

Global Environment Facility

United Nations Development Program

United Nations Office for Project Services

*GAB/92/G31-Conservation of Biodiversity through
Effective Management of Wildlife Trade*

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Context and purpose of the evaluation

The Gabon Wildlife Trade project ended on 31st December 1998. The objective was to “*develop indigenous capacity to effectively monitor wildlife populations and trade, to improve knowledge of the impact of trade on wildlife populations and on biological diversity, and to assist in developing and implementing sustainable trade strategies to ensure the long-term survival of wildlife species and the ecosystems they are part of*” (Project Document GAB/92/G31). The project’s budget was \$1 million over three years (1995-1998).

The final evaluation follows a project mid-term evaluation which took place during September 1997. The objective of the final evaluation is to assess the relevance, performance, and success of the project. The mid-term and final evaluations are both provided for in the project document. The key elements of the final evaluation are to assess the relevance of the five expected results of the project and the degree to which these contribute to the project purpose and objectives; and to assess the performance of the project with respect to achievement of immediate objectives as well as other factors such as efficiency, effectiveness and timeliness.

In addition, the evaluation examines the degree of stakeholder ownership of the various project partners, and examines also the modalities of project execution by UNOPS, UNDP, and the sub-contracting agency, WWF-US. Other factors examined include the extent of Government of Gabon support and participation within the project, the legal and institutional framework as well as the broader enabling environment, and participation of project beneficiaries. Finally, the evaluation assesses the sustainability of project impact and its contribution to capacity-building.

Project objectives

The GEF Gabon Wildlife Trade Management project initially undertook to bring about five results all aimed at a common underlying objective: “*To create a mechanism to sustainably manage wildlife trade in Gabon and to reinforce government and local community capacity to ensure long-term sustainable management and conservation of biodiversity*” (Project document, Section D “*Immediate Objectives, Outputs and Activities*”). The anticipated results (“*outputs*”) comprised the following:

1. *Improved knowledge and implementation of national legislation and international treaties through training of personnel;*
2. *National legislation on management and trade of wildlife adapted to the socio-economic reality in Gabon and to CITES requirements;*
3. *Development of a framework for long-term monitoring of wildlife use and trade, and its impact on biological diversity;*
4. *Development of strategies to implement legislation and management policies on wildlife trade, and links with biological diversity conservation; and*
5. *Long-term maintenance of the directorates charged with wildlife conservation and management and continuation of monitoring activities.*

Findings and recommendations

Project relevance

The final evaluation finds that the relevance of the project has been amply confirmed by the activities carried out. These have effectively demonstrated the presence within Gabon of an understanding of the importance of managing wildlife trade in the context of biodiversity conservation. To its credit, the project has taken on an impressive range of initiatives with important long-term potential for conservation. What remains to be achieved is to bring these various initiatives into greater coherence, and to provide a realistic level of support needed for the creation of a management mechanism for wildlife trade and for strengthening the capacity for biodiversity conservation.

There is presently strong interest in a sub-regional project to build upon lessons learned from the Gabon Wildlife Trade Project, expanding its scope across the region. The evaluation mission underscored the need for harmonization of the legal and institutional framework beyond the borders of Gabon: there is an excellent case to be made for the development of a GEF initiative on the sub-regional scale, based upon the Gabonese experience. Nevertheless, this would need to meet certain conditions precedent:

1. to conduct with the states of the sub-region a number of preliminary feasibility studies, which would be needed for effective identification of the project;
2. to assure that contributions committed from the side of the project partners, notably the Government of Gabon, are delivered to a reasonable degree, as foreseen in the project instrument; and
3. to achieve the establishment of an operational and sustainable mechanism for monitoring and management of wildlife species in Gabon.

Project performance

(a) Project design

In its original form, the project proposal called for a sub-regional initiative, beginning with activities in Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Gabon, and later expanding to the rest of central Africa. As eventually approved, the project was to focus on one country. Gabon was selected for various reasons, including an apparent acceleration in the process of loss of biodiversity in a country known for an abundance of natural resources; economic reversals in a context of high urbanization as well as relative hardship in rural areas, bringing serious pressures on natural resource exploitation; and an increasing level of unregulated trade in wildlife species as well as significant gaps in the legal and institutional framework.

However, the transition from a regional project concept to one at the national level seriously weakened the conceptual framework of the original proposal. The GEF project document which was eventually approved included a significantly higher level of government counterpart support, which was probably unrealistic under budget circumstances already known at the time. The project document also added an ambitious but poorly-formulated component for community-based wildlife management. The budget level of \$1 million in GEF funding was significantly below the level of resources needed to adequately address the wide range of activities defined in the project document, while the government was unable to provide the large counterpart contribution expected of it.

(b) Project implementation

The project also experienced institutional ambiguities which handicapped implementation and the achievement of the anticipated results. Implementation was affected, among other factors, by a work program which was interrupted at numerous points and which was carried out with little discipline; long delays in the establishment of mechanisms or precedures for effective collaboration between the project partners, thus undermining the contribution of the necessary institutional and technical support to the initiative; and by the absence, until late in the project, of a Steering Committee or a National Project Director.

Until approximately six months before its planned expiration date, the project spent a considerable proportion of its time in reformulation of priorities, adding or changing activities as objectives evolved. Originally conceived as an initiative to conserve biodiversity by better managing the trade in a wide range of species, the project quickly (though rather informally) came to focus upon the management of fauna, and more specifically, to the problem of domestic consumption of bushmeat. These changes entailed significant implications for the overall project approach as well as for project monitoring, follow-up, and long-term achievement of results. Although the project partners had diverging views about the project's overall direction and

priorities almost from the beginning, the mid-term evaluation, which recommended a formal restructuring, was delayed by some six months, to September 1997, with restructuring agreed at the end of January 1998. The project became significantly more focused and productive during this final phase.

Project success

The project's activities and accomplishments clearly are relevant to the objectives, but at present there is significant risk that some of these activities will not be followed-up. For this reason, they can be considered as results which still remain to be achieved. It is therefore important that the various project partners undertake to bring about the conditions necessary for their consolidation, which requires a more coherent base, with a realistic time-frame and budget level. This is particularly true for initiatives such as the captive breeding experiments, which must be seen as a longer-term investment.

With respect to the legislative framework, the project's proposed reforms to the law 1/82 on waters and forests and to the numerous decrees and administration application texts represent a substantial accomplishment and are very hopeful signs for the future. However, these reforms remain to be promulgated and put into practice. In addition, the application of these legal texts on the management of fauna will be largely subsidiary to the promulgation and application of the new law on waters and forests, which is still pending. This latter represents the essential legislative basis for application not only of Gabonese law concerning management of fauna, but above all for compliance with the relevant international conventions, notably CITES and the Convention on Biodiversity. Therefore, until the broader legislative framework has been reformed and put into practice, one cannot yet speak of the establishment of a sustainable mechanism for management of wildlife trade in Gabon.

Main conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

With respect to the institutional framework, consideration should be given to transforming the DFC into a broader service for wildlife and national parks management (Direction de la Faune et des Parcs Nationaux). For their part, the donor agencies active in biodiversity conservation should provide financial support carefully linked with the further development of protected areas (including national parks and/or reserves yet to be instituted). In effect, the increase in recent years in the number of protected area sites in Gabon reflects a high level of interest and a significant comparative advantage.

For its part, UNOPS should better distinguish between NGOs and consulting firms in the execution of its projects; this is a key lesson if UNOPS is to avoid repeating the contractual and institutional ambiguities which were evident in the Gabon project. This relates to inappropriate use of sub-contracting mechanisms with serious consequences for the identification and inter-relationship of the various project partners.

With respect to biodiversity, the activity of game ranching (particularly for *potamochère*) should be continued. However, this should only take place with much greater analysis of market and commercial factors (supply and demand), and specifically of a far better understanding of presumed substitution effects between animals raised in captivity or ranches, vis-à-vis those harvested in the wild. Feasibility studies on zoning and management of hunting concessions based on ecological potential should also be carried out. The ecological survey work conducted under the GEF project in the WWF site in the Gamba protected area complex appears to be a useful starting-point but more needs to be done to extrapolate findings to other parts of the country.

Finally, the experience from certain Sahelian countries with respect to land and resource tenure could be highly useful to the central African situation. This experience is little-known in central

Africa, but in some respects is far more relevant than the more publicized experience from the Amazon Basin or Southeast Asia.

INTRODUCTION

This report constitutes the final evaluation of the GEF Gabon Wildlife Trade project, which began operations in November 1995 and ended on 31st December 1998. With a total budget level of \$1 million, the project's objective was to *“develop indigenous capacity to effectively monitor wildlife populations and trade, to improve knowledge of the impact of trade on wildlife populations and on biological diversity, and to assist in developing and implementing sustainable trade strategies to ensure the long-term survival of wildlife species and the ecosystems they are part of”* (Project Document GAB/92/G31).

The final evaluation follows a project mid-term evaluation which took place during the month of September 1997. The objective of the final evaluation is to assess the relevance, performance, and success of the project. The mid-term and final evaluations are both provided for in the project document. The key elements of the final evaluation are to assess the relevance of the five expected results of the project and the degree to which these contribute to the project purpose and objectives; and to assess the performance of the project with respect to achievement of immediate objectives as well as other factors such as efficiency, effectiveness and timeliness.

In addition, the evaluation examines the degree of stakeholder ownership on the part of the various project partners, and examines also the modalities of project execution by UNOPS, UNDP, and the sub-contracting agency, WWF-US. Other factors examined include the legal and institutional framework and the broader enabling environment, and participation of project beneficiaries. Finally, the evaluation assesses the sustainability of project impact and its contribution to capacity-building.

Methodology

A three person evaluation team was assembled by UNOPS, comprising three independent consultants: two international experts, one in biodiversity and wildlife trade (J. F. Swartzendruber); the other one in environmental law, concerning CITES provisions and environmental law issues (Ibrahima Ly). The third consultant (Anaclé Bissielo), a Gabonese social scientist, provided expertise in natural resource management and socioeconomic issues affecting development in Gabon.

After assembling in Libreville in late January 1999, the evaluation team spent approximately 2 ½ weeks reviewing project documents, interviewing a wide range of stakeholders and other individuals knowledgeable about the project or the subject matter, and visited project-related field sites in Owendo, Gamba, and Sette Cama. Prior to the the departure of the international consultants from Libreville, the team gave briefings on its preliminary findings to personnel of the Government of Gabon, including the Director-General of the Ministry of Eaux et Forêts and the Director of the DFC, and to UNDP staff. The briefings were also attended by a representative of WWF and a representative of the Gabon National Environmental Action Plan office. At these briefings, French-language summaries of the preliminary findings were made available to the participants of the briefings. The evaluation team received a number of valuable suggestions in the course of these discussions, which have been incorporated into the present report.

The evaluation report has been guided by the recommended format of the UNDP Handbook *Results-oriented Monitoring and Evaluation* (1997), and specifically adheres to the terms of reference provided by UNOPS (the latter are attached as Annex 1). The structure of the report is presented in the Table of Contents, above. In addition to the main body of the evaluation report, which elaborates the main points presented to the project partners during the post-mission briefings, each team member has individually prepared a technical report; these provide greater detail on various issues or topics raised in the course of the evaluation, and also provide

references to literature or other sources of information of interest to specialists. These reports are also found in the Annexes.

THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

Macroeconomic context

The development context of Gabon has undergone significant changes since the late 1980s when the original concept of this project was formulated. Within the ranks of upper-middle income countries, Gabon's per capita income in 1989 was higher than Yugoslavia, Uruguay or Hungary, and more than ten times higher than Zaire (World Bank, *World Development Report 1991*, p. 205). The export of primary commodities (oil, manganese, uranium, timber) has financed a physical infrastructure noticeably superior to most of its neighbors, and living standards in urban areas tend to be relatively good by comparison with other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, though significant hardship remains, particularly in rural areas. In 1996, Gabon's per capita GDP was \$5,102 – roughly 14% lower than 1990, when the figure was \$5,835 (SESRTCIC database).

In reality, the country's apparent high income level is somewhat misleading, due to the combination of a very small population plus the phenomenon of oil-sector rents which have only limited multiplier effects within the local economy. Moreover, the steep decline in oil prices since 1985-86 has imposed serious revenue shortfalls and economic dislocations. When one tracks oil prices on global commodity markets, taking for reference average prices in the year 1990 as an index of 100, oil prices have fallen dramatically, from \$224 in 1980 to \$63 in 1995, and continue to fall, according to World Bank data. The resulting revenue shortfall, combined with the fiscal burden of prestige projects planned during the boom years - such as the Transgabonaise railway - has seen the tripling of Gabon's external debt: from \$1.51 billion in 1980 to \$4.5 billion in 1995 (World Bank, *World Development Indicators 1997*, p.218).

Social indicators of development

Despite its generous natural resource endowments, the country has yet to produce a broadly-based transformation in overall development status; indeed, some analysts believe that oil has made Gabon a "rentier state" – 'an enclave economy driven by the immediate consumption of oil rents' (Yates, p.79). Gabonese income distribution is significantly skewed, with 66% of income going to the wealthiest 20% of the population. This ratio is nearly identical to South Africa, where the apartheid legacy explains the 65% share of income going to the top 20% of the population (data from WRI, *World Resources 1998-1999*, p. 248).

In 1990 the percentage of Gabon's population with access to safe drinking water was estimated at 90% for urban areas, but only 50% for the rural population (World Bank, *African Development Indicators 1994-95*, p. 343; these figures may have declined somewhat in recent years, according to observers). The country's infant mortality rate, 85 deaths per 1,000 live births, is virtually the same as that for the African continent as a whole, where the infant mortality rate averages 86 (data for 1995 in WRI op. cit., p. 258; note that WRI includes northern African countries in its averages for Africa).

Labor constraints

Gabon's population of 1.17 million (WRI, *World Resources 1998-1999*, p. 244), in an area about one-half the size of France, gives an overall population density of just four persons per km² (World Bank, *World Development Indicators 1997*, p. 7). Much of the territory remains under heavy forest cover (although logging over the past century has left few areas of undisturbed primary forest), and an extended process of urban migration has seen the departure of economically active age groups from many rural communities. Skilled manpower constraints at all levels are a significant aspect of the economy, with guest workers playing a major role. Even semiskilled services (taxis, restaurants, shops, etc.) are heavily dependent on workers from such countries as Senegal, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, while many artisans and informal sector workers come from neighboring countries, notably Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon.

Gabon's technical agencies such as the Ministry of Eaux et Forêts have difficulty finding qualified staff for both field and headquarters posts, and public sector retrenchment under structural adjustment is another constraint. The budget of the department of Faune et Chasse was cut by half in 1998, following a 46% decline from 1988 to 1991, according to project documents (WWF Final Report, p. 33; Project Document D.5.5). During the early 1990s the DFC *brigade* at the Lopé Reserve had 14 guards – today, it has just four, during a time of increasing encroachment into the reserve and intense hunting pressure from adjacent logging concessions (pers. comm., Lee White, Wildlife Conservation Society).

Economic and political stress

Economic insecurity has caused many Gabonese (especially in rural areas and small towns) to turn to hunting and other forms of natural resource use for livelihoods. As elsewhere in central Africa, economic instability has significant implications for the management of natural resources such as forest areas and wildlife (Sunderlin et al., forthcoming; Ekoko 1997). Economic stress has also periodically been accompanied by political tensions, though in this respect Gabon has been significantly more stable than other parts of the sub-region. The DFC's offices in Libreville were burned during riots in 1990, causing a near-complete loss of the agency's records, vehicles, computers, radios, etc. Passage of the country's new forestry law, which has major long-term implications for Gabon's management of biodiversity, has been delayed since September 1998 due to the recent electoral campaign, and by the installation of a new Cabinet during the period of the GEF evaluation mission.

Development capacities

Finally, it is important to bear in mind that as an upper-middle-income country, Gabon has been ineligible for many categories of concessional development assistance. World Bank projects in Gabon, such as the large *Projet Forêts et Environnement*, are financed through IBRD loans - the country is not eligible for IDA credits. For some bilateral donors, the country is not seen as a high development priority because of its high GDP per capita. In 1992, total official development assistance to Gabon represented just 1.2% of GDP; for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (excluding Nigeria and South Africa) the average was 14%, a proportion more than ten times higher than in Gabon (World Bank, *African Development Indicators 1994-95*, p. 319).

For these reasons, the country has had relatively little experience with the management of development projects, and there is only a limited cadre of technicians and managers available to participate in new development initiatives. It is probably fair to say that in its management and technical capacities Gabon more nearly resembles a "least-developed" country than a member of the middle-income group. In addition, while the number of Gabonese NGOs is rising rapidly, this process starts from a tiny human and institutional base, and as a result the sector at present can make only modest contributions to the development process. Civil society on the whole remains in an embryonic stage in comparison with many other parts of Africa (see Charancle 1996).

Because of these factors, the GEF Wildlife Trade project should be seen as an early investment in capacity-building for improved natural resource management in Gabon, during a time in which such capacities have been facing increasing stresses. During this period, the awareness of the global significance of Gabon's biological resources has been rising, and one can expect that donors will continue to show increased interest in measures to protect Gabonese ecosystems and habitats (see for ex. the New York Times editorial "*AIDS and Chimpanzees*," Feb.3, 1999). The project thus represents an important learning experience for its partners and for the broader conservation community.

THE GABON WILDLIFE TRADE PROJECT

Project background

The Gabon Wildlife Trade project entered into the UNDP/GEF work program in May 1991, among the very first GEF projects for Africa. More than three years passed before the project document was signed by UNDP, the Government of Gabon, and UNOPS in July 1994, with another year of delay before the arrival of the project's chief technical advisor (CTA) in late October 1995. When project activities formally began in November 1995, the project had already been in the GEF work program for 4 ½ years (see *WWF Final Report, Annex 1: Chronology of Project Events*). The project ended on 31st December 1998.¹

The GEF project document is based upon a proposal submitted to UNDP by WWF (McShane and D'Huart, 1992) during the GEF's pilot phase (see *GEF Technical Assistance Projects – First Tranche; Project Briefs*, p. 27). The WWF concept called for a sub-regional initiative covering West and Central Africa, to establish an office linking this area with the worldwide TRAFFIC (*Trade Record Analysis of Flora and Fauna in Commerce*) network monitoring the international movements of endangered species and related products (ivory, skins, trophies, etc. as well as live animals such as the African Grey Parrot). The objective of the regional initiative was “*to conserve the globally significant biological diversity found in the region by curtailing illegal trade in wildlife species, and by closely monitoring trade and basing this trade on sustainable harvest levels. A secondary objective is to assist governments to realize the benefits of sustainable wildlife trade*” (GEF Pilot Phase, First Tranche Report, p. 27).

In the course of GEF project design, several modifications to the original concept took place. The proposed location for the regional office shifted from Bangui (Central African Republic) to Kinshasa, Zaire, but following unrest in the latter country during 1991, the concept of a regional effort was abandoned in order to focus on controlling wildlife trade within Gabon. The nature and consequences of this restructuring, for which few changes were made to the substantive portions of the project document, are discussed in more detail in “Findings and Conclusions: Project Design,” in the next chapter.

Project objective and results expected

In its final form, the project's objective was to “*develop indigenous capacity to effectively monitor wildlife populations and trade, to improve knowledge of the impact of trade on wildlife populations and on biological diversity, and to assist in developing and implementing sustainable trade strategies to ensure the long-term survival of wildlife species and the ecosystems they are part of*” (Project Document GAB/92/G31). The project document indicates that conservation of biodiversity in Gabon would be improved through:

- improved knowledge of major wildlife resources impacted in trade;
- review and development of conservation and trade legislation adapted to reality;
- better knowledge of the conservation status of major species in trade through field surveys;
- greater appreciation by the authorities of the value of specific species in trade;
- development of management plans for specific species of value (i.e. grey parrots);
- improved institutional capacity by the DFC to manage wildlife resource trade;
- development of a framework for long-term monitoring of local and regional wildlife trade;
- and
- training of management and control personnel. (Project Document B.2.)

¹ It may be relevant to note that recent studies by the World Bank have shown that major delays in project start-up tend to be strongly correlated with subsequent implementation difficulties (pers. comm., Daniel Ritchie, Quality Assurance Group, World Bank).

The GEF Gabon Wildlife Trade Management project included five major outputs, all aimed at a common underlying objective: “*To create a mechanism to sustainably manage wildlife trade in Gabon and to reinforce government and local community capacity to ensure long-term sustainable management and conservation of biodiversity*”(Project document, Section D “*Immediate Objectives, Outputs and Activities*”). The anticipated results (“outputs”) comprised the following:

1. Improved knowledge and implementation of national legislation and international treaties through training of personnel;
2. National legislation on management and trade of wildlife adapted to the socio-economic reality in Gabon and to CITES requirements;
3. Development of a framework for long-term monitoring of wildlife use and trade, and its impact on biological diversity;
4. Development of strategies to implement legislation and management policies on wildlife trade, and links with biological diversity conservation; and
5. Long-term maintenance of the directorates charged with wildlife conservation and management and continuation of monitoring activities. (Project Document, D.1-D.5)

Project approach and criteria of success

The project approach was to strengthen Gabon’s technical and institutional capacity to monitor and rationally manage the trade in wild species, to revise the legal framework within which such management takes place, and to begin providing local communities with greater incentives and motivation for more sustainable use of wildlife. To achieve this, the project would carry out a wide range of analytic and capacity-building activities within the five major categories of results (strictly speaking, these were defined as “outputs” rather than results in the project document), which are listed above. Taken together, these activities would help to lay the foundation for a long-term effort to better manage the consumptive use of wild species in Gabon, and in turn the Gabon experience could become the basis for an eventual sub-regional effort (this point is discussed within the section on recommendations of this evaluation).

The GEF project activities, nearly identical to those listed in the original WWF sub-regional proposal, included analysis of legislation pertaining to wildlife management, training of customs agents in CITES procedures, pilot tests on domestication of selected wildlife species which could eventually provide a substitute for bushmeat hunted in the wild, comparative studies of wildlife management approaches in other countries (Botswana, Zimbabwe, Cameroon), training of field agents in wildlife inventory techniques, and so forth. The project also purchased equipment in support of the DFC office in Libreville, and co-funded a number of related activities with other projects and agencies operating in Gabon (see WWF *Final Report*, Dec. 1998).

The project was organized around technical assistance to the department of wildlife and hunting (*Direction de la Faune et de la Chasse* - DFC) under the ministry of Eaux et Forêts. This technical assistance was provided by WWF-US, through a sub-contract awarded by UNOPS. The primary technical assistance input was an internationally-recruited chief technical advisor (CTA), representing the single largest line item in the project budget (see “Implementation and Management Arrangements,” below), roughly 24% of the project total and nearly one-third of the WWF sub-contract. Consultant sub-contracts, through locally-based specialists or through international agencies such as IUCN, supported a series of studies and reports to begin defining the legal and institutional framework for moving toward more rational management of wildlife species.

In addition, sub-contracts supported a technical feasibility study and a pilot experiment on captive breeding, to establish the technical basis for potential game ranching to substitute for bushmeat hunting. A series of training activities was funded, as well as two workshops at the end of the project, which established the Wildlife Trade Working Group (*Groupe de Travail sur la*

Commerce des Espèces Sauvages – GTCES).² UNOPS directly managed the procurement and shipping of capital equipment (computers, audio-visual equipment, etc.) to support the DFC, and WWF procured items such as tents, sleeping bags, and compasses for use by DFC agents and others receiving field training in inventory techniques.

The project document identifies two criteria for assessing the project’s success in achieving the objective of creating a mechanism for sustainable management of wildlife trade in Gabon:

- “*The placement of an efficient mechanism to promote institutional strengthening...to allow the country to work towards sustainable management of wildlife trade and...fulfill its obligation [under] CITES;*” and
- “*Rural community involvement in the development, management and monitoring of local systems to sustainably use forest resources, most notably meat as a source of protein.*” (Project Document, section D.)

Project stakeholders

The second criterion for success, which did not appear in the original WWF proposal, reflects a significant element of the GEF project approach, and substantially expands the set of stakeholders. Although the original WWF proposal made brief mention of reinforcing local capacities to monitor and manage wildlife, a careful reading of the document suggests that was not a central element of the plan, and that efforts toward introducing community-based wildlife management would perhaps be taken up in subsequent project phases. In fact, the 1992 proposal emphasizes the need to ensure project support well beyond the initial pilot phase (this reference does not appear in the final GEF project document, however):

Without the second phase, envisaged as an extension of 3 to 4 years with a budget of \$4.5 million, the project will fail. It is recommended...that if this cannot be guaranteed the project should not be implemented. (McShane & D’Huart 1992, p. 31)

In the final form, the GEF project document identifies two major categories of stakeholders: (a) the DFC and other official agencies which have a role in trade control, i.e. customs officials, the gendarmerie etc., and (b) the rural communities “*who rely on wildlife as part of their livelihood*” (Project Document B.3.1). The document also identifies as indirect beneficiaries the country’s citizens, who would, in the long-term, “*benefit from legal, sustainable exploitation of bushmeat, as well as access to legal and sustainable sources of income from national and international wildlife trade*” (B.3.2.). Considering the complexity of the subject, the project document treats the issue of stakeholder participation and community-based approaches very briefly and rather superficially:

The project will work with these communities to develop systems whereby they become directly responsible for management of wildlife resources and will receive benefits directly. The project will train rural communities in monitoring wildlife populations important for consumption and trade. (Project Document, B.3.1)

With the assistance of the implementing agent and DFC, members of selected rural communities will be trained to implement such a monitoring programme. This scientific approach should be seconded by native approaches (knowledge) used for wildlife monitoring. Traditional structure of society or local NGOs could

² Following the end of the GEF project, the DFC has applied to the World Bank-funded *Projet Forêts et Environnement* for funds to continue the work of the GTCES; as of the date of the evaluation mission no decision had been announced by the PFE.

play major role in the motivation of people. The programme will be implemented in rural areas to aid communities in better management of their wildlife resources. (Project Document, D.3.1)

UNDP and UNOPS expected community management to play a central role in the GEF project, and the divergence of views with WWF on this point continued through most of the life of the project, straining relationships between the project partners. Early examples of this divergence of views are seen in a letter from UNOPS to WWF which states:

“...the aim is to empower local communities throughout the region, rather than just those communities living within the limits of a wildlife protected area.”³

This was followed by a letter from the CTA to UNDP, which responds:

“...I believe we have to ask ourselves whether the overall objective is capacity building or collecting reliable wildlife population data which could then be used for management purposes.”⁴

Only within the last year of the project, with the establishment of the Project Steering Committee, was there an effective mechanism for thorough and transparent discussion of such issues to support strategic decisions on the project’s direction. This point is also discussed in more detail in the last chapter of this report.

Implementation and management arrangements

The project was funded under the UNDP-managed capacity-building component of the GEF program. Gabon’s Ministry of Eaux et Forêts, which signed the project document for the government, was officially the project recipient, while the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) was the executing agency.

WWF-International, which had developed the original project concept, transferred responsibility for the Gabon country programme to WWF-US shortly before the GEF contract was signed, thus the Washington office was given responsibility for day-to-day activities of the project, through a technical assistance sub-contract issued by UNOPS⁵. WWF-US’ role included recruitment and posting of a CTA, managing a series of technical consultancies, producing technical reports, workshops, training courses, and so on. The WWF sub-contract in the amount of \$779,203 is detailed in Box 1.

In addition to the WWF-US sub-contract, funds were set aside for UNOPS support costs (\$74,073), UNDP and UNOPS supervision missions (\$39,840), capital equipment purchased for the DFC by UNOPS (\$105,285), and miscellaneous expenses (\$1,596). As the executing agency, UNOPS was officially responsible for management of the project, though working closely with UNDP, which has a field office in Libreville. During the course of the GEF project UNDP created a new position of regional GEF coordinator in Libreville, though New York-based staff continued to play a major role in supervision and management.

From the WWF side, legal responsibility for the project was held by WWF-US, through its Director for Africa and Madagascar. During the life of the GEF project, however, WWF decentralized its field operations, upgrading the Libreville office to the status of a regional headquarters - the Central Africa Regional Program Office (CARPO). The Washington WWF

³ I. Schuetz-Mueller to R. Carroll, 24 July 1996

⁴ T. Hammond to J. Hough, 2 Sept. 1996

⁵ UNOPS contract C-95918, dated 15 August 1995.

office retained formal authority and responsibility for the GEF project, but under current WWF policy such a project, if negotiated today, would probably come under the direct management of the Libreville office (pers. commun., Olivier Langrand, WWF-CARPO).

According to the GEF project document, counterpart funding from the Government of Gabon was expected to represent a substantial share of the total project resources: 34.2 million CFA Francs in in-kind expenses, in the form of 210 person-months (17.5 person-years) of staff inputs. Staff to be provided included a counterpart National Project Director, and a series of national counterparts to work with the consultants who would be sub-contracted by WWF for the analytic studies and reports described above. The government would also provide housing for the CTA and office facilities for the project from its counterpart contribution (Project document, E.2 and Annex 4).

Box 1. WWF Sub-contract

Chief technical advisor (CTA)	240,102
Support personnel	46,284
WWF HQ costs incl. travel	86,400
Studies:	
Wildlife legislation	26,000
Wildlife trade	27,000
Game ranching	46,600
Sub-contracts:	
Vehicle maintenance	8,519
CITES training	15,000
CITES manual*	20,000
NGO sub-contract	10,000
Training	
Wildlife inventory training	36,000
Training of trainers	20,000
Training of DFC staff	26,500
Rural community training	10,000
Operating costs	<u>160,798</u>
TOTAL WWF Sub-contract	779,203

* note: this sub-contract was cancelled as the CITES Secretariat was unable to complete the manual as planned.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Project relevance

The final evaluation finds that the relevance of the project has been amply confirmed by the activities carried out. These have effectively demonstrated the presence within Gabon of an understanding of the importance of managing wildlife trade in the context of biodiversity conservation. To its credit, the project has taken on an impressive range of initiatives with important long-term potential for conservation. What remains to be achieved, as illustrated by this evaluation, is to bring these various initiatives into greater coherence, and to more clearly focus on the essential objective: the creation of a management mechanism for wildlife trade and for strengthening the capacity for biodiversity conservation.

The project's activities clearly are relevant to these objectives, but at present there is significant risk that some of these activities will not be followed-up. For this reason, they can be considered as results which still remain to be achieved. It is therefore important that the various project partners undertake to bring about the conditions necessary for their consolidation, which requires first and foremost a more coherent base.

With respect to the legislative framework, the reforms to the law 1/82 on waters and forests and to the numerous decrees and administration application texts are very hopeful signs. However, these reforms remain to be promulgated. In effect, the application of these legal texts on the management of fauna will be largely subsidiary to the promulgation and application of the new law on waters and forests. This latter represents the essential legislative basis for application not only of Gabonese law concerning management of fauna, but above all for compliance with the relevant international conventions, notably CITES and the Convention on Biodiversity. Therefore, until the broader legislative framework has been reformed and put into practice, one cannot yet speak of the establishment of a sustainable mechanism.

Project concept and design

In its original form, the project proposal called for a sub-regional initiative, beginning with activities in Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Gabon, and later expanding to the rest of central Africa. As eventually approved, however, the sub-regional element was dropped and the project focused on just one country. Gabon was selected for various reasons, including an apparent acceleration in the process of loss of biodiversity in a country known for an abundance of natural resources; economic reversals in a context of high urbanization as well as relative hardship in rural areas, bringing serious pressures on natural resource exploitation; and an increasing level of unregulated trade in wildlife species as well as significant gaps in the legal and institutional framework. In this context, a number of conservation activities were initiated by the government of Gabon together with agencies such as the United Nations system, international NGOs, and bilateral or multilateral donors.

A question needs to be raised about the transition from a regional project concept to one at the national level. As noted previously, the original proposal focused on establishing a TRAFFIC⁶ network for the West and Central Africa region, yet few substantive changes were made to the text of the original WWF-International funding proposal when the GEF Gabon Wildlife Trade project was eventually approved, though their scope is quite different. Indeed, most of the text of the GEF project document repeats verbatim the text from the 1992 proposal, though without the regional aspects and also lacking some other useful elements of that document, such as the project organigram and an analysis of the structure of the wildlife department. Another significant omission in the final GEF document was a part of the risk assessment, noted earlier, which had

⁶ Trade Records Analysis of Flora and Fauna In Commerce.

clearly identified the need for the initiative to be seen as the first phase of a larger commitment.⁷ Finally, several brief sections of text were added, calling for the development of community-based wildlife management approaches, but without providing analysis of how this was to be accomplished or on what basis progress would be assessed.

Scope of activities and budget level

The activities and outputs identified in the original proposal try to cover too many topics in too short a time, and the proposed budget (\$1 million total) is inadequate for a project whose scope included livestock domestication experiments, revision of wildlife legislation, monitoring of bushmeat markets, training in ecological inventory techniques, introduction of community wildlife management concepts, CITES training for customs officials, and other topics. The original proposal clearly signaled that this was the beginning phase in a longer-term process of capacity-building, information base-strengthening, and institutional support within a very complex and dynamic sector, in a region with few environmental NGOs and limited technical and management capacities.

The indicative list of activities and outputs drafted in the 1992 regional funding proposal (in which it is labelled “Provisional Work Plan”) became incorporated into a GEF management sub-contract as a set of “deliverables.” Missing was a unifying principle to tie these components together, and to ensure the overall strategic vision of the effort. The regional proposal had called for technical assistance from an international body – TRAFFIC – to help the countries of central Africa to focus on common issues and problems related to regulation, monitoring and enforcement of wildlife policies, with national obligations under CITES as the overarching framework.

The eventual GEF project document deleted the TRAFFIC role along with the regional elements, and substituted a vaguely-defined set of community-based wildlife management activities in Gabon (a country which at the time had no policy framework supporting such approaches). This changed the project’s essential orientation from an outward-looking process of strengthening regional efforts under CITES, to a more inward-looking focus on domestic issues such as bushmeat, thereby losing much of the conceptual framework of the original proposal.

From the standpoint of project design, it is probably fair to say that the project document, and therefore the UNOPS sub-contract awarded to WWF, did not provide a fully-sufficient basis for beginning field activities by the time work began in late 1995. At the least, a project launch workshop should have been held with close collaboration of the project partners (UNDP, UNOPS, DFC, and WWF) to review assumptions, verify the feasibility of proposed activities, and develop mechanisms for communication and coordination.

Another area of concern is the counterpart contribution. In the 1992 WWF-International proposal, the three central African countries participating in the preliminary phase of the program (Gabon, Cameroon and Central African Republic) were slated to provide a combined contribution of 120 person/months (10 person/years) over two years, in the form of counterparts to participate in project studies on legislation, public awareness, the parrot trade, and bushmeat markets (McShane & D’Huart, p. 31, p. 35). Assuming the contribution were evenly divided between the countries and over the life of the project, this implies a commitment of slightly more than one person-year of professional staff effort per country per year of project operation – a reasonable expectation.

Yet the GEF Project Document, which reduced the project scope to one country (Gabon) at the same time increased the budget category for counterpart contribution to a total of 210 person-

⁷ Strictly speaking, this issue should not have appeared in the very brief ‘Risks’ section of the 1992 proposal (Section F), as it was a crucial aspect of the overall justification and feasibility analysis.

months (17.5 person-years) over three years, adding an entirely new budget line for participatory wildlife resource management (81 person/months, or 6.75 person/years), and raising Gabon’s counterpart contribution to a level 75% higher than proposed for all three countries in the WWF proposal (Project Document, E.2). Even adjusting for the third year added to the approved GEF project,⁸ this implies a level-of-effort for Gabon’s ministry of Eaux et Forêts of nearly six professional staff members on a full-time basis – an unrealistic expectation given the agency’s human resource constraints.⁹ The project document elsewhere notes the “limited number of trained staff available” as a critical risk factor in the project (F.2).

Finally, because of the analytic content and policy implications of this project, a key question for project design revolves around the responsibility for intellectual leadership. The intellectual leadership of the regional proposal would have been focused within the regional project office, which was to work closely with TRAFFIC and the CITES secretariat as it developed local “antennas” within each country and evolved an agenda responsive to national needs and priorities. As a new office, this project hub would have needed time to establish relationships, define working arrangements, negotiate agreements, and so on, but it would have been relatively unhindered by existing bureaucratic habits and relationships, and would have worked closely, on a day-to-day basis, with a valuable international peer group in the form of the TRAFFIC and CITES networks. Over time, lessons learned from the analytic and policy work could have spread outward through the national antennas and their respective networks, significantly expanding the potential long-term impact.

No equivalent role was provided in the Gabon Wildlife Trade project design, however. Some of the GEF activities retained the idea of building connections with other services which play a role in wildlife trade, i.e., the customs service, gendarmerie, etc., but it was probably unrealistic to achieve this expectation by simply “slotting” the project into the existing DFC structure, without an accompanying high-level donor dialogue to identify and address organizational and policy bottlenecks. The project design was in effect gambling that the presence of a single CTA, plus some modest capital expenditures, could substantially overhaul the role and institutional identity of the DFC and stimulate new forms of collaboration with other agencies and stakeholders. In retrospect, it is probably not surprising that some observers today criticize the GEF Wildlife Trade Project for having become “primarily an anti-poaching activity”¹⁰ – this is the fundamental role of the DFC, a point which was not adequately recognized in the project design. Some of the intellectual leadership might have been expected to be provided by WWF, but as discussed under “Implementation arrangements,” this also did not materialize.

Data-collection and monitoring

The project document provided for both a mid-term and a final evaluation, though no specific provision was made for project monitoring. An innovative and important element of the project’s approach to wildlife management is the plan to develop wildlife population indices, to measure relative population changes as a function of management decisions such as hunting quotas:

“Relative changes in these indices, up or down, would serve as indicators of impacts on various species of wildlife...The advantage of such an approach is that it is possible to begin almost immediately, it is easy to train people in its

⁸ the WWF-Int’l proposal had covered only two years for a preliminary phase.

⁹ In practice the DFC attributes a portion of its office staff time (director, secretaries, drivers, etc.) to the national commitment to the project.

¹⁰ comments of this type were made by several individuals interviewed by the evaluation mission.

methods, and it gives relatively reliable rates of change over time” (McShane and D’Huart 1992, p. 26 and GEF Project Document D.3.1).

This concept is potentially among the project’s most important elements, and probably should have had significantly more attention. The technical feasibility of the system of indices, the level of resources and time-frame required to establish and verify baseline data for such a monitoring system, and the long-term recurrent costs of data collection, appear to have had little attention, however. But accepting the technical feasibility and practicality of the approach, it should be evident that a pilot test of this concept would entail significant investments of time and effort: the project document mentions predefined transects to be monitored every month, located “*in protected areas, remote unprotected areas, near villages etc.,*” and “*the monitoring of trade movements both legal and illegal*” as well as changes in market prices for bushmeat “*over time and by area*” (McShane & D’Huart p. 26, Project Document D.3.1). These costs might very well be worthwhile incurring if the technical feasibility of the methodology could be established; but this would be hard to do as a single component within a very broad initiative whose total budget was \$1 million over three years. In the event, the budget did not include a line for on-going data collection and market surveys, illustrating a gap between the intentions expressed in the project design and the specific activities funded under the GEF sub-contract.

During the years since the original proposal was written, hunting pressures in Gabon (as elsewhere in central Africa) have become ever more severe, and the potential benefits of a cost-effective and reliable system of population indicators would be enormous. However, the ecological inventory work being conducted by WWF in the Gamba Protected Area Complex (which has other purposes) is not yet complete, thus even at the end of the GEF project we do not know whether a system of the type proposed by McShane and D’Huart might be feasible, nor is there a basis for extrapolating Gamba data to other parts of the country. From a technical standpoint this is among the most disappointing results of the GEF project, for even though the original proposal may well have been overly optimistic, the concept should have received a more adequate test. (This is not to detract from the inventory work taking place in Gamba, which in its own right is quite innovative and represents an excellent example of WWF – DFC field-level collaboration.)

There has also been only sporadic monitoring of bushmeat markets, mostly through occasional visits, seizures, etc. during the first years of the project, followed by a more cooperative approach during the organization of the GTCES (with *femmes commerçantes* who sell bushmeat invited to participate in the workshops). DFC agents appear to be well-informed about the bushmeat market (sources, times of arrival, species, etc.), but there has been no systematic recording of prices or other data, thus at present there is little basis for assessing changes in the market since the major bushmeat market study by Lisa Steel in 1994. According to some observers, the Ebola outbreak of 1997 caused a major disruption in demand for monkey meat, but the project was not collecting market data during this period, and thus an opportunity was missed to test the idea that bushmeat demand could be influenced through “social marketing” efforts to link consumption of bushmeat with health threats.

It is significant that the mid-term evaluation – effectively the first opportunity to formally review the project’s approach and the assumptions underlying it - took place in September 1997, more than six years after the project had entered into the GEF work program. The mid-term evaluation proposed an ambitious new set of monitoring indicators, calling for the project to track 41 separate indicators spread across seven major categories of activity (see Table 1). Although this is an unrealistic and excessive number, it would have been useful for the project to have initiated at least a subset of the proposed monitoring system.

Table 1. Proposed Monitoring Framework from Mid-term Evaluation**CITES Workshops**

Number of participants
 Number of manuals and posters distributed
 Surveys of popular reactions
 Impact on international trade (number of confiscations at airport)

Legislation adjusted

Projects for changes in laws in place
 Qualitative data on hunted animals
 Data on animals sold at markets
 Quantity of meat sold
 Number of game bred in captivity
 Analysis of comments by media and affected population

International trade

Consultants' reports
 Police statistics for border and customs crossings
 Prices of sold species
 Number of participants at workshops

Game ranching

Consultants' reports
 VSF (Owando) Pilot-project performance
 Number of game bred in captivity
 Economic profitability of game ranching
 Number of people trained
 Impact on hunting
 Comparison of number of animals sold on markets from captivity vs. hunted

Inventories

Number of participants at training workshops
 Periodic data gathering of results
 Geographic position of inventories
 Measures of local participation (number, type, availability...)
 Impact on wildlife trade

National strategy

Number of participants at workshops
 Number of strategy meetings
 Management plans in place (DFC)
 Plan for a national strategy in place
 Media reaction
 Stakeholder-beneficiaries (number, type, origin...)
 Number and type of alternative activities in place
 International reaction
 Impact on biodiversity (conservation measures, confiscations, sustainable use), as determined through periodic surveys
 Database in place and being maintained

Logistical support to DFC

Report on logistical support provided by the project
 Periodic survey of its utilization
 Institutional changes made
 Unresolved problems (reasons, solutions)
 Analysis of the extent of partnership between DFC and local population

In the event, the second international consultant only arrived a few months before the closing of the project, and the DFC did not take its own action to select relevant indicators. Thus the primary indicator of project success remains the completion of a series of studies, consultant reports, and workshop proceedings (Annex 1) but this provides little sense of the degree to which the project has been able to implant at least the initial components of a longer-term mechanism for sustainable management of wildlife trade. This issue is discussed further in the next chapter.

Government commitment

The DFC appears to have played a fairly passive role until the final year of the project, finally taking a more active role at the time of establishment of the Steering Committee, appointing a national counterpart to the international consultant. Another key DFC staff member is the *chef de brigade* at the Sette-Cama site, which forms part of the Gamba protected area complex. This individual also serves as national counterpart to the WWF chief technical advisor at Gamba, and through these relationships it appears that the DFC has evolved a close working relationship with the WWF Gamba activity. Together with the Gamba CTA, the counterpart is scheduled to participate in a meeting on Congo Basin protected areas management in Washington D.C. sponsored by the USAID CARPE project. Professional networking of this kind represents an important opportunity for national staff and raises the profile of DFC staff during a time of budget cuts and retrenchment, and thus can be an effective tool for boosting morale as well as strengthening technical skills. The GEF Wildlife Trade project had few occasions of this type, which probably hampered the development of strong ties between DFC staff and the project.

Capacity-building

It should also be noted that the government did not provide a substantial portion of the in-kind resources committed in the project document. Of the 210 person-months of professional staff time identified in the budget, only the two counterpart staff noted above appear to have been made available (although office space was provided within the DFC headquarters in Libreville). According to the plan, national staff members were to work side-by-side with the consultants sub-contracted to carry out specific studies on topics such as legislation, game ranching, etc. This would have given a significant number of mid-level DFC staff some very useful analytic and problem-solving experience. By managing these studies as contract deliverables rather than as training opportunities, another opportunity was missed for capacity-development within DFC. At present, copies of the studies “bought” by the GEF project are available in Libreville, but it is not clear to what extent they have been internalized within DFC or the ministry of Eaux et Forêts. The information base concerning wildlife management in Gabon has been strengthened as a result of the GEF project, but the institutional capacity to use this information remains uncertain.

Stakeholder ownership

The formation of the GTCES has been another very encouraging development, bringing a wider range of stakeholders into the project. GTCES participants interviewed by the evaluation mission were eager to see the DFC follow-up the first two workshops (September and November 1998), but this depends in part on a positive response for supplemental funding from the World Bank PFE project. The idea of licensed bushmeat vending has been very attractive to at least some of the market women, who are hoping this will legalize their livelihood and stabilize supply. However, the end of the project has left the GTCES with an uncertain status, though DFC management appears to be realizing that it may have opportunities to maintain at least some activities even in the absence of additional donor funding. The DFC’s near-term actions in this area will provide a measure of their ownership in the ideas launched by the GEF project, and of their responsiveness to the other stakeholders brought together within the GTCES.

Mechanisms for sustainability of results

With one exception, PFE funding appears at present to represent the only chance for project activities such as the GTCES to continue barring the appearance of a new project. The exception

lies in the fact that the WWF country program in Gabon has close linkages with the DFC, and through its field activities WWF is able to provide an opportunity for DFC to engage in field operations such as wildlife inventories. (A similar relationship exists with the joint ECOFAC – WCS program at the Lopé reserve.) Beyond these protected areas operations, however, the DFC has yet to articulate how it will to carry forward the work begun by the GEF Wildlife Trade project.

Factors affecting implementation

In addition to modification of the original project concept, the project experienced a number of institutional developments which had far-reaching consequences for its implementation and the achievement of the anticipated results, including the transfer of the Gabon country program from WWF-International (Gland, Switzerland) to WWF-US (Washington DC), a long delay in recruitment of the CTA, and a long management gap in the Libreville office following the departure of the WWF representative. Due in large part to the conflicting demands on the CTA's time following the departure of the WWF representative, together with the lack of a steering committee as well as a national project counterpart (until the last six months), this left the project in a very difficult situation. In sum, the project's implementation was characterized by:

- a work plan which was interrupted at numerous points and which was carried out with little discipline;
- long delays in the establishment of mechanisms or precedures for effective collaboration between the project partners, thus undermining the contribution of the necessary institutional and technical support to the initiative; and
- by the absence, until late in the project, of a Steering Committee or a National Project Director.

Particularly significant is the evident confusion surrounding the changes to the technical scope of the project. Originally conceived as an initiative to conserve biodiversity by better managing the trade in a wide range of species, the project quickly (though rather informally) came to focus upon the management of fauna, and more specifically, to the problem of domestic consumption of bushmeat. These changes entailed significant implications for the overall project approach as well as for project monitoring, follow-up, and long-term achievement of results.

The first major changes were proposed by the CTA in February 1996, three months after project start-up. The requested amendment – modifying the third of the project's five objectives - was approved by UNOPS more than a year later, in April 1997 (just five months before the mid-term review). In the meantime, in September 1996, a tripartite meeting was held of DFC / UNOPS-UNDP / WWF which was to consider the needs expressed by the DFC. The project amendment of April 1997, which incorporated the results of this tripartite meeting, brought the project activities from five to seven, raising the number of project activities from 15 to 22.

Finally, the project framework was substantially overhauled in a tripartite meeting of 23 January 1998, notably through the establishment of a project steering committee as well as various recommendations arising from the mid-term evaluation. (It must be noted, however, that these revisions to the project did not fully succeed in making the project activities more coherent from a strategic point of view). A new international consultant for the project arrived in June 1998, after the departure of the CTA in February 1998, and some activities were cancelled or suspended, while others remain to be achieved. Once they were in place, the new consultant and the Steering Committee stepped-up the pace of project activities, and the evaluation team was told by numerous stakeholders that, had such conditions been in place sooner, the project would have far greater accomplishments.

Institutional arrangements and project identity

These points raise fundamental issues of the project modalities and their effect on the project's direction. The ambiguities already noted handicapped project implementation and the achievement of its objectives. Perhaps the most vexing problem concerned confusion over the role of WWF vis-à-vis the other project partners, notably UNDP and UNOPS. The project files contain numerous letters and memos querying various aspects of project authority and responsibility. At various times, WWF's role is described as "executing agency," "implementing agency," "counseling agency," "technical assistance agency," and "sub-contractor."

The evaluation mission has noted the issue of WWF staff continuity following the transfer of the Gabon office from WWF-International to WWF-US: Washington-based staff were not involved in the original design of the GEF concept, and were perhaps not fully aware of the project's underlying assumptions, nor of changes which had taken place in recent years. The former CTA states that, in his opinion, WWF-US staff had little "buy-in" to the project concept and approach, and were simply executing a contract which had been negotiated by others (pers. commun., Tom Hammond, WWF-International). Other evidence suggests that WWF staff distanced themselves from the project's design; see, for example, an internal WWF memo commenting on UNDP's objections to conducting project field-training activities within existing WWF protected area sites (i.e., the Gamba complex):

“...we were not involved in the development of this program [but] are attempting to strengthen the activities with the proposed modifications.”¹¹

Another contributing factor may have been staff turnover within all the agencies associated with the project, largely as a consequence of the 4 ½ year delay between the proposal's entry into the GEF work program (May 1991) and the initiation of project activities (November 1995). In addition to the management gaps already noted, the WWF program in Gabon was undergoing a significant expansion during the period of the Wildlife Trade project, with the establishment of two major new protected areas at Gamba and Minkebe and a substantial fundraising effort related to these initiatives. Whatever the reason, the CTA complained in late 1997 about the lack of institutional support for GEF project activities:

“...the project has not benefitted from the vast experience and 'institutional memory' of [WWF-US].”¹²

Perhaps the most fundamental issue was that of the identity of the project. Originally conceived as a WWF initiative, in its final form the GEF project limited the NGO's role to that of a technical sub-contractor, with overall management responsibility reserved by UNOPS. Yet an observer might have assumed that the project was an integral part of the WWF Gabon country program, rather than an independent activity being implemented - on a contract basis - on behalf of UNDP and UNOPS. The CTA was seen as a member of the WWF Gabon program staff, and took on the responsibilities of interim WWF representative for several months following the departure of the Libreville office director, early in the implementation of the GEF project.

UNDP and UNOPS expected the CTA to function as a technical support contractor within the DFC, with no *a priori* commitments to WWF program responsibilities except those falling purely within the terms of reference of the GEF project. In contrast, within WWF the CTA represented a senior member of the WWF country staff, responsible for a particular component of the WWF program but nevertheless a part of the WWF "family" and responsible to WWF-US management

¹¹ R. Carroll to T. Hammond, 2 May 1996

¹² T. Hammond to O. Langrand, 7 Nov. 1997.

on a day-to-day basis. This issue of mixed identities was one of the most problematic aspects of the GEF project until the last six months of the project. The arrival in June 1998 of a temporary consultant, with much more precise terms of reference and based full-time within the DFC, seems to have substantially eased these issues.

Distinctions between the terms “executing agency” and “implementing agency,” already subtle enough in English, are almost impossible to disentangle once translated into French, and as a result project documents and correspondence contain numerous and inconsistent references to describe the respective roles of the project partners. These issues of project identity continued well into the life of the project, with disagreements over use of the WWF logo, the lack of stationery specific to the project, and so on.

Project modalities

With respect to project modalities, UNOPS should better distinguish between NGOs and consulting firms in the execution of its projects; this is a key lesson if UNOPS is to avoid repeating the contractual and institutional ambiguities which were evident in the Gabon project. This relates to inappropriate use of sub-contracting mechanisms with serious consequences for the identification and inter-relationship of the various project partners. The GEF medium-scale grants mechanism, which did not exist at the time the Wildlife Trade project was designed, may be a more appropriate vehicle for this type of operation. Regardless of the funding vehicle, it is also necessary to pay greater attention to the role of the government, to ensure active participation and internalization of experiences and lessons learned.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Actions to reinforce initial benefits from the project

Sub-regional GEF Program on Wildlife Trade

During the evaluation mission, considerable interest was expressed in the idea of a follow-on project for the sub-region. Any efforts in this direction would necessarily underscore the need for harmonization of the legal and institutional framework beyond the borders of Gabon.

Nevertheless, the prerequisite conditions for such harmonization need to be defined. There is an excellent case to be made for the development of a GEF initiative on the sub-regional scale, based upon the Gabonese experience, but this would need to meet certain conditions precedent:

- to conduct with the states of the sub-region a number of preliminary feasibility studies, which would be needed for effective identification of the project;
- to assure that contributions committed from the side of the project partners, notably the Government of Gabon, are delivered to a reasonable degree, as foreseen in the project instrument; and
- to achieve the establishment of an operational and sustainable mechanism for monitoring and management of wildlife species in Gabon.

National Parks Authority

With respect to the institutional framework, to bring to fruition the broader vision of conservation of biodiversity, the DFC should be transformed into a service for wildlife and national parks management (Direction de la Faune et des Parcs Nationaux). The conditions for such a transformation should be specified by the Gabonese authorities. For their part, the donor agencies active in biodiversity conservation should provide financial support carefully linked with the further development of protected areas (including national parks and/or reserves yet to be instituted). In effect, the increase in recent years in the number of protected area sites in Gabon reflects a high level of interest and a significant comparative advantage.

Biodiversity priorities

With respect to biodiversity, several key findings need to be highlighted:

Captive breeding and game ranching

The activity of game ranching (particularly for potamothere) should be continued. However, this should only take place with much greater analysis of market and commercial factors (supply and demand), and specifically of a far better understanding of presumed substitution effects between animals raised in captivity or ranching, vis-à-vis those harvested in the wild; among other sources of information, the existing experience of game ranching elsewhere (i.e. various antelope species in Kenya, Zimbabwe etc.) could prove useful, as well as greater attention to the potential advantages of exploiting savanna species (in suitable ecosystems, to be sure) which are already well-understood rather than attempting original (and highly uncertain) research toward the domestication of forest species;

Hunting concessions

Feasibility studies on zoning and management of hunting concessions based on ecological potential should be carried out: the initial work conducted under the GEF project in the WWF site in the Gamba protected area complex, which is said to be unique in Africa, appears to be a significant step in this direction;

Land and resource tenure

There are potential benefits to adopting a comparative assessment of experience from certain Sahelian countries with respect to land and resource tenure, which could be highly useful applied to the central African situation. This experience is little-known in central Africa, but in some respects is far more relevant than the more publicized experience from the Amazon Basin or

Southeast Asia.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Weaknesses of the GEF pilot phase with respect to project design, technical review, and work-planning are gradually being addressed through logframes, independent technical review, and closer supervision of field activities.
2. A “foot-in-the-door” approach to securing funding can backfire if the level of resources available is inadequate to ensure a solid base is being laid for follow-on activities.
3. Use of NGOs as international technical assistance / consulting-service providers is fraught with risks, and should only be used in rare situations, and only when all parties explicitly agree to specific procedures and costs required to ensure adequate supervision and monitoring.
4. Government commitments through “in-kind” contributions are often honored “in the breach,” but can significantly affect the level of ownership, internalization of lessons learned, and enthusiasm for interventions proposed by the project.

ANNEX 1. Calendar of Project Activities, Studies and Reports

1991

May

- Project entered into GEF Work Program

1994

July

- Project document signed by Ministère des Eaux et Forêts, UNOPS, and UNDP

1995

October - November

- CTA arrives and project activities initiated

1996

September

- Legal analysis of wildlife management legislation in Cameroon, Botswana and Zimbabwe.
- *Etude critique de la législation relative à la gestion de la faune sauvage au Gabon: Rapport National Botswana, Volume IV* by Batlalefhi Moeletsi, Consultant IUCN.
- *Etude critique de la législation relative à la gestion de la faune sauvage au Gabon: Rapport National Zimbabwe, Volume V* by Jennifer Clare Mohamed, Consultant IUCN

October

- CITES regional training seminar and training-of-trainers
- *Etude critique de la législation relative à la gestion de la faune sauvage au Gabon: Rapport National Cameroun, Volume III* by Stéphane Doumbe-Bille, Consultant IUCN

1997

February

- *Etude critique de la législation relative à la gestion de la faune sauvage au Gabon: Rapport Finale, Volume I* by Patrice Christy, Consultant national WWF
- *Etude sur la faisabilité de l'élevage commercial d'espèces sauvages au Gabon* by Ferran Jori, Consultant WWF

April-June

- Training in wildlife and botanical inventory methodology, Gamba Protected Area Complex

September

- Mid-term evaluation by J. C. Heymans and G. Rossatonga-Rignault, Consultants UNOPS

1998

June

- *Etat du commerce international des espèces animales et végétales couvertes par la CITES au Gabon* by Patrice Christy, Consultant WWF and Anne Vanden Bloock, TRAFFIC

July

- Creation of Project Steering Committee and designation of National Project Counterpart to CTA
- *Rapport final concernant l'étude sur l'élevage de gibier financée par le projet GEF* by Vétérinaires Sans Frontière

August

- Drafting of implementation decrees for new forestry law

September

- First wildlife trade working group meeting

- *Proposition sur un mécanisme de gestion du commerce national de la faune au Gabon – Synthèse du premier atelier du Groupe de Travail sur le Commerce des Espèces Sauvages (GCTES)* by Lisa Steel, Consultant WWF and Joseph Maroga Mbina, DFC

November

- Second wildlife trade working group meeting
- *Analyse des ébauches de décrets d'application - – Synthèse du deuxième atelier du Groupe de Travail sur le Commerce des Espèces Sauvages (GCTES)* by Lisa Steel, Consultant WWF and Joseph Maroga Mbina, DFC

December

- Draft implementation decrees for new legislation submitted to Ministry
- *Final Project Report*, WWF

1999

January – February

- Final project evaluation, J. F. Swartzendruber, Ibrahima Ly and Anaclé Biessielo, UNOPS consultants

ANNEX 2. TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE FINAL EVALUATION MISSION

GAB/92/G31-Gabon Wildlife Trade Management Project

I Background

Domestic and international trade in wildlife species plays an important role in national and local economies, and bush-meat constitutes a major source of protein for rural communities in Gabon. At the same time, much of the trade in wildlife in the region is unregulated and almost nothing is known about the impact of trade on biodiversity. Improved knowledge and management of wildlife and its trade is urgently needed to protect biodiversity in the region, and to ensure sustainable use of the resource and its continued contribution to economic development. Protection of wildlife resources requires improved capacity of government agencies in wildlife management and conservation and empowerment of rural communities to monitor, manage and derive benefits from wildlife utilization. The project aims to develop indigenous capacity to effectively monitor wildlife populations and trade, to improve knowledge of the impact of trade on wildlife populations and on biological diversity, and to assist in developing and implementing sustainable trade strategies to ensure the long-term survival of wildlife species and the ecosystems they are part of.

The project is funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for US\$1,000,000. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is the executing agency for the project, with actual implementation subcontracted in its entirety to World Wildlife Fund-US (WWF-US), which was a pre-selected contractor (selected by UNDP). Procurement of equipment and monitoring and evaluation functions are retained by UNOPS.

The project was due to start on 1 July 1995 for 36 months. The project effectively began field operations in November 1995 after the signature (end August 1995) of the contractual arrangements between WWF-US (World Wildlife Fund), and UNOPS. Completion date, following an extension from the target date by six months, is 31 December 1998.

The project document calls for two evaluations: (a) a mid-term evaluation after 18 months from the start; and (b) a final evaluation at the end of the project. The mid-term evaluation took place from 6 to 28 September 1997. The mid-term evaluation exercise was intended, on the one hand, to examine how well the project has performed to date; and on the other hand, to recommend corrective measures to improve project implementation and intended outcomes to ensure success by meeting objectives. In so doing the mid-term evaluation provided further guidance concerning project activities by devising clear indicators for the final evaluation of the project. The mid-term evaluation also provided further success criteria to be taken into consideration during the final evaluation.

Activities of the project are thoroughly described in the project document, which constitutes the binding legal instrument signed by the major partners in the project; that is, the Government of Gabon (represented by the Ministry of Forestry and the Environment, particularly in assisting the *Direction de la Faune et de la Chasse (DFC)*, the United Nations Development Programme (Represented by the Resident Representative in Gabon), and UNOPS (in New York, represented by the the Project Management Officer).

Project Objectives, Outputs, and Success Criteria

The project's immediate objective was:

To create a mechanism to sustainably manage wildlife

trade in Gabon and to reinforce government and local community capacity to ensure long-term sustainable management and conservation of biodiversity.

The specific objectives were sub-divided threefold:

- to develop indigenous capacity to effectively monitor wildlife populations and trade;
- to better understand the impact of trade on wildlife populations and on biological diversity; and
- to assist in describing and implementing sustainable trade strategies toward the long-term survival of wildlife species and the ecosystems they are part of.

The following specific outputs were planned:

Output 1: Improved knowledge and implementation of national legislation and international treaties through training of personnel.

Output 2: National legislation on management and trade of wildlife adapted to the socio-economic reality in Gabon and to CITES requirements.

Output 3: Development of a framework for long-term monitoring of wildlife use and trade, and its impact on biological diversity.

Output 4: Development of strategies to implement legislation and management policies on wildlife trade, and links with biological diversity conservation.

Output 5: Long-term maintenance of the directorates charged with wildlife conservation and management and continuation of monitoring activities.

For a more detailed description of outputs and activities, refer to the project document.

Criteria of Success (per project document)

- ◆ The placement of an efficient mechanism to promote institutional strengthening in Gabon, to allow the country to work towards sustainable management of wildlife trade and to satisfactorily fulfil its obligation deriving from its adhesion to CITES.
- ◆ Rural community involvement in the development, management, and monitoring of local systems to sustainably use forest resources, most notably meat as a source of protein.
- ◆ Demonstration of the efficacy of this mechanism will be by tangible results (outputs). These outputs will contribute to the reinforcement of components (i.e. institutional, managerial and technical) that make up the capacity of the government to manage wildlife trade.

In addition, the mid-term evaluation mission proposed a number of indicators of success which would allow an evaluation of performance and a measurement of the real impact of the project's activities. These were:

Related Output

CITES Workshops

Measurable indicators

- Number of participants
- Number of manuals and posters distributed
- Surveys of popular reactions
- Impact on international trade (number of confiscations at airport)

Legislation adjusted

- Projects for changes in laws in place
- Qualitative data on hunted animals
- Data on animals sold at markets
- Quantity of meat sold

- Number of game bred in captivity
 - Analysis of comments by media and affected population
- International trade
- Consultants' reports
 - Police statistics for border and customs crossings
 - Prices of sold species
 - Number of participants at workshops
- Game ranching
- Consultants' reports
 - VSF (Owando) Pilot-project performance
 - Number of game bred in captivity
 - Economic profitability of game ranching
 - Number of people trained
 - Impact on hunting
 - Comparison of number of animals sold on markets from captivity vs. hunted
- Inventories
- Number of participants at training workshops
 - Periodic data gathering of results
 - Geographic position of inventories
 - Measures of local participation (number, type, availability...)
 - Impact on wildlife trade
- National strategy
- Number of participants at workshops
 - Number of strategy meetings
 - Management plans in place (DFC)
 - Plan for a national strategy in place
 - Media reaction
 - Stakeholder-beneficiaries (number, type, origin...)
 - Number and type of alternative activities in place
 - International reaction
 - Impact on biodiversity (conservation measures, confiscations, sustainable use), as determined through periodic surveys
 - Database in place and being maintained
- Logistical support to DFC
- Report on logistical support provided by the project
 - Periodic survey of its utilization
 - Institutional changes made
 - Unresolved problems (reasons, solutions)
 - Analysis of the extent of partnership between DFC and local population

II Objective and Scope of the Final Evaluation Mission

Three interrelated dimensions of programmes and projects must be assessed as the substantive focus of monitoring and evaluation: relevance, performance and success.

2.1 Relevance

Review and assess the appropriateness of the project's concept and design, the relevance of the project's five outputs, and the extent to which they have contributed toward the overall development objective. Relevance means the degree to which the objectives of a programme or project remain valid and pertinent either as originally planned or as subsequently modified owing to changing circumstances within the immediate context and external environment of that programme or project. Comment on any other conceptual issue which may have impacted on project execution.

2.2 Performance

There are three criteria for performance:

- ◆ effectiveness - the extent to which a programme or project achieves its immediate objectives or produces its desired outcomes;
- ◆ efficiency - the optimal transformation of inputs into outputs;
- ◆ timeliness of inputs and results.

The evaluation mission shall assess whether the project produced its outputs effectively and efficiently: identify the major factors which have facilitated or impeded the progress of the project in achieving its desired results.

In particular the mission should review the quality and timeliness of inputs and activities by the implementing sub-contractor, WWF, e.g. responsiveness of project management to GEF requirements or changes in the project environment, timeliness of work plans and extent to which they were followed, the extent to which budgets were followed, etc. The main contact persons are the WWF Representative in Gabon, Dr. Olivier Langrand, Libreville, Tel: (241) 73 00 28 Fax: (241) 73 80 56; the UNDP Programme Officer, Bernard Voubou, at UNDP Libreville Fax: (241) 743 499 Email: undpgab@inet.ga, and the UNDP-GEF Regional Network Coordinator for Biodiversity in Central and West Africa, Dr. Trinto Mugangu, Tel (241) 774 928 Fax (241) 743 499 E-mail: trinto@internetgabon.com.

The mission should also review the UNOPS execution modality of the project: evaluate UNOPS involvement in the project (for questions to UNOPS, contact Ms. Karin Svadlenak-Gomez, Project Management Officer, Email: karinsg@unops.org Tel. (212) 906 6248 Fax. (212) 906 6903 and/or Mr. Ingolf Schuetz-Mueller, Chief, Division for Environmental Programmes, Email: ingolfsm@unops.org Tel. (212) 906 6220 Fax (212) 906 6903). The execution modality in terms of effectiveness and impact should be assessed.

Assess whether Government inputs, at national and local levels, were sufficient and how they should be improved, if necessary.

Review the contribution of the UNDP country office to the project.

- ◆ Examine whether the institutional set-up enhanced full involvement of the stakeholders and provided a sense of actual ownership by the country (if not, what mechanisms might be used to accomplish this in future projects of a similar nature);

2.3 Success

The three criteria of success are impact, sustainability and contribution to capacity development.

Impact

Impact refers to the results of a programme or project that are assessed with reference to the development

objectives or long-term goals of that programme or project. In this sense, impact represents changes in a situation, whether planned or unplanned, positive or negative, that a programme or project brings about.

Impact can be assessed only once a significant period has elapsed after the completion of a programme or project. It is thus essential that a programme or project be designed in a way that will lend itself to impact assessment at a later stage, e.g., through the preparation of baseline data and the setting of indicators for monitoring and evaluation.

Sustainability

Sustainability is the durability of positive programme or project results after the termination of the technical cooperation channelled through that programme or project. Static sustainability refers to the continuous flow of the same benefits that were set in motion by the completed programme or project to the same target groups. Dynamic sustainability refers to the use in, or adaptation of programme or project results to, a different context or changing environment by the original target groups and/or other groups.

Contribution to Capacity Development

As a criterion of success, the contribution made to capacity development relates to the extent to which a programme or project enables target groups to be self-reliant and makes it possible for government institutions, the private sector and CSOs to use positive experiences with the programme or project in addressing broader development issues.

Specifically, therefore, the evaluation mission shall:

List the achievements of the project and assess their effectiveness in solving the perceived problems and limitations;

Assess project impact: Determine the effect of the project on targets groups or institutions: the quality, usefulness and sustainability of the project's achievements and outputs in terms of improving the capacity for a sustainable management of wildlife resources;

Assess the extent of a feeling of actual ownership of the project's results by the country (at various levels);

Determine the degree of support given by the Government to integrating the project objectives and goals into the national development programme, and how well the project fits into national development policy;

2.4 Review the effectiveness of the indicators put in place by the project, vis-à-vis of the objectives, the outputs and activities, including objectivity, measurability, methodology of analysis to determine the effect and the impact of the project, etc.

2.5 Recommended future directions for the DFC.

Recommendations will provide directions for activities beyond project time-frame, particularly possible extension to several countries of the region.

The evaluation team's recommendations will be made available to a ZOPP workshop to be organized by the project immediately following the mission. The ZOPP workshop will be organized for about 25 participants from the DFC, other stakeholders in the Gabon, as well as from neighboring countries who could be involved in a regional follow-up project (notably Congo, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea).

III. Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on all the above points, the evaluation mission should provide conclusions and recommendations.

The mission should record, in conclusion, any significant lessons that can be drawn from the experience of the project and its results, especially anything that has worked well, as well as anything that has worked badly and should be avoided in the future.

IV Methodology

The evaluation team members shall familiarize themselves with the project through a review of a number of relevant documents prior to beginning travel to the region. (For a list of documents that will be distributed to the mission members prior to the start of the mission, see section VII below.) In addition to these Terms of Reference, the evaluation team shall use the guidelines provided in the UNDP's *Handbook for Programme Managers: Results-oriented Monitoring and Evaluation* in undertaking the evaluation and writing its evaluation report.

For a pre-mission briefing, the evaluation team shall contact the UNDP Regional Network Coordinator for Biodiversity, Dr. Trinto Mugangu, BP 2381, UNDP, Libreville Fax 241 – 743-499, Email: trinto@internetgabon.com and the UNDP GEF Co-ordinator for Biodiversity and International Waters, Africa, Dr. John Hough,. Contact: john.hough@undp.org or hough_j@hotmail.com Tel. (212) 906 5560 Fax. (212) 906 5974.

V Duration, timetable and itinerary

The mission will meet the UNDP country office, the Government officials in the capital and will visit the sites of field activities. The mission should also meet with representatives of local NGOs, the civil society and beneficiaries of the project. The mission will work in close collaboration with the representative of the sub-contractor WWF and the GEF Coordinator.

The mission will have a duration of up to 22 working days, including travel time and reporting, based on the following tentative itinerary (NOTE: this itinerary is based on an assumption of 7 working days/week. Travel days are considered working days.)

- Days 1-2: Desk review of all relevant documents at home base
- Day 3 : Travel of the International Expert to Libreville, Gabon and Meeting with the National Expert;
- Day 4 : Briefing of the two experts with Project CTA and national counterparts in Libreville; also briefing with UNDP Resident Representative in Gabon; Briefing with the Minister of Forestry and the Environment;

- Day 5 : Joint development of work program by the two experts
- Day 6 - 16 : Conduct Evaluating Activities in the Field, particularly in all localities and villages where project activities are being implemented, including visits, briefing, consultations and inquiries to officials, local NGOs officers, Community leaders and project protagonists;
- Day 17-18 Debriefing with Officials in Gabon and write report outline
- Day 19: Return travel of International Expert
- Day 20-22 : : Write up Project Report

Up to 1 additional days for revision after review by UNDP/UNOPS

VI Reports

The mission is required to discuss and revise the draft evaluation report prior to his departure from the region. It is recommended that the format of the evaluation mission report follow the UNDP Guidelines for Evaluators. In addition to addressing all the above-mentioned points, the report should contain the following Annexes:

TOR

Itinerary (actual)

List of persons interviewed

Summary of field visits

List of documents reviewed

Any other relevant material

The final version of the evaluation mission will be submitted to the UNDP/GEF (Dr. Trinto Mugangu, Regional Network Coordinator for Biodiversity , BP 495 Rue Foch, UNDP, Fax 242 - 83 76 90, Email: trinto@internetgabon.com) and UNOPS (Ms. Karin Svadlenak-Gomez, Project Management Officer, UNOPS/Division for Environmental Programmes, 220 East 42nd Street, New York, NY 10017, Fax: 212 906 6903, Email: karinsg@unops.org), no later than one week after the end of the field work. The official version of the report shall be submitted in English & French, including the team's conclusions and recommendations. The report shall be submitted in five hard copies and in electronic format in MS Word or WordPerfect for Windows.

VII Documents to be made available to the evaluation team prior to start of mission:

Provided by UNOPS (In electronic format as Word documents to the extent available.):

Project Document – electronic format

UNDP Handbook *Results-oriented Monitoring and Evaluation* (1997) – electronic format

Mid-term Evaluation Report

Tripartite Review Meeting Report (January 1998)

GEF Project Implementation Review 1998

Steering Committee meeting reports and other relevant documents shall be made available to the evaluation team by WWF and the DFC.

VIII Qualifications needed

The mission will be composed of three independent consultants: two international experts, one in biodiversity, wildlife trade; the other one in environmental law, concerning CITES provisions and

legal environmental issues. The third expert will be a national of Gabon and will assist the team in natural resource management, political and sociological issues in Gabon.

The international expert, with an MS or a PhD in ecology and management of wildlife will lead the team. The team leader needs to have had at least 10 years of experience in conservation and sustainable use of biological resources as well as experience in community participation, training, project analysis and development in Central Africa (Gabon, Congo, Central African Republic, Congo Democratic-Zaire, and Cameroon). Being currently resident and working in one of the countries of the region (except Gabon) will be a plus for the international expert. The lead international expert in wildlife management, will be assisted directly by an international expert in environmental law. The international expert in environmental law shall have at least an MS or PhD in Law with emphasis on environmental questions. The expert in environmental law shall have working experience with African environmental issues, and have at least 5 years of working experience. The incumbent must know of the CITES Convention and TRAFFIC enforcement mechanism for wildlife trade. Finally the team will be assisted by a national expert in natural resource management or social sciences. The national expert, with at least a BS Degree in natural resource management or social issues related to wildlife trade, needs to be conversant with local traditions from various communities participating in the project activities in Gabon.

The three consultants shall be fluent in English and French. The evaluation report shall be submitted in both languages, if possible, but the French version will be made in the field and discussed within country with Governmental counterparts during the evaluation mission. The English version will be needed for final filing with UNOPS, UNDP, and GEF.

ANNEX 3. List of persons contacted

UNDP Libreville:	Toon VISSERS Bernard Henri VOUBOU Trinto MUGANGU Simon TREPANIER
WWF CARPO office:	Oliver LANGRAND Jean-Baptiste NGOMA PAGA Seraphin DONDYAS
WWF Gamba Complex:	Marc THIBAUT
Ministry of Eaux et Forets:	Faustin LEGAULT
Direction de Faune et Chasse:	Emile MAMFOUMBI KOMBILA Joseph MAROGA Joseph NGOUROU
PFE Project:	Andre-Jules MADINGOU Barry MBIA
Biodiversity Coord. Unit:	Jean-Baptiste MEBIAME Omer NTOUGOU
PNAE/NEAP Unit:	Jean-Bruno MIKISSA
Vétérinaires sans Frontieres:	P. HOOBEN
Wildlife Trade Working Group:	Jean-Claude NGOMA MBOUITY Isabelle AKONGZAK
Customs Service:	Capt. MASSALA Fidolin ONGUINDA
ECOFAC Project:	Conrad AVELING
WCS Lopé Project:	Lee WHITE
FORAFRI Project:	Robert NASI
World Resources Institute:	Dirk BRYANT Jean-Gael COLLOMB
WWF-International	Tom HAMMOND Tom MCSHANE
WWF-US	Richard CARROLL Lee ZAHNOW

ANNEX 4. Evaluation Mission Itinerary

Mon. evening, Jan. 25: Swartzendruber and Ly arrival in Libreville.

Tues. Jan. 26: team meetings with WWF (Langrand) and UNDP (Voubou, Vissers) to discuss evaluation arrangements, arrange use of project vehicle.

Wed. Jan. 27: meeting with WWF (Langrand, Ngoma-Paga); meeting with Bissielo; review documents at WWF.

Thur. Jan. 28: meeting with DFC (Marogas); review documents at WWF.

Fri. Jan 29: meeting with DFC (Marogas), UNDP (Voubou) and WWF (Langrand); given access to GEF office in DFC.

Sat. Jan. 30: review documents in GEF office.

Sun. Jan. 31: team discussion of plans, visit market selling bushmeat and other forest products near Libreville.

Mon. Feb. 1: team meeting with DRC Director (Mamfoumbi) to agree program for evaluation; meeting with WWF to check arrangements for Gamba site visit; contact with UNDP (Mugangu).

Tues. Feb. 2: Meet with former director of DFC (Eyi Mbeng); visit Owendo – site of VSF pilot project *petit élevage de gibier* (P. Hooben); meeting with Director-General of Ministry of Eaux et Forêts (F. Legault).

Wed. Feb 3: Meetings with environmental legislation specialists (Christy, Rossatonga), WCS representative for Lope Reserve (White), and ECOFAC project regional coordinator (Aveling).

Thur. Feb. 4: Meetings with PFE project (Madingou), Biodiversity Coordination Unit (Mebiame, Ntougou), and Customs offices.

Fri. Feb. 5: Travel to Gamba project site and meeting with project director (Marc Thibault) and counterpart (Joseph Ngourou).

Sat. Feb. 6: Visit to Sette Cama project site; contact project workshop participant (Ngoma Mbouity).

Sun. Feb. 7: Meeting with workshop participant (Ngoma Mbouity); return travel to Libreville; team review of findings and drafting of report.

Mon. Feb. 8: Preparation of material for presentation to project partners, drafting French and English translations, and arrangements for completion of evaluation.

Tues. Feb. 9: Completion of presentation materials, briefing meeting with DFC and Director-General of Eaux et Forêts, meeting with WWF; departure of International Consultant (Swartzendruber).

Wed. Feb. 10: Drafting of technical annex on legislative framework by International Consultant (Ly), and Swartzendruber return to Washington.

Thur. Feb. 11: Return of International Consultant (Ly) to Dakar.

Feb. 12-18: Completion of draft final report.

ANNEX 5. List of documents reviewed or cited

Jean-Martial Bonis Charancle. *Assessment of NGOs in Central Africa: Case Studies in Cameroon, C.A.R., and Gabon*. USAID CARPE Project, 1996.

Ekoko, Francis. Univ. of Yaoundé, 1996.

Ndoye, Osseynou. CIFOR/IITA, Yaoundé.

New York Times, Feb. 3, 1999: “*AIDS and Chimpanzees*” – editorial.

Sunderlin, William. CIFOR/CARPE Project (forthcoming).

Yates, Douglas. *The Rentier State in Africa: Oil rent dependency and neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press Inc., 1996