



UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Extending the Coastal Forest Protected Area Sub-system in Tanzania

ATLAS ID 73328 PIMS 2760



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Final Report of the Terminal Evaluation Mission

August 2014

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Acknowledgements

This is not really the work of the Terminal Evaluation Team but that of all the staff and people connected with the Coastal Forest Project who gave freely of their time and ideas to make the evaluation process a success. There are far too many people to mention by name – and hopefully everyone who contributed is included in the lists of names annexed to this report – but special mention must be made of the Project's Acting Project Coordinator, Philipina Shayo, who gave unstintingly of her time in accompanying us during the field mission, and who provided, or coordinated the provision of, much of the information that we required.

Following completion of the Draft Report on 20th July 2014, it was reviewed by the UNDP-CO, UNDP-GEF RTA, Tanzania Forest Service, Zanzibar Vice-President's Office and National Environment Management Council, and WWF Tanzania. Review comments were received only from WWF and minor corrections from the DFNRNR on 5th August 2014. These comments have either been included into the revised text where these related to factual inaccuracies in the draft, or have been reproduced in full and unedited as footnotes to the appropriate text to ensure a fair hearing to all parties. The Terminal Evaluation Team has made responses to some of the comments. We thank the reviewers sincerely for their efforts and insights which have undoubtedly improved this final report.

The views expressed in this report are intended to offer an overview of, and some of the lessons learned from, the Coastal Forest Project at its conclusion. We have tried to balance our thoughts and to offer fair perspectives of what was observed and learned from people far more knowledgeable about the Project and its context than we will ever be. Furthermore, in a complex project where there are many parties, and where some views are counterposed, it is impossible to find a form of words that would be acceptable to all in all cases. Nonetheless, we offer our sincere apologies in advance if anyone should take anything written to be anything other than constructive criticism.

PE would like to express his sincere gratitude to Deo-Gratias Gamassa for his perceptive thoughts, incisive questions and insights, extensive technical and cultural local knowledge, and without whose linguistic skills none of this would have been possible. He represents one of the most capable national consultants that I have had the privilege to work with in any country on any evaluation and I thank him for his considerable input, both verbal and written. Furthermore, with a ready smile he prioritised my welfare, and his kindness and friendship have been much appreciated.

And finally, one of the delights of this sort of work remains that of visiting new and extremely welcoming countries and going home again having made new friends, seen new things, and witnessed with great admiration the dedication and enthusiasm that so many people bring to their work in conserving the important places of the world. I would like to thank them and wish them every success in their continuing endeavours.

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8th August 2014

ACRONYMS AND TERMS

Currency of Tanzania is the Tanzanian Shilling (Tzs). At the time of the final evaluation, US\$ 1 = IRs 1,623 and this conversion rate is used throughout this report.

COCOBA	Community Conservation Bank
CoFMA	Community Forest Management Agreement
DCCFF	Department of Commercial Crops, Fruits and Forestry
DED	District Executive Director
DFO	District Forest Office/ District Forest Officer
DFNRNR	Department of Forestry and Non-renewable Natural Resources
FACE	Finance, Accounting, Control and Evaluation
FBD	Forestry and Bee-keeping Division
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse gas
LGA	Local Government Authorities
LULUCF	Land use, land use change and forestry
MANR	Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Zanzibar)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MJUMITA	Mitandao ya Jamii ya Usimamizi wa Misitu Tanzania (Community Network in Forest Conservation in Tanzania)
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
PA	Protected area
PDF-B	Project Development Facility – Block B
PFM	Participatory Forest Management
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PMU	Project Management Unit
PSC	Project Steering Committee
RotI	Review of Outcomes to Impacts
RTA	Regional Technical Advisor
TE	Terminal Evaluation
TET	Terminal Evaluation Team
TFCG	Tanzania Forest Conservation Group
TFS	Tanzania Forest Service
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRAC	Target Resource Assignment for Care
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP-CO	United Nations Development Programme Country Office
US\$	United States Dollar
VCOBA	Village Conservation Bank
VLFR	Village Land Forest Reserve
VNRC	Village Natural Resource Committee
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Project Summary Table:				
Project Title:	Extending the Coastal Forest Protected Area Subsystem in Tanzania			
GEF Project ID:	3428		at endorsement (US\$)	at completion (US\$)
UNDP Project ID:	00073328	GEF financing:	3,550,000	
Country:	Tanzania	IA/EA own:	400,000	
Region:	East Africa	Government:	3,674,666	
Focal Area:	Biodiversity	Other:	2,947,500	
Operational Programme:	GEF -4 Strategic programme(s): GEF 4 SPM - SO1 SP3	Total co-financing:	7,022,166	
Executing Agency:	<u>Mainland Tanzania</u> : Forestry and Bee-keeping Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism; <u>Zanzibar</u> : Department of Commercial Crops, Fruits and Forestry	Total Project Cost:	10,572,166	
Other Partners involved:	WWF, TFCG, CARE Mpingo Conservation Project	Prodoc Signature	30 th March 2010	
		(Operational) Closing Date:	Proposed: December 2014	

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The Eastern African Coastal Forests (Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique) have been recognized as a distinct Global Hotspot for the Conservation of Biodiversity on account of high levels of both endemism (plants and several animal taxa) and species richness, both within and between the many constituent small forest patches. This fragmentation into many distinctive small patches compounds the conservation challenge. Forest patches support soil development and hence there is conversion pressure to cultivate forest soils instead of the sandy low clay and low fertility soils elsewhere in the coastal area. The lack of timber, distance from tourism routes, and limited water catchment function, prevents the use of most existing payment for ecosystem services mechanisms.

Coastal closed forest patches are surrounded by a matrix of different woodland, wooded grassland, and cultivation areas. Woodlands (eastern dry miombo/coastal savanna) offer connectivity and buffer zone functions within forest landscapes but have valuable timber trees which led to massive external logging pressure earlier this decade. This problem led to strengthening forest management, and especially local community involvement through participatory forest management. Historically coastal forests with little or no timber or water values have been low priority for government investment, and reserve management, which was transferred to district mandates in the 1970's is grossly underfunded and understaffed. Despite the large number of reserves, several large forest patches with important biodiversity values remain unprotected.

This project worked with Government, covering both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar (note they have totally different forest institutions with separate and different legal frameworks) largely through the forest sector, WWF and other NGOs to strengthen overall conservation and management of the coastal forests of Tanzania. The project ran for four years through National Execution Modalities, with government sub-contracting WWF to undertake some specific functions. The project increased the extent of protected areas, upgraded key areas to higher status, and worked to increase community involvement in participatory forest management.

Evaluation Rating Table		
Criterion	Comments	Rating
IA & EA Execution:		
Implementing Partners (implementation)	Despite the many challenges, disruptions, and delays that the implementing partners have faced, they have brought about significant achievements. The TFS and DFNRNR have shown considerable commitment, engagement, and ownership, while WWF, in an implementing role, has worked effectively across a wide geographic area. The PSC has provided good oversight.	Satisfactory
Implementing Partner (coordination)	The Project has been poorly managed with ineffective communication, unauthorised pre-financing, significant disruption to staffing, and escalating levels of distrust between WWF and its partners. As a result of this, very little activity is reported to have been carried out in the second half of the Project.	Unsatisfactory
UNDP supervision and backstopping	The UNDP-CO has provided an adequate level of supervision and backstopping to the Project with only minor shortcomings, and its performance has benefitted as a direct result of the UNDP-CO's commitment. However, the FACE system has caused considerable difficulties with the disbursement of funds.	Satisfactory
Financial management	Financial management has been poor with significant errors introduced through unauthorised pre-financing, inequitable sharing of funds, and no tracking of co-funding. Delays in disbursement of funds have been rife. Disputes between WWF and the auditors have been left unresolved for a long period which has hindered effective decision-making and implementation.	Unsatisfactory
Cost-effectiveness (Efficiency)	Although government implementing partners appear to have operated cost-effectively, the same cannot be said of WWF's project management which ran excessively over budget (377% of GEF budget). This amounts to an overspend of US\$ 904,330 of GEF money (which is 39% and 55% more than the totals spent on activities for Outcomes 1 and 2 respectively) which was budgeted to bring global conservation benefits but which has not done so.	Highly Unsatisfactory ¹
Outcomes		
Overall attainment of objectives	Only one of the four Objective indicators has been achieved (see paragraph 73) which is a poor result, but of the 16 Outcome indicators that it is possible to evaluate against, 11 (68.75%) show successful achievement at the end of the Project and one (6.25%) shows achievement nearly successful; total 12 (75%) – a good achievement (see Annex IV).	Marginally Satisfactory

¹ **Important note:** the TET received significant comments on project management costs from WWF which strongly disputes the figures presented here from ATLAS. However, even at the time of producing the final version of this report, the UNDP-CO and WWF had not reached an agreement over this issue and the UNDP-CO is still not satisfied by the responses from WWF. As such it considers the figures in ATLAS to be official at this time and these are the only ones that the TET can work with.

Evaluation Rating Table		
Criterion	Comments	Rating
Relevance	The Project intervenes in a globally important landscape, is congruent with GEF and national priorities, and remains pertinent in the light of the current levels of threat	Relevant
Effectiveness	As a result of the review of outcomes to impacts (ROtI), the outputs produced will go a long way to bringing about the intended outcomes and with a good likelihood that the impacts will be achieved – two cases of Highly Likely and one of Moderately Likely. As a result, the Project is expected to achieve most of its major objectives and yield satisfactory global environmental benefits with only minor shortcomings.	Satisfactory
Monitoring and Evaluation		
Overall quality of M&E	See below.	Marginally satisfactory
M&E design at project start up	The design of M&E was of a standard normal for the design period, but lacked adequate allocation of responsibilities and had no budget	Marginally satisfactory
M&E Plan Implementation	M&E implementation has been mixed, with good progress monitoring, but fairly strong internal activity monitoring has been let down by confused reporting and by little use of data being used for decision-making which are considered as significant shortcomings. Limited attempts have been made at impact monitoring.	Marginally satisfactory
Sustainability:		
Overall likelihood of risks to Sustainability	Each risk dimension of sustainability is deemed to be critical, the overall rating for sustainability cannot be higher than the rating of the dimension with lowest rating. Because of variations between the Outcomes/organisations, ratings are separated.	Moderately Likely
Financial resources	Outcome 1 (TFS): Conflicting evidence that State financing for protection and conservation management will continue at levels necessary to be effective.	Moderately Likely
	Outcome 2 (DFNRNR): No evidence that Government financing of measures adequate for conservation will be forthcoming, but this is balanced by the fact that most of the Project's achievements have been of a nature that do not require much funding for their sustainability.	Moderately Likely
	Outcome 3 (WWF): Clear evidence that donor funds will continue to be invested in activities in the landscape	Likely
Socio-economic	Outcome 1 (TFS): Strong support in the local communities for all aspects of forest conservation, especially sustainable harvesting of community forests. Bee-keepers disappointed by low yields but keen to continue.	Likely
	Outcome 2 (DFNRNR): Support for CoFMAs said to be good but TET visited only one. Bee-keepers disappointed by low yields but may continue. Stove groups enthusiastic and sell products to wider communities, but require continued support to transport raw material if they are to continue	Moderately Likely

Evaluation Rating Table		
Criterion	Comments	Rating
	Outcome 3 (WWF): Strong support in the local communities for all aspects of forest conservation, even where processes incomplete. Bee-keepers disappointed by low yields but keen to continue.	Likely
Institutional framework and governance	Outcome 1 (TFS): Strong – new Coastal Forest Unit established and staffed. Conservation remit within TFS taken seriously with long-term aim of having productive forests take pressure off of natural forests by producing sufficient timber to meet country's demands.	Likely
	Outcome 2 (DFNRNR): Strong – Conservation Section established and staffed on both Unguja and Pemba. Management plans approved and said to be in use for 3 PAs. Gazettement of two new PAs is underway and two others have been upgraded.	Likely
	Outcome 3 (WWF): Strong – WWF have implemented activities in close cooperation with District authorities and TFS such that in the unlikely event WWF should withdraw, the achievements have been fully institutionalised.	Likely
Environmental	Outcome 1 (TFS): No risks apparent.	Likely
	Outcome 2 (DFNRNR): No risks apparent.	Likely
	Outcome 3 (WWF): Drought problems have resulted in immigrant pastoralists grazing their cattle in the forests. Project does not appear to have addressed this issue.	Moderately Likely
Impact:		
Environmental Status Improvement	No data available, and too little time has passed for status improvements to be noticeable. Although it cannot yet be shown, the long-term improvement in environmental status is likely to be Significant.	Minimal
Environmental Stress Reduction	Involvement of a high number of local communities in participatory forest management bodes well for the future, although the process must be completed quickly for as many VLFRs as possible. Bye-laws and enforcement will reduce illegal felling for charcoal and timber. Income-generating schemes need improvement but provide a basis for increased valuation of forests. Improved boundary demarcation will limit future encroachment.	Significant
Progress towards stress/status change	Again too early to assess this. Most VLFR processes still incomplete hindering enforcement of bye-laws, but there is increased awareness about conservation issues evident amongst local communities. Improvements in protected area management capacity and economic benefits for local people should result in positive changes. As above, the long-term progress is likely to be Significant.	Minimal
Overall Project Rating		Marginally Satisfactory

KEY SUCCESSES

Gazettelement of 12,000 ha of Rondo forest as a Nature Forest Reserve, and completion of its management plan; Jambiani-Muyuni Protected Area (4,200 ha) surveyed, mapped and demarcated and awaiting gazettelement; demarcation of 74 Village Land Forest Reserves totalling 169,952 ha in

Zanzibar (11 CoFMAs), Lindi Region, and Kilwa, Rufiji, Pangani, Handeni, Muheza, Mkinga, Bagamoyo and Kisarawe Districts, with 56 (75.6%) of these covering 154,825 ha (91.1%) having management plans; enhanced collaboration between TFS, district offices, and local communities with regard to forest conservation; significant increase in the Financial Scorecard for Lindi (+51%); significant increase in the METT scores for nine protected areas (Malehi, Mbinga, and Mitundumbea in Kilwa; Chitoa, Litipo, Noto, and Rondo in Lindi; and Jambiya-Muyuni and Mtende in Zanzibar); formation of Coastal and Mangrove Forest Section in TFS and Conservation (Biodiversity) Section in DFNNR; staff involved with forest conservation activities in TFS and seven District Offices increased by 45 persons; nine Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) over joint responsibilities in conservation of coastal forests signed between TFS and Districts of Mkinga, Handeni, Muheza, Pangani, Bagamoyo, Mkuranga, Kisarawe, Rufiji, and Kibaha; total funding for coastal forest conservation increased by TFS in nine districts to US\$ 250,375; business plans for Jozani Chwaka National Park and Ngezi Forest Nature Reserve prepared and three new developed and approved for the Forest Reserves of Kiwengwa-Pongwe, Masingini, and Msitu-Mkuu; conservation plans for Matumbi (Rufiji), Kilwa, and Lindi landscapes completed, approved, and under implementation; and income generating schemes and financing instruments introduced into numerous communities – bee-keeping, improved stoves, COCOBAs – and the first FSC certifications for sustainable timber production.

KEY PROBLEM AREAS

Financing delays leading to interruptions in implementation on the ground and disappointment of community partners' expectations; financing delays leading to pre-financing of activities made in good faith but unauthorised, leading in turn to yet more delays in financing and loss of trust between implementing partners; huge overspend on project management amounting to US\$ 904,330 of GEF money that should have been spent on direct conservation activities, and which is largely responsible for the Project being unable to take advantage of the six-month no-cost extension granted to it after the MTE²; unequal allocation of Project finances between implementing partners adding to loss of trust; poor communication by PMU and WWF in coordinating role exacerbating trust issues; significant disruptions to staffing in, and reduced capacity of, WWF country office; very little activity reported to have been carried out in the second half of the Project thereby squandering opportunities and solid base built during first half of Project; and large number of activities still incomplete.

KEY ISSUES

The Project has been characterised by major upheavals in its implementation brought about by WWF-Tanzania which was contracted with its coordination, namely a period of unauthorised pre-financing followed by extensive and significant staff changes imposed by its parent body WWF International. These have resulted in considerable delays that have interrupted work and on several occasions during the Project's second half have brought it to a standstill. Such problems have led to squandered opportunities since the Project has failed to build fully upon its promising start. The poor communication practiced by, significantly reduced capacity of, and misconstrued ownership displayed by, WWF have undermined the trust between the implementing partners and WWF, built up over the many years preceding the Project. The TET expresses serious concern over the financial figures reported to it from ATLAS that appear to show an inequality in the allocation of GEF funds in favour of WWF at the expense of its government partners and the extraordinarily high project management costs which are running at 3.77 times over the original GEF budget – that is an overspend of US\$ 904,330 of GEF money that should have been spent on direct conservation activities², and which is largely responsible for the Project being unable to take advantage of the six-month no-cost extension granted to it after the MTE; hence closing on its original date of 30th June 2014 rather than 31st December 2014. A focus on undertaking activities to achieve the indicators rather than maintaining a wider perspective of the Project's overall design has resulted in many of the financial/revenue aspects have not received attention, e.g. Outputs 1.3 and 3.4. Reporting of results has also been confused and error-strewn with conflicting data and misinterpretations, these

² These figures are strongly disputed by WWF – see footnote # 1.

almost always having the effect of over-stating the Project's achievements to the detriment of making progress.

However, while these issues play at the forefront of the minds of those involved, it is very important that they are not allowed to overshadow the Project's very real achievements. Yes, it is true that many of these were completed or had the foundations of processes laid in the first half of the Project, and some have failed to be built upon in the second half. Nonetheless, these achievements are real and significant for the conservation of the coastal forests, such as the gazettement of the 12,000 ha of Rondo Forest Nature Reserve; 74 VLFRs in the process of designation; increased resources (personnel, financial, and capacity) being allocated to conservation of coastal forests; and, perhaps ironically in the light decreased trust in WWF, bringing together the various government actors with each other as well as improving the capacity and understanding of district authorities and local communities in regards forest conservation. Importantly, for a project involving non-union matters such as forestry, the concept of a constituted coordinating body, or sub-contracting the coordination to a third party, has been shown to be a highly successful mechanism, even if in this case the actual implementation has left a great deal to be desired. Oversight of the Project has generally been of a high standard with considerable engagement displayed by its members, in turn reflecting the high level of Government ownership evident which bodes well for the sustainability of the Project's outcomes. Yet, the overriding feeling of most of the people interviewed is that the Project could, and should, have done so much more. The evaluation of achievements against indicators (provided in Annex IV) shows that of the 36 indicators that it is possible to evaluate against (three are impossible), 21 (58.3%) show successful achievement at the end of the Project and four (11.1%) show achievement nearly successful; total 25 (69.4%) – a good performance.

The Terminal Evaluation (TE) was conducted over a period of 24 days between 11th June and 19th July 2014 by a team comprising one international and one national consultant. It was carried out according to schedule at the Project's operational closure on 30th June 2014. The Evaluation's ToR is given in Annex I, its itinerary in Annex II and the list of people interviewed in Annex III. A list of indicators, their end of Project achievement level, together with performance rating is given in Annex IV. After receipt of comments on 5th August 2014, which have either been added as footnotes to the main text or included in annexes, the report was finalised on 8th August 2014.

Recommendations and Lessons Learned are listed on pages 60-61.

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

1. The *Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects* issued by the Evaluation Office in 2012 states that:

“Evaluations for UNDP-supported GEF-financed projects have the following complementary purposes:

- *To promote accountability and transparency, and to assess and disclose the extent of project accomplishments.*
- *To synthesize lessons that can help to improve the selection, design and implementation of future GEF financed UNDP activities.*
- *To provide feedback on issues that are recurrent across the UNDP portfolio and need attention, and on improvements regarding previously identified issues.*
- *To contribute to the overall assessment of results in achieving GEF strategic objectives aimed at global environmental benefit.*
- *To gauge the extent of project convergence with other UN and UNDP priorities, including harmonization with other UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) outcomes and outputs.”*

With this in mind, this Terminal Evaluation (TE), carried out by an independent team of consultants, was initiated by UNDP Tanzania as the GEF Implementation Agency for the *Extending the Coastal Forest Protected Area Sub-system in Tanzania* Project (known to all throughout its implementation as the Coastal Forest Project) to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of Project activities in relation to the stated objectives, and to collate lessons learned.

2. The TE was conducted over a period of 24 days between 11th June and 19th July 2014 by a team comprising one international and one national consultant. It was carried out according to schedule at the Project’s operational closure on 30th June 2014. The approach was determined by the terms of reference ([Annex I](#)) which were closely followed, via the itinerary detailed in [Annex II](#). Full details of the objectives of the TE can be found in the TOR, but the evaluation has concentrated on assessing the concept and design of the Project; its implementation in terms of quality and timeliness of inputs, financial planning, and monitoring and evaluation; the efficiency and effectiveness of activities carried out and the objectives and outcomes achieved, as well as the likely sustainability of its results, and the involvement of stakeholders. The report was finalised on 8th August 2014 after receipt of comments from WWF and corrections from DFNRNR on 5th August 2014. The text has been revised to correct factual inaccuracies in the draft or to include additional information, while other comments have been reproduced in full and unedited as footnotes to the appropriate text or in annexes to ensure a fair hearing to all parties. The Terminal Evaluation Team (TET) has made responses to some of these comments.

3. The evaluation was conducted through the following participatory approach to provide it with sufficient evidence upon which to base conclusions:

- extensive face-to-face and Skype/telephone interviews with the project management and technical support staff, including some members of the project Steering Committee; group interviews with local stakeholders, particularly the beneficiaries, mainly in the villages;
- face-to-face interviews with relevant development institutions and individuals;
- a thorough review of project documents and other relevant texts, including the Project Document, revised logframe, Mid-term Evaluation (MTE), and monitoring reports, such as progress and financial reports prepared for UNDP and annual Project Implementation Reviews (PIR) for GEF, minutes of Project Steering Committee (PSC) meetings, technical reports and other activity reports, relevant correspondence, and other project-related material produced by the project staff or partners; and

- field visits to Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba Islands), and to Tanga and Lindi Regions, and Rufiji District where the Project worked to view its interventions on-the-ground.
4. Interviews were not carried out using a set of interview guidelines which the Lead Evaluator finds too inflexible. Instead, interviews were carried out informally, often focussed on certain key points, thereby allowing the evaluator to pick up on certain issues and draw vital information out from what often starts as a seeming “throw-away” answer to a question. Long experience has proved the efficacy of this method. Preparation is not required by the interviewee and there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. It is people’s experiences, insights, reflections, and suggestions with or on the project that are important. Throughout the evaluation, particular attention was paid to explaining carefully the importance of listening to stakeholders’ views and in reassuring staff and stakeholders that the purpose of the evaluation was not to judge performance in order to apportion credit or blame but to measure the relative success of implementation and to determine learn lessons for the wider GEF context. The confidentiality of all interviews was stressed. Wherever possible, information collected was cross-checked between various sources to ascertain its veracity, but in some cases time limited this. An opportunity was always provided to all interviewees to ask questions of the evaluators. A full list of people interviewed is given in [Annex III](#).
5. Wherever possible the TET has tried to evaluate issues according to the criteria listed in the *UNDP-GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy*, namely:
- Relevance – the extent to which the activity is suited to local and national development priorities and organisational policies, including changes over time, as well as the extent to which the project is in line with the GEF Operational Programmes or the strategic priorities under which the project was funded.
 - Effectiveness – the extent to which an objective has been achieved or how likely it is to be achieved.
 - Efficiency – the extent to which results have been delivered with the least costly resources possible.
 - Results – the positive and negative, and foreseen and unforeseen, changes to and effects produced by a development intervention. In GEF terms, results include direct project outputs, short-to medium term outcomes, and longer-term impact including global environmental benefits, replication effects and other, local effects.
 - Sustainability – the likely ability of an intervention to continue to deliver benefits for an extended period of time after completion. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially and socially sustainable.
6. The Project logframe in the Project Document appears to have been revised during the inception period but there was confusion when the two versions were being used simultaneously and the PSC called for clarity (see paragraphs 17). However, this does not seem to have occurred and an amalgamation of the two ensued. There is no documentation relating to this. The version presented here is the one being used by the PMU at the time of the TE. It comprises one Objective, three Outcomes, 14 Outputs together with 39 indicators and has been used throughout as the basis for this evaluation (see [Annex IV](#)), and the TET has evaluated the Project’s performance against these according to the current six-point evaluation criteria provided to it by the GEF. This is reproduced in Table 1 for clarity.

TABLE 1: CRITERIA USED TO EVALUATE THE PROJECT BY THE FINAL EVALUATION TEAM

Highly Satisfactory (HS)	Project is expected to achieve or exceed all its major global environmental objectives, and yield substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The project can be presented as “good practice”.
Satisfactory (S)	Project is expected to achieve most of its major global environmental objectives, and yield satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings.

Marginally Satisfactory (MS)	Project is expected to achieve most of its major relevant objectives but with either significant shortcomings or modest overall relevance. Project is expected not to achieve some of its major global environmental objectives or yield some of the expected global environment benefits.
Marginally Unsatisfactory (MU)	Project is expected to achieve some of its major global environmental objectives with major shortcomings or is expected to achieve only some of its major global environmental objectives.
Unsatisfactory (U)	Project is expected not to achieve most of its major global environment objectives or to yield any satisfactory global environmental benefits.
Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)	The project has failed to achieve, and is not expected to achieve, any of its major global environment objectives with no worthwhile benefits.

7. In addition, other scales have been used to cover sustainability (Table 2), relevance (Relevant/Not Relevant), and impacts (Significant/Minimal/Negligible) although the *Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported GEF-financed Projects* 2012 does not provide any methodology for the latter. In order to try and overcome some of this deficiency, a Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) has been included. Although not yet a UNDP requirement, the Lead Evaluator has experience of undertaking this for UNEP-GEF projects and believes it to be a valuable indicator; and the 2012 UNDP publication states that “... the GEF Evaluation Office is developing new guidance in 2012 that will likely require the introduction of a new section in the results analysis on “progress to impacts” for all full-sized projects”. The method requires ratings to be made for outcomes achieved by the project and the progress made towards the ‘intermediate states’ at the time of the evaluation. The rating scale is given in Table 3 while Table 4 shows how the two letter ratings for “achievement of outcomes” and “progress towards intermediate states” translate into ratings for the “overall likelihood of impact achievement” on a six-point scale. A rating is given a ‘+’ notation if there is evidence of impacts accruing within the life of the project which moves the double letter rating up one space in the six-point scale.

TABLE 2: SCALE USED TO EVALUATE THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE PROJECT

Likely (L)	There are no risks affecting this dimension of sustainability.
Moderately Likely (ML)	There are moderate risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.
Moderately Unlikely (MU)	There are significant risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.
Unlikely (U)	There are severe risks that affect this dimension of sustainability.

TABLE 3: RATING SCALE FOR OUTCOMES AND PROGRESS TOWARDS “INTERMEDIATE STATES”

Outcome Rating	Rating on progress toward Intermediate States
D: The project’s intended outcomes were not delivered	D: No measures taken to move towards intermediate states.
C: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, but were not designed to feed into a continuing process after project funding.	C: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started, but have not produced results.
B: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, but with no prior allocation of responsibilities after project funding.	B: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which give no indication that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.
A: The project’s intended outcomes were delivered, and were designed to feed into a continuing process, with specific allocation of responsibilities after project funding.	A: The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, which clearly indicate that they can progress towards the intended long term impact.

NOTE: If the outcomes above scored C or D, there is no need to continue forward to score intermediate stages given that achievement of such is then not possible.

TABLE 4: RATING SCALE FOR THE “OVERALL LIKELIHOOD OF IMPACT ACHIEVEMENT”.

Highly Likely	Likely	Moderately Likely	Moderately Unlikely	Unlikely	Highly Unlikely
AA AB BA BB+	BB AC+ BC+	AC BC	AD+ BD+	AD BD C	D

8. The results of the evaluation were conveyed semi-formally to stakeholders at a de-briefing prior to the end of the field mission (i.e. before the visit to Tanga Province) (see [Annex V](#)). **Lessons learned** have been placed in boxes and cross-referenced with a number hyperlinked to the “*Lessons Learned*” section. They are numbered according to the order in which they occur in the “*Lessons Learned*” section, not in the order that they occur in the text.

CONSTRAINTS

9. The evaluation has faced a number of constraints, the primary one being that it was finalised with very little notice due to other pressing procurements prioritised by the UNDP Country Office (UNDP-CO). This resulted in many senior people associated with the Project being unavailable for interview; an issue exacerbated by a number of others having to cancel for emergency domestic issues. Although in many cases able deputies were provided, their level of knowledge about the Project was inevitably less. With the Project working in remote areas, travel times for the mission were long and only a limited number of sites and villages could be visited in the time made available for the evaluation process.

PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

BACKGROUND AND DURATION

10. The Project had a very long gestation. In the 1999 Hotspots analysis by Conservation International, the Coastal Forest Mosaic, together with the adjacent Eastern Arc Mountains was recognized as one of the 25 Global Biodiversity “Hotspots” characterised by exceptional levels of biological diversity and species endemism. It ranked first among the Global Hotspots in terms of the number of endemic plant and vertebrate species per unit area, and eighth in terms of levels of threat. The Project was conceived initially as an idea emanating from WWF’s follow-up work during their Global 200 Ecoregion Programme. The description and analysis of the East African Coastal Forests focussed attention on their high global biodiversity value and the intensity of the threats that they faced, and the Government’s Natural Environment Management Council originated the Project’s development through the GEF Focal Point in the Vice President’s Office. Originally, the Project was developed as a regional mid-sized one, including forests in Kenya and Mozambique using a GEF PDF-A in 1997, but the three countries moved at different speeds and the partnership broke down. With Kenya already implementing their mid-sized project, WWF again suggested pursuing GEF funding and UNDP invited it to help write the project document. A number of changes including those from the Biodiversity strategic programme to that of Sustainable Forest Management and from mid-sized to full-sized project, plus the need to change authors after the lead consultant fell ill and died suddenly, incurred a number of delays. The Project entered the GEF project pipeline on 1st June 2005 and was designed under a PDF-B grant approved on 13th February 2008. After the Project Brief was approved by GEF Council it received CEO endorsement on 4th December 2009 as a Full-sized Project under the GEF-4 Strategic Programme SFM SO1-SP3, i.e. Sustainable Forest Management: To Conserve and Sustainably Use Forest Biodiversity – Biodiversity/Climate Change/Land Degradation Strategic Programme (new): Management of LULUCF as a Means to Protect Carbon Stocks and Reduce GHG Emissions. The final signature on the Project Document was made on 30th March 2010, but the official launch was delayed until after the national elections in July 2010.

11. An Inception Workshop was held on 9th August 2010 and the first disbursement to the Project was made from UNDP-CO to WWF on 29th October 2010. The Mid-term Evaluation mission took place in December 2012 with the final report dated April 2013. The Project was granted a six-month no-cost extension to 31st December 2014 but at the time of the TE, it had been decided that this was unnecessary and the original end date of 30th June 2014 had been restored – see paragraph 104 for further discussion.

PROBLEMS ADDRESSED

12. The Project Document does not contain an explicit problem statement. In its analysis under its “*Threats and Barrier Analysis*” section it identifies and ranks ten key threats to coastal forests, thus:

<i>Conversion to agriculture</i>	<i>V HIGH</i>
<i>Increased fuel demand -charcoal, firewood</i>	<i>V HIGH</i>
<i>Infrastructure development</i>	<i>HIGH</i>
<i>Unsustainable logging (timber, poles)</i>	<i>HIGH</i>
<i>Uncontrolled fire</i>	<i>HIGH</i>
<i>Over-harvesting of wood for carving</i>	<i>MED</i>
<i>Unsustainable hunting (legal & illegal)</i>	<i>MED</i>
<i>Conversion for salt pans, aquaculture</i>	<i>MED</i>
<i>Mineral mining</i>	<i>MED</i>
<i>Adverse climate change</i>	<i>MED</i>

An analysis of the root causes of these threats describes issues at the local, national, and international levels. At the local level, poverty and limited alternative economic activities in rural areas are identified for the:

“high level of direct reliance on forest products to sustain livelihoods contributes to their overuse in some areas. The lack of affordable energy alternatives also drives the urban demand for charcoal”, and “Demographic changes combined with uncontrolled settlement increases overall direct pressures on land, timber and non-timber forest resources”.

At the national level,

“limited consideration of environmental impacts of economic development policies” and “inadequate institutional coordination and integration of sectoral policies”

were considered to be the key drivers of forest degradation. At the international level, increased pressure on the coastal forest habitats was being brought about by a combination of a) structural adjustment programmes required by the macro-economic policies of the international financial institutions which had reduced staff numbers available for enforcing existing environmental policies and for developing or implementing new ones; b) the demands of the international market driving legal and illegal logging; and c) poorly-managed long-haul tourism development on the coast. Key barriers were identified as a systemic lack of capacity, summarised as:

“Systemic level capacity weaknesses include: (a) Limited oversight by the national PA authorities of decentralized forest PA management entities and little systematic conservation planning, management coordination, and monitoring; (b) Policy frameworks governing PA management are often in-compatible with those governing development; the impacts of the latter on conservation values are not being accommodated in the cost-benefit calculus that underpins decision making; (c) Limited business planning to tap into economic opportunities (i.e. REDD, sustainable logging revenues, oil and gas mitigation and perhaps tourism) ”

and weak institutional/individual capacity for protected areas management and a limited landscape focus, summarised as:

“The District Councils and Forestry and Bee-keepng Division are constrained by finances, inadequate and qualified human resources and working facilities. This shows that structural changes alone cannot solve current range of problems associated with the sustainable management of Coastal Forest in District Councils. Complementary changes

of building capacity in training, provision of working tools, changes in individual staff attitude/behaviours to improve governance and accountability are imperative. There is also the problem of awareness or mindset to some politicians, decision makers and officials of in rational resource allocation.

It appears that forestry sector is not a priority in district councils and the situation will still prevail during implementation and after the Coastal Forest project. This may have been attributed to the policy of the Central Government that natural resources sector is not among the four priority sectors (education, health, water and infrastructure) set by the Central Government.”

EXPECTED RESULTS

13. The Goal (Development Objective) is given as:

“The Coastal Forest Biodiversity and Ecosystem Values are Conserved and Provide Sustainable Benefit Flows at Local, National and Global Levels.”

and the Project (Immediate) Objective, as:

“The spatial coverage and management effectiveness of the Coastal Forest PA sub system is expanded and strengthened.”

These were to be achieved through the accomplishment of three Project Outcomes, thus:

“Outcome 1: Strengthened Enabling Environment is functioning for conservation of Coastal Forests in mainland Tanzania, leading to increased funding, staffing and oversight.

Outcome 2: The Protected Area System for Zanzibar is strengthened in terms of both representativeness, connectivity, financing and managerial capacity.

Outcome 3: Effective PA Management Systems in place at four project priority landscapes, with co-management between central, local and village government partners, leading to improved conservation of biodiversity values.”

The Project was designed prior to introduction of the Project Identification Form in 2008 and hence there is no explicit statement of the expected global environmental benefits being realised by it. However, some idea of these can be gleaned from the incremental logic, thus:

“Under the GEF-led alternative scenario, Tanzania and Zanzibar Coastal Forest biodiversity will benefit from a concentrated effort to extend conservation to areas which are currently unprotected in a reconfigured Coastal Forest protected area network, designed to protect biodiversity while optimizing its ecological service function – under effective and sustainable adaptive management.

Under the GEF alternative there would be greatly enhanced efforts to generate a comprehensive network of Coastal Forest protected areas. This would be done on both the Tanzanian mainland and the Zanzibar islands. A series of new protected areas would also be gazetted on the mainland of Tanzania, primarily in the Kilwa and Lindi Districts and probably mainly at the level of Village Land Forest Reserves. The GEF alternative will also explore ways to make the Coastal Forest protected area network more financially stable, and to generate sustainable sources of funding, such as from forest carbon and to put in place sustainable forest management systems such as Participatory Forest Management around the reserves and, especially, in the village lands. The involvement of the local communities is also expected to assist the better control over the exploitation of timber and other forest resources from the area, as is being piloted by the Mpingo Conservation Project. Finally, the GEF alternative would also develop landscape level plans together with the Districts and would seek to have these embedded within the District Development Plans in Rufiji, Kilwa and Lindi Districts.”

and from the indicators which are assessed in Annex IV.

PROJECT PREPARATION

CONCEPT AND DESIGN

14. The Project originated from the Government of Tanzania's desire to increase the conservation efforts directed at its coastal forests. The biological and socio-economic importance of these had been highlighted in the *Tanzania Forest Action Plan (1988)*, and the *Country Assessment and Strategy and Action Plan* carried out for the 1992 Convention of Biological Diversity formally recognised the coastal forests as a centre of diversity and endemism. This was corroborated subsequently by work done by Conservation International during its analysis of Global Biodiversity Hotspots in 1999. Further work, this time undertaken by WWF during its Global 200 Ecoregion Programme, alerted the authorities to the fact that this still under-recognised ecosystem had high global biodiversity value in terms of high levels of endemism (plants and several animal taxa) and species richness and had suffered considerable loss. The remaining fragments were generally small, averaging <500 ha, and were distinctive in terms of substrate, moisture, and hence diversity. As a result, the Government and WWF prioritised the conservation of these coastal forests, developed and approved a national conservation strategy, and created a national Coastal Forest Task Force to oversee the strategy. After prolonged work (see paragraph 10), the *Extending the Coastal Forest Protected Area Sub-system in Tanzania* Project was formulated and approved.

Design Logic

15. Much of the Project Document is extremely well-written and provides an excellent exposition on the biodiversity values and threats facing the various landscapes involved. The general design of the Project provides a logical response for dealing with the fact that:

"... whilst Tanzania's PA estate is huge, relatively little of the Coastal Forest resource is adequately protected"

and the legacy of the fact that:

"In 1977 Forest Reserves with no national catchment or timber values (i.e. most of the Coastal Forest patches) were passed to districts to manage as part of Tanzania's decentralisation process, with fewer staff, less funds and little conservation interest or capacity."

through building capacity of the Government institutions on the mainland and Zanzibar; increasing the size of the forest protected area estate; and increasing community involvement in providing buffer areas and corridors to improve connectivity between forest patches. The Project Document provides detailed evidence of the fact that it was:

"... based on the lessons learned over more than a decade by WWF and its partners in implementing participatory methods of forest management within the Coastal Forest Mosaic. It also builds upon the past 4 years' experience of developing a conservation strategy for the Coastal Forests of Eastern Africa."

and these lessons have clearly been incorporated into the design.

16. There are a number of issues in the design that it is worth drawing attention to:

- Coordinating body: Forestry is a non-union matter for Tanzania and that means that the institutions of both the government of the mainland and on Zanzibar have to be involved. Giving primacy for implementing the Project to either of these bodies would not have been politically acceptable, hence the designers rightly identified the need for a coordinating body. The organisation tasked with this was WWF – an obvious choice given its long-term involvement with forest conservation in Tanzania and with the design of the Project itself, and with its high level of scientific knowledge and political capital. The selection was approved by both Governments and as a concept has proved to be highly successful in enabling a coordinated approach to be made to conservation issues. This is important; the concept as a concept works, even if events during this Project have meant that the implementation of that concept has been

found wanting, primarily because of poor communication and poor financial management. A DFNRNR interviewee stated:

“The model is strong and replicable and we would use it again irrespective of the problems encountered here with WWF”.

#1

Lesson learned: Having an independent coordination body is a highly successful mechanism for projects involving institutions from the mainland and Zanzibar.

- **Conflict of interest:** Hindsight tends to bless evaluators with twenty-twenty vision, but it is clear that where the design did provide the basis for problems was in suggesting the same organisation (WWF) to have two key roles – that of coordinating body and of implementing partner. While WWF were clearly uniquely placed to provide an implementing role in the south of the country, it should have been apparent that having a body coordinating three implementing partners where one of those partners was actually the same organisation as undertaking the coordination posed real risks of a conflict of interest should the Project run into difficulties. This proved to be the case and one senior stakeholder interviewed indicated that:

“Having coordination and implementation by the same organisation in the same project was a very poor idea. I am very clear about this.”

and

“There was a clear conflict of interest between the coordination role and that of implementing partner. Since the [WWF] problem we have started to wonder what exactly is going on.”

To be fair, the Project Document identified the coordinating body to be solely a secretariat role:

“As this is a single project with single reporting into GEF, a small administrative secretariat will be formed; with the mandate for reporting and coordinating work plans, between the three activity centers (FBD, field landscapes and Zanzibar). WWF will be contracted to provide this function, but reporting through National Coordinators to the Project Steering Committee.”

which was never intended to deal with the flow of funds. This was to be dealt with directly through UNDP:

“UNDP will disburse funds separately to DCCFF Zanzibar and to FBD using government procedures. UNDP will also disburse funds to WWF based on the MOU with FBD on site implementation.”

The move to have WWF play a full coordination role including the coordination of funding can be traced to the second meeting of the Management Committee on 5th February 2013 where the minutes note that:

“It was informed that, the project will be producing a single report which will combine all project components. This will be in the new GEF format which includes a work plan, report and financial report (FACE).”

The concerns of the Government partners regarding poor communication (see paragraph 34) and the imbalance in allocation of Project funds and the ensuing loss of trust (see paragraph 49) can all be found to be rooted in this subtle change to the design. In the TET’s view, the age old adage “*hope for the best but plan for the worst*” was not adhered to. Complete separation of roles should have been ensured by maintaining the UNDP-CO was responsible for disbursing funds separately (even though this would have required considerable resources to be allocated to the task) or by appointing or establishing a separate body as the PMU (even though this may also have led to delays in disbursement).

#5

Lesson learned: The coordination and implementation roles need to be kept separate so that in any given project the same organisation does not play two roles.

- Zanzibar: The design process took special care to fully include conservation of the forests on Zanzibar. While these forests are relatively small in comparison to those on the mainland, they support a high number of endemic species and their conservation remains globally important. The Project paid attention to creating a fully inclusive implementing environment for the Zanzibar institutions, and a member of the DFNRNR interviewed indicated clearly that:

“Zanzibar was fully engaged in the Project throughout and was very happy to be fully involved by UNDP”.

He also noted that despite the problems experienced with WWF that:

“The Coastal Forest Project had brought the forestry institutions [of Zanzibar and the mainland] together”.

This is an important achievement. It is true that such engagement may have come at a financial cost. More than one interviewee indicated that the apportionment of funding to Zanzibar was based not on conservation need but on political considerations and was the result of a negotiated compromise. The TET is not in a position to be able to offer any meaningful comment but simply reports a common view that was aired to it.

- Local communities: The Project Document notes that:

“At the landscape scale, the project’s primary stakeholders are organized groups of rural residents and District government authorities within the landscape sites.”

and the MTE perceptively stresses:

“The importance of the local community and local authorities in the efforts to sustainably manage the coastal forests cannot be over-emphasized. They are absolutely central to the chances of success.”

With this in mind, the TET draws attention to the success of the TRAC funding provided by UNDP. It was very noticeable that the members of the local communities had come to rate the benefits of conserving their local forests through the income-generating activities that would accrue, whether this be bee-keeping, timber sales, or indirectly through COCOBAs. While the Project design clearly incorporated TRAC funds, nowhere are the activities associated with this funding spelt out explicitly. It is perhaps pertinent to ask how the Project would have looked to the local communities (and indeed fared as a result) if these activities had not been included. It is perhaps also worth drawing attention to a lesson learned by the Lead Evaluator from many other projects, and that is that producing results successfully on-the-ground is often more important than producing paper. Paper rarely galvanises the interest in the same way that tangible results do, and results engender trust amongst local communities by proving that changes are possible and proving the efficacy of the methods used. They sometimes also draw the attention and support of senior politicians to a project’s aims.

#6	Lesson learned: It is important to include in the design of projects, income-generating activities or other actions that bring direct economic benefits to those communities whose behaviours the Project is seeking to change or whose involvement/increased awareness it is hoping to catalyse.
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#2	Lesson learned: Successful results on-the-ground engender trust and garner support.
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- Time: The MTE makes two important and related points:

“... given the required institutional and community behavioural change required to make the project a success, an additional year for project implementation would have been advisable.”

and:

“Another important insight that still resonates with the project is the time that it takes to build trust with communities, establish acceptable procedures and effect behavioural change. This element, together with the time taken to promulgate new legislation and procedures and take these through all the requisite processes, [requires time].”

The Project has undoubtedly achieved significant progress despite the major challenges it has faced. Furthermore, it has done this over an effective three-year period since delays at start-up meant that little could be achieved prior to the hiring of the first Project Coordinator in April 2011 (see paragraph 31). The TET has found that many of the processes for establishing VLFRs to be incomplete but only because the steps involved require time which is not now available. Furthermore, the TET notes that almost all GEF projects have a duration that is set at what is thought necessary for the achievement of the outputs; this Project being no exception. Yet it was also noticeable in this Project that many of the beneficiaries would have benefitted greatly from continuing technical advice and practical assistance on activities arising from the Project, over as wide a range as implementation of forest management plans to advice on technical aspects of bee-keeping³. Such advice could have been supplied at very low cost by staff from the implementing agencies or the District Offices if this had been designed in at the beginning. Such continued low-level support would have greatly increased the chances of the achievements being sustained in a meaningful way.

#7

Lesson learned: GEF projects should look at the efficacy of including an additional period of continued low-level (low-cost) technical support to beneficiaries beyond the time necessary to achieve the outputs in order to consolidate the achievements and increase their likely sustainability.

Logical Framework and Revisions

17. The logframe is something of an issue. The original logframe from the Project Document was adequate and comprised four Objective Indicators and 17 indicators covering three Outcomes. It is clear that another logframe was considered, apparently the result of changes made during the Inception Workshop. The minutes of the second PSC meeting held on 27th October 2011 refer:

“It was noted that there was a later version which was the approved one and that the targets were much lower than the presented ones. It was agreed that the GEF UNDP coordinator would confirm and share the latest version of the approved project document and that the PMU should ensure affirmative action take to adjust where relevant. It was also noted that, if the project will achieve the presented target with the same GEF resources that would be very accepted, but monitoring and reporting would have to use the agreed final document.”

and

“PMU to review the logical framework and the M&E using the right document, update and share prodoc with PSC members by December 2011”

What happened is unknown, but the MTE notes that:

“... the project logframe recorded in the UNDP/GEF PIMS and the logframe that the PMU is using in their project implementation work are slightly different.”

and goes on to list a whole range of differences and suggests several changes, e.g. to Objective Indicator #2, favouring the wording from the revised logframe. It also states that:

- “○ The revised project dropped what was Outcome 4 in the original document i.e. Increased institutional capacity to implement range of PA management functions effectively and added the three of its planned outputs and activities to outcome 1 and 2.
- Three outputs have been added to Outcome 1 making a total of 8 outputs. These are:

³ **WWF comment:** “Aspects of beekeeping were outsourced from districts and there were no additional scientists on these aspects and advices and low costs were seek”. **TET response:** Point noted; but in this case perhaps there was too much emphasis on low cost. Certainly the advice provided was not sufficiently practical nor over a long enough period.

- ✓ *Training and staffing needs assessment at all levels of conservation practice directs capacity building interventions*
- ✓ *In service training courses developed and implemented at all levels within both forestry and associated sectors and within NGOs, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Government.*
- ✓ *Built capacities evaluated and monitored, identifying weak points for further intervention.”*

Although the version of the Monitoring Plan received by the TET from the PMU and presented in Annex IV has dropped Outcome 4, it does not contain the changes listed immediately above. Furthermore, it has ignored most of the changes suggested by the MTE. Most of the indicators for the Objective and Outcomes use the wording from the original logframe, yet there are introductions from other sources, the origin of which would appear to have been from the amendments suggested during the inception period but which have not been seen by the TET. For example, the target for Objective Indicator #1 reads “12,000ha as Forest Nature Reserve and 100,000 ha as VLFRs” – the 12,000 ha comes from the original logframe and ignores the amendment to 12,750 ha, but includes the amendment of “100,000 ha as VLFRs”. The original logframe contains no indicators for Outputs, yet the version used by the Project includes these for the Outputs under Outcomes 1 and 2 but strangely there are none for the four Outputs under Outcome 3. It is worth noting that while most of these indicators are SMART⁴ or results-oriented, not all are (e.g. Indicator #20 in Annex IV where the target is set as “[Conservation] Section with sufficient staff and resources to implement mandate” but where “sufficient” is not defined); there is inconsistency between some (e.g. #21 “System increased by at least 3 gazetted PAs (at least 5,000ha), with improved connectivity between existing sites” and #30 where the area is given as 6,000 ha); and duplication (e.g. 19 and 27; 20 and 28; 21 and 29/30 – see Annex IV).

18. The TET notes that the changes in the logframe resulted in there being a subtle shift in the interpretation of the project design during implementation, undoubtedly brought about by small changes during the inception phase. The original design has Outcome 1 as a strategic component to be implemented across the entire mainland at the institutional level of the FBD (now TFS). It sought a system-wide response by attempting to increase the institutional capacity of the FBD by establishing a section dedicated to coastal forests, and by improving its strategic approach to planning and funding. The system-wide approach is clear from the implementation organigram which includes a box under FBD covering Muheza, Tanga, Bagamoyo, Coast, Kisarawe, Mkuranga, Pangani, Kilwa, Lindi, and Mtwara. Note the inclusion of Kilwa and Lindi. The changes during the inception period dropped Coast, Mkuranga, Kilwa and Lindi from this remit, thereby effectively separating the project geographically into one where FBD/TFS dealt with the northern areas of the mainland and WWF the south. As a result, it would seem that the thought process also shifted away from system-wide interventions to more locally-focussed ones. In the Project Document, none of the indicators for Outcome 1 deal with community-level interventions; specifically, Indicator #5 for Outcome 1 reads:

“5. N°. of VLFR-District Forestry collaborations on Management Plans, improved logging and on certification processes.”

Yet in the logframe reported on by the MTE, this has been changed to:

“5. Number of villages and households benefiting from IGAs.”

This change is not apparent in the logframe included in the Inception Report, but has clearly been a part of the undocumented changes referred to above, and as a result the focus of implementing Outcome 1 appears to have shifted to some degree towards being a replication of Outcome 3’s landscape approach covering the northern part of the mainland, rather than the system-wide approach originally envisaged. As part of the general confusion surrounding the logframe, a new version of Indicator #5 for Outcome 1 has been created in the logframe provided to the TET and reproduced as Annex IV (see #9 therein), yet again combining elements from both the versions above, thus:

⁴ Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, Time-bound

“Nº. of VLFR-District Forestry collaborations on Management Plan and households benefit from IGAs”

19. These changes have also led to significant shifts in the implementation of certain outputs. Key examples are:

- Output 1.2 where the original design emphasis was on financial instruments for the conservation of protected areas and developing frameworks for activities such as business planning; but these have subsequently become lost. The activities listed in the Project Document for Output 1.2 include undertaking PA-valuations (on which to base proposals to increase public-budget allocations), or to include a costing of PA co-management as opposed to traditional top-down management; developing a framework for forecasting potential income and revenue generated for forests zoned for sustainable use; assessing options to maximize PA management effectiveness at current and projected funding levels; and establishing new Forest Reserves in the most important areas for biodiversity; yet in the Inception Report, this is changed to:

“Coastal Forest Reserves within target landscapes are assessed as to priority for conservation on biodiversity and threat criteria, and conservation strategy developed. This will entail collecting and compiling existing and new biodiversity and threat data for all reserves in the target landscapes for the project, and then developing a strategy for their better conservation, including landscape scale linkage and the development of suitable corridors.”

with an indicator that refers to a conservation strategy but that also suddenly introduces the need to increase the area of coastal forest reserves (see #s 13 and 14 in [Annex IV](#) and see paragraph 81).

- Output 1.3 where the original requirement was for a framework for business planning at site and national level; a summary of other protected area revenue mechanisms for application over the mid- to long-term; and a feasibility review of different protected area management models for landscape systems. These were reasonably well-articulated in the Inception Report:

“Conservation Strategy includes Business Plan for Coastal Forests showing overall financing needs and potential revenue sources. This will entail contracting the services of a suitable consultant to develop business plan for coastal forests, building on previous work, that shows how funding might be located to sustainably manage the existing and proposed network of coastal forest reserves.”

but the indicator again simply referred to the conservation strategy.

- Output 3.4 where the original design included to monitor and record offtake levels, income and revenue earned from reserves, using the revenue forecasting framework, but where no indicators were included.

In each case, these changes may have been alright if the overall design concept had remained firmly in the PMU's eye, but when combined with the fact that the PMU's emphasis was on meeting the indicators (see paragraph 35), the combination led to many intended activities not being carried out.

20. There is also some confusion within the PMU over two indicators (see #s 8 and 25 in [Annex IV](#)). The PMU have noted that in both cases:

“This indicator has been dropped as recommended in the Mid Term Evaluation Report of April 2013. The deletion was endorsed at the PSC meeting in February 2013 and Project planning meeting in May 2013.”

The TET notes this confusion arises from the MTE report since in one place this recommends omission:

“The project logframe requires revision dropping the indicators that are not likely to be met. The indicators referring to the “State-Pressure-Response models” should be omitted.”

but in another recommends retention:

“... the project decided to change the target to an assessment at the beginning and end of the project, though this was not formally recorded anywhere or agreed to by UNDP. It is recommended that this indicator be adjusted accordingly.”

Deletion of indicators is not possible under GEF projects and the MTET must have known or learned this but not clarified its report, since the UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Advisor in Addis Ababa would not have approved such a recommendation. The TET has been through the minutes of the PSC and there is no formal endorsement mentioned, but the Management Committee approved the recommendations complete with their contradiction. There must have been some understanding of the situation since the changed requirement for an assessment was made at the end of the Project – *A Situation Analysis of Coastal Forests of Tanzania Mainland* was commissioned for some areas by TFS.

21. Finally, the MTE makes an important point that the logical assumption implicit in the Project is that if all the various components are successful (e.g. extension of the PA system, increase in capacity, increase in local community participation, etc.), these in turn will lead to increased METT scores and successful protection of forests.

“While these would be strong indicators of an improvement on the management effectiveness of PAs and the potential for successful protection of the forests, they are not really clear impact indicators and even with most of these indicators being met, the forest integrity could still be undermined by a lack of compliance with, or enforcement of, the rules. Within the ProDoc logframe, the METT scores provide the best potential impact indicator of the actual status of the forests. The level of canopy cover and other natural biological or forest status indicators would be useful additional outcome indicators. This was perhaps omitted because the project was seen as complementary to the REDD initiative where these are the performance indicators that determine the payment for carbon sequestration. However, delays in the full implementation of REDD, have meant that this type of impact indicator would be a useful addition to the project.”

The TET fully agrees that the omission of direct biological impact indicators is a weakness and these should have been included even if there was a duplication with the REDD initiative. The measurements for such indicators would still only have to have been measured once, even if used by both projects. As it is, with delayed implementation of the REDD initiative, no such direct measures of impact are available to this Project.

#8	Lesson learned: All GEF projects should be able to stand alone in terms of impact indicators.
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UNDP Programming Context

22. The sustainable management and rational use of the natural resources has been considered by UNDP to be essential to its strategy to alleviate poverty. At the time of the Project’s design, the Project’s intended outcome was deemed congruent with the *United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Tanzania, 2007-2010* (extended to June 2011). This makes direct reference to several of the Project’s aims:

“The present use of natural resources is unsustainable (e.g. wanton tree-felling for charcoal production, inappropriate farming methods that facilitate soil erosion, and weak fishing methods). Community participation in the planning and management of natural resources and the environment remains weak and, where available, existing regulations and by-laws need to be better applied.”

although reference to environmental issues are only vaguely included within the Strategic Results Matrix, under Cluster I: Growth and Income Poverty, under the first of the Country Programme Outputs, thus:

“Enhanced capacity of MDAs and non-state actors to undertake pro-poor, employment-driven and gender sensitive policy research and analysis, with a focus on agriculture; local economic development; urban development, rural energy; environment and natural resource links to industry; heritage and cultural tourism; trade; investment; and SME [small and medium enterprises] policies.”

23. In 2011, Tanzania became one of eight countries to pilot the United Nations' *Delivering as One Programme*, which seeks more effective delivery of UN interventions at the country level as well as providing greater cohesiveness while seeking to be less of a burden. As a result, the UNDAF was superseded by the *United Nations Development Assistance Plan (UNDAP) 2011-2015*. Under Cluster I of this plan, the mainstreaming of environmental and climate change adaptation seek to reduce income poverty of the population. The plan recognises that:

“Demand for fresh water, food, natural products, land for cropping and grazing, shelter, wood and charcoal for household energy, deforestation and environmental degradation stretches resources utilization and management. ... Access to land resources and demands for various needs including biodiversity conservation and natural resources management gives rise to conflicts.”

As a result, under the Programme Results Framework, a number of general outputs relate to the Project, e.g. *Cluster I: Growth for reduction of income poverty [MKUKUTA] / Growth and Reduction of Income Poverty [MKUZA]*, sub-cluster *Economic Growth and Economic Governance*, Output 1.6 is listed as *National policies, strategies, budgets and monitoring systems mainstream environmental issues*; and under sub-cluster *Environment and Climate Change* Output 2.2 is listed as *Technical, financial and governance capacities for sustainable land and forest management enhanced*. However, the key provisions from the Project are included directly under Output 2.3 *Improved capacity for sustainable management of Protected Areas, coastal forest, and marine ecosystems including policy and regulatory frameworks where three activities where the following activities relate:*

“2.3.2 Finalise and publish guidelines on benefit-sharing from reserves where local communities are co-managing reserves with government; Support the development of sustainable financing mechanisms for the protected area estate of Tanzania (national parks, game reserves, forest reserves, nature reserves, marine reserves)

2.3.3 Support the Government of Zanzibar to establish a functional and sustainable institutional structure for terrestrial Protected Areas at Board level and Conservation Section within Forest Department; Strengthen the protected area system for Zanzibar (Pemba and Unguja) in terms of representativeness, connectivity, financing and managerial capacity

2.3.4 Assist government to improve the conservation of Coastal Forests in mainland Tanzania through the establishment of a coastal forests management unit, enhancement of capacity, and the creation of a representative and well-managed protected area network; Facilitate development of Conservation Strategy including Business Plan for Coastal Forests showing overall financing needs and potential revenue sources; Create effective protected area management systems at four coastal forest priority landscapes in Rufiji, Kilwa and Lindi”

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

24. The Project has been executed in accordance with the standard rules and procedures of the UNDP National Execution Modality. The Project's executing partner agencies have been the **Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism** on the mainland, and the **Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MANR)** on Zanzibar. The Project's implementing partners have been the **Division of Forestry and Bee-keeping (FBD)** which became a new parastatal in 2012, the **Tanzania Forest Services (TFS)**, on the mainland; the **Department of Forestry and Non-renewable Natural Resources (DFNRNR)** on Zanzibar; and the **World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)**. The Project has been coordinated through a Project Management Unit (PMU) run by WWF through Memoranda of Understanding signed with the Governments of Tanzania and Zanzibar. This has exercised financial control and management of the Project with the WWF's Forest Programme Coordinator acting as the approving officer and the Project Coordinator as the certifying officer for payments. The UNDP-CO has signed the quarterly budgets and annual workplans, provided an assurance role by always having a presence on any selection panel. UNDP has acted through the Project Document to empower the

Project to enter into contractual arrangements with physical and legal persons on their behalf, and to manage project funds, including budget planning, monitoring, revisions, disbursements, record keeping, reporting and auditing that all observe UNDP rules.

Stakeholder Participation

25. In addition to the implementing partners, the Project involved a range of organisations. In particular, many of the activities were implemented through, or in concert with, the district offices of the District Councils under the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government. Key actors here were the District Executive Directors, the District Forest Officers, and the District Natural Resource Officers. At the local level, organised groups of villagers have been absolutely critical to the success and sustainability of the Project's activities. These include the Village Councils and Village Natural Resource Committees of a number of communities working with the Project. A number of NGOs have also been involved, for example in the southern landscapes of Lindi, Kilwa and Rufiji, work on establishing Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification for sustainable timber harvesting has been undertaken by Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative; and work on raising awareness of the need for forest conservation has been undertaken by the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group and on compiling databases on coastal forests by the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania.

26. Sadly, the Project lacked a Communication Strategy until December 2012, but the one that was produced through a consultancy is concise and practical with guiding principles and strategic objectives clearly laid out; a comprehensive audience analysis; key messages clearly conveyed; and a wide range of communication media described. Unusually, it even has a section dedicated to monitoring and evaluation. Since its creation, the Project has improved its communication activities providing a number of television and radio broadcasts, as well as publishing a range of magazine and newspaper articles and science-based journal articles. It never produced its own website, but made use of various platforms under WWF, and the one of the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (<http://coastalforests.tfcg.org/>) on which many of its articles were posted. This has been an adequate response to the MTE's recommendation:

“Design and implement an effective system for deriving the lessons learnt from the project's field experience and develop and implement a more effective communication strategy for lessons learnt.”

but the TET feels that some more specific learning materials in the form of “soft science” booklets and “how-to” manuals could have been produced to capture knowledge and to disseminate it to a wider audience to promote replication of key achievements, e.g. a benefits and how-to guide on village land forest reserves aimed at village councils and natural resource committees setting out the benefits of such reserves and a step-by-step guide on the processes required, where to get help, and how to approach the District Forest Officers and TFS. WWF indicated that it produced pamphlets during the Project's launch and t-shirts and caps for publicity, as well as items such as calendars, but the TET saw no evidence of these, nor of any booklets or posters that could have been produced for local schools and village meeting centres. The TET also feels that the lack of a core “brand” for the Project with a simple message and a simple memorable logo is as a missed opportunity to draw stakeholders together and assume close common identity where experiences could be shared. However, the issue of logos and identity is discussed further in paragraph 106.

27. The MTE also raised the issue that:

“The relationship with the REDD project in the southern coastal forest area has not yet realised as much synergy as the potential indicated. Implementation delays and other factors have been responsible for this, but this element will require additional attention during the remainder of the project.”

The TET can find no evidence that such attention was given to this during the second part of the Project, not least because of difficulties experienced with staffing (see paragraph 33) and delays in fund disbursement (see paragraph 46 *et seq.*).

The Project has worked closely with a small number of organisations but with a large number of communities throughout and the active engagement of stakeholders has been vital to fulfilling its achievements, hence stakeholder participation is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

Gender

28. Gender equity is effectively absent from the Project's design. The Project Document notes that gender inequality is a problem and that:

“Professional and technical natural resources staff at districts and FBD levels is dominated by men (87%). Another observation is that some districts have no female staff at all. ... Rufiji, Kilwa and Lindi districts have considerable numbers of staff who have been trained on the use of National Forestry and Beekeeping Database (NAFOBEDA), and only one staff amongst them is a female.”

yet it makes no effort to provide a strategy to counter this. The TET noticed that all of its contact with government-associated staff was male with the exception of TFS's Project Coordinator/Head of Coastal Forest Unit, and that all of WWF's project staff and higher level management was male with the exception of the Landscape Coordinator (and Acting Project Coordinator). In contrast, in the field at the local community level, women were conspicuous by their presence – many of the Village Councils and Natural Resource Committees had almost 50% women (although no women were observed in leadership roles) and many of the resource user groups (e.g. bee-keeping, stoves, and conservation community banks) had a majority of women.

IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH

Project Oversight

29. Operational oversight of the Project was vested in the Project Steering Committee (PSC) comprising 11 members and co-chaired by the Director, Forestry and Beekeeping Division (and after the formation of TFS by the Chief Executive Officer of TFS) and the Director, Department of Commercial Crops, Fruits, and Forests (see [Annex VI](#)). The Project Document provides few details as to project oversight, but the Inception Report provides the ToR which states that:

“The Project Steering Committee will meet at least twice a year but could meet more frequently at the start of the project.”

Unfortunately it did not, with only five meetings having taken place to date (17th February and 27th October 2011; 27th June 2012; 27th February 2013; 2nd January 2014) and the final one scheduled for 24th July 2014. However, a Management Committee, comprising UNDP, TFS, MANR, DFNRNR, and WWF was also formed to provide an additional form of oversight when required but when the PSC could not meet. This proved to be effective during 2013 when management and financial issues required considerable attention, and it met twice on 31st May and 18th June 2013. Interestingly, and unusually, the same Management Committee met on 25th January and 5th February 2010, that is pre-Project, in order to lay the ground work for the Project's inception

30. Minutes from the meetings show that the PSC was constituted at a high enough level to provide the strategic direction necessary. The second, third, and fourth meetings were held over two days and included field trips to Project sites in Zanzibar, Lindi and Tanga respectively which provided members with an opportunity to view progress directly for themselves and illustrates an unusually high degree of commitment to overseeing the Project. The minutes from the meetings also show that the PSC was engaged, responsive, helpful, and when necessary held the PMU and WWF to proper account over the management and financing of the Project. It took the decision to appoint auditors to verify the financial position of the Project after the pre-financing came to light (see paragraph 47) as recommended by the MTE, and has continued to be engaged with this issue since.

Project Management

31. The Project's organisational structure is unusual in that there has been no designated Project Director. Instead, under agreement during the Project's design (see paragraph 24) and through a

subsequent formal Memorandum of Understanding, WWF-Tanzania was appointed to provide the coordination role between the implementing partners. As stipulated under the MoU, WWF established a Project Management Unit (PMU) within its own offices, which since has been seen by some as a mistake since it helped lead subconsciously to WWF assuming greater ownership of the Project than was warranted under their coordinating role. Retrospectively, provision of PMU services from a neutral location is thought likely to have been better and would have provided a more cohesive unit since it would have meant a dedicated Project accountant would have had to be present (see below). The PMU comprised a Project Coordinator, a Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, an accountant, and a driver. The PMU has suffered from staff turnover. The **Project Coordinator** has been held by three persons with no period of handover between them:

- Mr. Adam Kijazi – April 2011 to May 2013
- Mr. Almas Kashindye – July 2013 March 2014
- Ms. Philipina Shayo – April 2014 to June 2014 (acting only)

Note that the first Project Coordinator was not hired until April 2011, 13 months after the signing of the Project Document, and this delay caused some problems for co-financing (see paragraph 43). The MTE also notes that:

“... the dedicated accountant had been placed in the WWF pool of accountants and had subsequently left the organisation. At the moment the project is being served by a forest programme accountant who is new to WWF and the project. The project M&E officer also left in January 2013.”

At the time of the TE, there was a dedicated Project Accountant but he still remained in WWF’s finance department and not in the PMU. The M&E Officer had been replaced but as with the Project Coordinators, there had been no period of handover between the two persons concerned. The PMU was supported by a **Chief Technical Advisor** – throughout the Project this had been Dr. Neil Burgess. On average he made three visits a year to Project sites in a loose rotation, and had at least weekly contact with the PMU throughout.

32. At the field level, the Project’s three components (Outcomes) have been implemented by three different organisations. Outcome 1, operating geographically in the northern part of the mainland (Tanga Region), has been implemented initially through the Division of Forests and Bee-keeping and latterly through Tanzanian Forest Services. TFS has used the capacity-building part of the Project to establish a Coastal and Mangrove Forest Section and one of its officers acted as the Coordinator for this Outcome and focal point for working with the PMU. Outcome 2, operating in Zanzibar, was implemented through the DFNRNR which appointed its Manager for Forest Protection Areas as the Coordinator and focal point for working with the PMU, and two other persons to coordinate the Project on the islands of Unguja and Pemba. Outcome 3, operating in the southern part of the mainland (Lindi, Kilwa, and Rufiji Regions), was implemented by WWF-Tanzania. It appointed a Landscape Coordinator based in Kilwa and a single Project Executant in each of the three Regions to facilitate implementation of activities through various district offices.

33. Implementation of the Project was undertaken successfully until mid-2012. During this time WWF had a highly experienced and very knowledgeable cadre of staff who undertook coordination and implementation of the Project to a very high standard; not surprisingly since many of them had been involved in one role or another over the decade of more of the Project’s development. They exhibited a high degree of commitment and technical skill in working towards its targets and made significant progress despite real challenges faced in financial reporting and delays in the disbursement of funds (see paragraph 46). Until this point, the assumption by all parties that WWF was a competent and safe pair of hands to act as the coordinating body held true. Unfortunately this all changed in mid-2012 when, following a forensic audit ordered by WWF International into four other projects being run by WWF-Tanzania, fraud was uncovered and eight employees had their contracts terminated while several others resigned. While WWF International’s zero tolerance policy towards fraud is to be applauded, the results for this Project were significant. The MTE notes that:

“... during its restructuring, WWF unilaterally laid off all of the three landscape coordinators (executants). This event brought a halt to all the project activities in the areas.”

The word unilaterally resonates – there was no consultation or even any communication of any sort with WWF’s Project partners. As one person interviewed put it, *“the reorganisation was carried out with thoroughness but no understanding”*, while another noted that it *“eviscerated the organisation”*. The result was that the institutional knowledge and collective memory of the Project disappeared virtually overnight, leaving partners unsettled and annoyed. At the community level, partners feared that the Project had stopped. The trust that had been fostered carefully over many years of contact between WWF staff and project staff on the one hand, and the District staff and leadership of the communities on the other, simply evaporated. The TET found that in some places this had never been re-established. The issue of significantly eroded staff capacity in WWF was raised by many of the people interviewed at all levels. Trust, that intangible yet highly important factor necessary for the successful implementation of projects, remains severely damaged between WWF and nearly all the stakeholders interviewed. With the two main Government implementing partners, this problem has been exacerbated by issues relating to the allocation of funds (see paragraph 49).

34. Poor communication by WWF has been at the root of most of the main problems experienced by this Project. Internally, WWF management admit that:

“Internal communication was not good enough between the PMU and the [WWF] Finance Office, probably as a result of not having a Project-specific accountant for a long period.”

Externally, and in addition to that described immediately above, WWF failed to check with the UNDP-CO as to whether pre-financing was an acceptable strategy in GEF-funded projects to overcome the challenges of repeated and prolonged delays in the disbursement of funds. Had they done so, the ensuing catalogue of problems, delays, and erosion of trust might have been avoided. WWF did not ask – it was not acceptable; but by the time they communicated with the UNDP-CO office, it was too late. Full details are given in paragraph 46 *et seq.*. In part, this can be put down to poor management, but there is another view that there has been confusion in the mind of many WWF staff over the ownership of the Project. This is well articulated by the MTE:

“... some WWF personnel have not fully understood their role and have seen the project as ‘owned’ by WWF and therefore felt that WWF procedures enjoy primacy with regard to project management.”

One person interviewed by the TET stated:

“WWF have become the owner and manager of the Project rather than the coordinator they were supposed to be.”

This increased ownership role has manifested itself in WWF placing little or no priority on the need to inform and consult with its government partners, and although the MTE recommended that the issue be addressed by the PSC early in 2013, it does not appear that it was amongst the issues raised when the MTE Report was discussed. The issue remains current with one interviewee noting that:

“Currently, the Ministry [of Agriculture and Natural Resources] hardly knows what is happening in the Project. ... WWF request UNDP money and UNDP send it to WWF with no communication with the Ministry. [We] don’t know what has been approved ... [since] WWF are no longer communicating.”

and it has continued until the very end of the Project, as the following telling examples demonstrates. In December 2013, TFS prepared a work plan and budget on the basis of the amount of money it calculated was still owed to them from the Project – about Tzs 766 million (c. US\$ 472,200). In January, WWF sent a budget back to TFS with the remaining moneys calculated at TZs 35 million (c. US\$21,750) with no explanation other than money has been withheld awaiting resolution of the dispute between the auditors and WWF over the pre-financing issue (see paragraphs 47-48; and it is clear to the TET that not everybody working in TFS fully understands this issue. Then, when funds were disbursed finally to TFS, they amounted to only Tzs 18 million (c. US\$ 11,100), again with no accompanying explanation. When the TET queried this with WWF, it was found that an explanatory

letter was in preparation, but two weeks after disbursement of the funds it was still awaiting the signature of the Country Director. With distrust between partners and WWF already high, the TET believes it should have been a priority to have ensured that this explanatory letter accompanied the disbursement.

35. Implementation of the Project has closely followed the logical framework. While this is standard practice, there is a weakness inherent in the approach in that by focussing on achieving the indicators, the wider intent of the Project's designers can become lost. This weakness is exacerbated if the logframe has been tinkered with during the inception period and the internal logic of the design has been subtly corrupted, as here. It is clear, for example, that it was not the intention during the inception period to lose the business planning and financial/revenue mechanism elements from Output 1.3 (see paragraph 19 second bullet point), yet by not keeping the wider descriptive sections of the Project Document in mind and by having an M&E system focussing too tightly on the indicators, this important aspect has been lost. Therefore, it is important that a project's management keep in mind the wider intentions of the project's designers as articulated in the Project Document. The elaboration of the strategic approach and the description or list of activities intended to be implemented to achieve the outputs are as important as the indicators themselves.

#9

Lesson learned: Too close a focus on achievement of the logframe's indicators can lead to key elements of the project being lost

Adaptive Management

36. Like much else with the Project, its adaptive management was good in the early stages but deteriorated thereafter. The MTE reports that:

"The project has generally been managed in an adaptive and responsive fashion."

but provided no examples. Some interviewees indicated that the first Project Coordinator and the first M&E Officer were particularly responsive and helpful, providing excellent advice and technical direction as the need arose and often beyond the limit of their remit, enabling changes in approach to be made. The CTA and WWF's Coastal Forest Ecoregion Coordinator were also singled out for praise. One example of their clever adaptive management involved the case of Njini village, Pemba, whose members were reluctant to get involved with forest conservation activities. It was suggested that community members were taken to Amani Nature Reserve to demonstrate the benefits and after this the whole community became closely engaged. The TET finds that since the upheaval in the Project in 2012, although the M&E Officer has provided conscientious monitoring and reporting (see paragraph 65), there is no evidence to show that this has been fed back through any system which has subsequently influenced any management decision. In part, the TET's findings may be partially attributable to the fact that there appears to have been very little activity undertaken by the Project in 2013 and almost none in 2014 as a result of funding issues (see paragraph 48).

37. With regard to the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tools, the MTE notes the "*confusion around the METT process*", and although these were calculated at appropriate times, again there is no evidence to show that this tool was used in any decision-making. To some degree the design has placed too much emphasis on the METT, the assumption being that the PMU would monitor the METTs carefully and make decisions accordingly to prioritise the actions necessary to build the management capacity and effectiveness of the various protected areas (whether geographically or by governance type). This assumption has not been born out, and the process of scoring the METTs appears to have been considered as a hoop to jump through rather than as an important management tool to direct Project activities and resources.

Technical Management

38. The standard of technical management of the Project has been mixed, but generally has not been particularly high. Technical advice has been good and practical, but the direct implementation has often left much to be desired. Where concrete boundary markers (beacons) had been used to mark the edge of various forest reserves in the north and in Zanzibar, these had been done well (although in Tanga Province perhaps not placed at sufficient frequency); wells sunk on Unguja to provide water for

services and fire-fighting were of a high standard, as were building renovations. However, the TET witnessed conservation strategies that lacked targets and were too general to have much effect; draft conservation plans that had received comments but no further versions produced; boundary signs erected without concrete bases and which would rust and fall over or be easily removed in a short time; boundary marks in the south painted low on trees in fire-prone areas where already scorch marks had obliterated them; bee-keeping groups with surprisingly poor yields because of inadequate training; stove making groups constructing poor quality stoves again because of poor training; and COCOBAs established in villages where VCOBAs were already operating.

The Project has been poorly managed with ineffective communication, unauthorised pre-financing, significant disruption to staffing, and escalating levels of distrust between WWF and its partners. As a result of this, very little activity is reported to have been carried out in the second half of the Project. As a result, the implementation approach has been evaluated as **Unsatisfactory**.

UNDP supervision and backstopping

39. UNDP-GEF supervision has been accomplished by standard procedures undertaken competently, and has benefitted from having the same Programme Specialist at the helm throughout; indeed she was even present during the Project's design and therefore the UNDP-CO was able to have retained considerable institutional memory of the Project. Key aspects of supervision were made through UNDP's involvement in the meetings of the PSC and the Management Committee, and through the annual PIRs, but there was also frequent contact between the CO and the PMU. The UNDP-CO was heavily involved in regular issues such as the review and approval of workplans and budgets, review of progress and performance against such workplans, and completion of the tracking tools. It appears that the CO was helpful and supportive throughout the implementation period, responding adequately to provide good guidance, honest and constructive criticism, and advice to overcome particular problems as necessary. Indeed one member of the DFNRNR referred to the fact that "*UNDP played a significant and passionate role*".

40. However, there have been some issues where UNDP has faced criticism, primarily over the use of the Finance, Accounting, Control and Evaluation (FACE) system which has been seen as being too inflexible to accommodate the needs of field implementation of a Project (see paragraph 46). The TET is critical of the UNDP-CO over the delay of finalising the agreement over the verification audit, which according to the covering letter included in the report, was completed on 6th January 2014. Yet at the time of the TE, common agreement was still being sought between WWF and the auditors, apparently not because the disagreements were insurmountable but because the tripartite meeting including UNDP had not yet been arranged – in fact hurried arrangements were being discussed after the debriefing meeting. Given the delays and interruptions to funding in 2014 that this lack of agreement has caused, the TET cannot understand why the UNDP-CO has not facilitated the resolution of this more rapidly. Furthermore, while the TET has been critical of WWF's inadequate communication, it also notes that there has been no communication from UNDP with the implementing partners over this issue. The TET believes that it was incumbent upon the UNDP-CO, who commissioned the audit, to write to all partners explaining the discrepancies under discussion from the report, explaining what the next steps in the process would be and assigning them a timetable, and pointing out what the consequences would be for the forthcoming quarterly payment(s). That it did not is viewed as a mistake.

The UNDP-CO has provided an adequate level of supervision and backstopping to the Project with only minor shortcomings, and its performance has benefitted as a direct result of the UNDP-CO's commitment, hence UNDP's supervision and backstopping role is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT

Overview and co-financing

41. Disputes and distrust between the implementing partners have dogged this Project throughout its second half with two key issues at the forefront – a) the amount and allocation of the pre-financing

provided by WWF; and b) the allocation of funds by WWF between the various Project components. Before entering a discussion of these key points, it is perhaps best to start with an overview of the Project's finances.

42. Table 5 shows that as of 31st May 2014 (the latest full month that figures were available for at the time of the TE), 94.85% of the GEF funds had been disbursed, while UNDP had provided 18% more TRAC funds than originally budgeted in the Project Document. All other contributions are recorded as being according to budget. However, there are two issues relating to these. Firstly, in-kind contributions were poorly tracked, as also noted by the MTE report:

“... the project has not really tracked the co-financing in a systematic way. This omission gives rise to an additional complication. It is an issue that does relate to the co-financing and that requires attention. It is the need to maintain discrete accountability for funding from different funding sources so as to preclude ‘double-dipping’. Despite assurances that the work plans allow for the clear distinction of funding expenditure and the fact that the MTE Team could not find any evidence of this, it is an element that requires constant attention.”

Despite the concerns of the MTE, the TET can find no evidence of measures taken by the Project to increase tracking of these funds. The TET is aware of the difficulties that any PMU has in trying to deal with this issue, and it is common to all projects where in-kind contributions are a feature. Notwithstanding the fact that GEF has moved recently to redefine in-kind and cash co-financing such that monies or goods supplied to a project on a current accounting basis, i.e. that were included in a given year's budget (e.g. electricity or telephone costs in an office or fuel for stakeholder vehicles used by the project) are now counted as cash co-financing, tracking of partner-managed funds remains an issue. While partners (most commonly governments) are rightly keen to have their contributions acknowledged, the TET believes strongly that with such acknowledgement comes a responsibility for transparent accounting and that each partner institution should be accountable for reporting its funding each quarter to UNDP in just the same way as the PMU is responsible for accounting for its disbursement of GEF and TRAC funds.

#4	Lesson learned: Partner institutions should be made responsible for tracking and reporting all of their financial contributions to a project.
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TABLE 5: SOURCES OF ACTUAL FINANCING TO 31ST MAY 2014 (US\$)

Cash Financing	Budget	Actual	%
GEF	3,550,000.00	3,367,281.92	94.85
UNDP	400,000.00	470,518.26	117.63
Tanzania Forest Conservation Group	400,000.00	400,000.00	100.00
CARE	600,000.00	600,000.00	100.00
Mpingo Conservation Project	400,000.00	400,000.00	100.00
WWF UK	360,000.00	360,000.00	100.00
WWF Finland	347,500.00	347,500.00	100.00
WWF Denmark	40,000.00	40,000.00	100.00
WWF Sweden	800,000.00	800,000.00	100.00
Total Cash Financing	6,897,500.00	6,785,300.18	98.37
In-kind Contributions			
Forestry and Beekeeping Division	1,280,000.00	1,280,000.00	100.00
Department of Commercial Crops, Fruits and Forestry	1,732,750.00	1,732,750.00	100.00
Rufiji District Council	204,000.00	204,000.00	100.00
Kilwa District Council	240,000.00	240,000.00	100.00
Lindi District Council	217,916.00	217,916.00	100.00
Total In-kind Contributions	3,674,666.00	3,674,666.00	100.00
	10,572,166.00	10,459,966.18	98.94

SOURCE: ATLAS, Project Document. Co-financing figures from WWF since these were not channelled through UNDP.

NOTE: it is outside the scope of the TE to verify independently the financial figures contained in any of the tables and figures presented here through an audit.

43. The second of the issues arising from Table 5 concerns the cash contributions from many of the donor partners. Because of poor tracking of co-financing in general, the TET has no means of verifying the amounts received. The MTE notes that:

“The delay in project implementation certainly caused complications and, as has been noted for the pledges of co-financing, some of the resources were difficult to realise.”

This statement and WWF’s reporting of full cash contributions being realised from the co-financing donors are hard to reconcile, made even more difficult by a senior member of WWF reporting that:

“There was no verification as to whether it [co-finance] came into the Project ... and is probably a source of deficit.”

The MTE report also states:

“Considerable co-financing was pledged at the project inception (just over \$7 million). Much of this is being realised, but the delay in project inception certainly had an impact upon the co-financing. It did not mean that the co-financing was not realised, but it did mean that the project built upon the implementation of the projects that formed part of the co-financing rather than directly working with them. Many of the projects have now closed. This should not be seen as something necessarily negative and the Mid-Term Evaluation Team regard this as ‘realised’ co-financing. This is a common experience with many GEF projects and it must be realised that much of the co-financing occurs through related projects which cannot wait for the GEF-supported project.”

The TET cannot agree with this. The Lead Evaluator has seen many projects in Asia where such delays in project start-up have meant that pledged co-funding spent prior to the project has not been considered as realised. Since many GEF-funded projects build upon the work of others that have gone before them, where are the boundaries to be drawn as to what is considered as co-financing – one year, five years, ten years? At best, such work prior to the start of a given project should be considered as parallel financing, but since GEF has now withdrawn this distinction, the boundaries defining co-financing appear to have become even more opaque. Yet, contrary to this idea of co-financing being spent prior to the commencement of the Coastal Forest Project, the figures reported by WWF in Table 6 show that all of the US\$ 2,947,500 of cash co-financing from non-GEF and UNDP sources was accounted for as being disbursed during the period 2011-14. The problem of poor tracking inevitably leads to confusion.

44. Table 6 shows a breakdown of the source of cash funds disbursed by Outcome. Total disbursement of cash funds to the end of May 2014 amounted to US\$ 6,805,571. If Project spending can be taken as a crude measure of the progress of implementation, then the Project has achieved the progress originally envisaged, since this sum represents 97% of the budget projected in the Project Document. Table 6 also highlights a number of points:

- Project management costs were primarily funded by GEF (76%), and these costs ran significantly over budget totalling twice the overall budget and almost 3.8 times the GEF budget (see paragraphs 50 and 56);
- The final GEF : co-finance ratio in terms of monies spent was 1:1.01 (US\$ 3,387,552 to US\$ 3,418,019), an acceptable result;
- UNDP provided 18% more in co-finance than was budgeted; and
- Spending on Outcomes 1 and 2 were significantly less than originally budgeted for (71% and 79% respectively) and the proportion of GEF funds spent on these Outcomes was worryingly even less (49% and 60% respectively) – see paragraph 49);

TABLE 6: TOTAL DISBURSEMENT OF CASH FUNDS (US\$) BY OUTCOME BY SOURCE TO 31ST MAY 2014 AGAINST FULL PROJECT BUDGET AS PER PROJECT DOCUMENT (FIGURES ROUNDED) ⁵

	GEF			UNDP			Other - Cash			Total		
	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%
Outcome 1	1,332,000	649,212	49	120,000	89,889	75	1,119,965	1,119,965	100	2,621,965	1,859,066	71
Outcome 2	964,500	581,137	60	10,000	0	0	820,888	821,070	100	1,785,388	1,402,207	79
Outcome 3	926,500	925,873	100	85,000	263,016	309	742,546	742,538	100	1,789,546	1,931,427	108
Proj. Man.	327,000	1,231,330	377	185,000	117,613	64	264,101	263,927	100	791,101	1,612,871	204
Total	3,550,000	3,387,552	95	400,000	470,518	118	2,947,500	2,947,500	100	6,988,000	6,805,571	97

SOURCE: ATLAS, Project Document. Co-financing figures from WWF since these were not channelled through UNDP.

NOTE: it is outside the scope of the TE to verify independently the financial figures contained in any of the tables and figures presented here through an audit.

45. Table 7 shows the figures for the disbursement of GEF funds by Outcome against budget in each of the project's half- yearly periods. Figure 1 illustrates these figures as a percentage of the budget disbursed in each period by Outcome, and Figure 2 shows the same but cumulatively. These illustrate a number of factors:

- the high project management costs that started hugely over budget and which, although declining cumulatively over time, spiked in the second half of 2012 when WWF was experiencing problems and which, tellingly, were only ever under budget once (first half of 2012) and then at 96% of budget;
- the typical slow start to actual activities of a project appears not to have occurred here, but the delays are masked since there are no figures for the Project in ATLAS for 2010 despite first disbursements being made to WWF on 29th October 2010.
- a curious high disbursement to Outcome 2 (Zanzibar) in the first half of 2012 followed by what appears to be a repayment in the second half, coinciding with WWF's management problems and perhaps attributable to a simple mistake – certainly the balance of US\$ 154,603 is in line with low disbursement against the annual budget for 2012 (US\$ 310,000).
- the sharp drop off in disbursements in 2014 due to uncertainties surrounding the remaining availability of funds because of unresolved issues pertaining to the pre-financing and the verification audit; and
- the levels of disbursement for Outcomes 1 and 2 always running at significantly lower proportional levels than that for Outcome 3.

TABLE 7: TOTAL DISBURSEMENT OF GEF FUNDS (US\$) BY OUTPUT BY HALF-YEAR AGAINST FULL PROJECT BUDGET AS PER PROJECT DOCUMENT (FIGURES ROUNDED)

	Jan - June 2011			July - Dec 2011			Jan - June 2012			July - Dec 2012			Jan - June 2013			July - Dec 2013			Jan - May 2014		
	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%	Budget	Actual	%
Outcome1	163,000	84,232	52	163,000	121,736	75	221,500	298	0	221,500	142,221	64	164,500	86,914	53	164,500	186,748	114	234,000	27,062	12
Outcome2	127,250	75,041	59	127,250	42,778	34	155,000	527,390	340	155,000	-372,787	-241	115,000	83,805	73	115,000	172,285	150	170,000	52,625	31
Outcome3	116,500	209,793	180	116,500	134,024	115	121,750	0	0	121,750	254,408	209	121,750	75,926	62	121,750	178,921	147	206,500	72,801	35
Proj. Man.	42,000	275,931	657	42,000	187,971	448	40,000	38,441	96	40,000	309,314	773	40,500	57,056	141	40,500	118,499	293	82,000	244,118	298
	448,750	644,998	144	448,750	486,509	108	538,250	566,130	105	538,250	333,155	62	441,750	303,701	69	441,750	656,453	149	692,500	396,606	57

SOURCE: ATLAS, Project Document. Note that half-yearly budget figures are taken simply as the year budget given in the Project Document (Year 1, Year 2, etc.) divided by two.

NOTE: it is outside the scope of the TE to verify independently the financial figures contained in any of the tables and figures presented here through an audit.

⁵ **Important note:** WWF strongly dispute the figures contained within Table 6 and in comments provided on the draft TE Report, have provided different figures for the GEF budgets for Outcomes 1, 2 and Project Management, as well as different figures for actual Project Management spend that show the Project Management costs in a better light than is presented here. However, even at the time of the final drafting of this report, these figures have still not been agreed by the UNDP-CO and the issue remains under discussion. As a result, the TET can work only with the official figures provided from ATLAS, as presented here.

FIGURE 1: DISBURSEMENT OF GEF FUNDS (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY HALF-YEAR AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET IN PROJECT DOCUMENT





FIGURE 2: CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENT OF GEF FUNDS (US\$) BY COMPONENT BY HALF-YEAR AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET IN PROJECT DOCUMENT



Delays in disbursements and pre-financing

46. Perhaps one of the two key issues affecting this Project has been the delays incurred in disbursing funds through UNDP's use of the FACE system. While the benefits of the system for financial control and reporting are recognised, it poses significant constraints on the implementation of projects, especially those requiring flexibility of management and implementation response when working in remote areas with poor infrastructure, limited institutional capabilities, and variable weather. The key issues with the system relate to a) the need for full reports and accounts to be received by the UNDP-CO at the end of each quarter prior to funds being released for the next; and b) for 80% of the funds to have been spent at the end of each quarter or deductions are made from the next quarter corresponding to previously unspent funds. There is almost an inevitability about problems and delays arising from these requirements, especially where reports are required from multiple implementing partners. Consider the requirements carefully – a report is required at the end

of Quarter A before funds can be released for Quarter B. Partners are spending until the last day of Quarter A so they cannot start reporting until Quarter B has already begun. If a coordinating body is involved, as here, even with maximum efficiency it will take a week or more for a report to be made. Then the UNDP-CO has to check the report thoroughly and order the release of funds. When banking operations are added, one is looking at a minimum of another week. Thus, the funds for Quarter B are released at the earliest two weeks into the quarter meaning that the implementing partners now have to spend 13 weeks' money in just 11. It doesn't take much imagination to realise that as these effects become cumulative, the ability to spend more than 80% of the quarter's funds in any quarter becomes impossible. Throw in a delay to implementing a large or complex activity because of external factors, and the whole reporting mechanism brings the project to a grinding halt. This Project experienced this repeatedly. The MTE notes:

*“While the narrative operational reports have generally been produced on time, the financial reports have usually been delayed. This has a ‘knock-on’ effect in that delayed reports result in delayed disbursements. In fairness to WWF who have produced the reports, they report that they have frequently faced challenges with the information of the reports that they have received from partners. Clarifying issues can take time and it is not helpful to blame any individual institution. **The system needs some overhaul.**” [TET emphasis].*

Indeed the system does need an overhaul, particularly since this is a problem common to many projects. There is a simple means of overcoming this by building a buffer period into FACE to enable flexibility. At the Project's outset, funds are disbursed for Quarter B without the need to report the results for Quarter A. Instead, Quarter A's report (still required at the end of Quarter A) triggers the release of funds for Quarter C, not Quarter B; the report for Quarter B triggers the release for Quarter D; and so on. Yes, it does add slightly to the amount of money that is at risk at any one time, but it also allows for the flexibility needed to accommodate delays in implementation and reporting, especially amongst partners, and it would overcome the problem exhibited in this Project of all partners being tied to the pace of the slowest member. Crucially, the current system does not facilitate the smooth implementation of projects, so an alternative must be worth trying.

#3	Lesson learned: A buffer period needs to be introduced into FACE to facilitate the flexibility necessary to implement complex projects.
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47. As the delays increased, WWF decided to act to try and keep the Project on schedule by pre-financing it using their own funds and then seeking to recoup such monies from subsequent funds as and when they were released by UNDP. This technique is used very commonly by international NGOs when implementing large projects and WWF's intent was solely for the good of the Project. Recognition of this fact is not currently universal amongst the Project's partners – it should be. It was after all its own funds it was using to keep the Project moving. Unfortunately, WWF made a crucial error; it did not communicate its intention to do this to the UNDP-CO. If it had done, it would have found that pre-financing is against the rules for implementing UNDP-GEF projects and all of the ensuing problems would have been avoided. But poor communication between parties has also been a feature of this Project (see paragraph 34). The Audit Verification Report⁶ submitted in April 2014 shows that pre-financing took place as given in Table 8 and states that:

“Though pre-financing took place during September 2011 to March 2012 WWF formally communicated [this] to UNDP in May 2013 (15 months later).”

to which WWF have responded:

“It is not true that the pre-financing was not noticed early. Pre-financing of Tzs 73.5 million was accepted and refunded by UNDP in December, 2012.”

The minutes of the 3rd PSC Meeting held on 27th June 2012 would appear to support this, since they note that:

⁶ Expenditure Verification for “Extending The Coastal Forests Protected Area Sub - System In Tanzania” for the Period from October, 2010 To 31st December, 2012. Financial Consultants & Services, Certified Public Accountants, Kagera Street No. 42 Magomeni Area, Dar Es Salaam.

“Despite of several challenges which resulted to funds not be disbursed on time, UNDP emphasized that according to their policy pre-financing is not allowed unless prior approval is given through formal communication to allow certain activities to continue through pre-financing.”[sic]

This indicates that the subject was under discussion at this time and that UNDP did know about it no more than three months after the practice ceased.

TABLE 8: TIMING AND AMOUNTS OF PRE-FINANCING CARRIED OUT BY WWF

Period	Tanzanian shillings	US Dollars (approx)
Up to September 2011	181,635,956	111,914
October to December 2011	73,553,919	45,320
January to March 2012	380,661,757	234,542
Total	635,851,632	391,776

48. Crucially, WWF dispute the net amount of pre-financing calculated by the auditors in their report. The auditors show that UNDP refunded some of the pre-financing and that the net amount outstanding at the end of the period they covered (31st December 2012) was Tzs 449,296,884 (US\$ 276,831), but WWF’s response is:

“Net Pre-financing of Tzs. 449 million is incorrect. Correct amount is Tzs. 574 million [US\$353,666]. Currently, we are submitting the reports to UNDP soon after receiving retirements from Implementing Partners.”

This dispute remained current at the time of the TE and as a result, the final instalment of funds had been only partially released to the implementing partners as late as early June 2014; the remainder held back to repay the pre-financing once an agreed figure was available. Consequently, almost no work has been possible on Project activities during 2014.

Allocation of funds

49. One of the important consequences of the pre-financing issue has been a significant loss of trust in WWF by the other implementing partners. The interruptions to the release of funds and the lowering of budgets with little or no explanation (see paragraph 34) have led to many unanswered questions. There is widespread feeling amongst the partners that WWF have not played fair with the allocation of GEF and UNDP funds and have prioritised themselves above their partners. In short, TFS and the DFNRNR feel that they have not received the funds to which they were entitled under the Project Document. The figures provided from ATLAS in Table 6 provide substantive evidence that this is indeed the case. Outcome 1 (implemented by TFS) received only 71% of the amount budgeted (including all cash co-financing) and only 49% of the GEF funds budgeted; Outcome 2 (implemented by DFNRNR) received only 79% and 60% respectively of those funds budgeted. Compare this to Outcome 3 (implemented by WWF) which received 108% of the amount budgeted including cash co-finance and 100% of the GEF budget and it is instantly apparent that there has been gross inequality in the allocation of available funds between the implementing partners. While it may be argued that the two Government agencies were slower and less efficient than WWF in implementing their activities, the TET has seen no evidence to this effect, and they argue that they have done all they can with the money provided.

Management costs

50. A second factor that is immediately obvious from a perusal of the figures in Table 6 is that project management costs are exorbitantly high. Project management cost US\$ 1,612,871 out of a total Project cost of US\$ 6,805,571, that is 23.7%. In terms of GEF funds, US\$ 1,231,330 was used for project management, or 36.4% of GEF funds disbursed to the end of May 2014. In terms of budget, this is twice the amount envisaged in terms of total project funding, and 3.77 times what was envisaged from GEF funds. That is a staggering overspend – US\$ 904,330 of GEF money that should have been spent on direct conservation activities – and raises many questions about why the UNDP-CO and the PSC did not recognise this at an early stage and introduce measures to curb such spending. It is the belief of some stakeholders that this overspend is the main reason why the Project closed at its

originally scheduled end date of 30th June 2014 rather than being able to take advantage of the six month no-cost extension granted to it after the MTE. It is possible that some of this overspend is funds which have been misallocated and should have been costed against one of the Project's Outcomes⁷ – the Lead Evaluator has come across this on many occasions, and notes that in the verification audit (for the period up to 31st December 2012), figures for Outcome 4 (Project management) show the two largest sums to be Tzs 94,370,000 (US\$ 58,145) for consultancy (which had no budget allocated) and Tzs 81,618,774 (US\$ 50,289) for management and reporting services forming 61% of the then total. Even allowing for this possibility, the management costs as currently reported are quite simply the highest the Lead Evaluator has come across in 26 GEF projects. Table 9 provides some comparisons from recent projects to help to illustrate the scale of the problem here. While in the examples provided, the *Western Terai Landscape Complex Project* had proportionally higher management costs, these were largely budgeted for within the Project Document and agreed by GEF; that project posted an overspend of just 14% on its budget, compared to 377% overspend on this project. Note also that even multi-country projects with complex international coordination have lower management costs than those incurred for this Project here. Furthermore, it is unclear as to whether the figures recorded for the Coastal Forest Project include or exclude the 7.9% management fee paid to WWF under the contract with UNDP for acting as the coordinating body.

TABLE 9: COMPARISON OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT COSTS FROM RECENT PROJECTS EVALUATED BY THE LEAD EVALUATOR

Dates	Title	PIMS	Countries	Management costs as % of GEF grant	% of GEF budget
2005-2012 Terminal	Creating Biodiversity Conservation Landscapes in Nepal's Lowland Terai and Eastern Himal Areas (Western Terai Landscape Complex Project)	1831	Nepal	44.7	114
2010-2014	Extending the Coastal Forest Protected Area Sub-system in Tanzania	2760	Tanzania	36.4	377.0
2006-2010 Terminal	Enhancing Conservation of the Critical Network of Sites required by Migratory Waterbirds on the African/Eurasian Flyways "Wings Over Wetlands"	GF/6010-06-03	Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal/Gambia, South Africa Tanzania, Turkey, Yemen	32.25	104.3
2007-2011 Terminal	Community-based Conservation of Biological Diversity in the Mountain Landscapes of Mongolia's Altai Sayan Eco-region	1929	Mongolia	29.5	240.5
2009-2012 Mid-term	Strengthening the Management Effectiveness of the Protected Area System of Turkmenistan	3961	Turkmenistan	28.95	82.3
2003-2011 Terminal	Development of a Wetland Site and Flyway Network for Conservation of the Siberian Crane and Other Migratory Waterbirds in Asia	GF/6030-03	China, Kazakhstan, Iran, Russia	National 21.8 Regional 20.5	Nat. 100.5 Reg. 118.0

⁷ Figures from WWF suggest that US\$ 406,844 currently allocated under Project Management are actually consultancy fees paid on behalf of one or more of the other implementing partners and hence may actually refer to Outcome 1 (and possibly 2) but as of 6th August 2014, these are not yet agreed by the UNDP-CO and the matter remains under discussion. Putting aside other figures disputed by WWF (see footnote # 5), reallocation of these funds would mean that actual Project Management spend was US\$ 824,486, i.e. 24.3% of the total GEF grant and 252% of the original budget, an overspend of US\$ 497,486.

2004-2009 Terminal	Biodiversity Protection in the North Vidzeme Biosphere Reserve	2190	Latvia	21.4	69.1
2005-2012 Terminal	Establishing Conservation Areas through Landscape Management (CALM) in the Northern Plains of Cambodia	2177	Cambodia	15.4	63.6
2008-2010 Mid-term	Strengthening Sustainability of the National Protected Area System by Focusing on Strictly Protected Areas	2111	Uzbekistan	12.4	95.7
2009-2012 Mid-term	Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity in the Headwaters of the Huaihe River Basin	3934	China	10.0	55.1

51. The TET views this huge overspend on project management and the inequitable distribution of project funds in favour of WWF and at the expense of their government partners with grave concern, and in the light of this it recommends that UNDP request a formal explanation from WWF as to its actions in coordinating this Project. The TET is aware that the final PSC meeting has been re-scheduled for 25th July to allow the TET report to be available to it, and is also aware that some money remains to be spent and discussions on keeping open the Project beyond its closing date of 30th June 2014 are underway. As such, the TET further recommends that WWF's formal explanation be presented to either the full PSC if possible, or to a meeting of the Management Committee if not. Depending upon that meeting, the UNDP-CO and the other stakeholders should take whatever action they deem necessary. Minutes of the meeting should be forwarded to the UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Advisor in Addis Ababa.

The TET recommends that UNDP request a formal explanation from WWF as to their actions in coordinating this Project.

<i>Responsibility</i>	<i>Task</i>	<i>Time frame</i>	<i>Deliverable</i>
UNDP-CO/ PSC	Hold a meeting with WWF to seek an acceptable explanation as to a) why project management costs were so heavily overspent; and b) why the remaining funds were unequally distributed in WWF's favour	By end of Project	Minutes of meeting and written explanation from WWF if deemed necessary

Financial control

52. The audit verification report lists 19 findings of instances where WWF's financial control has been inadequate within the period October 2010 to December 2012. Of these, three are deemed to be high risk, defined as:

*“Issue which needs to be addressed on an urgent basis. **Internal Control procedures are frequently overridden or ignored.** There is a substantial risk of failure to achieve the Internal control objectives on the reliability of financial reporting.”* [Auditor's emphasis]

and seven are deemed to be significant risk, defined as:

*“Issue which needs to be addressed on the first available opportunity. **Internal Control procedures are generally followed.** However, there are **significant exceptions** which could impact the effectiveness and reliability of Internal Control.”* [Auditor's emphasis]

Of the former, the pre-financing and unauthorised overspend from budget account for two of the three issues, while the third relates to the payment of Tzs 88,330,414 (US\$ 54,424) which was not supported by documentary evidence and represents unretired imprests and advances. WWF's response is that:

“We are currently going through the files to try to locate the missing documents.”

It is unknown what the current situation relating to this is but this amount may form part of the totals disputed by WWF. Of the seven issues deemed significant, these include ineligible expenditure (US\$ 5,161); allowances paid contrary to Government regulations (disputed) (US\$ 5,750); vouchers

unavailable for audit purposes) (US\$ 15,978); reports on fixed assets (non-expendable equipment) not submitted to the Government as per letter of agreement (US\$ 0); overstatement of project costs (use of high exchange rates) (US\$ 1,925); differences in the payroll and general ledger (US\$ 7,215). The final one appears to be simply a misunderstanding in reporting. It is clear from WWF's management responses made at the time that a) they were unaware of these issues, and b) could provide little or no explanation for them. While the total amount concerned (excluding the pre-financing issue) is approximately US\$ 90,500, this represents only about 2.5% of the total GEF budget; serious enough to show an uncomfortable degree of laxity in WWF's financial control system, but not serious enough to generate significant concern and likely to be of a similar order to irregularities in many projects that do not go through a formal audit. Furthermore, WWF's control procedures were tightened significantly after the country office was re-structured in 2012, and discussions with WWF indicated to the TET that these procedures were probably now robust and being fully implemented.

53. There is one other issue of financial control with which the TET does take issue, and that is WWF routing Project funding through the personal bank accounts of the Project Executants. The TET stresses that absolutely no impropriety has been uncovered, but in a situation where the country office has a history of misappropriation of funds and current Project's financial control procedures have in places been found to be lax, the use of personal bank accounts provides wholly the wrong perception. Furthermore, the TET views it as unfair on the project executants; they may be subject to tax inquiries, accusations of deceit, and there are significant grey areas, e.g. the personal accounts are savings accounts that attract interest (perhaps on a daily basis) but there are no rules governing ownership of that interest. This practice has come about through the WWF country office seeking to circumvent controls imposed by WWF International; controls which simply do not take account of the realities of implementing a project in the field. WWF International requires that all bank accounts in use for a project are opened from their HQ in Gland, Switzerland, directly with the local branch of the bank concerned; and that each such account has two signatories approved by Gland. The former takes considerable time, while the latter is unrealistic in a situation where only one WWF operative is working in a remote area and where WWF staff changes may be frequent. To overcome this problem, the WWF country office has paid all advances, imprests, and travel costs for the Project through the Project Executants' personal bank accounts. The TET believes that one of the central tenets of financial control is the complete separation of monies at all times; it is simply not good practice mix project and personal funds, even if the former can be tracked transparently. The TET cannot make formal recommendations to WWF International since this lies outside its ToR. Nonetheless, it strongly urges WWF International to make minor changes to their control system to reflect on-the-ground realities and maintain complete transparency of accounting. These are:

- a) enable project bank accounts at the Project Executant level to be opened directly by the WWF country office; and
- b) that the same accounts require only one signature.

The end product would be exactly the same as the current pragmatic practice (the Project Executant opens his own personal account and is the only signatory to it) but will ensure complete separation of project funds from private funds.

Summary

54. While the Project has exhibited acceptable financial planning skills in dealing with the Project in terms of the array of activities undertaken, the management of the finances has been poor with significant errors introduced through unauthorised pre-financing and inequitable sharing of funds. Tracking of co-funding has been effectively non-existent. Financial oversight by the PSC has been as good as possible once problems have been discovered, but delays in reporting the accounts and significant confusion in these, such that long-running disputes have remained between WWF and the auditors, have masked some of the issues of inequitable distribution, even if stakeholders had some inkling of this. Slow reporting and the inflexibility of the FACE system has been at the root of many of the problems since it has resulted in inefficient budget replenishment and consequent implementation delays.

Financial management has been poor with significant errors introduced through unauthorised pre-financing, inequitable sharing of funds, and no tracking of co-funding. Delays in disbursement of funds have been rife. Disputes between WWF and the auditors have been left unresolved for a long period which has hindered effective decision-making and implementation, hence financial management has been evaluated as **Unsatisfactory**.

Cost-effectiveness

55. The *UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported GEF-financed Projects* (2011) eventually defines the criteria of “efficiency” in Box 3 as:

“The extent to which results have been delivered with the least costly resources possible; also called cost effectiveness or efficacy.”

Since the term “efficiency” is rather ambiguous and could apply to efficiency in terms of time, energy-use or even carbon footprint, it has been replaced in this evaluation with the precise term “cost-effectiveness” to which it actually relates, as per Box 3.

56. The Project has not been managed in a cost-effective way by WWF. The very high cost of Project management amounting to 23.7% of total project funding and 36.4% of GEF funds remains to be explained by WWF and is out of proportion to the activities undertaken and achievements made. To put it into context, the overspend of US\$ 904,330 of GEF money is actually 39% more than the total amount TFS received to undertake its activities in Outcome 1, and more than half again (55%) what the DFNRNR received for its activities in Zanzibar (Outcome 2); or to put it another way, project management costs to GEF totalled 1.9 times the GEF spend on Outcome 1 and 2.1 times the spend on Outcome 2. This would appear either a mistake or profligate. While the TET recognises that the Project was carried out over a large area, with poor communication infrastructure, and was complex involving three implementing partners, these issues are replicated in many other projects with significantly lower management costs. Since WWF has now become a GEF Implementing Agency, the reasons behind such high costs should be examined very carefully to ensure that lessons are learned and that costs to future projects are reduced significantly.

57. On the other hand, the Government implementing partners appear to have been cost-effective since both TFS and the DFNRNR have managed to achieve many of their targets with significantly reduced funds. The TET made a point at the debriefing meeting, before it had access to the collated financial data from UNDP, that the activities that it had seen carried out on Zanzibar did not appear to be worth the almost US\$ 1 million of GEF funds budgeted. Indeed, they did not because as has subsequently been found, they cost at most 60% of that. However, the TET noted on a number of occasions that there had been ineffective deployment of funds – television equipment bought before basic furniture at Masingini (see paragraph 92); and COCOBAs being initiated in villages in Lindi where other projects had very recently introduced the same thing a few months previously (see paragraph 101 third bullet point).

Although government implementing partners appear to have operated cost-effectively, the same cannot be said of WWF’s project management which ran excessively over budget (377% of GEF budget). Since this amounts to an overspend of US\$ 904,330 of GEF money (which is 39% and 55% more than the totals spent on activities for Outcomes 1 and 2 respectively) which was budgeted to bring global conservation benefits but which has not done so, overall cost-effectiveness of the Project has been evaluated as **Highly Unsatisfactory**.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

M&E Design

58. The Project Document contains a short Monitoring and Evaluation Plan which states at the beginning:

“The project will support the implementation of a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation ... framework designed to monitor performance, process, objective achievement, and its environmental and socio-economic impacts and will rely strongly on active involvement of project implementing partners ...”

While this plan goes on to outline a comprehensive approach to monitoring, including performance and impact monitoring, it concentrates most of this on the logframe’s indicators. The actual issue of impact monitoring is left to the inception phase, a common mistake in design:

“The project team will utilize the recent UNDP GEF guidelines on indicators of conservation impact to develop during the inception period a plan for the measurement of project impact on biodiversity, protected areas, and livelihoods.”

No plan was developed for biodiversity, METT scores were used for PAs, and no significant or meaningful indicators were introduced for measuring impacts on livelihoods. Crucially there is no dedicated M&E budget provided within the Project Document, and although mid-term and terminal evaluations are identified as necessary, again no budget for these is ring-fenced.

The design of M&E was of a standard normal for the design period, but lacked adequate allocation of responsibilities and had no budget; hence monitoring and evaluation design has been evaluated as Marginally satisfactory.

M&E Implementation

59. Monitoring and evaluation of Project activities have been undertaken in varying detail at three levels:

- i. Progress monitoring
- ii. Internal activity monitoring
- iii. Impact monitoring

60. Progress monitoring has been fairly good and has been made through quarterly and annual reports to the UNDP-CO. The annual work plans have been developed for the period July to June with inputs from Project staff and the UNDP-CO. The annual workplans were then said to have been submitted for endorsement by the PSC, but given that this met no more than once per year and in February 2013 and January 2014, the TET finds it hard to reconcile how this could have been done in any meaningful way for a workplan commencing in July. The UNDP-CO provided formal approval. The TET is also aware that workplans were sometimes also required for shorter periods – that for January-June 2014 having to be re-written three times because of budget difficulties. The PMU has been in close communication with the UNDP-CO (3-4 times per week) regarding progress, the work plan, and its implementation, and has also ensured that the UNDP-CO received quarterly progress reports providing updates on the status of planned activities, the status of the overall project schedule, the products completed, and an outline of the activities planned for the following quarter and an estimate of expected completion date. These reports appear to have caused the Project considerable problems and the implementing partners were frequently late in submitting their contributions which in turn led to considerable delays in the release of the next quarter’s funds (see paragraph 46). These report formats contained quantitative estimates of project progress based on financial disbursements which have served as an additional monitoring tool. The UNDP-CO generated its own quarterly financial reports from Atlas from data provided by the Trust. These expenditure records, together with Atlas disbursement records of any direct payments, served as a basis for expenditure monitoring, and budget revisions, the latter on an *ad hoc* basis depending upon the rate of delivery.

61. From the quarterly reports, the UNDP-CO has prepared Quarterly Operational Reports (150-word fixed-format) which have been forwarded to UNDP/GEF Regional Coordination Unit in Johannesburg/Addis Ababa, and in turn submitted to UNDP HQ and to GEF. The major findings and observations of all these reports have been given in an annual report covering the period July to June, the Project Implementation Review (PIR), which is also submitted by the PMU and the UNDP-CO to the UNDP Regional Coordination Unit and UNDP HQ for review and official comments, followed by final submission to GEF. All key reports were presented to PSC members ahead of their meetings and

through this means, the key national ministries and national government has been kept abreast of the Project's implementation progress.

62. The PMU and the UNDP-CO have maintained a close working relationship, with Project staff members meeting, or talking with, CO staff several times a week to discuss implementation issues and problems. The UNDP-CO appears to have monitored the Project regularly through a number of field visits made by persons from the Energy and Environment Team as well as the two Deputy Country Directors (Programme and Operations) – an unusually high level of involvement at this level reflecting the high degree of commitment the UNDP-CO showed to the supervision of this Project. Back-to-the-Office Reports were made on all visits and the TET has viewed these – they have a significant level of detail. The CO has also participated in all PSC meetings. The Project has been subject to a verification audit by independent auditors appointed by UNDP – see paragraphs 30 and 47.

63. The Project's risk assessment has been reviewed by the UNDP-CO every six months. The initial risks identified during the design were uploaded at the commencement of the Project and management responses reported against as their situation changed. Only one new risk was added during the Project, that relating to the discovery of precious minerals in forest areas introducing a threat of unauthorised mining and noted on 19th July 2012. None of the entries have been considered as "Critical".

64. A Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) was undertaken in December 2012 with the report being finalised in April 2013. It gave a formal rating to the "Overall Project Results" as Marginally Satisfactory

"The project has performed fairly well. Many significant achievements have been realised – the increase in the PA estate as well as the arrangements for community and co-management of forests. The partnerships that have been built through the project provide the most significant achievement. Challenges have been associated with the implementation – the financial management, the instability of the project team and the limitations of some of the alternative income generating initiatives started by the project, like the nursery."

It contained 11 recommendations for corrective actions for the implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the Project, all but one of which were acted upon as the 2013 PIR makes clear:

"The management response to the MTR agreed with all but one of these recommendations. The single recommendation on which there was disagreement related to the METTs; the MTR recommended that the project undertake a comprehensive analysis of the METTs to better focus the project's efforts in the targeted PAs. However, the project's management disagreed with this recommendation, which they found to be relevant to only 6 of the 22 targeted PAs. The recommended work will be undertaken for those 6 sites, but not for the others."

65. The process of internal activity monitoring undertaken by the Project's management appears generally to have been of a high standard comprising a range of mechanisms to keep abreast of the situation and to respond to any areas of concern. This is one of the few Projects the Lead Evaluator has seen with a dedicated M&E Officer, and reports from interviewees indicate that both persons holding the post have been helpful and responsive. At the change over of Officers, all previous reports were validated in concert with the CTA and WWF management. Since then, field visits have been made quarterly with these prioritised according to the priority of project concerns and distance; thus four visits were made to Zanzibar (but none to Pemba); two to the southern landscapes which were treated as one unit for monitoring purposes; and one to Tanga. The latter required fewest visits because TFS had its own good M&E resources and passed information regularly to the Project. Indeed, the M&E Officer had monthly contact with TFS's Project Coordinator, including face-to-face meetings when issues required clarification. The M&E Officer also had close contact with WWF's Landscape Coordinator and direct access to the three Project Executants as necessary. Quarterly reports were prepared for the UNDP-CO and twice-yearly reports for WWF. With regard to external contracts, these were all issued on a lump-sum basis payable according to milestones defined by time

and quality – failure to achieve either resulting in forfeiture of some part of the payment. By and large, this provided enough incentive for sound delivery.

66. Despite the importance accorded to this system, the TET found two significant shortcomings –
- a) much of the data reported tended to overstate the Project’s achievements by reporting progress to levels not fully achieved, for example VLFRs that were in the process of being designated were reported as having been fully designated; the Ufufuma-Pongwe Corridor was reported as having been designated when in fact just a single consultative meeting had been held. While this over-statement of progress was not thought by the TET to be disingenuous, it was likely to be counter-productive since the views of management would likely be distorted such that the attention and resources that an activity would warrant would not be provided if it was believed to be close to completion; and
 - b) much of the reporting was confused, inaccurate, and inconsistent with data relevant to the indicators either not being provided clearly, being replaced with data which was wholly irrelevant, and totals not matching constituent parts. The TET had to go through the final results matrix with the PMU three times before clarifications were satisfactory. There was clearly a lack of comprehension that the statement of the Outcome was actually relevant to the indicator leading to lack of data being collected; for example, Outcome 2.2 states “*Terrestrial Protected Area Network expanded to include key gaps in coral rag and thicket communities of high biodiversity, with buffer and connectivity forests*” but its indicator #30 is “*Area (ha) gazetted*” with a target of 6,000ha. Only data on the total area protected has been collected because it was not recognised that coral rag and thicket communities was an important part of the conservation aim, hence no data on the area of these habitats that has been protected has been collated.

Finally, the TET could find no real evidence to suggest that the Project Coordinator actually used any of this M&E data to influence management decisions, and as the above shows, (s)he would have had difficulties in using it had (s)he tried to do so.

67. Impact monitoring, as usual, has been the least well-developed type of monitoring. The Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) and the Financial Scorecards have been completed more than once (Table 14 and Annex VIII), and importantly WWF extended the use of the METT from the original six protected areas covered by the Project in 2009 and included in the submission to GEF, to 146 sites covering differing governance types to form a system-wide baseline in November 2011. The TET notes that this more extensive baseline may provide an important and interesting comparison for future work beyond the Project, but the MTE notes that:

“This process was not seen as inclusive of key personnel by the Zanzibar partners, and the scores were regarded as unrealistically high.”

Unfortunately, as the MTE also noted, this confused the issue for the Project and it concentrated efforts on getting repeat measures of the original PAs since:

“the purpose of the METT instrument is to track changes in management effectiveness over time.”

These repeat measures were finally undertaken in January-February 2013 by one of the members involved in the initial METT baseline study, which helped add some consistency to the process. Final scoring was made in June 2014, apparently directly by WWF, but throughout it remains clear that the METT scores have not been used by the Project in any meaningful way to direct resources and management actions towards addressing the challenges for the PAs where the METT scores low. Elsewhere, the Project has made informal and unstructured efforts at measuring impacts in certain areas. For example, COCOBA members have been asked about when they joined, how much they had saved and borrowed, and what they had used loans for; and forest managers have been asked about boundary marking and its effects on encroachment, but no systematic approach has been made to assess real impacts – no biodiversity surveys, no measures of forest cover using satellite data (see issue of REDD in paragraph 21), no structured questionnaires for trainees to measure uptake of material. Even simple questionnaires to villagers with questions such as “*Have you visited other villages where demonstrations are available?*”, “*Have you tried new methods of ...?*”, “*What have you*

noticed as a result?”, and “Are you keen to spread conservation messages yourself?” could have provided significant feedback which could have been used to influence management or adopt new approaches to activities.

M&E implementation has been mixed, with good progress monitoring, but fairly strong internal activity monitoring has been let down by confused reporting and by little use of data being used for decision-making which are considered as significant shortcomings. Limited attempts have been made at impact monitoring. Overall, the implementation of monitoring and evaluation has been evaluated as **Marginally satisfactory**.

PROJECT RESULTS

ATTAINMENT OF OBJECTIVES

68. A summary of the Project’s achievements is given directly below, followed by an outline of the attainment of objectives. This is followed by a Review of Outcomes to Impacts in Table 10 and a brief discussion on the verifiable impacts. A summary evaluation of Project Output is given in Table 11 followed by a more detailed description. A detailed evaluation of the level of achievements made against the indicators of success contained in the logframe is given in Annex IV.

Summary of Achievements

69. The Project has been characterised by major upheavals in its implementation brought about by WWF-Tanzania which was contracted with its coordination, namely a period of unauthorised pre-financing followed by extensive and significant staff changes imposed by its parent body WWF International. These have resulted in considerable delays that have interrupted work and on several occasions during the Project’s second half have brought it to a standstill. Such problems have led to squandered opportunities since the Project has failed to build fully upon its promising start. The poor communication practiced by, significantly reduced capacity of, and misconstrued ownership displayed by, WWF have undermined the trust between the implementing partners and WWF, built up over the many years preceding the Project. The TET expresses serious concern over the financial figures reported to it from ATLAS that appear to show an inequality in the allocation of GEF funds in favour of WWF at the expense of its government partners and the extraordinarily high project management costs which are running at 3.77 times over the original GEF budget – that is an overspend of US\$ 904,330 of GEF money that should have been spent on direct conservation activities, and which is largely responsible for the Project being unable to take advantage of the six-month no-cost extension granted to it after the MTE; hence closing on its original date of 30th June 2014 rather than 31st December 2014. A focus on undertaking activities to achieve the indicators rather than maintaining a wider perspective of the Project’s overall design has resulted in many of the financial/revenue aspects have not received attention, e.g. Outputs 1.3 and 3.4. Reporting of results has also been confused and error-strewn with conflicting data and misinterpretations, these almost always having the effect of over-stating the Project’s achievements to the detriment of making progress.

70. However, while these issues play at the forefront of the minds of those involved, it is very important that they are not allowed to overshadow the Project’s very real achievements. Yes, it is true that many of these were completed or had the foundations of processes laid in the first half of the Project, and some have failed to be built upon in the second half. Nonetheless, these achievements are real and significant for the conservation of the coastal forests, such as the gazettement of the 12,000 ha of Rondo Forest Nature Reserve; 74 VLFRs in the process of designation; increased resources (personnel, financial, and capacity) being allocated to conservation of coastal forests; and, perhaps ironically in the light decreased trust in WWF, bringing together the various government actors with each other as well as improving the capacity and understanding of district authorities and local communities in regards forest conservation. Importantly, for a project involving non-union matters such as forestry, the concept of a constituted coordinating body, or sub-contracting the coordination to a third party, has been shown to be a highly successful mechanism, even if in this case the actual implementation has left a great deal to be desired. Oversight of the Project has generally been of a high standard with considerable engagement displayed by its members, in turn reflecting the high level

of Government ownership evident which bodes well for the sustainability of the Project's outcomes. Yet, the overriding feeling of most of the people interviewed is that the Project could, and should, have done so much more. The evaluation of achievements against indicators (provided in [Annex IV](#)) shows that of the 36 indicators that it is possible to evaluate against (three are impossible), 21 (58.3%) show successful achievement at the end of the Project and four (11.1%) show achievement nearly successful; total 25 (69.4%)⁸ – a good performance.

Overall, the Project has achieved most of its major relevant objectives but it has significant shortcomings, largely through it not completing many of the processes it initiated, such as designation of VLFRs, because of significant coordination delays, hence its attainment of objectives and results is evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

71. Key Project achievements include:

- gazettement of 12,000 ha of Rondo forest as a Nature Forest Reserve, and completion of its management plan;
- Jambiani-Muyuni Protected Area (4,200 ha) surveyed, mapped and demarcated and awaiting gazettement;
- demarcation of 74 Village Land Forest Reserves totalling 169,952 ha in Zanzibar (11 CoFMAs), Lindi Region, and Kilwa, Rufiji, Pangani, Handeni, Muheza, Mkinga, Bagamoyo and Kisarawe Districts, with 56 (75.6%) of these covering 154,825 ha (91.1%) having management plans;
- enhanced collaboration between TFS, district offices, and local communities with regard to forest conservation;
- significant increase in the Financial Scorecard for Lindi (+51%);
- significant increase in the METT scores for nine protected areas (Malehi, Mbinga, and Mitundumbea in Kilwa; Chitoa, Litipo, Noto, and Rondo in Lindi; and Jambiya-Muyuni and Mtende in Zanzibar);
- formation of Coastal and Mangrove Forest Section in TFS and Conservation (Biodiversity) Section in DFNRNR;
- staff involved with forest conservation activities in TFS and seven District Offices increased by 45 persons;
- nine Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) over joint responsibilities in conservation of coastal forests signed between TFS and Districts of Mkinga, Handeni, Muheza, Pangani, Bagamoyo, Mkuranga, Kisarawe, Rufiji, and Kibaha;
- total funding for coastal forest conservation increased by TFS in nine districts to US\$ 250,375;
- business plans for Jozani Chwaka National Park and Ngezi Forest Nature Reserve prepared and three new developed and approved for the Forest Reserves of Kiwengwa-Pongwe, Masingini, and Msitu-Mkuu;
- conservation plans for Matumbi (Rufiji), Kilwa, and Lindi landscapes completed, approved, and under implementation; and
- income generating schemes and financing instruments introduced into numerous communities – bee-keeping, improved stoves, COCOBAs – and the first FSC certifications for sustainable timber production.

72. The main problem areas identified by the TET are:

- financing delays leading to interruptions in implementation on the ground and disappointment of community partners' expectations;

⁸ Since there is duplication of indicators between Outcomes and Outputs, an assessment of just Objective and Outcome indicators shows that of the 20 which can be assessed, 12 (60%) show successful achievement and one (5%) shows achievement nearly successful; total 13 (65%) approximately the same.

- financing delays leading to pre-financing of activities made in good faith but unauthorised, leading in turn to yet more delays in financing and loss of trust between implementing partners;
- huge overspend on project management amounting to US\$ 904,330 of GEF money that should have been spent on direct conservation activities, and which is largely responsible for the Project being unable to take advantage of the six-month no-cost extension granted to it after the MTE;
- unequal allocation of Project finances between implementing partners adding to loss of trust;
- poor communication by PMU and WWF in coordinating role exacerbating trust issues;
- significant disruptions to staffing in, and reduced capacity of, WWF country office;
- very little activity reported to have been carried out in the second half of the Project thereby squandering opportunities and solid base built during first half of Project; and
- large number of activities still incomplete.

Immediate Objective Indicators

73. Development objectives, those things that the project will *contribute towards*, are best assessed independently of the project and at portfolio level. However, the Immediate Objective is something that the project is trying to achieve *in its lifetime* or shortly thereafter, and is a key element in the M&E framework because it defines the project's target. In the case of the Coastal Forest Project, the logframe contains four indicators for the "Objective" of which only one has been achieved (see [Annex IV](#)).

- 12,000ha as Forest Nature reserve and 100,000 ha as VLFRs
 - The Rondo Forest Reserve covering 12,000ha is awaiting the signature of the relevant Cabinet Minister for formal gazettement.
 - A total of 74 Village Land Forest Reserves totalling 169,952 ha has been demarcated in Zanzibar (11 CoFMAs) Lindi Region; and Kilwa, Rufiji, Pangani, Handeni, Muheza, Mkinga, Bagamoyo and Kisarawe Districts. Of these, 56 (75.6%) covering 154,825 ha (91.1%) have management plans.

The first of these constitutes the single biggest achievement of the Project and is an important accomplishment in the conservation of coastal forests. The second exceeds the target by almost 70% and adds a significant area to land providing buffering and corridor functions around and between coastal forest protected areas.

- Increase in area under landscape conservation, with functional corridors and buffer-zones, managed under detailed landscape conservation plans – 1,277million ha
 - A total of 622,903 ha are under proper management status within the landscapes of Rufiji, Kilwa, Lindi, Tanga and Zanzibar.

This figure amounts to just 48.8% of the target. However, it includes 84,884 ha of proposed Wildlife Management Areas which are not yet managed under any formal conservation plan. If these are excluded, as they should be, then the total is 538,019 ha – 42% of the target. Furthermore, the baseline is given as "Nil". Since Central Government Forest Reserves were extant at the time of the baseline, these were presumably not included in it because the designers did not count such reserves under "landscape conservation". These Government Forest Reserves account for 130,361 ha (e.g. Jozani National Park (5,000 ha) and should therefore likely be excluded from the area given as "*under detailed landscape conservation plans*" which would lower the indicator to around 407,658 ha, or 31.9% of the target (419,658 ha 32.9% if the new Rondo Forest Reserve is included).

- Business plans show improved Financial Scorecard for national system of coastal forest protected areas and target landscape (Rufiji, Lindi, Kilwa and Zanzibar) of 40%⁹
 - The average Financial Scorecard in the Kilwa, Lindi and Zanzibar landscapes averages 55.3%.

This figure represents an increase of 21% points across the three landscapes. [Note that in the figures provided to the TET as definitive, the baseline average is given as 34.3% and not 22.2% as provided in the logframe.] A breakdown of these shows that significant progress, enough to meet the target, was made only in Lindi 82% (+51%). The other results were: Kilwa 34% (+8%); Zanzibar 50% (+4%).

- METT scores for PAs and PA landscapes show improvement in targeted landscapes 20% in the METT score
 - METT scores updated in June 2014 show an average improvement of 12%.

The average score for all 27 PAs was 46.3%, an increase of only 12%. This breaks down into provincial averages thus: Kilwa 43.5% (+9.1%); Rufiji 37.6% (+2.5%); Lindi 46.25% (+24.9%); Zanzibar 66.25% (+25.85%). Therefore, while the overall target was not achieved, it was for Lindi and Zanzibar. On a site basis, only 9 of the 27 sites achieved a 20% increase; i.e. the target was achieved in 33% of the sites; 12 (44.4%) achieved an increase of <20%; and 6 (22.2%) resulted in a decrease.

Effectiveness

Review of Outcomes to Impacts

74. Table 10 provides a review of the likelihood of outcomes being translated into intended impacts using the recently-introduced methodology described in paragraph 7 and Tables 3 and 4.

TABLE 10: REVIEW OF OUTCOMES TO IMPACTS AT THE END OF PROJECT SITUATION

Component	Findings	Review of Outcomes to Impacts
Site Level Outcomes		
Outcome 1: Strengthened enabling environment is functioning for conservation of coastal of forests in mainland Tanzania, leading to increased funding and oversight	The Coastal Forest Unit has been established by TFS and appears to be fully funded. Nine MoUs have been signed with Districts over joint responsibilities in conservation of coastal forests. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the number of staff allocated by both TFS and the District Offices to coastal forest issues in seven districts; and funding has been increased almost to target levels and in seven, not just three districts. A total of 41 VLFRs are in the process of being delivered – three have been handed over to the communities; the other 38 are at various stages in the designation process. Thus, the intended outcome was delivered, and was designed to feed into a continuing process, with specific allocation of responsibilities after project funding. The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, but it is too early to establish whether they can progress towards the intended long term impact since this will depend on continued levels of adequate funding.	AB: Highly Likely

⁹ As it stands, the indicators for this and the following objective indicator are ambiguous. The indicator “An increase of over 40% in finance scorecard scores” could mean an increase by 40% points – so that a baseline of 30% needs to improve to 70%; or it could mean that there needs to be an increase of 40% of the baseline, i.e. 30% x 1.4 = a target of 42%. The TET has assumed the former in all cases and gained the CTA’s agreement.

Component	Findings	Review of Outcomes to Impacts
Outcome 2: The protected Area system for Zanzibar is strengthened in terms of both representativeness, connectivity, financing and managerial capacity	A Conservation (Biodiversity) Section has been established and staffed; eleven new community forest areas have been established acting as buffers around the PAs; five of the six management plans have been approved; competence levels of PA institutions have increased by an average of almost 26% points. However, a National Protected Area Board was not reconstituted; and the gazettement process for new PAs has started but has not yet delivered. These outputs have gone a long way to delivering the Project's intended outcomes and appear to feed into a continuing process, with specific allocation of responsibilities after project funding. The measures designed to move towards intermediate states have started and have produced results, but it is too early to establish whether they can progress towards the intended long term impact since this will depend on continued levels of adequate funding.	AB: Highly Likely
Outcome 3: Effective PA management systems in place at three project priority landscapes, with co-management between central, local and village government partners, leading to improved conservation of biodiversity	Conservation Plans for Matumbi (Rufiji), Kilwa, and Lindi landscapes have been completed, approved and are being implemented and 27 VLFRs, at various stages of designation, have management plans. Fifteen villages are participating actively in forest conservation in three regions, but no business plans have been developed for any reserve and the average increase in the METT scores has failed to achieve its target. In cases where the intended outcomes were delivered, they have started to move towards intermediate states but the TET has not seen any evidence that they have yet produced results.	AC: Moderately Likely

As a result of the review of outcomes to impacts (ROtI), the outputs produced will go a long way to bringing about the intended outcomes and with a good likelihood that the impacts will be achieved – two cases of Highly Likely and one of Moderately Likely. As a result, the Project is expected to achieve most of its major objectives and yield satisfactory global environmental benefits with only minor shortcomings, hence it is evaluated as Satisfactory.

Impact

75. The Project has no indicators that provide a direct measurement of its impact which makes assessment of this extremely difficult. The only information that seems remotely relevant comes from the *Situation Analysis of Coastal Forests of Tanzania Mainland*, dated May 2014, commissioned from GEO Network and Development Associates Ltd. by TFS under the Project. This highlights the serious challenges still faced as the following excerpts from the Summary show:

“Human activities such as agricultural expansion, charcoal making, harvests of timber, building poles, planks for carvings making and wildfires were rampant, particularly when crop failure happens. ... challenges and gaps observed in almost all districts visited were inadequate staff with forestry qualification, poor transport facilities, unclear roles and responsibilities between district forest officers and TFS staff, and low environmental awareness among the coastal communities.

Very few villages had village land use plans, and the majority of the existing forests did not have forest management plans. Participatory forest management (PFM) has been implemented in the area for many years, but in many places the community-based forest management of joint forest management arrangements were not operational. Majority of the PFM forests in study areas have undergone participatory forest resources assessment (PFRA), however, very few have forest management plans and do not have bylaws approved by village assemblies. Further, for forests under village forest management agreements, almost all have no agreements signed by TFS.”

The report goes on to discuss the key issues which include inadequate financing, unsustainable use of forest resources, unsustainable harvest of fuelwood, community poverty, conflicts (with pastoralists), fire, mining, and low awareness on environmental issues. From this it would seem that nothing has changed, but the report covers only the landscapes in Tanga, Coast Region and Dar es Salaam and appears to make little allowance for, or pay sufficient attention to, achievements made by the Project which are likely to have a long-term impact.

76. It is clear to the TET that the situation must be improving. Increases in the area of the coastal forest subsystem protected area estate (e.g. Rondo (12,000 ha); Jambian-Muyuni (4,200 ha)); new or revised management plans for several of these; a large number of VLFRs (CoFMAs) in the process of being gazetted providing buffer functions to important protected areas; units dedicated to coastal forests formed within TFS and the DFNRNR along with increased funding; greater cooperation with the district authorities over forest conservation activities; clearer boundary demarcation in many sites; and increased awareness amongst local communities on the importance and benefits of conserving coastal forests will undoubtedly bring conservation benefits – it is simply the case that as with so many projects, a period of four years is really too short to see realisation of impacts on the ground. The best material for the current Project is purely anecdotal where forestry professionals on Zanzibar report increasing closure of the forest canopy in areas where illegal logging tracks and other access routes have been closed; and, now that there are clear boundary markers in place, peer pressure from local people has increased on community members who attempt to encroach the forest preventing them from doing so. But the situation could have been made to be so much clearer if impact indicators had been included in the design.

ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OUTPUTS

77. This section provides an overview of the Project's main activities. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account but summarises key points from material collected by the TET, viewed by it, or discussed in interviews. Much of the information has come from the PMU supplemented by data provided by the DFNRNR, and the TET acknowledges their kind assistance.

TABLE 11: EVALUATION OF THE END OF PROJECT SITUATION AS PER THE REVISED LOGFRAME

Outputs		Evaluation*					
		HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Output 1.1:	Capacity built in Tanzania Forest Service to lead and oversee a Tanzania Coastal Forest Conservation Programme						
Output 1.2:	Coastal Forest Reserves (non reserves) within target landscapes are assessed as to priority for conservation on biodiversity and threat criteria, and conservation strategy developed						
Output 1.3:	Conservation management framework established						
Output 1.4:	MOU put in place with Coastal Forest Districts over joint responsibilities in conservation of Coastal Forests.						
Output 1.5:	REDD initiatives adopted for Coastal Forest Landscapes, management	Not assessed.					
Output 1.6:	Monitoring and Evaluation at Project Level Implemented						
Output 2.1:	Government of Zanzibar with a functional and sustainable institutional structure for terrestrial Protected Areas at Board level and Conservation Section within Forest Department						
Output 2.2:	Terrestrial Protected Area Network expanded to include key gaps in coral rag and thicket communities of high biodiversity, with buffer and connectivity forests						
Output 2.3:	Key forest Protected Areas are consolidated, and their management status improved						
Output 2.4:	Community Forest Management Areas provide sustainable buffering and connectivity support, whilst contributing to household security						
Output 3.1:	Landscapes (Rufiji, Kilwa, Rondo – Lindi) are agreed, described and assessed as to issues of connectivity, gaps and buffer						

Outputs		Evaluation*					
		HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
	functions						
Output 3.2:	Gaps in landscape plan filled by strategic development of local area FRS and VLFRs						
Output 3.3:	Landscape Conservation Plan developed and agreed with local district and national partners						
Output 3.4:	Conservation plans under implementation with key indicator baselines completed and new area METT scores completed						

* Note: HS = Highly satisfactory; S = Satisfactory; MS = Marginally satisfactory; MU= Marginally unsatisfactory; U = Unsatisfactory; HU = Highly unsatisfactory. Components are hyperlinked to relevant section.

Outcome 1: Strengthened enabling environment is functioning for conservation of coastal of forests in mainland Tanzania, leading to increased funding and oversight

Output 1.1: Capacity built in Tanzania Forest Service to lead and oversee a Tanzania Coastal Forest Conservation Programme

78. The Project expanded a section formed in 2009 within TFS dealing with mangrove forests to cover coastal forests. It has no formal name but is generally referred to as the Coastal and mangrove Forest Section. It has six staff – a head of section, two technical officers coordinating coastal and mangroves forest issues respectively, an accountant, and two drivers. Prior to the Project, the nine District Forest Offices (DFOs) that implemented the project in the mainland coastal landscapes were greatly understaffed having a total of 27 staff with an average of two employees in each district, and no staff designated to manage coastal forests within TFS. The Project enabled this to be increased so that there are now 78 staff in seven of the nine project districts and with an average 11 employees per district. The TET obtained no information on the other two districts. Table 12 shows that of these, TFS which is mandated to manage national forest reserves, public land forests, and forest plantations has a total of 50 staff in these seven districts, while the DFOs, which manage Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs), had 28. Interviews with TFS personnel indicated that increased staffing was one of the major factors enabling increased law enforcement and its associated revenue collection.

TABLE 12: NUMBER OF STAFF AT END OF PROJECT IN SEVEN DISTRICTS

	Kisarawe	Bagamoyo	Mkuranga	Pangani	Mkinga	Muheza	Handeni	Total
TFS	10	3	2	3	7	7	18	50
DFO	5	4	4	4	1	1	9	28
Total	15	7	6	7	8	8	27	78

Source: PMU.

79. The Project has also increased annual district funding levels from less than US\$ 10,000 in 2010/2011 to US\$ 250,375 in 2013/14. This amount is impressive and shows real commitment to coastal forests by the authorities. While this amount averages over the nine districts to US\$ 27,819, slightly below the target of US\$ 30,000 per district, this is over nine districts, three times the Project target. The resources are not evenly spread however, and while Mkinga District had a budget of US\$ 45,400, impressively above the target, inevitably that means that some districts had less. TFS staff interviewed indicated that:

“The establishment of TFS effectively devolved forest management responsibilities to TFS District Forest Managers (DFM) because they were doing their own planning, decision making, budgeting, and managing budget expenditures”.

However, the TET also learned that the TFS budget for Mkinga District in 2014/2015 is forecast to drop to US\$ 40,000, with no explanation available from TFS Zonal Headquarters in Same which oversees TFS functions in Tanga, Kilimanjaro, and Arusha regions.

80. Disappointingly, the Project failed to increase stakeholder participation in coastal forest conservation at districts because it did not establish any coastal forest conservation networks of stakeholders which would have brought together NGO, community-based organisations and local

government authorities. These networks were deemed necessary to create a seamless transfer of responsibilities of, and to consolidate, project achievements beyond the project period. Only one stakeholder meeting was held in 2012/2013 for developing an action plan, but no records of it were available to the TET. No activities were carried out in 2013/2014 apparently due to delays in the release of funds, but even had these funds been provided, the TET believes that at this late stage, there would have been inadequate time to have established the planned networks since it is usually a slow and iterative process.

This Output has achieved two of its three objectives to a high standard, and yielded most of its expected benefits, and its failure to achieve its third is viewed as a minor shortcoming, hence it is evaluated as Satisfactory.

Output 1.2: Coastal Forest Reserves (non reserves) within target landscapes are assessed as to priority for conservation on biodiversity and threat criteria, and conservation strategy developed

81. Implementation of this Output is an excellent example of the Project's focus on achieving the indicators rather than focussing on the intent of the Project's design (see paragraph 35). The Project appears to have made no attempt to undertake a protected area gap analysis to identify the location of potential new reserves and corridors in the coastal region of the mainland; to undertake PA-valuations (on which to base proposals to increase public-budget allocations), or to include a costing of PA co-management as opposed to traditional top-down management; to develop a framework for forecasting potential income and revenue generated for forests zoned for sustainable use; to assess options to maximize PA management effectiveness at current and projected funding levels; or to establish new Forest Reserves in the most important areas for biodiversity – all activities identified under it within the Project Document. However, it has worked on fulfilling the indicators.

82. It has developed a *Strategy for Conservation of Coastal Forests of Tanzania Mainland 2014-2018* (as per the indicator) which was commissioned by TFS to guide a comprehensive planning process for the coastal forests on the mainland. It covers three landscapes, namely Pugu-Kazimzumbwi-Ruvu south, Kiono-Zaraninge-Msubugwe-Gendagenda and Lowland East Usambara on the Mainland Tanzania in Tanga, Coast Region and Dar es Salaam. It appears to be of reasonably high technical quality and includes most of the requirements for mainstreaming it into TFS's planning processes for coastal forests, namely a vision, goal, objectives, and the activities needed to bring them about complete with monitoring plan and logical framework. However, tellingly, and especially so in the light of the designers' emphasis of financial issues just outlined, it lacks any attempt to cost these activities and even an outline budget is not included. The Strategy does not yet have any formal status and has a number of other serious shortcomings. Chief amongst these is the decision to anchor it in the reconstituted Forest and Beekeeping Division as stated:

“Overall coordination of the strategy will be the responsibility of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, through the reconstituted Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD). A special desk will be set up within the Division to specifically oversee Coastal Forest management issues. FBD will ensure organisation and collaboration with all stakeholders responsible for implementation of proposed actions. It will collaborate closely with TFS on operational modalities at national, district and village levels. At the national level, the Director of Forestry within the FBD will work closely with the Chief Executive of TFS.”

Probably this was influenced by factors other than the separation of roles between the FBD and TFS. The former is responsible for policy and legal matters and the latter executes government policies and legislation using management tools such as this conservation strategy. The TET believes it makes more sense for the strategy to be housed in TFS which has the legal mandate to manage forest resources; plus newly increased resources, linkages with local government authorities through DFO, and MoUs on management and conservation of coastal forests with district councils all of which will facilitate implementation of the strategy. In contrast, the FBD is a policy and legislation organ and holds a supervisory role on TFS performance in accordance with *Executive Agencies (Amendment) Act, 2009*, hence it does not operate at the forest resource, conservation, and management level and its

budget does include allocating staff and resources for implementing forest management activities. It is also not clearly evident that the Strategy was validated at the stakeholders' workshop as alluded to in the executive summary, which states:

“A stakeholders' workshop where the draft Coastal forest conservation strategy will be presented for review and discussion to improve the draft strategy”

because there is no annex or list of workshop participants indicating that the workshop has been conducted, while the statement itself implies that the activity is yet to be carried out. Finally, the document could be improved by a rigorous edit to remove the numerous inconsistencies and grammatical mistakes.

83. The other indicator, introduced during the inception period but that has no relevance to the original aims of the Output, involves the establishment of VLFRs. declared by District Councils after the completion of a number of steps from the formation of Village Natural Resource Committees (VNRC), through mapping, preparation of a forest management plan, a participatory forest resources assessment (PFRA), preparation of forest bye-laws, approval of those bye-laws by the Village Government, declaration of the VLFR by the District Council, and the subsequent handover of the VLFR to village community by the District Council. Table 13 shows a summary of the status of this process at the end of the Project and indicates that three VLFRs had been completed and handed over to the community, while at the other end four had undergone formation of the VNRC only. It should be noted that most of the progress reported here was achieved in the first two years or so of the Project prior to the management problems which interrupted completion of the process for many of the VLFRs. The process has been instrumental in raising community awareness and knowledge of, and commitment to, forest conservation and the need to value and conserve forest resources.

TABLE 13: STATUS OF COMMUNITY-BASED FOREST MANAGEMENT IN TFS-IMPLEMENTED AREAS UNDER GEF/UNDP FUNDING

District	VLFR area (ha)	VNRC formed	Mapped	PFRA	Man. Plan	Bye-laws	Community level approval	District level approval	Handed over to community
Pangani	19,145	9	9	9	9	9	8	7	2
Handeni	1,934	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
Muheza	1,328	7	7	7	7	7	2	0	0
Mkinga	2,570	4	4	4	1	4	3	3	1
Bagamoyo	5,278	8	5	2	1	1	1	0	0
Kibaha	2,000	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Kisarawe	7,119	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0
	39,374	41	37	34	29	23	14	10	3

Source: PMU 2014.

Evaluation of this output is extremely difficult since on the one hand the original aims of the Output have largely been ignored, while on the other some excellent work has been done on those activities introduced during the inception period. As a result, the Output has achieved most of its objectives but with only modest overall relevance, hence it is evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

Output 1.3: Conservation management framework established

84. The TET can find no evidence that any of the activities listed in the Inception Report's articulation of this Output have been attempted (see paragraph 19). The indicator marked in Annex IV is irrelevant since it actually refers to Output 1.2.

The output has failed to achieve any of its major objectives and as produced no worthwhile benefits, hence it is evaluated as **Highly Unsatisfactory**.

Output 1.4: MOU put in place with Coastal Forest Districts over joint responsibilities in conservation of Coastal Forests.

85. The Project produced an MoU template entitled “*Memorandum of Understanding on Management and Conservation of Coastal Forests of Tanzania Mainland*” which has been used in signing MoU agreements over joint responsibilities in conservation of coastal forests between TFS and the nine district councils involved in this Outcome. This is 50% more than the Project Document required and is to be commended. These are in alphabetical order: Bagamoyo, Handeni, Kibaha, Kisarawe, Mkinga, Mkuranga, Muheza, Pangani, and Rufiji. A copy of the MoU signed on 21/12/2012 between TFS and Handeni District Council was provided to the TET as an example. This seven page document contains nine articles namely: Objective, Mutuality, Timescale, Obligations, Parties Responsibilities, Joint Responsibilities, Applicable Law, Dispute Settlement and Amendments and Termination. Its application is not limited to the coastal forest project but engenders commitments of TFS and the district council to implement it during and beyond the Project’s lifetime. It creates opportunities for post-project work relations between the parties and implies under sub-article 9.1 that it sets ground for a project exit strategy. Some of the salient articles include:

“Article 1: Objective: The objective of the memorandum is to strengthen collaboration between the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and Local Government in conservation and Management of Coastal Forests.

Article 4: Obligations: Sub article 4.3 states “Parties hereby shall work and implement under one integrated plan jointly prepared”

Article 9: Sub article 9.1 “This Memorandum of understanding may be reviewed, modified or amended by mutual written agreement to that effect by the two parties”

This output has exceeded the achievement of its major objectives, and yielded substantial environment benefits without any shortcomings, hence it is evaluated as **Highly Satisfactory**.

Output 1.5: REDD initiatives adopted for Coastal Forest Landscapes, management

86. Activities intended to be undertaken under this Output were not carried out because of delays in the associated REDD project. It was reported that some activities were initiated under the REDD project in Pugu and Kazimzumbwi Forests Reserves in Ilala and Kisarawe Districts respectively, but that these were funded by NORAD and coordinated by the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania. Similarly, REDD+ activities, also funded by NORAD, were implemented by MDCI but these were not listed by TFS. Since the lack of activities under this Output were beyond the implementing partners’ ability to control, this output has not been rated.

Output 1.6: Monitoring and Evaluation at Project Level Implemented

87. Discussion with District Forest Managers indicated that monitoring and evaluation was carried out periodically, i.e. daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, and annually, and semi-annual and annual reports were submitted to zonal offices and, thereafter, presumably compiled and sent to TFS’ Coastal Forest Unit in Dar es Salaam. However, information reported in the results matrix (see [Annex IV](#)) supplied by the PMU suggested that monitoring visits were made by the District Forest Officer (local council not TFS) every two months and by the TFS Project Coordinator every four months. Effective monitoring and evaluation is associated with a work plan and a reporting framework, neither of which were evident in this output. The TET viewed a sample back-to-office M&E report provided by TFS which provided outline details of the field mission undertaken, but this did not provide sufficient detail to fulfil the requirements of a structured report based on an M&E reporting framework. Efforts by the TET to get clarification on the existence of such a framework and to see an example M&E report were not successful. Similarly, there was no evidence of quarterly or annual reports which would have reflected the implementation status of the Project in all nine districts. It is clear to the TET that the actual mechanics of M&E were conducted by the Project but the reporting, and therefore the overall value of the exercise, was of poor quality. Furthermore, it was not clear that TFS had actually separated the concept of evaluation from that of monitoring.

This output has achieved some of its major objectives but has major shortcomings and has not yielded some of the expected benefits, hence it is evaluated as **Marginally Unsatisfactory**.

Outcome 2: The protected Area system for Zanzibar is strengthened in terms of both representativeness, connectivity, financing and managerial capacity

Output 2.1: Government of Zanzibar with a functional and sustainable institutional structure for terrestrial Protected Areas at Board level and Conservation Section within Forest Department

88. The Project planned to reconstitute a functional National Protected Area Board (NPAB) which had been initiated in 1990 and established in 2002 but which did not meet on a regular basis. By 2006 its tenure had expired. Its reconstitution was always considered as a priority under this Project and it comprises the first (and therefore most important) indicator at the Outcome level (see #19 [Annex IV](#)). Notes from an inception meeting held on 27th September 2011 under the auspices of this Project confirm this:

“One of the main outputs [of the Project] is to support reactivating the NPAB board and ensure it is functional.” TET emphasis.

That meeting set a timetable for it to be functioning “within the financial year 2012” and a consultative technical group was formed along with a ToR/timetable and a budget. Unfortunately, this never happened as the *Final Report on Facilitation for Reviving the Zanzibar National Protected Areas Board* (July 2014) makes clear:

“It took almost a year of hard bargaining and consultation to have a meeting on the process for the revival of the Board, at last on January 2013, the efforts were rewarded. On 2 January, 2013 it was a turning moment for the revival of the Board. According to the Director of Environment, the Office of First Vice President is sceptic about the revival and has decided not to engage any more on the process. Again, according to the Director of the Environment, he met with the Director of Fisheries and decided, with different reasons, they are not interested in the revival of the Board.”

Currently, the proposed draft bill of the Zanzibar Environment Management Act (2014), which was presented to the Inter-Ministerial Technical Committee of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar in April 2014, has removed a requirement for a NPAB and replaced it with three institutions – Environmental Advisory Committee, Department of Environment, and Zanzibar Environmental Management Authority. The Final Report states that:

“... none of these is going to undertake the function of the Board, according to the draft bill”.

and points out the contradiction implicit in the draft bill’s provisions:

“Section 62, the powers to declare protected area is vested to the relevant institutions, which shall also “be responsible for the preparation and implementation of regulations and management plan”. While on the same protected area and at the same time, in Section 63, the Director of Environment shall issue guidelines and prescribe measures for the conservation of biological diversity.”

The current idea is to form the Zanzibar National Forestry Advisory Committee, and to do this a draft bill to amend the *Forest Resources Management and Conservation Act N^o. 10 of 1996* to enable this was put forward by the DFNRNR on 13th June 2014.

89. The Project has facilitated the formation of a Conservation (Biodiversity) Section within the DFNRNR with a mandate to oversee and manage terrestrial protected areas. Apparently it comprises six staff with four based on Unguja and two on Pemba. Unfortunately, the TET could not obtain information about the extent of its legal mandate, structure, or its funding, particularly for after the Project. This is a concern. Interviews indicated that there was no reliable and sustainable funding to support its functions beyond the Project and that even the current staff are seconded from other sections of DFNRNR. Furthermore, there was no evidence that some of the main requirements expected under the Project Document had been met, e.g. partnerships in place to tourism, community and district sectors; an economic analysis of the PA system completed showing options for sustainability; a tourism development plan harmonized with conservation planning; a business plan

incorporating economic factors in place; staff training plans in place; a GIS unit with capacity for forest planning.

Despite the best efforts of the DFNRNR, this Output has not achieved most of its major objectives or yielded satisfactory benefits, hence it is evaluated as **Unsatisfactory**.

Output 2.2: Terrestrial Protected Area Network expanded to include key gaps in coral rag and thicket communities of high biodiversity, with buffer and connectivity forests

90. The Project commissioned a Protected Area Spatial Planning study from the Wildlife Conservation Society in 2011 to strengthen the representativeness and connectivity of the protected area system. The study included:

“Data from GIS analysis of aerial photographs were used to locate and map all remaining forests thought to be of importance to wildlife on Unguja and Pemba Islands, and the corridors that could be created to link these areas to ensure wildlife movements and gene flow which are necessary for long term species survival. Reconnaissance surveys and camera trapping were then used to fine tune the proposed protected areas network, by determining the current state of the forests and proposed corridors and their importance for wildlife.”

As a result, the Jambiani-Muyuni Forest (4,214 ha), Ufufuma-Pongwe Forest (Corridor) (1,988 ha), and the Kangagani Forest (406 ha) were identified as priorities for upgrading to Forest Reserves and these were surveyed, mapped, and demarcated but delays in the disbursement of funds has meant that they remain to be gazetted. The TET learned that the DFNRNR has prepared and submitted a notice of intent to the MANR for the legislative processes for the gazetting of these forests, but that there is no timeframe indicated for the completion of this process. The PMU was unable to supply any information as to the extent of coral rag and thicket communities that were included in these two areas

This output has achieved most of its major objectives but, with no new protected areas actually gazetted, it has significant shortcomings and has not yet yielded some of the expected benefits, hence it is evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

Output 2.3: Key forest Protected Areas are consolidated, and their management status improved

91. The Project reviewed and revised the management plans for Jozani Chwaka Bay National Park, and Ngezi Forest Nature Reserve and developed three new ones for Kiwengwa-Pongwe, Masingini, and Msitu-Mkuu Forest Reserves. The TET has viewed that for Kiwengwa-Pongwe which is well structured with a physical description; information on stakeholders, threats, and policy framework; and then a strategic plan together with its implementation arrangements, zoning, and budgets. The TET is concerned that two key elements are missing – a) there are no targets (quantitative or otherwise) for any of the indicators given; and b) although budgets are detailed, there is no indication of the sources of funding and no business plan (although this may be separate). Draft business plans have been prepared by the Project for Ngezi Nature Forest Reserve and for Jozani yet strangely the latter is entitled “Jozani Nature Forest Reserve” rather than its official name of Jozani Chwaka Bay National Park which is acknowledged on the first page! The TET has viewed these and finds that they are still very much works-in-progress with unverified assumptions, optimistic levels of income, potentially unrealistically low levels of expenditure, and very high dependence on donor funding – 89% of forecast budget (for an unspecified period) in the case of Ngezi.

92. The Project has also undertaken a range of management activities on the ground. These include installing numbered, GIS-referenced, concrete boundary demarcation beacons in places around, Jozani-Chwaka Bay National Park, Masingini Forest Reserve, and Ngezi-Vumawimbi Nature Forest Reserve (see [Annex X](#)); provision of improved water supplies for visitor, management, and fire-fighting purposes in Jozani and Kiwengwa-Pongwe; renovation of buildings at Kiwengwa-Pongwe and Masingini; and construction of entrance guard posts and closure of illegal access tracks at Kiwengwa-Pongwe. The building work seen by the TET generally seemed to a high standard but equipment of the buildings for interpretive centres and accommodation was still to happen. The TET raises one concern over the priority accorded equipment at Masingini where a television and satellite transceiver had been purchased, but basic furniture (chairs, tables, beds) and kitchen equipment had

not, and because of funding problems these may not be available within the lifetime of the Project thereby casting doubt over the sustainability of the centre. As a result of these and similar measures, the Management Effectiveness Track Tool scores for the four PAs measured at the baseline in 2009 have increased – see Table 14.

TABLE 14: METT SCORES AT SELECTED PAs IN ZANZIBAR

Protected Area	Baseline (2009)	Mid-term (2012/13)	Final (2014)	Difference: baseline to final
Jambiya-Muyuni	16.7	42	51	+ 34.3
Mtende	29.2	73	74	+44.8
Jozani	61.5	72	73	+11.5
Ngezi	54.2	67	67	12.8
Mean	40.4	63.5	66.25	+25.85

Source: PMU.

This output has achieved most of its major objectives but with significant shortcomings, and has not yielded some of its expected benefits, hence it is evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

Output 2.4: Community Forest Management Areas provide sustainable buffering and connectivity support, whilst contributing to household security

93. Community Forest Management Agreements (CoFMAs) empower communities to manage their surrounding forest areas sustainably and include provisions for law enforcement and revenue collection from sustainable harvesting of forest resources; and opportunities for establishing and managing community woodlots, private tree nurseries, community-based ecotourism and bee-keeping. The Project facilitated and funded the establishment of 12 CoFMAs covering 2,968 ha through the provision of technical support from the DFNRNR. Table 15 provides details. All these community forests are adjacent to existing PAs and were designed to improve their protection by providing important buffering functions.

TABLE 15: ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNITY FOREST MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS

District	Name of Shehia ¹⁰ with CoFMA	CoFMA Members	Area (ha)
Unguja			
North “A”	Pwani Mchangani	35	60
	Kandwe	35	195
North “B”	Upinja	35	416
	Pangeni	35	50
Central	Uroa	35	1,014
	Pagali	35	175
Pemba			
Micheweni	Makangale	35	20
	Konde	35	18
	Wingwi Mapofu	35	71
	Wingwi Mtemani	35	72
	Majenzi Michewani	35	877
	Kiuyu Mbuyuni	35	138
Total		420	2,968

Source: DFNRNR

¹⁰ Shehia is equivalent to Village in Mainland Tanzania.

94. The Project engaged communities contiguous with the CoFMAs areas in income-generating activities focused on bee-keeping and improved cooking stoves.

- **Bee-keeping:** Training and sensitization was provided to a total of 92 groups whose membership now totals 982 people (402 females (41%)) as detailed in Table 16. This has been well received by the communities, and the bee-keeping groups visited by the TET were enthusiastic. However, there was a general complaint that honey production was low averaging 1.5 litres per hive from an improved top bar hive, i.e. considerably lower than the average five litres yielded from a traditional tree bark hive. As an example, the “*Tuwalee*” Beeking Group in Njini village on Pemba harvested only 18 litres from 10 modern beehives. The causes of low productivity were attributed mainly to inadequate training on beehive site location in terms of vegetation, and access to water and nectar; timing of colonisation; and inspection to determine optimum harvesting time. Members reported that most hives had been attacked by insects (ants and termites), rodents, and honey badgers, and some had experienced theft by community members. One group member interviewed summed up the challenges by saying:

“We had poor harvesting because we do not know the time to inspect hives and collection of honey. We received only one day’s training on bee-keeping and rarely receive extension services.”

TABLE 16 : BEE-KEEPING ACTIVITIES PROMOTED BY THE PROJECT IN ZANZIBAR

District	Groups	Men	Female	Total	Beehives
Unguja					
Central	5	32	29	61	75
South	7	56	63	119	165
North B	4	24	37	61	85
West *	16	112	129	241	375
Pemba					
Micheweni	19	198	114	312	158
Wete	17	117	42	159	79
Chake Chake	12	61	53	114	82
Mkoani	12	80	64	144	68
Total	92	680	531	1,211	712

Source: DFNRNR

* Sensitization stage only

- **Improved stoves:** The Project organised community members to form groups to work on and adopt improved cooking stoves – see Table 17. Training was provided, and each group member was encouraged to make her/his own improved stove for use in their own kitchen. There is high demand for the stoves within the shehias and communities in the vicinity, and the group at Mtemani Shehia with 20 members copied the programme after attending the cooking stoves theory and practical training provided by the Project, and has fabricated about 2,000 stoves since its formation and earned about US\$ 300. In terms of energy-saving one ox-cart load of firewood now lasts about 45 days while hitherto it would last for not more than 15 days. Another lady indicated that the stoves used only 50% of the wood used previously, thereby greatly reducing pressure on forest resources. Although these statistics cannot be verified technically, all people interviewed acknowledged that the frequency of collecting, or cost of buying, wood has reduced significantly, resulting in more time or money for other activities. The major challenge aired to the TET was the poor availability of suitable clay soil from which to mould the stoves. This raw material was over 10km away from the communities in almost all cases and villagers indicated that without continued help to transport it, the practice of stove-making would die out. The DFNRNR has identified a source of metal stoves fabricated by Environfit International Ltd. which saves about 80% energy and sells at around US\$ 36 each. It is popular in urban Zanzibar, and rural communities prefer to use it because it is more durable than the clay ones but the majority are too poor to buy them. The TET suggests that finding a donor who could provide a subsidy to rural communities living close to the forests to purchase these stoves would be a very cost-effective conservation measure.

TABLE 17: IMPROVED COOKING STOVES ACTIVITIES PROMOTED BY THE PROJECT IN ZANZIBAR

Stove-making centre	Shehia	Members	Fabricated stoves
Unguja			
Kigomani	Kigomani	100	210
Matemwe	Matemwe	50	100
Pwani-mchangani	Pwani-mchangani	250	200
Kiwengwa	Kiwengwa	200	108
Pemba			
Umoja ni Nguvu	Kiuyu Mbuyuni	30	472
Tushauriane	Kiuyu kwa Manda	30	120
Jambo nia	Wingwi Mtemani	20	2,000
Total		680	3,210

Source: DFNRNR

This Output has achieved most of its major objectives, and yielded satisfactory benefits, with only minor shortcomings in the quality of the training provided, hence it is evaluated as Satisfactory.

Outcome 3: Effective PA management systems in place at three project priority landscapes, with co-management between central, local and village government partners, leading to improved conservation of biodiversity

95. The lack of indicators generated by the Project for the Outputs under this Outcome makes the process of evaluating them extremely difficult. While the four Outcome indicators correlate loosely to the four Outputs, and these have clearly been used to guide the work undertaken here, they are not comprehensive. The PMU's focus on achieving indicators has meant that many of the activities listed in the Project Document as necessary to achieve the Outcome have not been carried out, to the detriment of the overall results and intended conservation framework. This is an important omission and one the TET notes with concern. The TET cannot blame the PMU for its approach since it is entirely logical. Nonetheless, the limitations imposed by absent indicators should have been identified and remediated by the PSC, the CTA, the PMU (or even salient persons in WWF's senior management who were involved in the design) and/or the MTE at some stage of implementation.

Output 3.1: Landscapes (Rufiji, Kilwa, Rondo – Lindi) are agreed, described and assessed as to issues of connectivity, gaps and buffer functions

96. The TET can find, and was shown, no direct evidence that the activities intended under this Output were actually undertaken, namely that the landscape concept and models were outlined and agreed; that the landscapes were assessed as to effectiveness and coverage; that the stakeholders were identified and facilitated to participate; and that gaps in the landscape spatial coverage and in thematic input (e.g. credit, agro-forestry) were identified. However, that some of this did occur, even if not through a formalised process, can be inferred by the fact that new protected areas (mainly VLFRs) were being created under Output 3.2 to provide buffer functions and improve connectivity. The apparent lack of documentation of these processes is seen as a significant shortcoming and its provision would have enabled the TET to have provided an improved assessment and ranking¹¹. The identification and facilitation of stakeholders, mostly Village Natural Resource Committees (VNRCs), appears to have built on the achievements of other projects. Most VNRCs were formed during Utunzaji wa Misitu¹² (UTUMI) project that started in 2001, while some like Nndawa were established under Participatory Forest Management (PFM). A few are said to have been formed under the Coastal Forest Project, but no data were provided. PFM, which started in 1990s with pilot forests, is enshrined

¹¹ Subsequent to the draft of this report being written, WWF pointed out the existence of a National Coastal Forest GIS database housed in TFS and WWF. Unfortunately, this was the first time the TET had knowledge of this and hence has not had any opportunity to review it.

¹² Preservation of Forests

in the *Forest Act (2002)* and has been implemented across Tanzania in diverse forest ecosystems. The 2012 PFM report¹³ acknowledges that WWF established some VLFRs in coastal forests in Tanga and Lindi, but this makes it clear that the Coastal Forest Project started by identifying communities that had a working knowledge of VNRCs. Nndawa VNRC informed the TET that it had received training on awareness raising on forest conservation and sustainable management, law enforcement, resource monitoring, boundary demarcation (clearing) and enrichment planting using indigenous plants.

This output has achieved most of its major objectives but with significant shortcomings, and has not yielded some of its expected benefits, hence it is evaluated as **Marginally Satisfactory**.

Output 3.2: Gaps in landscape plan filled by strategic development of local area FRs and VLFRs

97. The Rondo Nature Forest Reserve covering approximately 12,000ha is under the final process for gazettment and upgrading into a Nature Reserve by the Ministry of Natural Resource and Tourism. This forms the single biggest achievement of the Project in the TET's view. The dossier (containing the agreement from surrounding villages, the district, the region, and TFS) was submitted to the cabinet in June 2013. The TET understands that a change in Minister between December 2013 and February 2014 meant that the authorising letter required re-drafting for the new Minister's signature, and this signature was imminent at the time of the TET's mission. Under the Project, Rondo has been well buffered by six VLFRs surrounding it (Mihima, Nndawa, Liganga, Mtemanje, Ntene A and Ntene B). Once gazettment is legalised, the Rondo Nature Reserve Management Plan 2012/2013- 2016/2017 will be operationalised. The copy provided to the TET appears still to be a draft. It is long on description and short of prescription. No objectives have been set and there are no management targets (qualitative or quantitative). Most prescriptions relate to forest management operations (the philosophy of which is minimum intervention) which are not really surprising since the plan has been prepared by the Plantation Manager of Rondo Forest Plantation. The TET would have thought that WWF would have offered or been invited to play a bigger role in assisting with such an important document and thereby to have provided technical guidance on management of biodiversity. The plan plays lip-service to various forms of revenue generation and financing mechanisms but contains no details. The budget, contained in a separate spreadsheet, shows funding anticipated to peak at about US\$ 456,100 in 2013/14 and then declining steeply thereafter to just US\$ 66,657 – see Table 18. This would appear to include an expectation of the use of Project finance – but with the gazettment delayed, the management plan and its budget would seem to require revision. TFS will have to re-think the budget since it is unlikely that they will be able to meet the suggested level of funding without the Project's support.

TABLE 18: TOTAL ANNUAL BUDGET ANTICIPATED FOR YEARS 2012 TO 2017

Year	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
Tzs	431,799	740,249	446,244	204,674	108,184
US\$ (approx)	266,050	456,099	274,950	126,109	66,657

98. Data supplied by the PMU on the Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs) initiated in the southern landscapes is inconsistent and limited. Two tables of VLFRs, both referred to as “definitive” showed 27 and 29 VLFRs under formation totalling 128,699 ha and 147,455 ha respectively, while a third version supplied to the National TE Consultant showed 30. Unlike the data supplied by TFS through the PMU for Outcome 1, the status of the VLFRs has not been provided but the idea that all have been designated is false. A visit to Liganga (Lindi), which was recorded by the PMU as a declared VLFR, was instead found to be only at the stage of having its bye-laws approved by the Village Government. While most of these processes were facilitated by WWF, some data suggest that others were facilitated by co-financing partners, namely Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (four), Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (three), Kilwa District Council (two) and MJUMITA (one) building on their work over several decades of involvement in the landscape.

¹³ *Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania: Facts and Figures*. Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. 2012.

99. The TET visited four VLFRs during its mission, three in Lindi (Liganga, Mihima and Nndawa) and one in Rufiji (Nyamwage), and the following summarises its observations.

- Village Natural Resource Committees (VNRCs): Guided by VLFR bye-laws, VNRCs play an important role in forest resource management. These averaged about 15 members and there was general agreement that they were responsible for law enforcement, clearing boundary fire breaks during the dry season, and afforestation planting; as well as the supervision of any sustainable logging. VNRCs appear to meet fortnightly to review progress and establish work plans for the next two weeks. Where needed, it also calls *ad hoc* meetings to address any urgent issues. No minutes of VNRC meetings were available to the TET, so this frequency could not be verified, nor the quality of the meetings assessed. Monitoring as management tool was not emphasised within the VNRCs. Nonetheless, it was established that the committees undertook resource monitoring during law enforcement activities that included incidents of illegal activities (logging, wild fires, encroachment), status of the forest (ground and canopy cover), frequency of sightings of rare and endemic species. The TET notes that much useful data could have been, and continued to be, collected had it provided the VNRCs with simple GPS data-loggers equipped with MIST¹⁴ and provided training. Data could have been downloaded onto computers by District Forest Officers on a regular basis for further analysis. Unfortunately this was not considered. While it is imperative that effective management of VLFR resources rests with VNRCs, it is apparent that they require regular technical and financial support from district councils, TFS district offices, and perhaps from NGOs and other stakeholders.
- Boundary demarcation: The quality of this varied but was generally poor when compared to that achieved by the DFNNR on Zanzibar. No numbered concrete beacons were used, just a mixture of signboards and markings painted on trees. Most of the signs were painted metal on metal rods, stuck in the ground rather than set into concrete, and bore only the WWF logo (see Figure 3). This means they are rickety, easy to remove in a short space of time, and will rust quickly. Paint markings were inconspicuous, with dull-coloured paint marked low on the trunks of trees in fire-prone areas; many were observed to be already partially obscured by soot and burn marks. At Mihima VLFR, paint marks were placed along the boundary road of Rondo Nature Forest Reserve which was unnecessary since no threats are faced by the VLFR from that source; instead emphasis should have been placed on areas near adjacent villages.
- Management plans: These are legal requirements for the gazettement of a VLFR in accordance with Section 11 of the Forest Act (2002). The TET did not manage to see a copy of any management plan to assess its quality though the layout will be in accordance with Section 11.

FIGURE 3: BOUNDARY SIGN AT LITIPO FOREST RESERVE, LINDI



This output has achieved most of its major objectives, and yielded satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, hence it is evaluated as **Satisfactory**.

¹⁴ Management Information SysTem is an intuitive, open-source monitoring programme able to cover most aspects of protected area management. Originally it was developed by the Ugandan Wildlife Authority, to produce standard monthly reports on patrolling effort and coverage, and actions taken by patrolling teams against illegal activities. MIST can be used to monitor threats, focusing on key illegal activities such as hunting, logging and land clearance, using data from patrol and other field teams to calculate simple indices, such as the number of illegal activities encountered per square kilometre patrolled.

Output 3.3: Landscape Conservation Plan developed and agreed with local district and national partners

100. A report entitled “*Integrating Landscape Conservation Plans into District Development Plans in southern Tanzanian Coastal Forests*” was commissioned from the Faculty of Forestry and Nature Conservation, Sokoine University of Agriculture and produced in November 2012. This appears of fairly high quality, providing an analysis of various forests along axes of biological value and threat to identify priority areas for conservation; and identifies the degree to which key conservation issues have been integrated into district development plans, and what further actions need to be taken. It provides a plan covering a range of eight components – PA management, wildlife corridors, incentive mechanisms for sustainable management of PAs, land allocation to local villages, improvement of agricultural practices and productivity, alternative income generating activities, institutional capacity building, and information dissemination/awareness creation –with the activities necessary to bring about defined outputs. Its usefulness is depressed by the facts that none of these outputs are SMART, and the associated monitoring and evaluation plan has no quantitative targets. The TET has no evidence that this plan has received approval by the local, district, and national partners, or that it is being used in any meaningful way¹⁵. Similarly, the TET has no information regarding the proposed partnership protocols allowing joint working modalities at the landscape scale.

101. The Project has paid considerable attention to introducing income-generating schemes and credit facilities into key villages around forest sites. Again, data on the actual number of villages lacks clarity, but is said to be 15 – four in Kilwa – Hotelitatu, Likawage, Nakiu, Kiwawa; six in Lindi – Ndawa, Mihima, Liganga, Ntene, Mnara and Namtamba; and five in Rufiji – Tawi, Kungulwe, Utunge, Kipo, Kipugira. The main income-generating activity has been bee-keeping, with sustainable logging just starting in some villages; while the credit mechanism has been community conservation banks (COCOBAs). These are discussed in turn:

- **Bee-keeping:** Generally the Project appears to have built on the traditional bee-keeping activities of groups operating in the various villages. The *Mshikamano* bee-keeping group at Ndawa provides an example. It was started in 1997 and has eight members using traditional hives. In 2012 it received 20 modern beehives from the Project along with a full set of protective clothing for handling bees and harvesting honey. It also received training in siting beehives, facilitating colonization, and harvesting time. The Project promoted the use of off-cuts timber planks to fabricate modern design beehives and local village carpenters were trained on how to fabricate these, thereby reducing the fabrication cost from US\$ 40 to US\$ 12. As with bee-keeping groups in Zanzibar, groups have faced challenges resulting in poor yields in comparison to those from traditional hives. The groups indicate that this is because the initial training was poor, being too short and too theoretical leaving group members short on practical demonstrations, and with no access to follow-up extension services. The 2013 PIR tells a different story:

“Beekeeping groups experienced problems of bees not colonizing hives. This was due to the fact that some group members did not participate fully in the beekeeping training and little knowledge on the best time and place to locate the beehives. In addressing this challenge the managers re-organized further training to impart knowledge to beekeeping groups on the best time and location. The team conducted regular visits to groups for monitoring of progress of beehives and bees. This improved number of beehives which were colonized increased volumes of honey.”

yet the TET was unable to find a single person who could corroborate this version. However, where everything has come together properly, yields and rewards are high. It is reported that Nakiu village in Kilwa harvested 104kg of honey from their hives worth Tzs 504,000 (US\$ 310).

¹⁵ Subsequent to the draft of this report being written, WWF indicated the existence of workshop proceedings for approval of these plans. Unfortunately, this was the first time the TET had knowledge of these and hence has not had any opportunity to review them.

- **Logging:** This activity is still in its infancy. An example is Mihima village in Lindi which, after a five year moratorium to promote forest growth, started logging in its VLFR in 2014. The Village Government and its VNRC received training from the Project on logging procedures, contract management, and supervision of logging, the latter being done by members of the VNRC. The first logging contract was let to a private businessman, from which the village received US\$ 3,634 from 1,000 sawn timbers. Working through Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative, the Project has helped some villages to seek FSC forest certification by providing training in branding, marketing, first aid, and self-logging, as well as the issues of certification process. This is coming to fruition, e.g. Nyamwage village in Rufiji is awaiting its official marking hammer and then it can cut.
- **COCOBAs:** These have been introduced into a wide range of villages to act as credit facilities. Basically they act as a savings and credit scheme where local people buy shares in a given savings period (usually a year) and are entitled to borrow up to three times the value of their shares (although exact details and amounts vary according to the rules of the individual COCOBA). Each shareholder must take one loan and repay it successfully in any given period. At the end of the period, the accumulated savings and interest are shared between members according to the proportion of their shareholding. While it is easy to link bee-keeping and timber to forest conservation, the TET found it harder to establish this link with COCOBAs since it rarely involves use or appropriation of forest resources. Basically it is a credit facility like any other micro-financing scheme. In the Project context, the link between COCOBA and forest conservation was best summarized by a member of the “*Jiunge*” COCOBA group at Nndawa village:

“We obtain COCOBA loans to operate small businesses like carpentry, fruits vending, and mighahawa (canteens). The loan conditions include weekly repayment of loans, hence no opportunity is available for illegal logging. COCOBA has also improved our income and we are able to build corrugated sheet houses”.

The TET found that many villages already had Village Community Banks (VCOBAs) in place at the time that this Project started to introduce COCOBAs. VCOBAs ostensibly provide exactly the same financial service operating through the same system, but do not purport to link the scheme to forest conservation. In villages where both occur, the TET established that most members belonged to both schemes and as a result were finding it difficult to service two loans. As a result, the number of members in the COCOBA group had declined from 20 to 18 in Nndawa village with a similar trend apparent in Mihima village. It is interesting to note that where the Project had established a COCOBA prior to the Aga Khan Foundation (which was behind the formation of VCOBAs) arriving, e.g. in Liganga village, the Aga Khan Foundation refused to put its resources into such an area since it believed the duplication to be cost-ineffective. For some reason, the Project did not take the same view when faced with VCOBAs already in place.

This output has achieved most of its major objectives, and yielded satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings, hence it is evaluated as Satisfactory.

Output 3.4: Conservation plans under implementation with key indicator baselines completed and new area METT scores completed

102. Activities under this Output are mixed. It would seem that baseline assessments of biodiversity, threat analysis and community participation/benefits) were largely completed under other aspects of the Outcome, e.g. the landscape conservation plan in Output 3.3. Also, the Project extended the METT scoring system to 146 forest sites under various forms of governance in 2011 and these will form a useful baseline for subsequent measurements and analysis, but none have been made since thereby weakening the immediate usefulness of the exercise. However, landscape plans have not been undertaken with partners seeking sustainable financing (e.g. carbon-trading, payments for ecological services), largely as a result of delays to the REED project, and the revenue forecasting framework has not been used to monitor and record off-take levels, income and revenue earned from reserves. It is a common feature of this evaluation that the majority of the activities proposed by the Project’s designer

that deal with financial mechanisms and potential revenue streams have not been implemented, thereby severely weakening the Project's achievements and sustainability.

This output has achieved some of its major objectives but, with no attention to financial activities, it has major shortcomings and has not yielded some of the expected benefits, hence it is evaluated as Marginally Unsatisfactory.

STRATEGIC ISSUES

103. The aim of this section is to concentrate on some key cross-cutting issues. At this point, there are just two project-specific issues to be dealt with.

PROJECT-SPECIFIC ISSUES

End date

104. There appears to be some confusion over the end date for the Project. As a result of delays at the start-up, a six-month no-cost extension had been granted to the Project with the official end date fixed at December 2014. The MTE concurred but raised an issue about whether project funds would be sufficient for this. The TE was fixed for May/June to coincide with an end date that had been reset to the original, i.e. 30th June 2014, apparently at the behest of the UNDP-CO on the basis that the Project had indeed completed the use of its funds. The issue was confused because the discrepancies between the findings of the verification audit and WWF's accounts had not been resolved and remaining Project funds had been ring-fenced to ensure settlement with all parties could be made. This remained the position at the de-briefing of the TE (see Annex V), but there it was announced that some money may still remain once the issues surrounding pre-financing and the audit had been resolved. Clearly, resolution of these issues is a priority.

105. Assuming that some funds do remain, it is difficult to envisage how the Project will continue to operate since the PMU staff have already been given notice of the end of their contracts. Since the contract with WWF to provide a coordinating function as the PMU will have been terminated, perhaps it may be possible for remaining funds to be released directly to the implementing partners with concomitant direct reporting to the UNDP-CO. Operational details will need to be resolved by the PSC at its meeting scheduled for 24th July 2014. The other outstanding issue will involve allocation of those funds¹⁶. Table 6 shows that WWF has already spent its share of GEF funds, hence there may be compelling reasons for remaining monies to be allocated to TFS and DFNRNR to complete some of their activities. However, the TET counsels caution – allocating remaining monies to maximise long-term conservation gain may be wiser. In the TET's view, the activities that would achieve this in the most cost-effective manner would be completing the processes of VLFR designation and getting these handed back to the communities in whatever geographic area they may be. This would seem to mean operating on the mainland. Although TFS may have the greatest claim over outstanding monies, again the TET urges that those VLFRs that would bring the highest conservation gains in terms of buffering or connectivity functions be prioritised – the view of the CTA may well be helpful here. Magnanimity and politics can make uncomfortable bedfellows, but the TET hopes that any partisan considerations can be put to one side over this issue to favour the greater good with thanks registered appropriately to those bodies foregoing their “fair share” of the remaining funds.

Ownership

106. Ownership by each of the Project's implementing partners has been very strong. The PSC has insisted throughout that the Project was the property of the Government and all the forests belong to the various Government authorities. As a result, across the whole of the Project's geographic spread, UNDP and GEF have virtually no visibility on the ground – there are a few signs present with a GEF or UNDP logo; one vehicle on Zanzibar was seen with a GEF logo. None of the communities

¹⁶ According to the draft minutes of the PSC meeting of 24th July 2014, there is no remaining balance as per UNDP records.

interviewed showed any recognition or understanding of GEF or UNDP. While the TET recognises that UNDP-GEF may find this untoward, it is worth asking whether this should be seen as a problem given that the central message of the importance of conserving coastal forests has been achieved at community (and District) level. The view expressed by one TFS person that the plethora of donor signs and logos often causes confusion at the community level has merit, and this appears to have been avoided here. However, while strong ownership is to be applauded in the case of Government partners, the TET expresses some concern over that displayed by WWF. While it is only natural that an international NGO should want to promote its identity wherever it is working, the TET questions whether this should be at the exclusion of others. Many of the boundary signs seen in the southern landscapes had only WWF's logo on them (see Figure 3), not even shared with district or central government or TFS; WWF also had high visibility amongst the communities compared to that of TFS. This strong ownership and presence of WWF in these southern landscapes would seem to be at odds with the Project's aim of building government capacity in the areas of protected area and forest management. If the long-term aim of the Project was to build the capacity of government agencies in forest conservation, then building the recognition of that capacity amongst local communities should surely be a significant element. For WWF to maintain such a high visibility in such a situation would surely appear to be counter-productive to the long-term sustainability of the Project's achievements.

RELEVANCE

107. A discussion of the relevance of the Project towards the national development priorities covers three distinct but overlapping issues – relevance to biodiversity conservation and GEF priorities; relevance to national policy; and relevance to the current context on-the-ground.

108. Biodiversity conservation and GEF priorities: The most significant measure of relevance has to be that whether the Project addresses the conservation of globally threatened biodiversity. For the coastal forests of Tanzania this is overwhelmingly the case since these habitats are recorded as having the highest number of endemic plant and vertebrate species per unit area of any of the global hotspots defined by Conservation International. With regard to GEF priorities, the Project was designed under GEF-4, so the priorities under this are relevant. The Programme Objective for *Sustainable Forest Management: SO1 – To Conserve and Sustainably Use Forest Biodiversity* Strategic Programme 3: Biodiversity/Climate Change/Land Degradation Strategic Program (new): *Management of LULUCF as a Means to Protect Carbon Stocks and Reduce GHG Emissions* is heavily biased towards providing benefits:

“... whose value is not wholly reflected in the marketplace.”

The argument is that:

“There are many proponents of developing incentive-based instruments to protect forests as a carbon stock and to generate biodiversity benefits. They propose that by according a real cash value to the carbon stored in standing forest, and implicitly to biodiversity conservation and the other environmental services forests provide, a financial alternative would be created to counter the unsustainable forest practices that produce only short-term financial gain (e.g. illegal logging or transformation into pasture or croplands), thus counterbalancing the forces of forest destruction.”

The aims of the strategic programme are summarised thus:

“Through this strategic program, the GEF will promote the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF). GEF activities to be supported under this program could include improving methodologies to reliably measure carbon stored/emitted from LULUCF; building national capacity; and funding investments aimed at enhancing the adoption of systems and practices that reduce emissions, increase sequestration, and accurately measure and monitor the benefits of such efforts within the forest sector.”

The indicators are listed as:

- *“Methodologies developed for carbon measurement*

- *Improved institutional and technical capacity to monitor and measure emissions from, and sequestration in, the LULUCF sector*
- *GEF forest-related projects quantify carbon benefits*
- *Tons of CO_{2eq} avoided or sequestered in forests at national level*
- *Coordinated policy and regulatory frameworks adopted to address drivers of land use and management changes in forests*

Of these, only the last one appears directly relevant. Although the Project did provide links to REDD and has the end result of trying to maintain standing forests, the aims as articulated in the Project Document and its focus as encapsulated in its title “*Extending the Coastal Forest Protected Area Sub-system in Tanzania*” appear much more relevant to the Strategic Programme Biodiversity SO1-SP3, i.e. *Biodiversity: To Catalyse Sustainability of Protected Area Systems – Strengthening terrestrial protected area networks* under which it was originally designed. The TET can only surmise that there were likely funding quota reasons for its change and inclusion under the SFM Programme. Notwithstanding this however it is viewed, the Project is directly relevant to GEF’s overall priorities.

109. National priorities: The Project has built upon the *National Forest Policy (1998)* and the *Tanzania National Forest Programme of 2001-2010*. Government and WWF in the region prioritised the Coastal Forest Eco-Region, developed “*The Eastern African Coastal Forest Ecoregion (EACFE): Strategic Framework for Conservation 2005-2025*” at national level, and created a functional Coastal Forest Task Force to oversee it. The Project was always seen as an integral part of the strategy.

110. Current context: As the Project comes to an end, its relevance remains high since the coastal forests remain under considerable threat. A growing human population, high demand for fuel and timber from urban centres, demand for carving artefacts, nomadic pastoralists, and restricted Government resources means that these forests remain under threat. The existing protected areas are under-resourced since however much political goodwill is exhibited, Tanzania remains a poor country with many competing needs in health, education, transportation, and other sectors that place demands upon the small and finite treasury. Despite the Project’s achievements, the “*Situation Analysis of Coastal Forests of Tanzania Mainland*” published by the Project in May 2014 could not be clearer:

“Human activities such as agricultural expansion, charcoal making, harvests of timber, building poles, planks for carving-making, and wildfires were rampant, particularly when crop failure happens. Field observations show that some tree species were over harvested. ... High fuelwood demand triggers deforestation and degradation of the coastal forests. Villages with high poverty levels depended more on forests products to sustain their lives. Other challenges and gaps observed in almost all districts visited were inadequate staff with forestry qualification, poor transport facilities, unclear roles and responsibilities between district forest officers and TFS staff and low environmental awareness among the coastal communities.

“... it is concluded that these forests continue to face very severe threats to biodiversity conservation and livelihoods of the coastal communities.”

The Project intervenes in a globally important landscape, is congruent with GEF and national priorities, and remains pertinent in the light of the current levels of threat; hence it is evaluated as Relevant.

SUSTAINABILITY

Exit strategy

111. The Project produced an *Exit Strategy* written by Almas Kashindy in February 2014 at the time he was leaving as Project Coordinator, in order to guide the implementation of the remainder of the Project. While very astute in places, e.g. on the disposal of assets, the document nonetheless does not appear to have been embedded within the implementing partners and seems, as one person said, “*more symbolic than functional*”, while another indicated that “*recommendations for sustainability had not*

been taken seriously enough". One WWF interviewee indicated that not everything would be sustainable since some income-generating activities had started in 2012, but other people had been trained as late as the end of 2013 making the six months to the end of the Project insufficient to give them enough experience to carry on. Another WWF interviewee indicated that an additional exit strategy was needed to hand over WWF-facilitated services to TFS. However, it was also noted that deliverables were likely to be sustainable because of high levels of ownership displayed by TFS, but that at the same time, TFS needed to act now to move the conservation agenda forwards if a return to business-as-usual was to be avoided. It would be important for TFS to step into any gap that may appear if WWF reduce their input to the southern landscape and commit to allocating the necessary financial and human resources necessary. One interviewee raised a very pertinent point, namely that it is very important to institutionalise the Project's gains in order to find additional funding to build on these; *"after all, how do people who have never been to school write finance proposals to UNDP [and other donors]?"*

Evaluation

112. Evaluation of the sustainability of this Project is not straightforward because of the disparate nature of both the components and the three organisations involved. Attempting to lump together the three Outcomes that have been designed expressly to deal with different site level initiatives across three groups of landscapes to get a single rating would, in the view of the TET, not lead to a meaningful appraisal. Therefore, although not as neat as producing a single rating for each of the elements of sustainability, each of the four elements has been evaluated by Outcome (landscape group) in tabular form for completeness (Table 19). Rating criteria are defined in Table 2. An overall rating has been provided for each Outcome. Since UNDP-GEF deems each risk dimension of sustainability critical, the overall rating for sustainability cannot be higher than the rating of the dimension with lowest rating.

113. Financial: It is worth prefacing this evaluation of financial sustainability with some more general observations since it appears to the TET that the three implementing partners have viewed the input of GEF funding very differently and as a result have approached the Project in different ways which in turn has affected sustainability – always it must be noted in a positive way.

- **WWF** declare that they have a long-term commitment to the area, and apparently this is referred to in their Strategic Plan, although the TET did not find an opportunity to view this. However, it is clear to the TET that this is so, after all the conservation of rare wildlife is its *raison d'être*, the coastal forests hold great diversity of such wildlife, and WWF was clearly operating in the area for well over a decade with a wide variety of donors before the current Project was implemented. Indeed, one of the strengths of involving international NGOs such as WWF in a GEF project is the fact that, unlike most nationally-executed projects where a project team is established solely for the duration of implementation, such organisations see the GEF project not as a stand alone intervention, but as being designed to fit into a bigger process – a single if albeit very large step on a much longer journey. As a result, WWF have already committed large amounts of funds to conservation work in the area, and show every intention of continuing to commit such funds to follow-up activities. While its effectiveness in the second half of the Project has left much to be desired, its continuing commitment to the landscape group is not in doubt and suggests strongly that the achievements will be sustainable and those part-finished will likely be completed.
- **TFS** was born during this Project and appears to have viewed GEF funding as a catalyst for its work in the north. Since as a parastatal, it now has greater control over the funds it derives from its own operations, now sending perhaps only 50% of these to the Treasury instead of all of them, there is some indication that it will be able to devote resources to its conservation efforts. Interviews with senior staff suggested that TFS was now much better resourced than its predecessor the FBD and there were big improvements in the Districts. Increased regulation and enforcement had further increased the amount of funds available. However, TET interviews in the Districts provided some contradictions, it being said that Rondo now had perhaps 30% more funding than at the time TFS was formed, but the budgets for its management show a sharp decline post-Project (see paragraph 97), and in Mkinga it was

suggested that while funding for conservation had seen an increase, this was no longer being sustained and budgets were declining (see paragraph 79).

- The **DFNRNR** appear to have used GEF funds differently, seeing them as a singular injection of money that can be used to achieve major one-off advances that involve high capital costs, e.g. erection of boundary markers, creating water supplies, renovating buildings. Effective work on process-based activities has included the establishment of CoFMAs but only a few income-generating activities in a few villages. While this has meant that some of the progress that was hoped for has not come about, in terms of sustainability these capital-intensive achievements, as well as the CoFMAs, will require very little funding to sustain them. Since they are viewed by the DFNRNR as being central to its forest conservation operations, the funding that is necessary would appear moderately likely to be forthcoming.

114. Socio-economic: The Project has been implemented through participatory processes with a range of local communities with implementation of activities being undertaken in concert with the District authorities. As a result, most of those people interviewed by the TET at the District and local levels expressed support for the Project's aims and a willingness to continue conservation actions because of the benefits that they brought. The TET found strong support amongst communities for the establishment of VLFRs on the mainland and CoFMAs on Pemba. Even in villages where the operational delays had caused breaks in the process, desire to have these completed was strong. The only concern the TET had was that for many of the income-generating activities the training had been of poor quality resulting, for example, in low yields of honey and poor-quality stoves. Stove-making in Zanzibar also suffered from the fact that sources of clay were very distant from the villages involved and unless the authorities continue to provide help with the transportation, this activity may cease. COCOBAs were very popular and the size of the groups was either stable or increasing where there were no VCOBAs competing.

115. Institutional and Governance: The institutional sustainability of the Project appears strong in all cases. TFS have created a new Coastal and Mangrove Forest Section and staffed it with six people under the Project. Senior management indicate that efforts are being made increase the area and productivity of plantation forestry in order to a) reduce pressure on natural forests by meeting the country's demand for timber (primarily charcoal and construction); and b) increasing revenues, part of which will be directed to conservation activities which are seen as having value in their own right. In Zanzibar, the DFNRNR have established a Conservation (Biodiversity) Section comprising four staff on Unguja and two on Pemba to deal with protected area issues. Two forest reserves have been upgraded to nature reserves (Ngezi-Vumawimbi and Masingini, and management plans are said to have been approved (not seen by the TET) and to be in use for three protected areas (Masingini Nature Forest Reserve, and Kiwengwa-Pongwe, and Msitu-Mkuu Forest Reserves) while those for Jozani Chwaka Bay National Park and Ngezi-Vumawimbi Nature Forest Reserve have been reviewed. In the south, Rondo Forest is awaiting the Minister's signature to complete its formal gazettement as a Nature Reserve. Although all work in Rufiji, Kilwa and Lindi has been led by WWF, it has ensured that all of the activities were implemented in close cooperation with the District authorities and TFS. The capacity of these organisations has been built locally, and all project achievements, e.g. the VLFRs, have been fully institutionalised so that should WWF exit the area, these achievements will continue in place.

116. Environmental: Risks associated with this dimension of sustainability are present and mostly relate to the potential impacts of climate change. Drought in the southern area has led to an in-migration of pastoralists who graze their cattle in the forests, but although bye-laws have been drawn up, they have not yet been enacted and, despite some easing of the drought, this problem continues at present.

TABLE 19: SUSTAINABILITY OF PROJECT OUTCOMES

	Outcome 1 TFS	Outcome 2 DFNRNR	Outcome 3 WWF
Financial	Conflicting evidence that State financing for protection and conservation management will continue at levels necessary to be effective. Moderately Likely	No evidence that Government financing of measures adequate for conservation will be forthcoming (e.g. the Conservation (Biodiversity) Section), but this is balanced by the fact that most of the Project's achievements have been of a nature that do not require much funding for their sustainability. Moderately Likely	Clear evidence that donor funds will continue to be invested in activities in the landscape. Likely
Socio-economic	Strong support in the local communities for all aspects of forest conservation, especially sustainable harvesting of community forests. Bee-keepers disappointed by low yields but keen to continue. Likely	Support for CoFMAs said to be good but TET visited only one. Bee-keepers disappointed by low yields but may continue. Stove groups enthusiastic and sell products to wider communities, but require continued support to transport raw material if they are to continue. Moderately Likely	Strong support in the local communities for all aspects of forest conservation, even where processes incomplete. Bee-keepers disappointed by low yields but keen to continue. Likely
Institutional	Strong – new Coastal Forest Unit established and staffed. Conservation remit within TFS taken seriously with long-term aim of having productive forests take pressure off of natural forests by producing sufficient timber to meet country's demands. Likely	Strong – Conservation Section established and staffed on both Unguja and Pemba. Management plans approved and said to be in use for 3 PAs. Gazettement of two new PAs is underway and two others have been upgraded. Likely	Strong – WWF have implemented activities in close cooperation with District authorities and TFS such that in the unlikely event WWF should withdraw, the achievements have been fully institutionalised. Likely
Environmental	No risks apparent. Likely	No risks apparent. Likely	Drought problems have resulted in immigrant pastoralists grazing their cattle in the forests. Project does not appear to have addressed this issue. Moderately Likely
Overall	ML	ML	ML

CATALYTIC ROLE AND REPLICATION

117. Discussion of replication in relation to the Coastal Forest Project has to be undertaken at the three levels that it has been working at, namely national strategic level; the landscape level; and the a local or site-based level.

- National level: this approach has not yet resulted in any scaling-up although parts of the strategic approach to this Project would lend themselves to this – e.g. specialist habitat-based units, habitat-specific conservation strategies and business planning. The Project has attempted to replicate the use of the Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool to all coastal forests and, despite some confusion engendered to the Project itself, in 2011 it undertook a baseline METT scoring exercise of what is said to be 146 forests covering different governance types. Unfortunately this has not been followed up so at present its use is limited to a comparison of the different types which have shown that VLFRs and National Parks have scored well, but Local Authority and National Forest Reserves have scored poorly reflecting their under-investment in funding and management over many years. The seeming enthusiasm to replicate METTs system-wide has not been matched by a full understanding of its use either to prioritise management and investment actions at given sites to focus on those aspects deflating some scores; or in the logic of the approach needed to maintain make the tool work, i.e. as a comparison of performance over time, thereby requiring the same areas to be assessed repeatedly, ideally by at least one of the same people who conducted the baseline assessment. An element of continuity could be introduced if the new Coastal and Mangrove Forest Section

was given responsibility for this task and METT scores were measured for at least some of the forests (if not all) annually; the results then being fed back into the preparation of the annual work plans and budgeting requirements. There is as yet no evidence that this is being done.

- Landscape level: this approach has provided some replication with the approach to the designation of VLFRs running at a much greater scale than the Project Document intended. Indicators for VLFR formation for Outcome 1 set a target of eight VLFRs (two in each of four districts) whereas the Project has designated three with another 38 at various stages in the process; while those for Outcome 2 have a target of four whereas the Project has designated two new ones and reviewed another seven; and for Outcome 3 the target was 15 villages involved whereas the Project has 29 VLFRs at various stages of designation. Some of those villages where the designation process is incomplete showed clear intent and enthusiasm to complete it after the Project has finished.
- Local level: The Project has taken steps “to catalyse the public good”¹⁷ through the introduction of new methods and training, notably bee-keeping using modern hives and techniques; fuel efficient stoves on Zanzibar, and COCOBAs. It is unclear as to whether any of these will ultimately be replicated widely since all suffer from some fatal flaw in their implementation – training was largely of poor quality or not at a practical enough level for bee-keeping to have produced yields high enough to be considered as an incentive to get others to take it up; the raw material for stove-making was too far from the relevant villages for the people to be able to transport without financial help; and COCOBAs had often been introduced into villages where VCOBAs had already been introduced by other projects meaning that there were competition for members.

118. The Project Strategy for Replication provided in the Replication Action Plan within the Project Document states that

“Lessons from implementing the protected area systems approach in the Coastal Forests will be documented, captured, and disseminated in technical papers and scientific products.”

and that:

“Detailed learning from this field projects will be fed back to the systems of Government that are trying to roll these conservation approaches out across the country.”

As the MTE notes:

“This was well conceived, but in practice, this requires an effective system to gather and distil the lessons learnt from the field and to translate these into policy and strategic implications. ... it will only be successful in reality if a sound and effective communication strategy is put into practise. Within the short project time-frame, the project itself cannot directly address replication and this is why documentation and effective communication of lessons learnt is so important.”

Although a good Communication Strategy was produced and in part implemented, the TET notes that documentation of the lessons learned did not really take place effectively. Some nice semi-scientific articles were published in *The Arc Journal* (the journal of the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group) but these were more news-type articles than the documentation of lessons learned. The production of “how-to” manuals or best practice guides would have proved much more effective in capturing lessons from the project and in disseminating them via the Coastal Forest Units (mainland and Zanzibar) for replication of the activities elsewhere.

¹⁷ *Project-level Evaluation: Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects.* (2012). UNDP Evaluation Office.

COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

119. The TET takes great pleasure in being able to report that the key Government institutions, the TFS and the DFNRNR, have taken considerable ownership of this Project. This may appear to be obvious, given that the Project was nationally executed through them, but sadly ownership does not always accompany such execution. In this case, however, the Governments have built incrementally upon the preceding groundwork, e.g. *National Forest Policy (1998)*, the Tanzania National Coastal Forest Task Force formed in 2002, and the *Tanzania National Forest Programme of 2001-2010*. Interviews clearly indicated that the Project was seen as owned by the two main institutions – indeed there was considerable resentment that WWF have appeared to usurp this ownership during its implementation (see paragraphs 34 and 106). Ownership by high-level government is evident through the willingness to establish new Nature Reserves (e.g. Rondo) or to upgrade existing protected areas to Nature Reserves (e.g. Ngezi and Masingi); but on Zanzibar this is tempered by the resistance exhibited outside of the MANR to the reconstitution of the National Protected Area Board. TFS clearly value the conservation of forests in their own right as well as for the protection of their opportunity values (e.g. undiscovered medicinal plants) and its long-term guiding strategy is to accomplish this both by direct conservation (e.g. protected areas) and through the reduction of pressure on natural forest by increasing plantation forests to meet the timber demands of the population (mainly charcoal and building material). There has been recognition of the fact that local communities play an essential part in conservation activities and the government has supported the establishment of community forests (VLFRs and CoFMAs) through the involvement of the local authority planning processes at district level where, for example, DFOs operate under an MoU with TFS. The PSC has been actively engaged at high level throughout. If a definition of political will is the inclination to make changes necessary to meet a particular challenge, then the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (mainland and Zanzibar) has clearly been exhibiting the political will necessary to meet the conservation challenges faced by the coastal forests.

RECOMMENDATIONS

120. Making recommendations at the point of Project closure cannot really help it, yet the TET makes a single one in the hope that certain outstanding issues can be laid to rest.

- UNDP request a formal explanation from WWF as to their actions in coordinating this Project, namely: a) why project management costs were so heavily overspent; and b) why the remaining funds were unequally distributed in WWF's favour (see paragraph 51).

LESSONS LEARNED

121. Lessons learned have been arranged under project-related headings, and cross-referenced back to the paragraph where they appear if relevant.

STRATEGIC

- #1 Having an independent coordination body is a highly successful mechanism for projects involving institutions from the mainland and Zanzibar. [Paragraph 16]
- #2 Successful results on-the-ground engender trust and garner support. [Paragraph 16]

FINANCIAL

- #3 A buffer period needs to be introduced into FACE to facilitate the flexibility necessary to implement complex projects. [Paragraph 46]
- #4 Partner institutions should be made responsible for tracking and reporting all of their financial contributions to a project. [Paragraph 42]

DESIGN

- #5 The coordination and implementation roles need to be kept separate so that in any given project the same organisation does not play two roles. [Paragraph 16]
- #6 It is important to include in the design of projects, income-generating activities or other actions that bring direct economic benefits to those communities whose behaviours the Project is seeking to change or whose involvement/increased awareness it is hoping to catalyse. [Paragraph 16]
- #7 GEF projects should look at the efficacy of including an additional period of continued low-level (low-cost) technical support to beneficiaries beyond the time necessary to achieve the outputs in order to consolidate the achievements and increase their likely sustainability. [Paragraph 16]
- #8 All GEF projects should be able to stand alone in terms of impact indicators. [Paragraph 21]

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

- #9 Too close a focus on achievement of the logframe's indicators can lead to key elements of the project being lost. [Paragraph 35]

ANNEX I: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR FINAL EVALUATION

PIMS No: 2760 Proposal ID: 00049523, Award ID 00058855; Project Number 00073328

Project Title: **Extending the Coastal Forest Protected Area Subsystem in Tanzania**

Programme Component: Biodiversity

Project Duration: 4 years

Allocated Resources (Cash) at project Signature:

GEF US\$ 3,550,000

UNDP US\$ 400,000

In kind Contribution from Government US\$ 3,674,666

Management Arrangement: NIM (National Implementation Modality)

BRIEF PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The Eastern African Coastal Forests (Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique) have been recognized as a distinct Global Hotspot for the Conservation of Biodiversity on account of high levels of both endemism (plants and several animal taxa) and species richness, both within and between the many constituent small forest patches. This fragmentation into many (>100) distinctive (in terms of substrate, moisture and so diversity) patches, averaging <500 ha compounds the conservation challenge for this region. The lack of timber, distance from tourism routes, and limited water catchment function, prevents the use of most existing PES mechanisms (although carbon via REDD does offer some opportunity). Forest patches support soil development and hence there is conversion pressure to cultivate forest soils instead of the sandy low clay and low fertility soils elsewhere in the coastal area.

Government and WWF in the region have prioritized the Coastal Forest Eco-Region, developed an approved Conservation Strategy at national levels, and created a functional Coastal Forest Task Force to oversee the Strategy. GEF supports this Conservation Strategy in Kenya (PIMS) and has funded the development of this FSP, covering both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar (note they have totally different forest institutions with separate and different legal frameworks).

Coastal closed forest patches are surrounded by a matrix of different woodland, wooded grassland and cultivation areas. Woodlands (eastern dry miombo / coastal savanna) have valuable timber trees which led to massive external logging pressure earlier this decade. This problem led to strengthening forest management, and especially local community involvement through Participatory Forest Management (PFM). Woodlands offer connectivity and buffer zone functions within forest landscapes. Historically Coastal Forests with little or no timber or water values have been low priority for government investment, and reserve management, which was transferred to district mandates in the 1970's is grossly underfunded and understaffed. Despite the large number of reserves, several large forest patches with important biodiversity values remain unprotected.

This project works with Government, largely through the forest sector, WWF and other NGOs; to strengthen overall conservation and management of the Coastal Forests of Tanzania, focusing on both Zanzibar and three priority landscapes in south-eastern Tanzania. The project is designed to run for four years through National Execution Modalities, with government sub-contracting WWF to undertake some specific functions. The project will increase the extent of Protected Areas, upgrade key areas to higher status and seek innovative funding mechanisms for the Hot-Spot. Carbon offers some opportunity for such funding

1. INTRODUCTION

The GEF Coastal Forest project document was endorsed in March 2010. The inception period started with negotiations on implementation arrangements culminating to the signing of an MOU between MNRT, DCCFF and WWF on 9th April 2010 followed by recruitment of project staff including the

appointment of the National Project Manager. The project started its main implementation from January 2011.

In accordance with UNDP and GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full and medium-sized UNDP supported GEF financed projects are required to undergo a final evaluation at project end.

These terms of reference (TOR) sets out the expectations for the Final Evaluation of the Extending the Coastal Forest Protected Area Subsystem in Tanzania project

The objectives for Project Final Evaluation are:

- To review the results that measure the impacts achieved by project implementation;
- To promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing through results and lessons learned among partners. The evaluation will identify lessons of operational and technical relevance for future project formulation and implementation in the country.
- Judging from the results of the project, point out any, gaps and challenges that need to be addressed to achieve the **extension of Coastal Forest PA Subsystem in the country and the possible initiative to manage** coastal forest sustainably in the future.

2. SUMMARY OF THE NEED FOR FINAL EVALUATION

To try and address the current weaknesses in the protected area system in the coastal forests, provide an overview of the values and management needs, and put in place more economically sustainable management regimes, UNDP GEF has committed \$3.5 million (2011 – 2014) for improving the conservation of the coastal forests of Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. Field action will focus on Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba) and southern Tanzania (Lindi, Kilwa and Rufiji districts). However, the project will consider all coastal forest patches in every coastal District on the mainland and also all forest patches on Pemba and Unguja. The project activities are coordinated by a Project management Unit (PMU) hosted by WWF.

This four year project started in 2010, and has proceeded more or less on track according to the timescale. Some delays have been caused by the somewhat complicated arrangements of project implementation and funding transfers between UNDP, Government of Tanzania, Government of Unguja and WWF. If one of the partners fails to complete its required reporting on time, then this causes delays for funding release and hence delays for the whole project implementation structure. Final evaluation at this point is considered relevant because the project has spent over 95% of the resources allocated. The Final Evaluation should build on the Mid-Term Evaluation where possible, and in particular verify the extent to which the Mid-Term Evaluation recommendations have been implemented.

3. PROJECT SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

Deforestation and forest degradation are occurring in many parts of coastal Tanzania. The remaining forest areas in the coastal region of the country, known as Eastern African Coastal Forests, contain high levels of species diversity and richness, with numerous endemic and threatened species being present. A network of Forest Reserves managed by a poorly articulated arrangement between the central and local government provides the bulk of the protected extent of forest in the area. However, management of these reserves is often extremely weak and considerable utilisation of the forest resource for logging and charcoal production, and even farming in some reserves, has taken place over several decades. This has left some of the reserves almost bereft of trees, especially those reserves close to Dar es Salaam. In more remote areas, such as southern and northern Tanzania, however, larger areas of forest and woodland in mosaic habitats remain. This includes significant areas of natural habitat outside the formal network of reserves. In these areas, but especially in southern Tanzania, efforts have been made over around a decade to put resources under the management of local communities through the form of Village Land Forest Reserves and to see ways that these VLFR

can benefit local communities through income generation mechanisms, while also keeping the forests broadly intact and still supporting the important assemblages of plants and animals for which they are globally important.

Over recent years significant progress has been made to develop systems whereby Village Land Forest Reserves and the communities that own and manage them can start to gain tangible benefits from logging of high value timber, including with the global ‘FSC’ certification. The area of land that is being harvested for the benefit of communities in southern Tanzania is expanding and there is a high demand from communities for this kind of approach to be expanded to other parts of the coast (and throughout Tanzania). A number of barriers to effectively implement this form of income generation from forests have been discovered in the past year or two, which include the lack of some of the paperwork and systems to allow communities to legally log, transport, and gain benefits from logging on their own lands. Solving these challenges, through putting in place solid business plans, assessing and using the economic potential of these village forests has become an important element of all forest conservation work in the country, and seems likely to be a major thrust for the coming next few years. On the part of Zanzibar and Pemba the issues are somewhat different and income generation from forests is mainly coming from the large numbers of international tourists who visit the area and from smaller income flows from water catchment functions, and the provision of firewood and other essential materials for local livelihoods.

This project has the following goal, objective and outcomes:

Goal: The Coastal Forest Biodiversity and Ecosystem Values are Conserved and Provide Sustainable Benefit Flows at Local, National and Global Levels.

Objective: The spatial coverage and management effectiveness of the Coastal Forest PA sub system is expanded and strengthened.

Outcomes:

Outcome 1: Strengthened Enabling Environment is functioning for conservation of Coastal Forests in mainland Tanzania, leading to increased funding, staffing and oversight.

Outcome 2: The Protected Area System for Zanzibar is strengthened in terms of both representativeness, connectivity, financing and managerial capacity.

Outcome 3: Effective PA Management Systems in place at four project priority landscapes, with co-management between central, local and village government partners, leading to improved conservation of biodiversity values.

4. EVALUATION CRITERIA

To focus the evaluation objectives, by defining the standards against which the initiative will be assessed, the following five evaluation criteria will be applied:

- **Relevance**, concerns the extent to which the project and its intended outcomes or outputs are consistent with national and local policies and priorities and the needs of the intended beneficiaries. Relevance also considers the extent to which the initiative is aligned with the GEF/UNDP programming priorities. Relevance vis-a-vis other ongoing projects (MCDI, IUCN, CARE, TFCG/MJUMITA including REDD+-related projects) implemented in the coastal areas of Tanzania should also be examined, in terms of synergies, complementarities and absence of duplication of efforts.
- **Effectiveness**, measures the extent to which the Project’s intended results (outputs and outcomes) have been achieved or the extent to which progress towards outputs and outcomes has been achieved. To explain why certain outputs and outcomes have been achieved better or more than others, the evaluation will review:
- **Efficiency**, measures how economically resources or inputs (such as funds, expertise and time) are converted to achieving stipulated outcomes and outputs.

- **Sustainability**, analyse the likelihood of sustainable outcomes at programme termination, with attention to sustainability of financial resources, the socio-political environment, catalytic or replication effects of the project, institutional and governance factors, and environmental risks.
- **Impact**, measures to what extent the project has contributed to, or is likely to contribute to intermediate states towards impact, such as changes in the governance systems and stakeholder behaviour, and to impact on people's lives and the environment. The evaluation will assess the likelihood of impact by critically reviewing the programmes intervention strategy (Theory of Change) and the presence of the required drivers and assumptions for outcomes to lead to intermediate states and impact.
- **Factors and processes affecting the attainment of project results** – which looks at examination of preparation and readiness of the project, country ownership, stakeholder involvement, financial planning, performance of national and local implementing agencies and designated supervision agency, coordination mechanism with other relevant donors projects/programmes, and reasons for any bottlenecks and delays in delivery of project outputs, outcomes and the attainment of sustainability.

PROJECT FINANCE PLANNED AND CO-FINANCE

The Evaluation team will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. Results from recent financial audits, as available, should be taken into consideration. The evaluator(s) will receive assistance from the Country Office (CO) and Project Team to obtain financial data on co-financing.

MAINSTREAMING

UNDP supported GEF financed projects are key components in UNDP country programming, as well as regional and global programmes. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project was successfully mainstreamed within other UNDP priorities, including poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender.

IMPACT

The evaluators will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings to be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.¹⁸

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & LESSONS

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of **conclusions, recommendations and lessons**.

¹⁸A useful tool for gauging progress to impact is the Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) method developed by the GEF Evaluation Office: [ROTI Handbook 2009](#)

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP CO in Tanzania. The UNDP CO will contract the evaluators and ensure the logistical arrangements are in place.

The evaluation exercise will be conducted by two consultants one lead international consultant backed up a national consultant who will be recruited at the same time in a parallel process. The international consultant will serve as overall Team Leader and responsible for the final quality of report submitted to UNDP. The two consultants will form a team making a joint presentation to a project Stakeholders Meeting to be planned in the course of the assignment. The project management team in consultation with UNDP CO will be responsible for logistical arrangements (setting up meetings, organizing travel).

The evaluation will commence when formalities are completed ideally in late April 2014, and the Evaluation Team will present key findings to a Project Stakeholders' meeting by end of May 2014. A draft Final Evaluation Report, with comments from project partners incorporated will be submitted to UNDP no later than end of June 2014. A final report will be submitted ten days after receiving consolidated written comments from stakeholders

The Project Management Team will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluators team to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits, coordinate with the Government etc.

EVALUATION TIMEFRAME

The Evaluation is expected to start by end of April 2014 and have an estimated total duration of 21 working days. The final work plan will be agreed jointly by the Evaluation Team and UNDP upon submission of Inception report including a draft evaluation work plan for discussion during the initial briefing meeting.

EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The evaluation team is expected to deliver the following:

Deliverable	Content	Timing	Responsibilities
Inception Report	Evaluator provides clarifications on the organization and methodology describing the field missions and the work plan for the evaluation team	Within 10 days from the contract signature.	Evaluator submits to UNDP CO
Presentation to project partners and submission of Draft Report	Initial Findings Presentation report and Draft Evaluation report, (per annexed template)	End of evaluation mission preferably within 10 working days following completion of in-country mission	Evaluator submits draft evaluation report to project management team as UNDP Country Office for onward transmission to stakeholders
Draft Final Evaluation Report*	Revised report incorporating comments from project partners	Not later than 10 working days after comments are received from UNDP	Evaluator submits draft Final report to be cleared by RTA before uploading to UNDP ERC.

*When submitting the final evaluation report, the consultants are also required to provide an 'audit trail', detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report.

TEAM COMPOSITION

Specifically, the International Consultant will have the following profile:

1. Functional Competencies for the International Consultant (Team Leader)

- An effective evaluation manager with demonstrated experience in conducting international development evaluations preferably at team leader role;
- Demonstrated strong knowledge of Monitoring and Evaluation methods for development projects; knowledge of UNDP's results-based management orientation and practices;
- Broad knowledge of Forest Conservation in Africa (particularly Eastern or Southern Africa), especially on community based forest management approaches, and the best ways to improve livelihoods from these approaches.
- At least 10 years' experience in the implementation of forestry / community forestry / livelihood / protected areas in the developing countries;
- Demonstrated experience with implementation and/or evaluation of capacity-building efforts in developing countries, ideally in the area of forestry and/community based natural resources management;

2. Corporate competencies:

- Demonstrates commitment to UNDP's mission, vision and values;
- Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability;
- Highest standards of integrity, discretion and loyalty

3. Qualification and experience Requirements:

- At least Masters Degree or higher in the area of environment and natural resources management, natural sciences or economics with experience in research, project design, planning, implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation
- A minimum of ten (10) years of post-graduate professional experience in environment/sustainable development, with practical working knowledge of the developing world including East Africa and Tanzania;
- Previous experience in protected areas management and landscape planning including Monitoring and Evaluation or management of GEF projects - ideally in Africa
- Substantive knowledge of UNDP-GEF tools for monitoring and Evaluation, and general knowledge of the UNDP Practice Areas, specifically the UNDP Ecosystems and Biodiversity (EBD) Strategy and Global Portfolio
- Familiarity with project implementation in complex multi donor-funded projects;
- Fluency in the English language and excellent oral and written communication skills.

The consultants must not have had any involvement in the design or implementation of this project and have no present affiliation with the UN organisations funding the programme UNDP, or any of the programmes key project stakeholders that would jeopardize their objectivity in relation to the assignment

The Team Leader will report to the UNDP Deputy Country Director (Programme) through the Programme Specialist - Environment and Natural Resources. The project team (PMU at

WWF) will serve as the reference group for the evaluation and ensure the monitoring of satisfactory completion of evaluation deliverables.

In consultation with the Evaluation Team Leader and as requested, the PMU personnel will make available all relevant documentation and provide contact information to key project partners and stakeholders, and facilitate contact where needed. The team will also assist in organizing any briefing de-briefing meetings including coordination of stakeholders input in the evaluation draft report

EVALUATOR ETHICS

Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a Code of Conduct (Annex E) upon acceptance of the assignment. The evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles laid out in UNDP Evaluation Policy. <http://www.undp.org/evaluation/19> and the principles outlined in the UNEG ‘Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation’ <http://www.uneval.org/search/index.jsp?q=ethical+guidelines>.

¹⁹The UNDP M&E Handbook <http://www.undp.org/evaluation/handbook/> is another useful reference to UNDP’s evaluation principles.

ANNEX II : ITINERARY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE FINAL EVALUATION MISSION

Date		Activities
Wed	11 th June	All day: Document review.
Thu	12 th June	All day: Document review
Fri	13 th June	All day: Document review
Sun	15 th June	Lead evaluator travels to Tanzania.
Mon	16 th June	pm: 1. Lead evaluator arrives in Tanzania. 2. Initial meeting of consultancy team. 3. Itinerary planning meeting with WWF.
Tue	17 th June	am: 1. Meeting with Programme Specialist, Energy & Environment UNDP (Ms. Gertrude Lyatuu. 2. Meeting with Head Programme Finance, UNDP (Mr. Victor Kida). 3. Meeting with Deputy Country Director, UNDP (Ms. Mandisa Mashologu). pm: 1. Inception workshop with WWF (Country Director (Mr. Bell'aube Houinato), Conservation Manager (Mr. Gerald Kamwenda), Forest Programme Coordinator (Mr. Isaac Malugu), Financial Controller (Mr. Davis Mjeme), Acting Project Coordinator (Ms. Philipina Shayo), Project M&E Officer (Mr. Evodius Rutta), Project Accountant (Mr. Fridolin Sangawe)). 2. Meeting with Conservation Manager, WWF (Mr. Gerald Kamwenda). 3. Meeting with Regional Technical Coordinator UNDP-GEF (Mr. Paul Harrison) (S). 4. Meeting with Country Director, WWF (Mr. Bell'aube Houinato).
Wed	18 th June	am: 1. Meeting with Director of Resource Management, TFS (Mr. Zawadi Mbwambo). 2. Meeting with Head of Coastal Forest Unit and Coordinator Coastal Forestry Project, TFS (Ms. Anna Lawuo). pm: 1. Logistics planning. 2. Meeting with former Forest Programme Coordinator, WWF (Mr. Peter Sumbi). 3. Meeting with Forest Programme Coordinator, WWF (Mr. Isaac Malugu). 4. Meeting with Project Accountant (Mr. Fridolin Sangawe).
Thu	19 th June	am: 1. Travel to Zanzibar. 2. Meeting with Deputy Principal Secretary, DFNRNR (Dr. Bakari Asseid). 3. Meeting with Director, DFNRNR (Mr. Sheha Idrissa Hamdan) pm: 1. Field visit to Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve (building renovation, boundary markers, water supply). 2. Meeting with beneficiary of improved stoves, Kiwengwa village (Ms. Zuena Rashid Khalfan). 3. Meeting with members of bee-keeping group, Kiwengwa village (two people – see Annex III). 4. Visit to Jozani National Park (water supply for fire-fighting).
Fri	20 th June	am: 1. Field visit to Masingini Forest Reserve (building renovation, boundary marking). 2. Meeting with Manager for Forest Protection Areas (Unguja), DFNRNR and Coordinator (Zanzibar) Coastal Forest Project (Mr. Ali Mwinyi). 3. Meeting with Project Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (Mr. Evodius Rutta). pm: 1. Travel to Pemba Island. 2. Meeting Planning Officer of Forests (Pemba), DFNRNR.
Sat	21 st June	am: 1a. (PE) Field visit to Ngezi-Vumawimb Natural Forest Reserve. 1b. (DG) Visit to Ngezi-Vumawimb NFR Information Centre. pm: 1a. Meeting with Head of Conservation Section, DFNRNR (Pemba) (Mr. Sharif Faki Sharif). 2a. Meeting with Head of Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve (Mr. Salim Ali Khamis). 3a. Meeting with Project Monitoring and Evaluation Officer (Mr. Evodius Rutta) 1b. (DG) Meeting with Chair of Njini Community Forest Management Association (Mr. Ismail Bakari Haji). 2b. Meeting with Njini Bee-keeping Group ("Tuwalee") (three members – see Annex III). 3b. Meeting with Mtemani Stove Group (four people – see Annex III).
Sun	22 nd June	am: 1. Travel to Dar-es-Salaam. pm: 1. Meeting with Chief Technical Advisor (Dr. Neil Burgess). 2. Travel to Ikwiriri.
Mon	23 rd June	am: 1. Travel to Lindi. 2. Meeting with WWF Project Executant (Lindi) (John Masam). 2. Meeting with Assistant District Executive Director, Lindi District

Date		Activities
		(Salem Ani Ngaweja). pm: 1. Travel to Rondo Forestry Station. 2. Meeting with Assistant Manager (Accounts), TFS (Rondo) (Eliapenda Wavii). 3. Travel to Lindi.
Tue	24 th June	am: 1. Travel to Rondo Forest. 2. Field visit to Rondo Forest. 3. Meeting with Nndawa Village stakeholders and beneficiaries (eight members– see Annex III). 3. Travel to Mihima. pm: 1. Meeting with Mihima Village stakeholders and beneficiaries (seven members– see Annex III). 2. Travel to Liganga viewing boundary markers en route. 3. Meeting with Liganga Village stakeholders and beneficiaries (three members– see Annex III). 4. Travel to Lindi. 5. Meeting with WWF Project Executant (Lindi) (Mr. John Masam).
Wed	25 th June	am: 1. Delay – vehicle problem. 2. Travel to Nyamwage village (Rufiji District). pm: 1. Meeting with Chairman (Mr. Ibrahim Said Boweto) and Executive Officer (Athumani A. Mgomi) Nyamwage Village Council. 2. Meeting with Chairman (Mr. Shamte Ali Mtanga) and Member (Mr. Mohamed Salim Kileka) Nyamwage Village Natural Resources Committee. 3. Meeting with WWF Project Executant (Kilwa) (Mr. Harry Hussein).
Thu	26 th June	am: 1. Travel to Dar-es-Salaam. pm: 1. Meeting with WWF Acting Project Coordinator and Landscape Coordinator (Ms. Philipina Shayo). 2. Meeting with WWF Financial Controller (Mr. Davis Mjeme).
Fri	27 th June	am: 1. De-briefing meeting with eleven participants (see Annex V). pm: 1. Travel to Tanga.
Sat	28 th June	am: 1. Meeting with TFS District Forest Manager (Mkinga District) (Mr. Frank Chambo). 2. Meeting with Mkinga District Bee-keeping Officer (Mr. Erasto Msigwa). pm: 1. Collation of information.
Sun	29 th June	am: 1. Travel and field visit to forestry nursery, Lanzoni. 2. Travel to Wajumbe village. 3. Meeting with Chairman (Mr. Tyson Msigwa) and Executive Officer (Mr. Martin Mika), Wajumbe Village Council. 4. Meeting with members of Wajumbe Village Natural Resources Committee (five members– see Annex III). 5. Meeting with Bamba Bee-keeping Group (“Juhudi”) (five members – see Annex III). pm: 1. Travel to Dar-es-Salaam airport.
Mon	30 th June	am: 1. Lead evaluator departs Tanzania.

ANNEX III : PERSONS INTERVIEWED

(S) = skype interview. Alphabetic order.

UNDP Tanzania / GEF

Gertrude Lyatuu	Programme Specialist, Energy & Environment
Victor Kida	Head Programme Finance
Mandisa Mashologu	Deputy Country Director
Paul Harrison (S)	Regional Technical Advisor, UNDP-GEF Africa Bureau

Project Staff

Evodius Rutta	Project M&E Officer
Fridolin Sangawe	Project Accountant
Harry Hussein	Project Executant (Kilwa)
John Masam	WWF Project Executant (Lindi)
Neil Burgess	Chief Technical Advisor
Philipina Shayo	Acting Project Coordinator and Landscape Coordinator

WWF Tanzania

Bell'aube Houinato	Country Director,
Davis Mjeme	Head Financial Control, WWF Tanzania
Isaac Malugu	Forest Programme Coordinator, WWF Tanzania
Gerald Kamwenda	Conservation Manager, WWF Tanzania
Peter Sumbi	Former Forest Programme Coordinator

Tanzania Forest Services

Anna Lawuo	Head of Coastal Forest Unit and Coordinator Coastal Forestry Project
Eliapenda Wavii	Assistant Manager (Accounts), (Rondo)
Frank Chambo	District Forest Manager (Mkinga District)
Zawadi Mbwambo	Director of Resource Management

Department of Forestry and Non-renewable Natural Resources

Ali Mwinyi	Manager for Forest Protection Areas (Unguja), and Coordinator Coastal Forest Project (Zanzibar)
Bakari Asseid	Deputy Principal Secretary
Salim Ali Khamis	Head of Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve and Assistant Project Coordinator (Unguja)
Sharif Faki Sharif	Head of Conservation Section, DFNRNR (Pemba) and Assistant Project Coordinator (Pemba)
Sheha Idrissa Hamdan	Director

District Authorities

Erasto Msigwa	Bee-keeping Officer, Mkinga District
Salem Ani Ngaweja	Assistant District Executive Director, Lindi District

Community Stakeholders and Beneficiaries

Abiba Selemani	Member, Nndawa Village COCOBA, Lindi
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Aisha Juma	Member, Wajumbe Village Natural Resources Committee, Tanga
Alasa Juma	Treasurer, Mihima Village COCOBA, Lindi
Asha Petra Palawana	Member, “Junge” Bee-keeping Group, Mihima Village, Lindi
Athumani A. Mgomi	Executive Officer, Nyamwage Village Council, Rufiji
Bakari Liwowo	Secretary, Mihima Village Natural Resources Committee and COCOBA, and member of “Tuungane” Bee-keeping Group, Lindi
Beatus Thomas	Member, Ligangi Village Natural Resources Committee, Lindi
Bikombo Hamadi Othumam	Member, Stove Group, Mtemani village, Pemba
Charles Kiegezo	Member, Bee-keeping Group “Juhudi”, Bamba village Tanga
Edna Aloyce	Member, Bee-keeping Group “Juhudi”, Bamba village Tanga
Edwin Egnius	Chairman, Ligangi Village Natural Resources Committee, Lindi
Elizabeth Bendera	Member, Bee-keeping Group “Juhudi”, Bamba village Tanga
Fatuma Hamadi Faki	Member, Stove Group, Mtemani village, Pemba
Fatuma Hassani	Member, Nndawa Village Bee-keeping Group, Lindi
Gaufrio I. Kalembo	Secretary, Nndawa Village Natural Resources Committee, Lindi
Harriet Peter	Member, Bee-keeping Group “Juhudi”, Bamba village Tanga
Ibrahim Said Boweto	Chairman, Nyamwage Village Council, Rufiji
Ismail Bakari Haji	Chair of Community Forest Management Association, Njini village, Pemba
John H. Nonjela	Chairman, Nndawa Village Natural Resources Committee, Lindi
Juma Ali Hamadi	Member, Stove Group, Mtemani village, Pemba
Juma L. Nandonde	Secretary, Nndawa Village Council, Lindi
Juma M. Juma	Chairman, Nndawa Village Council, Lindi
Juma Omari Juma	Member, Bee-keeping Group “Tuwalee”, Njini village, Pemba
Logatu Saidi	Member, Mihima Village COCOBA, Lindi
Lukia Hassmi Umila	Chair, “Junge” Bee-keeping Group, Mihima Village, Lindi
Maiko Liwamba	Secretary, Wajumbe Village Natural Resources Committee, Tanga
Makame Hasani	Member, Wajumbe Village Natural Resources Committee, Tanga
Makani Shamata Khalid	Member, Bee-keeping Group “Tuwalee”, Njini village, Pemba
Mariamli John	Member, Nndawa Village COCOBA, Lindi
Martin Mika	Executive Officer, Wajumbe Village Council, Tanga
Mohamed Salim Kileka	Member, Nyamwage Village Natural Resources Committee, Rufiji
Mtumwa Bariuku Juma	Member, Bee-keeping Group “Tuwalee”, Njini village, Pemba

Omari Rajabu	Member, “Jiunge” Bee-keeping Group, Mihima Village, Lindi
Omari Zuberi	Chairman, Wajumbe Village Natural Resources Committee, Tanga
Othumam Hamadi	Member, Stove Group, Mtemani village, Pemba
Rashidi Nyimbile	Member, Nndawa Village Bee-keeping Group, Lindi
Rukia Juma	Member, Wajumbe Village Natural Resources Committee, Tanga
Shabani Seifu Chitanda	Executive Officer, Ligangi Village Council, Lindi
Shamte Ali Mtanga	Chairman, Nyamwage Village Natural Resources Committee, Rufiji
Sharifa Omar	Member, Mihima Village COCOBA, Lindi
Stella Wallace	Secretary, Bee-keeping Group “Juhudi”, Bamba village Tanga
Tyson Msigwa	Chairman, Wajumbe Village Council, Tanga

ANNEX IV : SUMMARY EVALUATION OF PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS BY OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

The Project logframe in the Project Document appears to have been revised during the inception period but there was confusion when the two versions were being used simultaneously and the Project Steering Committee called for clarity (see paragraphs 17). However, this does not seem to have occurred and an amalgamation of the two ensued. There is no documentation relating to this. The version presented here is the one being used by the PMU at the time of the TE, and the delivery status herein is taken from the most recent information available from the PMU and clarified by the TET.

KEY:

GREEN = Indicators show achievement successful at the end of the Project.

YELLOW = Indicators show achievement nearly successful at the end of the Project.

RED = Indicators not achieved at the end of Project.

HATCHED COLOUR = estimate; situation either unclear or indicator inadequate to make a firm assessment against.

Goal: The coastal forest biodiversity and ecosystem values are conserved and provide sustainable benefit flows at local, national and global levels.

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
1	Objective: The spatial coverage and management effectiveness of the coastal forest PA sub system is expanded and strengthened	Increase in extent (ha) of PA network that includes coastal forests, and a network with increased legal protection and management of biodiversity values, including four forest nature reserves	19,570ha is under improved management of which none is Forest Nature Reserve (FNR)	12,000ha as Forest Nature Reserve and 100,000 ha as VLFRs	The Rondo Nature Forest Reserve covering 12,000ha is under the final process for gazettment and upgrading into a Nature Reserve by the Ministry of Natural Resource and Tourism. The dossier (containing the agreement from surrounding villages, the district, the region, and TFS) was submitted to the cabinet in June 2013. A total of 74 Village Land Forest Reserves totalling 169,952 ha has been demarcated in Zanzibar (11 CoFMAs,) Lindi Region, and Kilwa, Rufiji, Pangani, Handeni, Muheza, Mkinga, Bagamoyo and Kisarawe Districts. Of these, 56 (75.6%) covering 154,825 ha (91.1%) have management plans.	TET understands that just the Minister's signature is awaited. A recent change in Minister means the authorising letter requires re-drafting for the new Minister's signature						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
2		Increase in area under landscape conservation, with functional corridors and buffer-zones, managed under detailed landscape conservation plans	Nil	1.277million ha	A total of 536,590 ha are under proper management status within the landscapes of Rufiji, Kilwa, Lindi, Tanga, and Zanzibar. There are 130,361 ha under Central Government Forest Reserves; 77,825 ha under Wildlife Management Areas; 307,463 ha under Village Land Forest Reserves; and 22,370 ha under Local Authority Forest Reserves; plus 84,884 ha under proposed Wildlife Management Areas	The TET notes that these figures still do not add up to the total given. Excluding those proposed WMAs, the total is 538,019 ha – 42% of the target. Allowing for the 84,884 ha under proposed WMAs, this rises to 622,903 ha or 48.8%, still less than half the target.						
3		Business plans show improved Financial scorecard for national system of CF protected areas and target landscape (Rufiji, Lindi, Kilwa and Zanzibar)	Average of financial scorecard is 22.2% Note that in the figures provided to the TET as definitive, the baseline average is 34.3%. [It is also impossible to get a score of 22.2% from an average of three scores.]	An increase of over 40% in finance score card scores	The Financial Scorecards for the Kilwa, Lindi and Zanzibar landscapes averaged 55.3% (+21%). A breakdown of these shows that significant progress enough to meet the target was made only in Lindi 82% (+51%). The other results were: Kilwa 34% (+8%); Zanzibar 50% (+4%).	There is no Financial Score card for Tanga because it was not included in the baseline. No Financial Scorecard was submitted for Rufiji – no reasons provided.						
4		METT scores for PAs and PA landscapes show improvement in targeted landscapes	The average METT score for PAs is 44.2% Note that in the figures provided to the TET as definitive, the baseline average is 34.3%. [It is also impossible to get a score of 42.2% from an average of three scores.]	An all over increase of 20% in the METT score	The average score for all 27 PAs was 46.3% (+12%). This breaks down into provincial averages thus: Kilwa 43.5% (+9.1%); Rufiji 37.6% (+2.5%); Lindi 46.25% (+24.9%); Zanzibar 66.25% (+25.85%). Therefore, while the overall target was not achieved, it was for Lindi and Zanzibar. On a site basis, 9 of the 27 sites achieved a 20% increase; i.e. the target was achieved in 33% of the sites; 12 (44.4%) achieved an increase of <20%; and 6 (22.2%) resulted in a decrease.	Scores are from 27 PAs (11 in Kilwa; 8 in Rufiji; 4 in Lindi; 4 in Zanzibar).						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
5	Outcome 1: Strengthened enabling environment is functioning for conservation of coastal of forests in mainland Tanzania, leading to increased funding and oversight	Institutional collaboration for management effectiveness of coastal forests between FBD/TFS and Districts strengthened	No section and MOUs	Section in place with >2staff, and at least 6 MOUs with District signed	Coastal Forest Unit established in TFS with 4 staff. 9 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) were signed between TFS and Districts of Mkinga, Handeni, Muheza, Pangani, Bagamoyo, Mkuranga, Kisarawe, Rufiji, and Kibaha over joint responsibilities in conservation of coastal forests							
6		Increase in staffing levels and funding levels for CF in all four landscapes. Better articulated PA financing needs lead to improved local government budgetary subvention for PAs in 8 districts	Average staff per district on Mainland is <5. Funding <US\$ 10,000	Average staff increased to >10 in 3 districts. Funding exceeds US\$ 30,000 in each of 3 Districts	There has been an increase and relocation of staff at District level. At the beginning of the project there were 27 staff, but by the end there were 72 staff: Kisarawe 15 (10 for TFS), Bagamoyo 7 (3 TFS), Mkuranga 6 (2 for TFS), Pangani 7 (3 for TFS), Mkinga 8 (7 for TFS), Muheza 8 (7 for TFS), and Handeni 27 (18 for TFS). Total funding for the 9 districts was US\$ 250,375.	The total funding represents an average of US\$ 27,820 per district, just short of the target but applied to nine districts rather than three – an excellent result. The TET has not been able to verify these figures independently.						
7		Significance % increase in competence levels of protected area institutions for PA including co-management partners;using UNDP-GEF PA Scorecard	Average is 48.5%	None set	There was an average of 63.5% for 4 Pas	This indicator cannot be assessed since i) there is no target set; and ii) TFS sites (in Tanga) were not included in the baseline.						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
8		Number of reports produced synthesizing the Annual Status of the PA network (using the "State-Pressure-Response Models)	Average is 48.5%	4 by EOP (annual reports for each of the year that the project will run)	This indicator has been deleted as recommended in the Mid Term Evaluation Report of April 2013. The deletion was endorsed at the PSC meeting in February 2013 and Project planning meeting in May 2013. The MTE reports that a Forest Assessment Study was completed in 2011. A <i>Situation Analysis of Coastal Forests of Tanzania Mainland</i> was produced in May 2014.	See paragraph 19 – this indicator was not deleted but changed by the MTE to one requiring a report at the start and end of the Project.						
9		No. of VLFR - District Forestry collaborations on Management Plan and households benefit from IGAs	Nil	At least 2 VLFRs in each of 4 districts	A total of 41 VLFRs are at various stages in the process of being designated. Of these, 29 in ? Districts have management plans – Pangani 9 VLFRs (19,145 ha); Handeni 1 VLFR (567 ha); Muheza 7 VLFRs (1,328 ha); Mkinga 1 VLFR (124 ha); Bagamoyo 1 VLFR (2,195 ha); Kibaha 1 VLFR (2,000 ha); Kisarawe 9 VLFRs (4,449 ha) – totalling 27,828 ha. Of these, 23 have byelaws (the next step), 14 have been approved at community level, 10 approved at district level and 3 handed over to the community.	See Table 13 and Annex IX .						
10	Output 1.1: Capacity built in Tanzania Forest Service to lead and oversee a Tanzania Coastal Forest	Staffing level for costal forests	No designated officers	2 staff at FBD and 2 staff in each District	There has been an increase and relocation of staff at District level. At the beginning of the project there were 27 staff, but by the end there were 72 staff: Kisarawe 15 (10 for TFS), Bagamoyo 7 (3 TFS), Mkuranga 6 (2 for TFS), Pangani 7 (3 for TFS), Mkinga 8 (7 for TFS), Muheza 8 (7 for TFS), and Handeni 27 (18 for TFS).	TFS provide figures showing 78 staff – see Table 12.						
11	Conservation Programme	Funding level	< US\$ 5,000	Funding exceeds US\$ 30,000 in each of 3 District	Total funding for the 9 districts was amounting to US\$ 250,375.	The total funding represents an average of US\$ 27,820 per district, just short of the target but applied to nine districts rather than three – an excellent result. The TET has not been able to verify these figures independently.						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
12		Increased stakeholder participation	Not established	Networks in each district established	No meetings were done because of fund delay issues between UNDP and PMU							
13	Output 1.2: Coastal Forest Reserves (non reserves) within target landscapes are assessed as to priority for conservation on biodiversity and threat criteria, and conservation strategy developed	Coastal Forest Reserve Area increased and conservation strategy developed and implemented	No conservation plan	Conservation plan for coastal forests	The final draft of the Conservation Strategy has been submitted to both TFS and WWF-PMU. The Strategy will be used as guideline document for sustainable management of Coastal particularly in Landscapes where the project was working.	The Conservation Strategy is dated May 2014 and as yet it has no formal status.						
14		Number and area assessed	146 Forest Reserves in Costal Forests	8 VLFRs established, one FR upgraded to NR and 145 Forest reserves and 1 NR managed	Three VLFRs have been created and handed over to the communities – 2 in Pangani and 1 in Mkinga. However, another 38 are at various stages in the process with 7 having been approved at District level and awaiting handover – 5 in Pangani and 2 in Mkinga.	The TET has no information regarding the number of reserves managed.						
15	Output 1.3: Conservation management framework established	Coastal forests are managed based approved conservation strategy	146 Forest Reserves in Costal Forests	145 Forest reserves and 1 NR managed	A Conservation Strategy has been developed that covers all 145 forest reserves of various categories and the Rondo Forest Nature Reserve.	This indicator is actually irrelevant to this Output but is relevant to Output 1.2 on which basis it is assessed.						
16	Output 1.4: MOU put in place with Coastal Forest Districts over joint responsibilities in conservation of Coastal Forests.	Improved coastal forests management	No MoUs	6 MoUs	9 Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) over joint responsibilities in conservation of coastal forests were signed between TFS and Districts of Mkinga, Handeni, Muheza, Pangani, Bagamoyo, Mkuranga, Kisarawe, Rufiji, and Kibaha.	This represents a 50% increase over the target.						
17	Output 1.5: REDD initiatives adopted for Coastal Forest Landscapes, management	REDD initiatives incorporated into coastal forest management	REDD National Framework	5 forest reserves adopt REDD initiatives	Communities adjacent Pugu and Kazimzumbwi were involved in REDD activities through WCST project.	Implementation of the associated REDD project was delayed, hence indicator no longer valid.						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
18	Output 1.6: Monitoring and Evaluation at Project Level Implemented	Number of M&E conducted	M&E system for MDA and LGAs	Monitoring conducted quarterly and evaluation semi-annually	Monitoring visits to project sites were conducted every four months by the TFS Project Coordinator and every two months by the relevant DFO in Mkinga, Bagamoyo, Kisarawe, Muheza and Pangani Districts to assess the progress of community groups that are involved in tree planting and horticultural activities.	It is not clear that the concept of evaluation was separated from monitoring.						
19	Outcome 2: The protected Area system for Zanzibar is strengthened in terms of both	The protected Area Authority is reconstituted, with viable TOR and meets frequently.	Defunct, has not met in over two years	Reconstituted PAA, with updated ToR, and meets twice annually	National Protected Area Board not formed. The new Environmental Management Act of Zanzibar does not recognise the idea of such a Board. Current reviews of forestry and fishery legislative and policy frameworks mean that, at best, a Terrestrial Protected Area Board may be formed.	This was considered a major aim of the Project. For it to be still under discussion after 4 years of the Project is very disappointing.						
20	representativeness, connectivity, financing and managerial capacity	DFNRNR has a conservation section in place that is staffed and functional	No distinct section	Section with sufficient staff and resources to implement mandate	Conservation (Biodiversity) Section has been established and 6 staff (4 in Unguja Office and 2 in Pemba) appointed. The section has a mandate to oversee and manage protected areas and sufficient resources and facilities to support the implementation of activities.	Although the section was formed, doubts remain over the extent of its capacity and continuing funding.						
21		The terrestrial PA network increases in area and connectivity	Six PAs totalling 12,241ha	System increased by at least 3 gazetted PAs (at least 5,000ha), with improved connectivity between existing sites	Jambiani-Muyuni Protected Area (4,200 ha), Ufufuma-Pongwe Forest (Corridor) (1,988 ha) and Kangagani Forest (406 ha) have been surveyed, mapped and demarcated but not yet gazetted due to Project funding delays. Notice of intent has been submitted to the MANR for legislation processes on gazettelement of these forests but there is no indicative timeframe to accomplish this.	Jambiani-Muyuni and Ufufuma-Pongwe are on Unguja; Kangagani on Pemba.						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
22		Village partners and CBOs/NGOs involved in PA conservation through VFRs, with financial and technical support from Government	Community Forest Areas in 12 sites	Community Forest Areas provide buffer functions around all Forest PAs	12 new CoMFAs have been established with total area of 2,968.54 ha. These are from Pagali (175 ha), Uroa (1,014 ha), Pwani Mchangani (60 ha), Pongwe (416 ha), Kandwi (195 ha), Pageni (50 ha), Konde (18 ha), Wingwi Mtemani (72 ha), Wingwi Mapofu (71 ha), Majenzi Michewani (877 ha), Makangale (20 ha) and Kiuyu Mbuyuni (no area data). These CoFMAs provide buffer zones around four major Zanzibar PAs – Jozani Chwaka National Park, Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve, Jambiani Muiyuni Forest Reserve, and Ngezi Forest Reserve on both Unguja and Pemba.							
23		Protected Areas with Management plans approved and under implementation leading to improved METT scores	Two forest PAs (Ngezi and Jozani) with plans; but limited implementation. METT averages 51% Note that in the figures provided to the TET as definitive, the baseline average is 40.4% although the MTE says 36%.	All six PAs (Jozani, Ngezi, Ras Kiuyu, Masingini, Kiwengwa and Msitu Mkuu) Management plans under implementation. METT > 20% increase	Two business plans prepared – Jozani Chwaka National Park, and Ngezi Forest Nature Reserve. Three new management plans have been developed and approved – the Forest Reserves of Kiwengwa-Pongwe, Masingini, and Msitu-Mkuu. METT for 4 PAs (Mtende, Jozani-Chwaka, Ngezi and Muiyuni) averages was 66.25%, an increase of 25.85% points.	Only Ras Kiuyu missing.						
24		Significance % increase in competence levels of protected area institutions for PA including co-management partners; using UNDP-GEF PA Scorecard	Average is 51% Note that in the figures provided to the TET as definitive, the baseline average is 40.4% although the MTE says 36%.	Increase by 20%	The average METT score for the four PAs on Zanzibar in June 2014 was 66.25%, an increase of 25.85% points. A breakdown by site is: Mtende 74% (+44.8%); Jozani 73% (+11.5%); Ngezi 67% (+12.8%); and Jambiya-muiyuni 51% (+34.3%).	This would appear to be a repeat of part of Indicator #23.						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
25		Number of reports produced synthesizing the Annual Status of the PA network (using the "State-Pressure-Response Models)	Nil	4 by EOP (annual reports for each of the year that the project will run)	This indicator has been dropped as recommended in the Mid Term Evaluation Report of April 2013. The deletion was endorsed at the PSC meeting in February 2013 and Project planning meeting in May 2013. The MTE reports that a Forest Assessment Study was completed in 2011. A <i>Situation Analysis of Coastal Forests of Tanzania Mainland</i> was produced in May 2014 but none was produced for Zanzibar.	See paragraph 19 – this indicator was not deleted but changed by the MTE to one requiring a report at the start and end of the Project. While the TET has no information on whether the first report covered Zanzibar, the second clearly did not.						
26		Nº. of VLFR (CoFMA) - with Government collaborations on Management Plans	Nil	4 by EOP (annual reports from the project)	12 new CoFMAs have been established with total area of 2,968.54 ha. These are from Pagali (175 ha), Uroa (1,014 ha), Pwani Mchangani (60 ha), Pongwe (416 ha), Kandwi (195 ha), Pangenji (50 ha), Konde (18 ha), Wingwi Mtemani (72 ha), Wingwi Mapofu (71 ha), Majenzi Michewani (877 ha), Makangale (20 ha) and Kiuyu Mbuyuni (no area data). These CoFMAs provide buffer zones around four major Zanzibar PAs – Jozani Chwaka National Park, Kiwengwa-Pongwe Forest Reserve, Jambiani Muiyuni Forest Reserve, and Ngezi Forest Reserve on both Unguja and Pemba.	All 11 CoFMAs have management plans.						
27	Output 2.1: Government of Zanzibar with a functional and sustainable institutional	Board reconstituted and functional	Defunct, has not met in over two years	PAB reconstituted, with updated ToR, and meets twice a year	National Protected Area Board not formed. The new Environmental Management Act of Zanzibar does not recognise the idea of such a Board. Current reviews of forestry and fishery legislative and policy frameworks mean that, at best, a Terrestrial Protected Area Board may be formed.	Same as Indicator #19						
28	structure for terrestrial Protected Areas at Board level and Conservation Section within Forest Department	Number of staff with capacity allocated for Conservation Section(CS)	No distinct section	Section with sufficient staff and resources to implement mandate	Conservation (Biodiversity) section has been established and 6 staff (4 in Unguja Office and 2 in Pemba Office) appointed. The section has a mandate to oversee and manage protected areas and sufficient resources and facilities to support the implementation of activities.	Same as Indicator #20.						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
29	Output 2.2: Terrestrial Protected Area Network expanded to include key gaps in coral rag and thicket communities of high biodiversity, with buffer and connectivity forests	Number of PAs identified	Six protected areas	3 protected areas		Indicator generally meaningless in the context of indicators #21 and 30. Not assessed since those new PAs "identified" are in the process of gazettelement.						
30		Area (Hectares) gazetted	Six PAs totalling 12,241ha	6,000 ha increased	Jambiani-Muyuni Protected Area (4,200 ha) has been surveyed, mapped and demarcated but not yet gazetted due to Project funding delays. A single consultative meeting on establishing the Ufufuma Pongwe Corridor (6,400 ha) has been held. Notice of intent has been submitted to the MANR for legislation processes on gazettelement of the two forests but there is no indicative timeframe to accomplish this.	Note the inconsistency of the target between this indicator (6,000 ha) and Indicator #21 (5,000 ha). It is unknown whether the increased areas include coral rag and thicket communities.						
31	Output 2.3: Key forest Protected Areas are consolidated, and their management status improved	No. of approved management plan of PAs	2 Management plans of Jozani and Ngezi	Review 2 management plans and prepare 7 new management plans	Two business plans prepared – Jozani Chwaka National Park, and Ngezi Forest Nature Reserve. Three new management plans have been developed and approved – the Forest Reserves of Kiwengwa-Pongwe, Masingini, and Msitu-Mkuu.	Reviews meet target; new plans are < 50% of target.						
32		No of PAs upgraded	Nil	1 Forest Reserve to Nature Reserve and 3 Public Forests to Forest Reserve	Ngezi Forest Reserve (2,900 ha) and Masingini Forest Reserve (566 ha) have been upgraded to Nature Reserve.	Target effectively met with two upgrades to Nature Reserve rather than one; but no upgrades of public forest.						
33		No. of PAs with established permanent boundaries	4 PAs with Permanent boundaries	5 PA boundaries reviewed and 4 PAs established	Two new PAs Jambiani-Muyuni Forest (4,200ha) and Ufufuma-Pongwe (6,400 ha) identified, surveyed, and beacons installed.	Only two new PAs with boundaries fixed; but these would appear to be larger than initially envisaged – see target for #21.						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
34	Output 2.4: Community Forest Management Areas provide sustainable buffering and connectivity support, whilst contributing to household security	No. of CoFMA	7 CoFMA	Review 7 CoFMA and formulate 6 new CoFMA	12 new CoMFAs have been established with total area of 2,968.54 ha. These are from Pagali (175 ha), Uroa (1,014 ha), Pwani Mchangani (60 ha), Pongwe (416 ha), Kandwi (195 ha), Pangeni (50 ha), Konde (18 ha), Wingwi Mtemani (72 ha), Wingwi Mapofu (71 ha), Majenzi Michewani (877 ha), Makangale (20 ha) and Kiuyu Mbuyuni (no area data).	Existing CoFMAs apparently not reviewed, but 11 new ones is almost double target.						
35		Number of communities supported in IGA	7 Shehia around PAs	35 communities around PAs	Trainings on conservation best practices in bee-keeping and improved cooking stoves to reduce human pressure over forests were provided to 982 people and 680 respectively from around 75 communities							
36	Outcome 3: Effective PA management systems in place at three project priority landscapes, with co-management between central, local and village government partners, leading to improved conservation of biodiversity	Number of Landscapes with broad conservation plans in place, approved and implemented	Nil	All target Project Areas and – at EOP an additional 10,000 ha of Village Forest Reserves established within the Kilwa and Lindi landscapes	Conservation Plans for Matumbi (Rufiji), Kilwa, and Lindi landscapes were completed and approved. Implementation of Conservation plans are reflected in the FY14 workplans. 27 VLFRs totalling 129,698 ha are at various stages of designation	Conservation plans appear adequate. No breakdown is available of various stages of VLFRs						
37		Number of protected areas with update and approved management and business plans	Nil	One FNRs, 20 VLFRs with management plans and 3 pilot business plans	Rondo Forest Nature Reserve (12,000 ha) has a management plan. Local Authority Forest Reserves totalling 146,749 ha (Mirambani LAFR 9,573 ha (Kilwa); Mbarawala LAFR 46,180 ha (Kilwa); Kichi Hills LAFR 22,357 ha (Rufiji) and Ruhoi LAFR 68,639 ha (Rufiji) have management plans under implementation. A total of 27 VLFRs totalling 129,698 ha has management plans, but not all are yet under implementation. No business plans have been developed.	Management plan for Rondo is not yet operationalised since formal gazettelement of the Reserve is awaiting the Minister's signature						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
38		Village governments support CF conservation through creation of VLFRs as buffers and corridors, and prevent alienation for bio fuels in key biodiversity	Nil (apart from stand alone VLFRs)	At least 15 villages participate actively in Forest Conservation process (>5 per Landscapes)	15 villages are participating actively in forest conservation in three regions, 6 in Lindi – Ndawa, Mihima, Liganga, Ntene, Mnara and Namtamba; 4 in Kilwa – Hotelitatu, Likawage, Nakiu, Kiwawa; and 5 in Rufiji – Tawi, Kungulwe, Utunge, Kipo, Kipugira.	Indicator is logically inconsistent. If >5 per landscape then total has to be >15. Assumed to mean “at least 5 per landscape”.						
39		Management effectiveness of PAs improved as a result of co-management, using GEF METT Score Card	Averages is 40.5% Note that in the figures provided to the TET as definitive, the baseline average is 33.3%.	Average improved by 20%	The average METT score for the 23 PAs in the Kilwa, Rufiji and Lindi landscapes in June 2014 was 42.8% (+9.5% points). This breaks down into landscape averages thus: Kilwa 43.5% (+9.1%); Rufiji 37.6% (+2.5%); Lindi 46.25% (+24.9%). Therefore, while the overall target was not achieved, it was for Lindi. On a site basis, 7 of the 23 sites achieved a 20% increase; i.e. the target was achieved in 30.4% of the sites; 10 (43.54%) achieved an increase of <20%; and 6 (26.1%) resulted in a decrease.							
40	Output 3.1: Landscapes (Rufiji, Kilwa, Rondo – Lindi) are agreed, described and assessed as to issues of connectivity, gaps and buffer functions					No indicators provided within the logframe for this Output.						

#	Objectives	Performance Indicator	Baseline	End of Project Target	Delivery Status at Final evaluation	Comments	HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
41	Output 3.2: Gaps in landscape plan filled by strategic development of local area FRS and VLFRs					No indicators provided within the logframe for this Output.						
42	Output 3.3: Landscape Conservation Plan developed and agreed with local district and national partners					No indicators provided within the logframe for this Output.						
43	Output 3.4: Conservation plans under implementation with key indicator baselines completed and new area METT scores completed					No indicators provided within the logframe for this Output.						

ANNEX V: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT DE-BRIEFING

De-briefing held on 27th June 2014, 10:00-12:00

Participants listed in alphabetic order


Name	Designation
Ali Mwinyi	Manager for Forest Protection Areas (Unguja), and Coordinator Coastal Forest Project (Zanzibar)
Deo-Gratias Gamassa	National Evaluator
Evarist Nashanda	Forest Officer, TFS
Gemma Alili	Programme Associate, Energy & Environment, UNDP Tanzania Country Office
Gerald Kamwenda	Conservation Manager, WWF Tanzania
Gertrude Lyatuu	Programme Specialist, Energy & Environment, UNDP Tanzania Country Office
Kasim H. Madeweya	Chief Officer, Department of Forestry and Non-renewable Natural Resources
Philipina Shayo	Acting Project Coordinator and Landscape Coordinator, WWF
Phillip Edwards	Lead Evaluator
Sharif Faki Sharif	Head of Conservation Section, DFNRNR (Pemba) and Assistant Project Coordinator (Pemba)
Titus Osundina	Deputy Country Director (Operations) UNDP Tanzania Country Office

ANNEX VI: LIST OF PROJECT STEERING COMMITTEE MEMBERS

1	The Director, Forestry and Beekeeping Division (mainland)	Co-chairman
2	Director, Commercial Crops, Fruits, and Forests (Zanzibar)	Co-chairman
3	Vice President's Office – GEF Focal Point	Member
4	Representative of the Ministry of Finance	Member
5	Representative of the National Environment Management Council	Member
6	Representative of the Ministry for Local Governments	Member
7	Representative of the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group	Member
8	Representative of the Wildlife Conservation Society of Tanzania	Member
9	Representative of the UNDP Country Office	Member
10	Representative of the RAS Coast Region	Special invitee
11	Representative of the RAS Lindi Region	Member
12	Representative of the WWF Tanzania	Non Official Member
13	Representative of the CARE Tanzania	Non Official Member
14	Others to be co-opted as necessary	Member - Secretary

Source: From Annex II: ToR for the Project Steering Committee, Inception Report.

ANNEX VII: MAP OF COASTAL FOREST LANDSCAPES



ANNEX VIII: SUMMARY OF METT SCORES AND FINANCIAL SCORECARDS

METT SCORES

Landscape	Name of PA	Baseline (2009)	Mid-term (2012/13)	Final (2014)	Improvement: baseline to final
Kilwa	Mangrove	66.7	62	63	-3.7
	Mitundumbea	28.7	49	49	20.3
	Tongomba	51	49	49	-2
	Malehi	15.9	45	45	29.1
	Kitope	51	42	43	-8
	Rungo	27.1	42	42	14.9
	Mitarure	30.2	36	41	10.8
	Mbinga	15.6	38	38	22.4
	Ngarama South	32.3	37	38	5.7
	Ngarama North	28.1	35	35	6.9
	Pindirola	32.3	30	35	2.7
Mean Score		34.4	42.3	43.5	
Lindi	Rondo	38.5	54	65	26.5
	Litipo	18.8	31	45	26.2
	Chitola	12.5	35	40	27.5
	Noto	15.6	22	35	19.4
Mean Score		21.35	35.5	46.25	
Zanzibar	Mtende	29.2	73	74	44.8
	Jozani	61.5	72	73	11.5
	Ngezi	54.2	67	67	12.8
	Jambiya-Muyuni	16.7	42	51	34.3
Mean Score		40.4	63.5	66.25	
Rufiji	Kichi Hillis	42.7	46	48	5.3
	Tamburu	42.7	42	46	3.3
	Muhoro Fr&River	34.4	42	44	9.6
	Kiwengoma	42.7	42	42	-0.7
	Utete	38.4	44	42	3.6
	Nyamakutwa Nyamuete	42.7	43	41	-1.7
	Katundu	35.4	36	39	3.6
	Rupiage	21.9	20	19	-2.9
Mean Score		37.6	39.4	40.1	
Total (all 27)		34.3	43.6	46.3	

KEY: GREEN = Increase at or above 20% target. YELLOW = Increase below target. RED = Decrease.

FINANCIAL SCORECARDS

Landscape	Baseline (2009)	Mid-term (2012/13)	Final (2014)	Improvement: baseline to final
Kilwa	26	28	34	+8
Lindi	31	21	82	+51
Zanzibar	46	46	50	+4
Mean	34.3	31.7	55.3	

ANNEX IX: STATE OF VLFRS IN NORTHERN MAINLAND LANDSCAPES

District	Village	Forest	ha	VNRC	Mapped	PFRA	Man. Plan	By-laws	Community level approval	District level approval	Handed over to community
Pangani	Mtonga	Mtonga	1,188	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	at village level	no	no
	Kwakibuyu	Bojo	3,411	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	Mvimoni, Msaraza, Masaika and Kigurusimba	Kububu	3,266	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
	Mtango	Kwatango	1,092	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
	Kigurusimba	Kwasinge	331	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
	Mkwaja	Mavata	4,953	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
	Mseko	Beho	3,578	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	Mtango	Misakazi	1,242	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	
	Msaraza	Kwavirinde	83	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no
		Total	19,145	9	9	9	9	9	8	7	2
Handeni	Mkalamo	Mkalamo	1366.4	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no
	Kwa Msisi	Kwamsisi	567.4	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	at village level	no	no
		Total	1,934	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
Muheza	Bwitini	Kaziwa Mngodo	453	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	at district level	no
	Kicheba A&B, Magoroto and Magula	Mlima Kituwe	535	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	at village level	no	no
	Msakangoto and Mgome	Ngereko	105	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	at district level	
	Tingeni	Baloki	25	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	at village level	no	no
	Shebomeza	Emau	40	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	at village level	no	no
	Muembeni and Magoroto	Kwendelema	20	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	at village level	no	no
	Kiwanda	Pangamanyoka	150	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	at village level	no	no
		Total	1,328	7	7	7	7	7	2	0	0
Mkinga	Mbuta	Mbuta	2,224	yes	yes	yes	draft	yes	yes	at district level	no
	Horohoro	Horohoro	146	yes	yes	yes	draft	yes	at village level	yes	no
	Mavovo	Mavovo	76	yes	yes	yes	draft	yes	yes	yes	no
	Makoya	Nguweni	124	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
		Total	2,570	4	4	4	1	4	3	3	1
Bagamoyo	Kwamduma	Kwamduma	2,195	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no
	Mihuga	Kiona Mihuga	816	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no
	Mihuga	Tembe	951	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no
	Mihuga	Kipaku Mihuga	716	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no
	Magulumatali	Magulumatali	600	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no	no
	Mkoko	Makangara	0	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
	Mkoko	Walugonge	0	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
	Kifleta	Kifleta	0	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
		Total	5,278	8	5	2	1	1	1	0	0
Kibaha	Lukenge	Lukenge	2,000	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no
	Msua	Msua		yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
		Total	2,000	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Kisarawe	Sofu	Sofu	856	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no

	Mafumbi	Mafumbi	1,183	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
	Kisangire	Kisangire	633	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
	Msanga	Msanga sokoni	239	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
	Kidugalo	Kidugalo	105	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
	Nyani	Nyani	1,006	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
	Chakenge	Chakenge	316	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
	Kisanga	Kisanga	111	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
	Gwata	Gwata	2670	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
		Total	7,119	9	9	9	9	0	0	0	0
		Total	39,374	41	37	34	29	23	14	10	3

ANNEX X: INSTALLATION OF PA BOUNDARY BEACONS IN ZANZIBAR

