, development of new grazing management systems, and some rangeland rehabilitation measures such as removal of invasive plant species at Tšenekeng, as well as deferred grazing.

195. Percentages of rock and bare soil cover overall had certainly decreased - in a couple of places to nearly half - but in Nthapo the opposite is true, percentage of rock coverage increased from 2010 from 2.3% to 15% in 2014. A surprising result is that Ha Seng showed reductions in land degradation as measured by these two indices, yet it was one of the villages where the project was not able to make any progress. Another 2014 monitoring report also highlights an incongruity: the good performance of the Telle communities, especially Masienyane, seems to contradict the expectations that there should be a relationship between improved vegetation cover and the status of the GAs since all the GAs under formation in this area proved problematic. Therefore, there must be another explanation for the reduction in degradation in Ha Seng and the Telle communities.

196. Negative results were observed for the indicator on species composition.

**Decreaser species** were observed to dominate plant species and had the frequencies ranging between 28% and 45% (Fig. 7) whereas in current vegetation assessment **invaders species** seem to have high frequencies of 30%-45 %<sup>17</sup>. The observations are as follows:

Decreasers from 2010 to 2014:

- Mokolometsane: 32 to 7%
- Telle: 44 to 23%
- Semonkong: 28-12%

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<sup>16</sup> The team of six Range Resources Management technical staff from the Department of Range Resources Management Head Quarters and Maseru district carried out vegetation survey exercise. The survey involved the making of observations at permanent transects which were established in the 2010 vegetation survey.

<sup>17</sup> Excessive grazing on rangeland reduces or removes *desirable* perennial plants. This loss may indicate a decline in range condition. An improvement in range condition may be indicated by an increase in the density of desirable perennial plants (*Decreasers*) and/or a reduction in the density of undesirables (*Invaders*).

Invaders from 2010 to 2104

- Mokolometsane: 22 to 44%
- Telle: 14 to 33%
- Semonkong: 27-35%

197. The MFLR report also raises the possibility that the improvement in overall site stability may have resulted from high rainfall frequencies that have been experienced in recent years. Monitoring of rainfall trends and comparing this to the data on vegetation cover in multiple areas would help to attribute project results to behavioural change rather than the underlying rainfall trend.

198. In some places, the attribution of positive environmental impact to the project may not be justifiable as some communities such as Boreipala already had a grazing management system in place and good grazing quality.

### **3.6.2 Poverty reduction impact**

199. The results of the socio-economic survey undertaken in 2014 show that on average the situation in the SLM pilot project area is showing signs of poverty *increases* and the poverty gap getting wider. In 2014, the average income was M5720/household with 81% of households earning less than this and accounting for only 24% of total annual cash income. In 2010 average annual income was 14% higher at M6640; with 74% of households receiving less than average and accounting for 26% of total annual cash income. This decline in income status suggests that there are other influencing factors on the project communities. One might argue that the project somewhat attenuated the falls in income, but without a control group to compare the project group against it is impossible to say the effect that the project had on the socio-economic baseline.

200. There was no gender analysis or gender targeting carried out by the project yet the gender disparity is stark. In 2010 the average income for male headed households was M7023 and for female headed households it was 32% of this: M2240. In 2010, the difference was smaller. Male-headed household income was M7790 and female-headed household income was 52% of this: M4119. Poverty seems to be strongly associated with women and the gender gap is widening. The factors explaining the widening poverty gap should be understood in order to inform future programming in this area.

### 3.7. Results, monitoring and evaluation

201. Out of 18 Outcome indicators, 8 have been achieved, with 7 not achieved (though as explained below, 4 of these were always going to be unachievable) and a further 4 without conclusive evidence of achievement for various reasons. The project seems to have been most successful in delivering Objective and Outcome 1 targets, with weak results for Outcomes 2 and 3. On Outcome 2 the Project largely lost sight of the strategy in the Project Document and there were no indicators to track it.

202. Targets were over-ambitious and then scaled down to more realistic levels within the first year of implementation. By the end of 2010, an M&E consultant was hired to review the realism and attainability of the targets set in the original Project Document. The following targets were highlighted as problematic; a 50% increase above the socio-economic baseline score; a 25% increase in biological productivity; 75% score on Composite Index for SLM Enabling Environment; and % change in soil carbon content (Project inception report). Then at the second PSC the target on improvement for biodiversity indicators was also reduced to 5%. Soil erosion index as approved as a new indicator to replace soil carbon. Thus, the Results Framework changed substantially from the Project Document. Annex 4 compares the original indicators with the revised Results Framework.

203. The new targets were based on experience. The PM stated that the reduction of hectares from 250,000 to 40,000 hectares was based on findings from an assessment of past experiences in the country, specifically the USAID Range Management Programme of the 1980s and early 1990s.

204. The socio-economic (poverty reduction) index was reduced from 50% to 10%, based on recent experiences on poverty reduction in Lesotho. For instance, the Household Budget Survey (1994/95-2002/03) recorded a 10% improvement in the poverty level in eight years in a positive macro-economic environment. This constitutes a 5% average improvement over four years as a result of all government programming.

205. The change in biological diversity was revised to 10% from a target of 25%, based on the finding that the last reliable record of improvement, at Sehlabathebe 1983-1990, was reported to reach 6.5% in seven years. Similarly, the target for reduction in land degradation in pilot areas was reduced from 50% to 10%, based on the latest reporting from MFLR, which indicates negative coverage trends at established transects in planning/booking between 1996-2002 (57%-37%).

206. Regarding the results framework, there were too many indicators, some of which were outputs (deliverables) rather than outcomes (changes in development conditions). 22 indicators out of which four are outputs, leaving another 18 outcome

indicators, would make the monitoring system too costly. There was no monitoring and evaluation strategy to assess whether perception or utility based targets would have been met, which were in any case dropped from the results framework. Four of the indicators were not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound). This includes two of the indicators (Local council development plans having SLM content and fiscal plans to reflect SLM) which were always going to be out of reach as they were beyond the project scope. And the last indicator in Outcome 3 (percentage of national recurrent budget being dedicated to SLM) would have been difficult to attribute to the project, but was almost certainly unachievable as Outcome 3 outputs were delivered only in the last year of the project. All the above is to say that the results framework was disorganized and repetitive, and contained redundant and unachievable indicators that should have been discarded at the start of project implementation.

207. More broadly, the results framework did not reflect the underlying (unidentified yet somehow implicit) ToC. This represents a missed opportunity to generate monitoring data that would be useful to policy makers. It all starts with asking: what are the policy questions that need to be answered and how should this project be structured to answer them?

208. Targets that have been dropped entirely from project are as follows:

**Objective:** At national level, the country attains at least a 10% score on Composite Index for the SLM Enabling Environment against baseline as measured by policy changes, availability of finance resources to address SLM at national level, functionality of SLM institutions etc.

**Outcome 1:**

- 7 Community Councils collaborating effectively with user groups in their areas to implement SLM plans, these pilot models validated, and the approach is endorsed for national implementation.
- Government, NGO, bilateral and multilateral agencies are collaborating effectively in promoting SLM, which is better integrated into national environmental and development projects.

**Outcome 2:**

- A 25% increase in their scores on a knowledge and attitude measurement tool
- At least 5% of the target population benefiting from IGAs which are ready for extension to areas with similar NR management issues.

**Outcome 3:**

- National level policy on SLM either approved or planned

- The enhanced SLM models and techniques piloted by the project are central to the strengthened commitment to SLM that has been mainstreamed into the relevant policies, strategies and projects, as expressed in a National SLM Framework.
- The Lesotho SLM knowledge management network has been institutionalised so that it can continue to function without project resources.
- The network has completed a synthesis of SLM lessons learned and best practice.

209. There was an inadequate staffing on M&E with project staff allocated to this for less than half of the project duration, leaving UNDP to pick up the reins on this. This is not the role of UNDP, which would normally be in a support/ oversight role, unless there is an explicit agreement for UNDP to provide direct technical services, which should have been enshrined in a letter of agreement. Should this exist, it was not availed to the evaluators.

210. The agreement early on was that M&E should not cost more than 10% of the budget. Monitoring and evaluation was carried out by the MFLR as well as through international consultancies. There is no complete financial data to show what was actually spent partly because of the output costings for the MFLR does not exist.

211. The MTE was completed in February 2013 and then reported on in the 2013 PIR. However, beyond setting out the findings of the PIR, there was no explanation of how the recommendations were to be taken forward in the implementation plan going forward. The ratings provided by Project staff on the Development Objective and Implementation Progress did not reflect on the MTE findings. On a more positive note, PIR reports were discussed at the PSC meetings, which shows that the PIRs were treated as more than compliance tools; they were also viewed as management tools. Annual monitoring visits were carried out by UNDP as well as more frequent visit by MFLR staff and reports are available, but it is unclear from the PSC meetings whether these reports were discussed during the PSC meetings.



## 3.8 Project Ratings

212. Annex 1 contains the matrix which assesses progress against the project targets as well as providing achievement ratings for the project Objective and Outcomes. The summary ratings are as follows:

Table 12: Summary of project ratings

<b>Evaluation Ratings:</b>			
<b>1. Monitoring and Evaluation</b>	<i>rating</i>	<b>2. IA&amp; EA Execution</b>	<i>rating</i>
M&E design at entry	U	Quality of UNDP Implementation	MS
M&E Plan Implementation	MU	Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	MU
<b>Overall quality of M&amp;E</b>	<b>MU</b>	<b>Overall quality of Implementation / Execution</b>	<b>MS</b>
<b>3. Assessment of Outcomes</b>	<i>rating</i>	<b>4. Sustainability</b>	<i>rating</i>
Relevance	R	Financial resources:	ML
Effectiveness	MS	Socio-political:	MU
Efficiency	U	Institutional framework and governance:	ML
<b>Overall Project Outcome Rating</b>	<b>MS</b>	Environmental :	ML
		<b>Overall likelihood of sustainability:</b>	<b>ML</b>
<b>Impact</b>			
Environmental Stress Reduction	M		
Poverty reduction	M		
<b>Progress towards stress/status change</b>	<b>M</b>		
<b>Overall project results</b>	<b>MS</b>		

Table 1. rating Scales

<b>ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, m&amp;E, I&amp;E Execution</b>  <b>6: Highly Satisfactory (HS):</b> The project had no shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness, or efficiency  <b>5: Satisfactory (S):</b> There were only minor shortcomings  <b>4: moderately Satisfactory (mS):</b> there were moderate shortcomings  <b>3. moderately Unsatisfactory (mU):</b> the project had significant shortcomings  <b>2. Unsatisfactory (U):</b> there were major shortcomings in the achievement of project objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness, or efficiency  <b>1. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):</b> The project had severe shortcomings	<b>Sustainability ratings:</b>  <b>4. Likely (L):</b> negligible risks to sustainability  <b>3. moderately Likely (mL):</b> moderate risks  <b>2. moderately Unlikely (mU):</b> significant risks  <b>1. Unlikely (U):</b> severe risks	<b>relevance ratings:</b>  <b>2. relevant (r)</b>  <b>1. Not relevant (Nr)</b>  <b>Impact ratings:</b>  <b>3. Significant (S)</b>  <b>2. minimal (m)</b>  <b>1. Negligible (N)</b>
<i>Additional ratings where relevant:</i> Not Applicable (N/A) Unable to Assess (U/A)		

## 4. Conclusions

213. On Outcome 1, it is difficult to judge whether a ‘new’ governance model was in fact piloted as well-functioning grazing associations have existed in some areas for years, and the Chiefs continue the control grazing in the way they traditionally have. The innovation of the model probably comes in in the work undertaken to base the grazing plans and permits on measured environmental conditions. Whether in fact this transpired in the day-to-day to management of rangelands was not evident from the reports, in other words we cannot say whether the intention was actually followed through. In addition, there is a paucity of information relating to the effectiveness of efforts to reduce livestock numbers or to produce fodder. The other area of innovation seems also to be the establishment of the IGAs which provided another driver for communities to bind together as a group. Therefore, on the question of whether this project identified a new governance model for range resources management, the answer is probably no, but that success of the model (which was pre-existing in some areas) in environmental and social terms may have been made more likely through those two innovations.

214. Empowered participation by communities in range management is important to ensure that the rules are set fairly for all, are understood by the communities as being fair for all and enforced. But grazing control in the Lesotho context of the many villages, cattle, and pressures on land use is extremely complicated as the grazing plans show and an authority to provide overall coordination, arrive at operational

consensus and enforce the rules is needed. The traditional system of chiefs seems to be as strong as it always has been, but there is no operational alternative today. The system of local government still needs considerable efforts to build up to make it effective. Changing the balance of power does seem to be happening slowly. But for now, Chiefs should be co-opted constructively to avoid their becoming obstructers of change.

215. The link between the GAs/user groups and reversal of land degradation is inconclusive. On the one hand, a range of communities reported better pastures from the brush control activities. On the other hand, the scientific information shows that the correlation between pasture improvement and the presence of the GAs is weak. There may be other factors to explain the incongruence that is not being captured such as mismatch between the areas where the transects were placed and the pasture areas referred to by communities.

216. Given the supposed link between the effective working of the GAs and SLM in the rangelands, it may be too soon to say whether the project succeeded or failed in its ultimate objective of improving SLM. This is because GAs take time to settle in and because of dynamic and unpredictable forces such as the willingness of the communities themselves to take up the responsibility of continuing with range management and IGAs. The indications are that provision of institutional support in facilitating PIFs and inclusive, participatory trainings as well as supporting the IGAs would most likely accelerate this process of social cohesion with resultant positive environmental impacts. The point is made eloquently by the review of donor initiatives (2010):

*“This would seem to be the fate of many SLM projects in Lesotho; the gathering of management information and the establishment of the relationships of trust with community stakeholders takes such a long time and shows such a paucity of concrete results that donor financing disappears precisely at the point where the groundwork has been laid for meaningful progress to be made”.*

#### **4.1 Strengths**

217. There are promising elements of innovation that, if nurtured and replicated, could offer some positive lessons learned, such as the conflict mediation workshop and the Project Implementation Forums. These need to be institutionalized and developed further in order that they may develop their full potential in the advancement of the participatory management and planning processes. The mapping exercises to establish environmental conditions as the basis of the grazing management plans was pioneering and provides experience of how to do this which is relevant to one of the four objectives of the new Range Management Policy which is to ensure availability and access to information on the rangeland situation.

218. Some surprising but welcome unintended consequences came about, such as the pooling of own resources by communities following on from project support, and the creation of connected groups. Even with the failure of some of the IGAs, communities were willing to invest their own resources into trying again.

219. There are some interesting advancements on Outcome 3 on policy development. But the main SLM policy, the CSIF, needs institutional embedding if it is not remain a strategy on paper. Follow-on work is urgently needed. The recommendation on creating an institutional body for SLM interests seems particularly relevant to Lesotho and the inter-connectedness between its economic and environmental challenges.

## **4.2 Weaknesses**

220. There was a lack of well-understood model at the field level and centrally which led in many cases to the disengagement of stakeholders. This can be seen from the lack of leadership by the Chiefs in many of the incipient GAs as well as the continuing conflicts. The lack of clarity ultimately undermined project implementation progress. A better understanding of how the training Outcome fit into the model (beyond imparting knowledge) could have shaped a better inclusive approach to be taken between the Chiefs, Councillors and Communities. .

221. There is scant information on the scale of activity, not to mention effectiveness, related to reduction of livestock (increasing off-take), introduction of improved livestock varieties or supplementary feeding, yet these elements would be critical in developing achievable rotational grazing plan, which would be a determinant of potential effectiveness. This is symptomatic of a lack of workable project strategy (ToC), leading to the project focusing on parts of the 'system' without a plausible way of connecting these parts to deliver the project objective.

222. Service delivery to communities was weak mainly due to a lack of coordination between the MFLR and MoAFS and the lack of a consistent presence in the field. If the GAs are to work, which requires a dual strategy of community empowerment and development of mutual understanding and trust between all actors, they will need continued and consistent support and facilitation.

223. The work streams on policy engagement, national level trainings, toolkit development, knowledge management and strategy communications would have benefitted from stronger, unified concept. Meaningful capacity development was not achieved by the project at the Central government level and results fell far short of the vision and intention of the project strategy as contained in the Project Document. The work under Outcome 1 to develop the model may have

overwhelmed the time availability of the project team to manage the other aspects of the project.

224. The findings suggest that management efficiency was low for a variety of reasons including under-staffing of the management team, poor project design leading to time-intensive project re-design, a lack of strategic planning; implementation from Maseru making support to communities expensive and not very effective; lack of delegation of activities to competent agencies; and lack of coordination of extension services at the community level.

## 5. Recommendations

225. 14 recommendations are put forward organised in five areas: i) Promoting better coordination and collaboration between ministries; ii) Improving the performance of ministry staff; iii) SLM Policy development iv) Developing the range management governance model; and v) Improving management efficiency.

226. The first three recommendations are to do with ways to promote better coordination and collaboration between ministries which have interests in SLM for the ultimate objective of better service delivery and policy implementation to the communities. The fourth and fifth recommendations are about ways to promote better performance of ministry staff. The sixth, seventh and eighth recommendations are around the inter-connected issues of policy development, data and learning from experience to ensure that future investments build knowledge and experience in order to advance the implementation of SLM. The ninth to twelfth recommendations are about ways in which the governance model can be developed further. And the 13th to 14th recommendations are focused on improvement of budget control with respect to SLM which will ultimately lead to improved project design and implementation effectiveness.

### Promoting better coordination and collaboration between ministries

**1. Constitute a Strategic Investment Programme Board.** It is clear that better ways must be found to engage other ministries for cross-government learning and strengthened policy making. The CSIF's primary recommendation is to legally establish a Programme Investment Board as the key inter-sectoral coordination mechanism at central government level. Competitive recruitment processes could be used to identify seconded staff from a range of ministries, with the aim of developing a cross-ministerial team for joint-working, better coordination and leadership. An additional feature would be to work together with the Ministry of Economic Development & Planning, with the latter in a leadership, convening role and the SLM Board in a Secretariat function, to enable policy and investment linkages of SLM to wider economic planning, for example, in issues around market access.

**2. Establish a programmatic approach to dual-focused project steering committee meetings.** This would be another way to strengthen cross-government collaboration and learning on SLM-relevant initiatives. Ministries would come together to discuss the strategy, intended results, implementation challenges and possible solutions for a range of projects. Attendance would be incentivised through opportunities for learning and cross learning. Expert speakers could be invited. New proposals could be discussed. In essence, day 1 would be dedicated to a results-based substantive discussion. Separate, management/logistical discussions could be taken on a separate day by the project Implementing Partner. The results-based

discussion could conceivably be convened by the SLM investment board and/or the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning.

**3. Incentivising ministry staff to work with the project** through non-monetary incentives, given the limitations present in civil service salary pay-scales and difference in relation to private sector market rates. These non-market incentives could be especially important to offer as a reward to technical staff willing to move to the field for a period of time. These non-monetary incentives could, for example be:

- Good standard of accommodation in the field.
- Professional learning. If this could be applied to the project, the project officer gets a double reward with regards to an updated qualification plus applied work experience. Examples could be GIS training, monitoring and evaluation; project management, contract management and so on.
- Exposure and learning opportunities through connections to international conferences. This could be facilitated through research links to higher learning institutions.

This strategy should be considered a sustainability strategy as institutional support makes or breaks a project. Therefore, it would be justifiable to put funds and time aside (3 to 6 months) for this kind of professionalization. The issue of attrition of well qualified staff from government is a real one but that should not matter if the talent stays in the country.

#### Improving the performance of ministry staff

**4. Consider how ministry staff time is used.** A greater de-concentration of ministry staff would deliver better support services to communities and help to support continuation of these GAs. Given obvious limitations in numbers of staff available, more time to institutional support would mean less time to the production of technical reports, which can be contracted out to the private sector. Sub-contracting to the private sector on issues of construction is likely to work better based on the principle of payment on delivery (and where requirements for apprenticeships can be written into the contract). This essentially means a change of role to a more facilitative, supervisory role, which is likely to need skills development, for example on conflict management and contract management skills.

**5. Develop training standards for communities.** This would comprise standardised training materials, Standard Operating Principles for organising these such as where best to hold the training events, how to develop a blended service mix of formal training and farmer-to-farmer learning and evaluation methodologies.

#### SLM Policy development

**6. Use the CSIF as a platform to mainstream SLM** in the next iteration of the National Strategic Development Plan, which is due to end in 2016/7. The starting point would be putting in place a process for institutional coordination, for which there are two possibilities and one recommendation in the CSIF. In addition, the CSIF contains a schedule of activities, some of which could serve to build awareness and political will to support the new National Range Resources Management Policy.

**7. Policy needs should frame the efforts on knowledge management and project data monitoring.** This needs attention from the very start. What are the needs and what is the strategy? It is suggested that sub-contracting responsibility for managing this work to a policy specialist would be necessary in order to draw in the necessary expertise and in order for the policy component to receive the necessary attention from the start. This would enable a stronger link to be made between detailed design and field implementation, results and policy processes, thereby helping to maximise the project's relevance to GoL. This work stream would also provide a useful framework for the monitoring system (see recommendation below), which should include metrics for capacity development. It is common for Parliamentarians to be dropped from the project focus in relation to the main project priorities because of time constraints, they are an important group to factor into a policy engagement strategy because of their role in progressing the democratic principle and to create national visibility and debate for SLM. Getting an adequate management team in place from the start is an investment in project success.

**8. Structure the monitoring exercise from the point of view of the policy questions that need answering** in order keep the exercise contained, focused and cost effective. For example, is the governance model working in achieving a sustainable model for rangeland management and what would be the indicators to measure this (see point 6 above). What are the most cost-effective ways of halting soil erosion and rehabilitating gullies? Another policy question of relevance could be the use of trees for soil stabilisation as well as providing other co-benefits such as fruit production, fuel wood and shelter, paying due regard to the tree species in question and possible impacts on water resources. The effect of climate change on rangeland condition as well as the effectiveness of range management systems in the face of this changing risk should be included.

Monitoring would also need to shed light on the underlying theory of change and monitoring the assumptions underlying it. For example, will grazing fees lead to improved quality of rangelands? Do income generating activities improve rangeland quality and justify the investment from this angle or any other? Will paid incentives be needed for communities to spend time on brush control? The IGAs were seen by some as a compensation to engage in SLM activities – is the causal link justified by the evidence? Will paid incentives be desirable from the point of view other rangeland management functions such as condition monitoring? The role of gender



differences and different impacts on women and men should be central line of enquiry given the wide gender disparity in Lesotho.

The UNCCD indicator monitoring study estimated the costs of sampling UNCCD indicators (land cover, grazing capacity, livestock numbers, plant and animal biodiversity, aridity index, carbon stocks above and below ground, land under SLM and population below the poverty line) as being M14, 250.000 per sampling occasion for an area of 50km assuming 3 to 4 members in a team working for 28 days average per year. This is therefore a costly exercise. Experimenting with different models such as the range riders' concept would be useful in finding cost-effective ways of carrying out the monitoring. The monitoring system developed could try as far as possible to involve communities. It should be approached from an experimental perspective to keep the enquiry objective and open to all ideas.

#### Developing the range management governance model

**9. Develop evaluative case studies** on the different models under operation and success factors, in order to inform policy decisions on the choice of implementation strategies regarding range management. Successful governance models have already been developed and are being implemented, such as in LHDA project. An evaluative case study approach to exploring why some rangeland management systems work well and others do not would be an important input into designing future initiatives as well as identifying key indicators to measure progress such as membership numbers. Given the wide gender disparities, the different roles of men and women and impacts on men and women should be explored.

**10. Support the continuation of the district-level project implementation forums** which have had good feedback in bringing all relevant parties together. These could be an important mechanism to provide communities with an additional avenue for voice and accountability and to provide a platform for Community Councillors to begin to build a profile. Councillors should be supported to use these fora to begin the process of developing local development plans as well as to enforce the newly approved Rangeland Management policy. These could be important mechanisms to begin carving out new roles for chiefs. Empowering communities may ultimately not be sufficient to break away from the traditional model without a parallel effort to build local government authority and mandate on local development planning processes.

**11. Develop an engagement strategy with the Chiefs** since they are a critical part of the range management system while the new system of democratic governance phases in, which could be a 10 year medium term prospect. Even with a well-functioning local government system, it will be important to carve out a niche role for the chiefs as they are likely to continue commanding the loyalty of the communities. It is likely that more support for the changing development planning system can be

secured from the Chiefs if they see themselves as moving with the change, rather than being left behind.

**12. Community empowerment is part of the solution.** Farmer to farmer learning blended with more conventional training should be continued because it is through capacity development that faith in alternative management methods, and in particular quantitative measurements of environmental conditions can be accepted as the basis for range management planning. In addition, motivation to participate in monitoring exercises can be fostered. Vandalism rates may decline if communities see the range management efforts as something to benefit all. IGAs may have more value in the empowerment sense (in the short-term) than in relation to reducing pressure on the resources. Supporting CSOs and NGOs would be central to this, perhaps by engaging them in areas where they are already working.

#### Improving management efficiency

**13. Develop cost-output benchmarks that can be used for budget planning and control.** For example, how much institutional support (this needs definition) is needed to get a GA working well (this needs definition)? What is the cost of monitoring of 10 hectares of rangeland? What is the cost of carrying out 1 hectare brush control comparing different alternatives? A better understanding of costs (and benefits) of different implementation strategies can inform project design and ultimately lead to better value for money implementation as well as better results.

**14. Training workstreams** should be sub-contracted to professional training organisations, working closely to develop the materials and the training plan, possibly by establishing a partnership with the Lesotho Institute of Public Administration. By professionalising the task, it would be possible to establish quality standards and to develop methodologies to measure capacity development.

## 6. Lessons learned

1. The basis for project design should be a theory of change so that a clear strategy for connecting and sequencing outputs to deliver the intended targets is developed. This requires understanding clearly the policy questions that the project needs to address at the correct level of intervention. This project set out to address the land degradation problem *via* the mechanism of community-owned range management processes, but the problems with the currently operating systems were never really identified preventing the emergence of a unified concept and the effective targeting of the project resources. The lack of a properly thought out concept was one of the main reasons for the underachievement of the project.
2. Using existing information will help to design better projects and avoid re-design once implementation starts, which is costly in management time. If design is based on experience, identifying SMART indicators should be easy to do. For example, harsh winters and difficult terrain are known quantities in Lesotho, and there is documented evidence that it takes a minimum of three years to set up a GA, which experience on this project supports. Benchmarks for output delivery had already been set by other projects, for example what it costs to support 20,000 hectares of land under SLM. These were known quantities yet the project design was wildly optimistic in the way it had set its targets, setting up the project to fail.
3. Change processes are likely to entail backward as well as forward movements, it takes time but the trajectory may eventually be one of progress. Patient investment is needed as well as a commitment for continuous support and supervision. Though it is likely to take specialist skills such as conflict management, much can be done to avoid conflict in the first place by designing an effective consultative process. For example, experiences in Lesotho show that trainings that bring together different parties (Chiefs, Communities including herders, Community Councillors) and are carried out in a participatory manner can play a vital role in promoting coordination, mutual understanding and improving community relations.
4. The IGAs seem to have been instrumental in promoting community cohesion and may therefore be considered as an integral part of a community-based range management strategy. Communities have shown a willingness and ability to pool funds together to expand or re-start (where previously efforts had failed) the IGAs, showing that lack of credit need not be a barrier to starting up small enterprises. The bigger immediate barrier is technical know-how and management skills, as well as the need for integrated service delivery on veterinary services. For longer-term growth potential, access to credit and markets will be a constraint that will need attention.
5. The model was widened in 2013 to include conservation agriculture (CA) for some communities. Given the emerging importance of agriculture in the rangelands and its

influence on environmental system dynamics, it seems to make sense to include it in future range management schemes.

6. It is well understood that communities need to see benefits accruing to them from their investment of time in group range management schemes. But whether the group management schemes work on the basis of voluntary time is also a question of relative benefits, recognising that there is an opportunity cost of time. Time spent on brush control is less time spent growing food for subsistence or time spent on income generating activities. There are other models under implementation, such as the cash for work scheme for herder boys (a figure of the equivalent of \$83 for 20 days was mentioned) and the range rider model (voluntary). These alternatives should be monitored to assess the extent of their effectiveness in brush control, as well as any other benefits which may arise.

7. The project demonstrates that an effective capacity building approach for changing practice is the interchange between farmers. Study tours between villages were perceived by farmers interviewed as most effective for learning and sharing new technologies and innovations for changing their current practices and for the community organization work. These should be encouraged and supported by MFLR.

8. The management team was too thinly spread and this negatively affected project results. For half of the project life, there was only one PM to lead the management, deal with the routine logistical issues and coordinate the technical aspects of the project. A technical adviser working on a project that is trying to pilot innovations and promote a learning process is essential. Technical inputs are required for guiding the project strategy, to guide consultants producing technical reports, and connect the technical information to the implementation process. Specialist technical input would free up time for the project manager to manage. Implementation would also have worked better had a policy specialist been recruited to provide direction to the M & E (from a policy needs perspective), strategic communications, and the training programme which are all means to achieving policy shifts. Getting an adequate management team in place to cover all bases may be seen as costly, but with the right people in place, it is an investment in project success.

9. Implementation would have worked better had it been based on a meaningful partnership model, delegating authority to competent agencies within and outside the private sector where it makes sense to (ie where the expertise and experience lies). This would also have incentivized more meaningful participation of other ministries in the PSC meetings. The role of government in this area of work is best served in a facilitative and supervisory role, setting standards, coordinating and promoting dialogue.

10. Work to implement the GA system should be carried out from the field in order to make the funds go further and crucially, to provide a better service to communities. Delays in placing of Government extension staff in the project area to train and guide the association members was a challenge, and was acknowledged in project reports as being an oversight in the design of the project which ultimately affected implementation progress. This can be seen clearest in what must be concluded to the woeful performance of the water harvesting tanks for irrigation, though the contributing factor was that the appropriate partner, MoAFS, was not engaged to lead on this activity, ultimately sealing the fate of this activity.

11. The MTE was carried too late to maximize its utility to the project. The MTE was *initiated* at mid-point (in May 2012) but was not completed until February 2013, which left the project with less than a year to implement the recommendations. With a further seven months to complete a technical audit, this left less than 4 months to implement the recommendations (according to original closure timing) and a fraction of the budget remaining. MTEs are more than a compliance requirement, they can be very helpful in steering the project to help it reach its objective, but they need to be initiated well in advance. The leakage of funds to pay for a high level of per diem rates (linked to the poor decision to implement from Maseru) should have triggered the MTE much sooner.

12. The land degradation issue in Lesotho needs a sustained, longer-term effort that approaches the problem from an integrated systems perspective. This means that it requires the effective inputs from a multi-disciplinary team of implementing partners to work in their respective expertise and ideas, calling for effective coordination. The disciplines that SLM needs to cover include agriculture, livestock management, veterinary services, energy, water, marketing, economics, institutional development, training, and transport. This implies the need for larger programmatic projects. Small budgets can still be useful but should be focused on delivering results in niche areas with working connections to the bigger whole.

## Annex 1: Matrix for Assessment of Progress Towards Results

**Project GOAL: Sustainable land management provides a strong base for sustainable development and ecosystem restoration in Lesotho to support better livelihoods and provide a range of global environmental benefits**

Objective/Outcome	Performance Indicator	2009 Baseline Level	End of project target	2014 End-of-Project Status	Terminal evaluation comments	Overall rating
Objective: Supported by a knowledge management network, Lesotho begins to alleviate poverty, achieve more sustainable livelihoods and deliver global environmental benefits on the basis of enhanced local and national techniques, approaches, capacity and strategy for upscaling successful SLM.	<b>End of project targets</b>					MS
	By project end point, at least 50% of the project pilot area registers reduction in land degradation of 10%			Achieved	Reversals in land degradation have been recorded but attribution to the project is uncertain. In some cases, the improvements have been seen in areas where the community groups have not worked or worked effectively.	
	By project end point, at least 50% of the project pilot area registers an increase in biological productivity of 10%			Achieved		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At the project level, the at least 10% increase over the baseline on social and economic indicators for households, such as diversification of incomes, reduction in poverty index, reduction in food vulnerability, etc.</li> </ul>			Uncertain.	Assessment shows an increase in poverty through for the area as a whole, not necessarily the project communities.	

Objective/Outcome	Performance Indicator	2009 Baseline Level	End of project target	2014 End-of-Project Status	Terminal evaluation comments	Overall rating
<b>Outcome 1: : Proven, strengthened, participatory, replicable models and techniques that successfully overcome current institutional and governance barriers to SLM, strengthen country partnerships and integrate SLM into country projects are ready for national implementation.</b>	1. Hectares of land under SLM	There has been limited piloting of models and techniques and limited discussion of their potential. But they are not yet widely known or sustainable, and the significant new potential of Community Councils as resource management institutions is threatened by uncertainty about how they will operate on the ground. There are few effective partnerships	By the end of PY 3, at least 40,000 ha under direct SLM (project pilot area).  By project end point, at least 80,000 ha impacted by up-scaling.	Achieved  Uncertain	The seven registered GAs have hectares of land that probably come close to the 40,000 hectare project target(see Table 7). But the data on the quality of range management is patchy and there are indicators from one GA (Ha Seng) that range management activity was below what was expected.  Nothing is known about the additional 40,000 ha outside the project boundary.	

Objective/Outcome	Performance Indicator	2009 Baseline Level	End of project target	2014 End-of-Project Status	Terminal evaluation comments	Overall rating
	2. An SLM model formulated, tested in pilot area and ready for upscaling to the rest of the country (with similar resources and resource management issues);	between government, bilateral and multilateral agencies in promoting SLM, which is poorly integrated into national environmental and development projects. There are few IGAs in the mountain Districts and almost no concerted effort at testing and refining them.	By the end of PY 3, at least one community NRM institution has been created with devolution of management functioning and institutionally robust.  By project end point, community NRM institutions functional across the project pilot area.	Groups formed and appear to be working collectively on range management.  Same as above	Indicator is not SMART, eg what does 'robust' mean? What does devolution of management functioning' mean? The Chief still controls grazing. Target was set too low. No documented information on they are working in practice and whether the balance of power has changed between chiefs, communities, ministries and community councils. However, communities report positive results.  The second indicator is similar to the first.	<b>MS</b>
<b>Outcome 2 Adequate local and national capacity in place and is adapting and scaling up proven SLM</b>	1. Innovative assessment tools used for land management	Several Ministries, parastatals, projects and NGOs are committed to upscaling effective SLM models and techniques; their combined human	By the end of PY 2, an assessment of the technical tools being used for land management in Lesotho has been conducted and recommendations made for updating where required.	Assessments made but unclear as to whether they are being used for range management.	Indicator is not SMART: specific, measureable, and time-bound.	<b>MU</b>



Objective/Outcome	Performance Indicator	2009 Baseline Level	End of project target	2014 End-of-Project Status	Terminal evaluation comments	Overall rating
<b>models and techniques</b>	2. SLM information is disseminated to policy makers	and operational resources are substantial. But, despite GOL decentralisation and policy statements, these resources and commitments are fragmented and ineffective and there is no plan to integrate them around an SLM strategy.	By the end of PY 3, at least two dissemination sessions have taken place spreading SLM success stories within Lesotho	Achieved	There is an overlap between the first two indicators. The National Dialogue was the main dissemination session. Others have been the Project Implementation Fora and the model development workshops.	
			By the end of PY 3, a National Dialogue has been convened and the importance of the promotion of SLM has been acknowledged by relevant stakeholders.	Not achieved	The first of these two indicators is for output delivery not a change in development outcomes.  There are two parts to the second indicator: the first is an output, the second part is the changed development condition. On the latter, we do not have any measured information on whether political will towards SLM has changed. One dialogue is not usually enough to build political will to make changes.	
	Parliamentarians engaged		By the end of PY 3, Parliamentarians have begun to create national visibility of SLM expenditures and advocate for increases.	Not achieved	There was no work undertaken with Parliamentarians	
	3. Increased understanding and capacity among stakeholders to promote SLM		By project end point, technical personnel, resource users and NGOs understand and promote SLM in their day to day activities	Uncertain	Quantitative indicators measuring capacity development were dropped from the project. No measurement were therefore taken.	

Objective/Outcome	Performance Indicator	2009 Baseline Level	End of project target	2014 End-of-Project Status	Terminal evaluation comments	Overall rating
<b>Outcome 3:</b> Lesotho adopts a programmatic approach to SLM - The enhanced awareness, dialogue, understanding and analysis of SLM best practice at resource user, community, local government, NGO and national government levels across the country, is reflected in strengthened, synergistic, multisectoral policies, strategies and projects that achieve an integrated approach to natural resource management.	Government coordination on SLM improved	Many people are aware of good SLM techniques and practices, but the knowledge base is scattered and fragmented and more technical than strategic. There is no SLM knowledge management network in Lesotho, so no structure through which awareness and understanding can be spread and enhanced. Policies, strategies and projects refer to technical SLM measures without explaining adequately the institutional and governance frameworks	By the end of PY 3, an inter-sectoral mechanism for the coordination of SLM activities has been established and is functional.	Achieved	Stakeholder coordination happened in the context of the development of the CSIF as well as in regular PSC meetings. The CSIF recommends two options for coordination, The policy now needs to be implemented.	<b>MS</b>
	Knowledge coming out of the project is being actively managed for policy benefits.		By the end of PY 3, a Knowledge Management Strategy for SLM finalised.  By project end point, SLM Knowledge Management System institutionalised and functional.	Not achieved	There were a few knowledge products produced but nothing that could be a knowledge management system.  The first of these two indicators is an output, not a change in development conditions (outcome).	
	3. National policies and development strategies revised to reflect SLM principles (PRSP, Agricultural policy, NAP, etc.).		1.By the end of PY 2, SLM integrated into at least 2 government sectoral policies.  2.By the end of PY 3, SLM integrated into one national-level planning document.  3.By project end point, SLM is integrated into Maseru District plan or inputs	Achieved  Not achieved  Not achieved	Only the first target has been reached. Two policies were supported by the project, one of which has been approved by Cabinet, the other which is in draft form.  Target 2: The National development plan (2012-2016) makes no mention of SLM, but that is as expected as it was produced before the project started implementation on Outcome 3.	

Objective/Outcome	Performance Indicator	2009 Baseline Level	End of project target	2014 End-of-Project Status	Terminal evaluation comments	Overall rating
		through which these measures can be achieved. There is no programmatic approach to mainstreaming SLM and no strategic investment framework for SLM	<p>provided for next planning window opportunity.</p> <p>4.By project end point, at least 15% of Community Council activities have SLM content or relevance.</p> <p>5.By project end point, at least 5% of Community Council funding is dedicated to SLM.</p> <p>6.By project end point, at least 0.6% of recurrent national budget is SLM related.</p>	<p>Not achieved</p> <p>Not achieved</p> <p>Unlikely</p>	<p>Targets 4 and 5: The project did not focus on the Community Council development planning process so targets 4 and 5 were beyond reach from the start. It is unclear why there were included in the RF.</p> <p>Target 6 is unachieved, not least because SLM does not appear in the National Development Plan which in principle would allocate budgets to policy priorities. There is also the question of the data collection methodology that would have been needed (but was absent) to track this indicator in order to verify whether the target had indeed been reached. Lastly, the target is not worded as a change due to the project; the 0.6% dedicated to SLM could have been argued to have been in place in the baseline.</p>	

## Annex 2: Semonkong land use mappings, rotational grazing plan, sustainable grazing calculations, and the summer grazing cattle post

Figure A2.1: Ha Phallang and Ha Sechache current land use.







Figure A2.2: Tšenekeng current land use



**Figure A.3: Grazing Management Plan for Ha Phallang and Ha Sechache**



**Figure A.4: Grazing Management Plan for Tšenekeng**



**Table A2.1: The Attributes of Grazing areas in terms of size (area), average yield, carrying capacity and Grazing Duration**

<b>THABA-PUTSOA</b>	<b>GRAZING AREA</b>	<b>AREA (ha)</b>	<b>Average Yield (KG)</b>	<b>TOTAL USABLE FORAGE (KG/HA/YEAR)</b>	<b>CARRYING CAPACITY (AU/HA/YEAR)</b>	<b>CARRYING CAPACITY MONTH/AU/Ha</b>	<b>Grazing Duration</b>
	Mphatsoenyane	1608	483.4	777348	234	1919	0.3
	Litelaneng	305	620.8	189354	57	468	4.1
	‘Makhoalipana	1380	271.1	374057.2	112.6	924	0.8
	Thaba Putsoa	466	258.8	120621.8	36.31	298	0.1
	Hlobola	1535	616.8	946770	285	2338	7.4
	Matsoku	2605	593.0	1544730	465	3814	6.7
	Sesene	2619	336.1	880330	265	2174	0.2
	‘Mamanong	2531	374.1	946770	285	2338	1.7
	Seleso	1073	820.4	880330	265	2174	1.9
	Ketane	3808	339.4	1292258	389	3191	2.3
<b>HA PHALLANG</b>	Ha Moqibi	427	148	63196	14.4	156	1.3
	Phoqane	945	148	139860	31.9	345	2.9
	Khoshane	425	148	62900	14.4	155	1.1
	Nchochoane	781	148	115588	26.4	285	2.7
<b>HA SECHACHE</b>	Masuoaneng	131	111.1	14554.1	3.3	36	0.8
	Khoiting	403	111.1	44773.3	10.2	111	1.8
	Lithabaneng	337	111.1	14554.1	3.3	156	1.4
	Ha Ralinomoro	288	111.1	31996.8	7.3	79	0.4
	Khohlong	69	111.1	7665.9	1.8	19	0.1
	Ha Masia	127	111.1	14109.7	3.2	35	0.2
	Malinoka	118	111.1	13109.8	3.0	32	0.3
	Ha Liphapang	312	111.1	34663.2	7.9	86	0.5
	Mabenkele	172	111.1	19109.2	4.4	47	1.0
	Nakeli	54	111.1	5999.4	1.4	15	0.1
	Matlakeng	21	111.1	2333.1	0.5	6	0.3
	Mabenkele	94	111.1	10443.4	2.4	26	0.1
<b>TŠENEKENG</b>	Boropa Pere	217	104.4	22654.8	5.2	56	1.3
	Letsa le Moleka	191	104.4	19940.4	4.6	49	0.7
	Tsenekeng	111	104.4	11588.4	2.6	29	0.6
	Tonamela	89	104.4	9291.6	2.1	23	0.4
	Nokeng ea Tsekane	154	104.4	16077.6	3.7	40	0.8
	Phuleng e nyane	56	104.4	5846.4	1.3	14	0.2
	Phuleng e Kholo	363	104.4	37897.2	8.7	94	1.2
	Masimong a Letlapeng	135	104.4	14094	3.2	35	0.6



	Rasefale	258	104.4	26935.2	6.1	67	0.9
	Mapuli	24	104.4	2505.6	0.6	6	0.1
	Makeneng	87	104.4	9082.8	2.1	22	0.4
	Letsoapong	150	104.4	15660	3.6	39	0.4
	Torong	69	104.4	7203.6	1.6	18	0.1
	Motjoli	175	104.4	18270	4.2	45	0.3



Figure A2.5: Thaba-Putsoa cattlepost area, with the adjacent cattlepost areas





Figure A2.6: Summer Grazing Areas for project areas



## Annex 3: SLM Institutional Arrangement Overview



## Annex 4: Results framework at project start and project end

	Prodoc	2014
<b>Objective</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>40,000 ha under direct SLM (project pilot area) and a further 40,000 ha impacted by up-scaling in next 2 yrs.</li> </ul>	10% Improvement in socio economic baselines
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Of the 40,000 ha under direct SLM, at least half registers reduction in land degradation by at least 10% as measured by reduction in soil erosion, improvement in soil organic matter (as a primer for soil carbon) and structure, increased ground cover</li> </ul>	By project end point, at least 50% of the project pilot area registers reduction in land degradation of 10%
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At national level, the country attains at least a 10% score on Composite Index for the SLM Enabling Environment against baseline as measured by policy changes, availability of finance resources to address SLM at national level, functionality of SLM institutions etc.</li> </ul>	By project end point, at least 50% of the project pilot area registers an increase in biological productivity of 10%
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At the project level, the at least 10% increase over the baseline on social and economic indicators for households, such as diversification of incomes, reduction in poverty index, reduction in food vulnerability, etc.</li> </ul>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At pilot project level, at least a 10% increase in biological productivity (vegetation cover enhanced with rainfall use productivity) by end of Project Year 3.</li> </ul>	
<b>Outcome 1</b>	1 Community Council collaborating effectively with user groups in their areas to implement SLM plans, these pilot models validated, and the approach is endorsed for national implementation.	By the end of PY 3, at least 40,000 ha under direct SLM (project pilot area).
	Government, NGO, bilateral and multilateral agencies are collaborating effectively in promoting SLM, which is better integrated into national environmental and development projects.	By project end point, at least 80,000 ha impacted by up-scaling.
	At least 5% of the target population benefiting from IGAs which are ready for extension to areas with similar NR management issues	By the end of PY 3, at least one community NRM institution has been created with devolution of management functioning and institutionally robust.
		By project end point, community NRM institutions functional across the project pilot area.



<b>Outcome 2</b>	40,000 ha of land under improved SLM practices.	By the end of PY 2, an assessment of the technical tools being used for land management in Lesotho has been conducted and recommendations made for updating where required.
	A 25% increase in their scores on a knowledge and attitude measurement tool	By the end of PY 3, at least two dissemination sessions have taken place spreading SLM success stories within Lesotho
		By the end of PY 3, a National Dialogue has been convened and the importance of the promotion of SLM has been acknowledged by relevant stakeholders.
		By the end of PY 3, Parliamentarians have begun to create national visibility of SLM expenditures and advocate for increases.
		By project end point, technical personnel, resource users and NGOs understand and promote SLM in their day to day activities
<b>Outcome 3</b>	National level policy on SLM either approved or planned	By the end of PY 3, an inter-sectoral mechanism for the coordination of SLM activities has been established and is functional.
	The enhanced SLM models and techniques piloted by the project are central to the strengthened commitment to SLM that has been mainstreamed into the relevant policies, strategies and projects, as expressed in a National SLM Framework.	
	The Lesotho SLM knowledge management network has been institutionalised so that it can continue to function without project resources.	By the end of PY 3, a Knowledge Management Strategy for SLM finalised.
	The network has completed a synthesis of SLM lessons learned and best practice.	
		By project end point, SLM Knowledge Management System institutionalised and functional.
		By the end of PY 2, SLM integrated into at least 2 government sectoral policies.
		(2) By the end of PY 3, SLM integrated into one national-level planning document
		By project end point, SLM integrated into Maseru District plan or inputs provided for next planning window opportunity.
		(4) By project end point, there has been a 10% improvement in the score obtained on the TerrAfrica Composite Index Scorecard which measures the enabling environment for SLM
	At least 15% of proposed activities have SLM content or impact and in which at least 15% of budgets are dedicated to SLM.	By project end point, at least 15% of Community Council activities have SLM content or relevance.
		By project end point, at least 5% of Community Council funding is dedicated to SLM.
		(3) By project end point, at least 0.6% of recurrent national budget is SLM related.



## Annex 5: Terms of reference

### INTRODUCTION

In accordance with UNDP and GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full and medium-sized UNDP supported GEF financed projects are required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation. These terms of reference (TOR) sets out the expectations for a Terminal Evaluation (TE) of the Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho

The essentials of the project to be evaluated are as follows:

### Project Summary Table

<b>Project Title:</b>	Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho			
GEF Project ID:	PIMS 3044		<u>at endorsement</u> (Million US\$)	<u>at completion</u> (Million US\$)
UNDP Project ID:	00063046	GEF financing:	US \$1,724,500	
Country:	Lesotho	IA/EA own:	US \$350,000	
Region:	SA	Government :	US \$112,471 + US \$400,000(in kind) = US \$512,471	
Focal Area:	Land Degradation	Other:		
FA Objectives, (OP/SP):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SLM model and techniques ready for national implementation</li> <li>- Local and national capacity for adapting and scaling up proven SLM models and techniques in place.</li> <li>- SLM Policy Enabling Environment</li> </ul>	Total co-financing:	US \$862,471	
Implementing Agency	UNDP	Total Project Cost:	US \$ 2,586,971	
Executing Agency:	Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation			
Other Partners involved:		ProDoc Signature (date project began):		September 2009
		(Operational) Closing D Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho ate:	Proposed: January 2014	Actual: December 2014

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## Objective and Scope

The integral functioning of Lesotho's mountainous ecosystems is vital not only to the livelihoods and welfare of its people, but for the delivery of ecosystem services and global environmental benefits to a large part of Southern Africa. The mountainous Kingdom is the source of rivers that reach the Atlantic Ocean in the west and supply an increasing proportion of the water consumed in South Africa's industrial heartland. SLM in Lesotho is therefore a vital ingredient of broader environmental wellbeing. Unfortunately, the Kingdom is largely characterized by inhospitable terrain, harsh climate, dense populations and intensively utilized and highly degraded natural resources. Despite numerous attempts and extensive but fragmented technical knowledge, barriers in capacity, knowledge and SLM models continue to obstruct efforts to adopt effective sustainable land management practices and action. As a result, land degradation continues to impoverish local livelihoods and to impose broader environmental costs on the region beyond Lesotho's borders.

The goal of this MSP is that sustainable land management provides a strong base for sustainable development in Lesotho while providing a range of global benefits to the region. In order to overcome these barriers and address the corresponding programmatic gaps, the specific objective of this MSP is that, supported by a knowledge management network, Lesotho is equipped at local and national levels with the techniques, approaches, capacity and strategy for upscaling successful SLM in support of national biodiversity conservation, food security and poverty reduction strategies. Three project outcomes are intended to achieve this objective:

- i. Proven, strengthened, participatory, replicable models and techniques that successfully overcome current institutional and governance barriers to SLM are ready for national implementation.
- ii. Adequate local and national capacity for adapting and scaling up proven SLM models and techniques in place.
- iii. SLM Policy Enabling Environment - Enhanced awareness, dialogue, understanding and analysis of SLM best practice at resource user, community, local government, NGO and national government levels across the country, reflected in the relevant policies, strategies and projects.

By building a proven, replicable SLM model for Lesotho and strengthening the capacity and knowledge needed for its subsequent use across the country, implementation of this project will make a direct contribution to the kingdom's Poverty Reduction Strategy, to its Food Security Policy and to the fulfillment of its National Action Project in response to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification.

The TE will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP and GEF as reflected in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF Financed Projects.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming.

## Evaluation approach and method

An overall approach and method<sup>18</sup> for conducting project terminal evaluations of UNDP supported GEF financed projects has developed over time. The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact**, as defined and explained in the

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<sup>18</sup> For additional information on methods, see the [Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results](#), Chapter 7, pg. 163



UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects. A set of questions covering each of these criteria have been drafted and are included with this TOR ([Annex C](#)) The evaluator is expected to amend, complete and submit this matrix as part of an evaluation inception report, and shall include it as an annex to the final report.

The evaluation must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts, in particular the GEF operational focal point, UNDP Country Office, project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders. The evaluator is expected to conduct a field mission to Semonkong, Makhoalipane Community Council, including some but not all of the following project sites.

### List of villages

Grazing Association	Area Chief	Village Name	# of Household
Ramosebo	Ha Ramosebo	Matsatseng	10
	Ha Chechane	Mokoallong	34
	Ha Mantsa	Ha Mantsa	31
Ha Elia	Ha Elia	Ha Elia (Meeling)	11
	Ha Mphafolane	Ha Mphafolane	73
Rapoleboea	Ha Fochane	Ha Mateu	31
	Ha Mahlomola	Ha Mahlomola	44
Ha Tsokotsa	Ha Tsokotsa	Ha Tsokotsa	53
	Ha Lerumonyane	Ha Lerumonyane	52
Tsenekeng	Tsenekeng	Ha Rasefale	35
Ha Nthapo	Ha Nthapo	Mpatana	16
Ha Seng	Ha Seng	Moeaneng (Ha Seng)	43
Boreipala	Boreipala	Ha Tlhabi	30
Ha Taniele	Ha Taniele	Motse-Mocha (Ha Taniele)	26
Hlabathe	Hlabathe	Ha Lekhetho	41
	Hlabathe	Hlabathe Moreneng	26

Interviews will be held with the following organizations and individuals at a minimum:

### The project key stakeholders

#### National:

Organization/Institution	Name of Officer	Position	Contacts
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Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation	Doreen Chaoana(Ms)	Principal Secretary	58698659 dcmapietja@yahoo.com
Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation	Seetla Mabaso(Mr)	Deputy Principal Secretary	Seetla.Mabaso@yahoo.com 58884351
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security	Ntitia Tuoane(Mr)	Director, Dept. of Field Services	ntitia@hotmail.com 63048270
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security	Seipati Mofolo (Ms)	Chief Fish Production Officer	<a href="mailto:Seipati2011@gmail.com">Seipati2011@gmail.com</a> 63096840
Ministry of Tourism Environment and Culture	Lisebo Motjotji (Ms)	Deputy Director, Department of Environment	<a href="mailto:Lisebomotjotji@yahoo.co.za">Lisebomotjotji@yahoo.co.za</a> 59227153
GEF Operational Focal Point	Stanley Damane (Mr)	Director, Department of Environment	<a href="mailto:Stanleydamane@hotmail.com">Stanleydamane@hotmail.com</a> 62000010/22320534
Department of Range Resources Management, MFLR	Rats'ele Rats'ele (Mr)	Director, Dept. of Range Resource Management	<a href="mailto:ratselec@yahoo.com">ratselec@yahoo.com</a> 588843417
Department of Forestry, MFLR	Elias Sekaleli (Mr)	Director, Dept. of Forestry	<a href="mailto:Elias.sekaleli@yahoo.com">Elias.sekaleli@yahoo.com</a> 58884338
Energy and Environment Head, UNDP	Limomane Peshoane (Mr)	Head of Energy & Environment Unit, UNDP	<a href="mailto:Limomane.peshoane@undp.org">Limomane.peshoane@undp.org</a> 58742832
SLM Project Monitoring Officer, UNDP	Mabohlokoa Tau (Ms)	SLM Project Monitoring Officer, UNDP	<a href="mailto:Mabohlokoa.tau@undp.org">Mabohlokoa.tau@undp.org</a> 62133550
Planning Unit, MFLR	Paepae Selahla (Mr)	Seniors Economic Planner	<a href="mailto:pselahla@yahoo.com">pselahla@yahoo.com</a> 67104480
Food and Agricultural Organization	Bokang Mantutle (Mr)	Agricultural Officer	<a href="mailto:Bokang.mantutle@fao.org">Bokang.mantutle@fao.org</a> 58753767/22273300
Lesotho Non-Government Organization (LCN)	Seabata Motsamai (Mr)	Executive Director	<a href="mailto:Seabata.motsamai@lcn.org">Seabata.motsamai@lcn.org</a> 58991144/22317205
Ministry of Local Government, Department of Decentralization	M. Mokuoane (Mr)	Director, Decentralization Dept.	<a href="mailto:mokuoanec@yahoo.co.uk">mokuoanec@yahoo.co.uk</a> 58000314/63597234
Ministry of Energy Meteorology and Water Affairs, Department of Water Affairs	Mafanana Mokhatla (Ms)	Director, Dept. of Water Affairs	<a href="mailto:fananam@gmail.com">fananam@gmail.com</a> <a href="mailto:director@dwa.gov.ls">director@dwa.gov.ls</a> 63079965/ 58666677/ 22317516
Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM)	Mamotebang Moeketsi (Mr)	Director, PELUM	<a href="mailto:dorcaspelum@gmail.com">dorcaspelum@gmail.com</a> 58745457/62745457
Department of Soil and Water Conservation, MFLR	Refuoe Boose (Mr)	Director, Dept. of Soil and Water Conservation	<a href="mailto:Rboose2000@yahoo.co.uk">Rboose2000@yahoo.co.uk</a> 58767886
SLM Technical Advisor	Qalabane Chakela (Mr)	SLM project Technical Advisor	<a href="mailto:Qalabane.chakela@gmail.com">Qalabane.chakela@gmail.com</a> 59139356

## International:

- 1) UNDP Country Offices in Lesotho
- 2) Regional UNDP-GEF office in Ethiopia

The evaluator will review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – including Annual APR/PIR, project budget revisions, midterm review, progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluator for review is included in [Annex B](#) of this Terms of Reference.

## Evaluation Criteria & Ratings

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework (see [Annex A](#)), which provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact**. Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary. The obligatory rating scales are included in [Annex D](#).

Evaluation Ratings:			
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	rating	2. IA& EA Execution	rating
M&E design at entry		Quality of UNDP Implementation	
M&E Plan Implementation		Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	
Overall quality of M&E		Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	
3. Assessment of Outcomes	rating	4. Sustainability	rating
Relevance		Financial resources:	
Effectiveness		Socio-political:	
Efficiency		Institutional framework and governance:	
Overall Project Outcome Rating		Environmental :	
		Overall likelihood of sustainability:	

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## Project finance / cofinance

The Evaluation will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. Results from recent financial audits, as available, should be taken into consideration. The evaluator(s) will receive assistance from the Country Office (CO) and Project Team to obtain financial data in order to complete the co-financing table below, which will be included in the terminal evaluation report.

Co-financing (type/source)	UNDP own financing (mill. US\$)		Government (mill. US\$)		Partner Agency (mill. US\$)		Total (mill. US\$)	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Actual	Actual
Grants								
Loans/Concessions								
• In-kind support								
• Other								
Totals								

## Mainstreaming

UNDP supported GEF financed projects are key components in UNDP country programming, as well as regional and global projects. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project was successfully mainstreamed with other UNDP priorities, including poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender.

## Impact

The evaluators will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings that should be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.<sup>19</sup>

## Conclusions, recommendations & lessons

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of **conclusions, recommendations** and **lessons**.

## Implementation arrangements

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP CO in Lesotho. The UNDP CO will contract the evaluators and ensure the timely provision of per diems and travel arrangements within the country for the evaluation team. The Project Team will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluators team to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits, coordinate with the Government etc.

## Evaluation timeframe

The total duration of the evaluation will be 21 working days according to the following plan:

Activity	Timing	Completion Date
<b>Preparation</b>	3 days	November 2014
<b>Evaluation Mission</b>	10 days	7 <sup>th</sup> January 2015
<b>Draft Evaluation Report</b>	5 days	20 <sup>th</sup> January 2015
<b>Final Report</b>	3 days	30 <sup>th</sup> January 2015

## Evaluation deliverables

The evaluation team is expected to deliver the following:

Deliverable	Content	Timing	Responsibilities
<b>Inception Report</b>	Evaluator provides clarifications on timing and method	No later than 2 weeks before the evaluation mission.	Evaluator submits to UNDP CO
<b>Presentation</b>	Initial Findings	End of evaluation mission	To project management, UNDP CO
<b>Draft Final Report</b>	Full report, (per annexed template) with annexes	Within 3 weeks of the evaluation mission	Sent to CO, reviewed by RTA, PCU, GEF OFPs
<b>Final Report*</b>	Revised report	Within 1 week of receiving UNDP comments on draft	Sent to CO for uploading to UNDP ERC.

<sup>19</sup> A useful tool for gauging progress to impact is the Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) method developed by the GEF Evaluation Office: [ROtI Handbook 2009](#)

\*When submitting the final evaluation report, the evaluator is required also to provide an 'audit trail', detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report.

## Team Composition

The evaluation team will be composed of a national and international consultants. The consultants shall have prior experience in evaluating similar projects. Experience with GEF financed projects is an advantage. The international consultant will be designated as the team leader and will be responsible for finalizing the report. The evaluators selected should not have participated in the project preparation and/or implementation and should not have conflict of interest with project related activities.

The Team members must present the following qualifications:

### **International consultant**

1. Masters or Ph.D. degree in social sciences related to international development, i.e. economics, international relations, public and business administration or equivalent;
2. Extensive (at least 10-year) experience and proven track record with land degradation and/or natural resource management, policy advice, development and implementation;
3. Highly knowledgeable of participatory monitoring and evaluation processes, and experience in evaluation of at least 3 projects with a major donor agencies;
4. Familiar with sustainable land management techniques and models in Africa either through management and/or implementation or through consultancies in analysis and evaluation of sustainable land management projects
5. Demonstrated ability to assess complex situations, succinctly distills critical issues, and draw forward-looking conclusions and recommendations;
7. Ability and experience to lead multi- disciplinary and national teams, and deliver quality reports within the given time;
8. Writing and communication will be in English, and must have excellent communication skills in English. The consultant must bring his/her own computing equipment.

### **Local consultant:**

1. Masters degree in social sciences related to international development, i.e. economics, international relations, public and business administration or equivalent;
2. At least 5 years experience with land degradation and/or natural resource management, policy advice, development and implementation;

3. Demonstrated skills and experience in development project implementation and management;
4. Knowledgeable on sustainable land management in the country, climate change issues and priorities, and related policies and legislations;
5. Proficient in writing and communicating both in English and in Sesotho and also ability to interpret to the international counterpart and also to translate necessary written documents into English.

**Team Qualities:**

1. Recent experience with result-based management evaluation methodologies;
2. Experience applying participatory monitoring approaches;
3. Experience applying SMART indicators and reconstructing or validating baseline scenarios;
4. Recognized expertise in sustainable land management models and techniques;
5. Familiarity with sustainable land management policies and management structures in Lesotho;
6. Demonstrable analytical skills;
7. Work experience in relevant areas for at least 10 years;
8. Experience with multilateral or bilateral supported projects;
9. Project evaluation experiences within United Nations system will be considered an asset;
10. Excellent English communication skills.

The National Consultant will provide input in reviewing all project documentation and will provide the International Consultant with a compilation of information prior to the evaluation mission. Specifically, the national expert will perform tasks with a focus on:

*Review documents;*

- Prepare a list of the outputs achieved under project;
- Organize the mission project and provide translation/interpretation when necessary;
- Participate in the design of the evaluation methodology;
- Conduct an analysis of the outcome, outputs and partnership strategy (as per the scope of the evaluation described above);

- Draft related parts of the evaluation report;
- Assist Team leader in finalizing document through incorporating suggestions received on draft related to his/her assigned sections.

## Evaluator Ethics

Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a Code of Conduct (Annex E) upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the [UNEP 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'](#)

## Payment modalities and specifications

*(this payment schedule is indicative, to be filled in by the CO and UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based on their standard procurement procedures)*

%	Milestone
10%	At contract signing (for international consultants upon arrival in Maseru)
40%	Following submission and approval of the 1ST draft terminal evaluation report
50%	Following submission and approval (UNDP-CO and UNDP RTA) of the final terminal evaluation report

## Application process

Applicants are requested to apply online at <http://jobs.undp.org> and/or <http://www.ls.undp.org> by the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2014. Individual consultants are invited to submit applications together with their CV for these positions. The application should contain a current and complete C.V. in English with indication of the e-mail and phone contact. Shortlisted candidates will be requested to submit a price offer indicating the total cost of the assignment (including daily fee, per diem and travel costs).

UNDP applies a fair and transparent selection process that will take into account the competencies/skills of the applicants as well as their financial proposals. Qualified women and members of social minorities are encouraged to apply.

## **Annex 6 Mission Itinerary**

**January 05 – February 05, 2015**

### **Capacity Building and Knowledge Management for Sustainable Land Management in Lesotho**

#### **Monday 05, 2015**

10:40	Arrival in Maseru
11:30 – 12:30	Meet project team
14:00	Depart to project site - Semonkong
15:00 – 16:00	Meet beneficiaries - Ramosebo

#### **Tuesday 06, 2015**

08:00 – 12:00	Meet beneficiaries – Boreipala (Moreneng)
14:30 – 17:00	Meet beneficiaries – Ha Nthapo

#### **Wednesday 07, 2015**

08:00 – 12:00	Meet beneficiaries - Hlabathe
14:00 – 17:00	Meet beneficiaries – Ha Seng

#### **Thursday 08, 2015**

08:00 – 12:00	Meet beneficiaries – Tsenekeng
14:00 – 16:00	Meet beneficiaries – Ha Moitsupeli
16:00	Depart to Maseru

#### **Interview meetings with project stakeholders**

#### **Friday 09, 2015**

09:00 – 11:00	UNDP
11:30 – 13:00	MFLR Group discussion

#### **Monday 19, 2015**

08:30 – 10:30	GEF Operational Focal Point
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11:00 – 12:00	Group discussion: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
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<b>13:00 - 14:00</b>	<b>LUNCH</b>
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14:00 – 15:30	UNDP M & E officer
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16:00 – 17:00 (PELUM)	Participatory Ecological Land Use Management
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**Tuesday 20, 2015**

11.00 – 12.30	UNDP
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<b>13:00 – 14:00</b>	<b>LUNCH</b>
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14:00 – 15:00	Ministry of Local Government, Department of Decentralization
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15:30 – 16:30	Ministry of Energy Meteorology and Water Affairs, Department of Water Affairs
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**Wednesday 21, 2015**

09:00 – 13:00	Stakeholders Validation workshop Presentation of key Findings
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**Thursday 21, 2015**

**Return to SA**

## Annex 7 List of persons interviewed

<b>Boreipala</b>	<b>Key positions</b>
Mathabang Soetsane	
Molibeli Motebang	
Silas Zulu	
Ramokete Mphofe	Chairman
Phakiso Mokobocho	Chief
Tseliso Thejane	
Leaoa Rankolane	
Koloane Koloane	
<b>Hlabathe</b>	
Letu Kelahe	Deputy Chairman
Kabelo Khobole	
Rolintja Khoboth	Chairman
Mamokoena Mohale	
Mahlomola Mothae	
Maleja Mohale	
Mr Jabele Kelane	Adviser
Lebie Kobeli	
Meca Moholo	
Mantbo Mohoanyane	
Malitsetheho Mohoanyane	
Reboho Mosakeng	
Ramoros Makhabane	
Ralekono Moranyane	
<b>Ha Seng</b>	
Sekoli Sekaleli	
Teboho Molibeli	
Mabontle Makhele	
Thabo Mokoene	
Teboho Lenkoe	
Timeletso Mokhethi	
Sello Makhele	
Jokhomo Makhele	
Taole Makhele	
Motibela Kaph	
Makamohelokaph	
Thoana Nkete	
Tumelo Maja	
Mankhala Letsie	
Matau Makhele	

Matakane Formelane	
Thabiso Makhele	
Sekliak Nompoula	
Mpho Loake	
Relebohile Molibeli	
Tiisetso Jenki	
Tsele Fomelane	
Morena Kenyang Pelala	
Bokang Nompula	
Sekate Janti	
Thabiso Malaka	
<b>Moitsupeli</b>	
Jacob Mohabata	
Mamoyane None	
Faul Moladje	
Mamojalefa Phakalatsang	
<b>Nthapo</b>	
Nthapo Metsing	
Mapulane Ntheka	
Mantsabeng Motjeane	
Matumelo Ntheka	
Lebusa Mochala	
Thank Ntheka	
Malebohana Lehata	
Khomani Nakha	
Mamakha Makha	Councillor
Makabiso Matha	Chief
<b>Ramosebo</b>	
Mapoloko Khoeli	
Maphomotsa Belema	
Marajaka Rajake	
Masanti Santi	
Makatlheho Sebilo	
Malikhang Mokhamelili	
Mika Mokhameleli	
Mashao Maribe	
Mosi Mosi	
Nteboheng Khoeli	
Mapulane Khashole	
Mothepane Motumi	
Makamoho Matijane	
Mamoliehi Matijane	

Mokuoane Setetana	
<b>Tsenekeng</b>	
Masebili Genone	
Makholu Machao	
Malitsoando Ntai	
Maphanyane Ntai	
Lukase Phetloka	
Thato Adoro	
Matumelo Monyamame	
Mamololi Adoro	

**Table A7.1 List of villages**

Grazing Association	Area Chief	Village Name	# of Household
<b>Ramosebo</b>	Ha Ramosebo	Matsatseng	10
	Ha Chechane	Mokoallong	34
	Ha Mantsa	Ha Mantsa	31
<b>Ha Elia</b>	Ha Elia	Ha Elia (Meeling)	11
	Ha Mphafolane	Ha Mphafolane	73
<b>Rapoleboea</b>	Ha Fochane	Ha Mateu	31
	Ha Mahlomola	Ha Mahlomola	44
<b>Ha Tsokotsa</b>	Ha Tsokotsa	Ha Tsokotsa	53
	Ha Lerumonyane	Ha Lerumonyane	52
<b>Tsenekeng</b>	Tsenekeng	Ha Rasefale	35
<b>Ha Nthapo</b>	Ha Nthapo	Mpatana	16
<b>Ha Seng</b>	Ha Seng	Moeaneng (Ha Seng)	43
<b>Boreipala</b>	Boreipala	Ha Tlhabi	30
Ha Taniele	Ha Taniele	Motse-Mocha (Ha Taniele)	26
Hlabathe	Hlabathe	Ha Lekhetho	41
	Hlabathe	Hlabathe Moreneng	26

Interviews were held with the following organizations and individuals:

**Table A7.2 National stakeholders**

Organization/Institution	Name of Officer	Position	Contacts
Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation	Seetla Mabaso(Mr)	Deputy Principal Secretary	Seetla.Mabaso@yahoo.com 58884351
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security	Ntitia Tuoane(Mr)	Director, Dept. of Field Services	ntitia@hotmail.com 63048270
UNDP	Ms Agi Veres	Deputy Resident Representative	
GEF Small Grants Programme	Nthabiseng Najara	SGP coordinator	
GEF Operational Focal Point	Stanley Damane (Mr)	Director, Department of Environment	<a href="mailto:Stanleydamane@hotmail.com">Stanleydamane@hotmail.com</a> 62000010/22320534
Department of Range Resources Management, MFLR	Rats'ele Rats'ele (Mr)	Director, Dept. of Range Resource Management	<a href="mailto:ratselec@yahoo.com">ratselec@yahoo.com</a> 588843417
Department of Forestry, MFLR	Elias Sekaleli (Mr)	Director, Dept. of Forestry	<a href="mailto:Elias.sekaleli@yahoo.com">Elias.sekaleli@yahoo.com</a> 58884338
Energy and Environment Head, UNDP	Limomane Peshoane (Mr)	Head of Energy & Environment Unit, UNDP	<a href="mailto:Limomane.peshoane@undp.org">Limomane.peshoane@undp.org</a> 58742832
SLM Project Monitoring Officer, UNDP	Mabohlokoa Tau (Ms)	SLM Project Monitoring Officer, UNDP	<a href="mailto:Mabohlokoa.tau@undp.org">Mabohlokoa.tau@undp.org</a> 62133550
Planning Unit, MFLR	Paepae Selahla (Mr)	Seniors Economic Planner	<a href="mailto:pselahla@yahoo.com">pselahla@yahoo.com</a> 67104480
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security	Nchemo Maile	Deputy Principle Secretary	<a href="mailto:Nchemo@yahoo.com">Nchemo@yahoo.com</a> +266 58882840
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security	Thabang Chabeli		+266 63003326
Ministry of Local Government, Department of Decentralization	M. Mokuoane (Mr)	Director, Decentralization Dept.	<a href="mailto:mokuoanec@yahoo.co.uk">mokuoanec@yahoo.co.uk</a> 58000314/63597234
Ministry of Water	Makomoreng Fanana		
Participatory Ecological Land Use Management (PELUM)	Mamotebang Moeketsi (Mr)	Director, PELUM	<a href="mailto:dorcaspelum@gmail.com">dorcaspelum@gmail.com</a> 58745457/62745457
Department of Soil and Water Conservation, MFLR	Refuore Boose (Mr)	Director, Dept. of Soil and Water Conservation	<a href="mailto:Rboose2000@yahoo.co.uk">Rboose2000@yahoo.co.uk</a> 58767886
SLM Project	Bore Motsamai	Former SLM project manager	bore@ilesoto.com

The stakeholders at the TE validation meeting held on 21 January 2015 were as follows:

Seetla Mabaso	DPS, MFLR
Makomoreng Fanana	Department of Water Affairs, MEMWA
Sekaleli Sekaleli	Director Forestry, MFLR
Bore Motsamai	Ex-SLM Project Manager
Qalabane Chakela	SLM Technical Adviser
Refuoe Boose	Director, Dept. of Soil and Water Conservation, MFLR
Makhalane Mofolo	Economic Planner, MFLR
Makhetha Mokuoane	Ministry of Local Government
Frances Howe	Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN)
Momotebang Moeketsi	PELUM
Lisebo Motjotji	Ministry of Environment (GEF OFP)
Lebajoa Mahalefele	District Coordinator Maseru, MFLR
Itumeleng Bulane	Chief Range Management Officer, MFLR
Ratsele Ratsele	Director, Dept. of Range Resource Management, MFLR
Tsele Rantso	Range Resource Management Officer, MFLR
Mabohlokoa Tau	SLM Monitoring Officer, UNDP
Limomane Peshoane	Climate Change Specialist, UNDP

## Annex 8 Summary of field visits



### *Field notes*

#### Ramosebo



IGA: seedling project. Started with 11000 seedlings which they bought: pine trees. MFLR bought the seedlings. Most attached to this IGA from other IGAs. Already had this idea.

Predominantly women.

Project bought materials and tools.

Some seedlings attacked by a worm killing 25-30% of them. They used their own pesticide to kill it.

Year-round activity. The only constraint is the time needed to put into their crop production. Plans to expand to 20,000.

MFLR will buy the seedlings from the women.

Membership fees are annual, from where the funds were used to purchase the seedlings. Subscription fee from new members.

Not yet started selling seedlings. But good returns are expected. No plans yet as to how they would spend it.

Subsistence farming is now complemented with this productive activity.

Pigs and chickens were not productive and in fact died. 3 months between being given the animals and the training being given. Pass on model was planned. 4 members were given one male and one female: 8 pigs. With regards to chickens, 34 members were given 4 each. 8 members still have chickens.

Started in Sep 2014. Very late in the project lifetime.

Satisfied with the project. Pigs and chickens – would like to try again??? Using money that they have.

MFLR: every month technical officers come to provide advice.

Mention also activities to protect the wetland, demarcating lands for grazing and brush control – every Monday.

### **Boreipala**





GA started in 2010. Sensitisation for 3 years. 180 started out as members, some dropped out and now at 122 members.

149 lambs in all, some died and now at 115 lambs from an initial 13 rams given in 2013 and 2014. Improved to produce better wool. Inter-breeding planned.

Brush control: initially the SGP supported ram exchange for brush control. The incentive is now for continued brush control as it improves the pasture for the ram.

SGP focused on this community because of the good sensitization. Ram were given to other GAs from this one.

Women have home gardens.

### **Nthapo**



GA membership: 67

Clearing of brush takes place monthly. Pastures are increasing and preventing soil erosion.

Pigs and chickens unsuccessful.

Water harvesting tank for irrigation unsuccessful.

Were given two lambs. 7 families have benefited but no idea how many lambs have been reproduced.

Tsele: IGA gives a reason for the GA to continue – brings people together to discuss.

Sales of ram, quality of mohair is better so better returns. With increasing incomes, membership premiums are expected to increase.

In future they want to self-finance trainings.

They have had 10-15 trainings over the last 4 years.

## Tsenekeng



Started in Nov 2011 with trainings.

Dec 2014: started with seedlings. Pine.

Advised to start first with grazing management, ram breeding and water tanks.

Plans for seedlings: some will plant, some will be sold to the MFLR.

Trainings covered different species.

Benefits from planning trees: stops soil erosion and income.

Wooden planks would benefit them by not having to travel to Semonkong to purchase these. Use these for construction of houses and in preparation for the electricity grid coming – their co-financing for the project. They expect to buy the wood

Beekeeping failed because of the cold winter – no supply.

Chickens very successful. Keep selling them at R60 each. Sold most of them over xmas. Don't know how many they sold.

Pass on model: 4 x 32 people. Around 70 survived. 18 farmers no longer have them: died or sold (lack of business acumen?)

Only 4 left which will be used for breeding.

Birds of prey a hazard for the chickens, they need protection.

Pass on model planned for the eggs: 10 each person planned. But did not materialize because some died.

Committee meets every month on the 17 to discuss livelihoods planning.

### **Ha Seng**



Ready to start implementing the project. They formed the GA. But frequent miscommunication by Chief. General lack of leadership. This was the largest group of villagers that we met, both men and women. They are still waiting to see the project benefits. The only positive thing has been the water tank which is midway through construction.

### ***Community narratives***

What follows is a summary of the relevant findings from data generated in the focus group interviews. The focus group discussions were conducted with members of GA's and the respective chiefs of Ha Nthapo, Boreipala, Ha Seng, Hlabathe, Ramosebo and Tsenekeng. Details about the methodology and an expanded explanation and discussion of the findings of this study can be found in the report, which follows the executive summary.

Analysis of focus group interview transcripts revealed a number of key findings related to members' experiences with the project. These findings include 1) the community

experiences with sustainable rangeland management, sustainable land management and income generating activities, 2) new innovations that the project supported, models of co-management that did/did not work, and the support needed to sustain the benefits, 3) challenges faced during project implementation, 4) levels of community participation, 5) community perceptions regarding reversal of land degradation.

These findings are elaborated below. Discussion of each key finding begins with a bulleted list of the major themes that were reflected in focus groups discussions about the key finding and a brief summary of the findings. This is followed by an expanded description of narratives about their perceptions and experiences. Excerpts from focus group discussions and the actual words used by participants are integrated into these narratives to provide the reader with a greater understanding. What follows is an extended description of the key findings of this study.

#### Key Finding 1: Community experiences with sustainable rangeland management, sustainable land management and income generating activities

Focus groups participants were asked to first talk about what the project meant to them, their experiences with set aside grazing areas, and the extent to which they were successful in improving pastures. All the respondents, with the exception of Ha Seng members, were of the view that the project was immensely successful in improving their pastures and ranges. The improved pastures have resulted in their animals (especially sheep and goats) breeding better quality livestock and producing superior quality wool and mohair. Importantly, the informants were able to make the nexus between the improved ranges and pastures and the corresponding improvement of the livestock.

Furthermore, all the participants indicated that they would like to see the project being implemented again because of the strides achieved in reversing the destructive effects of land degradation and soil erosion. They indicated that they learnt valuable skills, including the importance of clearing brushes, in improving pastures and ameliorating the effects of soil erosion.

Participants also indicated that all the Grazing Associations were formed as a result of the SLM project. That is, there were no formal organizations that enabled community members to interact and discuss issues that are affecting them as the community.

*“We formed the grazing association as a result of the project initiatives.”*  
*Female, Ha Seng*

Even though project has come to end, participants will continue with the activities they learnt (e.g uprooting clearing shrubs and other invasive species)

*“Initially, there were a lot of shrubs in our ranges. We learnt the importance of removing shrubs in order for grass to grow meaning we got more food for animals and less soil erosion. Therefore, even after the project closes, we will continue with the work of clearing the brushes and other invasive species.”*  
*Female, Hlabathe*

The project was also applauded for enhancing the working relationship between the local chiefs and the community councillors.

*“...it was good because we were told from the onset that we should include both the chief and the councillor in everything we do which we did. This also resulted in improved working relations between our local chief and community councillor.”*  
Male respondent, Boreipala

*“...adding to what he has said, both the chief and the councillor are active members of the association.”* Female respondent, Ha Nthapo

Key Finding 2: New innovations that the project supported, models of co-management that did/did not work, and the support needed to sustain the benefits

During the discussions, participants also indicated the innovations and support that were brought forth through the income generating activities that formed part of the project.

*“Some members were given chickens by the project, while others were given pigs and both survived. We were also provided with 2 improved rams by the project.”* Female respondent, Hlabathe

*“We got chicken, pigs and irrigation tanks from the project, even though we have not yet started using the tanks. The irrigation tanks have not yet been completed”* Male respondent, Ha Nthama

*“We learnt about conservation agriculture and also planting trees from this project. Planting trees is quite easy and we would be able to make a living by selling the trees to the Ministry and other villages.”* Female respondent, Ramosebo

*“4 members were given pigs and all those pigs died. The last one died recently and had piglets. We were told to give others those piglets and some died even before they had piglets. Some members were given chicken but they also died”.* Female respondent, Ramosebo

Home gardens to grow vegetables

Irrigation water tanks

*“Now that the project has come to an end, we had planned to visit other villages and see how they are succeeding with the IGAs so that we copy but the problem we are faced with is lack of funding to finance the trips.”*  
Female respondent, Ha Nthapo

Currently we do see the importance of our association but we still are not quite clear of its administration but we shall be in the near future.

*"I would like to see additional trainings for the grazing association committee members for them to understand and know the skills required in day to day administration of associations and societies."*

*Male respondent, Boreipala*

*"Most of us are members. When we get trainings, the information spreads quickly because the majority of the village are members of the association"*

*Female respondent, Ha Nthapo*

Going forward, participants would like to receive additional trainings and mentoring especially in relation to artificial insemination and pig breeding (Boreipala & Ha Ramosebo)

*"... the trainings we received are not enough. The chief and the councilor are the only ones attending the training sessions and then disseminate the lessons they learnt to the members upon their return. I think the other members need to attend the training sessions as well."* Female respondent, Ramosebo

*"We would like to be taught more in relation to artificial insemination in order to increase our sheep flock. The rams given to us by the project are high quality breed and we are culling our old stock of sheep. Therefore we need to be taught more about how we can increase our flock through means such as artificial insemination."* Male respondent, Boreipala.

Given that the members live in remote and inaccessible locations, they would like to be assisted with mobile dips in order to medicate their sheep and other livestock. They indicated that Semonkong (which is quite a long way from the respective villages) is the nearest place where they can access veterinary services.

*"Another challenge we are faced with is lack of medicine for the animals. Most of the animals died because they were sick and we lacked medicine to cure them. We were told to go to a center (in Semonkong) and get those medicines but as you can see, this village of ours is very far away from Semonkong."* Female respondent, Ha Nthapo.

### Key Finding 3: Challenges faced during project implementation

One of the key challenges faced with IGAs was the non-survival of pigs and chicken due to lack of skills and training on how to care for them. Lack of medicines also led to the death of chickens and pigs.

*"Initially we were given pigs and chicken for us to earn a living. However, we were only given training on how to care and nurture them after about two months".* Female respondent, Ramosebo.

Due to conflict/lack of interest of the chief in Ha Seng, the community received only the irrigation water tank and only one training. However, the members are still very active in the grazing association and they meet once every month as stipulated in the association's constitution.

*“Initially there was lack of interest in the project activities from our chief until he saw developments brought about by the project in the other adjacent communities.”*  
Male member, Ha Seng

Furthermore, the grazing association members pointed to the lack of management and administration skills as one of the obstacles to project success. Also, the roles that members were supposed to play in the administration of the association was not clear leading to general confusion and conflict in some instances.

*“Another thing is that we did not understand our roles in the association and expected to be told what to do instead of making our own plans. We were given plans because we had not planned and time was running out, all this because we did not understand.”*  
Male respondent, Boreipala

*“We are still not clear as to what roles we should play in the day to day administration of the association and which steps to follow in the project.”*  
Female member of Grazing Association, Ha Seng

However, Grazing Associations sometimes encountered problems of some people not respecting designated set aside pasture areas and grazing their animals in those ranges. Thus, they felt that they need more legal powers for regulation and enforcement of grazing rules.

*“... we need more power. I am the leader of this association and there are many villages that I lead in the association. So there is really a problem and I even involved the police for assistance in one incident, when one community member continued to graze his animals in a set aside area despite continued pleas for him to stop.”* Male, Hlabathe

Initially, community involvement was low until they saw the developments IGA brought forth as a result of the project.

*“The greatest challenge was that people did not join the association until we were given an incentive for pulling out shrubs. So had they joined earlier, maybe we could have achieved more...”*

Also, the communities pointed to the lack of trainings and supervision as some of the main impediments to project success.

*“We need additional training for shepherds so that they too can know how range management works. We also need water in the tanks and we are still awaiting nurseries as promised”. Female respondent, Ha Nthapo*

*“M: training as well. In actual fact, we are animal farmers, but we lack the proper training to take care of them for instance, when they get sick, we have to know what medication to give them. For sheep, we need training so that we know how to handle them until the mating season and in what condition they should be in for them to mate, during pregnancy and after having lambs we have to know how to properly take care of it.”* Male respondent, Boreipala



#### Key Finding 4: Levels of community participation and project achievements

They (i.e. chief and councillor) were very cooperative and worked well together. We have a rule that every time we had a meeting like now, they were both present because each time we met, we discuss our animals and whenever we discuss animals, the chief and the councillor have to be involved and when we were stuck, they would help us.

*“Currently all people, even herd boys now know that whenever they come across shrubs or other similar invasive species, they pull them out without being instructed...”*  
Male, Boreipala

*“We are now excelling in farming unlike before. I have showed you the crops we have here and we are able to feed our families. We take better care of our lambs and rams now”.* Male, Boreipala

*“We have a burial society that was formed as a result of the interactions we had inside our grazing association.”* Female respondent, Ha Nthapo

However, at Ha Seng, GA membership is declining because the community members claim they were promised incentives that did not materialize in return for their continued work on brush control.

*“GA membership is in decline because some members complain that they were promised some incentive for doing things like clearing shrubs but they never got the promised incentives”*  
Male, Ha Seng

As a result, in order to continue with the range management activities, informants asked to be provided with incentives. Notably, informants also observed that they have to divide their time between working in the fields (from which they get food) and pulling shrubs, which in itself requires a fine balancing act. That is they are of the view that the opportunity cost of clearing shrubs is lost time working in the fields which equates to less food. The incentives that were mentioned include stipends, lunch, additional trainings and mentoring visits from the Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation officials.

*“...they do participate but not in great numbers. The thing is, we work on fields to live, sometimes it is difficult to stop working on your where you get food and go pull out shrubs. It is sometimes a simple matter of scarcity of time”.* Female respondent, Hlabathe

*“The people in our community want to be given incentives for doing things, so when there are no incentives; it makes it difficult for people to participate in activities.”*  
Hlabathe, Male

However, in some villages, respondents felt that the powers that they currently have that allow them to take possession of animals that transgress the grazing areas are sufficient and respected by the community at large.



*“we have selected people in our subcommittees who are assigned to confiscating animals that graze where they are not supposed to. Such animals are taken to the chief and the owners pay a fine. So far we have not been challenged with uncooperative owners.” Female respondent, Ha Nthapo*

#### Key Finding 5: Community perceptions regarding reversal of land degradation.

The discussions with participants also focused on aspects they felt were achieved as a result of the SLM project. Respondents were asked to mention any accomplishments that were attained as a result of the intervention. A common theme that emerged was the observed reversal in land degradation in all the villages. Informants further noted that the project improved their range management and pasture improvement skills, which they lacked prior to the intervention. Additionally, participants observed that there has been a reversal of land degradation and fields that were no longer being utilized (ploughed) are now being farmed.

*“Ever since the project began, we now know range management. We now have healthier and improved animals because we lead our lives with more knowledge of what to do concerning good range management practices and when to do it.” Female respondent, Ha Nthapo*

*“Due to what we were taught concerning range and animal management, our lives have been transformed and improved with the knowledge we got”  
Male respondent, Boreipala*

*“...and we now know that whenever we see weeds, we should remove them and plant grass as we have realized that we live by animal and crop farming. We have learnt that when we plant grass, our food is conserved in a sense that when it rains, there is no soil erosion as the grass holds the water for longer meaning more food for our animals.” Female respondent, Hlabathe*



## Annex 9 List of documents reviewed

Document	Description
Project document	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Project Document and Revisions</li> <li>Proceedings of the workshop on project review, M&amp;E and socio-economic baseline studies, February 2011</li> </ul>
Project reports	<p>Project Inception Report Project Annual Work-plans</p> <p><b>Project monitoring reports</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quarterly Reports</li> <li>Implementation Forum, September 2009</li> <li>Implementation forum minutes, September 2010</li> <li>Report on the study tour follow up public gatherings, Nov 2010</li> <li>Progress report on vegetation survey in 7 community councils within SLM project, November 2010</li> <li>Field activities report, December 2010</li> <li>UNDP BToR for Learning mission to Namibia, July 2011</li> <li>User groups formation report, February 2012</li> <li>User groups formation report, March 2012</li> <li>Beekeeping section report, July 2012</li> <li>User groups committees workshop report, Sep-Oct 2012</li> <li>UNDP mission report, Oct 2012</li> <li>UNDP mission report, Nov 2012</li> <li>User groups monitoring report: June 2013</li> <li>UNDP mission report, July 2013</li> <li>MFLR Water Tank Inspection Report, December 2013</li> <li>MFLR field mission report: December 2013</li> <li>UNDP mission report, March 2014</li> <li>MFLR field mission report: April 2014</li> <li>UNDP BToR, October 2014</li> <li>Grazing association monitoring report: November 2014</li> <li>Project UNDP Annual Reports</li> <li>Learning Mission to identify 'impact-consolidation' activities and complete PIR and MTE, September 2013</li> <li>Best practices and lessons learned, n.d</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minutes to model development workshops 1 and 2, September and November 2011</li> <li>Global mechanism (UNCCD): Formulation of resource mobilization strategy, n.d</li> <li>Strategic performance assessment of the Wetlands Restoration and Conservation project, Executive summary, April 2013.</li> <li>Draft exit strategy</li> </ul> <p><b>Evaluation reports</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mid-term Evaluation</li> <li>Management Response to MTE, August 2013</li> </ul> <p><b>Consultancy reports:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of donor-funded NRM projects 1980-2010, conclusions and lessons learned, 2010</li> <li>Capacity barriers for rural income generation activities in Lesotho, April 2011</li> <li>Socio-economic baseline study in the Mountain of Maseru District, Jan 2010</li> <li>M&amp;E framework, Draft 1, January 2011</li> <li>SLM project area mapping of Tsenekeeng, Ha Phallang and Ha Sechache and inspection of Thaba Putsoa cattlepost areas, January 2013</li> <li>Climate change and sustainable land management nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa: a stock-taking exercise, World Bank</li> <li>Review of on-going national monitoring processes and methodologies for the UNCCD indicators, May 21014</li> <li>Socio-economic follow-up survey in Makhoalipane Community Council, Sep 2014</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lesotho SLM Strategic Investment Programme 2014-2024 programme document, March 2013</li> </ul> <p><b>In-house technical reports</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cattlepost inventory, October 2010</li> <li>• SLM draft model report, Nov 2011</li> <li>• SLM project mapping for Mokolometsane, Dec 2012</li> <li>• SLM project area mapping for Semonkong, January 2013</li> <li>• Rangeland monitoring exercise in SLM project area, March 2014</li> <li>• Validated SLM techniques toolkit, May 2014</li> <li>• Report on the population of Lesotho SLM project monitoring, Nov 2014</li> </ul> <p><b>Training reports</b>  Collaborative conflict management, April 2013  Wetland management: Introduction and delineation, November 2012</p> <p><b>SLM Dialogue research papers</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rantlo, A.M. The role of property rights to grazing lands in resource use and management: the case of Taung in Mphahle's Hoek.</li> <li>• Bulane, L. Sustainable rangeland management through capacity building of range resource governors and users: case study of Lesotho.</li> <li>• Nthejane, M. Investigating the effectiveness of exclusion of grazing in controlling shrub invasion in rangelands.</li> <li>• Ntshohe, R., Tsolo, C., Nthelane, M. and Ratsele, C. An investigation into the effectiveness of grazing associations in management of communal rangeland resources.</li> </ul>
Annual Project Report to GEF	Project Implementation Reports for 2010, 2012, and 2013
Policies	National Range Resources Management Policy, 2014 Forestry Policy, 1998
Other relevant materials:	Financial Audit Reports 2010,2011,2012, 2013 and 2014 Press articles Minutes of Project Steering Committee Meetingss (16)
GEF and UNDP/GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy	<a href="http://thegef.org/MonitoringandEvaluation/MEPoliciesProcedures/mepoliciesprocedures.html">http://thegef.org/MonitoringandEvaluation/MEPoliciesProcedures/mepoliciesprocedures.html</a> )  ( <a href="http://www.undp.org/gef/05/monitoring/policies.html">http://www.undp.org/gef/05/monitoring/policies.html</a> ).
Atlas Risk Management System	UNDP-GEF Risk Management Strategy resource kit, available as Annex XI at <a href="http://www.undp.org/gef/05/monitoring/policies.html">http://www.undp.org/gef/05/monitoring/policies.html</a>

## Annex 10 Evaluation Question Matrix

### Matrix for assessment of progress towards results

Evaluation questions	Indicators of success	Information source	Methodology
<b>A. Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?</b>			
<b>Theory of Change</b>			
1. Are the project design's underlying assumptions correct (theory of change) and if not, how has this affected implementation progress?  Have changes to the context affected the ability to achieve the Project results as outlined in the Project document?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An explicit theory of change designed for the project</li> <li>• Progress towards targets is tangible and due to project support.</li> <li>• No changes in Project RF</li> <li>• Implementation delays are minimal</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project documents such as inception report, M&amp;E reports, PIRs, annual reports.</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis,.</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews.</li> </ul>
2. Are the project's logframe indicators and targets "SMART" and how could they have been improved?  Are the Project's objectives and outcomes or components practical, and feasible within its time frame?  What were the critical gaps in the SLM project in addressing land degradation in the country?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SMART indicators</li> <li>• Project strategy integrates lessons learnt from previous projects and projects</li> <li>• Critical gaps addressed in the project design</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Results framework: project and country level.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> </ul>
<b>Evidence based-design</b>			
3. Is the Project strategy relevant and does it provide the most effective route towards expected/intended results? (Has the project missed any tricks?)  Does the Project address country priorities as demonstrated by national policies and plans?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project design integrates the lessons learned from programming experiences</li> <li>• A range of stakeholder views were considered in the project design</li> <li>• The project is aligned to country priorities as stated in national policy documents.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lessons learned documents</li> <li>• Design phase consultation meeting minutes and cross-checking of participants lists to assess inclusiveness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis,</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews.</li> </ul>

Evaluation questions	Indicators of success	Information source	Methodology
<p>Were the perspectives of those who would be affected by Project decisions, those who could affect the outcomes, and those who could contribute information or other resources to the process, taken into account during Project design processes?</p> <p>Were lessons from other relevant projects and projects incorporated in the project design?</p>		<p>and seniority of those consulted</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cross check with project document RF</li> <li>• interviews</li> </ul>	
4. Key barriers and project strategy to address the barriers. How successful was barrier removal strategy? Eg conflicts, decentralisation context.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Barriers were addressed effectively with minimal delays to implementation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
<b>Continuing relevance</b>			
5. Is the Project promoting ownership and meeting the needs of stakeholders?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The findings and recommendations from the steering committee meetings have been implemented.</li> <li>• Training and other capacity development support addresses the key gaps.</li> <li>• There are no implementation delays due to political/institutional factors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PB/steering committee minutes</li> <li>• Training events</li> <li>• Project reports such as PIRs and annual progress reports.</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews.</li> </ul>
<b>B. Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?</b>			
<b>Successes</b>			
1. Which aspects of the Project have been successful and which were not (and why not)?	Logframe indicators:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> </ul>
What innovations have been developed by the project that should be taken forward in future programming?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 40,000 ha under direct SLM (project pilot area) and by project end a further 80,000 ha from scaling up.</li> <li>▪ Of the 40,000 ha under direct SLM, at least half registers reduction in land degradation by 10% as measured by reduction in soil erosion, improvement in soil organic matter (as a primer for soil carbon) and structure, increased ground cover</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews.</li> </ul>
What unexpected results did the project yield?			

Evaluation questions	Indicators of success	Information source	Methodology
<b>Partnerships</b>			
2. Was there a sound partnership strategy, promoting synergies with other similar projects? How were the various stakeholder groups involved eg government ministries, NGOs, CSOs, private sector and cooperation partners/initiatives?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partnerships established for all relevant areas of project delivery within and outside government</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>Interviews</li> <li>Project documents</li> <li>Survey</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documentary analysis</li> <li>Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
Did stakeholders actively participate in the implementation process?			
3. Have the coordination mechanisms worked well for the achievement of the Project objectives?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The frequency of coordination meetings follows as planned</li> <li>The range of representation in the coordination meetings (sector, stakeholder group)</li> <li>Focus on results and timing maintained</li> <li>Levels of stakeholder participation in coordination meetings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Meeting minutes including participants lists for all coordination meetings</li> <li>Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documentary analysis</li> <li>Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
To what extent has the project promoted effective inter-sectoral collaboration?			
4. Have communication processes between stakeholders and partners of the Project worked well for the achievement of the project objectives? For example, was communication regular and effective? Were stakeholders left out of communication? Were there feedback mechanisms when communication is received? Was decision-making transparent?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Communication protocols and systems developed for interactions with stakeholders</li> <li>All constituencies represented..</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documentary analysis</li> <li>Interviews</li> </ul>
<b>Capacity development</b>			
6. Has the project developed/strengthened learning networks?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Establishment of learning network or working through existing network</li> <li>Numbers of people connected to the learning network and increase from baseline</li> <li>An advocacy strategy developed</li> <li>Regular dissemination of knowledge products (# reached, in which stakeholder group and at what level)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Progress reports</li> <li>Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Documentary analysis</li> <li>Interviews</li> </ul>
Were lessons learned documented by the Project team on a continual basis and shared/ transferred to appropriate parties who could learn from the Project and potentially replicate and/or scale it in the future?			
What is the quality of knowledge management?			

Evaluation questions	Indicators of success	Information source	Methodology
9 Did the project address the main capacity gaps and make a contribution to capacity development? Capacity for whom, what or to what end?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training plan developed on basis of needs assessment</li> <li>• # and quality of trainings delivered, as assessed by evaluation reports</li> <li>• Activities continue after the grant ends</li> <li>• Innovations being tried by the user groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Evaluation reports for the trainings</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
To what extent were user groups empowered to continue with SLM practices?			
<b>C. Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards?</b>			
<b>Work planning processes</b>			
1. How effective has Project management been in planning, organising and controlling the delivery of Project interventions in a cost-effective manner?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An adequate complement of technical and administrative project staff recruited for all main project functions</li> <li>• No staff turnover</li> <li>• No administrative delays</li> <li>• Staff happy with their roles</li> <li>• Project management tools used for effective work planning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project document</li> <li>• Project CDRs</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
Did the team work well and was the team composition adequate for the task? Was the distribution of responsibilities and reporting lines clear?			
2. Were the risks identified and the risk ratings applied comprehensive and appropriate? Did new/unexpected risks surface? What has been the quality of risk management?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk analysis and ratings were accurate</li> <li>• No delays due to foreseen or unforeseen risks materializing</li> <li>• Risk management system/tools applied</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project document risk matrix</li> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> <li>• Risk management tool</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
3. Were work-planning processes results-based? Has the project results framework been used as a management tool?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Awareness of Project targets</li> <li>• Results-based reporting (progress reporting, steering committee meetings)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
To what extent did results-based monitoring of implementation progress take place?			
4. Have there been any management delays in implementing the project, what were the causes and were they resolved?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No delays due to management processes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documental analysis</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>
<b>Financial management</b>			

Evaluation questions	Indicators of success	Information source	Methodology
5. Have there been changes to fund allocations as a result of budget revisions and have these appropriate and relevant?  Has the Project had the appropriate financial controls, including reporting and planning, that allow management to make informed decisions regarding the budget and allowed for timely flow of funds?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extent of deviation between planned and actual expenditure outturns</li> <li>• Quality of annual work planning (costed and realistic workplans)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project CDRs and AWP</li> <li>• Project manuals/guidance notes</li> <li>• Financial reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
6. What level of co-financing was reached? Were funds leveraged by the project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Co-financing contributed to delivery of project results</li> <li>• Leveraging amount.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documental analysis</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>
7. Has the project provided value for money? (inputs to outputs to result)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Procurements made have contributed to results delivery</li> <li>• Costs expended are in line with costs of implementation in other projects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documental analysis</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>
<b>Implementation support</b>			
8. Has the IP implemented the project well?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project Board meetings convened quarterly and with appropriate range of representation;</li> <li>• Adaptive management steer provided. A focus on results and timelines.</li> <li>• Implementing partners (PB/SC): Institutional delays, causes and solutions found. Adequacy of management inputs</li> <li>• Candor and realism in annual reporting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PB minutes</li> <li>• Document analysis</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
9. Has UNDP provided good quality of technical support?  Is this project in line with UNDP comparative advantage?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quality of guidance provided on procedures and quality standards</li> <li>• Response time to address implementation challenges (accessibility; responsiveness)</li> <li>• Quality of interaction with implementing partners on technical matters (progress meetings, mentorship.)</li> <li>• Candor and realism in annual reporting</li> <li>• Project is in line with UNDP country project action plan and UNDP strategic plan.</li> <li>• Project integrates operational principles of UNDP such as gender equality and democratic governance.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>



Evaluation questions	Indicators of success	Information source	Methodology
<b>D.Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?</b>			
<b>Mainstreaming</b>			
1. Have SLM issues been mainstreamed into country-level implementation strategies?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policies and plans that have been adjusted to reflect SLM objectives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Country reports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> </ul>
What intermediate steps have been achieved?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project knowledge inputs have been used in policy processes</li> <li>• Strategy papers developed</li> <li>• Structures developed or adjusted to reflect SLM objectives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
<b>Drivers and constraints to sustainability</b>			
2. What have been the steps taken to promote sustainability?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainability strategy/exit plan in place</li> <li>• Measures have been taken to promote sustainability</li> <li>• Recurrent costs expected after completion of the Project will be covered by other sources of funding</li> <li>• # of partnerships initiated (evidence of network building)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> <li>• Cost analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
3. Are there any financial, institutional, socio-economic/political and environmental reasons why the project benefits/activities may not continue?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There are no financial, institutional, socio-economic/political and environmental reasons preventing project benefits from continuing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documental analysis</li> <li>• Verification and expansion through interviews</li> </ul>
<b>E. Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?</b>			
<b>Livelihood impact</b>			
1.To what extent have livelihoods been improved through project activities?	<p>RF target:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10% increase over the baseline on social and economic indicators for households, such as diversification of incomes, reduction in poverty index, reduction in food vulnerability, etc.</li> </ul>	<p>PIRs</p> <p>Annual reports</p> <p>M&amp;E reports</p> <p>Other project documentation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documentary analysis</li> </ul>
<b>Environmental impact</b>			
2.To what extent has land degradation been reversed?	RF targets:	PIRs	Documentary analysis

Evaluation questions	Indicators of success	Information source	Methodology
Have there been co-benefits such as increased water availability for livestock, lower production expenses for households, increased food security, increased wood production etc?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Of the 40,000 ha under direct SLM, at least half registers reduction in land degradation by 10% as measured by reduction in soil erosion, improvement in soil organic matter (as a primer for soil carbon) and structure, increased ground cover</li> <li>▪ 50% of project areas experiences a 15% increase in biological productivity (vegetation cover enhanced with rainfall use productivity).</li> </ul>	Annual reports M&E reports Other project documentation	

## **Annex 11 Interview guide: community consultations**

i) Sustainable rangeland management; ii) sustainable land management and iii) income generating activities were supposed to be an integrated package of measures to reverse land degradation. What is the experience with this in the community?

What have been the benefits: improved pastures? Wool yields? Lower mortality of small stock?

Are set aside grazing areas respected? Penalty imposed for transgressing grazing rules - have bylaws been made? Are there regulations?

When did membership fees begin to be paid? Is there a cost/What is the cost of annual membership? How frequent are meetings of GAs? How many members attend? Renewal of membership?

What is new that the project has supported? What models of co-management are working? What support is needed to continue to see the benefits?

How long did it take to set up the user groups and what the main factors in the time taken? How well are the user groups working and why?

How important is it for the grazing associations to have legal powers for regulation and enforcement? Do the grazing associations employ any staff?

What is the interaction between the user groups and the Community Councils and Chiefs? What is the role of the Community councils and chiefs? Are sector interests, different actors coordinated sufficiently well (aiming for a 'cross sector service model').

What is the main benefit or innovation that the project has generated that you would wish others to know about?

Have there been any changes recently that have upset project implementation?

What other government support to your livelihoods is being provided by government or NGOs?

What is the level of participation and involvement of local people in the implementation of the project? Have community views on the activities to be

implemented been taken forward? Has there been open and frequent communication between government and you on this project?

Is the project meeting your needs within its overall objective (reversing land degradation)? Do you feel more knowledgeable and empowered to manage your land resources more effectively? What would you have liked to be improved moving forwards?

Have there been visible improvements in land degradation? What are the indicators?

Will you willingly continue with the project activities?

### **Questions for community councilor and Chiefs**

What has the project supported in terms of capacity development? What has been the quality of trainings? Do they feel empowered to support the SLM process?

How are the community councilors and chiefs working together? Are there any good examples that merit replication?

## **Annex 12 Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form**