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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT  
(TF-28500)

ON A

GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 4.24 MILLION (US\$6.2 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

FOR A

Tana River Primate National Reserve Conservation Project

January 10, 2003

**Environment and Social Development Unit  
Africa Regional Office**

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## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 7, 2002)

Currency Unit = Kenya Shillings

Ksh 1 = US\$ 0.1276

US\$ 1 = Ksh 78.355

## FISCAL YEAR

July 1 -- June 30

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACC	Africa Centre for Conservation
AMP	Adaptive Management Plan
ASPEN	Africa Safeguards Policy Enhancement
BTO	Back-to-Office
CAC	Community Advisory Committee
CAP	Community Action Plans
CBAHC	Community-Based Animal Health Care
CBO	Community Based Organizations
CCDC	Community Conservation and Development Component
CDA	Capacity Development Africa
CDS	Community Development Specialist
CM	Community Mobilizer
COBRA	Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas Project
CPO	Community Partnership Officer
CRS	Relief Services
DC	District Commissioner
DDRP	Deputy Director for Research and Planning
DRSRS	Department of Remote Sensing and Resource Surveys
EA WLS	East Africa Wildlife Society
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
ENVGC	Global Environment Coordination Division
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GASP	German Assisted Settlement Program
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GEFSEC	Global Environment Facility Secretariat
GOK	Government of Kenya
GTZ	Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit
HQ	Headquarters

Vice President:	Callisto E. Madavo
Country Director:	Makhtar Diop
Sector Manager:	Richard G. Scobey
Team Leader:	Richard J. Kaguamba

ICB	International Competitive Bidding
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IPR	Institute of Primate Research
JRMC	Joint Reserve Management Committee
KEFRI	Kenya Forestry Research Institute
KPCG	Kenya Primate Conservation Group
KWS	Kenya Wildlife Service
LOA	Letters of Allotment
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MLS	Ministry of Lands and Settlement
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPIC	Management Plan Implementation Committee
MTR	Mid Term Review
NES	National Environment Secretariat
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMK	National Museums of Kenya
PAWS	Protected Areas and Wildlife Services Project
PC	Project Coordinator
PD	Project Document
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PSR	Project Supervision Report
QACU	Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
RMAC	Reserve Management Component
RMOC	Research and Monitoring Component
SAC	Scientific Advisory Committee
SRS	Senior Research Scientist
TADEMFO	Tana Delta Environmental Management Forum
TARDA	Tana River Development Authority
TM	Task Manager
TRCC	Tana River County Council
TRPNR	Tana River Primate National Reserve
VRAU	Voluntary Relocation Assistance Unit
WB	World Bank



**KENYA**  
**Tana River Primate National Reserve Conservation Project**

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MAP

IBRD 27614



<i>Project ID:</i> P001217	<i>Project Name:</i> Tana River Primate National Reserve Conservation Project
<i>Team Leader:</i> Richard Kaguamba	<i>TL Unit:</i> AFTES
<i>ICR Type:</i> Core ICR	<i>Report Date:</i> January 10, 2003

## 1. Project Data

*Name:* Tana River Primate National Reserve Conservation Project    *L/C/TF Number:* TF-28500  
*Country/Department:* KENYA    *Region:* Africa Regional Office  
*Sector/subsector:* Other social services (54%); Central government administration (33%); General agriculture, fishing and forestry sector (13%)

## KEY DATES

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Revised/Actual</i>
<i>PCD:</i> 03/07/1991	<i>Effective:</i>	07/01/1997
<i>Appraisal:</i> 05/22/1995	<i>MTR:</i>	01/17/2000
<i>Approval:</i> 11/21/1996	<i>Closing:</i> 06/30/2001	12/31/2001

*Borrower/Implementing Agency:* GOVERNMENT OF KENYA/KENYA WILDLIFE SERVICE  
*Other Partners:*

STAFF	Current	At Appraisal
<i>Vice President:</i>	Callisto E. Madavo	Callisto E. Madavo
<i>Country Manager:</i>	Makhtar Diop	James W. Adams
<i>Sector Manager:</i>	Richard G. Scobey	Sushma Ganguly
<i>Team Leader at ICR:</i>	Richard Kaguamba	Agi Kiss
<i>ICR Primary Author:</i>	Richard Kaguamba; A. Agostini and K. Creighton FAO	

## 2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

*Outcome:* U

*Sustainability:* UN

*Institutional Development Impact:* M

*Bank Performance:* U

*Borrower Performance:* U

	QAG (if available)	ICR
<i>Quality at Entry:</i>		U
<i>Project at Risk at Any Time:</i> Yes		

### 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

#### 3.1 Original Objective:

The overall goal of the project was to improve the conservation and management of Tana Primate Reserve (a unique and diverse biological entity of global importance), with participation and increased benefits for local communities. The objectives of the project were: (i) to support the conservation of the unique biological community of the Tana River riparian forests; (ii) to incorporate the results of targeted research and monitoring into the management of a fragile and complex ecosystem; and (iii) to reduce identified threats to the ecological integrity and survival of the forest ecosystem. It was recognized that, to achieve these objectives, it would be necessary to identify and implement an effective management program for the forest ecosystem, taking into account the interests of the full range of stakeholders affected by the project, with a specific focus on people living within and adjacent to the Tana River Primate National Reserve (TRPNR). Hydrological changes upstream have reduced the fertile land area suitable for forest regrowth and agricultural activities, and, therefore, exacerbated competition for scarce resources between the primates and local residents. The objectives were suitable, if ambitious, for biodiversity protection. Improving the well-being of the local population was not an explicit objective of the project, but was regarded as a means towards achieving sustainable conservation objectives. This, along with the scientific focus of the project, was in line with the Global Environment Facility (GEF) pilot phase priorities. The project was identified during the Pilot phase of GEF and reflected the GEF priorities at the time, which were: (1) global environmental significance of project objectives; and (2) demonstration value of a project to guide evolution of the GEF portfolio. The global importance of the ecosystem and its biodiversity, including two endemic primate species, was widely accepted. The particular demonstration value in this project, lay chiefly in exploring approaches to dealing with a situation where communities live inside a protected area. Improved community welfare was seen as a measure to reduce constraints on biodiversity protection, rather than as an end in itself.

#### 3.2 Revised Objective:

The objective remained unchanged throughout the project.

#### 3.3 Original Components:

**Research and Monitoring (RMOC):** Supporting necessary baseline studies to identify the composition and status of flora and fauna within the TRNPR and adjacent forest and aquatic habitats, as well as the underlying factors affecting their present status and constraining future management options. The research program was to address five priority areas: (a) monitoring of primate populations, genetics and habitat parameters; (b) baseline and monitoring surveys of flora and fauna; (c) studies and monitoring of the Tana River hydrological system and its ecological effects; (d) human resource utilization (to establish sustainable use levels for forest products); and (e) prospects and methods for promoting and facilitating community-based conservation of remaining forest patches outside the Reserve boundaries. Implementation was to be guided by a Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC).

**Reserve Management (RMAC):** Developing an adaptive management system, to restore the integrity of the TRNPR and maintain or enhance the habitat quality and productive potential of adjacent riverine forests along the lower Tana River. The reserve management component was to include: (a) measures to enhance security within the reserve and adjacent areas; (b) measures to reduce poaching and agricultural encroachment in the reserve; (c) improvement of physical facilities for reserve management, research and monitoring; (d) establishment of consultative and advisory bodies, such as the Joint Reserve Management Committee (JRMC), to involve local communities in the planning and management of project activities; and (e) preparation and implementation of an Adaptive Management Plan (AMP) for the Reserve, with significant input from research studies, and incorporating a rigorous and sustainable monitoring regime for key indicators related to the core project objectives. Implementation was to be guided by the JRMC.



**Community Conservation and Development (CCDC):** the specific objectives of the CCDC were to build support among local communities and to reduce pressure on reserve resources. This was to be achieved by: (a) supporting alternative livelihoods through the implementation of microprojects and income-generating activities, based on the sustainable use of resources within and outside of the reserve; and (b) to encourage voluntary relocation of communities farming in the reserve, by identifying and acquiring alternative land, and increasing its productivity. US\$400 000 (6% of the total project costs) were envisaged in the budget for supporting outward migration from the reserve. In the remainder of the report, the terms "relocation" and "resettlement" are used interchangeably. The latter was to be coordinated by a Voluntary Relocation Advisory Unit (VRAU), composed of local community representatives, the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), and local government representatives. Overall component implementation was to be guided and monitored by the Community Advisory Committee (CAC), comprising KWS and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) stakeholders.

The communities immediately affected by the project are sedentary farmers (Pokomo), living and cultivating in and around the reserve, and pastoralists (Wardei). With respect to their attitude to the project, the affected communities fell into three groups – those opposed to the project, those cooperating with the project, and inclined to participate in voluntary relocation, and those cooperating with the project, but not inclined to relocate. While the Wardei uniformly belonged to the latter group, the local Pokomo community was split across the three different groups. Baomo, the only village situated inside the Reserve, remained hostile to the project throughout implementation. No other specific explanatory characteristics were identified, by which the various Pokomo households differed across the three groups.

#### **3.4 Revised Components:**

Components were not revised throughout the project. Within the CCDC, all efforts were concentrated on relocation assistance after December 1999, while other activities (endowment funds, microprojects around the Reserve) were put on hold. A reallocation of all remaining CCDC and some RMAC and RMOC funds was proposed in 2001, to finance the resettlement plan. GEF Secretariat (GEFSEC) determined that it could not authorize this reallocation.

<b>Component</b>	<b>Cost</b>	<b>Rating</b>
RESEARCH AND MONITORING	\$2,500,000.00	S
RESERVE MANAGEMENT	\$1,400,000.00	S
COMMUNITY CONSERVATION & DEVELOP	\$2,400,000.00	U
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT	\$300,000.00	U

#### **3.5 Quality at Entry:**

No Quality Assurance Group (QAG) rating exists for this project. The inter-linkage of component activities provided a solid conceptual basis for achieving the objectives. However, these cross-linkages also contributed to the risk of delays in overall implementation, if individual components failed to keep pace with the others. It was recognized at appraisal, that the extensive engagement of communities in developing a plan for joint management of biological resources within and outside of the Reserve, represented a change in approach from previous KWS methods and practices. Considering this fact, as well as the intense competition for land suitable for forest restoration or cultivation, and the heterogeneous attitudes toward the project among local residents, it was anticipated that the CCDC would be the factor limiting the speed of overall implementation. To minimize this risk, the Bank and GEF allowed an unusually long preparation period, in which the main objective was to bring the community "on board". Ultimately, it was agreed that a sufficient portion of the community supported the project to allow implementation to begin on a "phased basis", i.e. to proceed with RMOC and RMAC immediately, and to begin the CCDD with those communities that were ready to do so, allowing others to follow at

their own pace. The identification and allocation of alternative land ideally should have been a condition of effectiveness, rather than a project activity. However, the urgency of taking action to control ongoing encroachment and biodiversity loss precluded this option.

The operating and management procedures outlined in the PD had problems. The quest for highest caliber personnel conflicted with the low attractiveness of TRPNR as a duty station, and with the intention eventually to integrate the project activities into regular KWS work and management processes. The former constraint demanded high pay schedules (higher than KWS' own salary schedules), whereas the latter required that pay would be more in line with KWS averages. In the end, a mid-way path was followed, which may have contributed to poor project performance. However, it is not clear how this dilemma could have been avoided given the circumstances or that any other approach would have been more effective. Greater attention from KWS' management would have speeded-up recruitment, initiation of field components and disbursement, especially on the non-research components. Two key governance structures outlined in the PD, the Project Steering Committee (PSC), and the CAC, were not constituted prior to effectiveness, as had been agreed. Final versions of ecological and socio-economic monitoring indicators were also not provided prior to effectiveness, although this had been agreed at appraisal. The lack of agreed indicators over most of the project implementation cycle, has limited the performance of both KWS implementation and Bank supervision, during project execution. The disbursement profile set out in the PD was accelerated relative to other Bank projects in Kenya, despite anticipated difficulties and potential delays. The PD envisaged to provide funds for "legal, technical and financial assistance, to identify and acquire alternative land and increase its productivity (e.g. through micro-irrigation)" (p.5).

#### 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

##### *4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:*

The two species of globally-threatened primates occurring within the project zone, have maintained their population levels during the period of project implementation within the range of statistical observational uncertainty. However, habitat that is critical for the survival of these indicator species, has declined in quality and quantity throughout the project period, though the rate of decline may have moderated during the project period, in particular within the Reserve boundaries. The total area of suitable habitat (inside and outside the Reserve) is estimated to have decreased by at least 5%. The level of vulnerability of at least one of the target species (red colobus) has increased. Human activities that are incompatible with long-term survival of the primates and the forest habitats, upon which their survival depends, have also increased within the project zone during implementation. The research community is in consensus, that the primate populations, as well as the forests upon which they depend, remain potentially viable at the time of project closure. However, given that the project did not resolve the underlying driving factor of human encroachment and destruction of the critical habitats, the prospects for medium- or long-term sustainability, let alone improvement of the status quo, are uncertain. The overall development objective of ensuring the survival and sustainability of threatened biodiversity of global significance within the project region has, therefore, not been met. Some achievements were made in incorporating targeted research into the AMP, but not to the degree anticipated in the project design phase.

Local communities have benefited from increased security, attributed to KWS's presence. Alternative livelihood options were not developed, and the potential for sustainable use of resources in and around the reserve, has not been determined. Families who had signed up for the resettlement program will receive letters of allotment for their allocated plots at the new site. This is a significant benefit, considering the scarcity of agricultural land in the area. However, no resettlement assistance will be forthcoming, and it is therefore unclear whether they will be able to relocate successfully. It will be desirable, nevertheless, for the Bank to try and support initiatives that might, in the future, come from Kenya Government aimed

at completing the resettlement plan or supporting the communities to pursue environmentally sustainable management of the Tana Reserve's resources.

#### *4.2 Outputs by components:*

**Research and Monitoring:** An overall plan for research and monitoring was developed soon after project effectiveness. Most research activities were to be carried out and coordinated by the National Museums of Kenya (NMK), under a contract with KWS. Initial implementation was slow due to a number of factors. These include: a delay in reaching an agreement with NMK on the specific research program as well as weak financial administration by NMK that restricted cash flow, to limited logistic support due to delays in purchase of equipment and vehicles by KWS, and to ineffective coordination of the overall work schedule for this component, and unusually severe flooding of the Tana River in 1997-98. Despite this, most of the baseline biological studies were accomplished, and monitoring of primate populations, forest cover, human use of forest resources and habitat quality were carried out during the life of the project. Ten of thirteen studies identified in the PD were undertaken, and the results have been incorporated into the AMP developed for the 2001-006 period. At project closure, limited monitoring of endangered primates, and habitat quality continues. Studies on the hydrology of the project zone, and on the potential for natural or managed regeneration of forests, were not accomplished. A seedling production and restoration planting program was established in the final year of the project.

Although a substantial amount of baseline data and knowledge of the biological content and human uses of the Tana River forests was generated under the project, RMOC has fallen short of achieving several of its most important objectives. First, despite three different studies of land use and land cover in the project zone, that were financed under the project, there is still lack of consensus or clarity concerning the quantity and habitat quality of forest cover remaining in the project zone. KWS and the World Bank (WB) agreed that the land cover assessment undertaken by Department of Remote Sensing and Resource Surveys (DRSRS), did not provide an adequate basis for guiding project evaluation and decision-making and, hence, KWS contracted a private sector company to undertake an additional study. The final report of this study is still outstanding. The rates and causes of changes in forest cover and habitat quality, both inside and outside of the reserve, are still not well understood. Second, although the two sets of primate studies commissioned under the project are in general agreement on overall population estimates for the two endangered primate species, there is a lack of consensus concerning the vulnerability of the remaining primate populations. At the time of project closure, both the primates and their habitat are viable, but remain at significant risk of extinction, if further erosion of the resource base occurs. In the absence of hydrological studies, there is a lack of clear understanding of the successional changes in the riverine forests and, therefore, it is difficult to define appropriate and viable forest restoration and regeneration activities. The recently prepared AMP notes that data on human uses of the forest are still required in order to set sustainable use limits for forest products. The close linkage between outputs of RMOC and RMAC, envisaged during project preparation, was not achieved, despite open-sharing of intermediate research results throughout the project. The researchers concentrated on the parts of the agreed research program that coincided with their research priorities, and KWS did not steer the research agenda sufficiently to ensure a comprehensive research output to support the AMP. In the absence of an agreed and reliable set of monitoring indicators for the target biota and the underlying factors, the key objective of this component has not been fully met, and despite significant gains in relevant knowledge about the project zone, the overall performance is therefore considered (marginally) satisfactory.

**Reserve Management:** The main RMAC outputs were in the areas of security, infrastructure, adaptive management planning, and establishment of liaison with relevant authorities and communities.

**Security.** Prior to the establishment of a permanent presence by KWS in the TRNPR, the lower Tana River region was plagued by livestock raiding, robberies and kidnappings. Potential farmland east of the river, could not be utilized due to the security risks. Villagers confirmed their appreciation for the

increased security, and attributed this to KWS's presence. Improved security, however, may have actually increased pressure on forest resources in and around the Reserve, as villagers now find it safer to cultivate lands that were previously inaccessible. Also, during the period of intensive community dialogue for relocation planning, enforcement activities were relaxed, to avoid potentially negative impacts on community relations. This may have resulted in more (temporary) degradation of forest habitats.

*Infrastructure.* Mchelelo Research Camp was upgraded with water and electricity supplies. The administrative headquarters (HQ) were relocated to a new site within the reserve, including construction of key infrastructure. A nursery with water supply and a small storage shed used as an herbarium, was constructed in 2000. The reserve airstrip was upgraded, and a new road entrance to the administrative HQ was built.

*Adaptive Management Planning and Implementation.* An interim management plan for the Reserve was developed during preparation, covering the period 1994-1999. The document was revised with inputs from the 1998 and 1999 research reports. The JRMC was established in May 1995, and met frequently until late-1998. Initially, the JRMC was composed of thirty-five members, including two County Councillors, two chiefs from villages adjacent to the Reserve, and ten appointed, at-large, community members. In early 1998, appointed, at-large, members were replaced by community-elected members, and an elected Chairman replacing the District Commissioner (DC) who had previously held that position. A new AMP, covering the period from 2001-2006, was prepared during 2001. The plan notes that the JRMC is not currently operational, and will need to be reconstituted to achieve an appropriate balance of stakeholder representation among remaining residents. It addresses the use of resources within the reserve by local communities, including both forest product harvesting and livestock grazing. During AMP preparation, two workshops were held with community representatives, to identify priorities and define options. A third workshop to "validate" the plan has not yet taken place. Use of the VRAU (a committee representing those residents planning to relocate) to organize participation, however, raises some question as to whether all appropriate stakeholders have been involved. The AMP also calls for initiation of an NGO collaborative agreement, to implement community management of priority forests. Originally, this was to be achieved during the project period, but searches for a suitable NGO partner were unsuccessful. The best example of collaborative management between KWS and local communities was the program to generate and plant seedlings for forest regeneration and habitat enrichment. The seedling production facility (tree nursery) is now run by two locally-recruited and trained assistants, who have been retained by KWS. The seedling planting and maintenance work done in late 2001, was carried out with the participation of more than 40 villagers. Planting was done by paid village labor while watering and weeding has been done by villagers on a voluntary basis.

*Quality and Viability of the Adaptive Management Plan (2001-2006).* The AMP has benefited from collaboration, technical review and input provided by Nairobi-based institutions (NMK, DRSRS, Institute of Primate Research (IPR)), and some local institutions and NGOs. The plan provides an effective framework for future management of the reserve. However, it is built on the assumptions that GEF project funding will continue until June 2003, and that 60 percent of farmland in the reserve will be abandoned by relocating families. In the absence of continued funding, many AMP activities will need to be scaled-back severely, or cancelled. Following the cancellation of the resettlement program, it is expected that some of the temporarily abandoned land will be reoccupied, and that land clearing and harvesting of firewood within the reserve and other vulnerable forest patches will continue, or increase. The AMP will need to be revised to reflect the changed situation.

*Establishment of Liaison.* Throughout the project, KWS has established effective liaison with local and regional authorities, such as the District Commissioner's Office and the Tana River County Council (TRCC). There appear to be regular information exchanges, and a general spirit of collaboration prevails.

In terms of the effort made to encourage community participation, the infrastructure improvements that were achieved, and the general outline of management interventions described in the Management Plan, the outputs of this component are satisfactory. Following the abrupt withdrawal of funding, however, it is questionable whether the outcome of Reserve Management efforts will be sustainable.

*Community Conservation and Development Component:* The CCDC was implemented with significant delay, reflecting the late recruitment of all key staff, inaccessibility of some areas, following the El Niño floods, and hostility among some communities. The component was refocused considerably throughout project implementation, in response to the local situation and evolving preferences of the communities.

*Goodwill projects:* Only one of the two goodwill projects initiated during project preparation was ever implemented (construction of an administrative school building). Little goodwill was created, and hostility towards the reserve persisted and continues to persist among some residents living within and adjacent to the reserve. A court case challenging the legitimacy of the reserve is still pending.

*Community-based endowment funds:* Neither the micro-project fund envisaged to ensure funding beyond project closure, nor the education fund for school bursaries was established. No progress was made in the first two years, and follow-up was then halted to concentrate CCDC efforts on relocation activities.

*Community Action Plans (CAPs):* Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs) that were to provide the basis for specific livelihood activities and CAPs were not carried out until autumn 1999, and the validity of the results was questioned, as only a small, and not necessarily representative, sample of households was interviewed. Four out of nine villages (including Baomo, the only village inside the reserve), did not participate in the PRA, because of their hostile attitude towards the project. The two largest villages surveyed, identified lack of title to their land as the most important problem. The CAPs were not followed-up, as a strategic decision was taken at the MTR to concentrate CCDC efforts on voluntary relocation. This was because reducing population pressure within the reserve had always been identified as crucial, and no real progress was being made on CAPs and there seemed to be no real progress of improvement.

*Support for voluntary out-migration:* During the preparation phase, a number of Pokomo households had expressed their desire to relocate from the reserve where they could not obtain clear land titles, and where restrictions on extending the areas under cultivation conflicted with the increasing needs of a growing population and with their traditional shifting pattern of agricultural activity. Despite the slow onset of supporting activities, interest persisted and grew. The VRAU was finally constituted in March 1999, and completed a supplementary census of the population, depending upon reserve resources, with a particular focus on households eager to relocate. Some observers have claimed that speculative land clearing increased in anticipation of possible compensation payments, but no concrete evidence of this has been produced. GOK identified several alternative land areas for settlement in August 1999, and community representatives selected the Witu II site as their preferred location. Witu II is located in Tana County, close to the coast in Lamu District, approximately four hours drive from TRPNR. This growing momentum, coupled with the realization that the continued ecological integrity of the reserve depends upon forest restoration on farmland in the reserve, resulted in a consensus decision by KWS and the WB in December 1999, to concentrate all CCDC efforts on supporting voluntary relocation, and to put other activities within this component on hold.

Based on guidance from Africa Safeguards Policy Enhancement (ASPEN) and Quality Assurance and Compliance Unit (QACU), a resettlement plan was prepared in line with WB guidelines on involuntary resettlement. In their view, the resettlement might not be regarded as fully voluntary, given that KWS' indicated that no further clearing of forest would be permitted within the Reserve. As this would undermine the prevailing practice of shifting cultivation, the resettlement could be regarded as having an element of coercion. This resettlement plan foresaw the construction of key social and physical infrastructure, housing, physical movement of families to the new site, crop compensation and settling-in assistance. Two hundred and forty seven households whose farms cover approximately 60 percent of farmland in the reserve, signed up for the first phase of resettlement. A further 100 households (approximately) subsequently recorded their interest in participating in a second phase of relocation. This second group would only receive free titled land as an incentive to resettle.

KWS led the land survey and demarcation activities at Witu II, in collaboration with district authorities and technicians from the Ministry of Lands and Settlement (MLS). An agreement was reached between KWS and Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)/German Assisted Settlement Program (GASP), which has over 20 years of experience in resettlement within the area, to implement the resettlement program, starting in the second half of 2001. In mid-2001, all resettlement activities were put on hold, awaiting the extension of the project and re-allocation of funding, which were eventually not approved. During a six-month extension (July-December 2001), project resources could only be committed to cover administrative expenditure to ensure that the 247 households would receive letters of allotment (LOAs), and eventually title deeds. It is expected that some families, most of whom had left their farms in anticipation of resettlement, and had even initiated forest restoration on the abandoned land, will relocate once they receive their LOAs, even in the absence of further benefits or support. Many, however, will likely return to farm their abandoned lands in the reserve. There was widespread agreement that, for any transfer to Witu II to proceed humanely and successfully, some additional investment is required. At the very least, access paths to the farmland need to be opened, and the families need to be formally shown their plots.

*Pastoral communities' projects:* The Wardei had cooperated with the project from the outset, but due to initial delays, and the subsequent concentration on resettlement, micro-projects identified in a separate compensation plan, drawn up in parallel with the resettlement plan, were only started in 2001, and none were finalized. Planned activities included construction of a school, borehole, cattle dip, dispensary, and training of community animal health workers. The training program will be now be implemented by the Catholic Diocese of Garissa, without KWS involvement. Materials for the school and dispensary were purchased with project funds. Alternative dry season grazing land was set aside, but not demarcated, and may therefore not be available following project closure. The AMP, however, allows for limited grazing in the reserve during extreme droughts.

The CAC only held one meeting, in August 2000, which was attended exclusively by KWS staff. An NGO representative was invited, but did not attend. Greater dialogue with NGOs, and dissemination of information about the project, could have avoided some of the negative press and community polarization, which hindered successful project implementation. However, some of the groups criticizing the project appeared intent on sensationalizing the situation and disregarded the information that was provided by KWS and by the World Bank. Therefore, it is not clear that providing additional information would have changed their perspective.

The outcome of the CCDC is highly unsatisfactory, even though progress in the later years is acknowledged. No alternative livelihood or sustainable reserve, resource-use strategies have been identified and fostered, given the slow start, and the principal focus on relocation in the latter years of

implementation. Goodwill towards the reserve, KWS and its partners that had been nurtured during continued dialogue has ceased, now that the resettlement plan is cancelled.

***Project Co-ordination and Management:*** Although this is not introduced as a component in the PD, it is treated as such in all cost tables. Originally, a dual coordination structure was proposed: A small number of externally-recruited staff were to be funded by the project, all of whom would report administratively to the Project Coordinator (PC). On technical aspects, however, the project staff, as well as the regular KWS staff involved in project implementation, were to report to the appropriate KWS line managers in the technical departments. Recruitment of key project staff suffered significant delays. While the PC was recruited in July 1997, and the Senior Research Scientist (SRS) joined the project in November 1997, it was only in August 1998 that management in the reserve was upgraded by posting a senior warden. The Community Development Specialist (CDS) was not recruited until July 1998, and the Community Partnership Officer (CPO) only came on board in March 1998, followed by Community Mobilizers (CMs) in 1999. Some project positions were never filled (Agroforester), or only for parts of the project life (Data Analyst, Forest Restoration Officer). Throughout project implementation, staff turnover was high - three PCs, two field activities' coordinators, two forestry officers, three accountants and, at the highest level, five DDRPs and four Directors of KWS. The dual reporting lines, designed to ensure a close integration of project activities into the regular KWS work program, led to problems, as some technical department managers expected to have full control over staff activities and project resources, which conflicted with the mandate of the PC. The "outsider status" of the PC and other project staff, slowed down early implementation. A lack of familiarity with KWS procedures on the part of project staff, was exacerbated by reduced cooperation of KWS insiders, who resented their privileged position. From 2000 onwards, project positions, including the PC post, were filled with regular KWS staff. The new team significantly increased the level of activity and implementation performance. Nevertheless, the project continued to be perceived as a set of interventions implemented separately from other KWS activities, limiting institutional commitment. It was also suggested that the posting of key project staff to TRPNR rather than Nairobi would have been more effective in ensuring smooth implementation on the ground. The overall direction of the project was to be guided by the PSC, but records exist of only one meeting held in November 1997, to confirm initial staff appointments and review the first annual workplan. An overall project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan was not prepared until May 2001 and was never implemented. However, certain technical indicators, such as primate populations, were monitored throughout project implementation, and Terms of Reference for independent M&E of the planned resettlement activities were prepared. It was envisaged to broaden the scope of this monitoring and evaluation study, to cover all project activities. Despite improvements in the later years, overall project coordination and management was unsatisfactory.

#### *4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:*

N/A

#### *4.4 Financial rate of return:*

N/A

#### *4.5 Institutional development impact:*

The project has provided an opportunity for KWS to identify a relevant research agenda for adaptive management and to incorporate the outputs into their planning and management of the Reserve. It has also built-up significant capacity within KWS to handle difficult dialogue with a community that is torn between support and opposition to the project. KWS has also built-up strong links with local authorities and the district and council, for collaboration in reserve management. The recruitment of key personnel from KWS ranks since 2000 has strengthened this impact, as the capacity will remain in the organization. However, as most key staff are now reassigned to other areas, little continuity remains on the ground.

The construction of key infrastructure in the reserve has increased KWS' capacity to control and manage the Reserve. The preparation of the AMP was to give KWS and local authorities the tools for effective reserve management. However, the AMP will now have to be substantially revised, in view of the termination of GEF funding, and the likely return of some families to their farms in the reserve. The sudden termination of funding has left KWS, the district authorities and the TRCC, with a major backlash of resentment, expressed by the communities who feel misled and cheated. Any future collaboration with these communities and others informed about the project will be very difficult. KWS is also concerned about potential repercussions on its other community wildlife projects elsewhere. Overall, the institutional development impact is mixed and modest.

## **5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome**

### *5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:*

A key factor was the polarized nature of the local communities *vis-à-vis* collaboration with the project. A number of families were returnees from the WB-supported failed Bura irrigation scheme (p. 5, Annex 5, PD). Other factors were the extensive floods in 1997, following El Niño, and the decision by GEFSEC not to authorize the reallocation of committed grant funds, to implement the proposed two year extension.

### *5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:*

Frequent changes in leadership at KWS, and, hence, priority setting and management philosophy, diminished project performance. The allocation of alternative land for settlement was slow, but eventually achieved. Collaboration of other government institutions in the resettlement planning was forthcoming and effective

### *5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:*

TRPNR has never been a priority area for KWS, as it does not generate revenues and is recognized as a difficult area for staff to live and work. The provision of a GEF grant to fund activities in this reserve did not fundamentally change the importance attached to TRPNR. KWS was to build consensus on project direction with other stakeholders, through the PSC, but only one meeting appears to have been held, and the desired consensus was not built. The project's slow start can be attributed predominantly to internal management issues, which were not rectified with sufficient urgency.

### *5.4 Costs and financing:*

The project was financed by a GEF grant and KWS counterpart contributions. Project costs were estimated at US\$7.14 million, but only US\$1.91 million (equivalent to 27 percent) were disbursed (see Annex 2). This can be attributed to the low levels of activity in the first two years of implementation, and the subsequent concentration on planning for resettlement. There were also significant delays in establishing systems by which KWS could advance funds to third parties, such as NMK. Delays in accounting for expenditure returns by partners, and from the field, slowed down replenishment of the special account. The original disbursement schedule was unrealistic, in view of the complex nature of project activities and the risk factors identified. If the two-year extension and reallocation of funding had been granted, it is expected that all funds would have been spent. In 2001, a reallocation of funding was proposed to finance the resettlement program (US\$3.2 million), as only US\$0.4 million had originally been budgeted for relocation assistance. Most funding was to be reallocated within the CCDC, with some contributions from the other component budgets.



## 6. Sustainability

### *6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:*

Sustainability of the modest project achievements, of relative stability of the primate populations, and (perhaps) a reduction in the rate of habitat destruction and degradation within the project zone; is unlikely, following the abrupt closure of the project in the absence of further intervention. Project-sponsored and earlier studies clearly indicate, that the pattern of present human use of the forests and the surrounding agricultural lands, is incompatible with long-term survival of the target species and their habitat. Following the cancellation of the resettlement plan, it is unclear as to how much farmland in the reserve will be abandoned, even if families eventually receive their LOAs. The project-stimulated dialogue over alternative livelihood options and resettlement, has led to heightened social tension and splits within the local communities. The project did create greater capacity in KWS and its partners for community dialogue, but the loss of credibility following cancellation of the resettlement support more than offsets this benefit. An adaptive management system was put in place through the AMP, but this is no longer appropriate, given the changed circumstances, and needs significant revision. The forest restoration program is continuing, but unless abandoned farmland in the reserve can be restored, the impact will not be significant.

### *6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:*

Following project closure, KWS proposes to: (i) continue enhancing security, proceed with the move to the new reserve HQ, and to strictly enforce the law, as well as to resolve the outstanding court case; (ii) revise the AMP to reflect reduced funding and to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with TRCC, to seek an increased role of the Council in management of the reserve; (iii) process and give LOAs and title deeds to the 247 families, and to enlist community support for conservation, through micro-projects around the reserve; (iv) continue research and monitoring activities, including through continuing cooperation with the Kenya Primate Conservation Group; and (v) fund raise through proposals development. However, as most key project personnel have been withdrawn, and equipment has not been clearly assigned to continue activities in Tana, and as KWS is under pressure to cut operating costs, the implementation of these proposed transition arrangements is not guaranteed. The promotion of the CPO to the position of Warden, should allow some continuity in Reserve management. The corporate communications strategy, envisaged as part of the exit plan to communicate project closure to various stakeholders and the wider public, has not been developed, let alone implemented. Prospects for successful transition are, therefore, limited.

## 7. Bank and Borrower Performance

### **Bank**

#### *7.1 Lending:*

Project identification and preparation reflected the GEF pilot phase priorities. The WB appears to have over-estimated the “power” of GEF grant financing, to raise the priority of TRPNR on KWS’s national agenda, which raises concerns for sustainability. The Bank’s appraisal team was appropriate. The appraisal team consisted of specialists in conservation ecology, research and monitoring, protected area management, and social anthropology, and the report contains a series of working papers that complement the draft PD prepared by KWS. The appraisal report identified many project risks, which subsequently hampered implementation. Risks identified included: (a) potential ecological non-viability of the reserve forests due to hydrological changes set in motion by upstream developments; (b) a substantial risk of inadequate community buy-in, and of difficulties with coming to consensus solutions, given what was known about divisions within the community; (c) a pace of implementation of the community component that was dependent on these communities and, therefore, difficult to coordinate with other components; (d) questions about whether KWS could provide sufficient level of management oversight, due to other

priorities. The overall GEF financing package was considered adequate, and complementary to related projects, including the WB-financed Protected Areas and Wildlife Services (PAWS) and the USAID-funded Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas (COBRA) projects under implementation. However, the disbursement schedule, which was more ambitious than the Kenya average, was inappropriate, in view of the expected risks of delays and complications. Further, the appraisal team could have anticipated the need for a higher budget allocation for relocation assistance activities. The preparation period for this project was unusually long (about 5 years), as was the period between completion of the initial preparation reports and appraisal (18 months) and between appraisal and project effectiveness (25 months). These delays were all the result of the task team awaiting assurance that there was sufficient community support for the project, given the troubled history and deep divisions within the community and their overall negative perceptions of the Reserve and KWS. KWS invested considerable effort in improving community relations and eventually was able to gain the qualified support of a substantial portion of the community, and it was agreed that the project could proceed in a phased manner -- working initially with the willing partners and anticipating that others would come on board when they saw that there were real benefits to be had. Lending performance was marginally satisfactory.

### *7.2 Supervision:*

Although project effectiveness took place more than one year after the grant agreement was negotiated, the grant termination date was not revised, resulting in an effective four-year implementation. This oversight was not corrected, as in any case the task team anticipated to extend the project by two years, to allow for the implementation of the resettlement plan. In the absence of an agreement to proceed with the scaled-up resettlement, the Bank determined that continuing for one more year would not lead to the project achieving its objectives. Therefore, there was no justification to continue, even to restore the "lost" 5th year of implementation. In the early period of implementation, levels of field supervision were lower than proposed in the PD, but there was continuous contact between the TM (two consecutive TMs, both based in Nairobi) and KWS. Supervision was carried out principally by an ecologist, a sociologist and an environmental specialist, complemented by additional specialists, where appropriate. Additional agricultural expertise to analyze the potential for alternative farming techniques would have been useful. The mission reports contain guidance for implementation, as well as detailed tables of agreed actions and target dates, which in the later years were followed closely by KWS. While the guidance was technically appropriate, not all of it was implemented by the Borrower. Aide Memoires were used in conjunction with the PD and annual work plans as the key guides to implementation. The risks identified at appraisal remained on the agenda, but could not be entirely mitigated. The mid-term review (MTR), which resulted in major modifications to the content and timing of activities within agreed components, was carried out only 18 months after the date of effectiveness, which was early even in a four-year implementation period. However, the Task Team showed flexibility in assessing the status of implementation of the CCDC and its poor prospects for success as compared with the high degree of community interest in resettlement, and agreeing to restructure the project to shift resources from the former to the latter.

The dialog between the WB task team and the GEF Secretariat (GEFSEC) on the reallocation of funding to the expanded resettlement activities in the CCDC was highly unsatisfactory. Despite the fact that voluntary resettlement is reported as a project element in the Project Document and discussed in all of the supervision mission reports/Aides Memoires, including the Project Mid-Term Review, there is no record of GEFSEC-Bank correspondence prior to mid-2001 (when the project was already operating under a short term extension) indicating any concerns or questions about the costs associated with voluntary resettlement. The Bank's task team seems not to have anticipated GEFSEC's objection to financing this component at the large level required to comply with the Bank's policies (e.g. OD 4.30). In its dialog with KWS and GOK concerning preparation of the extension request, it is clear that the WB team acted under the assumption that GEFSEC approval should be a matter of formality as long as WB guidelines governing the implementation of WB/GEF projects were adhered to. This assumption was based on the

fact that the proposed extension involved no restructuring of the project, but merely a shift in emphasis on a particular sub-activity within one of the components (with this emphasis requiring a substantial re-allocation of funds within the component). This assumption proved to be erroneous, however, and has had a detrimental impact on the final project outcome due to the abrupt project closure and cancellation of approximately two-thirds of the original grant funds. It is worth noting that the risk that GEF might not agree to a restructuring had been rated “modest” and not “negligible” in the PSRs since early 2001. If it had been known at the outset of resettlement planning that funding was not assured, a fallback strategy could have been pursued to protect vulnerable stakeholders.

The decision not to grant an extension of the project, in the absence of a reallocation of funds to implement the resettlement program, was appropriate. A continuation of research and reserve management activities without the restoration of forests on significant patches of farmland, and reduction of demand for forest resources was not considered to be adequate to meet project objectives.

*7.3 Overall Bank performance:*  
Unsatisfactory.

### **Borrower**

*7.4 Preparation:*

Throughout the long project preparation, there was a high turnover of staff involved, including the senior KWS counterpart responsible for the project (Deputy Director for Research). Following the exhaustion of preparation funds, KWS did, however, commit staff resources to prepare a project document in line with WB/GEF requirements, and in particular, the research agenda was elaborated well. Significant efforts were made to ensure community participation during preparation, and in fact it was the insistence that the community must endorse the concept and participate in preparation that led to the very long preparation period. It must be recognized that this situation made appropriate planning of the CCDC very difficult. However, in hindsight, it is questionable whether the planned micro-projects could ever have succeeded in limiting pressure on the reserve, given the severe land constraints and limited opportunities for alternative activities. The impact of current agricultural practices, and the potential for alternative methods, were not analyzed in detail. Although resettlement (involuntary and voluntary) was debated at length during preparation, the role of the project in supporting and financing specific relocation activities was not clarified sufficiently. The PD is vague, and not entirely consistent in its definition of “relocation assistance”. The main text refers to “technical and financial assistance to identify and acquire alternative land, and increase its productivity (e.g. through micro-irrigation). Annex 4 states that “the project will pay for overheads (e.g. surveyors, legal fees, transportation) incurred in willing buyer/willing seller land transactions”. At appraisal, community dialogue was reported to have resulted in a sufficient basis for collaboration. Nevertheless, it appears that this basis had not been reached, since previous delays in CCDC implementation were blamed predominantly on hostility in the community. Overall, preparation performance on the part of the Borrower was unsatisfactory.

*7.5 Government implementation performance:*

The substantial changes in policy direction and emphasis in KWS during project implementation, and the considerable internal restructuring that went along with the changes in leadership, negatively affected project implementation. The government’s official channel for granting land for relocation, through requests at the district level, was too slow to meet the project’s needs. However, acceptable land was subsequently made available by MLS, which also demonstrated flexibility with respect to the requirements of the project. Administrative fees, normally requested from settlers, were to be waived. Further, rather than the ten acres allocated on a standard basis in resettlement schemes, the government authorized 15-acre plots for the relocatees supported by the project, in view of the fact that these settlers

were giving up the use of fertile land resources in a national reserve to reduce pressure on the natural habitat, and were entitled to some compensation. The government also supported project activities by making technical expertise from other ministries available to participate in the resettlement planning. Furthermore, the government actively sought to include other partners to improve implementation, e.g.: obtaining the services of a private contractor to do aerial surveys when DRSRS failed to deliver, seeking (unsuccessfully) an NGO to assist in implementation of the CCDC, and arranging for the GOK/GTZ GASP program to implement the scaled-up resettlement component in recognition that KWS did not have the necessary capacity (this arrangement dropped when the resettlement was not approved). Government provided, in a satisfactory manner, overall support to KWS with respect to the above issues.

#### *7.6 Implementing Agency:*

The low priority attached to TRPNR in KWS, has reduced project implementation performance. Outside pressure applied by supervision missions, appears to have been essential to achieve progress on project activities. Internal management, recruitment and reporting problems, as well as financial management and procurement issues, were not addressed with sufficient urgency, but hampered project implementation for the first two and a half years. High staff turnover further diminished project performance. It is recognized that, following the appointment of an all KWS management team, project implementation in the last 18 months was accelerated significantly, and progress on all components, especially resettlement planning, was satisfactory. In the wrap-up phase, following first the suspension of resettlement activities, and then project closure, KWS did not act with sufficient transparency. Overall, implementing agency performance over the life of the project was unsatisfactory.

#### *7.7 Overall Borrower performance:*

Unsatisfactory, consistent with the above ratings.

### **8. Lessons Learned**

#### **Project Design**

- Unless local communities believe that their interests are at the heart of project design, they are unlikely to actively support project implementation. Making the improvement of local livelihoods a secondary objective, merely to reduce pressure on biodiversity, may be counterproductive.
- A four-year time horizon is not sufficient to achieve significant community participation, change livelihood strategies, and complete a voluntary relocation exercise, in a situation where community support for the project at the outset is at best shaky and divided, especially when the executing agency has little prior experience in managing such activities. It should be noted, however, that there were substantial community consultation during the 8 years of preparation prior to effectiveness. Recognizing that divisions within community opinion were likely to delay implementation of that component, the project was designed following a phased approach. However, the four year time frame was not sufficient to implement a phased approach.
- The eligibility of expenditures, to promote sustainable economic development (including relocation and related livelihood investment) as a strategy for achieving sustainable global benefits for biodiversity conservation, must be agreed upon prior to project approval, and realistic cost estimates for such expenditures must be included in the PD.

### **Institutional Experience and Capacity**

- Despite other shortcomings, the project did support KWS' efforts to build trust and improve communication and collaboration with the local community. This demonstrates that even in situations where there is a lack of trust, it is possible to have dialogue with community members, and better participation by communities in reserve management can be achieved.
- Complex and conflicting management and reporting lines for project staff operating in the context of a larger institution, can cause delays in decision-making and project implementation. Clear reporting and management lines need to be determined at the outset, and responsibilities must be unequivocally assigned to ensure smooth project execution.
- Administrative capacity of the implementing agency and major collaborating institutions, in carrying out procurement, financial management and reporting, must be considered very carefully when establishing project disbursement schedules.
- Since resettlement was always offered as an option to the communities, and many households, in fact, opted not to participate in the resettlement, a number of stakeholders thought it inappropriate to apply OD4.30. The government (and some other stakeholders, such as GTZ) considered the resettlement package expensive, and raised concerns about precedents being set, which would be impossible to follow in future non-Bank-funded activities. A less comprehensive compensation package might not have raised the same concern about the project having shifted all its emphasis and resources onto resettlement activities.

### **Inter-institutional Coordination**

- When significant activities in the critical path, such as the research and monitoring, are to be carried out by a cooperating institution (NMK, DRSRS), rather than directly by the executing agency (KWS), it is essential to ensure that the operational linkages for this collaboration are clear and workable. A functional Project Steering Committee, where inter-institutional bottlenecks can be identified and addressed, will then be all the more important to ensure performance of all partners.

### **Bank-GEF Coordination**

- Conflict can arise when the Bank (as implementing agency) must follow its internal operational policies and procedures when it comes to issues like resettlement, and GEF (as the source of funding) chooses to not finance the implementation activities necessary for compliance with Bank policies.

## **9. Partner Comments**

*(a) Borrower/implementing agency:*

Kenya Wildlife Service own assessment of the Project and its outcomes

### A. Project Data

Report Date	March 26, 2002	
Name	Tana River Primate National Reserve Conservation Project, GE-P001217	Grant Number TF028500
Recipient	Government of Kenya	Terms: Grant
Sector	Environment/Natural Resource Management	Sub-sector Biodiversity conservation
Starting Date	July 1, 1997	
Closing Date	July 31, 2001	Extension Requested: June 30, 2003 Extension Granted: Six Months from July 1 to Dec. 31, 2001 Actual Closing: December 31, 2001
Executing agency	Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS)	
Funding	SDR 4,24 million (US\$6.2 million equivalent)	Financing Plan GEF-5.53 million <i>local</i> and 0.67 million <i>foreign</i> , KWS- 0.85 million <i>local</i> and <i>local</i> communities – 0.09 million <i>local</i> .
<p><b>Beneficiaries:</b> Tana River Primate National Reserve (TRPNR), the people who rely on its resources, Kenya Wildlife Service and contracted implementing partners and collaborating agencies (National Museums of Kenya (NMK), Department of Remote Sensing and Resource Surveys (DRSRS) and Institute of Primate Research (IPR)</p>		
<p><b>Project Description:</b> To support the conservation of a unique and diverse biological community in Kenya. The TRPNR contains the last remaining contiguous area of indigenous riverine forest and protects two endangered Tana Red Colobus and Tana Crested Mangabey monkeys. The project was to demonstrate how research could assist managers to preserve a complex and fragile ecosystem- one that very likely would not survive without active management interventions beyond simple protection. It was to strengthen KWS' capacity to protect and manage the reserve beyond traditional sense and, to promote greater involvement of local communities in conservation and management of an area that represents an important but deteriorating resource for them.</p>		

## B. Principal Performance Ratings

Outcome	Most objectives not achieved.	<b>Remarks:</b> Project ended when implementation was in top gear
Sustainability	Not sustainable	Risk of reversal of some results are high. New interventions are required
Institutional Development Impact	Minimally enhanced	

<b>Bank Performance</b>	Satisfactory	KWS received a lot of support from the Bank
<b>Beneficiaries Performance</b>	Satisfactory	However, let down by the sudden closure of the project

## C. Assessment of Objectives and Design

### 1. *Original Objective*

The long-term objective was to restore the integrity of the Tana River Primate National Reserve (TRPNR). The specific objectives included:

- a) Strengthening the capacity of KWS to protect and manage the reserve through border demarcation, institutional capacity building and community outreach programmes;
- b) Quantifying factors (abiotic, biotic, and human) threatening the integrity of the TRPNR and its flora and fauna;
- c) Providing solutions to the threatened integrity through interventions such as improved management, ecological restoration and rehabilitation, community awareness raising, and development;
- d) Monitoring trends of ecological indicators and species population dynamics;
- e) Creating conservation awareness to the communities;
- f) Designing and implementing a flexible Reserve Management Plan for the TRPNR.
- g) Helping conserve forest patches occurring outside the TRPNR; and
- h) Assisting families resident in the Reserve to relocate outside on a voluntary basis.

### 2. *Original Components*

The project had three components:

- a) **Research and Monitoring:** was to provide information necessary for making informed management decisions and to establish a database on ecological and biodiversity parameters including key indicator species. The component was implemented by the National Museums of Kenya (NMK), Department of Remote Sensing and Resource Survey (DRSRS), Institute of Primate Research (IPR) and KWS. Thirteen research proposals were identified, which together were to address priority needs for ecosystem studies, species inventory, information management, human utilization of forest resources and population status of endangered species:

- i) Forest restoration
- ii) Land-use mapping and livestock/wildlife relationships
- iii) Primate genetics
- iv) Primate survey, inventory and monitoring
- v) Avifauna inventory and monitoring
- vi) Herpetofauna inventory and monitoring
- vii) Plant survey and inventories
- viii) Invertebrate survey and monitoring
- ix) Mammals and vegetation monitoring
- x) Ethnobiology
- xi) Palynology
- xii) Hydrological trends
- xiii) Wetlands and fish ecology and resources

In addition, US\$50,000 was allocated to a rapid response research fund in order to respond to requests from management for information needed to make urgent management decisions.

b) *Reserve management*: was to provide incremental support to enable KWS develop an adaptive management system that can effectively address the challenges facing sustainable management of TRPNR area, including protection and administration. This component was implemented by KWS. Its focus was on:

- i) improving security, management capacity and facilities;
- ii) determining priorities for management-oriented research programmes, and implementing conservation and development recommendations arising from this research;
- iii) strengthening conservation of biodiversity by supporting local initiatives to conserve unprotected forest patches or other biologically diverse areas, and supporting community conservation projects that would increase the supply of resources traditionally collected from forests, or alternatives;
- iv) enhancing appreciation and understanding of wildlife conservation in the region by involving local people in ecological monitoring and eco-tourism activities; and
- v) liaising with national and district bodies whose activities impact the reserve ecosystem.

c) *Community participation and development*: was to enlist the participation of the local people in the conservation the ecology of the reserve and improve their socio-economic position. Essentially, it was implemented by KWS and, consisted of the following elements:

- i) Small-scale community projects (micro-projects). An endowment fund of US\$350,000 was to be established to finance micro-projects beyond the life of the project.
- ii) Capacity building: An endowment fund of US\$400,000 was to be established to support activities under this element.
- iii) Encouraging out-migration: US\$400,000 was earmarked for this. In addition, two goodwill projects were to be implemented.

The objectives were clear realistic and important for Kenya and the wildlife sub-sector. They were in line with the country's policy and strategy to conserve biodiversity as well as improvement of the socio-economic life of the local community. If realized as envisaged, they would benefit the local people, Tana River district, Kenya and mankind.



## **D. Achievement of Objectives**

### ***Outcome/Achievement of Objective***

Achievement of objectives of this project should be assessed within the context of exceptional and complex social, economic and political environments in and around the TRPNR. The divisions, long standing conflicts and suspicions within the local communities greatly affected the achievement of objectives. Although the overall objectives reflected essential priorities for conservation and management of the TRPNR, the local social, economic and political conditions veered project implementation. As a result, project emphasis, strategies and sequencing of activities changed. On the other hand, the objectives allowed flexibility in response to changing constraints and opportunities.

### ***Outputs by Components***

#### **a) Research and Monitoring**

- ❖ Institutional collaborations between NMK, DRSRS IPR and KWS were enhanced. A research and monitoring team comprising of individuals from these institutions was built. This team contributed a great deal to the research ecological monitoring outputs and development of the Adaptive Management Plan of TRPNR.
- ❖ Institutional capacities of NMK and KWS to carry out research and monitoring were enhanced. Research equipment, as well as vehicles were procured for them to use.
- ❖ The NMK conducted biodiversity surveys of fauna and flora in the reserve and its environs. Comprehensive checklists of vertebrate and invertebrate species were compiled. The fauna checklists are as follows: Fish-31, Mammals-45, Birds-135, Amphibians-9 and reptiles-12. The checklists have been stored in computer databases at NMK and KWS.
- ❖ As a result of conducting fauna surveys, new species of catfish, *Synodontis manni* was discovered in the lower Tana. One scientific paper was published in a referenced journal and one internal technical report was prepared. The ethnobiology component documented the history of the local community and how they use and conserve natural resources in the reserve.
- ❖ DRSRS carried out two livestock/wildlife surveys. Results showed that populations of Grant gazelle, Giraffe, Ostrich, Waterbuck, Burchell's Zebra, Elephant and Oryx had declined in Tana River District. This was attributed to many factors including poaching and drought (DRSRS, 2001).
- ❖ DRSRS and Capacity Development Africa (CDA) conducted land use/cover mapping of the TRPNR and its environs. Results from aerial photo interpretation show that in 2000 approximately 397 ha and 1883 ha were under cultivation and forest cover respectively. From 1994 aerial photographs, cultivated land was 212 ha while the forest cover was 1,907 ha.
- ❖ Primate census was conducted between January and March 2001. The exercise was coordinated by IPR and participants were drawn from KWS, Moi University, Kenyatta University, East African Wildlife Society and NMK. The census results were presented at a workshop that was on September 27, 2001. Fifty-nine (59) groups of Crested Mangabey and 82 groups of Red Colobus were counted in the entire range. The total population was estimated to be between 1,796 and 2,344 for Mangabey and between 736 and 841 individuals for the Red Colobus. It was estimated that 46% of the Red Colobus and 56% of the

Mangabey populations are inside the reserve. IPR is still working with the Kenya Primate Conservation Group (KPCG) to produce the final report.

- ❖ A computer database of inventories of vascular plants and vertebrates species has been established at KWS. It uses MAB flora and MAB fauna computer software for biological inventories. A spatial database was also being developed using Arc/info GIS software.

- ❖ Primate monitoring of the two endangered primates inside the reserve was on-going with valuable assistance from the KPCG. The KPCG and KWS are continuing to implement this activity even after the end of the Tana GEF project. Six research assistants are collecting data under the supervision of the KWS Project Scientist. Plans are underway to expand primate monitoring outside the reserve.

#### *b) Forest Restoration*

The objective of forest restoration and research program was to restore the ecological integrity of TRPNR. This was to be achieved through tree planting in surrendered farms, enrichment planting in degraded forests and weed management to promote growth of naturally regenerating seedlings of target species. Priority was given to planting in farms, as it was in those areas where great impact was envisaged. By the time of project closure, the following had been achieved:

- ❖ A nursery with capacity to produce over 10,000 seedlings per year was established. Seedling production was started in March 2001 and 8,534 seedlings of 12 tree species produced by end of December 2001.

- ❖ 5,217 seedlings were outplanted by end of December 2001. About 3,784 seedlings were planted by farmers within the reserve while the rest were planted during tree planting publicity day or issued to individual farmers.

- ❖ Water pumps and delivery hose water pipes bought for watering seedlings during drought depending on need.

- ❖ Forest restoration capacity was enhanced by training locally recruited staff in dryland forestry, holding training meetings for farmers and through attachment of graduate volunteer.

- ❖ The tree planting publicity day, organized in collaboration with East Africa Wildlife Society (EA WLS) was used to launch Mnazini Youth Group from the neighboring Mnazini Village and Tana Delta Environmental Management Forum (TADEMFO).

- ❖ TADEMFO is the umbrella body for coordinating the activities of all the Community Based Organizations (CBOs) operating within the Tana Delta and it is in the formative stage.

- ❖ Phenological study had commenced. It was being undertaken by KWS officers and was focusing on canopy tree species that are rated highly in the provision of food resources for primates and important habitat components. Trees were being monitored to record foliar conditions, flowering and seed development patterns.

- ❖ Terms of reference for an NGO to assist in community forestry outside the reserve was developed and submitted to World Bank.

❖ Links between KWS and research institutions like the Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI) has been established.

❖ Research activities were linked to reserve management and community development, and local community capacity building and participation were being strengthened.

**c) Reserve Management:**

❖ The general security situation in the reserve and its adjacent areas has greatly improved as a result of pronounced KWS presence. The banditry menace that used to be there is no more. As a result, poaching of game animals and disruptions of human life have stopped.

❖ Procurement of services to prepare drawings and costing ended prematurely because the Bank could not give KWS a 'no objection' to undertake comprehensive civil works in the reserve as envisaged in the project proposal.

❖ A five-year management plan for TRPNR was prepared. A participatory planning process was used during the preparation of plan. All key stakeholders in TRPNR ecosystem were involved in this exercise. Two stakeholder workshops and two technical workshops were held during the planning process.

❖ The new site for the reserve headquarters has been cleared. The 7 shades to house 21 rangers' unipots have been put up. The water supply system and the new road to the new site are incomplete. Movement of the warden's prefabricated to the new site is yet to be undertaken. Construction of an office, an armory and a store had not started.

❖ The airstrip at Baomo was improved; bushes were cleared and murram was added and compacted along the landing strip/surface.

❖ Rangers have been trained to use GPs and fill data sheets. They now submit reliable vegetation and animal data to the headquarters. The data are based on what they observe when out in the field on patrols.

❖ Forest destruction activities had stopped as a result of intensified ranger patrols.

❖ Management Plan Implementation Committee (MPIC) had been established. This committee would replace the defunct Joint Reserve Management Committee (JPMC). The objective of having the MPIC was to assist the Warden-in-charge to manage the TRPNR ecosystem. Members of the committee include the county council, community members, NGO and GOK officers.

❖ The court case between the community and KWS over "ownership" and management of the reserve has not been determined. The court is yet to give a notification of the next hearing date. In the meantime, the reserve borders have been demarcated.

**d) Community Participation and Development:**

❖ Several meetings with the community members, local leaders, county council and government officials were held in the initial stages of project implementation. It is through these meetings that awareness creation and education about the project were undertaken. This process took long and delayed project implementation due to diverse community perceptions and conflicting interests.

❖ Participatory Rural appraisal (PRA) was undertaken.

- ❖ Two local institutions were created to assist project implementation; the Voluntary Relocation Assistance Unit (VRAU) and the Host Committee.
- ❖ A resettlement plan was developed and the World Bank approved it. The plan followed the World Bank Involuntary Settlement Guidelines.
- ❖ Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the proposed resettlement programme of 247 families at Witu II was undertaken and the Bank approved the report.
- ❖ The Government of Kenya allocated three parcels of land for purposes of resettling the people living/dependent on the TRPNR. These are Witu II Settlement Scheme, Lango la Simba and Danisa Galili.
- ❖ A total of 6,000 acres of land at Witu II Settlement Scheme have been surveyed and demarcated. These include, 274 farm plots and 247 house plots and the rest are for public utilities.
- ❖ The District Settler Selection Committee has allocated the farm and house plots to the 247 relocating families. Letters of allotment and title deeds are yet to be given to these families.
- ❖ Building materials for Hara Primary School have been procured and delivered on site. The community is mobilizing funds to start construction work.
- ❖ Community-Based Animal Health Care (CBAHC) work for the Wardei pastoralists by the Catholic Diocese of Garissa with the support of Relief Services (CRS) and KWS had started. Curriculum development, socio-economic data collection and selection of 10 youths to train had been completed. The drug store has been put up in the village and the initial drugs and kits have been procured and delivered. CRS through the Diocese of Garissa will fund the actual training and follow-up activities.
- ❖ The Ministry of Lands and Settlement is preparing of letters of allotment and title deeds to be issued to the 247 families. After this process, each family will legally own 15 acres of farmland and 0.25 of an acre of house plot.
- ❖ KWS, GOK and GTZ together planned to implement the resettlement programme. They reached agreement to contract the GTZ most of the work, since GTZ has over 20 years' experience settling landless Kenyans in the same area. Thereafter, a 'no objection' from the Bank to contract GTZ was not given.
- ❖ In addition to the 247 families, about 200 more families had expressed interest in resettlement.

#### **E. Institutional Development Impact**

The project's institutional development was modest. Beside the vehicles, computers and equipment, KWS personnel received on job training and experience in research and monitoring, reserve management using improved technologies and community development.

## **F. Major Factors that affected implementation and outcome**

These were:

- a) Local politics.
- b) El nino rains in 1997 and 1998.
- c) Emphasis on resettlement not only expanded the community component but also shifted the focus of the whole project.
- d) Freezing and staggering of implementation of some components.
- e) Unrealistic time frame of four years.
- f) Policy shift on funding resettlement and consequently the whole project.

## **G. Cost and Financing**

Low spending was recorded between 1997 and 1999. This is attributed to scaling down of the activities in the research and monitoring, and reserve management components to allow the community component to catch up. Natural phenomenon such as the El Nino rains of 1997/98 affected the rate at which activities could be implemented. Delay in implementation was also affected by the long time it took to enter into agreement with partner institutions (DRSRS and NMK) on modalities of implementing project activities. However, despite these shortcomings, there was improvement in spending during 2000/2001 financial year partly because of accelerated implementation of the research and community components and also because of receiving funding through the project account.

## **H. Sustainability**

### ***Transitional Arrangements to Regular Operation***

- ❖ Letters of allotment and title deeds will be issued to 247 families. Pressure on the reserve will reduce if this number of families moves to Witu II Settlement Scheme.
- ❖ Adaptive management plan will be revised and implemented on a reduced scale. KWS will enhance security and law enforcement in the reserve.
- ❖ KWS will continue with research and ecological monitoring activities in the reserve. It will work closely with Primate Conservation Group to monitor the primates. Similarly, it will work closely with other partners to undertake research and monitor the reserve ecosystem.
- ❖ KWS and partners will jointly develop fundable proposals.

## **I. Government of Kenya Performance**

The Government Of Kenya through its Ministry of Lands and Settlement did set aside land for resettlement of the farming community at Tana River Primate National Reserve. The Tana River District administration led the land identification exercise and it steered the Voluntary Relocation Assistance Unit (VRAU). The GOK assisted in ground water surveys at Witu II resettlement scheme and preparation of building designs. GOK also sent an appeal to GEF to extend the project to safeguard the gains made during the implementation of the project. The performance of GOK was good.

#### J. Bank Performance

The Bank conducted regular supervision/review visits. These visits built pressure on KWS to deliver. The Bank reviewed project performance and advised on necessary subsequent actions. The relationship between the Bank and KWS was good.

#### K. Lessons Learned

1. Community participation and commitment cannot be hurried or forced to adhere to externally imposed timetable, but must proceed at the pace set by the community.
2. The vulnerability of externally funded big conservation projects to external policy changes and forces. There can be detrimental shifts in commitment and change of mind on the part of donors.

*(b) Cofinanciers:*

N/A

*(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):*

#### 10. Additional Information

## Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

### Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix	Projected in last PSR	Actual/Latest Estimate
Ecological integrity of the TRNPR and forest habitats increased as reflected by increase in quality, quantity and connectivity of habitats and stability of primate populations and social structure.	Decline in habitat quality and quantity slowed or eliminated and vulnerability of primate populations reduced. A measurable reduction in pressure on critical habitats achieved.	Habitat quality and quantity has slightly declined and vulnerability of primate populations has slightly increased. Primate habitat quantity has declined by at least 5 percent both inside and outside of the Reserve. Human needs for and competition with target species for forest resources have not decreased within the project zone.
2. A viable basis for cooperative management of the TRNPR and critical habitats within the project zone has been established.	KWS capacity for implementing a cooperative reserve management regime increased and community participation strengthened significantly. An adaptive management system based on knowledge of ecological processes and resources developed and draft plan submitted. A functional reserve management unit in place.	KWS capacity for managing community dialogue has increased, but - following cancellation of resettlement plan - community resentment makes ongoing dialogue difficult. Cooperative management has only partially been implemented. A draft adaptive management plan has been developed reflecting interim research results. The joint reserve management committee is not functional at project closure.
3. Physical security and economic wellbeing of residents in and around the reserve increased	Insecurity in TRPNR mitigated through KWS presence Community welfare increased through improved sustainable livelihoods in and around the reserve, and through successful voluntary relocation to lands with secure tenure rights.	Security has increased due to KWS presence. Alternative livelihood options have not been realized. Access to alternative land resources has been partially achieved, but successful relocation of all participants in the resettlement program is not guaranteed.
4. Resettlement of 247 families (about 60% of those now utilizing reserve's natural resources) complete	significant progress was being made to accomplish this task.	Resettlement plans were completed. Compensation halted. Titting of land and preparation land title deeds was in progress. Issuance of titles will proceed with support from Government

### Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix	Projected in last PSR	Actual/Latest Estimate
1 Improved knowledge of the biological composition of TRNPR and the project zone.	Baseline studies of flora and fauna completed	10 of the 13 studies described in the PD undertaken. Baseline field studies completed. Final reports pending.
Identification of critical biological and ecological elements for monitoring and a sustainable monitoring program in place.	Definition of specific indicators for ecological monitoring; design and implementation of a monitoring program.	Some indicators defined. Monitoring program designed and implemented for primates and habitat quality. Hydrological studies and monitoring program not implemented.
Security of reserve area improved. KWS' capacity to protect and manage the Reserve strengthened (through improved and effective utilization of personnel and non-personnel resources). Patrols and reporting improved. Follow up actions by management documented. Use of GPS and computer	Additional rangers posted to reserve and provided with necessary training and equipment	An additional 7 rangers and a senior warden posted to the reserve in 1998. Rangers trained in the use of basic monitoring techniques. Close liaison established with local authorities and adjacent communities.
Improved infrastructure for research and reserve management within the TRNPR.	Adequate facilities to support research, monitoring and reserve management established.	Physical facilities improved and functional: Water and electrical supplies upgraded at Mchalele Research camp. Reserve headquarters construction not completed but expected to be in April 2002. Construction completed by March 2002: perimeter fence around HQ compound, new road entrance, reliable water supply, shade structures to

An Adaptive Management Plan for the Reserve and forests within the project zone developed, endorsed by community and under implementation.	AMP developed, endorsed by communities and operational as a framework for cooperative management of the Reserve and adjacent critical habitats.	accommodate 21 ranger unipots, storage shed/motor pool. Reserve airstrip upgraded. AMP prepared but not yet endorsed by communities. Consequences of project closure on availability of funding and farmland for forest restoration not fully incorporated in the AMP.
A forest restoration program set-up to enhance habitat quality and quantity.	A nursery and forest program started in TRPNR and forest enrichment undertaken.	A nursery established near Michalet Research Camp. Some replanting undertaken in abandoned farmland of families preparing to relocate. Nursery now operated by two local assistants recruited under the project and retained by KWS, and producing seedlings for restoration and enrichment planting.
A participatory co-ordination mechanism established to advise on matters pertaining to the management of TRPNR.	A Joint Reserve Management Committee (JRMC) established with representatives from KWS, local government and elected community representatives, to meet quarterly, and to attend to conflict resolution and provide a forum for community participation.	JRMC constituted in 1995 and met frequently, but elected community representatives only replaced appointed members in early 1998. Since August 1998, JRMC not operational. The AMP refers to the need to reconstitute this forum to implement the Plan.
Alternative livelihood base established for residents within and adjacent to the reserve through the implementation of microprojects and income generating activities based on the sustainable use of resources within and outside of the reserve.	Participatory establishment of Community Action Plans (CAPs) and implementation of microprojects selected in the CAPs. Identification and piloting of alternative livelihood strategies which do not threaten the sustainability of the reserve. Determination of sustainable use levels for reserve resources by local residents and strategies to foster sustainable resource use established.	CAPs developed in late 1999 through PRA processes, but the output was not considered an adequate basis for implementation. No micro-projects developed. No alternative livelihood options identified within the project zone. No sustainable use strategies for reserve resources and forest resources within the project zone established.
Voluntary out migration of communities farming in the reserve supported and undertaken to reduce pressure on reserve resources	Alternative land made available expeditiously by GOK and voluntary out-migration supported through legal, financial and technical assistance to identify and acquire alternative land and increase its productivity.	Alternative land made available in Project Year-3 (1999). A resettlement plan drafted in line with WB guidelines (OD 4.30) and accepted by 247 families. An additional 100 families expressed interest to participate in resettlement. The plan was not implemented and only letters of allotment and eventually title deeds will be issued to the 247 families.
Goodwill projects completed to encourage community co-operation with the project and KWS.	Two goodwill projects (one for each location) implemented immediately after project effectiveness	One goodwill project (Wenje, school administrative block) completed over the course of the project
Endowment Funds established which ensure continued funding for projects to reduce pressure on the reserve after project closure.	A Micro-project endowment fund (US\$ 350,000) and an Education Endowment Fund (US\$400,000) established.	No endowment funds established. After slow start to establish the funds, the concentration on resettlement put preparation of the endowment funds on hold.
Effective management structure put in place to ensure smooth implementation of project activities and ensure sustainability beyond project closures.	Management structure built up in KWS, drawing on expertise of selected outside experts working closely with and within the structures of KWS departments.	Integration of external experts into the KWS management structure not successful. Following the appointment of an all-KWS team, implementation performance improved significantly over the last two years. Most staff now reassigned to other activities, and sustainability therefore questionable.
Effective project co-ordination mechanisms in place for stakeholder dialogue and communication.	Project Steering Committee (PSC) formed with KWS, GOK, research and NGO representatives. Meetings held quarterly to act as a project executive board, ensure effective collaboration, review appointments and contracts, oversee monitoring and evaluation, approve annual workplans and resolve any issues in implementation.	PSC formed, but records exist of only one meeting held in 1998, which approved the annual workplan and confirmed some appointments. PSC not functional throughout most of the implementation period.

End of project



## Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

### Project Cost by Component (in US\$ million equivalent)

<b>Project Cost By Component:</b>	<b>Appraisal Estimate US\$ million</b>	<b>Actual/Latest Estimate US\$ million</b>	<b>Percentage of Appraisal</b>
Research & Monitoring	1.46	0.36	0.25
Reserve Management	1.47	0.46	0.31
Community Conservation and Development	2.43	0.37	0.15
Project Coordination and Management	0.39	0.72	0.018
<b>Total Baseline Cost</b>	<b>5.75</b>	<b>1.91</b>	
<b>Physical Contingencies</b>	<b>0.09</b>		
<b>Price Contingencies</b>	<b>0.36</b>		
<b>Total Project Costs</b>	<b>6.20</b>	<b>1.91</b>	
<b>Total Financing Required</b>	<b>6.20</b>	<b>1.91</b>	

### Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US\$000)

<b>Item</b>	<b>ICB</b>	<b>NCB</b>	<b>Other<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Total</b>
Civil Works		808.50 (735.00)		808.50 (735.00)
Vehicles and Equipment*	115.00 (115.00)	243.00 (243.00)	147.20 (135.00)	505.20 (493.00)
Consultants' Services and training*			1,755.00 (1,755.00)	1,755.00 (1,755.00)
Goods, works and services for Microprojects**			1,600.00 (1,600.00)	1,600.00 (1,600.00)
Relocation Assistance**			440.00 (440.00)	440.00 (440.00)
Operating Costs			1,412.40 (1,177.00)	1,412.40 (1,177.00)
<b>Total</b>	<b>115.00 (115.00)</b>	<b>1,051.50 (978.00)</b>	<b>5,973.20 (5,107.00)</b>	<b>7,139.70 (6,200.00)</b>

\* Vehicles and Equipment & Consultants' Services and training have been merged into 1 category.

\*\* Goods, works and services for Microprojects & Relocation Assistance have been split into 2 categories.

**Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual) (US\$000)**

Item	ICB	NCB	Other <sup>1</sup>	Total
Civil Works			284.00 (229.40)	284.00 (229.40)
Vehicles and Equipment	178.00 (160.20)	61.00 (54.90)	210.00 (181.84)	449.00 (396.94)
Consultants' services and training			516.60 (516.60)	516.60 (516.00)
Goods, works and services for Microprojects			137.17 (118.21)	137.17 (118.21)
Relocation Assistance			115.83 (115.83)	115.83 (115.83)
Operating costs			429.00 (385.97)	429.00 (385.97)
Total	178.00 (160.20)	61.00 (54.90)	1,692.60 (1,547.85)	1,931.60 (1,760.35)

<sup>1</sup> Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the GEF Grant. All costs include contingencies.

**Project Financing by Component (In US\$ million equivalent)**

Component	Appraisal Estimate			Actual/Latest Estimate			Percentage of Appraisal		
	Bank	Govt.	CoF.	Bank	Govt.	CoF.	Bank	Govt.	CoF.
Research & Monitoring	1.63	0.03		0.22	0.02		13.5	66.7	
Reserve Management	1.66	0.73		0.35	0.06		21.1	8.2	
Community Conservation and Development	2.49	0.13		0.27	0.03		10.8	23.1	
Project Coordination and Management	0.42	0.05		0.52	0.08		123.8	160.0	

### **Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits**

Not applicable

#### Annex 4. Bank Inputs

*(a) Missions:*

Stage of Project Cycle		No. of Persons and Specialty (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)		Performance Rating	
Month/Year		Count	Specialty	Implementation Progress	Development Objective
<b>Appraisal/Negotiation</b> 1995		5	ECOLOGIST, ANTHROPOLOGIST, RESEARCH SPECIALIST PROTECTED AREAS MGMT SPECIALIST		
<b>Supervision</b>					
1997		2	NRM, ECOLOGIST	S	S
1998		6	NRM, NGO SPECIALIST, SOCIOLOGIST, RESEARCH MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT, FMS, PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	U	U
1999		7	NRM, RESETTLEMENT SPECIALISTS, ECOLOGIST, PARK MNGT SPECIALIST, FMS, PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	U	U
2000		8	NRM, ECOLOGIST, EIA SPECIALIST, RESETTLEMENT SPECIALIST, SOCIOLOGIST, FMS, PROCUREMENT	U	U
2001		3	NRM, ECOLOGIST, SOCIOL DEV. SPECIALIST	S	U
<b>ICR</b> 2002		3	NR ECONOMIST, BIODIVERSITY SPECIALIST, ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIALIST	U	U

*(b) Staff:*

Stage of Project Cycle	Actual/Latest Estimate	
	No. Staff weeks	US\$ ('000)
Appraisal/Negotiation	21.5	85,100
Supervision	114.5	145,300
ICR	12.2	14,700
Total	175.5	289,200

## Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

	Rating				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Macro policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Sector Policies</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input checked="" type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Physical</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Financial</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input checked="" type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Institutional Development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Environmental</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input checked="" type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<b>Social</b>					
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Poverty Reduction</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input checked="" type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Gender</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input checked="" type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input checked="" type="radio"/> N	<input type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Private sector development</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Public sector management</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Other (Please specify)</i>	<input type="radio"/> H	<input type="radio"/> SU	<input type="radio"/> M	<input type="radio"/> N	<input checked="" type="radio"/> NA

## Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

### 6.1 Bank performance

#### Rating

- |  |                                 |                                |                                |                                 |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Lending</i>     | <input type="radio"/> <i>HS</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>S</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>U</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>HU</i> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Supervision</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>HS</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>S</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>U</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>HU</i> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Overall</i>     | <input type="radio"/> <i>HS</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>S</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>U</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>HU</i> |

### 6.2 Borrower performance

#### Rating

- |  |                                 |                                |                                |                                 |
|--|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Preparation</i>                           | <input type="radio"/> <i>HS</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>S</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>U</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>HU</i> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Government implementation performance</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>HS</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>S</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>U</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>HU</i> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Implementation agency performance</i>     | <input type="radio"/> <i>HS</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>S</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>U</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>HU</i> |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> <i>Overall</i>                               | <input type="radio"/> <i>HS</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>S</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>U</i> | <input type="radio"/> <i>HU</i> |

## **Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents**

### **KENYA: Tana River Primate National Reserve Implementation Completion Mission. March 11 – March 27, 2002 AIDE MEMOIRE**

An FAO/WB Cooperative Programme Mission composed of Astrid Agostini (Natural Resource Economist, FAO, Team Leader) and Ken Creighton (Conservation Biologist, Consultant) visited Kenya from March 11-27, 2002 to prepare the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Tana River Primate National Reserve project (the Project). The mission worked closely with KWS and held discussions with other key institutions involved in project implementation. Institutions consulted included the National Museums of Kenya (NMK), including its Institute of Primate Research (IPR), the Department of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing (DRSRS), the Tana River County Council (TRCC), the East African Wildlife Society (EAWS), the Ministry of Lands and Settlements and GTZ. The mission also consulted the former directors of KWS – Dr. Leakey, Dr. Western and Dr. Rotich. A close liaison was maintained with the World Bank (WB) Task Team Leader.

The mission undertook a field visit to the Reserve and the seat of the district administration in Hola as well as to the resettlement scheme Witu II. The mission would like to thank KWS and co-operating agencies for the excellent arrangements made during the field visit and for support provided in the preparation of this report. The mission's preliminary findings are reported in this Aide Memoire. All findings are subject to confirmation and revision in the final ICR.

#### **Methodology**

The mission assembled this report drawing on the insight gained from meeting with numerous stakeholders in Tana and Nairobi, a review of extensive documentation made available by the KWS management team and the World Bank including progress reports, technical reports, work plans and key correspondence as well as supervision mission Aide Memoires, Project Status Reports and Back-to-Office reports.

#### **Background**

The project became effective in July 1997. Although the project document foresaw an implementation period of five years, the grant and project documents signed in February 1997 stipulate June 30, 2001 as the date for grant termination. During the Mid Term Review (MTR), carried out in December 1998, it was agreed to slow down research and reserve management related activities pending progress on identifying suitable land for resettlement. These other activities picked up with full pace again in 2000. At the point of closure, the project had reached its high point of activity – an adaptive reserve management plan had been prepared in consultation with stakeholders and was awaiting endorsement, and the preparations for the voluntary relocation of 247 families farming inside the reserve had been finalized. KWS and the WB had prepared and expected a two year extension to complete project activities. The WB consulted the Global Environment Facility (GEF) regarding a reallocation of the original resources to finance the resettlement plan developed in conformance with WB policies regulations on involuntary resettlement. As the GEF indicated reluctance to authorize use of GEF funds for voluntary resettlement activities, the WB granted a six months extension to allow further dialogue and to explore alternative funding options. This dialogue was not successful and hence the project was closed on December 31, 2001 leaving the implementation of the adaptive management plan and the resettlement

plan in suspension. The abrupt closure of the project 4 and ½ years into implementation has been an key factor influencing project accomplishments and hence the conclusions reflected in this Aide Memoire. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and Quality at Entry

#### Original Objective

The objectives of the project were to conserve the unique biological community of the Tana River riparian forests, to incorporate the results of targeted research and monitoring into management of a fragile and complex ecosystem and to reduce identified threats to ecological integrity and survival of the forest ecosystem. It was recognized that to achieve these objectives it would be necessary to identify and implement an effective management program for the forest ecosystem taking into account the interests of the full range of stakeholders affected by the project with a specific focus on people living within and adjacent to the Tana River Primate National Reserve (TRPNR). These objectives remained unchanged throughout the project.

It was recognized during project preparation that options to maintain and restore the lower Tana River forests are constrained by changing ecological conditions created by upstream dams and diversions of the river during recent decades that have led to shrinkage in riparian forest cover and diminution of agricultural potential within the project zone. Changes in flow volume and seasonality of flooding have and are affecting the area on which forests can grow. Some die-off of forests in the project zone is the result of changes in ground water levels caused by changes in the flow volume and flood regime induced by upstream developments. Similarly, development of new forest patches via natural succession driven by river meandering has been reduced. These same hydrological changes affect the viability of agricultural land within the riparian zone. Thus, the amount of viable land for both natural forest growth and agriculture has declined during the past two decades, resulting in increased competition for usable land and more intense human harvesting of resources within the remaining forest patches.

A key element to achieving the project objectives was the engagement of communities living within and adjacent to the TRPNR and other stakeholders in a systematic, continuous and transparent dialog to identify options and resolve issues related to use of scarce land and biological resources within the project area. Upon identification of technically sound and socially acceptable measures to reconcile human needs for resources and ecological requirements for maintaining viability of the forest biota, the project was to finance their implementation in full compliance with relevant policies of the Government of Kenya, the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility. From the early stages of project identification it was recognized that some voluntary human resettlement was going to be required to strike an ecological balance that would permit maintenance of adequate forest quantity and quality to sustain the endangered primate species endemic to the region and some Pokomo families had already indicated their interest in voluntary relocation at the time of project preparation. Sustainability of project achievements was to be assured by adoption of a flexible management regime to be implemented in conformance with an Adaptive Management Plan to be agreed among the stakeholders and informed by project sponsored scientific studies. Implementation of the management plan was to be under the leadership of the Kenya Wildlife Service with meaningful participation of local institutions such as the Tana River County Council, the regional development authority and the residents of local communities represented by elected representatives. The outcome of project activities was to result in measurably increased ecological security of the forest biota and sustainability of the management regime as reflected by key indicators and demonstrably increased economic security and well-being of local residents.



## **Original components**

**Research and Monitoring:** Supporting necessary baseline studies to identify the composition and status of flora and fauna within the TRNPR and adjacent forest and aquatic habitats and the underlying factors affecting their present status and constraining future management options. The research program was to address five priority areas:

- (a) monitoring of primate populations, genetics and habitat parameters;
- (b) baseline and monitoring surveys of flora and fauna;
- (c) studies and monitoring of the Tana River hydrological system and its ecological effects (on aquatic and riparian ecological communities);
- (d) human resource utilization (to establish sustainable use levels for forest products); and,
- (e) prospects and methods for promoting and facilitating community-based conservation of remaining forest patches outside the Reserve boundaries.

Implementation was to be guided by a Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC).

**Reserve Management:** Supporting development of an adaptive management system to restore the integrity of the TRNPR and maintain or enhance the habitat quality and productive potential of adjacent riverine forests along the lower Tana River. The reserve management component was to include:

- (a) measures to enhance security within the reserve and adjacent areas;
- (b) measures to reduce poaching and agricultural encroachment in the reserve;
- (c) improvement of physical facilities for reserve management, research and monitoring;
- (d) establishment of consultative and advisory bodies such as the Joint Reserve Management Committee (JRMC) and the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) to involve local communities in planning and management of project activities; and
- (e) preparation and implementation of an Adaptive Management Plan (AMP) for the Reserve with significant input from research studies and incorporating a rigorous and sustainable monitoring regime for key indicators related to the core project objectives.

Implementation was to be guided by the JRMC.

**Community Conservation and Development Component (CCDC):** the specific objectives of the CCDC were to build support among local communities and reduce pressure on reserve resources. This was to be achieved by:

- (a) supporting alternative livelihoods through the implementation of microprojects and income generating activities based on the sustainable use of resources within and outside of the reserve;
- (b) to encourage voluntary out migration of communities farming in the reserve by identifying and acquiring alternative land and increasing its productivity.

The communities immediately affected by the project are sedentary farmers (Pokomo) and pastoralists (Wardei). One Pokomo village only is located inside the reserve (Baomo village). Other Pokomo settlements are adjacent to the reserve, but occupy some farm land inside the reserve. The Wardei occupy a village adjacent to the reserve (Hara) and use reserve resources for emergency grazing. With respect to their attitude to the project the affected communities fell into three groups– those opposed to the project, those co-operating with the project and inclined to participate in voluntary relocation and those co-operating with the project but unwilling to leave their land in or around the reserve. Membership in these groups varied throughout the project. While the Wardei uniformly belonged to the last group, the local

Pokomo community was split across the three different groups. The village of Baomo remained hostile to the project throughout implementation. No other specific explanatory characteristics were identified by which the various Pokomo households differed across the three groups. Component implementation was to be guided and monitored by the Community Advisory Committee (CAC) comprising KWS and NGO stakeholders. Voluntary relocation activities were to be co-ordinated by a Voluntary Relocation Assistance Unit (VRAU).

#### Quality at Entry

The interdependent activities of the individual components (research and monitoring, reserve management and community development) provided a solid conceptual basis for achieving the objectives. While conceptually sound, the tight cross-linkage among components also contributed to the risk of delays in overall implementation if individual components failed to keep pace with the others. Factors determining the pace at which each component could be implemented were functionally independent (see discussion below). It was recognized at appraisal that the extensive engagement of communities in a systematically managed formal dialog intended to develop a plan for joint management of biological resources within and outside of the Reserve represented a fundamental change in approach from previous KWS methods and practices. It was also recognized that given the declining forest and arable land resource base, competition for increasingly scarce viable land and forest resources within the project zone was likely and that tradeoffs would need to be identified. Given the limited experience of KWS with "co-management" and negotiation of resource allocation, as well as the acknowledged diversity of opinions and attitudes toward the project among residents of the project zone, it might have been anticipated that the community development component would be the "rate limiting" factor during implementation. Sequencing of project activities rather than simultaneous implementation of all three components is an option that appears not to have been considered during project design and appraisal.

During project appraisal and negotiation it was agreed that final versions of ecological and socio-economic monitoring indicators would be provided prior to effectiveness, but this was not accomplished. The lack of agreed indicators over most of the project implementation cycle appears to have limited the performance of both KWS implementation and Bank supervision during project execution.

During the early phases of implementation, project staff reported through multiple reporting lines. However, the senior management authority stopped at the Deputy Director for Research and Planning rather than the Director of KWS. This probably resulted in less overall policy guidance and priority setting from the Director's office than was required to push progress and troubleshoot problems on this complex project. A direct reporting line to the Director would also have been more appropriate given early recognition that the project encompassed KWS's key policies and strategies at the time and would provide an excellent opportunity to pilot KWS's "ecosystem/conservation area" approach, the new "partnership" approach and the integration of research into protected area management.

Although it was agreed that a Community Advisory Committee, consistent with Terms of Reference included in the Project Document (PD), was to be established prior to project effectiveness this was not done until August 2000. The benefits that were foreseen through operation of the CAC (dialog with NGOs and effective dissemination of reliable information about project objectives and activities) were, therefore, not realized. This may have indirectly contributed to some of the negative press and community polarization that took place during project implementation. Despite agreements reached during appraisal (reaffirmed during negotiations) about the need for robust indicators to monitor progress, the need for a transparent channel for information flow and dialog (the CAC), and a need for top level policy guidance from KWS (e.g. Director level) the absence of these factors led to a "quality at effectiveness" that, in retrospect, must be considered unsatisfactory.

## **Achievement of Objectives and Outputs**

### **Outcome/Achievement of Objective**

The overall development objective of ensuring the survival of threatened biodiversity of global significance within the project region has been only partially met. As key indicators, the two species of globally threatened primates occurring within the project zone have maintained their population levels during the period of project implementation. However, habitat that is critical for the survival of these indicator species and, by extension, the rest of the biological elements that comprise this habitat, has declined during the project period. Estimates vary, but the consensus is that overall habitat quantity and quality within and outside of the reserve has declined, though the rate of decline may have moderated during the project period, in particular within the Reserve boundaries. Project sponsored research has yielded data that suggest the level of vulnerability of at least one of the target species (red colobus) has increased. Human activities that are incompatible with long term survival of the primates and the forest habitats upon which their survival depends have also increased within the project zone during implementation. The consensus of the research community is that the primate populations as well as the forests upon which they depend remain potentially viable at the time of project closure. However, given that the project did not resolve the underlying driving factor of human encroachment within and destruction of the critical habitats, the prospects for medium or long term sustainability of the status quo or improvement of the prospects for survival of the target elements are uncertain.

Following the cancellation of the resettlement program, the primary stakeholders in and around the reserve who have collaborated with the project are significantly worse off. In anticipation of relocation, many Pokomo families had abandoned their farms inside the reserve. They are now in a state of limbo surviving mainly on food aid and remittances, abused and mocked by other community members who had opposed the project from the beginning. Letters of allotment will be provided to the families who had signed up for resettlement. However, this is a small benefit compared to the hardship and destitution these families are faced with at the end of the project. It is unlikely that all families will take up the new land in Witu II in the absence of even the most basic of support for relocation including the formal showing of the land and the creation of access to the farmland which is fully overgrown with bush. The co-operating Wardei pastoralists in Hara village adjacent to the reserve who were to benefit from micro-projects and alternative grazing land have received a pile of stones for a school but no further funds to undertake construction. They will also benefit from some improvements in community based animal health care. No alternative dry season grazing land was set aside for exclusive use by the Hara people as had been envisaged in the original resettlement plan. During consultations with district authorities it was agreed that the identified land could not be made available for exclusive use by the Wardei as it was traditionally used by various groups. However, the availability of dry season grazing on communally used land was deemed to be sufficient, and resource use conflicts with the reserve were minimal. The Adaptive Management Plan makes specific allowance for use of parts of the reserve for grazing and stock watering during periods of severe drought conditions. Such use is considered compatible with overall Reserve management goals.

### **Outputs by Components**

***Project Co-ordination and Management:*** The Director, Research and Planning Department of KWS oversaw the management of the project. Originally, a dual co-ordination structure was proposed: A small number of externally recruited staff were to be funded by the project, including the Project Co-ordinator (PC), the Senior Research Scientist (SRS), the Community Development Specialist (CDS), a Data Analyst, Agroforester and Forest Restoration Research Officer all of whom would report administratively

to the PC. On technical aspects, however, the project staff as well as the regular KWS staff involved in project implementation were to report to the appropriate KWS line managers in the technical departments.

Recruitment of key project staff suffered significant delays. While the PC was recruited in July 1997 and the SRS joined the project in November 1997 it was only in August 1998 that management in the reserve was upgraded by posting a senior warden. The CDS was not recruited until July 1998 and the Community Partnership Officer only came on board in March 1998. Community Mobilisers (CMs) were only contracted in 1999. Some project positions were never filled (Agroforester) or only for parts of the project life (Data Analyst, Forest Restoration Officer). Throughout project implementation, staff turnover was high including three project co-ordinators, two field activities co-ordinators, two forestry officers, three accountants and, at the highest level, five Deputy Directors of Research and Planning and four Directors of KWS. The dual reporting lines (to the PC and to technical department heads) designed to ensure a close integration of Tana River GEF project activities into the regular work program of KWS led to problems in the earlier years of implementation as some technical department managers expected to have full control over staff activities and project resources which conflicted with the mandate of the PC. The “outsider status” of the PC and other project staff slowed down early implementation. A lack of familiarity with KWS procedures on the part of project staff was exacerbated by reduced co-operation of KWS insiders who resented their privileged position. Following approval in principle by the WB supervision mission in December 1999, project positions including the PC post were filled with regular KWS staff smoothing internal management procedures. The KWS management team which oversaw project implementation in the last 1-2 year of the project has significantly increased the level of activity and implementation performance compared to early project stages. They adhered to tight schedules to produce complex deliverables including contributions from many partner institutions, particularly in the context of the resettlement activities. Although the “outsider management” issue was thus resolved the project continued to be perceived as a set of interventions implemented separately from other KWS activities.

The overall direction of the project was to be guided by the Project Steering Committee (PSC), composed of key KWS staff, NMK, East Africa Wildlife Society (EAWS), African Centre for Conservation (ACC), Tana River Development Authority (TARDA) and National Environment Secretariat (NES) and chaired by the Director of KWS. The committee was to meet quarterly, advise on policy and implementation, approve staffing and workplans and review project progress. A meeting was held in November 1997 which confirmed staff appointments and reviewed the first annual workplan. KWS holds no records or minutes of further PSC meetings.

A project monitoring and evaluation plan was not prepared until May 2001 and was never implemented. However, certain technical indicators such as primate populations were monitored throughout project implementation (see Research and Monitoring) and terms of references for independent monitoring and evaluation of the planned resettlement activities were prepared. It was planned to broaden the scope of this monitoring and evaluation study to cover all project activities.

*Research and Monitoring:* The objectives of this component were:

- (a) to establish an adequate baseline against which to evaluate project performance in terms of conserving biodiversity;
- (b) to provide results to be used as input into the development of an adaptive management plan for the Reserve and adjacent critical habitats;
- (c) to design a monitoring program for key biodiversity, habitat, land use and forest product use indicators that could be used to measure project impact and that could be sustained after project closure to monitor that status of the biological environment.

The project has made significant progress in meeting intermediate milestones toward achievement of the overall objectives. Early termination of the project after four and one-half years of implementation has, however, resulted in a number of outputs for this component not being carried through to completion at the time of the ICR mission. The project design lacked sufficient indicators by which to measure expected outputs. The project mid-term review (MTR), however, outlines a number of specific objectives (including finalizing impact indicators) and target actions that were agreed. Accomplishment of the target actions and an assessment of their contributions toward meeting the objectives agreed during the MTR can be used as a surrogate for impact indicators. Implementation of this component has been negatively affected by two factors. First, substantial delays in financial reporting by NMK led to slow replenishment of the imprest account that was set up to effect payments for NMK implemented activities. The consequent lack of liquidity of funds effected both field schedules and purchase of essential supplies and equipment. The second factor affecting NMK performance was the apparent lack of an effective coordination mechanism within NMK to coordinate the complex schedules and demands of individual researchers to carry out their baseline studies. Field work would have benefited from a comprehensive annual work program and schedule which clearly identified the logistic implications of the work program and on which agreement with KWS could have been sought.

Thirteen specific studies were identified in the Project Document of which 10 were carried out during the project. Several additional studies were identified commissioned and carried out under the project. Design and coordination of the project research and monitoring plan was accomplished during a workshop held in November 1997. Interim research reports were compiled in 1998 and 1999. Outputs from this component related to the priority activities described above were as follows:

*(a) Monitoring of primate populations.* Monitoring of primate populations was ongoing throughout most of the project implementation period, with some gaps due to weather related field conditions (e.g. flooding related to El Nino rains in 1997) and security concerns that limited access by researchers (mid 2000). A team of two project-supported graduate students assisted by six locally recruited and trained field assistants carried out regular surveys of primate populations and recorded information on habitat loss/change during the period from 1997 to 2000. A more extensive census of primate populations and evaluation of forest patches inside and outside of the reserve was carried out in early 2001. Although methods used to estimate population size and status differed between the two project supported primate studies, both indicate a modest reduction in population size in one of two endangered primates endemic to the lower Tana River riparian forests (red colobus). Best current evidence indicates a slight decrease in overall population size of red colobus in the range of 0 – 5% over the interval from 1994 to 2000. The long term study also indicated a decline in mean group size during the duration of the study (1998-2000). For the second endangered primate species (crested mangabey), population estimates between the two studies show greater variance. A best estimate seems to be that the total mangabey population in the reserve and adjacent riverine forests is stable or possibly has slightly increased. The results of long term studies indicate there may have been some changes in mangabey behavior during the project period, with increased crop raiding, disappearance of some known groups and changes in residency and movement patterns noted. Three other non-human primate species are recorded as present within the reserve throughout the project period and their populations appear to have remained stable.

*(b) Habitat.* Both of the primate surveys described above also recorded data on human impacts on the size and quality of forest patches as habitat for the two endangered primate species as well as other changes in the size and habitat quality of forest patches. The long term study (1998-2000) recorded incidents of forest clearing for agriculture and of damage to or removal of important primate food trees (both inside and outside of the reserve). The 2001 census, using data derived from year 2000 satellite imagery and 1979 topographic maps estimated decreases in forest cover within and outside of the reserve

of 28% and 38%, respectively. An independent assessment of forest cover change based on aerial photography recorded in 1991 (partial), 1994 (partial), 1998 (partial) and 2000 (complete) indicated a modest decline (ca. 5%) in forest cover within and outside of the reserve during the project period. The root causes of habitat change prior to and during the project period are complex. Some decline is undoubtedly due to human impacts. An additional fraction of forest cover loss is due to forest senescence and the absence of compensatory regeneration. Lack of regeneration is due, in part, to changes in the hydrological regime caused by dam and diversion projects upstream from the project area as well as ongoing land use change from forest to agriculture due to local human interventions. The relative fraction of changes in forest cover that can be explained by each of these factors is difficult to determine from the data at hand.

*(c) Baseline and monitoring surveys of flora and fauna.* Baseline studies were conducted for birds, reptiles and amphibians, vascular plants, invertebrates, non-primate mammals, wetland ecology and fishes beginning in 1998 and continuing through 2001. Final reports for these are pending. Interim reports were submitted by NMK to KWS in 1998 and 1999. Monitoring plans are to be included in the final reports.

*(d) Studies and monitoring of the Tana River hydrological system and its ecological effects on aquatic and riparian ecological communities.* Terms of reference were developed for hydrological studies that were reviewed by the project Scientific Advisory Committee at meetings held in early 1998 and 1999. These studies were never initiated due to a decision following the project MTR to slow down implementation of the Research and Monitoring component while accelerating implementation of the Community component.

*(e) Human resource utilization (to establish sustainable use levels for forest products).* A masters thesis study was carried out during the project and completed in 2001. The study indicates that in the TRNPR the most frequently harvested tree species in the forest are also those upon which the two endangered primates are most reliant for food. An ethnobiology study was carried out to document the range of uses of plant species within the forests. However, no indications of sustainable use levels were established. The Adaptive Management Plan (2001-2006) identifies the continuing need for studies on human use of resources within the reserve to provide input to reserve management. Further studies were supposed to be undertaken to provide a basis for identifying options for sustainable livelihood investments outside the reserve. These were not accomplished.

*(f) Prospects and methods for promoting and facilitating community-based conservation of remaining forest patches outside the Reserve boundaries.* This study was not carried out. The Adaptive Management Plan (2001-2006) refers to plans to develop a collaboration with an NGO to promote community based conservation of external forests.

*(g) Forest Restoration.* Based on data from the primate studies on primary food resources of the two endangered primates a program to plant seedlings for habitat enrichment was initiated in 2001. Research involved experimenting with effective methods for seedling propagation and planting that could be employed by locally hired assistants, community labor and volunteers. Based on the initial research a seedling production and planting program was initiated that involved locally recruited and trained personnel managing the nursery and involved both paid and voluntary labor drawn from local communities for seedling planting and maintenance. This appears to be the best example of “collaborative management” achieved under the project.

*(h) Land Use Survey and Census of Communities.* The survey was carried out in 1996 to provide detailed information on current land use activities, in particular cultivation, within the TRNPR and a census of the people doing the cultivation.

(i) *Design of Research and Monitoring Network/Database.* The contract to create a database to archive research reports, maps, aerial photos, references and other information about the TRNPR was only completed in November 2001. The work done provides an adequate archive of information gathered during the project and previously but falls short of the goal of producing a “living” library and dynamic database to inform both reserve management and provide an interactive basis for defining and fine tuning future research needs and priorities.

The studies described above in sections (a), (b-part) and (c) were executed under a contract with the National Museums of Kenya. The 2001 Primate Census and Forest Evaluation (a- part) was executed by the Kenya Institute for Primate Research (NMK). Land cover and livestock studies were executed by the DRSRS. A subsequent land cover study was done by Capacity Development Africa (CDA) (b-part). Additional studies identified in the Project Document that were not carried out under the project were: palynology of the lower Tana River and primate genetics. The former was to provide historical information to augment the planned hydrological studies concerning river dynamics. The latter was to provide a basis for developing plans for maintaining genetic diversity within the Tana River populations of red colobus and mangabeys through active habitat management based, in part, on analyses of habitat quality, size and stability of forest fragments to be protected inside and outside of the Reserve and restoration activities to be undertaken under the project.

Although a substantial amount of baseline data and increased knowledge of the biological content and human uses of the Tana River forests was generated under the project, the Research and Monitoring Component has fallen short of achieving several of its most important objectives. First, despite three different studies of land use and land cover in the project zone financed under the project, there is still disagreement and lack of clarity concerning the quantity and habitat quality of forest cover remaining in the project zone and the rates and root causes of change in forest cover and habitat quality, both inside and outside of the reserve. Second, although two separate sets of primate studies commissioned under the project are in general agreement on overall population estimates for the two endangered primate species, there is less consensus over the vulnerability of the remaining primate populations due to habitat degradation, fragmentation and human disturbance. It is not possible to estimate what the status of the primates and their habitats would have been without the project but, the data available indicate that, at the time of project closure, both the primates and their habitat remain at significant risk of extinction. In the absence of hydrological studies that were intended to be done under the project but were not executed, there is a lack of clear understanding of the successional changes taking place in the riverine forests and, therefore it is difficult to define the scope and location of forest restoration and regeneration activities that would be appropriate. The recently prepared (2001) Adaptive Management Plan for the Reserve notes that data on human uses of the forest are still required in order to set sustainable use limits for forest products. This would seem to be a cornerstone of effective co-management that is currently still lacking. The close linkage between outputs of the Research and Monitoring component and the Reserve Management component that was envisaged during project preparation seems not to have been achieved at the time of project closure, despite open and effective sharing of intermediate results that has been taking place throughout the project. Although knowledge relevant to management has undeniably increased and researchers and KWS appear to have shared information regularly throughout the project, the end result remains problematic. In the absence of an agreed and reliable set of monitoring indicators for the target biota and well as the underlying factors that determine its security and sustainability at the time of project closure, the objectives of this component have not been met and, despite significant progress during project implementation, the overall performance rating must be considered unsatisfactory.

**Reserve Management:** The objective of this component was to implement or to enable the implementation of all activities concerned with the conservation of biodiversity of the reserve and its surrounding area. Activities defined in the project document focused on:

- (a) improving security, management capacity and facilities;
- (b) determining priorities for management-oriented research programs and implementing conservation and development recommendations arising from this research;
- (c) strengthening conservation of biodiversity through support to local initiatives to conserve forest patches and other areas of biological significance through support to community conservation projects that would support increasing the supply of resources collected from the reserve or alternatives;
- (d) enhancing appreciation and understanding of wildlife conservation by involvement of local people in ecological monitoring, restoration and ecotourism activities;
- (e) developing effective liaison with national and district bodies whose activities impact the reserve ecosystem.

**Security.** Prior to the establishment of a permanent presence by KWS in the TRNPR in 1992 the general security of the human population in the lower Tana River region was at risk. Villagers noted that a high level of livestock raiding as well as robberies and kidnappings were common. In 1992, potential farmland east of the river could not be utilized by residents due to the security risks from itinerant bandits operating in the region. The KWS security force that moved in to combat mobile wildlife poachers operating out of southern Somalia and areas east of the river, resulted in increased security for residents living both within and adjacent to the reserve. Interviews with villagers held during this mission confirmed their appreciation for the decrease in banditry and security risk by rural pastoralists and farmers that had occurred during the project and was attributed by community correspondents to KWS's presence. An additional seven rangers were posted to the Reserve in 1998 and remain there until now. An unanticipated result of increased security is that this may have actually increased pressure on forest resources in and around the Reserve as villagers now find it safer to travel into the forest and to cultivate lands that were previously inaccessible. Also during the final two years of implementation when an intense and extensive dialog was underway under the Community Development component with residents contemplating relocation away from the reserve, enforcement activities were relaxed to avoid potentially negative impacts on community relations. This may have resulted in more (if temporary) degradation of forest habitats than would have occurred under a more rigorous enforcement regime.

**Infrastructure.** During the project limited upgrading of infrastructure at the Mchelelo Research Camp, including water and electrical supplies was accomplished. The administrative headquarters was relocated to a new site within the reserve including construction of a perimeter fence around the compound, provision of a reliable water supply, construction of seven shade structures built on concrete slabs to accommodate 21 unipots, and construction of a storage shed/motor pool. A nursery with water supply and a small storage shed used as an herbarium was constructed in 2000 about 500 m from the Mchelelo camp and a pump and pipeline were installed. The reserve airstrip was upgraded and a new road entrance to the administrative HQ was built. The project purchased seven vehicles to be used for management and research. One vehicle was assigned to the TRCC, one to NMK, one is maintained in the reserve for security forces and one for research. The other vehicles are stationed at HQ in Nairobi.

**Adaptive Management Planning and Implementation.** An interim management plan for the Reserve was developed in 1994 covering the period 1994-1999. The document has been revised annually during that period with input from the 1998 and 1999 research reports. The Joint Reserve Management Committee was reconstituted and revived in May 1995. The "new" committee had thirty five members including two County Councillors, two chiefs from villages adjacent to the Reserve and ten at-large community



members. The JRMC met nine times between May 1995 and August 1998. In May 1998 the Committee was again restructured with appointed at-large members replaced by community-elected members. Beginning in July 1998 the JRMC was chaired by a locally elected Chairman, replacing the District Commissioner who had previously held that function. From January 1999 the VRAU subsumed the function of the JRMC for planning and community dialog. The JRMC has not met since then. A new Reserve Management Plan covering the period from 2001 – 2006 was prepared during 2001. The plan notes that the JRMC has become dysfunctional and will need to be reconstituted. The plan addresses use of resources within the reserve by local communities, including both forest product harvesting and livestock grazing. During preparation of the new Adaptive Management Plan (2001-2006) two workshops were organized with community representatives to identify priorities and define options. A third workshop to "validate" the plan has not yet taken place. Use of the VRAU (a committee representing those residents planning to relocate) to organize participation, however, raises some question as to whether all appropriate stakeholders have been involved. Whereas KWS was not in a position to involve those stakeholders opposed to the reserve, a concerted effort should have been made to ensure the participation of those community members who co-operated with the project but were not party to the first phase of relocation as these would be the primary community stakeholders in the implementation of the AMP. The plan also addresses community management of priority forests outside the reserve and calls for initiation of an NGO collaborative agreement to do so. This has not yet been put in place partly owing to the inconclusive searches for a suitable NGO partner during project implementation. The best example of collaborative management between KWS and local communities was the program to generate and plant seedlings for forest regeneration and habitat enrichment. The seedling production facility (tree nursery) is now run by two locally recruited and trained assistants. The seedling planting and maintenance work done in late 2001 was carried out with participation of more than 40 villagers. Planting was done by paid labor recruited from amongst the villagers. Maintenance (watering and weeding) has been done by villagers on a voluntary basis. It was noted that once word of project termination reached the communities in late 2001, some previously established seedlings were slashed or uprooted. This is, however, a minor fraction of those planted. The nursery continues to produce seedlings for planting during the 2002 season and the locally recruited assistants are still being paid by KWS.

*Quality and Viability of the Adaptive Management Plan (2001-2006).* The management plan drafted during 2001 appears to have benefited from collaboration, technical review and input provided by Nairobi-based institutions (NMK, DRSRS, IPR) and some local institutions and NGOs. The plan provides an effective framework for future management of the reserve. However, it incorporates two assumptions that may strongly effect its implementation. The first is that GEF project funding will continue until June 2003. Many of the activities will need to be scaled back severely or cancelled in the absence of this funding. The second assumption is that the 247 families who had registered for relocation to the WITU-2 settlement scheme will actually do so in the absence of project funded investments in infrastructure and livelihood enhancement. With the withdrawal of project funding, the number of families who will relocate on their own is questionable. A significant fraction of agricultural land within the reserve has been temporarily abandoned in anticipation of relocation. It can be expected that some of this land will be reoccupied if residents reverse their decision to relocate. Similarly, tree cutting, land clearing and harvesting of fuelwood within the reserve and other vulnerable forest patches will likely continue or increase in the absence of the resettlement program. The Management Plan will need to be revised in the context of the changed situation.

*Establishment of Effective Liaison.* The project has shown significant success in establishing effective liaison with local and regional authorities such as the District Commissioner's office and the Tana River County Council. There appears to be regular information exchange with these entities and the general spirit of collaboration is well established and evident. Liaison with other regional actors such as the Tana

River Regional Development Authority and the Coastal Development Authority (CDA) has also been maintained.

In terms of the effort made to encourage community participation, albeit imperfectly, the infrastructure improvements that were achieved and the general outline of management interventions described in the Management Plan especially given the context of reduced activity in the mid-project implementation period, the output of this component is satisfactory. Sustainability of the outcome of reserve management efforts in view of the abrupt withdrawal of funding is, however, unlikely.

***Community Conservation and Development Component:*** The CCDC was implemented with significant delay reflecting the late recruitment of all key staff (CDS, CPO and community mobilisers – see above), inaccessibility of some areas in Tana following the El Niño floods and hostility among some communities. The component was refocused considerably throughout project implementation in response to the local situation and evolving preferences of the communities.

***Goodwill projects.*** CCDC was to complete two goodwill projects initiated during project preparation, but only one of these was ever implemented (Wenje, administrative school building). Little goodwill was created and hostility towards the reserve persisted and persists even now in some communities within and adjacent to the reserve. A court case challenging the legitimacy of the reserve is still pending.

***Community-based endowment funds:*** the project concept envisaged two endowment funds - a micro-project fund to ensure project funding beyond the life of the project and an education fund to support the education of local children through bursaries. No action was taken to create these funds in the first two years of implementation and follow-up was then halted to allow concentration on relocation activities.

***Community Action Plans (CAPs):*** PRAs which were to provide the basis for specific livelihood activities and community action plans were not carried out until autumn 1999 and the validity of the results was questioned as only a small and not necessarily representative sample of households was interviewed. Four out of nine villages, including Baomo, the only village inside the reserve, did not participate in the PRA because of their hostile attitude to the project. The two largest villages surveyed identified unadjudicated land as the most important problem which was to be addressed by identifying alternative land with associated title deeds. The CAPs were not followed up as a strategic decision was taken to concentrate CCDC efforts on voluntary relocation before pursuing microprojects in and around the reserve.

***Support for voluntary out migration:*** During the project preparation phase a number of Pokomo households had expressed their desire to relocate from the reserve where they could not obtain clear title and where restrictions on extending the areas under cultivation conflicted with increasing needs of a growing population and with their traditional (shifting) pattern of agricultural activity. Despite the slow start to launch supporting activities for relocation within the Project, interest persisted and grew. The VRAU envisaged in the project implementation manual was finally constituted in March 1999 and completed a supplementary census of the population depending upon reserve resources with a particular focus on households eager to relocate. The government committed alternative land for settlement in August 1999 and community representatives selected Witu II as the preferred location. This growing momentum coupled with the realization that the continued ecological integrity of the reserve depends upon forest restoration on farmland in the reserve resulted in a consensus decision by KWS and the WB supervision mission in December 1999 to concentrate all CCDC efforts on supporting voluntary relocation and to put other activities on hold. KWS contracted an expert to prepare (and later revise) a resettlement plan in line with WB guidelines on involuntary resettlement. The settlement plan foresees the construction of key social and physical infrastructure, housing, physical movement of families to the

new site, crop-compensation and settling-in assistance. The host community in Witu was to benefit from the rehabilitation of a school and health centre. 247 households whose farms cover approximately 60% of farmland in the reserve signed up for the first phase of resettlement. A further 100 households (approximately) who had failed to sign up by the cut-off date subsequently recorded their interest in participating in a second phase of relocation. This second group of families would not receive a full resettlement package, but it was expected that the prospect of free titled land would be sufficient incentive to follow other settlers to Witu II once the first phase had been completed. There is some evidence that in anticipation of possible compensation payments, speculative land clearing increased. An EIA of the resettlement site was conducted in line with WB guidelines. KWS led the land survey and demarcation activities at Witu II in collaboration with district authorities and technicians from the Ministry of Lands and Settlement. KWS's mandate and capacity does not extend to the implementation of a resettlement programme. An agreement was reached between KWS and GTZ/GASP which has over 20 years of experience in resettlement within the area, to implement the resettlement program on behalf of KWS. Implementation was to commence in the second half of 2001 when KWS received notification that all resettlement activities must be put on hold awaiting the extension of the project and re-allocation of funding within the CCDC. Following the failure to reach agreement with GEF on these matters, KWS could only commit project budget funds for administrative expenditure to ensure that the 247 would receive letters of allotment and eventually title deeds. No other facilitation of relocation will be forthcoming from the project. It is expected that some families, most of whom had left their shambas in anticipation of resettlement and had even initiated forest restoration on the abandoned land, will translocate to Witu II once the letters of allocation are distributed even in the absence of further benefits or support. Many, however, will likely return to farm their abandoned shambas in the reserve. There was widespread agreement that for any transfer to Witu to proceed humanely and successfully, additional investments are required. At the very least it will be necessary to open up access paths to the farmland and to arrange for an official showing of the land to the families once they arrive in Witu.

*Pastoral communities' projects:* The Wardei pastoralists in Hara village adjacent to the reserve had demonstrated their willingness to collaborate with the project from the outset. However, given initial delays and the subsequent concentration on resettlement activities for the Pokomo farmers cultivating inside the reserve, they only started to benefit from project investments in the last year of project implementation. The project purchased the materials for a school, but further support for construction had to be cancelled due to project closure. Planned investments in two boreholes were also cancelled. The Project financed the development of training manual for community animal health workers and entered into a collaborative agreement with the Catholic Diocese of Garissa to undertake the implementation of training and supervise the construction and operation of a dispensary. The Diocese has agreed to take over some of the costs which KWS can no longer meet following project closure. In the context of the AMP an agreement had been reached that alternative dry season grazing land would be made available in Lango La Simba, which was set aside, but not demarcated by GoK and may therefore not be available to them following project closure. The reserve management plan, however, allows for limited grazing in the reserve during extreme droughts.

The Community Advisory Committee which was to oversee this component only held one meeting in August 2000 which was attended exclusively by KWS staff. An NGO representative was invited, but did not attend the meeting. The outcome of the CCDC is highly unsatisfactory even though progress in the later years especially on resettlement planning is acknowledged. Any goodwill towards the reserve and trust in KWS that had been built up during continued dialogue has been eliminated now that the resettlement plan will not be implemented by the project. No alternative livelihoods and sustainable reserve resources use strategies have been identified and fostered given slow start-up and the principal focus on relocation in the latter years of implementation.

### ***Institutional Development Impact***

The project has provided an opportunity for KWS to identify priorities for research that is relevant for adaptive management and to incorporate the outputs into their planning and management of the Reserve. The shifting emphasis among project components during implementation has made it difficult to maintain synchrony between the research, planning and management activities. This has weakened the anticipated inter-linkage between the research and monitoring component and the other components but the importance of cross-linkage and iterative feedback between the research outputs and other components is well appreciated by project staff and KWS management although the degree to which this has been achieved is less than was anticipated during project design.

The Project has built up significant capacity in KWS to handle difficult dialogues with a community that is split in its support or opposition to the project. KWS has also built up strong links to local authorities and the district and council for collaboration in reserve management. The decision in 1999 to recruit key personnel from KWS ranks has strengthened this impact as the capacity will remain in the organisation. However, as most key staff are now assigned to other areas and responsibilities, little continuity remains on the ground and the positive impact is weakened. The construction of key infrastructure in the reserve has increased KWS' capacity to control and manage the Reserve. The preparation of the management plan was to give KWS and local authorities the tools for effective reserve management. However, the AMP will now have to be completely revised in view of the termination of GEF funding and likely return of some families to their farms in the reserve. Of even graver consequence, however, is the fact that the sudden termination of funding has left KWS, the district authorities and TRCC with a huge backlash of resentment and mistrust expressed by the communities who feel misled and cheated by the project. It will be very difficult for any of these institutions to collaborate with the affected communities, but also with other communities who know about the project, in the nearer future on any undertaking, and especially when it concerns collaboration for the protection of the reserve. KWS is also concerned about potential repercussions on its credibility and effectiveness in implementing other community wildlife projects.

### **Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome**

#### ***Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency***

As noted during appraisal, a major factor influencing both the rate of project implementation and a major risk to project success was the fractionated and polarized nature of the communities within the project area with regard to their attitudes toward the projects. Community views spanned the spectrum from enthusiastic support to nearly violent opposition. An additional factor that delayed project activities related to all three project components was extensive flooding that occurred in 1997 caused by exceptional rains associated with the el Nino phenomenon. Finally, it was recognized from the beginning that the long-term sustainability of the Reserve depended on reducing the number of people occupying and using it. However, the unexpectedly large number of people who volunteered to move, combined with the Bank's decision that the Involuntary Resettlement policy must be applied, raised the cost of the proposed resettlement to a level where a large portion of the project funds would have been used for resettlement. In the absence of approval for this reallocation, it was not justifiable to continue the project

### ***Factors generally subject to government control***

Three major factors affected the implementation of the project – the changes in leadership and direction at KWS, the allocation of alternative land for settlement and the collaboration of other government institutions in resettlement planning.

In its four and a half year of implementation the project was under the auspices of no less than four different directors at KWS and five Deputy Directors of Research and Planning. Significant changes in approach and policy of KWS came with each changeover of management and the relative progress of different aspects of project implementation is also a reflection of different priority setting and management philosophy of senior management staff. The lack of continuity of approach reduced the project's effectiveness in achieving continuous implementation of its full objectives and components. With the directors, other senior management positions also changed and this affected reporting lines and continuity for the Project.

The commitment of government to allocate alternative land for relocation was a key condition for the initiation of resettlement activities. Requests for land were initiated at the district level as early as 1997, but little progress was made in this “bottom-up” approach until high-level negotiations led to an offer of land in August 1999. Several sites were offered and an acceptable area for the relocatees was identified in Witu II.

Throughout the resettlement planning process, other government ministries, including the Ministries of Roads and Public Works, Agriculture, Education and Health as well as the district authorities under OP have collaborated closely with KWS and provided technical expertise and advice to complete the resettlement plan.

### ***Factors generally subject to implementing agency control***

TRPNR has never been a priority area for KWS. It does not generate revenues and is recognized as a difficult area for staff to live and work. The acceptance of a GEF grant to fund activities in this reserve did not fundamentally change the importance attached to TRPNR within KWS activities. The reassignment of key project team members immediately following project closure is another indicator of the low priority attributed to TRPNR.

The Project has been surrounded by much controversy, negative media attention and disagreements even among technical specialists. The principal vehicle to achieve consensus with other stakeholders on the way forward for the Project and the Reserve was the Project Steering Committee. However, following an initial meeting in 1997, KWS did not call further steering committee meetings. A stronger emphasis by KWS on involving other stakeholders and creating consensus could have improved overall implementation experience and prospects for sustainability by tying in other stakeholders and creating support.

The project's slow start can be attributed predominantly to internal management issues. Recruitment of key staff was slow, reporting lines were not clarified with urgency, procurement of key equipment suffered significant delays and important contractual agreements with partners were not finalised expeditiously. Only following increased pressure applied by WB supervision missions could a general speed up of all activities, and in particular the CCDC be observed. Over the last two years, workplans were determined by agreements reached during WB supervision missions resulting in shifts of emphasis and timing among various project activities.

### *Costs and Financing*

The financial costs incurred during project implementation are only a fraction of those envisaged in the project document. This can be attributed to the low levels of activity in the first two years of implementation and a subsequent concentration on planning for resettlement. The disbursement schedule foreseen in the project document was already more ambitious than the WB project average for Kenya. With the fifth year cut from implementation time it was unrealistic. If the two year extension and reallocation of funding had been granted it is expected that all funds would have been spent.

Community contributions envisaged in the project document were linked to the implementation of micro-projects. Since these were not undertaken during project implementation, no community contribution was computed.

*Financial management and procurement:* The project undoubtedly benefited from capacity building for KWS in financial management and WB procedures provided in the context of the PAWS project which was closed in 1999. However, a number of problems were encountered:

- delays in establishing mechanisms for KWS to advance funds to third parties (NMK, DRSRS). A buffer account was created to allow KWS to advance expenditure awaiting reimbursement from the special account.
- delays in returns from field officers slowing down reimbursement. This was addressed in the later years of project implementation; and
- delays in submission of accounting documentation from partner institutions which slowed down the submission of replenishment claims. This problem persisted throughout implementation. Further, there were problems relating to lack of clarity as to which institutions would hold original receipts for accounting purposes.

Procurement also suffered significant delays. The order of vehicles did not materialise until December 1999 although the ICB procedures had been started in late 1997. No major items were procured before 1999. Procurement delays in were due to a number of factors. No single procurement officer in KWS was responsible for procurement under this Project until 2000 and hence the priority attached to processing procurement was not high. Late recruitment of key project staff also led to a late start in procurement of equipment. The arrangement that KWS procured equipment on behalf of other organisations was cumbersome. As much of the equipment required was highly specialised, there were delays between receiving the experts' specifications (for example from NMK), verification and inspection. In 2000, funds were made available to NMK to procure some highly specialised equipment that could not be purchased nationally. However, the remaining sums were so small that international orders were not accepted.

It was agreed that equipment bought under the project for NMK activities would remain with NMK following project closure. An inventory of all equipment purchased will be drawn up by NMK and KWS.

### *Sustainability*

Sustainability of the modest project achievements of relative stability of the primate populations and (perhaps) a reduction in the rate of habitat destruction and degradation within the project zone, is unlikely in the absence of further intervention. Project sponsored studies clearly indicated that the pattern of present human use of the forests and the surrounding agricultural lands is incompatible with long term survival of the target species and their habitat. The project initiative to reduce human impact on the critical habitats by providing viable alternative livelihood options through the voluntary resettlement of a

major fraction (60%) of cultivators within the reserve and adjacent critical zones has been terminated with the withdrawal of GEF funds. Abandonment of the resettlement plan that was drawn up in full compliance with World Bank policies and procedures, exhaustively discussed and ultimately agreed with the primary stakeholders (the 247 families who signed up for relocation and the 100 families who had shown interest in being placed on the list) would seem to violate the principle of “do no harm” that underlies the Bank’s operational policies and procedures. The 247 families who had indicated their preference for resettlement and receipt of land titles have now reverted to their landless status while awaiting the allocation of letters of allotment. Having forgone cultivation of their former lands, they are in a situation of reduced food security, relying on public food relief for sustenance. Having no title to the lands they occupy nor any realistic prospects of obtaining such, they have little access to capital to invest in alternative livelihood enterprises. The project-stimulated dialogue over alternative livelihood options that culminated in a decision by a large fraction of the community to accept deeded and titled lands and a GEF financed package of infrastructure investments to enhance social well being and alternative livelihood options has led to heightened social tension within the communities that live within the project zone. The minor fraction of residents who declined to accept the alternative livelihood package have initiated hostile actions (beatings and house burnings) against the people who remain in limbo awaiting formal notification that the benefits which were promised and over which they negotiated in good faith will not be forthcoming.

When formal notification of project cancellation is forthcoming, it is expected there may be further clashes as the resettlement group moves to reclaim control over their abandoned farmlands and to renew use of income and meet basic needs for fuel, construction materials, etc. The result will likely be an increase in the rate of forest destruction and degradation of the remaining forest lands within and outside of the reserve with a corresponding negative impact on the primate populations and other biological elements. At the project’s end, therefore, the primary stakeholders (residents of the project zone) will be no better and more likely worse off than when they began to interact and participate in the project. The principal project objective of increased sustainability or ecological viability of a globally significant biological community will have failed and the vulnerability of the natural community to extirpation will have measurably increased.

The project’s secondary objective, of putting in place an adaptive (flexible) management system, informed by rigorous scientific research and monitoring studies, and implemented in partnership with local communities as primary stakeholders, will also have failed. Having undertaken a protracted and elaborate dialog with the communities to develop and agree on mutually acceptable solutions to increasing human economic security in parallel with increasing ecological security of the globally significant biodiversity, KWS and its partners in implementation will lose substantial credibility with the local residents. This is sure to make management of the Reserve and wildlife increasingly difficult in the face of a now skeptical public. The principal of cooperative management will be much harder to put in place when the communities lack confidence in KWS’s ability to meet their part of the bargain. Collapse of the cooperative management covenant of which voluntary resettlement, secure land asset titling, alternative livelihood and social infrastructure investments were key elements will erode both the prospects for maintaining biological integrity and the prospects for establishing a meaningful social compact between KWS and the primary stakeholders to undertake adaptive management of the dwindling forest resources in the project zone.

In sum, the chances of preserving the modest gains in community security and ecological security of the Reserve are precarious.

### *Transition arrangement to regular operations*

Following project closure KWS proposes to:

- continue enhancing reserve security, complete the movement to the new reserve HQ and to strictly enforce the law as well as to resolve the outstanding court case between KWS and the local community with regard to the legal status of the reserve.
- revise the AMP to reflect reduced funding and to sign an MoU with TRCC to seek an increased role of council in the management of the reserve. The MoU is still under discussion.
- process and give letters of allotment and title deeds to the 247 families and to enlist community support for conservation by supporting micro-projects around the reserve.
- continue research and monitoring activities including through continuing cooperation with the Kenya Primate Conservation Group.
- fund raise through the development of fundable proposals by KWS and its partners.

In view of the fact that most key project personnel has been withdrawn from Tana operations and that the fate of equipment purchased under the project, while not yet reallocated, also has not been clearly assigned to support the transition, it remains difficult to see how a satisfactory transition arrangement is to be achieved. A positive step has been the promotion of the CPO to the position of Warden in the Reserve instead of appointing an outsider. Some continuity should therefore be retained.

As part of the exit strategy, a corporate communications strategy was to be developed to communicate project closure to various stakeholders and the wider public. This has not been done.

### **Bank and Borrower Performance**

#### *Bank Lending*

*Preparation:* The project was identified during the Pilot phase of GEF and reflected the GEF priorities at the time which were: (1) global environmental significance of project objectives; and (2) demonstration value of a project to guide evolution of the GEF portfolio. Substantial funds were committed to project preparation, a large part of which was executed by social welfare and biological conservation-oriented NGOs. An extensive background study of the sociological situation in the project area was carried out, a census of primates with the area was completed and a Population Viability Assessment of the two endangered primates was undertaken. Neither the NGO consultants nor the individuals involved in the biological studies had extensive experience with preparation of Bank lending operation nor any experience with GEF project design. The Bank preparation supervision seems to have over-estimated the “power” of EF grant financing to raise the priority of TRNPR on KWS’s national agenda.

*Appraisal:* At appraisal the KWS demonstrated some institutional commitment as evinced by the preparation of a draft Project Document from the background studies previously commissioned. The Bank's appraisal team consisting of specialists in conservation ecology, research and monitoring, protected area management and social anthropology were appropriate and the appraisal report contains a series of working papers that complement the draft Project Document prepared by KWS.

The appraisal report included an unusually detailed analysis of project risks including: (a) potential ecological inviability of the reserve forests due to hydrological changes set in motion by upstream developments; (b) a substantial risk of adequate community buy-in and of difficulties with coming to consensus solutions given what was known about divisions within the community; (c) a pace of implementation of the community component that was dependent on these communities and, therefore



difficult to coordinate with other components; (d) questions about whether KWS could provide sufficient level of management oversight due to other priorities. The GEF financing package was considered adequate and complementary to other related projects financed by the Bank (PAWS) and bilaterals (e.g. COBRA) and under implementation. There were unusually long time lags between the completion of the initial preparation reports and appraisal (18 months) and between the appraisal mission and project effectiveness (25 months).

*Supervision:* Although project effectiveness took place more than one year after the grant agreement was negotiated, the grant termination date was not revised. This oversight, which was not rectified during supervision, resulted in a four year implementation period for a project that was planned to be implemented over five years. In the early period of implementation, levels of field supervision were lower than proposed in the project document. Supervision was carried principally by an ecologist, a sociologist and an environmental specialist, which seemed adequate to cover the technical issues arising throughout implementation. Additional specialists (e.g. Social Specialist and Wildlife Parks Management Specialist) included on mission teams were appropriate. The mission reports contain detailed tables of agreed actions and target dates that complement the annual work plans prepared by KWS. The mid-term review (MTR) which resulted in major modifications to the content and timing of activities, was carried out only 18 months after the date of effectiveness – early even in a four year implementation period.

The dialog between the WB task team and the GEF Secretariat (GEFSEC) on the reallocation of funding to the expanded resettlement activities in the CCDC was highly unsatisfactory. Despite the fact that voluntary resettlement is reported as a project element in the Project Document and discussed in all of the supervision mission reports/Aides Memoires, including the Project Mid-Term Review, there is no record of GEFSEC-Bank correspondence prior to mid-2001 (when the project was already operating under a short term extension) indicating any policy changes since the project was approved that would preclude financing costs associated with voluntary resettlement. The Bank's task team seems not to have anticipated GEFSEC's objection to financing this component at the level required to comply with the Bank's policies (e.g. OD 4.30). In its dialog with KWS and GOK concerning preparation of the extension request, it is clear that the WB team acted under the assumption that GEFSEC approval should be a matter of formality as long as WB guidelines governing the implementation of WB/GEF projects were adhered to. The proposed extension involved no restructuring of the project, but merely a shift in emphasis on a particular sub-activity within one of the components. Only a reallocation of committed funding was requested. This assumption, however, proved to be erroneous and has had a devastating effect on the final project outcome due to the abrupt project closure and cancellation of approximately two-thirds of the original grant funds. It is worth noting that the risk that GEF might not agree to a restructuring had been rated "modest" and not "negligible" in the PSRs since early 2001. If it had been known at the outset of resettlement planning that funding was not assured, a fallback strategy could have been pursued to protect vulnerable stakeholders.

The WB's decision to formulate a resettlement plan in line with its guidelines on involuntary resettlement has raised a number of issues. Since resettlement was always offered as an option to the communities, and many households in fact opted not to participate in the resettlement, a number of stakeholders considered that it was not appropriate to operate in the context of such strict guidelines for resettlement activities that were of a voluntary nature. Both the Ministry of Lands and Settlements and GTZ considered the package excessive and raised concerns about precedents being set which would be impossible to follow in future non GEF funded activities. Paradoxically, it is the adherence to these strict guidelines aimed at protecting the rights of the communities that has contributed to a situation in which they are now significantly worse off than at the beginning of the project. A less comprehensive compensation package would not have raised the same concern about the project having shifted all its emphasis and resources onto resettlement activities and may have obtained GEFSEC approval.

According to WB policy a project is not complete until the resettlement has been implemented and supervision must continue to the end. It is therefore pertinent that the WB considers alternative options to finance and implement the resettlement program. The opportunity should be taken to re-examine the validity of the original resettlement plan and agree with other stakeholders and local resettlement experts on an appropriate package that makes the resettled households better off without creating an unreachable precedent which might hinder subsequent resettlement activities.

The WB decision not to grant an extension of the project in absence of the authorization to reallocate funds to implement the resettlement program was consistent with results from research and reserve management that farming activities inside the reserve posed the greatest threat to viability of habitat and the primate populations. A continuation of research and reserve management activities without the restoration of forests on significant patches of farmland was not considered to be adequate to meet project objectives.

### *Grant Recipient*

*Preparation:* Throughout the drawn out project preparation period, no single senior counterpart took on responsibility in KWS for the oversight of project preparation activities and there was high turnover of staff involved with preparation. The many independent studies undertaken throughout preparation were not condensed and focused on assembling a viable project. Following the exhaustion of preparation funds, KWS did, however, commit staff resources to prepare a project document in line with WB/GEF requirements, and in particular the research agenda was elaborated well. At appraisal community consultation during preparation was reported to have resulted in a sufficient basis for collaboration. Nevertheless, it appears that an adequate basis had not been reached since early delays in implementation of the CCDC was blamed predominantly on hostility in the community.

*Government implementation performance:* The substantial changes in policy direction and emphasis in KWS during project implementation and the considerable internal restructuring that went along with the changes in leadership negatively affected project implementation. The government's official channel for granting land for relocation, through requests at the district level, was too slow to meet the project's needs. However, acceptable land was subsequently made available by the Ministry of Lands and Settlements, which also proved flexibility with respect to the requirements of the project. Administrative fees normally requested from settlers were to be waived as the provision of free alternative land was a condition of the project. Further, rather than the 10 acres allocated on a standard basis in resettlement schemes, the government authorised 15 acre plots for the relocatees supported by the project in view of the fact that these settlers were giving up the use of fertile land resources in a national reserve to reduce pressure on the natural habitat. The government also supported project activities by making technical expertise from other ministries available to participate in the resettlement planning.

*Implementing agency:* The low priority attached to TRPNR in KWS has reduced project implementation performance. Outside pressure applied by supervision missions appears to have been essential to achieve progress on project activities. Internal management, recruitment and reporting problems as well as financial management and procurement issues were not addressed with sufficient urgency, but hampered project implementation for the first two and a half years. High staff turnover further diminished project achievements. It is recognized that following the appointment of an all KWS management team, project implementation in the last year and a half was speeded up significantly and progress on all components and especially resettlement planning was satisfactory. In the wrap-up phase following first the suspension of resettlement activities and then project closure, KWS did not act with sufficient transparency. Several partners in implementation, including the TRCC and the district authorities had not been officially informed of the closure by the time the mission arrived. Other partners had only been informed after

specific follow-up from the World Bank Overall implementing agency performance over the life of the project was not satisfactory.


### **Lessons Learnt**

- While World Bank policies and procedures apply to all Bank implemented projects the Bank needs to be alert to possibly conflicting policies that may be set by "third party" financiers such as the Global Environment Trust Fund when, in its role as a GEF Implementing Agency, the Bank accepts responsibility for project implementation. Lack of timely and clear communication between the GEF and the Bank on matters of eligible expenditures, may result in an elevated risk of project failure and the unintentional violation of the principle to "do no harm". Annual reporting by the Bank to GEF on projects under implementation should be sufficiently complete and comprehensive to alert the third party financier to potential policy conflicts. Such conflicts should be resolved at the earliest possible opportunity and the outcome communicated to the client in a timely fashion.
- a four year time horizon may not be realistic to achieve significant community participation, change livelihood strategies and complete voluntary relocation exercises in a situation where community support for the project at the outset is at best shaky and divided, especially when the executing agency has little prior experience in managing such activities.
- a project, in which the different components are critically linked to each other, can only progress at the speed of advancement of the slowest component. Where at the outset it is envisaged that one of the components will progress "at a pace led by the progress of KWS' dialogue with the community", a longer implementation timeframe allowing step-wise progression should be considered from the start.
- KWS institutional culture can be changed to de-emphasise enforcement and strengthen collaboration with local stakeholders. Even in situations of adversity, dialogue with at least parts of the community can be sustained and constructive propositions for reserve management and community participation can be made.
- When significant critical path activities such as the research and monitoring component of this project are to be carried out by a cooperating institution (NMK) rather than directly by the executing agency (KWS), care must be taken to streamline operational procedures to avoid delays in implementation. The lack of a functional Project Steering Committee where inter-institutional bottlenecks could be identified and addressed very likely contributed to delayed implementation of the research and monitoring component and to reduced performance of NMK.



## MAP SECTION











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