Document of
The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003459

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-H4570 TF-92910 TF-94135)

ON A

CREDIT FROM THE

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 42.3 MILLION
(US$ 64.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

AND A

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY GRANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 6.0 MILLION

TO THE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

FOR A

FOREST AND NATURE CONSERVATION PROJECT

December 9, 2015

ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES GLOBAL PRACTICE
AFCC2
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2015)

Currency Unit = Congolese franc
SDR 1.00 = US$ 1.406390
US$ 1.00 = SDR 0.711039

FISCAL YEAR
July 1 – June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CARPE	Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
DGRAD	Directorate General of Administrative Judicial, Land, and Participation Receipts
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ESW	Economic and Sector Work
FA	Financing agreement
FNCP	Forest and Nature Conservation Project
GDP	Gross domestic product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEO	Global environmental objective
GIS	Geographic information system
ICCN	Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation
IDA	International Development Association
INT	Integrity Vice Presidency
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
KPI	Key performance indicator
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MECNT	Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation, and Tourism
MEDD	Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development
METT	Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool
MNP	Maïko National Park
MTR	Mid-term review
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCPCB	Timber production control and marketing program
PDO	Project development objective
PIU	Project implementation unit
PNEFEB	National Program for Environment, Forest, Water, and Biodiversity
PNFoCo	National Forest and Conservation Program
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
SEA	Strategic environmental assessment
SyGIAP	Protected Areas Management System

SyGIS	Spatial Information Management System
TTL	Task team leader

Senior Global Practice Director:	Paula Caballero
Practice Manager:	Benoit Bosquet
Project Team Leader:	Douglas J. Graham
ICR Team Leader:	Julian Lee

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Forest and Nature Conservation Project

CONTENTS

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Congo, Democratic Republic of	Project Name:	Forest and Nature Conservation Project
Project ID:	P100620, P111621	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-H4570,TF-92910,TF-94135
ICR Date:	12/09/2015	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL,SIL	Borrower:	Ministry of Finance
Original Total Commitment:	USD 64.00M,USD 6.00M	Disbursed Amount:	USD 65.19M,USD 4.76M
Environmental Category: A		**Focal Area**: B	
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Forest and Nature Conservation Project - P100620				
Process	**Date**	**Process**	**Original Date**	**Revised / Actual Date(s)**
Concept Review:	11/20/2006	Effectiveness:		09/09/2009
Appraisal:	01/21/2009	Restructuring(s):		10/28/2014
Approval:	04/02/2009	Mid-term Review:	10/15/2012	11/21/2012
		Closing:	06/30/2015	06/30/2015

DRC Rehabilitation and Participatory Management of Key Protected Areas in the DRC - P111621				
Process	**Date**	**Process**	**Original Date**	**Revised / Actual Date(s)**
Concept Review:	11/20/2006	Effectiveness:	10/02/2009	09/09/2009
Appraisal:	02/03/2009	Restructuring(s):		10/28/2014
Approval:	04/02/2009	Mid-term Review:	09/10/2012	11/21/2012
		Closing:	06/30/2015	06/30/2015

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes	MU
GEO Outcomes	MU

Risk to Development Outcome	H
Risk to GEO Outcome	H
Bank Performance	U
Borrower Performance	U

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	**Ratings**	**Borrower**	**Ratings**
Quality at Entry	MU	Government:	U
Quality of Supervision:	U	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	MU
Overall Bank Performance	U	Overall Borrower Performance	U

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Forest and Nature Conservation Project - P100620			
Implementation Performance	**Indicators**	**QAG Assessments (if any)**	**Rating:**
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA)	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA)	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status	Moderately Unsatisfactory		

DRC Rehabilitation and Participatory Management of Key Protected Areas in the DRC - P111621			
Implementation Performance	**Indicators**	**QAG Assessments (if any)**	**Rating:**
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA)	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality of Supervision (QSA)	None
GEO rating before Closing/Inactive Status	Moderately Unsatisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
Forest and Nature Conservation Project - P100620		
	Original	**Actual**
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Forestry	27	29
General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector	21	20
Public administration- Agriculture, fishing and forestry	52	51
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Biodiversity	5	0
Environmental policies and institutions	56	60
Indigenous peoples	10	13
Other environment and natural resources management	17	20
Participation and civic engagement	12	7

DRC Rehabilitation and Participatory Management of Key Protected Areas in the DRC - P111621		
	Original	**Actual**
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Forestry	32	37
General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector	52	47
Public administration- Agriculture, fishing and forestry	16	16
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Biodiversity	53	76
Environmental policies and institutions	16	11
Indigenous peoples	5	3
Other environment and natural resources management	26	10

E. Bank Staff		
Forest and Nature Conservation Project - P100620		
Positions	**At ICR**	**At Approval**
Vice President:	Makhtar Diop	Obiageli Ezekwesili
Country Director:	Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye	Marie Francoise Marie-Nelly
Practice Manager/Manager:	Benoit Bosquet	Marjory-Anne Bromhead
Project Team Leader:	Douglas J. Graham[1]	Giuseppe Topa
ICR Team Leader:	Julian Lee	
ICR Primary Author:	Julian Lee	

DRC Rehabilitation and Participatory Management of Key Protected Areas in the DRC - P111621		
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Vice President:	Makhtar Diop	Obiageli Ezekwesili
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ICR Team Leader:	Julian Lee	
ICR Primary Author:	Julian Lee	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The Project's Development Objective (PDO) is to increase the capacity of the Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Tourism (MECNT) and the Congolese Nature Conservation Institute (ICCN), and increase collaboration among government institutions, civil society, and other stakeholders in order to manage forests sustainably and equitably for multiple uses in Pilot Provinces.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
The PDO was not revised.

Global Environment Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
Same as PDO above.

Revised Global Environment Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
The GEO was not revised.

[1] Became TTL after project closure.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Areas covered by various types of forest land management plans agreed upon by the MECNT and other stakeholders (adopted and under implementation) in the three provinces			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	4,500,000		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring. Value at restructuring was 2m ha.			
Indicator 2 :	Households benefiting from at least one micro-project in conservation landscapes			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	35,000		34,321
Date achieved	09/14/2014	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator added at restructuring. Target substantially achieved (98%).			

(b) GEO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Stable trend in abundance of key bio-indicator species within and outside protected areas in project landscapes			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	See Annex 1	Populations stable		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring because data was unavailable for MNP due to security concerns, and because the indicator was considered irrelevant for protected areas not covered by the project.			
Indicator 2 :	Protected Area Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) score for Maiko National Park			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	49	58		58
Date achieved	09/01/2012	06/30/2015		06/30/2015

Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target achieved (100%). Indicator added at restructuring.			
Indicator 3 :	Absolute numbers of elephants in Maiko National Park			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	500	500		No data
Date achieved	09/01/2012	06/30/2015		06/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator added at restructuring. Data unavailable for end of project due to security concerns in the park.			

(c) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Forest fees and taxes collected by DGRAD as % of total billed by MECNT at national level			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	10%	75%		86.5%
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		12/31/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Targeted exceeded (115%) by the end of 2012, but then the indicator became non-pertinent as the collection responsibility for the surface area tax was transferred from DGRAD to the provinces.			
Indicator 2 :	Kilometers of illegal industrial logging tracks outside legal logging concessions in pilot provinces			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No baseline	At least 25% less than baseline		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring because it was beyond the control of the project. No monitoring was documented.			
Indicator 3 :	Number of logging infractions revealed by Independent Observers in pilot provinces			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	Positive trend		54
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		12/31/2013
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target reached at end of Independent Observer contract at the end of 2013. No data after closing of contract.			
Indicator 4 :	Percentage of logging infractions discovered that are prosecuted in pilot provinces			

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	60%		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring, as prosecutions were beyond the project's control. No monitoring was documented.			
Indicator 5 :	Number of field supervision reports made by Provincial and District MECNT teams in pilot provinces			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	150		25
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		11/30/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring, as it was not deemed linked to project outcomes. Value at MTR was 25.			
Indicator 6 :	Number of reports made by MECNT teams on the work of contractors and NGOs in pilot provinces			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	20		5
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		11/30/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring, as it was part of standard project management functions of the PIU. Value at MTR was 5.			
Indicator 7 :	Area of additional forest areas zoned using a participatory approach in pilot provinces			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	17.2 M ha	22 M ha		17.2
Date achieved	03/03/2009			11/30/2012
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring, as related activities were canceled. Value at MTR was 17.2 M ha, though it should be pointed out that this does not refer to "additional" forest areas, much as the target of 22 M ha did not.			
Indicator 8 :	Percentage of forest users in sample areas, including indigenous communities, aware of their legal and customary rights and obligations under the forest code			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	30%		5%
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		06/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target not reached (17%).			
Indicator 9 :	Percentage of households in targeted forest communities reporting additional sources of regular income			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	No baseline	Increase, 20%		42.85%

Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		06/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded (214%). This indicator relates to the micro-project intervention zones only. The project was able to show that the magnitude of the increase was generally higher in intervention areas than non-intervention areas, but has no data to compare that the percentage of households reporting additional income is higher than in control areas.			
Indicator 10 :	Number of water sanitation, feeder roads, and other small participatory infrastructure projects implemented with project financing			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	25	25	67
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		06/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded (268%).			
Indicator 11 :	No. of households utilizing small participatory infrastructure projects implemented with project financing			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	2,500		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator not formally dropped as part of restructuring, but no monitoring was documented due to security concerns.			
Indicator 12 :	No. of indigenous population's households benefitting from Project-financed initiatives			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	300		480
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		06/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Target exceeded (160%).			
Indicator 13 :	No. of people trained in safeguard related measures			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	75		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring, as it was not considered relevant to the results chain. No monitoring was documented.			
Indicator 14 :	No. of responses developed to mitigate impacts			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	10		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		

Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring. No small infrastructure projects had been delivered and development and implementation of appropriate safeguard measures was an obligation of the government.			
Indicator 15 :	No. of annual evaluations by qualified assessors on quality of responses			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	1		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring as no monitoring was documented, and the activity described was deemed to fall under the regular project management responsibilities of the PIU.			
Indicator 16 :	Protected areas management effectiveness score for Maiko NP (WWF Toolkit)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	48.6	58		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator promoted to GEO indicator at restructuring. No monitoring due before end-project, but reported at GEO indicator-level.			
Indicator 17 :	Reduced ratio of violations of Maiko park regulations (i.e. poachers arrested, fire arms seized, traps found, endangered species confiscated) to number of patrols conducted			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	50	20		
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator dropped at restructuring as monitoring proved impossible due to security concerns.			
Indicator 18 :	Volume of wood seized as a share of total illegal logging volume marked for seizure in government control posts			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	90		99%
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator added at restructuring.			
Indicator 19 :	Direct project beneficiaries			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	166,000		170,360
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		06/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator added at restructuring. Target exceeded (102%).			
Indicator 20 :	Direct project beneficiaries, of which female			
Value	0	50%		42%

(quantitative or Qualitative)				
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		06/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator added at restructuring. Target partially reached (84%).			
Indicator 21 :	Forest concessions with social responsibility contracts signed and publicly available			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	65		75
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Indicator added at restructuring. Target exceeded (115%).			
Indicator 22 :	Areas brought under enhanced biodiversity protection (ha)			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0	250,000		0
Date achieved	03/03/2009	06/30/2015		06/30/2015
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The target was misstated in the PAD. This World Bank core indicator requires that, to consider MNP to have been brought under enhanced protection, its initial METT value 49 (in the 35-70 range) would have to have improved to the 75-100 range. That would have been unrealistic and was never anticipated, so the target should have been 0 ha.			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

-						
No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	GEO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)	
					Project 1	Project 2
1	12/09/2009	MS	MS	MS	5.30	0.00
2	06/09/2010	MS	MS	MS	5.79	0.00
3	04/02/2011	MS	MS	MS	11.44	0.30
4	10/11/2011	MS	MS	MS	21.38	0.52
5	05/22/2012	MS	S	MS	28.69	0.58
6	04/24/2013	MS	MS	MS	41.74	1.34
7	11/11/2013	MS	MS	MS	50.14	2.40
8	05/26/2014	MU	MU	MU	59.06	3.75
9	11/27/2014	MU	MU	MU	62.70	4.02
10	06/09/2015	MU	MU	MU	65.19	4.38

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved		ISR Ratings at Restructuring			Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions		Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
	PDO Change	GEO Change	DO	GEO	IP	Project1	Project 2	
10/28/2014	N		MU		MU	61.66		Project restructured and fund allocation to disbursement categories changed. Results framework revised to increase measurability and effectiveness for measuring progress toward the PDO.
10/28/2014				MU	MU		3.86	Same as above.

I. Disbursement Profile

P100620



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

1. Project Context, Development and Global Environment Objectives Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

(a) Country and Sector Context

1. *Political context*: The project was approved during the complex political aftermath of years of economic mismanagement during the Mobutu years (1965-1997) and the deadliest war in modern African history. Although this conflict came to an official end in 2003, when a transitional government took power, violence continued in several provinces, primarily in the east of the country. Elections were held in 2006, but governance in all respects remained extremely weak.[2] Nevertheless, a democratically elected government instilled a degree of hope that much-needed reforms could now be tackled, leading to intensive support from the international community.

2. *Socio-economic context*: The restoration of relative peace and political consolidation returned the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to an economic growth path, with average net gross domestic product (GDP) growth between 2002 and 2008 at 2.6% (5.6% gross).[3] However, this started from a very low base, as GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in 2008 was only US$ 657, placing the country second-last in the world.[4] The DRC's poverty rate in 2006 (71%), its depth (32%) and severity (18%) were all extremely high for the region.[5] The country also ranked last in the world in the 2008 Human Development Index.[6]

3. *Sector context*: The DRC's vast forest resources – 145 million hectares, one of the largest forest tracts in the world covering 62% of the country – remained comparatively intact in 2008, in spite of displaying the Congo Basin's highest annual deforestation rate, at 0.27%. Most logging was carried out by artisanal actors to supply local and regional markets. At under 300,000 m^3, industrial timber exports were modest, especially when compared to other countries in the region.[7] Industrial concessions had been allocated with a lack of transparency, were largely speculative, and not designed to benefit the government or local communities. The 2002 Forest Code provided a largely progressive framework for forestry, the application of which was sorely lacking, however. The government professed an intention to develop and institutionalize the country's forests as an enduring provider of multiple goods and services rather than as an arena for rapid timber extraction, formulating a broad reform agenda. Meanwhile, conservation of protected areas was very limited, with rampant poaching enabled by a near-complete absence of budgets for protected area management. MEDD's preparation of a new Framework Law on Nature Conservation and a new Environmental Law suggested government interest in reforms.

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[2] Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2014; Corruption Perceptions Index 2008, Transparency International; Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014.
[3] World Bank Data, 2014.
[4] Expressed in 2011 dollars. World Bank Data, 2014.
[5] Democratic Republic of the Congo: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report No. 07/330. 2007.
[6] Human Development Index, UNDP, 2008.
[7] The Forests of the Congo Basin: State of the Forest 2010. COMIFAC.

(b) Rationale for Bank Assistance

4. The rationale for Bank assistance was provided by the 2002 World Bank Forest Policy and Strategy, which calls for the Bank to engage to (i) harness forests' potential for reducing poverty, (ii) integrate forests in sustainable development, and (iii) protect vital local and global environmental resources. It was further strengthened by the significant Bank engagement in supporting policy reforms in DRC, and by the strong government demand for further collaboration in the forest sector. The government had previously formulated its *Programme National Forêts et Conservation* (*PNFoCo*) to mobilize donor support (see PAD, Box 2 for details), and the Forest and Nature Conservation Project (FNCP) was intended to be the cornerstone of this multi-donor program that sought to build institutional capacity, safeguard the forests' social, economic, and environmental functions, ensure that forests contribute meaningfully to the livelihoods of rural and forest people, and expand the protected area network.

(c) Higher-Level Objectives

5. The project sought to contribute to the 2008-2011 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) by supporting the pillars on Promoting Good Governance, Consolidating Macroeconomic Stability and Economic Growth, and Promoting Community Dynamics. It set out to do so by strengthening processes and capacity to manage natural resources equitably, transparently and sustainably with the participation and for the benefit of rural and indigenous populations, as well the state and the global community. The project also sought to support the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy's (*Document stratégique de reduction de la pauvreté*, DSRP) goal of fostering poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability by maintaining forest cover and ensuring sound management of protected areas. The GEF portion of the project sought to provide Global Environmental Benefits by protecting populations of globally endangered species. It aligned with GEF Strategic Objective 1: "To catalyze Sustainability of Protected Area Systems," and specifically with Strategic Program 3: "Strengthening Terrestrial Protected Areas Networks".

1.2 Original Project Development Objective (PDO) / Global Environment Objective (GEO) and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)

6. The PDO was to increase the capacity of the Ministry of Forests and Nature Conservation[8] and the Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation, and the collaboration among government institutions, civil society and other stakeholders to manage forests sustainably and equitably for multiple uses in selected pilot areas of DRC. The PAD and

[8] Later renamed the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development (*Ministère de l'environnement et du développement durable,* MEDD), and named the Ministy of Environment, Nature Conservation, and Sustainable Development (*Ministère de l'environnement, conservation de la nature, et du développement durable*) at the time of writing. For simplicity, this report will refer to MEDD unless it is named in direct citations or component names.

the Financing Agreement (FA) differed in their identification of KPIs: The PAD's results matrix listed two[9], while the FA listed five.[10]

1.3 Revised PDO/GEO and KPIs and Reasons/Justifications

7. The PDO/GEO was not revised. The KPIs were revised at the mid-term review in 2012 as noted in the aide-mémoire with the intent to improve their measurability and effectiveness at measuring progress toward the PDO. However, they were only formalized in a corrective Level 2 restructuring in 2014. The final set of KPIs is: (i) Households benefiting from at least one micro-project in conservation landscapes; (ii) Protected Area Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (METT) score for Maiko National Park (MNP); (iii) Absolute numbers of elephants in MNP. The revised indicators in fact did little to improve alignment and measurability of the PDO/GEO outcomes as discussed further below.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

8. The project divided its beneficiaries into groups by project component. Component 1 targeted national, provincial, and district governments and forest institutions (MEDD and ICCN) and their 1,400 staff members. By investing in the capacity of these institutions, the project sought to restore MEDD's operational capacity to perform its core institutional duties, thus advancing the improvement of sustainable and equitable management of forests for multiple uses. The micro-projects in Component 2 targeted 384,000 rural forest-dependent and indigenous beneficiaries in areas whose population was estimated at 3.2 million, investing in small-scale infrastructure, sanitation, and dispensaries, while also seeking to boost their capacity for participation in forest management. Component 3 did not formally identify specific beneficiaries beyond the ICCN, but sought to conserve the global public goods of DRC's forest ecosystems by improving management in MNP.

1.7 Original Components (as approved)[11]

9. *Component 1: Institutional strengthening of MECNT* (US$37.2 million IDA): This component focused on the capacity building and the sustainable and equitable management objectives of the PDO. It aimed to (a) improve the institutional capacity of MECNT's and provincial ministries; (b) strengthen MECNT's technical forest management capacity; (c) carry out an institutional reform within MECNT; and (d) support project implementation.

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[9] (i) Areas covered by various types of forest land management plans" agreed upon by the MEDD and other stakeholders (adopted and under implementation) in the three provinces; and (ii) Stable trend in abundance of key bio-indicator species within and outside protected areas in project landscapes.

[10] (i) Forest land management plans, including community forests (simplified management plan), protected areas, timber concessions, conservation concessions, community hunting zones (simplified management plan) and others, have been agreed upon by all concerned stakeholders, and subsequently adopted and are being implemented; (ii) Population of key bio-indicator species in targeted forest landscapes; (iii) Percentage of cases of illegal forest exploitation for commercial purposes which are detected are prosecuted; (iv) Forest areas covered by a participatory zoning plan; (v) Development initiatives completed with community participation.

[11] The financial agreement contains slightly different wording of the components but is materially consistent with the PAD.

1.1 Infrastructure, equipment, and managerial functions (US$18.9 million IDA)
1.2 Establishment of specialized forest management systems (US$8.1 million IDA)
1.3 Institutional readiness and transformation (US$5.0 million IDA)
1.4 Support to project management (US$5.2 million IDA)

10. *Component 2: Community participation in forest management* (US$18.9 million IDA, US$ 1.9 million GEF): This component focused on the equitable management goals of the PDO. It aimed to: (a) increase local community and civil society participation in forest management; (b) support increased use of environmental services; and (c) assist with implementing the project's environmental and social documents and safeguard plans.

2.1 Participation of local communities and civil society (US$5.5 million IDA)
2.2 Development activities for forest communities (US$9.9 million IDA, US$1.9 million GEF)
2.3 Social, environmental, and cultural safeguard activities (US$3.5 million)

11. *Component 3: Management of protected areas and support to ICCN* (US$4.1 million GEF): This component focused on capacity building and sustainable management aspects of the PDO: (a) provide institutional strengthening for ICCN; and (b) help rehabilitate MNP.

3.1 Institutional strengthening of ICCN (US$1.0 million GEF)
3.2 Rehabilitation of MNP (US$3.1 million GEF)

1.8 Revised Components

12. The components were not revised.

1.9 Other significant changes

13. A Level 2 restructuring was approved by the Country Director on October 28, 2014. The restructuring (i) revised the results framework (see section 1.3); and (ii) revised allocations to the disbursement categories as a result of a reallocation of funds between components and sub-components to reflect changes in the project since its approval. The restructuring increased Component 1's budget from US$37.2 million to US$42.0 million, decreased Component 2's non-GEF components from US$19.0 million to US$15.3 million, and decreased Component 2's GEF components from US$1.9 million to US$1.3 million in exchange of an increase of Component 3 from US$4.1 million to US$4.7 million.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

14. The project was prepared in a challenging post-conflict setting during an ongoing democratic transition. Governance indicators for the DRC were exceptionally weak at the time, and remain so. Data on the forest sector were sparse, and as a result, the preparation team expended much effort to collect data to inform project preparation, in particular for the economic analysis. The project also was influenced by the analysis carried out for the 2007 World Bank study "Forests in Post-Conflict DRC".[12] Project preparation was

[12] The study placed its primary emphasis on the importance of regulating the industrial timber sector in the post-conflict context of the DRC, which was reflected in a number of project activities. The study further

deliberately delayed, awaiting the outcome of the 2008 Inspection Panel Investigation No. 2008/188/AFR on forest sector operations in DRC which, together with the Bank Management Report's Action Plan, inspired project design. A linked technical assistance product (Support to implementation of Forestry Code and mainstreaming with I-PRSP priorities (P080421)) carried out between 2008 and 2011 provided further inputs for project design pertaining to community forestry, participatory management of protected areas, and forestry zoning.

15. The project provided a good fit with the Bank's CAS (see Section 1.1.c.) and the DRC's sector priorities at the time: The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (DRSP) stressed the importance of fostering environmental sustainability by maintaining forest cover and ensuring sound protected areas management. The document emphasized that forests are an important provider of food, energy, and other sources of income for a large number of Congolese, and stressed that, to alleviate poverty and achieve livelihood security over the long term, natural resources must be managed sustainably and their depletion avoided.

16. The project considered lessons learned, however it is unclear where these were derived from: this was the first forest governance project in the DRC since the Bank's reengagement in the country in 2003, and few lessons were available from other projects in DRC. Nevertheless, at least in retrospect, some lessons cited seem ill-considered or weakly applied: For example, a call for "more cross-sectoral and spatially oriented approaches" may have been the wrong lesson in the extremely low-capacity context of DRC, where simplicity may have been a more appropriate starting point, and contrasted with a desire to make "the project design simple and flexible" - a lesson that was not fully heeded in the project design.[13] Giving "top priority to building capacity" in such a context was certainly appropriate, but insufficient by itself given many actors' vested interests in the *status quo*. Moreover, the fact that capacity building from a very low basis takes a long time to yield significant results was also not reflected. Perhaps most importantly, the project was conflicted on one of the chief lessons: "Mainstream the implementation arrangements while addressing governance and fiduciary issues". The creation of a *de facto* separate project implementation unit (PIU) ran directly counter to the spirit of this lesson, and also to a further cited lesson on the use of "delegated management contracts to accelerate implementation and facilitate capacity building". While this arrangement proved prescient from an implementation standpoint as the operating arrangements did yield substantial results, they illustrated the difficult trade-offs between a desire to build capacity and to deliver results on the ground. Lastly, the Inspection Panel case appears to have driven the importance of "pay[ing] greater attention to the environmental and social safeguards for indigenous people, forests, and protected areas".

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recognized the multiple purposes forests serve. This, too, was taken up through the diversity of planned project activities, including on small-scale development activities, community forestry, environmental services, and biodiversity conservation.

[13] This may have also been the result of the comprehensive reform agenda put forward in the 2007 ESW.

(a) Assessment of project design

17. *Design strengths:* The project's objectives were responsive to the borrower's stated development priorities. While the project's focus on timber concessions was debated in civil society, the project also sought to promote community forestry. Moreover, the project did not seek to finance industrial timber production, but rather the government's efforts to enforce the obligations of industrial timber concession holders. The focus on capacity building was also appropriate in the face of exceedingly low existing capacity. Technical implementation was supposed to be managed by MEDD directorates and ICCN, empowering them in theory. However, a lack of ownership and capacity by the institutions thwarted this good design idea. Overcoming MEDD weaknesses by using 12 delegated management contracts allowed the project to benefit from the experience of organizations already operating in the target areas, while minimizing duplication of effort and interventions with the same populations. This worked reasonably well in terms of yielding results, but produced few capacity improvements. The design of the retirement process for MEDD staff – intended to reduce personnel costs and create space for new talent – also proved very sound, to the point where it is now being replicated in five ministries. Finally, it is clear that the project targeted important issues, given the relatively high deforestation rates and high levels of poverty among forest populations.

18. *Design weaknesses:* Project objectives were not always responsive to borrower circumstances, given the very weak capacity and governance of the implementing agency, the importance of which is hard to overstate. The project's PDO/GEO displayed a complex structure and hard-to-evaluate elements such as "increased collaboration". The initial results framework was quite poor, with unclear links between the PDO, indicators, and components. KPIs did not adequately reflect the PDO's stated goals. The project could not take on entrenched vested interests in the forest sector, making some successes elusive, as illustrated by the failure of the *Programme de contrôle de la production et de la commercialisation des bois* (Timber production control and marketing program, PCPCB). In this overall context, the project design was very ambitious, even though almost 50% of project funds were nominally allocated to capacity building, which was appropriate. The design included a large number of diverse activities, making supervision difficult. Similarly, the geographic dispersion of activities increased implementation costs and diluted resources.

19. The project did not address illegal artisanal logging, which was the logical conclusion of the existing policy dialogue, and resulted in leaving 98% of Congolese wood production unaddressed. That said, the National Forest and Conservation Program (PNFoCo) intended for other donors to also fund the sector. The introduction of a computerized timber tracking system at a time when it does not appear that a functional one existed anywhere in Africa as of 2008,[14] was a high-risk activity not acknowledged in the PAD. It certainly held potentially high rewards, but which required close supervision. The lack of such close supervision may have reflected an under-appreciation of the supervision needs in project design. The already weak security situation in Maiko in 2008

[14] Seidel, F. Fripp, E, Adams, A. and Denty, I.: Tracking Sustainability: Review of Electronic and Semi-Electronic Timber Tracking Technologies. ITTO Technical Series No. 40, ITTO and CITES, 2012.

made that component highly risky, a circumstance that lasted for much of the project duration and impeded progress.

(b) Adequacy of government's commitment

20. Government commitment was initially high, as evidenced by the request for support for the forest sector, and by the quality of the policy dialogue in the lead-up to the project, high-level meetings between the Bank team and the government, including the prime minister, and at least a nominal commitment to co-finance the construction of the new ministry headquarters.

(c) Stakeholder involvement, and/or participatory processes

21. The project's design coincided with and followed on the heels of the preparation of a comprehensive study on the forest sector in 2007,[15] which was co-authored with many civil society organizations. Moreover, the safeguards process provided for a broad and transparent process of public information and consultation. Strategic environmental assessment consultations helped shape the project design, in particular Component 2.[16] The inspection panel investigation No. 2008/188/AFR also included consultations, in particular for indigenous peoples, which informed project design.

(d) Institutional set-up for implementation arrangements

22. The design sought to integrate the project in the ministry as part of the capacity building effort, but this was not followed through, even though the PIU took on some MEDD staff for training purposes. To mitigate institutional weaknesses, the design included (i) a relatively small number of staff which were to have managerial skills to provide technical assistance, and (ii) packaging inputs into 12 delegated management contracts, including supporting elements such as training, technical expertise, office equipment, etc.

(e) Assessment of risks

23. Overall, project risks were assessed as "substantial". The project correctly identified that implementing the DRC's decentralization policy could generate conflict between the forest administration and regional governments and hamper implementation

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[15] Debroux, L., Hart, T., Kaimowitz, D., Karsenty, A. and Topa, G. (Eds.) 2007 Forests in Post-Conflict Democratic Republic of Congo: Analysis of a Priority Agenda. A joint report by teams of the World Bank, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Centre International de Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD), African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Conseil National des ONG de Développement du Congo (CNONGD), Conservation International (CI), Groupe de Travail Forêts (GTF), Ligue Nationale des Pygmées du Congo (LINAPYCO), Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV), Réseau des Partenaires pour l'Environnement au Congo (REPEC), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC), World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and World Wide Fund forNature (WWF).

[16] "The project will make rehabilitated institutions and new mechanisms available to allow communities in the selected sub-districts to: (i) protect their sources of livelihood, (ii)p reserve their cultural heritage, (iii) consolidate their traditional rights and enjoy additional rights sanctioned in the new forest policy and the 2002 Forest Code, (iv) expand their participation in decision making, and (v) improve their social and economic conditions".

of some project components, however the proposed mitigation measure[17] was not followed through with. Likewise, the risk assessment correctly identified security in MNP as a potential risk,[18] and proposed relocation to another protected area if security were to worsen, but this also remained unimplemented. Furthermore, the project correctly identified that "sector governance may not increase significantly or fast enough". However, the proposed mitigation measure[19] was insufficient in light of the magnitude of the challenge, and in any case beyond the control of the project. Similarly, unsatisfactory financial management was correctly identified as a risk, however the mitigation measure[20] is standard practice in World Bank projects, and standard practice may not be sufficient for projects in the DRC's operating environment. While planning to support a timber-tracking system, project preparation did not adequately assess connected implementation risks. The project also relied on means beyond its control in identifying the risk that achievements may not be sustainable, referring to other donors as being "committed to providing long-term assistance". Given the unsecured counterpart funding for the MEDD headquarters, the risk of those funds not materializing should have been identified. The same applies to regulations and legislation on which project activities were conditioned. In sum, risk assessment in several instances relied on mitigation measures beyond the project's control and underestimated the challenges of the operating environment.

(f) **Quality at entry –** There was no Quality Assurance Group (QAG) assessment of Quality at Entry.

2.2 Implementation

24. The project became effective five months after Board approval, a reasonable amount of time in the DRC's context. The main events impacting implementation included: The mid-term review (MTR) in November/December 2012 and restructuring in September 2014. The MTR was delayed, taking place three and a half years into implementation and at a time when 90% of project funds were already committed. While the MTR concluded on the need for restructuring, the combination of the delay of the MTR itself and the subsequent delay in formalizing the restructuring represented a missed opportunity to correct the course of the project in a meaningful way, especially given that the MTR identified significant structural impediments to realizing project activities (especially with respect to regulatory pre-conditions for the PCPCB, the retirement of MEDD staff, and significant overall weaknesses in forest governance). The closing date was not extended. In response to the project's at-risk status, a new TTL was assigned, who concentrated his efforts on salvaging the PCPCB and improving financial management (see below for details). Additional key factors affecting implementation follow:

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[17] "The project includes provision for MECNT to identify and share tasks with the Provincial level, strengthen provincial offices and foster collaboration with MECNT".

[18] The presence of armed groups in the park posed a continuous challenge for implementation.

[19] "External assistance, third party oversight, and collaboration with qualified international NGOs have been set up to help MECNT implement activities that are susceptible to corruption or otherwise connected with the need for good governance".

[20] "Project specific financial management weaknesses were analyzed during preparation and corrective measures were recommended. A financial management team paid by the project will be in place at all time during implementation".

25. Government commitment, although apparently high during project design, waned in several respects: The presidential order necessary for the retirement of senior MEDD civil servants, and the joint finance/environment decree necessary for the self-financing of the PCPCB were both substantially delayed, with serious impacts on project costs in the latter case. In addition, following cost escalations resulting from a series of contract amendments sanctioned by the World Bank, the government decided not to honor its contractual commitment to attempt to rescue the PCPCB, thus sealing its fate in August 2014. Moreover, the community forestry decree necessary for the establishment of a corresponding unit at MEDD did not materialize until August 2014. The government also did not deliver the counterpart funding required to construct the new MEDD headquarters.

26. Further, security in MNP continuously hampered activities, and the voluntary relocation of rebels out of the park did not take place due in part to lack of government proactivity.

27. There was no QAG review of the project during implementation.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

(a) M&E design

28. The project's M&E design was fairly weak: The PDO was complex and multi-layered. The link between the results framework and the PDO was not straightforward, although intermediate indicators focused for the most part on "capacity", one of the two main elements of the PDO. The framework did not measure "collaboration", other than through Indicator 1.1 on various types of management plans. However, the quality of numerous indicators was flawed: Indicator 1.1., which focused on the existence of "forest land management plans", was inconsistent, given the persistence of a moratorium on new forest concessions at the encouragement of the Bank – such that more timber concessions (a better result according to the indicator) could have simultaneously run counter to Bank policy priorities. Indicator 1.2. should have been limited to MNP, as that was the only place the project could reasonably have had an impact on conservation of animal populations; moreover, the number of species covered was too large to be workable. Indicator 1.13. depended on third-party financing of the independent observer that was supposed to provide the data. Indicator 1.14. was only partially under MEDD's control, and depended on the judiciary, which did not benefit from project support. Indicator 2.21 was subject to reporting bias. The intermediate outcome on mitigation of negative social and environmental outcomes should not have been a discrete outcome, as it is required by Bank policies. Indicators 1.12. and 3.21. provide perverse incentives for weak patrolling and/or underreporting. In addition, no indicator existed for the PCPCB, a major project activity. Lastly, initial M&E design did not include direct indicators for sustainability and equity.

29. The project's intent to rely on existing outside data sources for part of the monitoring effort made sense from a cost-effectiveness perspective, however exposed the project to performance and continuity risks beyond its control. The intention of building M&E capacity in MEDD was laudable, but not executed as a result of the separate nature of the PIU. M&E was intended to be carried out by 2-3 government staff seconded to the PIU, with support from a technical assistant.

(b) M&E implementation

30. While M&E implementation was significantly delayed because the PIU could not initially find qualified staff, the international expertise eventually procured was mostly of high quality. Eventually, three staff worked on M&E and the underlying database. Nevertheless, the delay meant that no reporting on indicators took place in Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) until October 2011, two years after project effectiveness.

31. Reporting against indicators started in March 2011, and took place on average on a quarterly basis in the form of 18 M&E reports over the course of four years. While the reports were professionally presented and drew on a database that provided substantial detail, the fact that the M&E manual, although prepared on time, did not define indicators or data collection methodologies, and was not widely owned within the PIU, led to inconsistencies in indicator interpretation. At least in part as a result of this gap, capacity transfer to local counterparts was limited, as evidenced by the virtual collapse of M&E after the contractor's departure in February 2015, which led to differing interpretations of certain indicators among PIU staff, calling into question the reliability of data.

32. The MTR significantly changed the results framework in December 2012. In this process, out of a total of 21 indicators, 12 (including both PDO-level ones) were dropped, six were added, and three revised. However, these changes were not formally recorded through a restructuring until September 2014. Meanwhile, data collection was already being carried out against the new indicators from the MTR onwards, such that the project was not reporting on its formal indicators for nearly two years. While the restructuring generally improved the results framework, some problems persisted: PDO Indicator 1 (Households benefiting from at least one micro-project in conservation landscapes) was not clearly tied to the PDO. Its target was also incorrectly recorded, and some others (e.g. areas brought under enhanced biodiversity protection) were clearly misinterpreted,[21] leading to unrealistic target setting. In general, the new framework, while increasing measurability and clarity, produced less information on the achievement of the PDO.

33. Arrangements with external service providers for data delivery worked well. In addition, monitoring of the success of micro-projects, which included treatment and control sites, was reasonably sophisticated. The database on the implementation of social contracts was transferred to the Forest Management Department (DGF), increasing sustainability of M&E. However, contextual factors, such as the transfer of authority to the provinces of the power to collect most forest taxes and a lack of information flow between provinces and the central administration foiled ambitions to report on the corresponding indicator.

(c) M&E utilization

34. While the M&E system worked quite well during the tenure of an international M&E expert hired for this purpose, the degree to which data was evaluated and used to inform decision-making and resource allocation cannot be impartially assessed post-project due to a lack of documentary evidence.

[21] The indicator is an obligatory GEF indicator, see further information Section F(c), Indicator 22.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

(a) Safeguard Compliance

35. Safeguard compliance was moderately satisfactory. The project required a Full Assessment (Category A), a reasonable decision given the sensitivities of operating in areas populated by indigenous peoples. It triggered six safeguard policies.[22] MEDD carried out a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) for the whole PNFoCo, which also applied to PFCN.[23] On the basis of the SEA, an Environmental and Social Management Framework, a Resettlement Policy Framework, a Process Framework, an Indigenous Peoples Policy Framework, and a Physical Cultural Resources Framework were developed, adopted and disclosed in late 2008.

36. The project placed strong emphasis on safeguards, reserving a dedicated sub-component with a budget of US$3.5 million for implementation. While the project did not appear to have had to manage any major detrimental impact, safeguards implementation and supervision were weak. For example, there is scarce written evidence of safeguards supervision before the MTR. That said, this was not a period during which the most sensitive activities were underway. The micro-projects prior to the MTR and contractors hired for the construction of offices did not all respect contractual requirements for safeguard screening. In addition, the team noted in May 2014 that "poor reporting on compliance with safeguard frameworks makes it difficult to judge whether there are environmental issues or not," suggesting that earlier safeguard implementation and supervision showed weaknesses. Social safeguards presented a larger challenge for the project, although their application was more closely monitored and extra training was provided to the client. In May 2012, a Bank indigenous peoples' specialist found that one NGO in charge of developing income-generating activities had insufficient safeguards awareness. The discovery of an absence of Indigenous Peoples Development Plans for the micro-projects risked non-compliance with OP 4.10. This was rectified by May 2014. Aside from the resulting dip in the corresponding rating to U, overall safeguards were otherwise rated MS throughout the project.

(b) Financial Management Compliance

37. Financial management compliance was unsatisfactory overall. The PIU submitted 24 interim financial reports, of which only seven were on time. The World Bank received external audits more or less on time, however all carried qualified audit opinions, often because of alleged ineligible expenses, which took a lot of time to resolve. FM supervision reviews produced agreed actions, but these were not always properly implemented. Staffing levels were deemed sufficient throughout, but capacity challenges remained. The Bank provided trainings on the financial management system, disbursements, and ineligible expenses. The problem, however, persisted. The PIU fired two staff over financial improprieties. The project complied with its financial covenants. An audit of the

[22] Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01); Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04); Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11); Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12); Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10); Forests (OP/BP 4.36).

[23] The SEA also covered the Bank-managed Multidonor Trust Fund for Forest Governance and the national forest and nature conservation program.

retirement payments was still outstanding at the time this report was being written. Funds flow arrangements proved effective, however the use of a sequestered account for retirement payments meant that there was a lack of clarity over the ownership of interest accrued. INT currently has one open investigation in the project. The investigation involves allegations of fraud and corruption concerning project staff, certain of whom had already been removed from the project during its effectiveness. Separately, at the time of this report, outstanding expenses totaling US$520,544.37 have been declared ineligible and no justification has been provided. Similarly, the project still had outstanding unpaid bills.

(c) Procurement Compliance

38. Procurement performance was moderately satisfactory. Consistent procurement delays kept the rating at MS, suggesting insufficient mastery of procedures as a result of relatively weak personnel. In some cases, the reasons for procurement delays were oblique. Trainings at the Bank and in private institutes did not fundamentally change this. Procurement had initially been outsourced to a multi-donor agency with experience in World Bank procurement procedures, but was soon transferred to the PIU upon the dissolution of the agency. The Bank noted its suspicion of bias in selection in the February 2011 procurement supervision report in 2-3 cases, however it is unclear whether there was substantive follow-up.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

39. The PAD highlighted the risk that the sustainability of project investments might be limited. As a result of project performance, at project closing, no follow-on operation was planned, pending findings from an internal review of the forest sector in the DRC and the completion of this ICR.

40. There is no evidence to suggest that the government explicitly planned a post-completion operation. Several of the project's results could nevertheless continue to operate after project closing. These include the support committees that accompany communities in negotiating the social contracts in concessions; the consultative provincial committees on forest governance (although they have no funding, they have created a healthy culture of debate and exchange); and the micro-projects, which, due to their profitability, enjoy high buy-in from beneficiaries. Similarly, the impacts of staff retirement and construction and equipment of 28 MEDD offices will also exceed the project's life span. A consultative process is also underway on the future of MNP.

41. Donor support for forest governance is now mainly flowing through the REDD+ process, which is producing a National Investment Framework to align external sector funding. This overarching document also takes into account sector priorities as expressed through the National Program for Environment, Forests, Water and Biodiversity.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
Rating: Substantial

42. *Objectives: Rated High before and after restructuring*. The project diagnosed a development priority that remains relevant for current government priorities: the 2011-2015 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Document includes governance, decentralization, institutional and human capacity building and modernization of public administration in Pillar 1; Pillar 2 (Diversify economic, accelerate growth, and promote employment) contains objectives for forestry to (i) grow its contribution to economic growth through sustainable forest and land management, and (ii) ensure economic and social returns, especially to local and indigenous populations, while also securing potential tourist sites.

43. The project also enjoys continued good fit with the 2013-2016 CAS, notably with Outcome 1.2., "Increasing transparency and effectiveness in the management of financial resources from the extractive industries and ensuring that the country gets a fair share of the revenues from its natural endowments". In seeking to increase the returns for the rural poor of forestry and forest landscapes, the project also fits well with the World Bank's corporate goals. Moreover, the GEF components align well with GEF-6's Objective 1, "Improve sustainability of protected area systems", and its Program 1, "Implement financing strategies to reduce the funding gap for protected area systems and improve management effectiveness of protected areas".

44. *Design: Rated Modest.* The project design was consistent with the project's stated objectives, addressing shortcomings in forest governance that remain relevant. However, the results framework had significant shortcomings which were not remedied with the restructuring, as discussed throughout this document. Some project outcomes depended on activities not directly supported by the project (e.g. the management plans). Risks were underestimated and mitigation measures were weak.

45. *Implementation: Rated Modest before restructuring and Substantial after restructuring*. The results framework was eventually adjusted, however the restructuring missed an opportunity to clarify the linkage between the PDO and the indicators. The project made adjustments to account for the government's inability to raise the funding for the new ministry headquarters, parallel funding from Japan covering previously budgeted equipment needs, and a delay in passing the community forest decree. More generally, it was delayed so much that it could only rectify problems with some indicators, rather than enable a significant shift in project activities or focus. The task team leader (TTL) who took over the project toward its end tried to rectify some of the shortcomings, including trying to rescue the timber tracking system, formally finalizing the restructuring, and improving the financial management.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives and Global Environment Objectives
Rating: Modest

46. *PDO/GEO:* To increase the capacity of MECNT and ICCN and collaboration among government institutions, civil society and other stakeholders in order to manage forests sustainably and equitably for multiple uses in selected pilot areas in three provinces of DRC.

47. *Increase capacity of MEDD and ICCN:* Achieved to a modest extent before and after restructuring**.** The activities that contributed to strengthening MEDD's institutional capacity had a mixed record. No PDO indicators measured this portion of the PDO even after restructuring. Of the two intermediate indicators intended to measure institutional capacity, the first – the percentage of assessed forest fees and taxes collected by DGRAD – can no longer be measured following the transfer in 2012 of collection responsibility for most taxes to the provinces. At the time of transfer, the average rate of 85%[24] exceeded the target of 75%. The second indicator, measuring logging infractions revealed by the Independent Observer, was unclearly formulated, and hence inconclusive.[25]

48. The most successful contribution to MEDD's institutional strengthening, in spite of initial political resistance, was the provision of compensation to allow the retirement of 1,702 staff and 972 managers who had passed the retirement age. This marked the first time a project succeeded in doing so, and the government is now replicating the methodology in five other ministries. Nevertheless, the process could have gone further had a plan for reassigning remaining staff been drawn up, and had a new hiring methodology been devised by an independent agency, as planned.

49. The installation of a specialized forest management system, the Spatial Information Management System (SyGIS), was successful. It is producing maps and an interactive atlas from its base in the Department of Inventories and Forest Management. In addition, the provision of investments in the form of office space, equipment, and vehicles helped staff more effectively execute their duties.

50. Activities intended to build the capacity of ICCN were largely unsatisfactory. While project support covered administrative and operating costs that helped keep ICCN – a notoriously weak arms-length institution of the ministry – operational, no substantial activities were pursued aside from development of a new law on nature conservation and some limited training. No evidence was presented that the planned Protected Areas Management System (SyGIAP) was ever created.

51. *Increase collaboration among government institutions, civil society and other stakeholders:* Substantially achieved before and after restructuring, since the PDO and activities did not change at restructuring. The participatory micro-zoning carried out on

[24] All results figures in this document draw on the project's M&E system.
[25] Notably, it is unclear whether a higher value indicates project success or not.

3,739,460 ha occupied by well in excess of 139,750 people[26] in the three landscapes acted as a lever for equitable management, as land use conflicts were mitigated. Similarly, the implementation of the micro-projects managed to change the prevailing attitude in the landscapes from a desire for each actor to have their own project to collaborating for the formation of development clusters to increase results, and outputs are monitored by citizen committees.

52. For policy planning and monitoring, three Consultative Provincial Forest Councils were established and equipped, albeit with some delays. While their sustainability is doubtful and a higher degree of decentralization could have increased their representativeness and geographical coverage, they have functioned as platforms for dialogue among all stakeholders, such as for the Program on Forest Governance Diagnostic, which carried out a participatory evaluation of forest governance to inform future sector priorities in the DRC. The Provincial Councils also conducted 39 outreach events to explain the forest code to some 8,900 stakeholders. However, surveys suggest that only 5% of forest users hold satisfactory knowledge of their rights and obligations under the code. The National Council was not established owing to the lack of a ministerial decree nominating the members.

53. The project also supported the negotiation of 75 social responsibility contracts between concessionaires and local communities in 57 forest concessions. These innovative contracts provided for in the DRC's forest legislation are channeling US$15.1 million over the four years of the simple management plan to community-led social development. These projects benefited a reported 588,530 individuals, substantially more than initially targeted, although the quality of projects implemented with these funds has been mixed owing in part to non-transparent local management of funds.

54. *Manage forests sustainably and equitably for multiple uses*: Achieved to a modest extent before restructuring and after restructuring. The original PDO indicator's target of 2 million ha under forest land management plans by the mid-term review was met, however the indicator and the basis of this data were both weak. After restructuring, there was no PDO-level indicator to measure this aspect of the PDO. However, proxies and intermediate indicators can be used: The initially quite minor (US$2.9 million) activity of creating the PCPCB proved to be extremely challenging. It ultimately failed, absorbing much management attention in the process. The original budget for developing and running the PCPCB had to be increased to US$7.77 million[27], and eventually to US$10.85 million owing to unrealistic budgeting, delays in obtaining the presidential decree authorizing its operation, cost-overruns by the contractor, and a lack of tax and fine collection by authorities. The addition of control activities in eastern DRC, necessitating expensive equipment, as well as general equipment, added a further US$8.65 million. Central and political governments, as well as the private sector federation were not fully committed to the system's success. Its design had important weaknesses that lessened its effectiveness

[26] This estimate covers only two of the three landscapes, which together represent only 40% of the total intervention areas.
[27] Using historical exchange rates, and based on the contractor's final report.

and sustainability, such as the absence of nighttime controls and of a provision for auctioning off seized timber. During its four years of operation, the PCPCB controlled some 500,000 m^3 of timber, 250,000 of which were recommended for seizure. This would have generated US$4.59 million in nominal taxes and fines – but only US$745,000 were invoiced over the period, 99% of which was recovered. The system was supposed to be financially self-sustaining through the sale of bar code labels, however over a period of 1.5 years, the US$1.89 million thus generated proved insufficient given the abovementioned problems. No reliable data is available on the volume of wood actually seized. While the PCPCB as such failed, the effort did at least leave behind a limited culture of control among government and industry, which the government is now seeking to build upon by designing its own timber tracking system in an effort to improve the sustainable management of its forests.

55. The project's 153 micro-projects (agriculture, agroforestry, livestock raising, processing of agricultural products, etc.) and 65 small infrastructure projects, (including woodworking shops, small livestock raising facilities, bee hives, storage facilities, bakeries, schools, health facilities, etc.) directly affected the livelihoods of 34,321 households (an estimated 171,605 individuals), or 98% of the PDO-level target introduced at restructuring, by implementing: Households in villages that received at least one micro-project increased their expenditure (proxy for income) on average by 17% in the 1-2-year interval between baseline and post-intervention data collection. This was 56% higher than in control villages inside the landscapes (where incomes increased by 11%) and 26% higher than in control villages outside the landscapes (14%). The increases in income also far exceed national per capita GDP growth. While these indicative results are encouraging, caution is advisable in interpreting these results, as the sample size was small (five, three, and two villages, respectively, in each of the landscapes, 30 households per village).

56. Conservation activities in MNP started with a 2.5-year delay owing to the presence of some 5,000 rebels in the park. While not part of its original design, the project took a role in the voluntary departure of the rebels, which was a condition judged to be critical for the sustainability of the park. This included carrying out socio-economic studies and a demobilization and social development plan. This process is still ongoing. Meanwhile, six buildings were completed for the park administration, and equipment and training were provided. Because of the security situation, an inventory of the elephant population could not be started until 2014, and no data are available. By project closing, the METT score had risen from the baseline of 49 to 58.

3.3 Efficiency

Rating: Modest

57. The economic rate of return of the project was 12% (see Annex 3). For methodological reasons, and following the lead of the original economic analysis, the analysis focused on the measurable economic benefits of local investments. These represented US$9.7 million, only 14% of project expenditures. This share's net present value is US$1,714,189.

58. Several aspects of project design sought to increase efficiency: The micro-projects provided additional funding for a successful program started by USAID under its CARPE

program. The project built on their structure, leading to substantial efficiencies and savings in start-up costs. Similarly, a GIS system developed by the World Resources Institute already provided the basic structure of the SiGEF, again enabling efficiencies by design. Micro-zoning was carried out cost-effectively: Based on data from two of the three landscapes in which this was carried out, the cost per ha was US$0.13.

59. Nevertheless, the PCPCB's failure negatively affected overall project efficiency, not only because it delivered few results, but also because the contract may have been overpriced, as suggested by the substantial downward correction of monthly fees as part of the effort to save the system. Furthermore, numerous qualified audit reports and procurement delays did not suggest efficiency in overall project management.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome and Global Environment Outcome Rating
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

60. The overall outcome rating is Moderately Unsatisfactory before and after the restructuring, which is underpinned by a Substantial rating for relevance, Modest for efficacy, and Modest for efficiency.

		Against Original Indicators	Against Revised Indicators	Overall
1.	Rating	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	
2.	Rating Value	3	5	
3.	Weight (% disbursement before/after indicator change	96.3%	3.7%	100%
4.	Weighted value	2.89	0.11	3
5.	Final Rating			Moderately Unsatisfactory

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

61. *Poverty:* The negotiation of 75 social responsibility contracts in forest concessions directed US$15.1 million over four years in the form of investment projects financed by concessionaires to 588,530 beneficiaries in very remote areas that benefit from minimal government investment. These funds, if properly implemented, have the potential to substantially improve upon the baseline of available infrastructure and services. The average income rise over 1-2 years among the 170,360 beneficiaries of the microprojects was US$ 173, versus US$162 in control villages. The differential of US$11 per beneficiary increased aggregate incomes by US$1,873,960 per 1-2 year period.[28]

62. *Gender:* It is not clear that the project implemented measures specifically to benefit women. The project reports that 20% (or 34,072) of the beneficiaries of micro projects were women, and that they represented 43% (240,123) of the beneficiaries of the

[28] All data on income changes related to micro-projects from evaluation studies carried out by a contractor for the project, Prof. Charles Kinkela.

community projects launched through the social contracts. Both results are below the targeted 50%.

63. *Social Development:* The project specifically targeted indigenous peoples, who often are marginalized in the DRC. The project developed nine indigenous people's development plans, and its investments reached 480 indigenous households.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

64. The project's overall effects on institutional change were modest. The retirement process put the public service on a sounder footing, as its liabilities decreased and staff was rejuvenated. The provincial consultative committees provide a basis for policy engagement and consultation, however their unfunded nature limits their effectiveness. In spite of the failure of the PCPCB, the project did lay the ground work for a culture of legality, with MEDD now trying to establish a system without outside assistance.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

65. The project's retirement process was deemed effective, and is being replicated by five additional ministries under the leadership of the ministry of public service. Unfortunately, however, the project's inability to develop a recruitment process in time for project closure means that no recruitment system based on objective criteria exists. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the aquaculture ponds introduced in the micro project intervention areas are being copied by households who did not receive project assistance, suggesting that they hold commercial promise. This area requires further study.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome and Global Environment Outcome

Rating: *High*

66. A combination of poor budget execution of the MEDD, continued low capacity, and fluctuating political leadership means that the ministry is not yet in a position to systematically uphold the project's achievements. Only in the case of the micro-projects is the prospect for achievement of the outcome fairly high: Projects enjoy high ownership among the community, and communities are well organized into oversight committees.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: *Moderately Unsatisfactory*

67. The Bank undertook detailed analytical work in preparing the project, including through the 2007 ESW, which contributed significantly to project thinking. The economic analysis carried out was very detailed. Several design elements increased efficiency (see above), and the project introduced a number of innovations, not least of which the PCPCB and the social contracts.

68. Nevertheless, there were also some weaknesses: A quality enhancement review took place, concluding that the project was "simple" and appropriate for a low-capacity context. This judgment is questionable. In an operating environment with high corruption

risk, more stringent financial management and procurement supervision arrangements would have been advisable in design. The multitude of activities diluted management attention. Risk management and the results framework were weak. The latter was partially addressed during implementation.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: *Unsatisfactory*

69. Preparation and supervision spanned the tenure of four TTLs, and from November 2013 to May 2014, the GEF operation TTL had a separate TTL. The Bank carried out nine supervision missions over six years, which was insufficient given the need for close supervision. The missions correctly identified numerous implementation bottlenecks and provided detailed action plans in aide memoires to address them. Aide-memoires suggest, however, that follow-up was spotty. The Bank failed to predict and counteract the looming collapse of the PCPCB until it was already too late: The 2012 MTR aide-mémoire stated that the PCPCB was now "self-financing", which did not reflect reality. Intensive attempts at rescuing the PCPCB in 2014 and dealing with financial management issues meant that attention was bundled on these issues, not allowing for sufficient attention to making transition arrangements for the post-project period.

70. Ten ISRs were filed, at times with some delays (only every 7-9 months up till May 2012) and gaps (11 month gap between May 2012 and April 2013). Based on implementation challenges observed, the project rating should have been downgraded before this was eventually done in May 2014. Some ISRs contained factual errors (e.g. ISR #3 claimed that the community forestry unit had been established). Attention to indicators appeared limited. ISRs only started flagging major implementation problems in November 2013. The delay in restructuring between the MTR (November/December 2012) and the formalization of the restructuring (October 2014) was a clear omission on the part of the Bank. Quality of supervision improved substantially with the arrival of a new TTL in early 2014, as the restructuring, diagnosis and attempt at rescuing the PCPCB, and close financial supervision all occurred after the handover. Supervision budgets appeared to be sufficiently generous.

71. Aide-memoires provided limited evidence of attention to safeguards until the MTR, which may in part have been due to the limited availability of social safeguards specialists. Similarly, the intensity of financial management and procurement supervision may not always have been sufficient in light of the challenges the project faced in these domains.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Unsatisfactory

72. The overall Bank Performance rating is unsatisfactory, based on moderately unsatisfactory quality at entry, and unsatisfactory supervision, as the latter contributed to performance shortfalls, in particular with respect to the PCPCB.

5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
73. The government met its legal covenants, but some with significant delays, in particular the recruitment of an M&E specialist. An initially high willingness to pass reforms decreased over time with a change in ministers. Delays in passing decrees that were preconditions to project activities hindered project progress and success in several areas. Perhaps most significantly, the delay in passing the decree authorizing the PCPCB to function contributed to cost overruns that ultimately brought down the program,[29] in combination with the government's reneging on an agreement to rescue the PCPCB following numerous strategic errors on the part of all stakeholders and substantial cost overruns. Moreover, the government did not produce the counterpart funding required to build the new MEDD headquarters. This follows a pattern in which the release of the MEDD's budget voted by the national assembly has consistently been problematic.

(b) Implementing Agencies' Performance
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
74. **MEDD: Moderately Unsatisfactory**: While the project's disbursement rate reached 100% for its IDA resources, part of the reason was the escalation of the PCPCB cost. Overall implementation capacity never improved significantly, as evidenced by continuous FM and procurement issues and commensurate ratings that did not exceed MS. Safeguard ratings were mostly at MS level after some corrective action after the MTR. Implementation delays led to some incomplete activities, such as in the case of devising a recruitment plan for replacing retired MEDD staff as a culmination of the retirement process, as did a lack of assertive follow-up, as in the case of basic infrastructure work in MNP. A lack of close cooperation between the MEDD and the PIU meant that technical directors' engagement in the project was in many cases limited.

75. **ICCN: Unsatisfactory**: The relationship between the PIU and ICCN was poor, despite an ICCN director having been posted to the PIU for the duration of the project. The project did not realize significant investments for ICCN as a result, at least in part, of a lack of strategic vision on the part of ICCN. Annual work plans were of poor quality. Information on how project funds were used and on project accomplishments was frequently missing or of poor quality. US$1.24 million of the GEF funds (21% of the available total) remained undisbursed at the end of the project.

[29] Other examples include that the list of senior MEDD officials eligible for retirement was prepared on the basis of the biometric identification of all the ministry staff in 2011. The Presidential Decree necessary for their retirement was signed in December 2013, delaying implementation of this institutional strengthening component and contributing to the project's inability to devise a recruitment strategy. Similarly, the community forestry decree required for activities in this field only passed in August 2014, a delay that led to the cancelation of this sub-component.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Unsatisfactory
76. The combination of the unsatisfactory government performance, the moderately unsatisfactory MEDD performance, and the unsatisfactory performance of ICCN results in an unsatisfactory overall rating.

6. Lessons Learned
77. Relying on policy or regulatory pre-conditions, such as the government decrees for the PCPCB and for community forestry, poses risks, as commitment to meeting those pre-conditions can change over time. Whenever possible, such conditions should be met prior to project start. Alternatively, their achievement could be incorporated as outputs into projects, rather than as pre-conditions. In this context, it would also be worth exploring implementation models that rely on performance-based payments before subsequent project activities are launched. Where neither is possible, continued attention from the Bank is necessary at all levels to ensure implementation of commitments agreed at project appraisal. Nevertheless, inherent risks will remain.

78. Complex projects in challenging settings require the best project management talent the Bank can muster. While much of the technical capacity the Bank provided was of high quality, the quality of project management varied with TTLs. Some of the problems the project faced might have been avoided under different supervision arrangements. Where staffing shortages do not allow for one person to fulfill both roles, co-TTLships could serve to combine strong technical and project management skills. Furthermore, such projects require closer financial management and procurement supervision and support.

79. Investments in community income-generating opportunities in forest areas offer promising avenues for poverty reduction. The project was demonstrably able to reduce poverty directly through its microproject component. When combined with an analysis of the drivers of unsustainable forest management, a sound understanding of value chains of alternative products, socio-economic dynamics, and capacity building among communities, such approaches can also help address root causes of forest loss.

80. Engagements in governance issues in settings with a complex political economy should perhaps consider phased approaches, with incentives for delivery, such as disbursements linked to performance. This lesson draws on the mixed performance of several concurrent or governance initiatives the project introduced at the central level, which struggled to achieve their results in the weak-capacity setting of the DRC.

81. There are tradeoffs to be considered between implementation efficiency and project ownership. The project, billed as a capacity building project and designed with the intention of closely involving government staff in project implementation, ended up being implemented by entities outside the ministry's core structures. As a result, MEDD viewed the coordination unit like a separate entity, with mostly separate staff and a separate agenda. MEDD therefore had a reduced stake in the project's success and perhaps gave lesser priority to its undertakings. Similarly, in spite of the assignment of an ICCN staff member

to the PIU, there was a near-complete lack of ICCN involvement in implementation. On the other hand, the PIU arrangement provided for some independence in daily management, competitive hiring of staff, decreased political influence over activities, a more direct line of communication with the World Bank, and an arguably higher capacity to deliver a large project. The decision on institutional arrangements, while based on an assessment that government structures lacked the capacity to implement the project, meant that efficiency and effectiveness in implementation were traded for capacity building and ownership. This dilemma could be at least partially managed by opening up project positions to competitive hiring from among government staff, thus enabling the targeted building of capacity of a limited cadre of staff.

82. The project design established a detailed risk management plan. However, once implementation commenced, it is unclear that this plan was followed. Better integrating risk management provisions into day-to-day project management should be a priority, in particular in a high-risk setting such as the DRC's.

83. Reliance on co-financing is inherently risky in countries with constrained fiscal space. The project's reliance on government co-financing for construction of the new MEDD headquarters should have been appropriately reflected in risk management plans. In this case, corrective action was taken at the project's mid-point, such that the resources could be reallocated.

84. Cost-sharing between different financial sources can create obstacles for disbursements. The financial architecture of sub-components that blended IDA (53%) and GEF (47%) resources created limitations when the project's IDA resources were exhausted as a result largely of PCPCB cost overruns. The activities co-funded by the GEF were then unable to move forward as a result of a lack of blended IDA funds. Disbursements for a given activity should best be tied to a single source of funding, with some flexibility to allow for other sources to be used.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

85. No comments were received by the time this ICR was submitted.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Forest and Nature Conservation Project - P100620			
Components	**Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)**	**Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)**	**Percentage of Appraisal**
1. Institutional strengthening of MECNT			
1.1 Infrastructure, equipment, and managerial functions	18.88	10.74	57
1.2 Establishment of specialized forest management systems	8.11	19.06	235
1.3 Institutional readiness and transformation	5.00	8.99	180
1.4 Support to project management	5.19	10.00	193
Subtotal	**37.18**	**48.79**	**131**
2. Community participation in forest management			
2.1 Participation of local communities and civil society	5.53	4.25	77
2.2 Development activities for forest communities	9.97	8.66	87
2.3 Social, environmental, and cultural safeguard Activities	3.50	0.34	10
Subtotal	**19.00**	**13.24**	**70**
Total Baseline Cost	**56.18**	**63.97**	**114**
Physical and price contingencies	5.32	0.00	0
Total Project Costs	**61.50**	63.97	104
PPF			
Environmental & social management plan	2.50	1.93	77
Total Financing Required	**64.00**	65.90	103

DRC Rehabilitation and Participatory Management of Key Protected Areas in the DRC - P111621			
Components	**Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)**	**Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)**	**Percentage of Appraisal**
2. Community participation in forest management			
2.2 Development activities for forest communities	1.87	1.11	57
Subtotal	1.87	1.11	57
3. Management of protected areas and support to ICCN			
3.1 Institutional strengthening of ICCN	1.02	1.38	136
3.2 Rehabilitation of MNP	3.11	2.26	73
Subtotal	4.13	3.65	88

Total Baseline Cost	6.00	4.76	79
Total Project Costs	6.00	4.76	79
Total Financing Required	6.00	4.76	79

(b) Financing

P100620 - Forest and Nature Conservation Project				
Source of Funds	**Type of Financing**	**Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)**	**Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)**	**Percentage of Appraisal**
Borrower	In-kind	15.00	0.00	0.00
IDA Grant		64.00	65.90	1.03

P111621 - DRC Rehabilitation and Participatory Management of Key Protected Areas in the DRC				
Source of Funds	**Type of Financing**	**Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)**	**Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)**	**Percentage of Appraisal**
Borrower		0.00	0.00	.00
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT - Associated IDA Fund		64.00	65.90	1.03
Global Environment Facility (GEF)		6.00	4.76	0.79

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component 1: Institutional Strengthening of MEDD (ex MECNT)

Planned (PAD)	*Actual*	*Comments*
Sub-component 1.1.Infrastructure, Equipment, and Managerial Functions		
Reconstruction and equipment of offices	Strengthening of administrative functions at the central level and in three provinces (Bandundu, Equateur and Province Orientale): award of contracts (furniture, buildings, vehicles, motorcycles, etc.), 22 offices fully re-constructed and 6 others partially.	The MEDD office in Kinshasa wasn't build due to lack of counterpart funding
Training and equipment of 1,400 staff	Management training of forest resources and environmental protection: 14 modules given to 368 staff on SIGEF: 1. The management of reference data and access to SIGEF 2. Management of companies and their contacts 3. Identification of inventories 4. The application of cutting permits 5. Exploitation 6. The management of bar-code labels 7. Transport 8. Wood processing 9. Export 10. The management of seized, abandoned and lost goods 11. Purchasing / Sales 12. Taxation 13. Statistics 14. Audits – Technical training Recognition, Measurement and Classification of African Tropical Timber: 35 staff – Training and test of Version 1 SIGEF: 195 staff – Annual training seminar on professional integrity code: 52 staff – Training on the use of Outlook: 9 staff – Use of IT resources and telecommunications: 13 staff – Training of entry operators and field inspectors: 15 staff – First aid training: 21 staff – Motorcycle Driver Training: 15 staff	But only modules were used (a rate of 57 %). The percentage of MEDD staff trained was 26%

	– Learning English: 4 staff – Safety day session: 38 staff – Training on the use of the scanner: 6 staff Capacity building to cabinet and the office of the secretary general of the MEDD: 25 vehicles for MEDD, operating costs, and computer equipment	
Sub-component 1.2: Establishment of Specialized Forest Management Systems		
Geospatial information management system	Creation of new specific data management systems sector: SyGIS operationalized and Interactive Forestry Atlas was produced and distributed in 2010 and 2014.Access provided to real-time data, improve information sharing between provinces and Kinshasa and facilitate the exchange of data between projects – Geodatabase housed at DIAF (spatial information management system is operational): data harmonization with the technicians of the DIAF and DGF (roads, hydrography, localities, artisanal logging permits, forest concessions), artisanal permits from 2009 to July 2013 were entered into the database, boundaries of forest concessions modified, boundaries and names of protected areas modified following the recommendations of ICCN, annual felling quota-based management plans submitted by loggers digitized and validated by DIAF; Delivery of version 2 of the poster of the forest domain of the DRC. Capacity building in the 3 pilot provinces: acquisition of equipment for the provincial divisions and technical training for the effective participation of provincial teams.	WRI and others MEDD's directions (DIAF and DGF) collaborated to produce these tools.
Strengthening forest regulation implementation capacities	Implementation of PCPCB: the program employed 55 staff with 3 pilot sites (Sodefor, Safbois and BTNC). – Provided an IT-based timber tracking system: supply IT platform and support the program until the end of May 2012; – Installation of 9 checkpoints: Buni, Bunia, Mahagi, Kasindi, Maluku, Kasangulu, Boma, STCP port and Bandundu; – Deployment of ground control operations: 26 inspectors; – 404 registered operators (companies);	The PCPCB facilitated the establishment of chain of custody system. The lack statutory instruments delayed the implementation of the PCPCB and the low level of income resulting from the sale of bar codes did not allow the PCPCB to

	– 257 files recommended for seizure and passed to the DCVI; – Purchase of materials and equipment: 2 stations-scanners, 9 vehicles, 11 motorcycles, 3 Wimax antennae and accessories, 2 boats, 8 autonomous safety block, 37 desk-top computers, 82 chairs, 29 offices, 6 cameras, 17 fire extinguishers, 36 closets, 6 water coolers, 2 refrigerators, 6 generators, 22 printers, 16 laptops, 7 inverters, 29 power bars, 1 boat trailer, 16 splitters, 13 fixed phones, 1 satellite phone, 1 projector, 13 tables, 1 server, etc. – Independent Observers: 4 field assessment missions were carried out, involving 21 mining sites in 2011 and 2012	self-finance as expected. The system collapsed in August 2014.
Sub-component 1.3: Institutional Readiness and Transformation		
Retirement of 2,261 staff	2,674 staff retired (1,702 staff and 972 managers): – Implementation of the conclusions and recommendations of the institutional review MEDD; – Decree of Ministry of Public Service establishing the interministerial commission; – Staff biometrically identified; – Promulgation of the decree on the promotion and for the retirement of public servants of the MEDD.	
Recruitment of 1,000 new staff	No new staff recruited.	Not accomplished because of delays in hiring the consulting firm.
Sub-component 1.4: Support to Project Management		
Fiduciary and procurement activities, technical and financial audits and monitoring and evaluation activities.	Fiduciary and procurement activities, technical and financial audits and monitoring and evaluation activities were supported: UC-PFCN employed 32 staff (December 2014) at its peak and 28 staff at its end (June 2015): – Salaries, allowances, operating costs; – Equipment and materials: 4 vehicles (4x4), 4 cars, 2 minibus, 4 motorcycles, 1 TV, 1 DVD player, 1 radio, 1 refrigerator, 1 video-camera, security equipment, computer equipment (desktops, laptops, printers, etc.), furniture (chairs, offices, fire extinguisher, closets, water coolers, generators, etc.); – Consultants hired to provide technical assistance in procurement, financial management, communication, social and environmental protection, and monitoring and evaluation.	

Component 2: Community Participation in Forest Management

Planned (PAD)	Actual	Comments
Sub-component 2.1: Participation of Local Communities and Civil Society		

Participatory forest zoning and forest use plans for the landscapes in the project area	Management plans for forest concessions: – Participatory zoning of forest areas: 81 forest titles converted; Creation of the Environmental Services Division with 2 offices: the Office of Bioprospecting and the Carbon Inventory Management Bureau: – Bioprospecting ✓ Recruited technical assistants for environmental services ✓ Equipment and materials for DDD: 7 vehicles, furniture and computer equipment ✓ Developed national policies and programs on genetic resources: Developed a national strategy: studies (4 Studies on bioprospecting and 2 studies on the legal framework), workshops (3 workshops on bioprospecting and 2 workshops on the legal framework) ✓ Development of a legal and regulatory framework for bioprospecting ✓ Development of scientific and commercial research ✓ Registration and legal monitoring of bioprospecting activities – Carbon ✓ Development of national policies and programs relating to carbon: Development of the National REDD Strategy, Monitoring and evaluation of implementation of the strategy and Interdepartmental coordination ✓ Development of the legal and regulatory framework for REDD in DRC	For forest concession management plans, activities were taken on by the French Development Agency. Support dedicated to environmental services weren't as successful as expected, due to the lack of a multiannual program based on a clearly defined strategy.
Effective participation of local communities in the preparation and implementation of the forest management plans	– Facilitated mission for negotiation of social clauses: 75 signed social clauses – Monitored the implementation of social clauses – Strengthened capacities of local stakeholders: 1,165 local community members, 65 forest administration staff, 31 managers of the forest administration, and 25 NGOs, etc. – 7 national workshops: • Workshop on the negotiation process of social clauses agreements. This workshop resulted in the definition of the intervention process used by the facilitation mission and the production of: ✓ Booklets on the model agreement of social clauses and forest concession contracts in French, Lingala and Swahili, 2000 copies ✓ Booklets on negotiation skills in French, Lingala and Swahili,1000 copies	These training courses and the participation of NGOs in other activities of the Facilitation Mission helped to harmonize the working methods and tools for monitoring social clauses in agreements between the Forestry Administration and NGOs from civil society.

	✓ Booklets on the classification of tree species in French, Lingala and Swahili, 1000 copies ✓ 11 awareness posters used at public meetings ✓ 5 radio reports (10 minutes) in Lingala and Swahili • Workshop on design of management tools. This workshop resulted production and dissemination booklets (3,100) presenting management and monitoring tools for the implementation of community projects; • Workshop on the development of internal regulations of the local committees of management and monitoring (two days; January 2013). 500 booklets in French; • Workshop on the process of establishment of diagnostics on the signing and implementation of social clauses agreements; • Workshop on the presentation of the progress of the Facilitation Mission activities; • Workshop on the validation of the implementation monitoring system of social clauses agreements; • End of mission workshop: ✓ Improvements to regulations of social clauses in agreements contemplated the change of scale and better supervision responsibilities ✓ Improve the integration of territorial and environmental issues of the management plan in the social clauses in agreements ✓ Develop a methodology and accompanying monitoring meet the challenges of social clauses in agreements ✓ Adapt and ensure consistency of approach between logging concessions and that of conservation Capacity building : – Training: negotiation techniques, scaling techniques and management tools – Training of managers of the forestry administration in the provinces: understanding the social clauses of the agreements process, negotiation techniques and monitoring system for social clauses agreements – Training of managers of the forestry administration in Kinshasa: Knowledge about the process of social clauses agreements, Design of implementation of monitoring forms of social clauses agreements, Development of business listings for social clauses agreements, concrete Case implementation monitoring social clauses 13 agreements	

Consultative forums and public awareness about the Forest Code	Implementation of 3 advisory provincial councils (Bandundu, Equateur and Eastern Province) with an average of 25 members. 13 workshops rights and duties in relation to the Forest Code organized in 3 provinces	National advisory board did not function. 8,900 individuals reached
Sub-component 2.2: Living conditions for forest communities have improved in pilot areas		
Assistance to local communities (35,000 household) in 4 landscapes (Maringa-Lopori-Wamba, Epulu-Ituri-Aru, Salonga-Lukenie-Sankuru and Lac Télé-Lac Tumba) for diversification of economic activities by developing micro-projects.	62 social and economic structures built: 10 homes renovated for Kitawalistes, 10 teaching facilities, 5 water sources, 5 schools, 5 health facilities, 4 community warehouses, 8 livestock raising facilities (pigs, poultry, goats), 3 bee hives, 1 building workshop for improved homes, 2 boats, 1 community radio building, 1 butchery, 1 semi-industrial bakery, 1 community deposit, 1 social home, 1 wood workshop, 1 palm oil processing facility, 1 community radio, 1 doctor's residence. Development of 153 micro-projects for 34,321 households: agriculture, agroforestry, pig farming, small ruminants, and poultry, beekeeping, agricultural processing and marketing (storage facilities, means of transport); Systematic implementation of Local Development and Conservation Councils: capacity building of communities: – Monitoring and Evaluation; – Management of micro-projects; – Data collection techniques; – Financial management; – Promoting literacy of women: 153 women; – Literacy groups indigenous women pygmies: 117 women Establishment of a monitoring and evaluation of micro-projects system: Recruitment of a consultant for micro-projects of indigenous peoples: elaboration of 9 Indigenous Peoples' Development Plans for 9 territories (Opala, Inongo, Kiri, Bongandanga, Banalia, Yahuma, Oshwe, Bikoro et Mambasa) – Organization and facilitation of workshops consolidation (PA validation of development plans) : 182 persons participated in all workshops	
Sub-component 2.3: Social, Environmental, and Cultural Safeguard Activities		
	Safeguard activities were mainstreamed in project management.	

Component 3: Management of protected areas and strengthening of ICCN

Planned (PAD)	Actual	Comments
Sub-component 3.1: Institutional Strengthening of ICCN		
Update, publication, dissemination and implementation of the Conservation Law	New Conservation Law published and translated into 4 national languages.	Implementation decrees not yet prepared.
Staff Training Topics : finance (OHADA), administration,	Institutional support : – Purchase of materials and equipment: 3 vehicles, 1 minibus, 2 generators, 2 satellite phones, 10 computers, 1 photocopier, 5 printers, 1 scanner, 1 projector, 1 TV, 1 DVD player, 1 radio and 1 refrigerator; – Operating costs : fuel, compensation of focal point, vehicle maintenance ICCN's staff members participated in workshops: International workshops: – 5 members participated in Unesco World Heritage conference in Paris; – 4 members participated in Rio+20; – 5members participated at COP15 of CITES (Qatar). National workshops: – Financial inventory at PNVi and PNKB: 12 participants; – OHADA: 20 participants.	
Enhancement, analysis and entry to SyGIAP of data from 11 priority conservation sites not covered by UNESCO.	Purchase of SyGIAP materials and equipment: 11 motorcycles, 11 laptops and 11 solar kit (11 portable solar panels and 10 portable batteries) for 11 sites (Bombo-lumene, Lomako-Yokokala, Tumba-Lemba, Ngiri, Nsele, Luama-Kivu, Mangroves, Kisantu, Rubi-Tele, Tienga-Lele and Basse-Kando). Technical assistance: recruitment of SyGIAP specialist.	SyGIAP never became operational.
Public education and awareness initiatives	No activities	
Sub-component 3.2: Rehabilitation of Maiko National Park		

Enhancing park management capacity : upgrading office, communications, and field equipment	Delegated management contract signed with Conservation International (CI) for implementation of activities in Maiko, 5 NGOs (WCS, SZF, FFI, UGADEC and CI). – Uniforms provided: 240 shirts, 240 t-shirts, 240 pairs of socks, 240 berets, 240 belts, 50 officers' shirts, 240 pairs of boots; – Purchase of materials and equipment: 2 vehicles, 2 motorcycles, 11 bicycles, 3 radios, 2 satellite phones, 4 cameras, 8 laptops, 4 desktops, 4 printers, 4 scanners; – Training for 120 eco-guards in anti-poaching, 10 eco-guards in community conservation; – Management plans of Kahuzi Biega Park. Management plans for Garamba, Salonga, Maiko, Okapi Forest Reserve (OFR), Lomako-Yakokala and Virunga, and biomonitoring for RFO not completed.	Not all planned activities implemented because of insecurity in the project area. Research and monitoring plan never implemented, because of the insecurity in Maiko. Bio-monitoring and management plans of protected areas activities not carried out.
Developing and improving Maiko's infrastructures	– Administrative building, tourist cottage, site leader residence, officers' residence, canteen and bodyguards' residence; – Equipment provided: 21 shelves, 22 offices, 18 drawers, 61 chairs, 16 beds with mattresses, 6 sets of living room furniture, 8 closets, 17 tables, 3 TV stands, 4 big closets, 10 armchairs and 1 set of dining room furniture.	
Implementation of community development projects in buffer zones	No activities	Not implemented because of insecurity in the project area.
	Assistance to communities established within the Maiko National Park to allow for their voluntary resettlement: – Establishment of the Committee on monitoring the process composed of representatives of Simbas, ICCN, Government, MONUSCO, National Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Program; – Contact with national and provincial political and administrative authorities; – Support to DDR process: 4 workshops (Kisangani and Kindu) and 3 missions to Maïko (Lubutu); – Identification and negotiation of Simbas: 916 households identified corresponding to around 4,377 persons; – Awareness raising of Simbas and local residents; – Development of voluntary resettlement plan	Activity not originally planned, but deemed essential for ensuring the sustainability of the park

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

86. The ex-post economic analysis sought to replicate the methodology employed during the project preparation phase. The project's dual focus on institutional capacity building and investments meant that a considerable part of economic benefits – those related to capacity building – could not be quantified. The analysis therefore focused on the measurable economic benefits of local investments, which constituted 14% of total expenditures. Unlike the original methodology, the replication of the economic analysis did not include expenditures for Sub-Component 2.1., as the activities realized under this sub-component constituted capacity building. This is in keeping with the methodology in the PAD of excluding capacity building activities. The ex-ante analysis did not apply this method consistently for unknown reasons.

87. To establish the project's benefits, the ex-post analysis relied on the results from household surveys carried out by a consultant for the project in the landscapes in which micro-projects were implemented. Since increases in production and micro-enterprise revenues could not be assessed using project data, data on changes in household revenues collected by the project were used as a proxy. The project measured changes in household revenues using household surveys that sampled the expenditures (as a proxy for incomes) of 30 households in five villages in each of the four landscapes where the project implemented micro-projects. Thus, the average income change across the sample households was applied to beneficiaries in each landscape, and the same averaged income change was assumed to have occurred in all beneficiary households. For lack of exact data, it was assumed that the same share of total beneficiary households joined the program every year. The changes in household expenditures where assumed to have taken place over a one-year period. To extrapolate to the full duration of the economic analysis, the increase was assumed to be a one-off but sustainable change, and the effects over the period covered by the household surveys was extrapolated forward. This is in keeping with assumptions made in the ex-ante analysis.

88. To establish investment costs of the micro-projects under Sub-Component 2.2, the ex-post analysis relied on actual project expenditures as of the project closing date. Incremental labor and costs for enterprise development were assumed to have been correctly assessed in the original economic analysis, and the same figures were thus also used in the ex-post analysis. Furthermore, unlike the ex-ante analysis, the ex-post analysis took project management costs into account. This is consistent with establishing the investment costs for Sub-Component 2.2., which includes overhead costs. However, to avoid burdening the analysis of the productive components with unrelated project management costs, the project management cost applied was pro-rated to the share of expenditures of Component 2.2 (14%).

89. As in the ex-ante analysis, several elements of the project have not been included in the calculated Economic Rate of Return (ERR). The ERR omits any positive environmental impacts, such as improved management of production forests, protected areas and other forest lands; reduced poaching; reduction in conflicts and the promotion of

sustainable exploitation of forest resources. These benefits contribute indirectly to reduced deforestation, more sustainable wildlife offtakes and protection of endangered species. The environment and economic impact of the strengthened ICCN and rehabilitation of MNP have not been calculated given a lack of data and benefits assessable by compatible economic methods. As in the original analysis, the costs of establishing an enabling environment for realization of a range of environmental services from forests and the associated benefits are omitted from the ERR because attribution is not possible. Finally, as in the original analysis, the cost budgeted for the redeployment and redundancy schemes for MEDD staff has been omitted from the economic analysis.

90. Benefits arising from fiscal revenues could not be quantified, primarily because attribution is difficult, but also as the devolution of a number of forest taxes combined with poor data management means that the authorities are unaware of the amount of tax revenue collected between the provinces and the central government. In addition, there are considerable uncertainties even for the amounts collected centrally.

91. The ERR calculated reflects the benefits accruing from the impact of project interventions at community level which arise from the increased value of production, processing and marketing activities. Applying a discount rate of 10%, as at the PAD stage, the project's ERR was 12%, compared to an initially forecast ERR of 17%.

92. The discrepancy can be explained as follows: On the benefit side of the ledger, the project's investment in micro-projects were expected to improve incomes for participating households by US$700 and US$2,000 per year, depending on the activities adopted. These outcomes were based on an analysis of the likely income-generating initiatives that would be adopted, combined with micro-project investments that would improve marketing outlets, access, potable water sources to improve the general socioeconomic status of the communities in the four pilot landscapes. Additional secondary benefits would accrue to traders involved in the greater volume of marketed produce.

93. The household surveys showed that the increases generated on average did not fall into the predicted range. On average, incomes rose by US$173 per household (or by 17%). This was a higher absolute and relative increase than in control villages in the same landscape (US$162, 11%) and outside the landscape (US$165, 14%). To be sure, while the recorded increase fell well short of the predicted range, it still represents a sizeable increase in absolute and relative terms in poor rural areas.

94. On the cost side of the ledger, investments in Sub-Component 2.2 were US$9,725,046, US$1.9 million higher than the budgeted amount used for the ex-ante analysis. While this difference reduces the ERR, an attenuating cause for the difference in ERR is the exclusion in the ex-post analysis of capacity building activities of Sub-Component 2.1, which lowered the investment amount used as a basis for the calculation. Including these expenditures, the ERR drops to 7%.

Annex 4. Incremental Value of GEF Funds

95. **Global Environmental Benefits**: Global Environmental Benefits: The project provided critically needed support for post-conflict conservation in the largest lowland forest park in Eastern DRC, MNP. Two factors posed implementation challenges: 1) A complex consortium of five NGOs implemented activities. This arrangement eventually fell apart, slowing down implementation. 2) The continued presence in MNP of Simba rebels prevented biomonitoring from taking place before 2014. Nevertheless, by project closing, equipment, training, and buildings provided for the park administration helped raise the park's Protected Area Management Effectiveness Tracking Tool (PA-METT) score from the baseline of 49 to 58. The enhanced management capacity holds promise for generating additional future global environmental benefits with regard to conservation of eastern DRC's globally unique biodiversity, which includes globally endangered populations of Grauer's eastern gorilla (Gorilla gorilla beringi), eastern chimpanzee (Pan Troglodytes schweinfurthi), okapi (Okapi johnstoni), forest elephants (Loxidonta africana cyclotis), and the Congo peafowl (Afropavo congensis). Further, the project's contributions to the operations of ICCN headquarters helped maintain a basic ability to oversee park management and contribute to coordination between ICCN other donors and partners contributing to biodiversity conservation in DRC..

96. **Incremental value added by GEF funding**: The GEF funding provided crucial support to fill a financing gap in ICCN's rehabilitation plan for a top priority protected area. On the other hand, the support to the capacity of ICCN headquarters did not convincingly build protected area system planning and management capacities within ICCN as planned, as the SyGIAP data system was not implemented, and most project activities supported operating costs rather than investments. It is further unclear that the project was able to make significant advances in testing new and innovative financing models for forest conservation and sustainable use as planned.

97. The GEF funding leveraged IDA resources totaling US$70 million. However, contrary to its initial plans, there is no evidence that it leveraged resources from other partners to set up payment schemes for environmental services and a range of innovative financing mechanisms to forest dwelling communities supporting forest protection and sustainable use codes.

Annex 5. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
André Aquino	Carbon Finance Specialist	GENDR	Team member
André Simon	Sr. Specialist for Forest Institutions	FAO	Team member
Bourama Diate	Procurement Specialist	GGODR	Procurement
Gaspy Muanda	Financial Management Specialist		Financial Management
Gerhard Tschannerl	Principal Municipal Engr.		Team member
Gilles Veuillot	Sr. Counsel	GWADR	Legal
Giuseppe Topa	Sr. Forestry Specialist		TTL
Jacqueline Doremus	M&E Specialist		M&E
Jeannine Nkakala	Project Assistant	AFCC2	Admin support
Jeremy Stantifort	Consultant		Economic Analysis
Laurent Debroux	Sr. Forestry Specialist	AFCC2	Team member
Louise Engulu	Communications Officer	AFREC	Communication
Marjory-Anne Bromhead	Environment Sector Manager		Manager
Mohammed Bekhechi	Sr. Counsel	GEN05	Legal
Nestor Coffi	Sr. Financial Management Specialist	GGODR	Financial Management
Paul Jonathan Martin	Program Leader	AFCW3	Team member
Philippe Mahele Liwoke	Senior Procurement Specialist		Procurement
Prof. Kankonde Mukadi	Forestry Specialist		Team member
Supervision/ICR			
Anders Jensen	Sr. M&E Specialist	GPSOS	M&E
André Aquino	Carbon Finance Specialist	GENDR	Team member
André Simon	Sr. Specialist for Forest Institutions		Team member
Angelo Donou	Financial Management Specialist	GGODR	Financial Management
Antoine Lema	Sr. Social Development Specialist	GSURR	Safeguards
Balume Alpha Abonabo	Team Assistant	AFCC2	Admin support
Bourama Diate	Procurement Specialist	GGODR	Procurement
Douglas J. Graham	Sr. Environment Specialist	GENDR	Co-TTL / Closing TTL
Ernestine Ngobo-Njocke	Senior Program Assistant	GSPDR	Admin support
Etienne Benoit	Consultant	GENDR	Team member
Etienne NKoa	Sr Financial Management Specialist	AFTME – HIS	Financial Management
Gaspy Gedeon Muanda	E T Consultant	AFTME – HIS	Team member
Gerhard Tschannerl	Principal Municipal Engr.	AFCW1	Team member
Gilles Veuillot	Sr. Counsel	GWADR	Legal
Isabella Micali Drossos	Sr. Counsel	LEGAM	Legal

Jeannine Kashosi Nkakala	Team Assistant	AFCC2	Admin support
Julian Lee	Environment Specialist	GENDR	ICR Author
Lanssina Traoré	Procurement Specialist	GGODR	Procurement
Laurent Valiergue	Sr. Forestry Specialist	GENDR	TTL
Louise Engulu	Communications Officer	AFREC	Communications
Mohamed Arbi Ben-Achour	Lead Social Safeguards Specialist		Safeguards
Paul Jonathan Martin	Program Leader	AFCW3	Team member
Philippe Mahele Liwoke	Senior Procurement Specialist	GGODR	Procurement
Simon Rietbergen	Sr. Forestry Specialist	GENDR	TTL

(b) Staff Time and Cost

P100620

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY07	13	99.98
FY08	35	502.89
FY09	37	365.59
Total:	**85**	**968.46**
Supervision/ICR		
FY09	1	35.04
FY10	25	249.94
FY11	17	176.35
FY12	22	166.07
FY13	16	179.59
FY14	15	100.74
FY15	14	99.43
FY16	1	0.64
Total:	**112**	**1,007.80**

P111621

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY09	7	75.98
Total:	**7**	**75.98**
Supervision/ICR		
FY10	9	57.06
FY11	6	27.63
FY12	6	29.16
FY13	7	38.44

FY14	4	30.62
FY15	3	28.87
Total:	**34**	**211.79**

Annex 6. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

This section is based on the draft government ICR submitted in June 2015 and the executive summary submitted in September 2015. A final version of the ICR was still outstanding at the time of writing.

The government considers achievement of the PDO indicator 1 more than satisfactory (34,321 out of a targeted 35,000 beneficiary households reached, or 98%). The government further considers PDO indicator 2 achieved (METT score of 58 out of a target of 58). No information exists on PDO indicator 3, given that the presence of armed groups made data collection impossible. Monitoring plans were developed. The demobilization and reintegration process that the project contributed has led to joint ICCN-Simba patrols that should facilitate biomonitoring in the future.

Concerning institutional issues, the PFCN encountered a number of constraints from the part of its line ministry and the donor.

In the field, the standardization of infrastructure costs (in spite of difficult access conditions in some sites, the absence of materials, and of local technicians) was the reason for the ministry's taking over certain construction sites and modifying some contracts to finalize certain projects.

The presence of armed groups created an insecure environment that seriously affected project execution, supervision, monitoring and evaluation, especially in the Epulu-Ituri-Aru landscape.

Long negotiations between communities and forest companies slowed down the signing of the social responsibility contracts.

The management of the contract for the PCPCB posed a series of problems.

Recommendations:

- Continue government reforms, especially as concerns community forestry and conversion of forestry titles.
- Equip infrastructure (offices and control posts) built or renovated by the project at the decentralized level.
- Drawing upon territorial administrators and MEDD's decentralized staff, reinforce the approach of facilitating the social responsibility contracts.
- Continue and reinforce the diversification of economic activities using micro-projects to induce "social conservation" and ensure good forest governance.
- Continue the unfinished experience of the PCPCB to achieve traceability of wood production and market sawn wood.
- Redeploy and put into service without delay the scanners purchased for the east of the country. The MEDD urgently needs to cover maintenance costs for this equipment.

Conclusion

The FNCP to a very large degree helped the national institutions charged with the environment sector to reestablish a significant presence on the ground, to restore their regulatory function, and to build the necessary capacity for equitable and sustainable management of forests and biodiversity. The review of accomplishments of each component, as performed during the October 2014 mission, and the objective and detailed examination project performance as measured against its indicators provide evidence for this conclusion.

By establishing the diversification of socio-economic activities in its forest landscapes as one of its priorities, the FNCP provided significant direct benefits to local communities that constitute key partners for the conservation of biodiversity.

The MEDD, the World Bank, and the various partners of the FNCP across the territory are thus called upon to render sustainable the project's achievements in the context of the National Environment, Forest, Water, and Biodiversity Program, which serves as a guide for the sector.

This would consist of, on the one hand, a series of conservation and corrective measures taken as of project closing, and, on the other hand, translating into concrete and targeted action the proposals put forward during the various consultations conducted by the donor on forest governance in DRC.

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Documents

- Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
- GEF Biodiversity Tracking Tool
- Indigenous People's Plan
- ISDS Datasheet – Appraisal Stage
- ISDS Datasheet – Concept Stage
- P100620 Financing Agreement
- P100620 Financing Agreement Amendment
- Physical Cultural Heritage Management Framework
- Project Appraisal Document
- Project Paper
- Quality Enhancement Review Meeting Minutes
- Resettlement Framework

2. Mission Reports, Preparation and Supervision Documents

- Aide-mémoire 2008-03
- Aide-mémoire 2008-10
- Aide-mémoire 2009-02
- Aide-mémoire 2009-06
- Aide-mémoire 2009-09
- Aide-mémoire 2010-03
- Aide-mémoire 2011-05
- Aide-mémoire 2012-12
- Aide-mémoire 2013-11
- Aide-mémoire 2014-03
- Aide-mémoire 2014-06
- Aide-mémoire 2014-10
- Aide-mémoire 2015-02
- Implementation Status Report 1 – 10
- Management Letter 2009-06
- Management Letter 2011-05
- Management Letter 2012-03
- Management Letter 2012-06
- Management Letter 2012-12
- Management Letter 2013-05
- Management Letter 2014-03
- Management Letter 2014-06
- Management Letter 2015-02

3. FCPN Documents

Project Management

- Actualisation/Finalisation du manuel des procédures de suivi et évaluation
- Document préparatoire à la Revue à Mi-Parcours du Projet Forêts et Protection de la Nature

- État des lieux du PCPCB
- Semi-annual reports 2013/2, 2014/1, 2014/2
- Monitoring & Evaluation Reports 1-18
- PFCN Rapport d'achèvement (draft), Juin 2015

Project Outputs

- Baseline Reference Levels in Four Landscapes
- Mission de Facilitation des négociations des clauses sociales des cahiers des charges des contrats de concession forestière, Extrait Rapport trimestriel Octobre – Décembre 2014. Egis-BDPA
- Programme de contrôle de la production et de la commercialisation du bois : Rapport de fin d'activités. SGS.
- Rapport technique trimestriel de juillet à septembre 2014, Projet de réhabilitation du Parc national de la Maiko, Conservation International

4. World Bank Documents

- Country Assistance Strategy FY2008-2011
- Country Assistance Strategy FY2013-2016