TERMINAL EVALUATION
FINAL REPORT

UNDP GEF Project, financed by the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF):

Promoting Climate-Resilient Development and Enhanced Adaptive Capacity to Withstand Disaster Risks in Angolan's Cuvelai River Basin

UNDP PIMS ID 5177 | GEF ID 5166 |
Atlas Project Id: 00081003 LDCF/ climate-resilience Angola
Output #: 00090473 LDCF/Adaptation Cuvelai RB

This report has been prepared by an independent consultant reviewer. The findings and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or intentions of the UNDP.

December 2021

EBD Global Optimum
Consult

DELIVERABLE 4)
Final Terminal Evaluation Report

For client UNDP Angola
Terminal Evaluation of UNDP GEF LDCF Project

EBDGLO Project #0123 Angola Cuvelai TE Assignment

Report Number from Client Series:	#004
Period covered for this Report:	July to November 2021

FINALIZED ON
05 December 2021
by Fabiana Issler, CEO of EBD Global Optimum
and
Alicja Biesmer, Project Development Consultant at EBD Global Optimum

COLOPHON

Project:

"Promoting Climate-Resilient Development and Enhanced Adaptive Capacity to Withstand Disaster Risks in Angolan's Cuvelai River Basin"
UNDP GEF Project | PIMS ID: 5166
Atlas Award ID: XXX | Project ID: 5177

Client:

For UNDP Angola, reporting to Ms. Mamisoa Rangers <mamisoa.rangers@undp.org>, Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP Angola
With information to Mr. Janeiro Avelino <janeiro.avelino@undp.org>, Team Leader | Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction

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ACRONYMS

ADPP	Action from People to People | Acção de Povo para Povo (national NGO)
APR/PIR	Annual Project Reports / Project Implementation Reports
AWP	Annual Workplan
CETAC	Center for Tropical Ecology and Climate Change | Centro de Ecologia Tropical e Alterações Climáticas
CO	Country Office
COP	Conference of the Parties
CPD	Country Program Document
CRF	Center for Phytogenetic Resources | Centro de Recursos Fitogenéticos (in UAN)
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DW	Development Workshop (national NGO)
ERC	Evaluation Resource Center
EWS	Early Warning System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
FFEWS	Flood Forecast Early Warning System
GABHIC	Cabinet for River Basin Management of Cunene, Cubango and Cuvelai rivers | Gabinete para Administração das Bacias Hidrográficas do Cunene, Cubango e Cuvelai
GEF	Global Environment Facility
IDA	Institute for Agrarian Development | Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário
IIA	Institute for Agricultural Research | Instituto de Investigação Agronómica
INAMET	National Institute for Meteorology | Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia
iNDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
INRH	National Institute for Water Resources | Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hídricos
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund for Adaptation of the GEF
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MCTA	Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment | Ministério da Cultura, Turismo e Ambiente
MENADERP	Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries | Ministério da Agricultural Desenvolvimento Rural e Pescas
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NAPA	National Adaptation Program of Action
NCE	Nature Climate and Energy
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIM	National Implementation
PIR	Project Implementation Reports

PRODOC	Project Document
RTA	Regional Technical Advisor
SADC	Southern Afica Development Community
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-Bound (concerning indicators)
SPCB	Civil Protection and Firefighters' Service | Serviço de Protecção Civil e Bombeiros
TE	Terminal Evaluation
TOC	Theory of Change
UNCT	UM Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	US Government Development Aid
VRA	Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (domains covered together in development programs)
WLF	World Lutheran Federation (NGO)

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1) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PROJECT INFORMATION TABLE

Project Title			
Promoting Climate resilient Development and Enhanced Adaptive Capacity to Withstand Disaster Risks in Angola's Cuvelai River Basin			
Project Details		**Project Milestones**	
Project's SHORT Title:	*"Cuvelai Project"*	PIF Approval Date:	07-Mar-2013
PIMS #:	5166	CEO Endorsement Date (FSP):	11-Dec-2014
GEF Project ID:	5177	PRODOC Signature Date:	11-Feb-2016
UNDP Atlas Business Unit Award ID, Project ID:	AGO10, 00081003 / 00090473	Date Project Manager hired:	Jun/Jul, 2016
Country/Countries:	Angola	Inception Workshop Date:	16-Sep-2016
Region:	Africa	Mid-Term Review Completion date:	31-Jan-2019
Project Type:	Full Size (FSP)	Terminal Evaluation Completion Date:	30-Nov-2021
Focal Area:	Climate Change	Planned Operational Closure Date:	10-Feb-2022
GEF Operational Program:	Climate Change Adaptation Priorities in Least Developed Countries *[See further down for more details on GEF 'Strategic Priorities / Objectives']*		
Trust Fund:	Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)		
Implementing Partner (GEFExecuting Entity):	Initially, Ministry of Environment (MINAMB, now defunct) Since early 2020, environmental sector attributions were assumed by the MCTA – Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment | Ministério da Cultura, Turismo e Ambiente		
Cross-sectoral integration and NGOs/CBOs involvement:	▪ INRH - National Institute for Water Resources ▪ INAMET - National Institute for Meteorology ▪ GABHIC - Cabinet for River Basin Management of Cunene, Cubango and Cuvelai rivers ▪ DW - "Development Workshop" (NGO) ▪ Under MENADERP - Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries: IDA - Institute for Agrarian Development; and IIA - Institute for Agricultural Research ▪ ADPP - Acção de Povo para Povo (NGO) ▪ WLF - World Lutheran Foundation (NGO) ▪ National Commission for Civil Protection ▪ Provincial Services for Civil Protection, Cunene ▪ Local Environmental Departments (DUAs) in selected municipalities in Cunene Province (Cuvelai, Cuanhama, Namacunde, Cuanhama) ▪ CETAC - Center for Tropical Ecology and Climate Change | Centro de Ecologia Tropical e Alterações Climáticas, located in Huambo *[removed themselves from the project in 2018:]* ▪ UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund ▪ USAID – US Development Aid ▪ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN		

Project Details	Project Milestones
Private sector involvement:	▪ AMBIMETRIC; CONSULPROJECTO - Consultoria e Engenharia Hidráulica, lda ▪ UAN - Agostinho Neto University | Universidade Agostinho Neto ▪ Spanish Consortium of EVERIS Consultancy, MeteoSim and La Coruña University[1] ▪ Other private sector companies engaged under Component 1
Geospatial coordinates of project sites:	17°15'09"S | 11°45'05"E See also map in Box 3.

Figure 1. Project location (from open.undp.org/projects/00081003)

Financials (US$) | Financial Information, last updated on 30-Nov-2021.

PDF/PPG	at approval (US$)	at PDF/PPG completion (US$)
GEF PDF/PPG grants for project preparation	$150,000	$150,000
Co-financing for project preparation	$0	*Not informed*
Project	**at CEO Endorsement (US$)**	**at TE (US$)**
[1] UNDP contribution:	$917,000	$ 289,946
[2] Government:	$43,006,004	$ 39,100,000
[3] Other multi-/bi-laterals: FAO	$3,400,000	$1,800,000
[4] Private Sector:	$0	*$0*
[5] NGOs:	$950,000	$950,000
[6] Total co-financing [1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5]:	**$48,273,004**	**$42,139,944**
[7] Total GEF funding:	$8,200,000	$6,644,642
[8] Total Project Funding [6 + 7]	**$56,473,004**	**$ 48,784,408**

Notes on sources:

[1] This relates to TRAC contribution to the project (i.e. from UNDP's core funds). Source of information on expenditure: Combined Delivery Reports (CDRs) from UNDP's Atlas system availed by UNDP Angola. Timestamp: 30-11-2021.

[2] At CEO Endorsement stage, government co-financing included contributions from MINAMB at $2M (now defunct, with attributions moved to MCTA); MINEA ($1M); INAMET ($968K) and MINEA PIP. Only MINEA's contribution can be assumed realized by project end and linked to public investments in water supply to Ondjiva and repairs to Calueque Dam.

[3] At CEO Endorsement, the amount includes FAO ($1.6M) and USAID ($1.8M). Only the latter realized.

[5] From NGO DW with funds from Canadian NGO IDRC and BP investments in the South.

[7] From LDCF. Source of information on expenditure: CDRs from Atlas (same as in item 1), and https://open.undp.org/projects/00081003 for 2021 (last updated on 30-Nov-2021).

[1] Engaged to conduct a climate risk and vulnerability assessment in 2021.

Atlas Information through Open UNDP, as of 30-Nov-2021

ID	Output Title	Output Description	SDG*
00090473	LDCF/Adaptation Cuvelai RB	Promoting climate-resilient development and enhanced adaptive capacity to withstand disaster risks in Angolan's Cuvelai River Basin	

Donors

United Nations Development Pro

Global Environment Fund Truste

Year	Budget	Expense
2016	$339,754	$168,023
2017	$643,990	$398,524
2018	$1,700,000	$874,355
2019	$5,758,935	$2,194,231
2020	$3,832,931	$1,184,690
2021	$3,659,515	$2,087,628

Note from the TE: Amounts above include LDCF and TRAC, except for 2021, when only SCCF resource had been programmed in Atlas, and as verified in the 2021 Combined Delivery Report (CDR) availed by the UNDP CO, and date-stamped 09-Sep-2021.

Our Focus

Accelerate structural transformations

Signature Solutions

Promote nature-based solutions for a sustainable planet

Policy Marker

Gender Equality : Significant objective

Source: https://open.undp.org/projects/00081003 (last updated on 30-Nov-2021)

[*] SDG tags:

DESCRIPTION	CODE	VOCABULARY
By 2030, build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters	1.5	UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Targets
By 2030, significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of people affected and substantially decrease the direct economic losses relative to global gross domestic product caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with a focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations	11.5	UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Targets
By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements	15.1	UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Targets

Figure 2. UNDP Approaches (from open.undp.org/projects/00081003)

Our Approaches

Hows

Policy Advice

Capacity Development / Technical Assistance

Convening / Partnerships / Knowledge Sharing

South-South and Triangular Cooperation

Capacity builder

- Brazil
- Portugal

Note from the TE: Country names above should have included Spain and Mozambique

Partner

National government

Private sector

NGOs/CSOs

Multilaterals (Vertical Funds, EU)

Research Institutions / Universities

Whos

People living in peri-urban areas

People living in rural areas

Persons directly affected by natural disasters

Women

D-Portal Reference Identifier (Aid Transparency)
XM-DAC-41114-OUTPUT-00090473 https://d-portal.org/q.html?aid=XM-DAC-41114-OUTPUT-00090473 **"LDCF/Adaptation Cuvelai RB"**

Rio Policy Markers
Note from the TE: The project is not current tagged for Rio Policy Markers in D-portal, but it should have been. 4_7,3_7,2_7,1_7 Aid Targeting the Objectives of the Framework Convention on Climate Change - Adaptation

GEF Strategy Linkages: Strategic Priorities under the GEF5 Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation (CCA)

Note from the TE: The linkages to Focal Area Strategy shown in this box serve to guide the **GEF LDCF corporate indicators** and the selection of **Tracking Tool indicators** for this project]

Figure 3. Focal Area Objectives: nominal break down of LDCF funding per objective and outcome



Table 1. Break down of LDCF funding per GEF Focal Area elements (at CEO Endorsement stage)

Focal Area Objectives	Expected FA Outcomes	Expected FA Outputs	LDCF Grant Amount ($)
CCA-1 Reducing Vulnerability	*1.2: Reduced vulnerability to climate change in development sectors*	Output 1.2.1: Vulnerable physical, natural and social assets strengthened in response to climate change impacts, including variability	1,305,000
CCA-2 Increasing Adaptive Capacity	*2.1: Increased knowledge and understanding of climate variability and change-induced threats at country level and in targeted vulnerable areas*	Output 2.1.2: Systems in place to disseminate timely risk information	1,200,000
	2.2. Strengthened adaptive capacity to reduce risks to climate-induced economic losses	Output 2.2.1: Adaptive capacity of national and regional centers and networks strengthened to rapidly respond to extreme weather events	1,305,000
CCA-3 Adaptation Technology Transfer	*3.1: Successful demonstration, deployment and transfer of relevant adaptation technology in targeted areas*	Output 3.1.1 Relevant adaptation technology transferred to targeted groups	4,390,000

PROJECT DESCRIPTION (BRIEF)

1. Angola has emerged from what was one of Africa's most protracted conflicts. The civil war between 1975 and 2002 resulted in the destruction of infrastructure and the breakdown of institutions of all kinds. The ability of the Angolan Government to maintain an administrative presence and collect and monitor data of all kinds during this period was severely impacted by the war. This includes climatic and hydrographic data and surface weather observations more generally, which are necessary for generating climate information and relaying to the public, at times in the form of early warning messages.

2. The project's primary geographic focus is the Cuvelai River Basin, located almost entirely (within national borders) in Cunene province and one of the regions most affected by the war. Like other provinces in the dry south it remains poorly studied from a geographical (climate, soils and hydrology) and socioeconomic point of view. A decentralization process started taking place in Angola since the mid 2000's, albeit at a slow and uneven pace. This includes delegation of administrative and fiscal responsibilities to sub-national units of government. Much of the information gathered at national level still does not reach local authorities.

3. This project (titled "The Cuvelai Project" in short) focuses on supporting the two top priorities for climate change adaptation in Angola, as defined in the country's National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) from 2011 – which are to: 1) Develop an early warning system for flooding and storms, and 2) Develop a climate monitoring and data management system in Angola's Cuvelai River Basin. These two NAPA priorities are closely linked to each other and have therefore been bundled together for the purpose of this project.

4. Local communities in the Cuvelai River Basin, most of whom are poor and depend on small-scale farming, are vulnerable to the increasing frequency and severity of droughts, floods, increased temperatures and rainfall anomalies. Climate-related hazards impact their livelihoods and threaten their food security. Sectors such as agriculture, livestock and water resources are an important component of the economy in the region and form the basis of rural livelihoods in Cuvelai Basin. Because of prevailing gender inequality in Angola, and in the Cuvelai River Basin, women are a particularly vulnerable group.

5. In addition to directly responding to NAPA priorities (a condition of access to LDCF resource under the GEF), the project also seeks to reduce climate-related vulnerabilities that are faced by the local population in Angola's Cuvelai River Basin through targeted investments and capacity building. Project interventions were designed around three components: (1) Transfer of appropriate technologies and related capacity building for climate and environmental monitoring infrastructure; (2) Enhanced human and institutional capacity for increased sustainable rural livelihoods among those communities areas most prone to extreme weather events (flooding and drought) in the region; (3) Increased understanding of climate change adaptation and practices in climate-resilient development planning at the local community and government levels.

6. This project involves "several layers of government" (i.e. several stakeholders at different levels and with different attributions – refer to Project Information Table) – from national entities to provincial and municipal level authorities. It builds on a variety of initiatives that had been proposed in the mid-2000's, and which sought to address the complex climate-related challenges facing the Cuvelai River Basin, an important and trans-boundary sources of water and soil fertility in the dry south.

7. The project's concept (the PIF) had been approved by the GEF Council in March 2013 and CEO endorsed by the GEF 21 months later, in December 2014 – i.e. the Project Preparation Grant phase (PPG) lasted some 20 months. Since CEO endorsement, there was a long period of internal clearances before the project document (PRODOC) could be signed by UNDP and the Government of Angola. PRODOC signature only happened in February 2016. Project implementation kick started in late April 2016 (marked by the full project's first disbursement) and the Project's Inception Workshop took place in September 2016. From the GEF's CEO Endorsement date until the end of the Inception Phase (marked by the workshop) a total of 21.2 months elapsed, implying that the project had a rather long project mobilization period, and until implementation could effectively start.

8. Project Implementation will reach its end in February 2022, after 5.5 years of effective implementation, even though it was slated to last only 4 years. Nominally, the project will have lasted 6 years (from PRODOC signature to operational closure). See section Project Start and duration including milestones for the graphic TIMELINE.

EVALUATION RATINGS TABLE

Table 2. Evaluation Ratings (dashboard)

Criteria rated	*Ratings*	*Ref. to Exec. Sum. paras*
1. Monitoring and Evaluation		
M&E design at entry	MS - Moderately Satisfactory	12, 16
M&E Plan Implementation	MU - Moderately Unsatisfactory	17-24
Overall quality of M&E	**MS - Moderately Satisfactory**	12
2. Implementing Agency (IA) Implementation & Executing Agency (EA) Execution		
Quality of UNDP Implementation/Oversight	MS - Moderately Satisfactory	26-28
Quality of Implementing Partner Execution	MU - Moderately Unsatisfactory	29
Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	**MS - Moderately Satisfactory**	25
3. Assessment of Outcomes		
Relevance	S - Satisfactory	37
Effectiveness	MU – Moderately Unsatisfactory	38-40
Efficiency	U - Unsatisfactory	41-43
Overall Project Outcome Rating	**MU - Moderately Unsatisfactory**	9, 33-36
4. Sustainability		
Financial sustainability	MU – Moderately Unlikely	47
Socio-political sustainability	MU – Moderately Unlikely	48
Institutional framework and governance sustainability	U - Unlikely	49
Environmental sustainability	ML - Moderately Likely	50
Overall Likelihood of Sustainability	**MU - Moderately Unlikely**	44-46

Table 3. Reference to the TE's Rating Scales (from official guidance and with numeric reference)

Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, Implementation/Oversight, Execution, Relevance (6-point scale)	Sustainability ratings (4-point scale)
6 = Highly Satisfactory (HS): exceeds expectations and/or no shortcomings 5 = Satisfactory (S): meets expectations and/or no or minor shortcomings 4 = Moderately Satisfactory (MS): more or less meets expectations and/or some shortcomings 3 = Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): somewhat below expectations and/or significant shortcomings 2 = Unsatisfactory (U): substantially below expectations and/or major shortcomings 1 = Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe shortcomings Unable to Assess (U/A): available information does not allow an assessment	4 = Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability 3 = Moderately Likely (ML): moderate risks to sustainability 2 = Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks to sustainability 1 = Unlikely (U): severe risks to sustainability Unable to Assess (U/A): Unable to assess the expected incidence and magnitude of risks to sustainability

JUSTIFICATION FOR MAIN RATINGS

9. **The Overall Project Outcome** rating is **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)** – with reference to **Criteria 3 (Assessment of Outcomes)** in Table 6. This rating is similar to the TE's assessment of Project Progress Towards Project Objective and to the overall assessment of project performance by project end. The MU rating reflects both the project's situation right now and performance trend in previous years. The Terminal Evaluation (TE) needs to look at the project's entire lifetime and its effective results, the prospects for sustainability and impact and all other criteria included in in Table 6. The MU rating means that the Cuvelai Project performed somewhat below expectations. It did produce some important and commendable results, which are highlighted in this report.

10. A number of activities implemented by the project at the local level within Cuvelai River Basin helped reduce vulnerability of local population, although the exact number of beneficiaries cannot be estimated, but may range around 35,000 people. Other measures strengthened people's resilience and secured assets that strengthen livelihoods against climate-driven hazards. There was progress with disaster risk management and civil protection. However, the project faced many delays, not just in starting the project, but in connection with several operational processes, especially those involving complex procurement of equipment and services. In spite of very long delays, in 2021 the project finally managed to purchase and ship to Angola of all the equipment and materials required for the installation of EWS and its communications. Although this is an important achievement, it stops short of representing what was expected under Output 1.4: *"A comprehensive Flood Forecasting & Early Warning System (FFEWS), – based on interagency harmonized agreements and international standards and protocols – are developed and warnings made accessible to Disaster Management structure in Cunene Province as well as relevant public institutions to enable appropriate planning and response measures."*

11. The quality of implementation shows some important achievements in terms of studies and activities on the ground, many of which were implemented by NGO partners, national institutes and provincial level civil protection services. Many of these results also arrived in the project's lifetime. Therefore, the project's overall performance had significant shortcomings, including in connection with planning processes that were chronically unrealistic and financial delivery, which was, consequently, chronically low. The project will not be able to use all GEF funds (see Table 4 and corresponding analysis). According to the analysis, a significant amount of funds will likely need to be returned to the GEF's Least Developed Country's Fund (LDCF). The lack of an established and sufficiently strong Project Management Unit (PMU) created many distortions in the actual arrangements for the project (a point that will be further elaborated in this report).

Table 4. Execution and cumulative delivery on the LDCF Grant and on UNDP Core Resources[2]

	A	B	C [A + B]	D	D'	E	D / E	D / C	(C / D) -1
AWP year	Planned ($K) LDCF as of approved AWP	Planned ($K) TRAC as of approved AWP	Planned ($K) Total as of approved AWP	Executed total by year end ($K)	LDCF ONLY: Executed total by year end ($K)	End-of-year revised budget ($K)	End-of-year delivery based on revised budgets (%)	End-of-year execution in relation the original AWP (%)*	Gap between planned and executed (expressed as a factor of 1)
2016	1,093	50	1,143	195	168	340	57.4%	18%	4.9
2017	2,194	60	2,254	399	355	644	61.9%	18%	4.7
2018	1,700	0	1,700	874	869	1,700	51.4%	51%	0.9
2019	1,600	150	1,750	2,194	2,189	5,759	38.1%	137%	-0.2
2020	3,605	155	3,760	1,185	976	3,833	30.9%	33%	2.2
2021*	3,653	181	3,834	2,088	2,088	*3,660*	57.0%	57%	0.8
2022									
TOTAL				**6,934**	6,644			*49% <= average for 2016-2020*	
Cummulative execution on the LDCF budget of ($8,200K)					*81%*				

** execution for 2021 covers three quarters of the financial year only.*

ANALYTICAL NOTES: [*] The total LDCF grant is $8.2M. The cumulative disbursement on this grant by 30-Nov-2021 reached 81% of the total LDCF amount. The project can still execute planned activities, including until February 2022, but there a chance that it will have to send a reasonable amount of funds back to the GEF. An initial projection by the UNDP CO, as communicated to the TE around September 2021, foresaw that the project would execute by the

[2] Source: Annual Workplans and CDRs from Atlas. Timestamp for the latest one: 29-09-2021 01:09:20. For 2021 expenditure, the source is: https://open.undp.org/projects/00081003, retrieved on 30-Nov-2021.

expected closure date up to 91% of the total LDCF amount (and hence return only 9% of these funds to the GEF). By 30-November-2021, when the TE is delivering its main report, 81% of total LDCF resources have been cumulatively consumed by the project (meaning 19% of a $8.2M budget remaining to be spent). Compared to the same analysis conducted in September 2021, there are indeed improvements in delivery, which seems to be accelerating. At the same time, financial delivery in 2021 is still low (57% against the planned).[3] Based on current data (last updated in on 31-Nov-2021), we find this projection optimistic (as opposed to realistic). Yet, without insight into the 2022 budget and workplan, it is difficult to estimate the final ratio of GEF funds consumption. The 19% of unspent LDCF resources corresponds to $1.1M, and this is significant. **At the current rate of expenditure, the amount expected to be returned to the GEF will likely be significant ($0.7M, maybe up to $0.9M).** Regardless, the analysis above points to the limited absorptive capacity of national counterparts, in particular the Implementing Partner, and within an arrangement where UNDP not only plays an important operational role, but where it also acts as 'project manager', in the lack of a properly constituted project management unit (PMU). **RECOMMENDATION**: Carefully monitor budgets and plan realistically. Conduct budget revisions to recuperate the budget balance on the GEF grant and spend it wisely for the remaining of the project's duration.

12. The TE's general assessment of performance is corroborated by the fact that 'Progress towards the project Objective' was considered 'off track' by the project team itself -- not just in the last Project Implementation Report (the 2021 PIR), but also in PIRs for previous years. The TE assessed that progress towards two of the project's three outcomes showed mixed results: It is Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU) for Outcomes 1 and 2, and Moderately Satisfactory (MS) for Outcome 3. At the same time, the PIR assessed progress towards some key indicator as 'on track' and others as off track.[4]
13. No mission to the field was possible in connection with the TE exercise, due to covid-risk. Hence, much of the field level evidence could not be cross verified, except through remote stakeholder interviews. Evidence on relevance, effectiveness and efficiency had been considered in building up the overall outcome rating for this TE. Delivery of results weighed the most. Much of the evidence underpinning the MU rating was drawn mostly from the 2020 and 2021 PIRs, stakeholder interviews, as well as from the MTR.
14. The justification for ratings according to specific criteria is presented in the following paragraphs.
15. The first group of criteria assessed was the **Overall Quality of M&E,** which was rated as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**. There are two aspects covered: the **M&E design at entry (rated MS)** and the **M& Plan Implementation (rated MU).** The PRODOC contains a reasonably well-conceived and apparently practical set of six indicators. Together with focal area tracking tool and other M&E descriptions in the PRODOC, this appeared sufficient in terms of a M&E framework at the point of CEO Endorsement. However, a project of the size and scope of the Cuvelai project would usually require the establishment of a comprehensive M&E system. While the PRODOC indeed proposed a set of standard M&E activities, and it included a results framework with indicators that seemed SMART, there were shortcomings in the choice of those indicators. With implementation, the indicator set which lacked a baseline reading, became impractical and did not really help monitor the project.
16. Furthermore, M&E implementation would rely on development of a more detailed M&E framework, which did not happen. The PRODOC prescribed the following: "*It is foreseen that a more detailed M&E project framework is developed during the project inception phase for national management purposes*". This assumption is questionable, because it transferred to the inception phase activities that should have been concluded in the project preparation phase (PPG). Indeed, the Inception Report did not include additional information on detailed M&E framework.
17. As for the rating **M&E Plan Implementation**, it is It is notable that a detailed local M&E system was supposed to be developed during the inception. Indeed, the MTR noted that "*the project managers*" (in the plural) were not supplied with relevant tools for M&E, which points out to visible gaps in the M&E more broadly.
18. In terms of the **results framework**, most indicators are informative and complete, albeit somewhat generic. Indicators would be completed by more specific adaptation indicators included in the Climate Change Adaptation Focal Area Tracking Tool (AMAT), which had been prepared for the project only twice, and with

[3] Based on data from https://open.undp.org/projects/00081003 retrieved on 30-Nov-2021, and which showed expenditure at $2,087,628 against a budget of $3,659,515 (all SCCF resources) – hence 57% delivery.
[4] The analysis of results – including results against project indicators -- is still preliminary.

gaps. Not all Results Framework indicators included a baseline or proved to be SMART. In fact, if analyzed literally, only indicator 3.2 is fully SMART. Furthermore, the ability to monitor the progress towards the targets for three out of six in total indicators, relied solely on the conduct of a comprehensive a 'Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment' (VRA), supposedly at household level in project sites. The VRA was expected to be conducted during the project's inception – and this has not happened. It is noted that some form of VRA study was conducted later on, covering a few localities and with a limited scope (according to PIR 2019: 8 communities in 3 municipalities of Cunene province). This happened in 2018 -- i.e. two years after the end of the inception phase, a milestone that was only achieved in late 2016 and two years after CEO Endorsement. Expecting that project managers would have the capacity to commend, upon inception, a complex study for generating multiple project indicators, was a risky strategy during the project's design stage. Ideally, the VRA should have been applied during the PPG.

19. **The gender aspect** is mainstreamed into only a few logical framework indicators including the objective-level indicator, but any details provided whatsoever. That two would rely on the conduct of the VRA and with the expectation that the study would be gender sensitive.

20. The **implementation of the M&E framework / system** was assessed as overall **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**, which is rate that puts shortcomings in evidence. At the same time, the TE does recognize the important efforts by the project managers, UNDP, MCTA and various other project partners, towards putting together monitoring information to compose the PIRs. The project's indicators' set turned out to be unpractical for the purposes of reporting on progress towards project outcomes, so the reporting style had be "improvised". The PIRs reported on the progress towards the indicators through lengthy narratives. However it is hard to measure the exact progress at project closure, which after much analysis is assessed as showing 'mixed results'. According to PIR 2021 "[a] *proper measurable assessment* [of vulnerability] *was not concluded yet"*. As indicated further up, an initial VRA was conducted in 2018/9 by NGO DW. It covered at least five localities in the Cunene basin, but when comparing the location of these localities with the list of target *comunas* that had been included in the PRODOC, the TE notes a certain mismatch. Only three of the localities covered by the VRA are within the "seven target *comunas"* mentioned in the PRODOC.

21. There are apparently plans to conduct, at project end, a more comprehensive VRA study, but its scope and usefulness are not known by the TE. To date, a VRA using the same methodology as the one conducted by DW in 2018/9 had not been replicated across project localities in the Cuvelai River Basin. Nor has it been applied again to the same localities previously covered by DW. Engaging NGOs to replicate the VRA methodology applied by DW in 2018 in more localities across the Cuvelai River Basin would have been useful in terms of comparison. A **RECOMMENDATION** in that regard has been formulated.

22. The PIRs contain reasonable reporting on the progress towards the indicators including aspects related to project sustainability and gender, but the quality of reporting varies. At the same time, the data is not sufficient for meeting an adequate M&E indicator reporting, even though efforts were made to collect vulnerability data. The recent V&A assessments, as well as the VRA conducted in 2018 in part filled this gap, but not fully for the reasons explained above.

23. In terms of the further development of the M&E framework during the implementation, and vis-a-vis the design phase, the Inception Report does not contain any extra details on the structuring of an M&E system, as it had been prescribed in the PRODOC.

24. The PRODOC foresaw the engagement of an M&E international expert, who would be responsible for implementing most of the M&E activities. This person was however never hired (at least not with full dedication to the project) due to issues with procurement. It was also established that this role was taken over by the project managers, but not the official project manager based in Cunene. As from XXXX, UNDP Angola hired an M&E Specialist to help oversee several projects. The M&E function was strengthened, but with caveats. The person is responsible for a large portfolio and is not necessarily well acquainted with the specificity of the UNDP-GEF projects. Although the M&E Specialist dedicated time and attention to the project during the TE, aspects such as the monitoring of the co-financing and the tracking tool, which are GEF specific, have not been in the radar.

25. The **Overall Implementing Agency (IA) Implementation & Executing Agency (EA) Execution** was rated as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS).**

26. The **Quality of oversight of UNDP** was rated as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS).** The TE must look at the quality of UNDP implementation throughout the duration of the project. The TE thinks that in the periods when the project required extra support from UNDP the level of effort was indeed intensified. UNDP positively responded to most of challenges faced by the project such as the aftermath of governmental election and covid-19 pandemic. The oversight activities by UNDP are frequent and comprehensive. All of this is also relevant now when the project is in its second extension and intensified efforts are being made for the project to achieve its final push.

27. The TE assessed that there were two main issues with UNDP's oversight and implementation, which represents shortcomings. The first is an overarching problem affecting the entire implementation is related to inadequate management arrangements within the project—and in particular the maintenance of a weak PMU, even though this represented a high project risk and burdened the UNDP CO. The second issues is the long time-lag between the CEO Endorsement Date and the Inception Report date, and the fact that UNDP could have sensed the impact and risk of such delays and addressed it in different ways.

28. In terms of the first issue – the TE noted that the project manager in Cunene did not in fact perform the role of a project manager. Instead, his engagement was limited to managing local operations, while the role of managing and coordinating the overall project was mainly divided between other actors: the UNDP program officer, the Project Director and at times other actors (UNVs and technical advisor with part-time dedication). Another issue is that, to date, and during all of the project's implementation, the PMU had only half of the project personnel that had been foreseen for the Unit in the PRODOC (including managerial, operational and technical personnel -- the latter with skills in hydrology, meteorology, M&E etc.). These inadequate arrangements, that actually remain in force until today, have deeply affected project delivery, in addition to other aspects, and it can lead to weak national ownership and decreased potential of the project for building national capacity. The TE understands that the above issue is linked to insufficient capacity to coordinate such a complex project by the government of Angola and perhaps a "wish" (from UNDP and the Project Director) to 'compensate' for the shortcomings of the implementation caused by this. However, it is not clear to the TE why UNDP did not implement standard solutions applicable in case of insufficient capacity in the government and a weak PMU, such as conducting a 'substantive project revision' or effectively recruiting people with the necessary skills to fulfil specific roles within the PMU. A **RECOMMENDATION** was made in regards to still strengthening the PMU, if there is time. It is also not clear to the TE why the second issue – a delay with project mobilization in its initial phase – was not addressed earlier.

29. The **Quality of the Implementing Partner's Execution** was assessed as **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**. The MU rating means that there were significant shortcomings in the implementation of project activities by the IP, which bears the bulk of responsibly under NIM arrangement.

30. First, there were internal difficulties within the government of Angola related to the elections in 2017. As confirmed through stakeholder interviews, the implementation spanned over general election, the presence of three different ministers leading the environmental portfolio, and two government restructuring events. The consequences of that included procurement delays, high turnover rates among project personnel, coordination issues, agenda conflicts and other issues with delegating the responsibilities within the government. All of this was aggravated by the fact that the Cuvelai project did not have a strong PMU. These challenges had a very negative impact on the effectiveness of the implementation by the IP.

31. The level of ownership of the project among the involved governmental bodies varied throughout the project. The implementation of some of the activities faced significant challenges, e.g. the research on climate change resilient crop varieties, led by CFR-UAN in partnership with IIA, was not concluded and no new varieties of resilient cultivar reached local markets in the Cunene basin. The TE thinks that the output related to the development of crop varieties was unrealistic, but it could have been addressed differently (e.g. in partnership with Namibia, which are more advanced in this research). The purchasing and installation of hydrometeorological equipment arrived very late in the project's lifecycle. Without a consistent series of hydro-climatic observations, it is not possible to analyze hydro-climatic data. It is neither possible to consolidate and issue FFEWS to local population. There are indications from the project's documentation that the engagement of local NGOs to work with the governmental institutes at the local level on resilience building / vulnerability reduction actions was a good idea. The overall execution of the

project improved on the account of the comprehensive and far-reaching work of these partners. Also, the PIRs for years 2018 and later, provide evidence of successful execution of project activities on the ground and the progress towards project targets being at least in part 'on track'. E.g. progress toward targets 1.1., 2.1. and 2.2. was assessed as on track or partially on track. Substantial evidence had confirmed the quality and success of activities implemented by NGOs and some government partners (e.g. SPCB and IDA). Those activities include e.g. community-based water resources management, irrigation schemes, CSBs, radio Cuvelai system development, training and others.

32. The objective-level indicator (*Percentage change in vulnerability of local community to climate risks*) is 'off track', according to the PIR 2021. Several areas of progress were identified, but it is not possible to assess the scale of the overall progress towards the objective due to incomplete data. According to the PIR 2021, by project end, key indicators for Outcomes 1 and 3 were reported to be 'on track', and Outcome 2 indicator was 'off track'.[5][6]

33. The **Overall Assessment of Outcomes** includes various aspects that need to be pondered, some positive and others less so. Yet, the overall rating is **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU).** The TE needs to look at the project's entire lifetime: from beginning to end. To start with, project performance was hampered by long delays in the project mobilization phase – i.e. from the moment the project was CEO Endorsed at the GEF's level until all planning is concluded at the end of the Inception Phase.

34. The project mobilization phase lasted 21 months, of which 14 months were needed to achieve all internal clearances at UNDP and in the implementing partner (MINAMB, now defunct, with institutional attributions taken over by the MCTA). Delays in starting a much awaited project have high costs -- and beneficiaries lose the most with the time lost in bureaucratic processes and with transaction costs. The TE assesses that those delays that were not adequately compensated by milestone extension.

35. Overall, the project had several important achievements, but in general performance left to be desired because of shortcomings that persisted during much of the project's lifetime.

36. Performance improved with the years, after the initial delays were overcome. Performance could even be rated better, if only the last 1-2 years were considered. Still, the main reason behind the MU rating for the assessment of overall outcomes is the fact that the project faced significant difficulties with producing results, and in some cases with a confuse style of reporting on what was otherwise being delivered. There is also a pattern of low financial delivery, which is rooted in unrealistic planning and scoping, and in difficulties in coordinating the large number of partners that helped MINAMB (and now MCTA) deliver on the project. The analysis of project results, builds on a detailed analysis of the sequence of the PIRs, content and analysis provided by the MTR, several stakeholder interviews and discussions with UNDP and high level officials in MCTA. On a positive note, the project experienced periods of improved results and performance, which were however disturbed by restructuring of the government institutions, legislative elections in Angola and, since 2020, the covid-19 pandemic.

37. In terms of **Relevance**, the interventions proposed by the project were highly relevant when the project was conceived and still remains valid. Adaptation in drylands in Angola (Cuvelai River Basin is within the Miombo Drylands area), and in important river basins, remains highly relevant and needed. National institutions have limited capacity for building hydro-meteorological observations. FFEWS is a novelty and an adaptation

[5] The following indicators were considered:

- 1.1 A Flood Forecasting & EWS that is useful to communities developed and forecasts disseminated to target communities in Province of Cunene.
- 2.1 Percentage change in gender disaggregated household income in the 7 targeted communes as a result of project intervention via perception-based survey (VRA).
- 2.2. No. of household in targeted communes engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods
- 3.1 CC-Environmental Information System of Angola (CC-ENISA) is established, risk assessed and vulnerability maps developed for the Cunene Province and the Cuvelai in particular.
- 3.2 Number of National or Provincial relevant plans and/or policy documents that integrate climate change flood and drought risks

[6] These are interim conclusions. Moving forward, we would go in depth with the subject matter of these key indicators (Objective and Outcome) and still conduct triangulation of data, including analysis of the Tracking Tools. We note e.g. that the end-of-project is not yet prepared and there are inconsistencies in the reporting for the baseline and mid-term tracking tools. Also, the TE team has just only gained access to the partial collection of technical reports prepared through the project. Analysis will still ensue.

priority (NDC, NAPA). Climatic risk response and early warnings frameworks need to be developed. Also, the UN Strategic Frameworks in Angola prioritize adaptation, especially in the South, where drylands predominate. In this context, the interventions proposed by the project remain highly relevant. However, the TE agrees with the MTR, that to "*provide a FFEWS* [as] *an outcome by itself*" is not sufficient. The rating for 'relevance' criteria is therefore **Relevant (R) / Satisfactory (S).**

38. Regarding the **Effectiveness** of implementation, the situation presents itself as ambiguous. More specifically, there were numerous positive developments e.g. implementation of a suite of vulnerability reduction activities in local communities, piloted by NGOs and government institutions. This is highly commendable. Such activities included at least three important adaptation domains: (i) 'Agriculture Resilience & Livelihoods'; (ii) 'WASH Resilience'[7]; and (iii) 'DRR preparedness'[8]. The reporting on those activities is rich in detail and reached out to a high number of beneficiaries, although it is difficult to quantify the number of beneficiaries, or to properly disaggregate this number by gender. NGOs such as DW had reported to benefit as many as 22,000 people in different localities, while the World Lutheran Federation mentions 23,000 people, and ADPP mentions some 33,600 reached through awareness raising. Government institutions built their capacity by being engaged in the project, including INAMET, IDA, IIA, SPCB and possibly also CETAC and CFR-UAN. Capacity was also built at INRH and GABHIC, which are institution with more prior experience than the others with large projects.[9] The TE highlights the preparation by SPCB of 20 local level development of plans to face disaster. This too is also commendable, and an important project achievement under Component 3, assuming that the plans will be concluded by project end in February 2022. Other concrete and important results are the irrigation schemes in the communities, the development of radio communication system in local languages for early warning, as well as various successful training exercises that reached out to a large number of people, among others. Some of the first comprehensive climate vulnerability studies in Angola were conducted with the help of the project. A Spanish consortium was contracted in the beginning of 2021 to conduct the Climate Vulnerability and Risk mapping in the Cuvelai River Basin, with some results already delivered.

39. However, there were also important shortcomings with respect key results: hydrographic and climate measuring equipment, which are essential tools for producing climate information, including flood and drought warning, arrived too late or not at all in the project's lifecycle. Other crucial developments such as the planned agronomic characterization and selection of drought-resilient seeds that did happen to date. The TE thinks that, in hindsight, it was not realistic to expect that CRF-UAN, working together with IDA, would achieve, within 1 or 2 harvest seasons, the selection of drought resistant cultivars, which would then be disseminated widely among small farmers in the Cuvelai Basin.

40. These and other shortcomings were mostly due to poor planning and scoping, and most of all, unhelpful management arrangements within the project, including the very weak *de facto role* of the PMU. Other reasons included unfeasible timeline for certain activities (e.g. hydro-meteorological equipment installation and operationalization), and overall delays in project implementation, caused mostly by lengthy procurement processes, but also by factors external to the project (such as political changes, government restructuring, covid-19). Keeping in mind all of the above, the rating for the **Effectiveness** criteria is **Moderately unsatisfactory (MU).**

41. Concerning the **Efficiency** of the outcomes' implementation, it is overall **Unsatisfactory (U).** Project efficiency assessment looks at a number of parameters—the gap between planned and executed shown in Table 4 being an important one. For most of its implementation, the project struggled to coordinate

[7] WAHS stands for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (domains covered together in development programs).

[8] DRR stands for Disaster Risk Reduction.

[9] The following are the acronyms used here (alphabetically):

CRF-UAN	Center for Phytogenetic Resources | Centro de Recursos Fitogenéticos - at the Agostinho Neto University
GABHIC	Cabinet for River Basin Management of Cunene, Cubango and Cuvelai rivers | Gabinete para Administração das Bacias Hidrográficas do Cunene, Cubango e Cuvelai
IDA	Institute for Agrarian Development | *Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário*
IIA	Institute for Agricultural Research | *Instituto de Investigação Agronómica*
INAMET	National Institute for Meteorology | Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia
INRH	National Institute for Water Resouces | Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hídricos
SPCB	Civil Protection and Firefighters' Service | Serviço de Protecção Civil e Bombeiros
WLF	World Lutheran Federation (NGO)

activities and to spend financial resources. This is concluded based on the analysis of the Audit Report (2019), but in particular by the analysis of financial delivery conducted by the TE. Table 4 consistently shows low delivery rates. The average End-of-year "delivery", based on revised budgets, is 50.2% between 2016 and 2020. Only in 2019 did the project exceed the executed amount against what had been planned. When taking the End-of-year execution in relation the original annual work plan (AWP), the average ratio for the same period (2016 to 2020) is 47%.

42. Most importantly: by 30-November-2021, when the TE is delivering its main report, 81% of total LDCF resources have been cumulatively consumed by the project (meaning 19% of a $8.2M budget remaining to be spent). Compared to the same analysis conducted in September 2021, there are improvements in delivery, which seems to be accelerating. At the same time, financial delivery in 2021 is still low (57% against the planned).[10] The project is bound to reach its operational closure in February 2022, and it will likely have to return funds to the GEF, assuming that no addition milestone extension will be accorded to the project, beyond the two already approved by UNDP' Nature Climate and Energy Group (NCE).

43. Although it is difficult to assess exactly how much the project may need to send back to the GEF, based on the current pace of expenditure, the TE had initially foreseen this amount at approximately $1.0M or more. Currently, these projections point out now to some $0.7M, maximum $0.9M. There is some improvement in the speed of delivery. However, the point is that in an ideal situation, the project should not need to send funds back to the GEF. The GEF grant from SCCF could (and *should*) have been spent on implementing of a comprehensive Flood Forecasting & EWS that is useful to communities in the Cuvelai River basin, or in strengthening the dissemination of the resilience of the same communities, and perhaps in completing the development of a comprehensive CC-Environmental Information System of Angola (CC-ENISA) – an output that remains incomplete. Amounts that will likely end up being returned to the GEF should be spent in consolidating project results to ensure a stronger sustainability. With strict limitations imposed on project duration and the number of milestone extensions, it will be difficult to consume the remaining LDCF budget until February 2022. **RECOMMENDATION**: If possible, extend the project duration till mid-2022 to allow for the proper the conclusion of important project activities.

44. The **Overall Sustainability** of the project is assessed as **Moderately Unlikely (MU)**. The TE believes that the sustainability of the project is at risk due to: 1) ineffective management arrangement during project implementation, 2) gaps in the repository of technical reports that threatens project's legacy, 3) high likelihood of socio-political issues arising after project closure. The TE notes that, time and again, UNDP and the implementing partner (MINAMB/MCTA) had the chance to fix a fundamental problem that undermined the project throughout its duration (weak PMU) – but they did not act upon it. The lack of a strong, multi-disciplinary, capable and adequately staffed PMU was a glaring risk, while the composition of the PMU had been prescribed in the PRODOC. Further to this, the TE notes that, between 2015 and mid-2016, the project had funds approved but no PMU. For most of the implementation, the project had a weak PMU with limited coordination, operational technical and M&E capacity. More than a risk that was apparently not flagged and not adequately acted upon, a weak PMU ended up being a burden on those who were expected to oversee the project (officials in UNDP and MINAMB/MCTA), and to the extent that they stepped in to fulfil project management functions where there was a void. This situation created distortions in what would the ideal functions of different project players and it fueled the likelihood of conflicts of interest. (Accumulating roles in implementation and oversight is considered a conflict of interests.).

45. **RECOMMENDATION**: If there is still time, and especially if UNDP and MCTA can link the remaining work under the project with new interventions, recruit a person with senior project manager profile and a small technical team until project end. This will also help with delivery and sustainability.

46. Behind the limited prospects for sustainability, there are a number of issues that accumulated and that will curtail the project's potential impact. From this situation, it is possible to extract several lessons, which the TE will help curate together with project stakeholders, always in the positive spirit of learning and improving capacity and skills. Here is one: **LESSON** By securing, strengthening and enabling an adequate PMU, UNDP

[10] Based on data from https://open.undp.org/projects/00081003 retreived on 30-Nov-2021, and which showed expenditure at $2,087,628 against a budget of $3,659,515 (all SCCF resources) – hence 57% delivery.

and ex-MINAMB / now-MCTA would be otherwise applying simple project management methodologies and tools during the implementation to face challenges.

47. The **Financial Sustainability** of project outcomes beyond project duration shows limited prospects as well. It is **Moderately Unlikely (MU)** that the project's achievements can be sustained with current means available to government and responsible parties. The equipment purchased by the project constituted a significant investment that needs further maintenance. It is not clear whether INAMET and INRH will be able to secure the necessary budgets and human resource for this purpose.

48. The **Socio-Political Sustainability** of the project is, at this stage, considered **Moderately Unlikely (MU).** The project generally struggled to perform in face of restructuring, and the need to simultaneously engage different entities in the government, civil society and academia in a coordinated way. Changes in ministries and a high turnover of personnel are common. Such events are not just a risk, but an actual threat to sustainability. They will likely occur again in project settings. The TE finds that the risk counteracting measures have not been sufficiently developed within the institution to safeguard project sustainability against such risks. Local communities lose the most. The project is slated to generate a suite of adaptation benefits, but fell short on the socio-political sustainability front.

49. The **institutional frameworks and governance sustainability** is **Unlikely (U)**. As pointed out further up, the project developed an unsustainable management arrangement, as the Evaluator believe, in response to difficulties in managing the project among many various parties. The institutions involved in managing the project are multiple and, in most cases, not used to working together. It is unclear what safeguards were put in place by the project to ensure that these institutional frameworks remain beyond project duration. The Evaluator believes that given the difficulties related to institutional frameworks and governance experienced during project implementation it is likely that after project closure the problem will remain.

50. The **environmental sustainability** of the project is **Moderately Likely (ML)**. The project was designed to ensure environmental sustainability through adaptation and sustainable use of natural resources and e.g. with relation to water resources and through adaptation measures. The project implemented several important activities related to environmental sustainability e.g. activities aimed at conservation of water resources such as water harvesting and boreholes improvement, even though those results are mostly localized. At the same time, other activities that could contribute more to sustainable use of natural resources were not implemented e.g. the research on drought-resistant crop varieties and potential follow-on activities.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS

The present report is the **Draft Final Report and corresponds to DELIVERABLE 3** of the list of expected deliverables from the TE assignment.

The main conclusion on the TE is that the Cuvelai Basin Adaptation project is a worthwhile project, but which faced many difficulties, including long delays before it could be 'internalized' in UNDP and MINAMB (now MCTA), inadequate management arrangements and low delivery. It is generally rated as **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**: somewhat below expectations and/or significant shortcomings. Some of these shortcomings could perhaps have been avoided, if a strong PMU had been set up in MINAMB/MCTA. The project involves a large number of partners, including national institutions and NGOs, and it draws on the capacities of private sector entities and cross-border cooperation for delivering technically complex information and systems, and for building national capacities.

For managing complex processes, a strong, multi-disciplinary, capable and adequately staffed PMU would have been needed. The project never counted on one. Instead, the project struggled, and the sustainability of its results are at risk. Yet, it did deliver a number of interesting results, which should be capitalized upon, while there is still time.

Slated to close in February 2022, the project will likely need to return unused funds to the LDCF (possibly $0.8M to $1M, judging from the current pace of delivery). Such situations must be avoided in the future. Lessons and recommendations follow in the next section.

RECOMMENDATIONS MATRIX

Table 5. Recommendations and Lessons derived from issues pointed out in the TE

ISSUE / FINDING	#	LESSONS (in bold) and/or RECOMMENDATIONS
Low delivery, as demonstrated in Table 4. Execution and cumulative delivery on the LDCF Grant and on UNDP Core Resources.	[R1]	Carefully monitor budgets and plan realistically. Conduct budget revisions to recuperate the budget balance on the GEF grant and spend it wisely for the remaining of the project's duration.
There are apparently plans to conduct, at project end, a more comprehensive VRA study, but its scope and usefulness are not known by the TE. To date, a VRA using the same methodology as the one conducted by DW in 2018/9 had not been replicated across project localities in the Cuvelai River Basin, not conducted again in the same localities.	[R2]	**If there is still time, engage NGOs to replicate the VRA methodology applied by DW in 2018 in more localities across the Cuvelai River Basin.** The aim would be to produce a participatory end-of-project assessment of local vulnerability. This would be useful in terms of comparison, the data produced would also be useful as baseline for new adaptation interventions.
Amounts that will likely end up being returned to the GEF could also have been spent in consolidating project results to ensure a stronger sustainability. With strict limitations imposed on project duration and the number of milestone extensions, it will be difficult to consume the remaining LDCF budget until February 2022.	[R3]	If possible, extend the project duration till mid-2022 to allow for the proper the conclusion of important project activities.
Reference to Section 2.7) Limitations to the Evaluation Methodology	[Lesson 1]	**There are pros and cons in conducting evaluations remotely.** It is likely that not as many individual stakeholders would have been contacted and interviewed by the TE, if the assignment included a mission to Angola, which tends to be a rushed process. Interacting with 24 unique individual representing 14 different entities was only possible because of the remote nature of the TE. At the same time, it was not possible to directly interact with beneficiaries in the field and hear their perspective.
Although a 4-year duration tends to be the norm in several UNDP GEF projects, a duration this short for a project implemented in Angola, of the complexity of that of Cuvelai Project, and with a budget of $8.2M, is clearly too short. The limited absorptive capacity of government's implementing partner and responsible parties plays also a role in the delays, as attested by several of the stakeholders interviewed, including UNDP. However, even in countries with stronger implementation capacity, the project's complexity and budget size alone would warrant a longer duration, possibly of 5 to 6 years.	[R4]	**Scope project duration according to much more realistic expectations.** In the future, projects with a large budget, involving complex procurement and requiring the gradual development of technical capacity of national institutions, should definitely be scoped to last longer than just 4 years.
Although 18 months is currently the maximum time allowed by UNDP NCE in terms cumulative milestone extensions, it is not enough to compensate for the time loss in the beginning of the project, for the impacts of covid-19 on the project, and for the fact that the project's	[R5]	**Address the real reason behind requests for project Milestone Adjustments.** In the future, more attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project's methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments. Some of the shortcomings

ISSUE / FINDING	#	LESSONS (in bold) and/or RECOMMENDATIONS
original scoping of a 4-year duration had grossly overestimated the national absorptive capacity.		observed seem the affect the UNDP-GEF portfolio more broadly. Efforts should instead go towards addressing the causes of delays, and also towards a realistic analysis of context and circumstances, improved planning and time scoping across the board. Efforts must also go towards improving the collaboration between UNDP and Implementing Partner for ensuring a swifter, more efficient and more effective project mobilization and Inception Phase.
The TE analyzed the 'smartness' of project indicators in Section 3.4 (refer to Table 11). Several indicators and end-of-project targets are not specific enough to be easily measurable. This reflected negatively in the quality of reporting through the PIRs. If the VRA baseline VRA had been conducted during the PPG, it would be less of a problem, but this was not the case. the baseline only established very late and only in part.	[R6]	**In the future, the project's Results Framework should not be built around indicators that require expensive, demanding, complex and time consuming household surveys, such as the VRA.** This recommendations applies in particular if the project targets a large area with the population spread across several villages with difficult access, which is the case for the Cunene Basin.
Refer to Section 4.1, and under it 'Lessons from other relevant projects incorporated into project design'	[Lesson 2]	**The development of FFEWS needs to be approached through the step-by-step creation of pre-conditions.** First, it is important to generate hydroclimatic data and then generate analysis and develop Early Warning Services. And in order to generate hydroclimatic data, measurement instruments must be installed early in the project's lifetime.
From the point of view of adaptative management, the misalignment between project duration and expectations is shortcoming that could have been addressed in a timely manner, but was not.	[R7]	More attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project's methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments.
More than a risk that was apparently not flagged and not adequately acted upon, a weak PMU ended up being a burden on those who were expected to oversee the project (officials in UNDP and MINAMB/MCTA), and to the extent that they stepped in to fulfil project management functions where there was a void. This situation created distortions in what would the ideal functions of different project players and it fueled the likelihood of conflicts of interest. (Accumulating roles in implementation and oversight is considered a conflict of interests.)	[R8]	**If there is still time, and especially if UNDP and MCTA can link the remaining work under the project with new interventions, recruit a person with senior project manager profile and a small technical team until project end.** This will also help with delivery and sustainability.
The project has resulted in a lot of benefits, and it will rely on other projects to replicate and further upscale to a more significant level. A follow-up intervention is recommended to further secure the investment made by the GEF/LDCF, the government and UNDP.	[R9]	**Consider one or more follow-up interventions. It is commendable that government proceeds with its plans to carry out a follow-up intervention, especially in the wake of COP26. Such an intervention should first create a bridge between the Cuvelai Project and the next intervention in the form of a sustainability plan (Exit Strategy) – even though the development of such strategy should have been done earlier.** The next adaptation intervention for the Cuvelai River Basin should focus on bringing civil society actions on adaptation to scale, side by side with government. The new project should embrace and integrated approach to resilience building and strengthen not just the local disaster risk response but also local adaptation planning. It may choose to focus on sectors and

ISSUE / FINDING	#	LESSONS (in bold) and/or RECOMMENDATIONS
		geographical areas where achievements were partially accomplished and also on addressing emerging adaptation issues – including local finance for adaptation and ecosystem based adaptation, e.g. regenerative agriculture. The issue of private sector engagement and the role of women in farming and local rural development should also be addressed.
Sustainability of the results linked to [1] hydromet equipment purchased by the project; [2 CC-ENISA; [3] improved water access at the level of localities; and [4] civil protection actions / locally-driven disaster risk reduction. Refer to Box 4. Specific Recommendations on interlinked facets of Sustainability for details.	[R-Sust-1 through 4]	**[R-Sust-1]** Consistently follow standard managerial practices that optimize the operations and management of technical equipment **[R-Sust-2]** Adopt a suite of good practices for the development, data enrichment and maintenance of environmental monitoring systems. **[R-Sust-3]** In rural settings where water is scarce and people are vulnerable, income poor and deprived, certain approaches are recommended. Humanitarian and local development oriented NGOs seem to master a number of WASH best practices that can be replicated: **[R-Sust-4]** For DRR at the local level, adopt a variety of gender-sensitive approaches that will strengthen as much as possible community self-help, skills development, participation and empowerment by adhering to few useful principles.

-//- End of the Executive Summary -//-

2) INTRODUCTION

This report has been prepared in the context of the **Terminal Evaluation (TE)** of project *"Promoting climate-resilient development and enhanced adaptive capacity to withstand disaster risks in Angolan's Cuvelai River Basin"*, managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), has the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as the "GEF Agency". It is hence a UNDP GEF-LDCF Project.

The Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment (MCTA – formerly MINAMB), functions as UNDP's "Implementing Partner" for the project. MCTA and the project team works together with several other key national institutions responsible for meteorology, water resources, infrastructure, local affairs, finance, tourism and land use planning, in addition to other partners responsible for implementation on the ground or other aspects of service provision.

In June 2021, the new UNDP Evaluation guidelines replaced the previous UNDP Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, amidst several other reforms within the organization. The introduction of new guidelines document is meant to regularly address changes within the organization. The updated **UNDP Evaluation Guidelines**, which are not specific to GEF projects, highlights that evaluation within UNDP is:

- A means to **strengthen learning** within our organization and among stakeholders, to support better decision-making.
- Essential for **accountability and transparency**, strengthening the ability of stakeholders to hold UNDP accountable for its development contributions.
- Often **intended** to generate empirical knowledge about what has worked, what has not, and why. Through the generation of evidence and objective information, evaluations enable program managers and other stakeholders to **make informed management decisions** and plan strategically.

Previously known as the "UNDP-GEF unit", a new UNDP cluster has been recently rebranded as Nature Climate and Energy (NCE). The NCE Group continues to hold both HQ and regional presence. The Group is responsible for providing advisory and project development services to UNDP Country Offices (COs), which represent the decentralized level with respect to UNDP GEF projects. The NCE Group is also responding to a recent performance audit conducted in 2020 and targeting GEF projects, which pointed out several topics requiring improvement in the management of these projects.[11]

Altogether, the TE exercise has taken place during a period of change within UNDP with respect to evaluations and its institutional accountability as a GEF Agency.

According to the UNDP GEF project cycle in effect, two evaluative exercises are foreseen for all medium- and full-sized projects financed by the GEF: a Mid-term Evaluation/Review (MTE/MTR), which in the case of this project was conducted in 2019, and a TE (the present exercise). Separate UNDP GEF guidance for TEs and MTEs/MTRs are availed by UNDP to orient these exercises, including by outlining procedures and approaches and general guidance on evaluation processes, roles and responsibilities, terms of reference templates, evaluation report outlines and sample evaluation criteria matrices. The guidance and policies have been consulted widely applied in the present process.

Conducted between August and November 2021, the present TE was conducted remotely (100% home based), in light of heightened Covid-19 risks not just in Angola, but also in Brazil where the evaluator resides, and also globally, curtailing travel and other activities on the ground.

[11] UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations: Performance Audit of UNDP Global Environment Facility (GEF) Management, Report No. 2210, Issue Date: 1 December 2020. Downloaded from: https://www.thegef.org/documents/performance-audit-undp-global-environment-facility-management, accessed on 13/08/21.

Apart from the review of documents related to the project, including the Project Document (ProDoc), technical reports, project interim reports and meeting minutes, the Consultant also conducted detail interviews with project stakeholders. Stakeholder interviews happed during the first half of the TE period. Data triangulation, which counted on the assistance from the project team, the CO and the UNDP NCE Group's Regional Technical Adviser, permitted the TE process to ensure quality and reliable information gathering for the assessment. Project stakeholders included representatives from the various national institutions, local CSO service providers at site level and various exchanges with members of the project team.

The findings from the TE terminal evaluation were analyzed to assess the general performance of the project, with the results presented in the various sections of this report. Important recommendations based on the findings of the TE process are provided towards the end of the report for improvement of future similar programs, and especially to guide GEF and UNDP programming in Angola and elsewhere.

2.1) Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of the Terminal Evaluation (TE) and its methodology are specifically informed by guidance from both UNDP and the GEF on evaluation processes. A key publication that guides the present evaluation is titled *"Guidance for conducting terminal evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed projects"* of 2020[12], referred to in this report as the "**UNDP GEF 2020 Guidance on TEs**". According to this guidance, the following are the complementary and broad purposes of the evaluation:

- To promote accountability and transparency;
- To synthesize lessons that can help to improve the selection, design and implementation of future UNDP-supported GEF-financed initiatives; and to improve the sustainability of benefits and aid in overall enhancement of UNDP programming;
- To assess and document project results, and the contribution of these results towards achieving GEF strategic objectives aimed at global environmental benefits; and
- To gauge the extent of project convergence with other priorities within the UNDP country program, including poverty alleviation; strengthening resilience to the impacts of climate change, reducing disaster risk and vulnerability, as well as cross-cutting issues such gender equality, empowering women and supporting human rights.

Considering the contribution of project results towards achieving GEF strategic objectives (second bullet above), the LDCF's climate change adaptation objectives will be on focus. This is discussed in section 2.1, which more specifically to the need to show the additionality of interventions funded by the LDCF.

The 2020 Guidance on TEs prescribes the following and recommends further reading: *"A gender-responsive evaluation should be carried out even if the project being evaluated was not gender-responsive in its design. The UNEG guidance document, 'Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations' provides examples of how to incorporate these elements in the definition of the evaluation's purpose, objectives, context and scope and to add a gender dimension to the standard evaluation criteria.*" The gender aspect is an important aspect of the TE, including by taking into consideration UNDP's current policies and practices.

[12] See: http://web.undp.org/evaluation/guideline/documents/GEF/TE_GuidanceforUNDP-supportedGEF-financedProjects.pdf.

Concerning the gender aspect, UNDP's latest guidance can be found in recent UNDP Policies, in particular the *UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021*[13]. This is a rather recent piece of policy guidance at the level of the organization, vis-à-vis the project's timeline.

It should be noted that the project had been conceived and designed 8 years ago (see TIMELINE). Back then, UNDP's gender policies were not as well elaborated and comprehensive as they currently are. While the current UNDP policy provides indeed the actual "lenses" for looking at the gender aspect, it would not be completely "fair" to judge project design with the present lenses. The same level of stringency concerning gender mainstreaming into project indicators were not common practice back then, but gender marking was only beginning to be introduced.

Rather, the focus of the assessment with respect to the project's role in promoting gender equality and women's empowerment will be mostly on the implementation. The TE's entry point is to show the extent to which gender gradually became mainstreamed into key project's processes such as planning, choice of activities and partners, etc. Gender mainstreaming is explicitly taken into account in the evaluation's methodology and in the assessment of findings.

2.2) SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

The UNDP GEF TE guidance prescribes the following in terms of the **approach and methodology**[14]:

"[…] highlighting the conceptual models adopted with a description of data-collection methods, sources and analytical approaches to be employed, including the rationale for their selection (how they will inform the evaluation) and their limitations; data-collection tools, instruments and protocols; and discussion of reliability and validity for the evaluation and the sampling plan, including the rationale and limitations. Sample methodological approaches are described in the 'Pre-evaluation Phase' section of this guidance."

In this section, the above-mentioned aspects are covered from a methodological point of view, without repeating what is already in the TE guidance, which serves as a basis for the present TE exercise.

SCOPE OF THE TE AND PRODUCTS FROM THE ASSIGNMENT

The TOR mandates the evaluator to review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – including Annual Project Reports / Project Implementation Reports (APR/PIR) – which are the project's donor reports, project budget revisions, the MTR (for which the report that was finalized in mid-2019), progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, plus any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment.

The following criteria are **assessed through a rating scale**, as a minimum: **Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, execution, and finally overall project performance.** All ratings have been duly justified through evidence-based analysis.

[13] See e.g. https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/undp-gender-equality-strategy-2018-2021.html

[14] UNDP (2020) guidance for conducting terminal evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed projects.

Figure 4. The rating scales applied in the TE

FROM TE's TOR: ANNEX D: RATING SCALES *Color coded*

Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, I&E Execution	*Sustainability ratings:*	*Relevance ratings*
6: Highly Satisfactory (HS): no shortcomings	4. Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability	2. Relevant (R)
5: Satisfactory (S): minor shortcomings	3. Moderately Likely (ML):moderate risks	1.. Not relevant (NR)
4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	2. Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks	***Impact Ratings:***
3. Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): significant shortcomings	1. Unlikely (U): severe risks	3. Significant (S)
2. Unsatisfactory (U): major problems		2. Minimal (M)
1. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe problems		1. Negligible (N)
Additional ratings where relevant: Not Applicable (N/A) Unable to Assess (U/A		

Other aspects concerning the TE's scope relate to: (i) the process (Figure 5); (ii) the need for integrating gender equality and women's empowerment perspectives in the TE (covered in specific ***'gendered sub-sections'*** of this report); (iii) the package of documentation to be compiled and availed by the project team to the TE (Annex IV); and (iv) the reach out to project stakeholders and interview them, even though a remote evaluation, on account of the covid-19 pandemic, posed challenges to process (see Annex III).

Figure 5. Evaluation Timeframe from the 2020 official guidance on TE by UNDP



Source: UNDP (2020) guidance for conducting terminal evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed projects. Reproduction of Figure 1, on page 13.

With the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on international travel in connection with the TE assignment has not been feasible. The TE has been being conducted 100% remotely. This required some adaptations to the usual methodology for face-to-face processes of project visit and direct consultations with project stakeholders. All stakeholder consultation was conducted through video-conferencing. No site visit was possible.

With respect to scope, the TE report contains evidence-based findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations. The evidence and opinion (qualified opinion and presented as "findings") are presented herein in a way that makes the content accessible and coherently presented.

Project performance has been evaluated according to the following criteria, as required by the TOR (those marked with * require ratings):

- Relevance *
- Effectiveness *
- Efficiency *
- Sustainability *
- Gender and human rights
- Additional cross-cutting issues, as relevant[15]
- Results Framework
- Progress to Impact
- Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Design and Implementation *
- UNDP oversight/implementation *
- Implementing Partner execution*
- GEF-SCCF [adaptation] additionality
- Adaptive Management
- Stakeholder Engagement*
- Financing & materialization of co-financing* -- *tables and figures have been composed*
- Social and Environmental Standards (Safeguards)

All of the criteria (or topics) above are covered by the TE, either directly or indirectly, through working questions – i.e. the so called **'Evaluation Questions'** – and which have been formulated for guiding the TE, especially in stakeholder interviews, which were all semi-structured.

The items marked with an asterisk in the bullet-points' list further up (*) received special attention in the TE, because a rating is a minimum requirement for the TE and a specific scale must be used. See: Table 6. Evaluation Ratings (dashboard)).

For certain criteria, a **'consultative and analytical approach'** has applied (e.g. the issue of adaptative management and the project's duration issue). This was a specific request from the Resident Representative, echoed during the first interview. Yet for other analytical topics, the TE could not adequately investigate findings, given that the TE is being conducted remotely and not enough working have been accorded to the TE's contract. This is the case of the LDCF requirement of focusing on vulnerable populations and resilience. Secondhand sources were instead used.

The table that contains the **Evaluation Questions in matrix format** in Annex V includes more details on the methodological approach and scope.

Four main products or contractual deliverables (DELs) are expected from the TE assignment:

DEL1) TE Inception Report: *"TE consultant clarifies objectives and methods of the TE no later than 2 weeks before starting the TE desk work and mission [Assumption 1]. TE consultant submits the Inception Report to the Commissioning Unit and project management"*

DEL2) Presentation: *"TE consultant presents initial findings to project management and the Commissioning Unit at the end of the TE work and mission"*

DEL3) Draft TE Report: *"TE consultant submits full draft report with annexes within 3 weeks of the end of the TE mission"*

[15] The TE 2020 Guidance suggests for example: persons with disabilities, vulnerable groups, poverty and environment nexus, disaster risk reduction, climate change mitigation and adaptation. In this report, the gender entry point is adequately covered. For the focus on vulnerable populations and resilience, the TE faced limitations.

DEL4) Final TE Report and Audit Trail: *"TE consultant submits revised report, with Audit Trail detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final TE report, to the Commissioning Unit within 1-2 week of receiving UNDP comments on draft"*

In addition, the 2020 TE Guidance recommended the conduct of a **'Stakeholder Workshop'** for closing the TE process. This event happened on 21-Oct-2021 through the TE's participation in an extra-ordinary PSC meeting, when the Initial Findings were presented. Prior to that, there was a debriefing session with UNDP.

GENDERED SUB-SECTIONS WITHIN THIS REPORT

Concerning the gender aspect, the most important guidance can be found in recent UNDP Policies, e.g. the UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021.

In the Strategy, four priority areas for UNDP's interventions are presented, in addition to proposals for various entry points for programming and this project should be evaluated in terms of its contribution to one or more of the four priority areas in UNDP's gender policy:

a. Removing structural barriers to women's economic empowerment, including women's disproportionate burden of unpaid care work;
b. Preventing and responding to gender-based violence;
c. Promoting women's participation and leadership in all forms of decision-making;
d. Strengthening gender-responsive strategies in crisis (conflict and disaster) prevention, preparedness and recovery.

The strategy of the Cuvelai project is most in line with "a", "c" and "d" entry points for programming. This is reflected in the evaluation questions further down.

In addition, the TOR specifically mentions that "the TE consultant must use gender-responsive methodologies and tools and ensure that gender equality and women's empowerment, youth sensitive as well as other cross-cutting issues and SDGs are incorporated into the TE report" The gender aspect is therefore an important aspect of the TE, including by taking into consideration UNDP's current policies and practices.

The Strategy is a rather recent piece of policy guidance at the level of the organization. At the same time, it should be noted that the project had been conceived and designed almost 9 years ago (see Figure 1. Project Timeline in the next chapter). Back then, UNDP's gender policies were not as well elaborated and comprehensive as they currently are. While the current UNDP policy provides indeed the actual "lenses" for looking at the gender aspect, it would not be completely "fair" to judge project design with the present lenses. For example, the same level of stringency concerning gender mainstreaming into project indicators were not common practice 10 years ago, but gender marking was only beginning to be introduced.

Rather, focus of the assessment with respect to the project's role in promoting gender equality and women's empowerment will be on the implementation. The TE's entry point is to show the extent to which gender gradually became mainstreamed into key project's processes such as planning, choice of activities and partners, etc. Gender mainstreaming is explicitly taken into account in the evaluation's methodology and evaluation questions.

The 2020 Guidance on TEs prescribes the following and recommends further reading: "A gender-responsive evaluation should be carried out even if the project being evaluated was not gender-responsive in its design. The UNEG guidance document, 'Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluations' provides examples of how to incorporate these elements in the definition of the evaluation's purpose, objectives, context and scope and to add a gender dimension to the standard evaluation criteria."

2.3) METHODOLOGY

This section provides a more detailed description of TE methodological approach that will be adopted by the TE team. Although a general TE approach is based on applying the criteria matrix and as such it is supplied by the TE Guidance document referenced further up, some elements of the methodology need to be adapted due to the specific context of Angola and unforeseen circumstances such as Covid-19. This is explored in the next sub-sections.

EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

The conceptual model

As per the UNDP GEF 2020 Guidance on TEs, the model or approach to evaluating UNDP GEF project must depart from evidence. In fact, this is common sense in evaluation work.

The present TE is therefore evidence-based, but it is equally pragmatic in the selection and prioritization of this evidence, all according to *purpose* and *utility* – in addition to other principles, such as those that guide stakeholder engagement e.g., or gender mainstreaming

The approach to TE must be evidence-based and at the same time pragmatic with regards to selection and prioritization of the evidence, all according to purpose and utility.

Much of this evidence can be found in various reports prepared by the Cuvelai Project, including the project document, technical reports, the tracking tools and the sequential series of annual workplans and PIR.

Yet, with such wealth of evidence and information contained in the different documents and articles, consolidating the analysis for concluding the TE requires a course filter. The official guidance from UNDP GEF does not provide any indication on how this filter should apply. Rather, the **2021 UNDP Evaluation guidelines** prescribed the following **guiding quality criteria for evaluations' methodology and approach**:

- ***Strategic***, where Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the UNDP Strategic Plan and alignment with UNDAF feature high;
- ***Relevant***, including topics such as national needs and priorities, gender equality, climate additionality, etc.;
- ***Principled***, basically referring to the 'leave no one behind' motto, among other topics;
- **Management and monitoring**, where indicator smartness, Theory of Change, gender mainstreaming and the governance of programs and projects should be on focus;
- ***Efficient & Effective***, concerning mostly the use of resources; and
- ***Sustainability and national ownership***, as is

The official guidance from UNDP GEF does not provide enough information on how this filter should apply.

Beyond the project document, this evaluator proceeded to analyzing content and capturing the core opinions contained in the MTR report and in the PIRs. The Inception Report was also consulted in this sequence, for building an idea about where the project came from in its progress towards the objective and in implementation.

In an evidence-based and pragmatic approach, reporting against indicator takes prominence in the assessment of performance. The TOR's framework concerning the TE's project ratings and their application will follow the guidance from the "**UNDP GEF 2020 Guidance on TEs**". This is summarized in Table 1 and Box 3.

Table 6. Evaluation Ratings (dashboard) – to be included in the TE Report

Criteria requiring rating	*Ratings*
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	
M&E design at entry	According to the 6-point scale
M&E Plan Implementation	
Overall quality of M&E	
2. Implementing Agency (IA) Implementation & Executing Agency (EA) Execution	
Quality of UNDP Implementation/Oversight	According to the 6-point scale
Quality of Implementing Partner Execution	
Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	
3. Assessment of Outcomes	
Relevance	According to the 6-point scale
Effectiveness	
Efficiency	
Overall Project Outcome Rating	
4. Sustainability	
Financial sustainability	According to the 4-point sustainability likelihood scale
Socio-political sustainability	
Institutional framework and governance sustainability	
Environmental sustainability	
Overall Likelihood of Sustainability	

Box 1. TE Rating Scales with explanations

Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, Implementation/Oversight, Execution, Relevance (6-point scale)	Sustainability ratings (4-point scale)
6 = Highly Satisfactory (HS): exceeds expectations and/or no shortcomings 5 = Satisfactory (S): meets expectations and/or no or minor shortcomings 4 = Moderately Satisfactory (MS): more or less meets expectations and/or some shortcomings 3 = Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): somewhat below expectations and/or significant shortcomings 2 = Unsatisfactory (U): substantially below expectations and/or major shortcomings 1 = Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe shortcomings Unable to Assess (U/A): available information does not allow an assessment	4 = Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability 3 = Moderately Likely (ML): moderate risks to sustainability 2 = Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks to sustainability 1 = Unlikely (U): severe risks to sustainability Unable to Assess (U/A): Unable to assess the expected incidence and magnitude of risks to sustainability

The approach to gender, with respect to the conceptual framework accepts that gender inequality exists in Angola, and it assumes that gender equality is a goal being pursued by the project, even though this aspect may not have been as explicitly stated in project design, as it would be, was the project to be designed today.

The approach to gender issues also assumes that the Cuvelai project can make an important contribution towards gender equality in its areas of intervention and through the issues that are addressed. Considering the size and population in Angola and the sites in which the project operated, its sphere of influence can be considerable and the groups of stakeholders that the project engages significant. Therefore, gender screening, awareness and mainstreaming is recommended for the bulk of project activities, especially in the time remaining.

Tools for assessing Evaluation Questions and other TE aspects

Herein, we list some of the specific methods and tools that were used in the TE to consolidate findings and compose the final TE report:

- ***Dynamic context analysis***, including by considering the impact of covid-19 in the project and of background events that may have influenced the project (institutional instability, high staff turnover, etc.).

- ***Examining [and confirming] evidence for validating the findings***, which is a more general and broad methodology, concerning which we refer to further up under "The conceptual model" and elsewhere in the report.
- ***Consult project reports and other documentation***, including, where applicable, review of similar evaluation question in the MTR.
- ***Query stakeholders***, which had been proposed done through semi-structured interviews.[16]
- ***Analysis of timelines***, which had been included in the Inception Report and is reincluded herein with adjustments (see Figure 6).
- ***Analysis of the use of funds***, although we miss to evidence from the project team to validate the project's co-financing table.
- ***Assess the causal relationships among elements that compose the TOC (Theory of Change)***, including the [adaptation] problem that addressed by the project, its causes, the long term solution, the barriers to the solution, core assumptions and the project's logframe/LFA[17] elements – and noting that assumptions and risks are closely linked, hence risks would also be assessed.
- ***Assessment of progress towards results***, which follows a specific methodology that is made explicit in PIRs and is well mastered by the evaluator.
- ***Gendered analysis***, for which specific tools and analytical insight applies (see previous section).
- ***Stakeholder interview and analysis of responses***, kept within the limits of the time dedication scope of this evaluation.

Evaluation Criteria matrix

The table that follows summarizes our core methodology through a series of working questions, organized by topic, how they will apply and how data will be specifically collected, and opinions formed.

Table 7. Evaluation Questions (core methodology)

[see refer to Annex V]

NOTE ON THE QUESTIONS: The table contains questions revised during the course of the TE.

2.4) Data Collection Analysis

An entire set of documents, have been received and explored (see Annex IV).

Data on co-financing was collected based on these documents and other sources (as per the next subsection).

Some of consulted materials were read and annotation on importance added.

Interviews with stakeholder were remotely conducted. For the stakeholder calls, most of which were recorded, handwritten notes were also kept and, where needed, recordings were consulted.

Collecting information on Co-financing

The information on the amounts of co-financing mobilized during project implementation were gathered, to the extent possible and with gaps. The TE consultants insisted from the onset on obtaining the required information

[16] While it could have been useful to include how selected questions applied to different classes of interviews, it would make the present report excessive.
[17] Logical Framework Approach.

on the co-financing, consulted reports and directly queried partners, including during the Project Steering Committee event in which the TE consultants participated on 21 Oct 2021.

By the closing of this DEL3 report, the TE continues to lack information on the government co-financing. Yet, it may be concluded that, from the $48.2M foreseen at the project's CEO Endorsement stage, approximately $43M has apparently realized, thanks mostly to government investments. The evidence behind it is however weak, as explained in more detail herein.

The only partners whose co-financing status could be confirmed were: UNDP (through analysis of CDR reports from Atlas); DW, which directly provided information via email and orally, FAO (as informed by UNDP). Indirect evidence lead the TE to conclude that co-financing from MINEA has probably realized. See Table 8 and its notes.

To the TE's surprise, USAID is a project co-financier and a letter from USAID dated May 2014, mentioning $18M in co-financing to the project had been included in the set of PRODOC Annexes containing such letters. However, this information was not reflected in the project's CEO Endorsement Request. Hence, USAID never became an official co-financier.

A possible explanation for why USAID's co-financing was apparently not included in the GEF's registry could be the fact that the CEO Endorsement Request file made available by the GEF Secretariat online is dated "Oct. 29, 2014", while other records indicate that this is not the final version one submitted by UNDP, which is dated 08 December 2014.

USAID funded program for $1.8M titled *"NGO Strengthening for Improved Resilience and Climate Governance in Angola Cuvelai Basin".* DW was a beneficiary. The program concluded in 2015. From all accounts, the USAID project ended before the LDCF Cuvelai could initiate its activities. The Project's Inception Report (dated September 2016), mentioned the intention of involving USAID in implementation, but there is no other record of USAID's participation in the project, e.g. through the Project Steering Committees, or of any other form of involvement. For the sake of accounting we consider USAID's co-financing as realized.

Table 8. Co-financing information monitoring (from CEO Endorsement Request with caveats*)

Sources of Co-financing	Name of Co-financier (source)	Type	Co-financing Amount ($)	Type	Amount mobilized	Notes
National Government	MINAMB - Ministry of Environment - currently MCTA	Cash	2,000,000	Public expenditure	No info.	[a]
National Government	National Directorate of Hydrologic Resources - Ministry of Energy and Water (MINEA)	Cash	1,000,000	Public expenditure	No info.	[a]
National Government	INAMET - National Institute of Meteorology and Geophysics	Cash	968,292	Public expenditure	No info.	[a]
National Government	Ministry of Energy and Water (MINEA) - Program of Public Investment (PIP)	Cash	39,037,712	Public expenditure	$ 39,100,000	[a], [b]
GEF Agency	FAO's corporate Strategic Objective 5 (SO5 - increase the resilience of livelihoods to threats and crises).	In-kind	1,600,000	FAO Program	$ 0	[c]
GEF Agency	UNDP Core Resources	Cash	917,000	UNDP TRAC	$ 272,192	[d]
Others	Development Workshop Angola (Local NGO)	In-kind	950,000	Parallel interventions	$ 950,000	[e]
Bilateral agency	USAID (*not registered at CEO Endorsement published online)	Cash	1,800,000	Parallel interventions	$ 1,800,000	[f]
TOTAL			**48,273,004**		**$42,122,192**	[g]

Notes on the above Table:

a) During upcoming stakeholder interviews and the PSC events, the respective government agencies were queried about their contribution and how it can be assessed. No response was provided.

b) The TE tried to obtain information independently on government expenditure. The TE noted that the last financial year of published data on Public Investment Programs in Angola was 2017. This was before project implementation became effective.

Another approach was taken: The co-financing letter from MINEA, which is the largest amount, mentions investments in water supply to Ondjiva and repairs to Calueque Dam. For all of these works, the typical amounts would exceed the amounts declared as co-financing from government. Through internet search, the TE could confirm that the works have been concluded.[18] Hence, it would be reasonable to consider that at least the co-financing from MINEA at $39.1M has fully realized. Amount accounted for is rounded off.

c) According to UNDP, this co-financing from FAO was not effectively mobilized. Could not be re-confirmed by FAO.

d) Funds disbursed between 2017 and 2020 sum $289,955. There is no record of TRAC disbursement in 2021 (Table 9).

e) Co-financing from DW has fully realized, as confirmed by its Director. It could have included some level of private sector indirect funding (from BP), as well as through DW's programs funded by Canadian organization IDRC.

f) USAID's co-financing has been disbursed through project "NGO Strengthening for Improved Resilience and Climate Governance in Angola Cuvelai Basin", concluded in 2015. Considered fully realized.

g) The total amount at CEO Endorsement should have been $48,273,004, because the co-financing letter from USAID should have been included and was not. In turn, there is no documental record of FAO's letter of co-financing. However, due to FAO's participation in the PSC, the TE concludes that FAO remained a partner in the project, even though their effective co-financing, which was declared in-kind, could not be confirmed as realized.

Table 9. Expenditure for UNDP TRAC according to sequence of CDRs

Expenditure and projections per financial year	*UNDP's core funds co-financing*
2016	$26,958.00
2017	$43,990.00
2018	$5,311.46
2019	$5,297.41
2020	$208,388.77
2021 (by 04/11/2021)	$0.00
TOTAL	**$ 289,945.64**

The total co-financing has been re-classified and calculated according to the following criteria:

[1] UNDP contribution
[2] Government
[3] Other multi-/bi-laterals
[4] Private Sector
[5] NGOs

The results were added to the "Financials" box in the beginning of this document.

Stakeholder interviews and other interactions

Most stakeholders listed by UNDP have been contacted by the TE and interviewed (see Annex III). In addition, two joint session with UNDP for (1) kick-starting the assignment (briefing) and (2) sharing initial findings (debriefing) took place on 04-Aug-2021 and 08-Oct-2021. Another joint was organized to share findings with the Project Steering Committee (PSC) and it took place on 21 Oct-2021 with the presence of 27 stakeholders.

In this manner, of the 56 unique individuals in the long list provided by the UNDP CO to the TE, 24 of them have had contact with the TE consultant. They represent 14 different entities (institutions / organizations), listed alphabetically below:

1. ADPP - Acção de Povo para Povo | Action from People to People (NGO)
2. Cuvelai Project

[18] We deduced this through the following sites accessed on 04-Nov-2021:
https://www.jornaldeangola.ao/ao/noticias/reposto-abastecimento-de-agua-em-ondjiva-e-santa-clara/
https://www.tpf.eu/pt-pt/projects/calueque-dam-rehabilitation-and-construction-conclusion/

3. DW - "Development Workshop" (NGO)
4. Ex-UNDP CO Angola
5. GABHIC - Cabinet for River Basin Management of Cunene, Cubango and Cuvelai rivers | Gabinete para Administração das Bacias Hidrográficas do Cunene, Cubango e Cuvelai
6. INAMET - National Institute for Meteorology | Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia
7. INRH - National Institute for Water Resouces | Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hídricos
8. MCTA – Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment | Ministério da Cultura, Turismo e Ambiente
9. MINAGRI, IDA
10. Provincial Services for Civil Protection, Cunene
11. UAN - Agostinho Neto University | Universidade Agostinho Neto
12. UNDP CO Angola
13. UNDP Regional
14. WLF - World Lutheran Foundation (NGO)

The longlist prepared by UNDP included otherwise 18 different entities. Hence, most of institutional stakeholders have been covered by the TE. Also, of the 24 persons directly interviewed by the TE / or who engaged with the TE, 13 were women (27.2%).

2.5) ETHICS

According to the UNDP GEF TE Guidance, the following should be considered regarding the Ethics of the TE:

"UNDP and the GEF take seriously the importance of having competent, fair and independent evaluators carry out MTRs and TEs. Assessments must be independent, impartial and rigorous, and the evaluators hired to undertake these assessments must have personal and professional integrity, and be guided by propriety in the conduct of their business.

The TE ToR should explicitly state that TEs of UNDP-supported GEF-financed projects are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation' and the GEF and UNDP M&E policies. Evaluation ethics also concern the way in which evaluations are carried out, including the steps the TE team must take to protect the rights and confidentiality of persons interviewed. The TE team must clarify to all stakeholders interviewed that their feedback and input will be confidential. The final TE report must not indicate the specific source of quotations or qualitative data in order to uphold this confidentiality."

The TE is committed to adhering to the principles above. Refer to Annex VII for a signed statement.

2.7) LIMITATIONS TO THE EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

There are three important limitations linked to the present TE process:

1. Lack of mission to the field;
2. The budget accorded to the TE, which could e.g. have accommodated the engagement of an assisting consultant.
3. Remote stakeholder engagement

In all communications with the client, it has always been clear to both parties that the **TE would be conducted remotely**. The TOR have been adapted to TEs conducted during Covid-19 pandemic.

The following needs to be considered though:

- In a normal TE, a mission to Angola with site visits would be perfectly acceptable and welcome.
- In times of Covid-19, sanitary restrictions do not permit travel.
- Therefore, all communication between the evaluator, on the one hand, and the project, the CO and/or project stakeholders on the other needs to be remote using all the means possible to compensate the absence of face-to-face contact.

- The teleconferences were carefully planned, scheduled and confirmed. Because of the time difference between Angola and Brazil, a special attention was paid to accommodating the time that will suit everybody.

The budget dedicated to this TE is a limitation. The nominal number of days accorded in the TE's contract (35 days) are limited, but enough for the scope proposed.

The 2020 UNDP GEF TE guidance prescribes the formulation of a few evaluation questions for facilitating the approach to stakeholder engagement. Those questions are highly central to the TE (see Table 7. Evaluation Questions (core methodology)). In this sub-section, we focus on principles that guided the interactions with stakeholders, in addition to the gender mainstreaming approach, which is explained next:

Table 10. Stakeholder engagement principles

Principle	Stakeholder Participation will
Value adding	Be an essential means of adding value to the project
Inclusivity	Include all relevant stakeholders
Accessibility and access	Be accessible and promote access to the process
Transparency	Be based on information transparency and fair access to it
Fairness	Ensure that all stakeholders are treated in a fair and unbiased way
Accountability	Be based on a commitment to accountability by all stakeholders
Constructiveness	Seek to manage potential conflicts and promote the public interest
Redressing	Seek to redress inequality and injustice
Capacitating	Seek to develop the capacity of all stakeholders
Needs-basing	Be based on the needs of all stakeholders
Flexibility	Be flexibly designed and implemented
Rationality and coordination	Be rationally coordinated and not be improvised
Excellence	Be subject to ongoing reflection and improvement

It should also be added that the conditions for stakeholder consultations have been constrained by the fact that the TE was conducted remotely. The mentioned constrains had weakened the application of certain principles listed in Table 10, such as fairness, inclusivity and excellence. Still, to the extent possible -- and to the extent practical and pragmatic -- all principles were attempted applied.

One additional principle should be in the list in Table 10, in light of the remote nature of the TE: **patience**. There can be many constraints implied in remote meetings interviewing, in addition to frustration and time pressure. To the extent possible, there was an attempt to compensate the lack of a mission and of face-to-face interactions, while still applying all of the stakeholder engagement principles.

One LESSON on process: There are pros and cons in conducting evaluations remotely. It is likely that not as many individual stakeholders would have been contacted and interviewed by the TE, if the assignment included a mission to Angola, which tends to be a rushed process. Interacting with 24 unique individual representing 14 different entities was only possible because of the remote nature of the TE. At the same time, it was not possible to directly interact with beneficiaries in the field and hear their perspective.

2.8) STRUCTURE OF THE EVALUATION REPORT

The Evaluation Report has been structured as follows:

Section 1) Executive summary- The section includes a comprehensive summary of the TE's opinion, the ratings and their justification, main findings including with additional ratings, and recommendations and conclusions, in particular for future interventions related to climate change adaptation in Angola and elsewhere.

Section 2) Introduction- The section includes a description of the purpose of the TE report, key sources, the methodology and the report's structure. The evaluation methods are briefly described with cross-reference to the evaluation matrix that further details the main evaluative questions. The structure is compliant with what is expected from the report as of the TOR and official guidance. Some methodological considerations are also referenced (e.g. the limitations of the TE and the approach to stakeholder engagement). Chapters 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 clearly outline the purpose, scope and methodology of the evaluation, while 2.7 highlights the limitations of the evaluation and the approach in view of improvement of similar work.

Section 3) Project description and development context. The second section in the report aims to provide the general framework for the Cuvelai project, by describing its context, the problems that it was meant to address, the immediate and development objectives, baseline indicators and the main stakeholders at the time of formulation, compared to now. Considerations on project scoping and duration are also included.

Section 4) Findings. This is the most important TE section, which and a key TOR requirement and included three main s subsections:

- In the first one (4.1) it covers how the evaluation reviewed project design, the Theory of Change (TOC) that underpinned this design. The subsection also provides information about project structures and stakeholders, a description of the main institutional stakeholders involved in implementing the project, including their role and responsibilities. More specifically, it covers the project's results framework, including validity of indicators, assumptions and risks are analyzed and put into context as were the assumptions and risks. Linkages with other interventions and the participation of stakeholders were assessed. As the project has been implemented by UNDP, its comparative advantage was also checked.
- In the second subsection (4.2) project implementation is assessed, including the quality of management during implementation. The approach to adaptive management is on focus, including the issue of project duration, but also partnerships that were sought by the project through different arrangements for fulfilling project goals. The M&E systems is reviewed. The financial aspects of are touched upon. The management quality of both the implementing and executing agencies were assessed.
- The final subsection (4.3) covers project results and reviews the project through a set of evaluation criteria: overall results, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, country ownership, mainstreaming, sustainability and impact. These aspects and criteria were rated.

Section 5) Conclusions, Recommendations & Lessons. The conclusions address the consistency between the results that were actually achieved by the project and the proposed project objective and outcomes. To assess performance and draw conclusions, the TE estimated the degree of achieving project objectives were achieved, primarily through indicators and by comparing them to the baseline. The TE also looked at other elements of performance, in particular those that require specific ratings: (1) Monitoring and Evaluation; (2) The performance of the Implementing Agency for GEF funds (UNDP) and of the Implementing Partner (APAL); (3) Assessment of Outcomes, including Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency; (4) Sustainability, including several sub criteria. The TE discussed factors that contributed to the success or failure of the intervention for the entire project taking into account the efforts put in place by the different in-country stakeholders to correct and improve the project implementation Recommendations are made. Finally, the lessons learned are mentioned as a way to move forward for future programming.

A number of annexes are attached to this report and provide supplementary information.

3) PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

This project focuses on supporting the two top priorities for climate change adaptation, as defined by Angola in its National Adaptation Program of Action of 2011. They are to: 1) Develop an early warning system for flooding and storms, and 2) Develop a climate monitoring and data management system in Angola's Cuvelai River Basin. These two NAPA priorities are intricately linked and therefore have been bundled together for the purpose of this project. In addition to responding to NAPA priorities, the project also seeks to reduce, through targeted

investments and capacity building, the climate-related vulnerabilities that are faced by the local population in Angola's Cuvelai River Basin.

Project interventions are designed around 3 components: (1) Transfer of appropriate technologies and related capacity building for climate and environmental monitoring infrastructure; (2) Enhanced human and institutional capacity for increased sustainable rural livelihoods among those communities areas most prone to extreme weather events (flooding and drought) in the region; (3) Increased understanding of climate change adaptation and practices in climate-resilient development planning at the local community and government levels.

The project's primary geographic focus is the Cuvelai River Basin, located almost entirely (within national borders) in Cunene province and one of the regions most affected by the war. Like other provinces in the dry south, it remains poorly studied from a geophysical (climate, soils, hydrology) and socioeconomic points of view.

A decentralization process started taking place in Angola since the mid 2000's, albeit at a slow and uneven pace. This includes delegation of administrative and fiscal responsibilities to sub-national units of government. Much of the information gathered at national level still does not reach local authorities.

Angola's development context has changed somewhat since the Cuvelai project was approved by the GEF in December 2014, and the PRODOC signed between UNDP and the government of Angola in February 2016. Angola is still a post conflict country, but for every year that passes the effects of the war become less and less important.

A process of democratization started in 2017, marked by general election and followed by the inauguration of a new President. With the new government, there have been important institutional changes that were relevant to the project. In March 2020, the Government of Angola formally announced several changes in their structure, including the fusion of MINAMB (Ministry of Environment), which had been selected at PRODOC signature stage as the UNDP Implementing Partner for the Cuvelai project, with the Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Tourism, creating the new Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment (MCTA).

In 2014, the Government of Angola conducted a population Census and generated a large amount of data at household level, though not on income or poverty measurements. Cunene province, with 1 million people and relative low population density, continues to be rural and dependent on the waters of the Cuvelai River and its tributaries. In 2016, the Government introduced a new law for standardizing geographical names at the local level.[19]

There have been important development achievements in Cunene Province. After several years of neglect important repair works on the multi-purpose Calueque Dam, on the Cunene River, were finally completed in 2014. This allowed for a more effective flood control and water storage for other uses, including an improved supply of water to Ondjiva, the provincial capital, which also received public investment.

Flood warnings have apparently worked well in February 2020, when the authorities of Ondjiva, issued a public warning announcing that the local Calueque Dam had reached its maximum capacity, implying a serious risk of flooding for the communities living alongside the Cunene River downstream. It is however not clear if this is attributable to the project.

In terms climate and local condition, persistent drought continued to affect Cunene province 2018, worsening in 2019. In July 2019, UNICEF reported that more than 2 million people had been affected by lack of water in four provinces in the south, including Cunene. It is possible that a worse crisis driven again by drought in the south may be consolidating in 2021. We quote from UNICEF's recent *sit-rep*[20]:

"Angola is experiencing the worst drought in 40 years. Since January 2021, an estimated 3.81 million people have been reported to have insufficient food consumption in the six southern provinces of the country, namely Cunene,

[19] See references in Annexure B.
[20] UNICEF (2021): ANGOLA, Humanitarian Situation Report No. 1 Reporting Period: 1 January to 30 June 2021.

Huíla, Namibe, Huambo, Benguela and Cuanza Sul. This figure represents an increase of 138 per cent compared to 1.6 million people who faced food insecurity in 2020."

3.1) PROJECT START AND DURATION INCLUDING MILESTONES

Box 2. Quick reference to milestones and time lags

- ➔ *The project's concept (the PIF) had been approved by the GEF Council in March 2013 and CEO endorsed by the GEF 21 months later, in December 2014 – i.e. the Project Preparation Grant phase (PPG) lasted some 20 months.*
- ➔ *Since CEO endorsement, there was a long period of internal clearances before the project document (PRODOC) could be signed by UNDP and the Government of Angola.*
- ➔ *PRODOC signature only happened in February 2016. Project implementation kick started in late April 2016 (marked by the full project's first disbursement) and the Project's Inception Workshop took place in September 2016.*
- ➔ *From the GEF's CEO Endorsement date until the end of the Inception Phase (marked by the workshop) a total of 21.2 months elapsed, implying that the project had a rather long project mobilization period, and until implementation could effectively start.*

We refer to project's milestones in the Project Summary Table for the dates used in the present analysis. We used the dates from it to analyze the project's history graphically by depicting its TIMELINE in Figure 6. It served to show the different ways of looking into the project's duration. This was important, in order to be fair to the project, when considering the pros-and-cons of adjusting milestones.

The **effective project implementation** period started counting in September of 2016, with the conduct of the Inception Workshop. Shortly before, the project manager (and team) had been engaged. The project is expected to reach operational closure in February 2022.

Figure 6 and Box 2 make explicit a relatively long time lag between the CEO Endorsement Date and the PRODOC Signature Date (over one year), followed by a gap of over 6 months between PRODOC signature and the Inception Workshop. This is a visible shortcoming in the management of the project's lifecycle. Through the analysis of project documents and stakeholder interviews, the TE assessed that the initial delays were caused by the following factors:

- Agenda conflicts between the Minister of Environment and the remaining stakeholders coupled with a political will to make the Inception Workshop a big, political event.
- Procurement delays caused by issues with delegating responsibilities within MCTA

Further delays in project implementation were caused by:

- Governmental elections in 2017, and nominating of another Minister of Environment
- Turnover within the ministries engaged with the project
- A need to delegate responsibilities all over again
- Recent restructuring of the government incl. MINAMB, which now is a part of MCTA and the engagement of a new Minister
- Covid-19 pandemics

Due to the delays, the project requested two milestone extensions (see Figure 6, focusing on 2020 and 2021). Both were granted.

Although the project had been designed to last 4 years, all in all its full duration will have *nominally* lasted 6 years (from PRODOC signature till project closure, foreseen in February 2022), while *effectively* (counting from the end of the Inception Phase to project closure) it will have lasted 5.5 years.

FINDING Although a 4-year duration tends to be the norm in several UNDP GEF projects, a duration this short for a project implemented in Angola, of the complexity of that of Cuvelai Project, and with a budget of $8.2M, is clearly too short. The limited absorptive capacity of government's implementing partner and responsible parties plays also a role in the delays, as attested by several of the stakeholders interviewed, including UNDP. However, even in countries with stronger implementation capacity, the project's complexity and budget size alone would warrant a longer duration, possibly of 5 to 6 years.

RECOMMENDATION Scope project duration according to much more realistic expectations. In the future, projects with a large budget, involving complex procurement and requiring the gradual development of technical capacity of national institutions, should definitely be scoped to last longer than just 4 years.

On the issue of duration, it is important to consider that there were indeed long delays in starting up the project, including a period of 14 months between GEF CEO Endorsement and PRODOC signature. This long project mobilization period, which should have been much shorter. The explanations provided pointed out to complications in getting the national implementing partner (the now extinct MINAMB) to engage and internalize the project.

There were also slight delays between PRODOC signature and the end of Inception Phase, which lasted some 7 months – normally, this phase should last 6 months. There were in addition delays that were justified by the impacts of the covid-19 pandemic.

Another issue that needs to be pointed out is that the two milestone extensions obtained by the project, which together sum 18 months, have barely given the project additional time of implementation. The net balance of time awarded by the two milestone extension is at best 3-4 months (the difference between the 18 additional months awarded and the 14-15 months delay in project mobilization).

FINDING Although 18 months is currently the maximum time allowed by UNDP NCE in terms cumulative milestone extensions, it is not enough to compensate for the time loss in the beginning of the project, for the impacts of covid-19 on the project, and for the fact that the project's original scoping of a 4-year duration had grossly overestimated the national absorptive capacity.

Another **RECOMMENDATION** from this analysis is: **Address the real reason behind requests for project Milestone Adjustments.** In the future, more attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project's methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments. Some of the shortcomings observed seem the affect the UNDP-GEF portfolio more broadly. Efforts should instead go towards addressing the causes of delays, and also towards a realistic analysis of context and circumstances, improved planning and time scoping across the board. Efforts must also go towards improving the collaboration between UNDP and Implementing Partner for ensuring a swifter, more efficient and more effective project mobilization and Inception Phase.

Figure 6. Project Timeline: from project idea in 2012 to project final financial closure in end 2022



3.2) PROBLEMS THAT THE PROJECT SOUGHT TO ADDRESS

The main problem that the project seeks to address is *"vulnerability* [of Cunene Province] *to climate change together with its low capacity to address and adapt to this phenomenon"*.

And further:

"the fundamental problem that this project seeks to address is that a comprehensive flood forecast and early warning system (FFEWS) – including downscaled seasonal forecast delivery for flood and drought events, climate monitoring and data management system - which generates knowledge of the risks (vulnerability & hazard) and has the capacity to monitor, analyze and forecast hazards, provides communication and dissemination of alerts and warnings, does not function in Cunene Province as well as it ought to be relevant and useful for long-term planning, management and risk reduction activities."

Following are the problems that the project was slated to address:

1) limited knowledge and capacity to fully assess risks posed by climate change to disaster risks in the Province of Cunene;
2) lack of capacity of the extension network to enhance responsiveness and adaptability of subsistence agriculture in the Province of Cunene;
3) poor intersectoral coordination and weak policy framework to respond to change risks.

3.3) IMMEDIATE AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT

The project objective is to reduce the climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of Angola's Cuvelai River Basin through targeted investments and capacity building.

The above is the immediate objective and the one that the project must achieve through the achievement of its outcomes. The project document does not make reference to a specific "development objective" distinct from the objective in the paragraph above. Yet, from a programmatic point of view, the project is linked to various frameworks that include high level objectives, outcomes and outputs.

Relevant UNDAF (2015-2019) outcomes for this project are the following:

- ***UNDAF / Country Program Outcome****: By 2019, the environmental sustainability is strengthened through the improvement of management of energy, natural resources, access to green technology, climate change strategies, conservation of biodiversity, and systems and plans to reduce disasters and risks.*
    - ***CPAPC 2015-2019: Priority Area 4: Environmental sustainability for disaster risk reduction and economic advancement.***

In addition, **Primary Outcome of the Global Strategic Plan of UNDP (2014-2017)** sets out a global environmental benefit set for the project, namely: "*SP 2014-2017 #5: Countries are able to reduce the likelihood of conflict, and lower the risk of natural disasters, including from climate change.".*

From the GEF's point of view, the following are the applicable high-level strategic frameworks to which the project is expected to contribute are reproduced in Table 11.

Refer otherwise to GEF Strategy Linkages: Strategic Priorities under the GEF5 Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) for a graphic representation.

Table 11. Focal Area Outputs at CEO Endorsement[21]

Focal Area Objectives	Expected FA Outcomes	Expected FA Outputs
CCA-1 Reducing Vulnerability	Focal Area Outcome 1.2: Reduced vulnerability to climate change in development sectors	Output 1.2.1: Vulnerable physical, natural and social assets strengthened in response to climate change impacts, including variability
CCA-2 Increasing Adaptive Capacity	Focal Area Outcome 2.1: Increased knowledge and understanding of climate variability and change-induced threats at country level and in targeted vulnerable areas	Output 2.1.2: Systems in place to disseminate timely risk information
	Focal Area Outcome 2.2. Strengthened adaptive capacity to reduce risks to climate-induced economic losses	Output 2.2.1: Adaptive capacity of national and regional centers and networks strengthened to rapidly respond to extreme weather events
CCA-3 Adaptation Technology Transfer	Focal Area Outcome 3.1: Successful demonstration, deployment and transfer of relevant adaptation technology in targeted areas	Output 3.1.1 Relevant adaptation technology transferred to targeted groups

The measurement of the contribution to the GEF's frameworks is ensured primarily through the completion of the project's **Tracking Tool**, which has been completed in 2014 (baseline), in 2019 (mid-term). It was completed by UNDP CO by project end, i.e. in 2021. The TE has reviewed the End of Project Tracking Tool and provided specific detailed feedback to the project directly in the Tracking Tool in Excel, which was appended to the Deliverable 3 Report of the TE Assignment (DEL3). It is appended again to the current DEL4 Report, final version.

A comprehensive analysis of the Tracking Tools has been handed over to UNDP CO for finalization on 04 November 2021 (appended to this Report in the same state). This topic and the preliminary findings of this analysis are covered in this report under Section 4.1 > Monitoring and Evaluation – Design at Entry.

3.4) BASELINE INDICATORS ESTABLISHED

The project design has a comprehensive presentation of baseline indicators for project objective and outcomes. The MTR analysis of the Results Framework is rather brief, and the TE analysis cannot adequately build upon it, for e.g. analyze whether indicators were SMART[22], and if the baseline had been adequately set.

By the TE, a brief analysis is included below, and it underpins the findings in Section 4.1 > Monitoring and Evaluation – Design at Entry.

FINDING The main conclusion here is that project designer made a poor choice of indicators, to the extent that 3 out of 6 indicator depended on a VRA study and this study has, from all accounts, not been conducted during the PPG process. Hence, when the project started, it did not have the information necessary for assessing the baseline for key indicators.

The above finding is discussed more in depth in section 4.1 under MONITORING AND EVALUATION – DESIGN AT ENTRY.

[21] Refer to the Tracking Tool for indicators and their readings. See in addition in the Project Information Table > GEF Strategy Linkages: Figure 3. Focal Area Objectives: nominal break down of LDCF funding per objective.
[22] SMART: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-Bound.

Table 12. Analysis of indicators' baseline

Indicator#	Description of Indicator	Baseline Level and Targets	Assessment of baseline by the TE
Objective) To reduce the climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of Angola's Cuvelai River Basin through targeted investments and capacity building.			
Objective Level Indicator	Percentage change in vulnerability of local community to climate risks.	The vulnerability of the site is high. The baseline will be determined at project onset during the inception phase. At mid-term 35% increase of [the Vulnerability Resilience Assessment] VRA score; At end-of-project 70% of VRA score.	**By project start, this baseline had not been established and therefore this indicator is not SMART.** There was hope that shortly after the end of the project's Inception, the project would have conducted the VRA and baseline scores, which would be gender sensitive, would have been consolidated. In reality there are several competing methodologies that can be tagged as "VRA" – that methodologies that survey vulnerable people at the local level and establish how vulnerable or resilient they are according to different criteria, survey questions and methods of assessment. Some methods are participative, others are based on secondary data, and yet others require household level surveys, which are expensive and require time and qualified surveyors to be applied. The PRODOC had not prescribed any specific VRA methodology. Because no project management unit was in place when the project started, the conduct of the VRA was neglected. Other indicators were set with the same expectation that a VRA would be able inform the baseline. The indicator itself is SMART, but it is a significant problem for the project's M&E framework that no VRA baseline had been established during the Project Preparation Grant (PPG) phase.
Outcome 1) Enhanced capacity of national and local hydro-meteorological services, civil authorities and environmental institutions to monitor extreme weather and climate change in the Cuvelai Basin.			
1.1	1.1 A Flood Forecasting & EWS that is useful to communities developed and forecasts disseminated to target communities in Province of Cunene.	1.1 Currently no Flood Forecasting & EWS established in Province of Cunene By the end of the project a Flood Forecasting & EWS is developed and forecasts are being disseminated to target communities in Province of Cunene.	**This is a complex, results-oriented indicator, and it is generally SMART, as it can be informed in a simple way through "yes" or "no" – but there are caveats.** The target mentions that the goal would be to achieve a level when forecasts are being disseminated to target communities in Province of Cunene. A complex set of conditions would need to be in place, and within a certain order, for this goal to be achieved. Much of this remains implicit in the PRODOC, which is somewhat a sign of a missing Theory of Change. In the context of the PRODOC the baseline is explained in more detail: i.e. what a "Flood Forecasting & EWS" would look like, and what was in place, or not in place in the Province of Cunene when the project started. For those who understand the technicalities of Flood Forecasting & EWS (or FFEWS), it is clear that adequately informing this indicator is not just a matter of 'yes or no', but the extent to which capacities are being built, as this is indeed the subject matter of the Outcome 1.
Outcome 2) Increased resilience of smallholder farmer communities in the Basin to climate-induced risks and variabilities.			
2.1	2.1 Percentage change in gender disaggregated household income in the 7 targeted *comunas* as a result of project intervention via	2.1 N/A at present – project will undertake a gender disaggregate d VRA at project onset. At mid-term 25% gender disaggregated increase of VRA score;	**This indicator is dependent on the VRA. As analyzed further up, the baseline has not been set and this was a major problem for the project – therefore not SMART, because it cannot be measured.** However, this indicator focuses specifically on income. Of all development indicators, those for income are some of the hardest to adequately establish. Within an adaptation project, increased income is not necessarily a good indicator of the level of adaptation, but rather of development more broadly. The project would have been better served if other indicators, inspired by the Tracking Tool had been selected to inform the level of achievement of Outcome 2.

Indicator#	Description of Indicator	Baseline Level and Targets	Assessment of baseline by the TE
	perception based survey (VRA)	By the end of the project 50% gender disaggregated increase of VRA score	
2.2	2.2. No. of household in targeted *comunas* engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods	2.2 Few households have access to resilient livelihood assets and methods (Score=2) Score improved to 4: By the end of the project, at least 50% of targeted households have engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods introduced / strengthened in the project.	**Here the indicator seems to refer to a score, but the baseline is not clear. Because of the lack of clarity, this indicator is not SMART.** In the PRODOC, Results Framework, it is further mentioned that the project would resort to the following for informing the indicator: "Household surveys using an appropriately designed household livelihood asset/method index". However, nowhere else in the PRODOC is it made clear which household survey had produced a baseline score of 2 and how the score of 4 would be achieved. This is likely linked to VRA.
Outcome 3) Local institutional capacities for coordinated, climate-resilient planning strengthened &Capacity for effective community-based climate change adaptation (including traditional knowledge practices) improved at local level			
3.1	3.1 CC- Environmental Information System of Angola (CC- ENISA) is established, risk assessed and vulnerability maps developed for the Cunene Province and the Cuvelai in particular.	3.1 Climate Change risks have not been modelled Angola and no vulnerability maps have been developed so far for Cunene Province and the Cuvelai in particular. By the end of the project CC-ENISA has been running Risk modelling and Vulnerability maps for the Cunene Province and the Cuvelai in particular have been developed.	**This indicator is clearly a "2 in 1", but as formulated and it is generally SMART.** In the context of the PRODOC the baseline is explained in more detail, and it mentions that how the project will cater for the systematic storage and production of digital information required for mainstreaming climate change into National and Cunene Provincial Plans and Strategies, and that system will be titled CC-ENISA, to be developed within the now defunct MINAMB.
3.2	3.2 Number of National or Provincial relevant plans and/or policy documents that integrate climate change flood and drought risks	3.2 Currently, no plans and policies that explicitly integrate climate change flood and drought risks are in place. By the end of the project CC flood and drought risk/vulnerability are integrated into at least one National and one Provincial disaster preparedness and management Plans.	**The indicator is SMART and clear. The baseline is well established.** It relates well to the subject matter of the Outcome.

3.5) MAIN STAKEHOLDERS

During the project design phase an in-depth stakeholder analysis took place. To the extent possible, the gender aspect was highlighted. The purpose of the analysis was to identify main potential stakeholders and to consider their potential roles and responsibilities in the implementation and guidance of the Project.

There have also been at least two ministerial reforms affecting the relative functions and attributions of line ministries in Angola since the project started. Some of the institutional structures that were mentioned in the PRODOC in section 4.1 (*Planned stakeholder participation*) no longer exist.

The stakeholder analysis at design stage is presented in *Planned Stakeholder Participation* chapter. Stakeholder participation during implementation is included in chapter titled: *Actual Stakeholder Participation and Partnership arrangements*.

3.6) EXPECTED RESULTS

The project objective reads as follows:

> "To reduce the climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of Angola's Cuvelai River Basin through targeted investments and capacity building."

The project has three components, which respectively focus on: **(1)** development national capacity to render hydroclimatic information services so that the responsible authorities can respond to climatic hazards that affect Cuvelai River Basin; **(2)** resilience building of small farmer communities; and **(3)** institutional strengthening for community-based climate change adaptation, including disaster response.

A recurrent 'keyword' in the project strategy is **'flood forecast early warning systems (FFEWS)'**. We wish to point out that climatic early warnings and the forecast of floods events, which are an extreme event represent only a small subset of hydroclimatic information services, and are primarily linked to disaster risk reduction, as opposed to the apparent focus on the reduction of climatic vulnerabilities in the stated objectives.

In order to be able to issue useful warnings to the population and, furthermore, to disseminate them to those at risk and vulnerable, the services responsible for monitoring water and climate need to be able to collect and analyse large amounts of data, and to have in place functional protocols for transmitting this information to those who can take action and prevent disaster – normally civil protection services.

In addition, not just floods, but also recurrent droughts affect the Cuvelai River Basin. Drought warnings are normally of seasonal and annual nature. In order to issue such warnings, responsible services need to rely on complex climatic analysis for detecting anomalies in temperature and pluviometry, including natural and climate change induced anomalies.

The baseline capacity of both hydro-climatic and civil protection services in the Cuvelai River Basin was low when the project started – but not non-existent.

At the same time, the objective calls primarily for resilience building. More importantly, the project objective focuses on reducing the vulnerability of populations that are already quite vulnerable, income poor, with limited adaptive capacity and exposed to natural elements – including to climatic and other hazards. According to the objective, this vulnerability would be reduced through 'targeted investments and capacity building'. Three variables should have been adequately measured and monitored by the project: vulnerability, investments and capacity.

Within the underlying theory of change behind the project strategy, there is an assumption that the authorities (local and national) would need to strengthen their capacity for generating hydroclimatic information, including but not restricted to FFEWS, and that some equipment would need to be purchased and installed for the purpose. In the meantime, the local capacities for civil protection would be strengthened and resilience would also be strengthened, and specific national capacities for FFEWS, focusing on the Cuvelai River Basin, would also need to be strengthened.

FINDING Pursuing multiple those goals at the same time (resilience strengthening, vulnerability reduction, capacity and investment) would require a broad project, well supplied with resources (which was the case). Above all, it requires a coordinated approach to resilience building, vulnerability reduction capacity development and investment – the latter as a proxy for equipment and infrastructures. It would also require sufficient time. and as we have verified in section 3.1, the time accorded to the project for achieving its concomitant goals (4 years) was insufficient.

The following are the outputs grouped under three Components / Outcome:

Outcome 1: Enhanced capacity of national and local hydro-meteorological services, civil authorities and environmental institutions to monitor extreme weather and climate change in the Province of Cunene:

Output 1.1: 7 Automatic Weather Stations (AWS) (6 fixed plus 1 mobile) at least 6 rainfall gauges complete with remote data transmission and archiving, are installed in Cuvelai Basin to support flood forecast early warning systems (FFEWS).

Output 1.2: A hydrotelemetric monitoring system of 4 river gauging stations, 4 water level stations, are installed in Cuvelai and Miu Rivers to support flood forecasting and early warning system (FFEWS).

Output 1.3: At least 50 officers from MINAMB, INAMET, Provincial government, Civil Protection, INRH, CETAC and other relevant institutions are trained to operate, maintain climate-monitoring infrastructure and assist dissemination and response mechanisms of the FFEWS.

Output 1.4: A comprehensive Flood Forecasting & Early Warning System (FFEWS), – based on interagency harmonized agreements and international standards and protocols – are developed and warnings made accessible to Disaster Management structure in Cunene Province as well as relevant public institutions to enable appropriate planning and response measures.

Outcome 2: Increased resilience of smallholder farmer communities in the Province of Cunene to climate-induced risks and variabilities via access to locally-appropriate climate data and germplasm resources:

Output 2.1: Locally-appropriate climate proofed germplasm resources are accessed by regional agricultural and water technicians and amongst communities in the Cuvelai Basin.

Output 2.2: Extension Services (Estações de Desenvolvimento Agrário-EDA's) are trained in climate change risks and resilience agriculture techniques to support vulnerable communities in Cuvelai Basin (Mukolongondjo, Mupa, Evale).

Output 2.3: Water access and quality that mitigate climate change vulnerability are improved by piloting technologies, through partnerships with Provincial Government and INARH (e.g. Opening/rehabilitation of water reservoirs (Chimpacas), conservation measures, water harvesting, opening or remedial work on existing boreholes).

Output 2.4: Small-scale adaptation initiatives are set as a safety net to strengthen resilience of Province of Cunene communities' livelihoods to extremes of climate variability.

Outcome 3: Local institutional capacities for better coordinated, climate-resilient planning strengthened and Capacity for effective community-based climate change adaptation (including traditional knowledge practices) improved at local level:

Output 3.1: A CC-Environmental Information System of Angola (CC-ENISA) is established to allow systematic storage and mainstreaming of digital information to support decision making in sector planning.

Output 3.2: Capacity and inter-sectoral framework for mainstreaming weather and climate resilience in the Province of Cunene Master Plan is built for target communities (Mukolongondjo, Mupa, Evale, Nheone, Namacunde, Cubati, and Ondjiva).

Output 3.3: The existing dissemination/response system under the Serviço Nacional e Provincial de Protecção Civil e Bombeiros (SNPCB) is strengthened to support FFEWS.

Output 3.4: Community based FFEWS (CBFFEWS) network is developed in target areas to enhance and test its impact on risk reduction in sectors and population.

The Project Results Framework/Strategic Results Framework presents the logic and strategy of the project. Outcomes indicate change, since each one of the three project outcomes has, as the target, an altered future state.

The project reports against the indicator at the objective level (one indicator, disaggregated by gender) and at the level of outcomes (with 5 indicators), including one indicator under Outcome 1, two indicators under Outcome 2 and 2 indicators under Outcome 3.

The MTR has conducted only a coarse analysis of the project indicators. The MTR contains an analysis of the progress towards the targets, it is however restrained by "*the baseline not* [being] *determined at project onset during the inception phase"*.

The main suggestions that the MTR does are the following:

- Concerning the progress towards the objective-level target (*Percentage change in vulnerability of local community to climate risks – 70% of VRA score at project closing*): the MTR assessed that although the baseline data is not available and therefore quantifying the progress is not possible, some progress has been made as training and water hole rehabilitation activities were being implemented. The MTR recommended that the VRA exercise is conducted at the project scale, as the scope of the 2018 VRA was limited. The 2021 PIR assessed that "No significant changes in local communities' vulnerability to climate risks during the project implementation period, as proper measurable assessment was not conducted yet". The PIR 2021 then lists the activities that contributed towards the objective-level target.
- In terms of target 1.1 (*By the end of the project a Flood Forecasting & EWS is developed and forecasts are being disseminated to target communities in Province of Cunene*) under Outcome 1: the MTR reported that the procurement for EWS had not been concluded with success, but a new contract was signed and it was expected that the progress will now be accelerated. The 2021 PIR assessed the progress as 'on track', with a list of activities implemented up to date that contributed towards achieving the target.
- Concerning Outcome 2 target 2.1 (*Percentage change in gender disaggregated household income in the 7 targeted comunas as a result of project intervention via perception based survey (VRA) - By the end of the project 50% gender disaggregated increase of VRA score*) and 2.2 (*No. of household in targeted comunas engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods - By the end of the project, at least 50% of targeted households have engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods introduced/strengthened in the project*): the situation was similar as in case of the objective-level target – some activities were implemented and the conditions for improved progress towards the results were enhanced. The PIR 2021 marked the progress towards the target as 'off track'. The PIR lists the activities implemented but also contains a recommendation for the IP to request an extension, which was done.
- Regarding target 3.1 (*By the end of the project CC-ENISA has been running Risk modelling and Vulnerability maps for the Cunene Province and the Cuvelai in particular have been developed*) and 3.2 (*By the end of the project CC flood and drought risk/vulnerability are integrated into at least one National and one Provincial disaster preparedness and management Plans*) for Outcome 3: the CETAC was still working on the proposal for CC-ENISA, but also the Civil Protection was contracted for implementation of activities and therefore the conditions for progress were enhanced. The PIR 2021 marks the progress towards the targets under Outcome 3 as 'on track'.

RESULTS DISAGGREGATED BY GENDER

In the project document, none of the UN strategic frameworks listed on the cover, and which are meant to ensure the project's fit into higher level UN and UNDP goals had explicitly included gender. They referred to UNDP Strategic Plan 2014-2017 and to Angola's UNDAF 2015-2019.

During implementation, the UN and UNDP strategic frameworks changed, evolved, this changed. Currently, there is good alignment with UNDP's strategic priorities, such as UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021), in addition to UNDAF and CPD Outcomes, and other frameworks such as the SDGs (see e.g. the Project Summary Table). Also, UNDP Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021[23] is seamless aligned with UNDP Strategic Plan (2018-2021).

It may be said that at the highest strategic level, the project had effectively integrated a gender-sensitive approach by adopting updated UN and UNDP strategic frameworks. At a more basic level, it had not really accomplished this – as we will see further down.

The following questions were used for the assessment of the gender aspect of this project:

Evaluation Questions on Gender [#] – answered below

KEY QUESTIONS:

1) *How were gender considerations integrated in the project's design, including through a gender analysis with the specific context of the project for advancing gender equality and women's empowerment and a gender action plan with a specific implementation plan for the delivery of gender activities, with indicators, targets, budget, timeframe and responsible party?*
2) *How appropriate and adaptive was the gender action plan in facilitating gender mainstreaming objectives.*
3) *How were gender issues integrated in the project's strategy, rationale and theory of change, including how advancing gender equality and women's empowerment will advance the project's environmental outcomes?*

ANSWER: Gender considerations were included into the design of the project through a brief section, but there was no gender action plan. Two out of six project indicators, including the objective-level indicators incorporate gender aspect, but they were not properly informed with baseline readings.

4) *During implementation what systematic and appropriate efforts were made to include diverse groups of stakeholders (e.g. women's groups)?*
5) *How was the UNDP Gender Marker rating assigned to the project document realistic and backed by the findings of the gender analysis?*

ANSWER: Gender tagging read as 'substantial', but this is a mismatch vis-à-vis the level of gender mainstreaming in the project. NGOs reported on progress in a gender-sensitive manner and strived for gender equity in their activities as much as possible. It is not clear if true gender equality was the guiding principle. The lack of gender action plan made systematic gender mainstreaming impractical.

Gender considerations were included into the design of the project. Two out of six project indicators, including the objective-level indicators incorporate gender aspect.

The project design did not prepare a gender action plan, nor did it contain a gender marker as it was not a requirement when the project was conceived.

The gender approach is described in *Gender Involvement* chapter of the project. The chapter gives details of how gender aspects were mainstreamed into the design of the project:

> *"The project design was conducted so that most of the activities foreseen are gender balanced, particularly in the training and capacity-building approaches which are recommended to be gender sensitive (Outcome 1. Output 1.3 - Indicative activities 1.3.1). Furthermore, adaptation technologies to*

[23] See e.g. https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/womens-empowerment/undp-gender-equality-strategy-2018-2021.html

be deployed in the local communities, such as promoting dissemination of seed packets of climate-resilient crops for subsequent multiplication will target primarily smallholder farmer groups/Cooperatives/Women Associations. The indicator 2.1 under Outcome 2 will specifically track the percentage change in gender disaggregated household income in the 7 targeted comunas as a result of project intervention via perception-based survey (VRA). Outcome 2 - Indicator 2.2. No. of household in targeted comunas engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods will also be gender-disaggregated".

The MTR also lists the specific ideas and activities of the project that incorporate the gender aspect, although it points out that the benefit for the marginalized groups were not generated at this stage, most likely because no real benefits were generated yet at that point in time.

The TE assessed that gender balance was generally maintained in most project activities, especially the FEWS training and other types of training. It is also expected that the project results will continue to incorporate gender balance principles in a way they did during the implementation, which is overall assessed by the TE as satisfactory.

4) FINDINGS

In line with the methodology, the Evaluation findings are based on documented evidence, supplemented by interviews with stakeholders (Annex III). The following document types proved of most use to the TE with the full listing provided in Annex IV:

- Documents relating to the Project's design and approval
- Reports produced by the PMU for the implementing and responsible partners and UNDP.
- Documents produced in the course of the Project (e.g. workshop reports, Steering Committee reports; reports commissioned under the Project, PIRs)

4.1) PROJECT DESIGN / FORMULATION

MONITORING AND EVALUATION – DESIGN AT ENTRY

CRITERION	RATING
M&E Plan – design at entry	**Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**

Applicable Evaluation Criteria Questions [Q-#] – answered through the narrative	
[Q-1]	*Was the M&E plan well-conceived, practical and sufficient at the point of CEO Endorsement?*
[Q-2]	*Did the M&E plan include a baseline, SMART indicators and data analysis systems, and evaluation studies at specific times to assess results?*
[Q-3]	*Were baseline conditions, methodology, logistics, time frames, and roles and responsibilities well-articulated?*
[Q-4]	*Was data on specified indicators, relevant GEF/LDCF/SCCF Tracking Tools/Core Indicators gathered in a systematic manner?*

The Project Document (PRODOC)[24] followed a template in force at the time when it was completed. The mentioned template is rather simple (compared to today's standards e.g.). The PRODOC includes a section dedicated to M&E (Section VI. Monitoring Framework and Evaluation). [Q-3] The mentioned section includes

[24] We make reference to the version found online (filename "PIMS 5166_Prodoc - ANGOLA CUVELAI - Final_04Apr2016.pdf") accessed through in https://info.undp.org/docs.

M&E roles, responsibilities and time-frames, although some of them proved unrealistic (e.g. that the Inspection Workshop would be held within the first 4 months of project start[25]).

The following M&E activities were foreseen in the PRODOC:
- Baseline study
- Inception Report
- Inception Workshop Report
- Quarterly monitoring in UNDP Enhanced Results Based Management Platform
- Updates to Risk Log in Atlas
- Project Progress Reports
- Annually - APR/PIRs
- Site monitoring visits and the BTORs - happened mostly in 2016,17 and 2019 -
- MTR
- TE

To the above, the completion of Tracking Tools should have been added.

The Results Framework includes six indicators: one objective-level indicator, one indicator for Outcome 1, two indicators for Outcome 2 and two for Outcome 3:

Objective Indicator:	Percentage change in vulnerability of local community to climate risks.
Indicator 1.1:	A Flood Forecasting & EWS that is useful to communities developed and forecasts disseminated to target communities in Province of Cunene.
Indicator 2.1:	Percentage change in gender disaggregated household income in the 7 targeted *comunas* as a result of project intervention via perception based survey (VRA)
Indicator 2.2:	No. of household in targeted *comunas* engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods
Indicator 3.1:	CC-Environmental Information System of Angola (CC-ENISA) is established, risk assessed and vulnerability maps developed for the Cunene Province and the Cuvelai in particular.
Indicator 3.2:	Number of National or Provincial relevant plans and/or policy documents that integrate climate change flood and drought risks

[Q-1] For the standards of project design that applied at that time, the TE assesses that the M&E Framework was generally sufficient. The number of indicators in the indicator set would, in theory, make reporting against indicators a practical task. Hence, it may be said that M&E plan is reasonably well-conceived, practical and sufficient at the point of CEO Endorsement. Most indicators are informative and complete, albeit somewhat generic. Indicators would be completed by more specific adaptation indicators included in the Climate Change Adaptation Focal Area Tracking Tool (AMAT)[26] had been prepared for the project (discussed further down).

[Q-2] Not all Results Framework indicators included a baseline or were SMART, in fact, if analyzed literally, only indicator 3.2 is SMART. Furthermore, the ability to monitor the progress towards the targets for three out of six in total indicators, relied solely on the VRA survey that would be conducted at the inception. It is noted that the survey was only conducted in a limited scope (according to PIR 2019: 8 communities in 3 municipalities of Cunene province) in 2018 i.e. two years after the inception, which took place in 2016. Although the delays could not have been foreseen at the design phase, risks related to delays in implementation and issues with coordination have been identified in the Project Document. The lack of baseline for central indicators is a visible shortcoming in the design of the M&E.

Also, a project of the size of Cuvelai project would usually have a separate M&E system in place, while the PRODOC although indeed proposed a set of M&E activities, also relied on the implementation to develop a more detailed M&E framework: "It is foreseen that a more detailed M&E project framework is developed during the

[25] As stated in the PRODOC.
[26] The Climate Change Adaptation Focal Area Tracking Tool was shortened as "AMAT" and later as simply the "CCA Tracking Tool".

project inception phase for national management purposes". This assumption seems questionable and indeed the Inception Report did not include additional information on detailed M&E framework.

From the point of view of the implementation, it would have probably been better if the indicators were more specific and if the VRA had been conducted during the PPG. That would have probably improved the M&E effectiveness. This however couldn't have been foreseen at the design phase.

The PRODOC foresees the engagement of an M&E expert to provide oversight of the majority of the M&E activities.

With reference to section 3.4, we repeat a key finding and discuss the issue of project indicators more in depth here.

FINDING An important conclusion from assessing indicators and their baseline is that project designer made a poor choice of indicators, to the extent that 3 out of 6 indicator depended on a VRA study and this study has, from all accounts, not been conducted during the PPG process. Hence, when the project started, it did not have the information necessary for assessing the baseline for key indicators.

Concerning the Tracking Tool [Q-4], there is evidence that information to inform indicators has not been gathered in a systematic manner. Even through AMAT data and its application in connection with the project was not clearly explicit in the PRODOC, the completion of tracking tools had become a mandatory annex for all GEF projects around the time it was CEO endorsed. The preparation of the tool was then integrated into the UNDP GEF projects' M&E Frameworks, with completion at CEO Endorsement stage, at mid-term (in connection with the MTR) and by project (in connection with the TE). We note that the MTR exercise should have reviewed and validated the Tracking Tool, but, from all accounts, this did not happen.

We reviewed the Tracking Tools as prepared in 2014 (CEO Endorsement by the RTA Lucas Black) and in 2018 (by mid-term by the UNDP Program Officer, Goetz Schroth). Until today's date, we have not yet received from the project the Tracking Tool as completed by project end.

The preliminary analysis of the Tracking Tool shows:

- Lack of alignment with focal area strategy, as informed in the CEO Endorsement Request: Only indicators under Objective 2 had been completed by CEO Endorsement, even though the project should link up to Focal Area Objectives 1, 2 and 3 (refer to Figure 5), and to specific outcomes and GEF corporate level indicators.

- The tracking tool at CEO Endorsement Stage was quite incomplete.

- Lack of consistency: At mid-term, several indicators under Objectives 1, 2 and 3 seemed to have been completed, but without any criteria on their linkages to the selected focal area indicators. The completion at mid-term included an attempt to reconstruct the baseline. However, this was done without any supporting metadata being presented. And those were not the same indicators that have been completed at CEO Endorsement Stage. It is not clear if any of the tracking tools have been reviewed or validated by UNDP-GEF.

- We have streamlined the tracking tool by project end and added notation. We wait for the project / or UNDP to deliver a completed tracking tool, closing the cycle.

ASSUMPTIONS AND RISKS

Applicable Evaluation Criteria Questions [Q-#] – answered below and through the narrative
KEY QUESTIONS: *[Q-5] How did project risks affect project implementation?* ANSWER: The project was considered risky, but risk was managed and went down during implementation (Figure 7). *[Q-6] What systems and tools were used to identify, prioritize, monitor and manage project risks?* ANSWER: UNDP's standard risk monitoring systems in Atlas. Risks from the SESP were not being monitored though. *[Q-7] Were any risks overlooked and what were the consequences of that?* ANSWER: Risks #3, #9 and #11, as in Table 13, were not adequately mitigated. Refer to table for explanations. ANCILLARY QUESTIONS: *[Q-8] Were new risks or changes to existing risks reported on in the annual PIRs and/or MTR?* ANSWER: Yes *[Q-9] Was the project's risk register properly maintained during implementation?* ANSWER: Yes *[Q-10] Did the Project Team keep the Project Board informed of new risks, changes to existing risks and the escalation of risks?* ANSWER: Yes *[Q-11] Were action plans developed and followed? Was escalation necessary?* ANSWER: Refer to narrative and TE's feedback on risks #3. #9 and #11 in Table 13.

According to the sequence of PIRs, the general evolution of project risks, including the level of critical risks have been decreasing during the project's lifetime since 2019 (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Evolution of overall risk ratings according to PIRs (2017-2021)



There are eleven risks listed in Table 5. Summary of risks and assumptions to the LDCF project of the PRODOC. The table provides assumptions vis-à-vis which the risks are tested. The TE assessed that the risks and assumptions are logical and robust and informative for planning the project intervention.

Table 13. Project risks at the design stage, assumptions and feedback on them from the TE

#	Description of Risk	Assumptions at the PRODOC stage	TE's Feedback
1	Procurement and installation of hydro-meteorological equipment, including hardware and software, is delayed because of complications	Effective administrative planning will be undertaken, with support from UNDP CO, which will include procuring equipment at an early	The risk was relevant and actually materialized through the long period of project mobilization shown in the project's timeline.

#	Description of Risk	Assumptions at the PRODOC stage	TE's Feedback
	with the release of funds and/or national procurement procedures.	stage in the project implementation phase.	Management responses pertaining to delays in the project mobilization must be strengthened across the UNDP portfolio. It seems to be a chronic issue affecting several projects. To underpin this point we refer to the recent Performance Audit of UNDP GEF.[27]
2	Poor coordination between implementing and executing agencies.	There will be a clear project management arrangements and regular interactions between the stakeholders. Clear project management arrangements and regular interactions between the agencies.	The risk was relevant and actually materialized through the periods of delays that the project experienced. The assumption proved to be too optimistic, as the management arrangements within the project turned out to be one of its problems. Refer to chapter 3.2) Project implementation for more details on this.
3	Unavailability of requisite human resources and data	The issue of the unavailability of requisite human resources will be mitigated by recruitment of international consultants who will work closely with in-country counterparts and by targeted capacity building activities. Training activities of local personnel will also be part of all aspects of the work and the relevant institutions will be encouraged to expand the staff base if it is weak in particular areas.	The risk was in large addressed through the engagement of local NGOs and other actors that supported the implementation of training activities. However, the TE assesses that this was not enough. The PRODOC had foreseen the establishment of a PMU, which did not happen during implementation. The risk was probably minimized, and it has not been fully mitigated. The recruitment of international staff has not fully compensated the unavailability of requisite human resources. As for the unavailability of data, the project had options for addressing it through specialized consultancies. However, the critical VRA study, which would generate primary data that would have been necessary for informing several project indicators, was never conducted. Hence, also this aspect of Risk #3 was not adequately mitigated.
4	INAMET does not have enough capacity to tailor climate products to suit vulnerable populations in Province of Cunene and private sector needs by the end of the project.	During project development, INAMET already indicated that they have some experience working with private sector representatives to understand their needs for tailored products. This project will continue to	The risk was relevant and actually materialized through the delays with purchasing the equipment and training. TE assessed that the assumption was too ambitious.

[27] UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations: Performance Audit of UNDP Global Environment Facility (GEF) Management, Report No. 2210, Issue Date: 1 December 2020. Downloaded from: https://www.thegef.org/documents/performance-audit-undp-global-environment-facility-management, accessed on 21/10/21.

#	Description of Risk	Assumptions at the PRODOC stage	TE's Feedback
		build all information production agencies to tailor services. The project foresees a strong supportive training and capacitance programme so that INAMET will acquire enough capacity to tailor climate products by the end of the project.	
5	Capacity cannot be built on national and decentralized levels in the Cunene Province of SNPCB to assist with alert dissemination and crisis prevention	SNPCB will undergo significant capacity development through this project and budgets have been allotted to training and improving their outreach and communication systems. A training programme for gender sensitive SNPCB field officers and Local Disaster Risk Management Committees (LDRMC's) will be delivered by the project. Budget includes the provision of privileged communication systems (e.g., CB radios) for all alert dissemination agencies in need. Therefore, capacity can be built on decentralized levels to implement a Standard Operating Procedure for Alert Communication.	The risk has not materialized, as the SNPCB has already had a sufficient capacity level and has been implementing relevant activities on the ground.
6	Installed hydro-meteorological equipment fails because it is vandalized or not properly maintained.	There will be awareness raising activities in target communities to highlight the importance of the installed equipment. In addition, it is expected that the equipment will be housed within a secure fence and under the responsibility of local Community Leaders and/or Government Institutions.	The risk hasn't materialized because the installation of the equipment happened late into the project lifetime and at the TE stage it can't be foreseen whether it will be a subject of vandalization or not.
7	Climate shocks occurring during the design and implementation phase of the LDCF project result in disruptions to installed equipment and severely affect communities, prior to the EWSs being established.	It is expected that disaster mitigation and response activities will be prioritized at the target communities whilst the EWS is being established	As above – it can't be foreseen at the TE stage whether this risk will materialize or not.
8	Telecommunication (SMS) communication systems used for data transmission from Automatic Weather Stations will not be robust enough (e.g., bandwidth issues or local mobile telecommunication networks) to be able to effectively contribute to EWS data sharing and real time forecast development.	Costs of equipment and training will not rise dramatically during project implementation. Technical expertise and equipment for upgrading the network is available.	The TE established through consulting the PIR 2021 and the stakeholder, that the project has not yet reached the stage where all the data would be used to communicate climate-related threats to the communities, but important progress was made and part of the data is being used by the Civil Protection to warn the communities in the local language.
9	Insufficient institutional support and political commitments and lack of coordination of the various key stakeholders.	Government is committed to integrating climate change risk and adaptation needs in development planning of Province of Cunene; Planning will be conducted in a participatory manner to ensure that adaptation measures are appropriated by the community;	The risk was relevant and actually materialized through the coordination issues related to political elections in the country and government restructuring. The TE thinks that in cases where the elections are foreseen, the project design should come up

#	Description of Risk	Assumptions at the PRODOC stage	TE's Feedback
		Stakeholders are committed to implement the project interventions and provide the necessary support.	with ready solutions to decrease the likelihood of coordination failure.
10	Communities in target *Comunas* are not committed to cooperate and/or accept proposed adaptation measures	Financial, Technical and political support will be given to EDA's for training of staff and implementation of activities as planned. Communities in target *Comunas* are willing to cooperate and adopt climate change adaptation measures. A participatory and transparent project implementation will be established as well as adequate sensitization of the importance of the project and potential benefits from the project will minimize/eliminate this risk	The risk hasn't materialized, the communes proved to be engaged in the project interventions.
11	Complex technical and organizational management of knowledge base that can delay project implementation	Activities programmed for equipment purchase and training of staff in GIS are implemented as planned. Adequate and timely national and international support for sharing and exchange of climate change data, modelling information and other relevant data and information.	The risk did materialize, although the progress is still being made to operationalize the systems in question.

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FRAMEWORK (PROJECT LOGIC /STRATEGY; INDICATORS)

The project objective reads as follows:

> "To reduce the climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of Angola's Cuvelai River Basin through targeted investments and capacity building."

With respect to Results Framework for the Cuvelai project, the general analysis points out the intervention being logic, coherent and adequate, including the main elements in the Logic Framework Analysis (LFA), among them the project Objective, the three Outcomes, which are considered relevant and central to the project strategy and the problem that the project seeks to address, in addition to Outputs and Indicators.

The PRODOC is used as the main reference for the analysis in this section. Since the project was conceived in GEF5, there was no strict requirements for projects to include a thoroughly explained TOC in the project document, as it is the case in the GEF7 cycle e.g. Ideally, the TOC should also link up different LFA elements the problems that the project seeks to address, the solution proposed (which would be explicitly included) and the Barriers to the proposed solution.

The project has the following objective: To reduce the climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of Angola's Cuvelai River Basin through targeted investments and capacity building. To achieve the objective, the project focused on three components, with specific and well formulated Outcomes behind them:

Component 1: Transfer of appropriate technologies and related capacity building for climate and environmental monitoring infrastructure;	**Outcome 1:** Enhanced capacity of national and local hydro-meteorological services, civil authorities and environmental institutions to monitor extreme weather and climate change in the Cuvelai Basin.

Component 2: Enhanced human and institutional capacity for increased sustainable rural livelihoods among those communities' areas most prone to extreme weather events (flooding and drought) in the region;	**Outcome 2:** Increased resilience of smallholder farmer communities in the Basin to climate-induced risks and variabilities.
Component 3: Increased understanding of climate change adaptation and practices in climate-resilient development planning at the local community and government levels.	**Outcome 3:** Local institutional capacities for coordinated, climate-resilient planning strengthened &Capacity for effective community-based climate change adaptation (including traditional knowledge practices) improved at

Apart from being clear, relevant and complete, the project's Results Framework still had shortcomings in a few areas.

FINDING The TE analyzed the 'smartness' of project indicators in Section 3.4 (refer to Table 12). Several indicators and end-of-project targets are not specific enough to be easily measurable. This reflected negatively in the quality of reporting through the PIRs. If the VRA baseline VRA had been conducted during the PPG, it would be less of a problem, but this was not the case. the baseline only established very late and only in part.

RECOMMENDATION In the future, the project's Results Framework should not be built around indicators that require expensive, demanding, complex and time consuming household surveys, such as the VRA. This recommendations applies in particular if the project targets a large area with the population spread across several villages with difficult access, which is the case for the Cunene Basin.

LESSONS FROM OTHER RELEVANT PROJECTS INCORPORATED INTO PROJECT DESIGN

The Cuvelai project incorporated into its design various elements of other projects, but the way this was done was unspecific.

There are a few passages in the PRODOC where the incorporation of lessons from other relevant projects is mentioned. They include the following:

- A list of the interventions is included in the PRODOC under section 2.3.1, titled *'Ongoing relevant national and regional initiatives'*. The section serves to describe the baseline initiatives that underpinned the project strategy. Collaboration with those and with other projects and interventions were well articulated in the PRODOC. It is implicit that the project would learn lessons from them, even though the mechanisms for learning were not explicit.

- On the above, the incorporation of lessons from co-financing initiatives had the chance to be actively done through the project steering committee. However, not all co-financiers were actively engaged in the Committee. USAID and FAO could have been good contributors, but only the latter maintained a presences in the PSC overtime.

- Under "*LDCF Conformity*" section in the PRODOC, a sub-section titled "*Supporting a "learning-by-doing" approach*" is included, from which we quote

  "[…] the project will use, synthesized lessons learned for replication elsewhere with the ultimate goal of improving Flood Forecasting and Early Warning System (FFEWS) performance and Civil Protection responses as tools for climate change adaptation as well as a developmental instrument."

On the latter point, it is not clear which models could be followed, even though the UNDP-GEF Adaptation portfolio was expanding rapidly, when the Cuvelai project was designed, and some models and examples could

have helped curate some specific lessons. An important LESSON from the TE on this respect is that the development of FFEWS needs to be approached through the creation of pre-conditions. First, it is important to generate hydroclimatic data and then generate analysis and develop Early Warning Services. And in order to generate hydroclimatic data, measurement instruments must be installed early in the project's lifetime.

PLANNED STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

Applicable Evaluation Criteria Questions [Q-#] – answered through the narrative
[Q-12] Extent to which relevant stakeholders participated in the project
[Q-13] Extent to which the project was formulated according to the needs and interests of all targeted and/or relevant stakeholder groups
[Q-14] Extent to which the intervention is informed by needs and interests of diverse groups of stakeholders through in-depth consultation

A brief but logical stakeholder involvement plan was presented in the main body of the PRODOC. In addition, Annex 2 to the PRODOC titled: Stakeholder Consultations, featured a comprehensive list of project stakeholders, their respective roles and responsibilities and a log of consultations conducted during the PPG. Stakeholder analysis is also included in chapter 1.4. Stakeholder baseline analysis.

The TE learned that various institutions working on the ground in Angola (e.g. the DW, the Civil Protection and others), has already been implementing interventions that were further developed, consolidated or generally improved by the project. Through multiple interviews and the analysis of project documentation, the TE assessed that the interventions proposed by the project were considered highly relevant by project actors. This points out to good project design in this aspect.

The MTR repeated the list of main stakeholders from the PRODOC without major updates.

Based on the PRODOC Annex 2, the main stakeholders for the project and their expected roles and responsibilities are listed in the table below.

Table 14. Stakeholder Matrix as per the PRODOC

Main Stakeholders	Interests/ role in the project
Central Government	
Ministry of Environment (MINAMB)[28]	The MINAMB through the Climate Change Unit will be the lead institution for the project and will have the responsibility to do everything to achieve the objectives and outcomes of the project. Will ensure that the political, institutional, legislative and budgetary reforms are available to support the implementation of project activities. Develop capacities of vulnerable communities in the Province of Cunene to adapt these to climate change.
Ministry of Energy and Water (MINEA)	The MINEA play a key role in project implementation through the National Institute for Water Resources (INARH) regarding the monitoring of river dynamics (flow rate and water levels) land monitoring the fluctuation of underground water level in the locations identified in the Province of Cunene.
Ministry of Territory Planning and Development (MPDT)	The MPDT will ensure that sectoral strategies and programs developed for the areas of project implementation are fully tuned into other sectoral policies, programs and strategies. Will integrate budgets projected in the broader macro-economic program for the country.
Ministry of Finance (MINFIN)	The MOF is responsible for ensuring government funding assigning annual budget to MINAMB to fulfil the commitments of the Government co-funding for the project.
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI)	Extension services to support small farmers are under the supervision of this ministry and all provinces have a representation of the Agrarian Development Institute (IDA), and several Agrarian Development Stations (EDAs) that will make the link between the Agriculture Research Institutes and farmers. Agricultural extensions are crucial to a successful implementation of Component 2 of this project.

[28] MINAMB is now an extinct institution, whose attributions have been taken over by MCTA.

Main Stakeholders	Interests/ role in the project
Government Institutes	
National Institute of Meteorology and Geophysics (INAMET)	INAMET is a research institution and provision of scientific services in the fields of meteorology and geophysics under the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information. The duties of INAMET: ensuring the operation of conventional and automatic stations observations of atmospheric parameters network of seismic observation network and the network of geomagnetic observations, carrying the storage, processing and dissemination of data. INAMET is represented in the Province by a delegation in the provincial government) The role in the project: installation of weather stations, training of technical personnel and securing the operation of the stations to be installed. Will also have the role of developing and providing weather information for agricultural purposes, developing capacities of vulnerable communities in the Province of Cunene to adapt these to climate change. Will also support the creation of a database, particularly in the climate modelling process to evaluate the impacts of climate change on the Province of Cunene region. Additionally, the project will work with the INAMET to improve the ability of systematic data collection and communication of climate risks to strengthen the capacity of climate modelling
Center for Tropical Ecology and Climate Change (CETAC)	The CETAC is overseen by the Ministry of Environment, has its headquarters in Huambo Province and develops its activity throughout the national territory and may create for this purpose, Scientific research stations locally. The role in the project: Interact with the Centre for Plant Genetic Resources in conducting agro-morphological characterization tests including resistance to water stress and other crops infields of local farmers and experimental fields of the IIA, multiplication of seed of varieties that exhibit the characteristics of resistance to new climatic conditions.
National Institute of Water Resources (INARH)	The National Water Resources Institute, abbreviated INARH is a legal person of public law, legal personality, administrative and financial autonomy and its own assets, which is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the national policy water resources, in matters relating to planning and integrated management of these, use, preservation, protection, monitoring and control. The duties of INARH among many: to prepare national water policy, as well as ensuring the implementation, monitoring and verification; ensure planning and planning of water resources, to their efficient and sustainable use; develop plans, programs and projects for development, protection, conservation, preservation, recovery and efficient use of water resources. The role in the project: Work closely with the Provincial Service of Civil Protection and Fire Brigade, and provincial representation INAMET - Cunene in order to make the management of the process of dissemination of the information gathered for the different stakeholders. These services at national and provincial level will the one to support and manage all hydrometeorological and river gauge stations. They will also be actively involved in the development of national/provincial capability for forecasting river dynamics during flood events leading to Flood Forecasting Early Warning Systems in Cunene Province.
Other Governmental Organizations at National level	
Food Security Office (GSA)	The GSA is the support service of the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), whose duties among several others is to define, coordinate and monitor the implementation of policies and strategies to improve the food security of populations; calculate the food deficit and alert the relevant agencies on the magnitude of the situation and propose alternative measures to tackle or overcome the effects inherent thereafter, through an early warning system. The GSA is not represented nationwide and has its headquarters in Luanda. The role in the project: Early warning for food security; Agrometeorological monitoring of situation; Installation of equipment, training and climate monitoring in agro-forestry regions; Assessment of the food security situation in the region, vulnerability assessment and present alternative
National Service of Civil Protection and Fire Brigade (SNPCB)	The Basic Law of Civil Protection (Law No. 28 / 03 of 7 November 2003) was adopted not only to prevent the occurrence of collective risks arising from possible major accidents, disasters, natural or technological disasters as well as to implement a supporting the creation of the National system of Civil Protection system. This service is well represented countrywide and is the national institution for dissemination and response/rescue in case of any natural or manmade disaster The role in the project: Through its Operational Coordination Centre for Civil Protection (CCOPC), integrated in the National Service of Civil Protection and Fire Brigade, ensure a continuous flow of strategic information to the Service of Civil Protection and Fire at provincial and municipal level when eminent disaster or natural calamity occurs. Provide technical support to institutions and partners working in rural and local development, to integrate risk reduction criteria in their work processes; Disseminate press releases and notices the people and entities and institutions, including the media Develop training and other provincial and municipal committee of the Cunene civil protection programs, including direct actions on vulnerable or highly prioritized in the context of national development and fighting poverty in communities
Plant Genetic Resources Centre (CRF)	The CRFis an infrastructure for research and development of Agostinho Neto University, established as a center for conservation, research and utilization of plant genetic resources, and staff training at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate in the field of plant genetic resources. The role in the project: Implementation of agro-morphological characterization tests including resistance to water stress and other crops in fields of local farmers and experimental fields of the

Main Stakeholders	Interests/ role in the project
	Institute of Agronomic Research (IIA), conducting analysis of germplasm in the Laboratory of Molecular characterization of CRF-UAN, multiplication of seed of varieties that show resistance characteristics of the new climatic conditions and the distribution of seeds to farmers with the support of the Agrarian Development Institute(IDA).
Agostinho Neto University (UAN)	The Department of Geology (Geology DEI), Faculty of Science, University Agostinho Neto has a long scientific, pedagogical and human tradition built since the establishment in 1963. The DEI Geology has the fundamental objective of promoting the development of research and skills training, the level of undergraduate and postgraduate courses in different specialties in the field of Geology The role in the project: To provide technical assistance to geographic information system (GIS) geo-referenced mapping activities of the project. Support integration of GIS monitoring and impact assessment into the Sustainable Community Services of the Province of Cunene. Provide assistance in any training required by the project activities in geographic information system (GIS) tools.
Provincial and Local Government	
Government of Cunene Province	The provincial government will actively support and participate in the implementation of all project activities, and integrate them into the provincial development strategies.
Municipal Administrations	In collaboration with the provincial government, the Municipal Administrations municipalities) will support the continued provision of social services (health, education, security, etc.) and infrastructure (water, energy, etc.) for communities living in vulnerable areas of the Province of Cunene.
Local Stakeholders	
Traditional Authorities	Sobas will facilitate communication between the project and the communities at the village level. Sob swill also monitor the implementation of the project activities and interventions, mutually agreed upon, and will act as mediators for potential conflicts.
Councils Consultation and Social Dialogue (CACS)	The CACS, both at provincial and municipal level, serve as important vehicles for consultation with civil society involved in the areas of project activities.
Bilateral Institutionsand NGOs	
Development Workshop Angola (DW Angola)	DW Angola is a national partner of the DW international network whose action is mainly on human settlements, shelter construction, peri-urban redevelopment, water supply and sanitation, microfinance and small business development, reconciliation, governance and disaster mitigation. Working in Angola since 1981 at the invitation of the Angolan Government and for many years was the only NGO in the country. Since the end of the war, the DW has been positioned as the only development organization needs to find new transition and reconstruction. NGO DW continues to have one of the strongest network representations in Angola and currently manages a large number of successful projects in the sectors of water and sanitation, participatory planning, micro - finance, building shelters, reconciliation and citizenship, decentralization, monitoring, research and strategy, agrarian reform and climate change and rural development/adaptation issues. The role in the project: Collecting information, demographic census, administering surveys, occasional interviews with key people to search historical data to create a model and creation of database for continuous monitoring of disasters in Province of Cunene.
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)	The FAO is an important partner for this project as will share and collaborate with the project when and where needed in terms of know-how and human resources matters linked to subsistence agriculture, aquaculture and cooperative initiatives. Given their expertise in agricultural extension, FAO will possibly be a subcontractor for Outcome 2.

REPLICATION APPROACH

The project has been expected to follow, by default, an adaptive management approach and to adopt a learning and information-sharing orientation from the onset – even though it was not clear what this actually meant.

The project has also been expected to potentially reach a much larger population of indirect beneficiaries than just the intended beneficiaries. Project documentation mentioned that the project would, in this manner, "hopefully inform the development of similar multi-stakeholder efforts in other provinces of the country." On this, it was indicated in project documents that the Government of Angola would, in partnership with USAID efforts, seek to communicate all relevant findings, conclusions and recommendations to neighboring governments as well as SADC experts on climate-related disasters.

By project end, collaboration between the project and USAID has been non-existent, but exchange visits to Namibia did happen at some point.

In turn, collaboration with Mozambique and Spain through South-South and Triangular arrangements have been noted.

Replicability of the project interventions is described in PRODOC chapter 2.8. Replicability. It is foreseen that the investment into creating the FFEWS will stimulate the replicability effect leading to improved political awareness and legislative effort to address the issue of lack of sufficient monitoring of climate threats. It is also foreseen that the products and data developed as a result of the project, as well as improved capacity of stakeholders will contribute to the development of future initiatives.

The TE thinks that PRODOC assumptions regarding the replicability of project interventions are logical and overall promising, the level of ambition of those assumptions was a bit elevated.

At the same time, implementing project activities in the core communities of Cunene province paired with high relevance of these interventions is a strategic move that will much likely contribute to future dissemination and replication of project legacy. This was also confirmed during interviews with project stakeholders working at the local level e.g. with IDA and with Civil Protection.

UNDP'S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Aligned in aspects of capacity building, as well as experience in the Environment, Risks and Disasters thematic area. UNDP has a strong Country Office presence in Angola and works closely with the government on projects in various GEF focal areas, especially biodiversity conservation, climate change adaptation and mitigation and governance. With this experience, UNDP's comparative advantage is clear. According to the PRODOC, the UNDP portfolio in the country is the biggest among all GEF agencies.

This has also been pointed out in the PRODOC, where it is clearly stated that the project is in line with *"UNDP's comparative advantage, as articulated in the GEF Council Paper C.31.5 "Comparative Advantages of GEF Agencies", in the area of capacity building, providing technical and policy support as well as expertise in project design and implementation."* This is particularly relevant with regards to training.

LINKAGES BETWEEN PROJECT AND OTHER INTERVENTIONS WITHIN THE SECTOR

This aspect is covered in a thorough manner under section 'Lessons from Other Relevant Projects Incorporated into Project Design'.

MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The Management Arrangements were overall well designed in the PRODOC and comprehensively described in chapter V. Management Arrangements. The PRODOC foresaw that MINAMB (now defunct, and whose attributions have been taken over by MCTA) would be the implementing partner for the project, with support from other ministries and UNDP Angola. The implementing modality for this project was NIM.

From the perspective of UNDP as the GEF Agency, and its inherent roles and obligations in connection it, playing both an oversight role, and a role in the support to implementation would be fine, as long as these two roles could be kept very well separated – e.g. by different units within UNDP. However, this separation, which would constitute a conflict of interests, is not sufficiently articulated in the PRODOC and in practice. In addition, according to the Management Arrangements in the PRODOC, UNDP also plays a key role in quality assurance through the Project Board.

The details of management arrangements such as the location of the project team are well articulated in the PRODOC.

The TE agrees with the MTR that the main weakness of the management arrangements design at the PRODOC stage and the overall design of the project, was that the level of ambition was too elevated i.e., that the design team overestimated the capacity of the implementing actors and did not provide sufficient tools and resources

for ensuring that the designed management arrangements will be feasible. This pertains to both technical capacity and the capacity to coordinate work in the situation of multiple parties being involved in the project.

The TE believes that the PRODOC should have at least proposed a capacity assessment to be conducted at the inception and should have designed certain adaptive management tools to be applied in case the results of the capacity assessment were not satisfactory. Instead, the design simply assumed that project risks stemming from potential failure of management arrangements (such as poor coordination) will be mitigated with clear management arrangements, which was a mistake.

Further to this, the PRODOC was prescriptive about the project management unit (PMU). It foresaw a strong PMU, adequately staffed with a senior national project manager, supported by one international project advisor, one finance and administrative assistant, plus several technical personnel.

Beyond the position of a project manager, who would be in charge of preparing project workplans, coordinating all activities and leading the project, there would be technical personnel through a 'Technical Support Team' and which included hydrologists, meteorologists, a M&E expert. There would be a Finance Manager and Project Assistant, which is adequate since the project is large and complex.

PRODOC Annex 9, where the TOR for project personnel would be included, is missing. Yet, we quote from the PRODOC (paragraph 215) to show more details on the expected composition of the technical team that was never hired:

> *"215. The Project Implementation Technical Support Team (PITST) comprising experts (both national and international) who will be contracted to perform specific tasks as required by the project will support the Project Management Unit."*

This issue is that what had been foreseen in the PRODOC for the PMU never became a reality.

4.2) PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

MONITORING AND EVALUATION – IMPLEMENTATION

CRITERION	RATING
M&E Plan - implementation	**Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**

Applicable Evaluation Criteria Questions [Q-#] – answered through the narrative
[Q-15] Extent of compliance with progress and financial reporting requirements, including quality and timeliness of reports;
[Q-16] Extent to which information provided by the M&E system was used to improve and adapt project performance

The following M&E-relevant reporting was produced during the project implementation:

1. The full series of project PIRs (2016-2020)
2. The Inception Report
3. The MTR
4. Annual Audit Reports
5. A series of BTORs from visits to project sites
6. The baseline study was eventually conducted by NGO DW in mid-2018.
7. The Tracking Tools partially completed at MTR, however the TE so far had no access to the complete TT at CEO Endorsement Request. This gap is expected to be filled shortly.
8. The Steering Committee (PSC) meeting minutes

The repository of project reports was created in OpenUNDP, in Atlas and in UNDP's internal system. An extensive repository of project technical reports was also availed to the TE. The Inception Report was prepared, and the inception workshop happened in September 2016. The Project SC meetings were documented, and the repository of the meeting minutes was availed to the Evaluator. At least one Audit Report was also availed to the TE and is complete. The project managers made several field visits to the field in 2016, 2017 and 2019. Covid-19 rendered visits for the most of 2020 impossible due to the lockdown.

The MTR was completed between late-2018 and early-2019. The management response to MTR was prepared afterwards and the recommendation from the MTR were by and large adopted, with a few exceptions. An important recommendation concerning the strengthening the PMU was only partially followed.[29] Both the MTR and the Management Response represented an important source of information for the TE.

There are two main issues affecting M&E: high turnover of project staff, and a weak, non-consolidated Project Management Unit (PMU).

The TE assessed that the project managers—in the plural, because in reality several people played this role during implementation[30]—strived to implement M&E activities as much as it was possible. The role of project manager was at times fulfilled by UNDP staff or MINAMB high level officials, while they should preferably be in charge of project oversight and quality assurance. This overlap of roles represents a certain conflict of interests, and the arrangement was far from ideal.

Table 15. Who signed the PIRs over the years

	Project managers signing PIRs:
2017	Mr. Bonifacio Kaupu (jkaupu1@yahoo.com.br)
2018	Ms. Olivia Felicio Pereira (olivia.felicio@undp.org)
2019	Ms. Maria Cadahia Perez (maria.cadahia@undp.org)
2020	Ms. Maria Cadahia Perez (maria.cadahia@undp.org)
2021	Ms. Maria Cadahia Perez (maria.cadahia@undp.org)
	CO Focal Points signing PIRs:
2017	Mr. Goetz Schroth (goetz.schroth@undp.org)
2018	Mr. Goetz Schroth (goetz.schroth@undp.org)
2019	Mr. Goetz Schroth (goetz.schroth@undp.org)
2020	Mr. Goetz Schroth (goetz.schroth@undp.org)
2021	Mr. Janeiro Avelino Janeiro (janeiro.avelino@undp.org)
	RTAs signing PIRs:
2017	Mr. Henry Rene Diouf (henry.rene.diouf@undp.org)
2018	Mr. Henry Rene Diouf (henry.rene.diouf@undp.org)
2019	Ms. Mariana Simoes (mariana.simoes@undp.org)
2020	Ms. Mariana Simoes (mariana.simoes@undp.org)
2021	Mr. Adnan Kareem (adnan.kareem@undp.org)

Unfortunately, due to cumulative project delays, missing data and inadequate project management arrangements, the M&E function was negatively affected. For example, the leading role of the project manager in certain M&E activities (e.g. preparing the PIRs, ensuring the systematic measurements of project progress towards results through indicators) was, in part taken over by UNDP staff, in an attempt to 'compensate' the PMU's general weakness. This, in turn, also conflicted with UNDP's role in the project's quality assurance.

[29] In section 'Coordination and Operations Issues', the TE highlights issues with one of the MTR
[30] Discussed in more detail further down under 'Coordination, and Operational Issues'.

It is the Evaluator's impression that the PIRs pictured project progress as it actually was, and that PIRs were generally complete. However, only the first PIR was signed by the PM. The remaining reports were prepared and signed by UNDP staff team together with the government. (Table 15)

The PRODOC foresaw the engagement of an M&E international expert, who would be responsible for implementing of most M&E activities. This person was however never hired due to issues with procurement, and it was established that their role was also taken over by the project managers, but not the PM. This is a significant gap. This confirms that the overall M&E function, similarly to other crucial and co-related functions in the project (e.g. planning, financial management and report) were in fact taken over by stakeholders that should be exercising an oversight role. This reinforces the inadequacy of the project's management arrangements.

The M&E Specialist of UNDP Angola helped oversee the Angola Cuvelai and several projects. The M&E function was strengthened, but with caveats. The person is responsible for a large portfolio and is not necessarily well acquainted with the specificity of the UNDP-GEF projects. Although the M&E Specialist dedicated time and attention to the project during the TE, aspects such as the monitoring of the co-financing and the tracking tool, which are GEF specific, have not been in the radar.

In terms of the further development of the M&E framework during the implementation, and vis-a-vis the design phase, the Inception Report does not contain any extra details on the structuring of an M&E system, as it had been prescribed in the PRODOC. Also, a Vulnerability Resilience Assessment (VRA) was foreseen in the project. The assessment would help establish adaptation baseline data at the local level and, once conducted again, it would inform progress towards project results. The VRA was only conducted in 2018, which is midways into implementation, meaning that it had not significant impact on the M&E, as the project in its initial stage (2016-17) was significantly delayed and most activities were not yet being implemented. The VRA was also no conducted again, meaning that it served very little in terms of comparison, except across villages.

To sum up, project design had not proposed a particularly strong M&E system and implementation did not address this weakness.

However, it is noted that despite the delays, the management setup and turnover within the government, and the lack of a dedicated M&E project staff, the project still produce most of the required reports and ultimately filled in some of data gaps regarding the climate change vulnerability of the project area and the perceived vulnerability of the affected communities.

ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

The term 'adaptive management' refers to project team's ability to introduce changes to project design and to project outputs during implementation, in response to changes in circumstances, risks and guiding policies, while still staying on course to meet project objectives.

The Cuvelai Project should have adopted an adaptive management approach from the moment that the initial signs of delays in getting the PRODOC approved after GEF CEO Endorsement could be registered. Options of considering different management arrangements should have been pondered (e.g. if the blockage was at the level of MINAMB and difficulties in internalizing the project and preparing it for signature). UNDP Angola could have conducted a substantive PRODOC revision—as it is mandated by UNDP POPP[31] in similar cases. Project risks should have been re-evaluated. Yet, none of that happened during the 14 months period between GEF CEO Endorsement and PRODOC signature. It is possible that the project was at a 'limbo'. From all accounts, the PPG had finished and without a PRODOC signed, the full project was not even introduced into UNDP's systems to allow for risk monitoring.

[31] With reference to UNDP's Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP). See https://popp.undp.org.

RECOMMENDATION More attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project's methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments. From the point of view of adaptative management, the misalignment between project duration and expectations is shortcoming that could have been addressed in a timely manner, but was not.

There were major delays in the project mobilization, which lasted more or less 1.5 years between CEO Endorsement and the end of the Inception Phase – see TIMELINE.

At the stage of MTR it has been concluded that the application of adaptive management approaches were never effective in the Cuvelai project. This was due to poor coordination and insufficient exchanges between project partners. The MTR's summary for Adaptive Management rating reads as follows:

"Despite that the positions of Project Implementation Unit has been hired, is evident too that effectiveness and efficiency of project management, are not completely established; this mean that the persons are hired and physically there, but the work on the project management needs, is frankly is inferior of standard if comparing the time lapsed and the investment amount on project management with the progress to results.

There is no PMU working unified; by the contrary, the personnel are working distributed in two different cities and in three different institutions. On the other hand, a Technical Advisor 100% dedicated to support this project through PMU, need to be hired and allocated 100% to this project in the PMU, and in the same line, a project financial manager needs to be 100% dedicated to this project.

On the other hand, the delays to start project operations and low execution during operation indicate that the Steering Committee, has not had until recently, conditions to conceive, express and implement their decisions. However, both institutional conditions as contextual foresees, are indicating an evident improvement in and for project execution.

So far, the project cost-effectiveness is unsatisfactory, highlighting the surprising high cost of "project management" item. Despite the good tools and support provided by the UNDP, It is important to highlight the gap of an M&E tool "tailor made" for the project, which is very important tool for project management that need to be provided by a robust PMU.
MTR found that project has a good potential to develop and leverage the necessary and appropriate partnerships at provincial and national level."

At the same time, the MTR points out that certain aspects of the PIRs for 2017 and 2018 gave early signs that could have been interpreted as red flags. The mentioned PIRs give examples of some adaptive management activities being implemented, e.g. streamlining the payment processes. Since the MTR, the adaptive management practices have improved, as described in 2021 PIR:

> *"Adaptive management practices helped both IP/PMU and CO in accelerating delivery, particularly in the second semester of the reporting period. These measures included the use of IT systems to ensure that consultants were able to interact with National Entities and gather necessary data and information for their respective assignment, conducting remote/virtual PSC and other project related meetings, support additional costs from contractors to cover expenses related to mandatory quarantine to ensure that service and goods were delivered on site, among others".*

The above was confirmed during the stakeholder interviews conducted by the TE.

The Results Framework seems to have adopted the principles of adaptive management, as some of the targets of project indicators are based on the results of the assessment to be conducted at the inception. Therefore, the targets were to be adapted to the situation on the ground, which is good, although made the M&E harder.

Finally, adaptive management did apply to **needed adjustments on project milestones**. Since early 2020, the project has been facing the pervasive impacts of the covid-19 pandemic on implementation. Prior to that, the

implementation was also facing challenges due to the elections and restructuring of the government. The project requested two extensions, both were granted, first in July 2019 and the second one in August 2021. As discussed earlier, the TE does not think that the milestone extensions adequately compensated the project's need for more implementation time. However, it is probably too late to address it now.

ACTUAL STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION AND PARTNERSHIP ARRANGEMENTS

The MTR points out to significant gaps in stakeholder participation and mobilization of partnerships. The MTR concluded that: *"Until recently and despite some jointly activities, the project managers have not developed enough the partnerships with direct and tangential stakeholders as described the National and Provincial Project Inception Workshops (despite the number of partners involved in the project: INAMET, INRH, GABHIC, CRF, IIA, CETAC, Civil Protection, DW, ADPP)."*

The TE learned that the above-described patters have been at least in part improved, as several project actors managed to work in partnerships with other players e.g. IDA and ADPP jointly implemented various activities including training activities and the development of Radio Cuvelai system.

Based on the analysis of BTOR files availed to the TE, the TE concluded that the project managers undertook several missions to the field between 2016 and 2019 to among others, consult stakeholders. Also, Mr. Jose Kaupu was based in Cunene province, eventually had some form of role as the local project manager. However, the MTR assessed that the consultation in the field did not translate into accelerated project implementation.

In terms of the effectiveness of the communication within the project, the TE noted that the stakeholders were informed about the project and engaged through the PSC meetings. Those meetings were held roughly two times a year between 2017 and 2019. It is assumed that further meetings couldn't have been organized due to covid pandemic. The MTR points out that although frequent meetings with various project stakeholders were being organized, the effectiveness of communication was generally low. The MTR contains the following recommendation on improving this situation:

> *"Project needs a "tailor made" social communication strategy and actions to develop awareness campaigns related to EWS, climate change and agriculture adaptation measures and tools. Five objectives need to be addressed by the communication strategy: media incidence, internal communication, awareness campaigns, gender empowerment, visibility and knowledge management."*

This recommendation was picked up in the management response to the MTR and action on developing project communication strategy was foreseen. Subsequent workplans contain various activities aimed at improved communication with project partners and with the public.

Not all partnerships proposed in the project document were, however, followed through in implementation. It is the TE's understanding that partnerships with UNICEF was not effective. Another example of a partnership that didn't bring upon the expected results was one with Agostino Neto University.

Table 16. Stakeholder engagement during implementation

Main stakeholders	Relationship to the project	Comment by the TE
Project Management Unit (PMU)	Day-to-day management and implementation of the project	**IMPORTANT**: About the PMU From all accounts, the PMU was composed of: - A local Project Manager located in Cunene, who was not responsible for coordinating the entire project, but mostly for ensuring that local activities would follow the workplan, that equipment would be delivered and that reporting from the ground would flow to Luanda; - A Project Assistant, responsible for certain operational tasks; - A Project Director, who would oversee the project but also ensure several coordination and clearances tasks, in addition to ensuring the proper engagement

Main stakeholders	Relationship to the project	Comment by the TE
		of the implementing partner (MINAMB/MCTA) and of other institutional stakeholders; - Technical Advisors, who for certain periods were UNVs, and during other times, a more qualified consultant, but who dedicated only part time to the project, and who would prepare workplans, monitor implementation and support coordination tasks, in addition to donor reporting; Further to this, UNDP officials (Program Officer), who would normally be in charge of project oversight and quality assurance, would get involved in preparing workplans, reports, ensuring financial management and other tasks that would normally be assigned to sufficiently qualified national coordinator. In previous sections, we discuss that the PMU was weak and was never consolidated as it had been foreseen in the PRODOC. General project management functions (planning, coordination, activity implementation, monitoring, managing processes, etc.) faced therefore serious constraints during project implementation -- starting with the fact that it has not been led by a single project manager, but by several "project managers" (in the plural) at the same time, trying to fulfil this role and compensating for a void in leadership and balanced roles in the PMU. These project managers divided between various locations and in different offices and institutions, making the coordination of activities, planning, executing and reporting a very hard task. In the face of such circumstances, some roles of the PMU ended up being taken over by UNDP and the Project Director at MINAMB (later MCTA). For more on this, refer to a chapter titled: UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation / execution.
UNDP Angola	Project management and supervision	The part that refers to project management relates to the operational implementation role assumed by UNDP (procurement, finance, payments). UNDP CO. According to the PRODOC, UNDP CO was also requested to perform the following tasks: *"a. Procurement of goods and equipment for the project;* *b. Recruitment process of project staff (international technical advisor and national financial manager) as well as HR management for these project staff;* *c. Recruitment process of auditors and follow-up;* *d. Recruitment process of evaluators and follow-up."* Various functions not related to project supervision and management e.g. the role of the M&E officer were assumed by UNDP. See further down for more details.
Project Steering Committee (PSC) Members	Project strategic direction and supervision	The TE received a full set of PSC meeting minutes. Based on the analysis of these documents, the TE concluded that the PSC comprised of the representatives of various governmental bodies involved in the project, including local administration, NGOs involved, UNDP, the PM, and other project partners.
MCTA (Former : MINAMB)	Project Executing Entity (in GEF terminology) / Implementing Partner (in UNDP's terminology)	From all accounts, it took a very long time (up to 14 months) for MINAMB to internalize the Cuveli project in the institution – the time between GEF CEO Endorsement and PRODOC signature. During implementation, MINAMB had not helped the process of creating and supporting a PMU. The project's arrangements require the PMU to interact with different institutions and organization that have much more project execution experience than MINAMB (e.g. INMET, INRH, GABHIC, ADPP, DW, among others), in addition to the need to engage local stakeholders in Cunene. By not allowing a strong PMU to be established within MINAB (and later MCTA), the Ministry ended up curtailing its institutional leadership role, coordinating the stakeholder engagement process during implementation.
Other line ministries responsible for, meteorology, water, agriculture, civil protection, etc.	Implementation of project activities	The project involved a wide variety of governmental ministries and institutes. The level of their involvement and the effectiveness of implementation assigned to some of them also varied. For institutions such as INRH and GABHIC, which are used to executing large projects, their interest in the project appeared to decrease with time. For INMET, the project was quite important. They had some roles in implementation and were also beneficiaries. Perhaps a more active role from them, along with INRH and GABHIC, would have ensured that hydromet equipment would have been installed earlier and that FFEWS functions could be adequately and timely developed. As for Civil Protection in Cunene, the project was important, but it did not change very much their protocols and ways of working. It only allowed for a few activities such as campaigns etc. to be conducted.
Other donors, baseline initiatives	Coordination, co-financing	The difficulties in mobilizing co-financing from FAO, USAID, UNDP and all government entities that had promised co-financing at the beginning of the project are discussed in section 2.4 Collecting information on Co-financing.

Main stakeholders	Relationship to the project	Comment by the TE
Academia	Implementation of project activities	University of Agostino Neto was planned to implement activities on characterization of plant seeds. These activities were not concluded due to issues with payments and constituting significant gap in the successful implementation an activity considered important in project design, but likely unrealistic as conceived (develop climate adaptive strains of commonly planted crops). In turn, La Coruña University in Spain played an important role in the production of a crucial assessment report on climate modelling and FFEWS, and which included several mapping and visual results. The practical uses given to the information, graphics and data contained in report(s) are less clear. Only one NGO stakeholder reported using the information in community-level animation. From all accounts, the results produced never served to compose the Environmental Information System of Angola (CC- ENISA).
Local communities and NGOs/CSOs	Beneficiaries of the project and partners in implementation	The project's benefits to communities are mediated through national CSOs, some of them with strong ties to international NGOs and donors. They include primarily: - ADPP - Acção de Povo para Povo | Action from People to People (NGO) - DW - "Development Workshop" (NGO) - WLF - World Lutheran Foundation (NGO) These NGOs played a crucial role in realizing activities and outputs relating to vulnerability reduction and resilience building at the local level. Some of the most successful achievements by the project were attributed to NGO partners, even though they have had a limited financial share of it to be implemented.
Local Government	Involved primarily in Component 3 of the project	Due to the limitations of the TE, it was not possible to hold calls with representatives from local governments. However, the TE has interviewed Civil Protection and discussed how the project made a difference to their work, at the level of Cunene Province.
Private sector	Implementation of project activities	Private sector played an important role in the preparation of technical reports and in supplying hydromet equipment. Some of these players have reported that procurement processes were awfully long and protected, often not being worth the effort of preparing proposals for.

PROJECT FINANCE AND CO-FINANCE

The project is funded by the LDCF, which provides $8.2M to the project in the form of a grant, in addition to UNDP, which contributes directly to the project on an annual basis, also through grants. While the GEF/LDCF grant is fixed, the core contribution from UNDP (TRAC) is made annually according to availability. At project start, UNDP had promised up to $917K to the project from TRAC. Of these, only $272K have realized.

As for the remainder of the co-financing (the bulk of it from government), 87% has realized ($42.1M indicatively confirmed against $48.2M at CEO Endorsement stage). A more thorough analysis of the co-financing is included in Section 2.4 > Collecting information on Co-financing in Table 8. Co-financing information monitoring.

A summary on the use of funds by the project can be summarize by graphs in Figure 8 and Figure 9.

Figure 8. Overview of the use of LDCF and TRAC funds combined (source: Open UNDP, on 04-Nov-2021)



Figure 9. Cumulative use of funds: LDCF and UNDP (from d-Portal)



Source: https://d-portal.org/q.html?aid=XM-DAC-41114-OUTPUT-00089624 (by Aug-2021)

MONITORING AND EVALUATION: OVERALL QUALITY OF M&E

CRITERION	RATING
M&E Plan - implementation	**Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**

Refer to previous a chapter for Monitoring and Evaluation – Design at Entry and Monitoring and Evaluation – Implementation, which complement each other, and which together provide the overall quality rating for M&E.

The overall rating of the M&E component of the project was based on the analysis of the documents listed in previously referred Monitoring and Evaluation sections in this reports. Assessed criteria featured 1) the design of the M&E and 2) the implementation of the M&E have helped ponder the overall quality of M&E, whose rating is **Moderately Unsatisfactory** – the justification follows.

The first criteria assessed was the quality of the design of the project's M&E component. The basis for the assessment was the PRODOC, the PIRs and the MTR. The rating for the M&E design at entry is **Moderately Satisfactory.**

The PRODOC contains a robust M&E framework featuring a set of M&E activities to be conducted during the implementation. The PRODOC had foreseen that the project will engage an M&E consultant, who would supervise M&E activities together with the PM and the Project Team. This did not happen as planned.

At the same time, the design did not foresee a separate M&E system, which is a golden standard for a project of this size. More importantly, the VRA study, including household assessments were not conducted in the baseline, but only later during project implementation, and not covering the totality of *comunas* targeted by the project.

Other gaps in the design of M&E include: relying on the implementation with regards to detailing the M&E framework and not providing sufficient tools for an effective M&E; basing indicator targets on the results of a VRA survey to be conducted during the implementation.

Overall, the design of the M&E was relying on overly elevated ambitions regarding the implementation.

The second criteria assessed was the quality of the M&E's implementation. Materials used for the assessment included the Inception Report, the MTR, the PIRs, Annual Audit Report availed to the TE, the PSC meeting minutes, the BTORs and other documents. The rating for the M&E Implementation is **Moderately Unsatisfactory**.

The implementation certainly strived to implement as many M&E activities as possible in the circumstances of government restructuring and Covid-19 pandemic. The M&E-relevant reports produced by the project are generally informative and of value. Through the BTORs, there is a record of frequent local visits. The PIRs contain brief but relevant information about the risk management measures undertaken during project implementation. There is a record of adaptive measures being undertaken as a result of M&E activities, e.g. through the Management Response to the MTR and the corresponding workplans.

At the same time the project failed to hire the M&E officer foreseen in the PRODOC. Only a few years later had UNDP a person in place for handling M&E, but is not dedicated to the project. The responsibilities of this person were divided between the Project Team members, reinforcing incorrect management arrangements within the project.

Also, the implementation generally experienced several periods of slowed progress and this affected the M&E. First, the implementation could not conduct the VRA assessment except in until 2018, which contributed to insufficient data availability for adequate M&E indicator reporting and the MTR stage. The TE hopes that given the second project extension granted in Sep 2021 and the accelerated efforts by the Project Team since the Covid-19 situation improved, the project at its closing will manage to comprehensively inform the progress towards the targets. Finally, the implementation failed to propose a more detailed M&E framework/system for this project, as foreseen at the design stage.

UNDP AND IMPLEMENTING PARTNER IMPLEMENTATION / EXECUTION

CRITERIA	RATING
Quality of UNDP Implementation/Oversight	MS - Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Implementing Partner Execution	MU - Moderately Unsatisfactory
Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	MS - Moderately Satisfactory

The rating for the Overall UNDP and Implementing Partner Implementation / Execution was based on the analysis of the following documents, plus stakeholder interviews:

- The PRODOC and PRODOC Annexures
- PIRs
- Inception Report
- MTR
- BTORs
- Audit Report
- Technical Reports from project activities
- Tracking Tools
- AWPs

Assessed criteria featured 1) Quality of UNDP Implementation and Oversight and 2) Quality of Implementing Partner Execution. The overall rating of the UNDP and IP implementation / execution was rated **Moderately Satisfactory (MS)**.

The TE has given this rating as an upgrade vis-à-vis previous reports, and despite the MU rating for the IP execution. This is because of the recent progress made by the implementation of the project. However, the TE takes note of the inadequate management arrangements within the project, the PMU's weakness as a major undressed risk, as well as delays in project implementation. We also mention off-track progress towards the project's targets, in particular the objective-level target, which should measure reduction in vulnerability.

An important remark that the TE wants to make is that the project improved, its implementation is still ongoing, and it will only close in February 2022. The TE believes that the **project managers will be able to demonstrate viable progress towards achieving the objective-level target until the project closure**.

See Figure 10 in the next chapter for more details on the progress of implementation.

Quality of UNDP Implementation and Oversight

The reports availed to the TE, as well as the feedback from stakeholder interviews confirm that the overall oversight of the project by UNDP was satisfactory. The reports are frequent and comprehensive. The TE must look at the quality of UNDP implementation throughout the duration of the project. There are obviously periods in a project's cycle when UNDP's support is more important than in other periods. The TE thinks that in those periods, the support of UNDP indeed intensified. UNDP positively responded to most of challenges faced by the project such as the aftermath of governmental election and covid-19 pandemic. This is also relevant now, when the project is in its second extension and intensified efforts are being made for the project to achieve its final push.

However, the TE assessed that there were two main issues with UNDP's oversight and implementation. The first problem overarching the entire implementation is related to incorrect management arrangements within the project. The TE was led to conclude that the section reserved for the project manager in the PIRs were in fact elaborated by UNDP Officials, and perhaps also the project's International Technical Advisor.

Ideally, both UNDP Officials in the Country Office and the Project Director within the ministry responsible for the environment (previously MINAMB, now MCTI, the Implementing Partner - IP) should be in charge of project oversight. The justification provided by key stakeholder for this odd arrangement was that the Project Manager selected did not have the skills to coordinate such a complex project.

This was also confirmed through the analysis of e.g. PSC meeting minutes and other documents, which proved the initial involvement of the PM was in his real role. In subsequent reports the PM is marginalized or not present at all. The PM was not responsible for preparing project workplans, for coordinating and monitoring activities. Except for basic activity implementation, the project manager was neither responsible for preparing reports on

project progress towards results and against indicators. Beyond assuming the role of the PM, UNDP also took over the role of the M&E officer.

The TE thinks that this was not a desirable situation which could have been avoided. The quality of planning and implementation, the delivery of results, and the effectiveness and efficiency of the project's effort were all negatively affected by this arrangement. The TE understands that the above issue was caused by insufficient capacity to coordinate such a complex project by the government of Angola and a wish to compensate for the shortcomings of the implementation caused by this. However, it is not clear to the TE why UNDP did not implement standard solutions applicable in case of insufficient capacity of the government, such as project rewriting.

Indeed, an arrangement that is based on inputs from several different government agencies and NGOs responsible parties that are not used to working together presents some inherent challenges. This is one more reason why the project needed a strong project management unit. There are few indications in the project documentation that the project had a cohesive team with embedded leadership, technical and managerial skills. This left a void, which was attempted filled by the UNDP Officials and the Project Director.

Although well intentioned, they overstepped their role, which was supposed to be of oversight and quality assurance.

Second, the TE noted a long time-lag between the CEO Endorsement Date and the Inception Report date. This is a visible shortcoming depicted in the project's TIMELINE. The TE learned from stakeholder interviews that this delay was linked to slow mobilization of the project in its initial stage that in turn was linked to delays in delegating responsibilities within the government of Angola. This poses a question about the timeliness of UNDP CO's support to the Implementing Partner in this period. The delay eventually not only constituted a problem in itself but became even more aggravated later due to elections in 2017, subsequent government restructuring and covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Also, despite of the intensified efforts during the two extensions that the project was granted, not everything can be compensated for, and some chances were lost due to this delay.

The **Quality of UNDP Implementation and Oversight** was rated as **Moderately Satisfactory (MS).**

Quality of Quality of Implementing Partner Execution

The **Quality of Execution**, i.e. relating to MCTA's (formerly MINAMB) role as the Implementing Partner in the country for the GEF LDCF grant (using UNDP's terminology), is considered **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MS)**. There are positive elements and a number of shortcomings.

First, there were internal difficulties within the government of Angola related to the elections in 2017. As confirmed through stakeholder interviews, the implementation spanned over the election of three different ministers in the ministry of environment and two government restructuring events. The consequences of that included procurement delays, high turnover rates among the personnel, coordination issues, agenda conflicts and issues with delegating the responsibilities within the government. These challenges had a very negative impact on the effectiveness of the implementation by the IP.

The level of ownership of the project among the involved governmental bodies varied throughout the project duration but the TE concluded that it has recently improved. The project documentation proves that through engaging local NGOs to work with the governmental institutes, the overall execution of the project improved. Also, the PIRs for years 2018 and later, provide evidence of successful execution of project activities on the ground and the progress towards project targets being at least in part on track. E.g. progress toward targets 1.1., 2.1. and 2.2. was assessed as on track or partially on track. Substantial evidence confirming very successful implementation of some of project activities is available. Those activities include e.g. community-based water resources management, radio Cuvelai system development, training.

However, the level of ownership of the project among the stakeholders and the execution rates were very low in the initial years of project implementation (2016 and 2017), with virtually no activities being implemented, as

pointed out in PIR 2017. Also, some of the activities e.g. those related to equipment installation, were implemented much later in the project's lifetime than originally foreseen, which led to less benefits for the project beneficiaries.

COORDINATION, AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES

The project faced multiple challenges related to coordination between the project actors from the very beginning i.e. from the stage of Inception workshop, which was severely delayed due to conflicting agendas of the minister of environment and other project actors. The project then had to deal with many other operational and coordination-related issues, most of which were described in lengths in the previous chapters.

To sum up, the following are issues are the most striking:

- Significant procurement delays
- Delays in execution of project activities
- Issues with delegating power in face of frequent changes within the government
- Insufficient capacity of the PM to coordinate the project and due to this, incorrect management arrangements
- Inadequate communication of project outcomes
- Possibly other underlying operational, bureaucratic and political issues, that are not always obvious or direct, but which undermine progress in implementation.

Overall, the TE concluded that the implementing partner did not have within the institution sufficient operational capacity to coordinate a project of this complexity and involving that many partners. Given that this concern was identified as a risk at the design stage (and this matter also discussed in the next section). Yet, concerning the need for coordinating several, it is surprising that the design assumed that the project interventions themselves would address the issue and "government commitment" would be enough to overcome institutional coordination challenges.

This risk could have been addressed by ensuring a strong PMU within the implementing partner institution (MINAMB at that time). And indeed the PRODOC had foreseen several positions for the PMU, as we have seen in section 4.1 under 'Management Arrangements' – i.e. what the PMU should look like. In turn, Table 16 described in its first row what the PMU actually looks like. There is quite a gap that remained unaddressed by the project and its Steering Committee.

> The issue is that, to date, and during all of the project's implementation, **the PMU had only half of the project personnel that had been foreseen for the Unit in the PRODOC** (including managerial, operational and technical personnel -- the latter with skills in hydrology, meteorology, M&E etc.).[32]

From several accounts, the TE learned that the project manager based in Cunene was not the one in charge of actually managing the project: i.e. preparing workplans, coordinating activities and ensuring their effective implementation, and reporting regularly to the government, UNDP and the GEF.

For most of its implementation, the project had a weak PMU with limited coordination, operational technical and M&E capacity.

The TE thinks that the consequences of sustaining a weak PMU, with half of the prescribed capacity, throughout implementation, and with a project manager that does not really 'manage the project' (i.e. who is not given the mandate), created an even greater risk than the one identified at PRODOC stage relating to 'coordination challenges'.

[32] See e.g. 'Management Arrangements' under section 4.1. See also the first row in Table 16 that it says about the role of the PMU.

The TE wishes to highlight one important MTR recommendation on the strengthening of the PMU was only partially addressed by UNDP and Government. In hindsight, the TE assesses that this had important consequences for the remainder of the project's life. More specifically, in late 2018, the MRT recommended:

> *"2. Recommendation:*
> *Enhance the PMU, allocating all personnel to work as a unit, including a high-level Technical Advisor. All PMU positions as defined in the PRODOC should be placed permanently in Cunene province."*[33]

UNDP's Management Response to this recommendation read as follows:

> *"UNDP is in the process of hiring a Technical Advisor at P3 level who will have as one of his/her responsibilities to support the Cuvelai project. The position will, however, be based in Luanda. UNDP has also recommended to the IP to hire a management advisor to be based in Cunene. Further, UNDP has agreed with the IP already in 2017 to hire a finance manager for the project office in Cunene"* (added on 02-Jan-2021 and last updated in February that year)[34]

From all accounts, the recruitment that took place substituted a UNV by a person with P3 level and part-time dedication. From all accounts, the PMU continued to be weak, understaffed and without technical personnel. Hence, the management response was inadequate.

Although the weak PMU created glaring risks to the project, it is possible that the perception of impacts caused by a weak PMU have been downplayed by UNDP -- and likely also by the Project Steering Committee. It is as the issue of a weak and understaffed PMU was such a fundamental problem that the problem, and that it went unaddressed for so long, that key stakeholders in UNDP and MINAMB/MCTA simply "grew accustomed to it" and continued not to act upon it -- like an "elephant in the room". The issue of a weak PMU was e.g. never flagged as a risk. If it was (or if it ever is), it should be a critical risk.

FINDING More than a risk that was apparently not flagged and not adequately acted upon, a weak PMU ended up being a burden on those who were expected to oversee the project (officials in UNDP and MINAMB/MCTA), and to the extent that they stepped in to fulfil project management functions where there was a void. This situation created distortions in what would the ideal functions of different project players and it fueled the likelihood of conflicts of interest. (Accumulating roles in implementation and oversight is considered a conflict of interests.)

RECOMMENDATION: **If there is still time, and especially if UNDP and MCTA can link the remaining work under the project with new interventions, recruit a person with senior project manager profile and a small technical team until project end.** This will also help with delivery and sustainability.

On a more positive note, it is worth mentioning that several institutions have been presenting a good level of operational and coordination capacity. Those include the WLF, ADPP, DW, Proteção Civil (SPCB).

Furthermore, the TE agrees with the general picture of implementation progress gradually improving, as assessed by stakeholders through the sequence of PIRs (Figure 10). The trendline in the figure shows the how the project was able to lift itself from being Unsatisfactory (U) in 2017 to being Moderately Satisfactory (MS) in 2021, which is a 'decent' rating.

[33] Source : https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/managementresponses/detail/9071, accessed on 05-Nov-2021.
[34] *Ibid.*

Figure 10. Nuanced project ratings concerning progress in implementation according to PIRs (2017-2021)



RISK MANAGEMENT

The PRODOC lists a number of risks to the project. They were summarized with comments from the TE in a chapter titled: *"Assumptions and Risks".*

In terms of the Environmental and Social Screening, the TE noted that 1) it was completed in an old template 2) virtually all answers are negative, which is quite surprising given how many of the risks identified at the design stage actually materialized during the implementation.
The TE suspects that providing that downplaying certain social and/or environmental risks was a deliberate strategy of the design team to decrease project risk.

A series of PIRs and the MTR and the Management Response to the MTR were analyzed for conducting the analysis of how the project risks were managed throughout the project duration.

Table 17. Commented Risk Table

#	Risks identified during project implementation	When identified	TE comments
1	Unclear procedures and delegation of authority within the IP delay or prevent signing of contracts and MoUs to expend project funds to partners identified in the PRODOC and/or through consultations by the project team on agreed activities	PIR 2017	This risk was reappearing throughout the project as it was linked to restructuring of the ministries which happened more than once in the project's lifetime. The risk remained unaddressed until resolved internally within the IPs.
2	Administrative and operational delays on the side of the IPs.	PIR 2018	UNDP CO introduced direct payments upon presentation of the quotations of services/goods by IPs and supported the management of funds. However, the risk was not fully addressed as there were coordination and operational issues between UNDP and the IPs related to payments.

#	Risks identified during project implementation	When identified	TE comments
3	COVID related travel restrictions and the risk of getting infected with the disease	PIR 2020, 2021	The risk was addressed through applying restrictive sanitary regime to project activities and advancing with the project activities (including the TE) with no travel involved.
4	Delays due to ministerial restructuring process	PIR 2020, 2021	This risk was reappearing throughout the project as it was linked to restructuring of the ministries which happened more than once in the project's lifetime. The risk remained unaddressed until resolved internally within the IPs.

The issue of a weak and understaffed PMU does not appear in the risk log.

Additional comments on how the implementation addressed the risks identified during the design is also included in Assumptions and Risks and Adaptive Management chapters.

4.3) PROJECT RESULTS AND IMPACTS

PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVE AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES (*)

CRITERION	RATING
Overall Project Outcome Rating	**Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**

Project Progress towards its objective is similar to the Overall Project Outcome in this TE, whose rating is **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)** – with reference to **Criteria 3 (Assessment of Outcomes)** in Table 6 in the beginning of the report.

The justification for the rating is discussed in a more concluding fashion in a section further down (Overall Project Outcome). Herein, the focus in on verifying the achievement for the three project outcomes and how these contributed together to the overall achievement of the project objective.

To illustrate the narrative, the TE pulled an annotated synthesis from the 2021 PIR to highlight results, based on the project's own reporting against indicators (Table 18 further down).

We draw the attention to the progression in PIR ratings as assessed by the project itself – both the overall preponderant rating (Figure 12), and according to multiple stakeholders that assessed progress towards the project's objective in the PIRs (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Nuanced project performance ratings according to PIRs (2017-2021)



Figure 12. Overall project performance ratings according to PIRs (2017-2021)



Both figures use the rating legend shown in Table 3 and in Figure 4 and they show, through the trendline, that the project achieved improvements over the years.

In 2017, and with respect to progress towards the objective, two PIR reviewers (namely the the Project Manager/Coordinator and UNDP CO Program Officer) assessed the project as either Moderately Satisfactory (MU), and one (the RTA) as Unsatisfactory (U) (Figure 11),

Yet, the RTA's rating is the preponderant one (Figure 12) and the overall rating ended up being "U" in that year. This logic, of the RTA's rating being preponderant applies to all years.

In 2021, performance, in terms of progress towards the objective, tends towards Moderately Satisfactory (MU). This is the same rating accorded by the TE for this criteria -- even though the RTA was optimistic about the results presented and had rated the project Moderately Satisfactory (MS).

On this matter, the TE is being more 'conservative' in its assessment (as opposed to 'optimistic'), because the PIR itself had pointed out to the limited progress with respect to project outcomes (Table 18).

In the 2021 PIR, Outcomes 2 and 3 were tagged as 'off track', and so was the progress towards the objective. Only Outcome 1 was tagged as 'on track' by PIR reviewers in 2021. The TE tends to agree with these assessments and provides justification in (Table 18).

In Table 12, which includes an analysis of the baseline for project indicators, we highlighted the centrality of the VRA for helping inform project indicators. We had also pointed out that several different and competing methodologies can be tagged as "VRA". Most of them are aimed at surveying vulnerable people at the local level and establishing how vulnerable or resilient they are according to different criteria, survey questions and methods of assessment.

We have also observed that the PRODOC had not prescribed any specific VRA methodology to be applied, and that VRA methodologies that require household level surveys tend to be expensive and require time and qualified surveyors to be applied.

The conduct of the VRA was indeed neglected by the project during its first year. However, by 2020, the project reported the following in the PIR:

> *"Due to the delays at the beginning of the project implementation, the project team decided to adopt the VRA conducted in 2015 by the NGO Development Workshop as a base line reference and plans to acquire more data on proportion of vulnerability improvement (for men, women and youth in the project activity locations) in the final stage of the project implementation.*
>
> *However, during the project implementation[,] and particularly during the current reporting period[,] a considerable effort was made to collect quantitative and qualitative information to measure progress against the impact level indicator using different type of has been made in relation to proxy indicators, such as number of beneficiaries and type of activities implemented within each comuna that help to reduce vulnerability of their population to floods and droughts the impact level indicator".*

The conclusion of the VRA was indeed an important project achievement. Still, it needs to be put into perspective:

- Definitely, the VRA arrived late in the project's lifetime (almost 6 years after end of the PPG, when baseline conditions are expected to be assessed.
- Only a handful of localities was covered by the VRA assessment. DW, the NGO that conducted the VRA on behalf of the project, gave preference to localities where they had been working and focused only in part on the *comunas* that the project was otherwise slated to target, as per the PRODOC (see Box 3).
- The assessment had not produced sufficient data for e.g. informing indicator 2.1, which focuses on 'gender disaggregated household income in the 7 targeted *comunas* as a result of project intervention'.

Box 3. Cross-checking locations covered by the VRA and communes foreseen in the PRODOC

The Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (VRA) conducted by DW in 2019 covered at least five localities in the Cunene basin, as per table below. When comparing the location of these localities with the list of target *comunas* that had been included in the PRODOC, there is mismatch. Only three of the localities covered by the VRA are within the seven target *comunas*.

Cumunas foreseen in the PRODOC			**Covered by the VRA conducted by DW in 2018**	
Município	Comuna		Locality	
Cuvelai	Cuvelai Sede	x		
Cuvelai	Mukolongondjo	x		
Cuvelai	Mupa	x	Otchiveio, Mupa	x
Cuanhama	Evale	x	Evale Sede	x
Cuanhama	Ondjiva	x		
Namacunde	Namacunde	x	Omulova, Namacunde	x
	Chiede		Kafula / Okafula, Chiede, Namcunde	x
	Chiede		Olukwa / Olukua, Namacunde	x
Cuanhama	Nehone Cafima	x		



<u>TE Notes:</u> Some passages in the 2021 PIR reporting seem to indicate that the "seven target comunas" in the project are the following: "Ondjiva, Mongua, Evale, Nehone, Namacunde, Mucolongondjo, and Mupa". However, Mongua (or Môngwa) was not in the set of target comunas mentioned in the PRODOC. Nor has any other offical project documentation indicated that decision was made on swapping Cuvelai comuna by Mongua. There seems to confusion on the projec's site coverage.

See in addition <u>"Other Annexures for Information and Reference":</u>
<u>Annexure A) Municipalities and Communes in Cuvelai Province (from 2014 Census)</u>
<u>Annexure B) Tabulated List of Communes in Cunene Province (as standardized in 2016)</u>

We also bring some highlights from the 2018 MTR for underpinning the analysis, which noted the following:

> *"In [relation to] the indicator/end-of-project target, MTR has observed that the baseline has not been determined at project onset during the inception phase and thus, no progress can be measured; however, some change in baseline of vulnerability should exist, given the rehabilitation of 8 water access points benefiting over 6000 people and their livestock, and the initial work of 21 community extensionists (under training) to developing with farmers climate resilient agricultural practices. A monitoring exercise was held in Nov. 2018 using the VRA approach and linked with water point rehabilitation. However the monitoring exercise was good as a test exercise for student practitioners, but it's frankly limited."*

The MTR had further noted that the existence of a project-level comprehensive VRA baseline was still an important gap and recommended that this should be urgently corrected. The MTR equally mentioned that the VRA should be *"[…] conducted by professionals with high level of experience in vulnerability assessment related to development-based risk reduction, climate change adaptation and natural resources management."*

The 2021 PIR is expected to be the last one that the project has prepared. The synthesis of progress towards objective and expected outcomes, based on the 2021 PIR, is included in Table 18, where comments from the TE are included. In connection with it, we make reference to Table 12, in which includes an analysis of the baseline for each of the project's indicators and the problems inherent to it.

FINDING The TE finds that the underlying vulnerability of target populations should have been described, and the climatic element of this vulnerability should have been put in evidence through adequate methodologies from the onset. The project objective focuses on the reducing vulnerability of populations that are already quite vulnerable, income poor, with limited adaptive capacity and exposed to natural elements – including to climatic and other hazards. According to the objective, this vulnerability would be reduced through 'targeted investments and capacity building'. Three variables should have been adequately measured and monitored by the project: vulnerability, investments and capacity.

FINDING Concerning inconsistencies in the list of project sites, as pointed out in Box 3: Because of the general lack of coordination within the project, rooted in the fact that the PMU was never consolidated or worked as a team, there seems to be an 'opportunistic' approach to site level work. This means that each partner appears to plan and implement their activities according to their own convenience, rather than by following a consistent and strategic directive provided by the project's leadership for generating local benefits.

The 2021 PIR showed tangible progress through reporting. Different numbers for project beneficiaries in local communities are mentioned according to context, although with limited gender disaggregated data. It appears that the project never kept a central database of project beneficiaries and never ran stats or geographic cross reference on the numbers supplied by NGO and government partners. The TE questions those number, but lacks the time, tools and opportunities to fully verify the results. In the Tracking Tool, the inconsistencies are glaring.

In terms of results, there are important achievements by project end, but also significant shortcomings.

- The project assesses itself as being 'off track' in terms of progress towards the project objective, as well as 'off track' with respect to Component 2.
- The project is though **'on track'** with respect to both **Components 1 and 3**.
- In other words, **the picture is mixed**, which confirms the general assessment of performance being **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)** – i.e. somewhat below expectations and/or significant shortcomings.

Table 18. Summary of results delivered according to 2021 PIR and level of achievement per Outcome, commented by the TE

Heading | Description of Indicator	Baseline Level (2021 PIR)	Midterm target level (2021 PIR)	End of project target level	Cumulative progress since project start – as of 2021 PIR | This is a summary	Progress / Achievement	Comments by the TE IMPORTANT
Objective) To reduce the climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of Angola's Cuvelai River Basin through targeted investments and capacity building.					**Off track ↘ | (from 2021 PIR)**	**Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):** somewhat below expectations and/or significant shortcomings
Objective level Indicator: Percentage change in vulnerability of local community to climate risks.	The vulnerability of the site is high. The baseline will be determined at project onset during the inception phase.	*(not set or not applicable)*	At mid-term 35% increase of VRA score; at end-of-project 70% of VRA score.	No significant changes in local communities' vulnerability to climate risks during the project implementation period, as proper measurable assessment was not conducted yet (at base line, midterm or final evaluation). A TOR was developed in 2020 to conduct an assessment of activities implemented at the community level during the last year of implementation. This was done with the intention to estimate quantitative proportional change in community vulnerability to climate related risk: however, this TOR was not approved and publicly advertised during the reporting period due to the restructuration process and associated government changes in the ministry. In addition, the covid-19 pandemic travel restrictions, would have made it difficult to do the exercise in late 2020.	***Below target achievement, mitigated by the indicator being inadequate and not directly measured.***	The project cannot inform the achievement of its most important indicator, because the baseline has not been set. In other words, no project level VRA scores are available. It is therefore meaningless to refer to targets of "35% of the score at mid-term" or "70% by project end" without a baseline. The VRA assessment that was conducted in 2018 by DW was a limited exercise in scope. Also, there was a certain mismatch between the 7 *comunas* that the project was expected to target and the *comunas* covered by DW in the mentioned assessment (Box 3).[35] This is a visible shortcoming, but there are also achievements that need to be highlighted. There is extensive reporting in the 2021 PIR on project achievements, in terms of beneficiaries and vulnerability disaster risk reduction / resilience building actions, including through agriculture and WASH, climate studies, hydro/climatic measurement equipment purchase, and also technical training of officials. We highlight: (i) Number of beneficiaries and associated resilience building activities, noting that it is in fact not possible to properly account for the total number of beneficiaries. This is because the same beneficiary may have participated in several activities conducted by service providers. Several of these resilience building activities relate to WASH, disaster risk reduction (DRR), and agricultural techniques. Most of those activities were reported by NGOs (ADPP, DW, WLF), while other activities were reported by government entities IDA, IIA, SPCB, including one activity by CETAC, which the TE had initially assumed to have been withdrawn from the project. (ii) Various forms of training have been conducted, in particular technical training of government officials in GIS and other methods and application relating to IWRM, climate assessments and DRR. The protagonists here were GABHIC, INAMET and the company Ambimetric. It is not clear if all the technical training reported was funded by the project – or whether it is directly related to the project -- because there is mention of other provinces besides Cunene. It is possible that the trainings were considered as an activity with national scope.

[35] The seven target *comunas* are Cuvelai Sede, Mukolongondjo, Mupa, Evale Sede, Ondjiva, Namacunde and Nehone Cafima, while DW focused on localities in Mupa, Evale, Ondjiva, Namacunde and Chiede communes. The latter was not even expected to be part of the project.

Heading | Description of Indicator	Baseline Level (2021 PIR)	Midterm target level (2021 PIR)	End of project target level	Cumulative progress since project start – as of 2021 PIR | This is a summary	Progress / Achievement	Comments by the TE IMPORTANT
						(iii) Activities that can be classified as climate smart agriculture (CSA) have been extensively reported upon in locations not informed on. The timing of results delivered was far from ideal. Such activities should have been on focus much earlier in the project's lifecycle in order for impacts to reflect on vulnerability reduction. Also measuring vulnerability reduction in such a vast area as the Cuvelai River Basin without keep track of location is a poor project monitoring practice. (iv) Procurement for a Climate Vulnerability and Risk (CVR) Mapping study was initiated in March 2021. The study was/is still ongoing, and some products were already available when the PIR was concluded. There is quality in those products, but the TE wonders if there is a concrete plan for their application beyond project end. (v) Procurement of hydroclimatic equipment was conducted, with INAMET, GABHIC and INRH as the direct beneficiaries. The TE wonders if there is a plan for operations and maintenance of the equipment purchased. (vi) Specific early warning activities at the local level were reported, including with the involvement of ADPP, Civil Protection and Firefighters' Service (SPCB) and the company CICCI. (vii) Some activities appeared to have a 'humanitarian help' character: e.g. "local [food] distribution among the 15,000 households from 7 communities located in the project area that were heavily affected by exceptionally long and intense drought period experienced in the project area during 2019." As the drought crisis seems to have worsened in the south in 2021, approaches may need to be reconsidered.
Outcome 1) Enhanced capacity of national and local hydro-meteorological services, civil authorities and environmental institutions to monitor extreme weather and climate change in the Cuvelai Basin.					**On track → | (from 2021 PIR)**	**Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): somewhat below expectations and/or significant shortcomings**
1.1 A Flood Forecasting & EWS that is useful to communities developed and forecasts disseminated to target	1.1 Currently no Flood Forecasting & EWS established in Province of Cunene	*(not set or not applicable)*	1.1 By the end of the project a Flood Forecasting & EWS is developed and forecasts are being disseminated to	An estimated 50% of the work for the establishment of the FFEWS was achieved, however 0 "ZERO" warning dissemination to targeted communities have been done yet, because the system is noy fully in place, the hydro-telemetric monitoring system of 4 river gauging stations, the 4 water level stations,	***Target partially achieved***	Results are mixed. Since 2021 is the project's last full year, and because there is only 3-4 months of implementation left, achieving a 50% of the target is, on the one hand, an achievement, considering the difficulties that the project faced. On the other, it is a shortcoming, because of the importance of outputs expected under Outcome 1. Important equipment purchase had been reported in the 2020 PIR. In the 2021 PIR, the volume of equipment purchased appears to have been expanded. The project reported on

Heading | Description of Indicator	Baseline Level (2021 PIR)	Midterm target level (2021 PIR)	End of project target level	Cumulative progress since project start – as of 2021 PIR | This is a summary	Progress / Achievement	Comments by the TE IMPORTANT
communities in Province of Cunene.			target communities in Province of Cunene.	net digital communication system and associated training to support the right functioning of the FFEWS.		the constraints imposed by the covid-19 pandemic, which made e.g. the travel of a service provider from Spain impossible/or very difficult for a good period of time. Because Component 2 is a technical component, with focus on FFEWS, there is heavy involvement of private sector service providers. INAMET, INRH and GABHIC are the main beneficiaries. There were failed attempts to involve in the project the Food Security Office supported by WFP. Technical training involving instructors from Angola, Mozambique and Portugal was reported. There was also an online training using COBA applications (e.g. Advance Hydrological Training). INAMET, GABHIC, INRH and SPCB were the main direct beneficiaries.
Outcome 2) Increased resilience of smallholder farmer communities in the Basin to climate-induced risks and variabilities.					**Off track ↘ | (from 2021 PIR)**	**Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): somewhat below expectations and/or significant shortcomings**
2.1 Percentage change in gender disaggregated household income in the 7 targeted *comunas* as a result of project intervention via perception based survey (VRA)	2.1 N/A at present – project will undertake a gender disaggregate d VRA at project onset.	*(not set or not applicable)*	2.1 At mid-term 25% gender disaggregated increase of VRA score; By the end of the project 50% gender disaggregated increase of VRA score	No measurable percentage of change in gender desegrated household income in the 7 targeted *communas* because a proper measurable VRA was not conducted (base line and midterm) yet during the project implementation period.	***Target ASSUMED NOT achieved, noting that reporting is inadequate, baseline is missing, and targets cannot be derived***	In a previous section, we highlight the inadequacy of indicator 2.1 for capturing some of the achievements under Outcome 2, noting that it is difficult to assess income as an indicator at population level in a stringent, consistent and comparable way – in addition to providing gender disaggregated measurements. We have also pointed out that increased income is not necessarily a good adaptation indicator, but rather of economic development more broadly. The project recognized this and reported the following concerning income data: *"[…]it is not easy to get appropriate data on family income to properly inform the indicator, therefore for the final exercise it is suggested to use proxy indicators of wealth index, such as using data collection on a household's ownership of selected assets (assets accumulation index), such as televisions and bicycles; materials used for housing construction; and types of water access and sanitation facilities."* Nevertheless, the project reported some progress in the 2021 PIR at the level of activities: *"[a total of] 5048 women headed households from 120 villages located in the 7 targeted communities for project intervention benefitted directly from IDA extensionist trainings and seeds crops distributions. (33.5% of total beneficiaries)"* The main protagonists here are IDA extensionists.
2.2. No. of household in	2.2 Few households	*(not set or not*	2.2 Score improved to 4:	‘Agriculture Resilience & Livelihoods’: • Around 15000 people head of	***Target ASSUMED***	Reporting in the 2021 PIR focused on sets of activities tagged as follows: • ‘Agriculture Resilience & Livelihoods’;

Heading | Description of Indicator	Baseline Level (2021 PIR)	Midterm target level (2021 PIR)	End of project target level	Cumulative progress since project start – as of 2021 PIR | This is a summary	Progress / Achievement
targeted *comunas* engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods	have access to resilient livelihood assets and methods (Score=2)	*applicable)*	By the end of the project, at least 50% of targeted households have engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods introduced/ strengthened in the project.	households (33% are women, according to March 2021 IDA information) from 120 villages in the 7 targeted Communas engaged in climate resilient farming methods and livelihoods • Other results reported include: the establishment of seed banks, aquaculture tanks, beehives, tree nurseries, rainwater harvest facilities, drip irrigation systems and the production of efficient cooking stoves. • Rural extension support was provided 'WASH Resilience' • **DW**: 22319 people (43% women and 28% children) and their livestock from 8 communities benefitted from the rehabilitation of 9 boreholes and gained access to water since 2019. Also 104 community and sanitation groups (GAS) were created for the maintenance and management of the rehabilitated water wells. • 55 hygiene centers were created to ensure good water and sanitation practices in the communities. • 38 local government officials, 5600 adult's community members and 14 primary schools with 4587 children (44% boys, 56% girls) were also trained by DW in water management, sanitation and hygiene in order to reduce their vulnerability to water related issues. • **WLF**: 23439 people (10801 women, 8934 youth) benefitted in 2020-2021 from improved sanitation & hygiene practices	***achieved, noting that reporting is not totally adequate, baseline is missing, and targets cannot be derived***

Comments by the TE

IMPORTANT

- 'WASH Resilience'; or
- 'DRR preparedness'.

There is some overlap in the reporting, and it is not possible for the TE to verify results, given the remote nature of the TE exercise. Even if the TE assignment had involved a mission, verification of results would be based on mere spot check.

Results appear to be comprehensive and spread over a rather large geographical area, but location is not identified, though it would have been a useful piece of information. The TE wonders if a consolidated database of project realizations has been kept at all.

To a great extent, project reporting through the 2021 PIR focuses heavily on 'numbers' (i.e. number of people, of communities, of assets made resilient…), as well as on 'gender' (breaking down these numbers by gender whenever possible), and on different categories of people that constitute the groups of beneficiaries (e.g. youth, government officials, religious leaders, male, female, children, etc.). Reporting is comprehensive but lacks structure beyond the three domains mentioned further up.

The level of detail provided in the reporting is commendable and the way the reporting is presented is generally logic and consistent. E.g. activities relating to soap making are reported under 'Resilient WASH', while seed banks, irrigation and aquaculture are reported under 'Agriculture Resilience & Livelihoods'.

Resilience, additionality and the climate angle are stressed in many of the detail provided by NGOs and government entities implementing activities, and reporting on them – namely to differentiate activities implemented with project funds from others that could be characterized as 'mainstream development work' or 'humanitarian assistance'.

There is a large number of beneficiaries for a quite varied set of activities. More structure and geographically based information on these activities would be useful. As shown in The main protagonists were ADPP, DW, WLF and SPCB, but also IDA and IIA. It is difficult to calculate the total number of beneficiaries. As indicated further up, there could be overlap and simply summing up could give a skewed total.

The TE misses a more geographically consistent way of reporting. At the same time, when comparing what has been reported to the project's outputs under Component 2, it is reasonable to assume that for extension services (Output 2.2), access to water (Output 2.3)

Heading | Description of Indicator	Baseline Level (2021 PIR)	Midterm target level (2021 PIR)	End of project target level	Cumulative progress since project start – as of 2021 PIR | This is a summary	Progress / Achievement
				• 371 people (254 F, 117M, 37% Youth) were member of community action groups, including 210 with improved their skills in soap production. • 72 people (25 women and 55 youth) were community mobilisers; 283 community leaders (150M, 141F, 28% youth); 239 religious' leaders (92M, 147F, 33% youth); 99 teachers and health workers (40M, 59F, 39% youth), and other 37 provincial and municipal government officers (19M, 18F, 13,5% Youth) from Cunene • Finally, 455 families that comprises around 2730 people has been engaged in the baseline study and 940 community members (60% women) have attended awareness raising sessions on sanitation, environmental hygiene, use of family latrines and water treatment. 'DRR preparedness' • 331 people (194M, 137F, 64% young) members of 14 Local Community action groups on DRR were trained from April 2018 to June 2021 by government officers of Civil Protection (SPCB) Cunene.	
Outcome 3) Local institutional capacities for coordinated, climate-resilient planning strengthened &Capacity for effective community-based climate change adaptation (including traditional knowledge practices) improved at local level					**On track → | (from 2021 PIR)**

Comments by the TE

IMPORTANT

and small-scale adaptation initiatives (Output 2.4), the project has generally achieved what has been expected.

It is though important to comment on the lack of progress in Output 2.1, which reads as follows "Locally-appropriate climate proofed germplasm resources are accessed by regional agricultural and water technicians and amongst communities in the Cuvelai Basin." The TE considers that this output and activities planned under it were unrealistic, given the national capacity.

Moreover, the detailed interview with researchers from the Center for Phytogenetic Resources (CRF) at Agostinho Neto University (UAN) lead the TE to conclude that the goals under Output 2.1, of achieving within 1 or 2 harvest seasons the selection of drought resistant cultivars, were not viable – let alone to expect that, if selected, seeds for these cultivars could be safely and massively multiplied and then be distributed widely among small farmers in the Cuvelai Basin, including without causing market distortions.

To start with, developing a new cultivar requires several years (sometimes almost a decade or concerted research) and heavy technological investments. The ambition level set in project design for Output 2.1 was too high.

The TE also learned that CRF researchers worked together with officials from IDA and IIA, but they lacked the financial and logistical means to produce results, as well as the time necessary for it.

The unsuccessful attempts to develop locally adapted seed varieties were thus reported in the 2021 PIR:

"CRF during 2019 and 2020 were analyzing at the laboratory the seeds they collected in 2018 in Cunene. Now they are waiting for the finalization of the IIA work to return to Cunene and to do the next seed testing."

The TE assesses that it is not feasible to expects results under Output 2.1.

Moderately Satisfactory (MS): more or less meets expectations and/or some shortcomings

Heading | Description of Indicator	Baseline Level (2021 PIR)	Midterm target level (2021 PIR)	End of project target level	Cumulative progress since project start – as of 2021 PIR | This is a summary	Progress / Achievement	Comments by the TE IMPORTANT
3.1 CC-Environmental Information System of Angola (CC-ENISA) is established, risk assessed and vulnerability maps developed for the Cunene Province and the Cuvelai in particular.	3.1 Climate Change risks have not been modelled Angola and no vulnerability maps have been developed so far for Cunene Province and the Cuvelai in particular.	*(not set or not applicable)*	3.1 By the end of the project CC-ENISA has been running Risk modelling and Vulnerability maps for the Cunene Province and the Cuvelai in particular have been developed.	Some relevant progress has been done during the reporting period with regards to Angola´s Environmental Information System through a study: • The Climate Vulnerability and Risk mapping in the Cuvelai River Basin, initiated in February 2021 • Prospects of collaborating with the Agro-ecological Zoning Project under implementation in CETAC	***Target partially achieved***	The CC-ENISA is not yet consolidated. Achieving this goal will require a significant acceleration of activities – and it is not a given that this is viable given the limited implementation time left. Even if tangible results are achieved here, the TE questions the sustainability, given how late they would be delivered in the project's lifecycle. The TE notes incipient progress in procuring equipment for the CC-ENISA and also the fact that the actual scope and functioning of the system appear to be fragmented. More specifically, it is not clear if CC-ENISA will be an integrated system connected with other governmental systems (e.g. within CETAC, INAMET or INRH) or if another model was opted. It is not clear if MTCA has sufficient tech savvy personnel to invest in the further upbuilding of the system – which also relates to the prospective sustainability of achievements. The Ministry does not even maintain an independent website.[36] It is also not clear if the plans for developing the CC-ENISA have included, or will include, the development of human capacity to operate it and further develop it.
3.2 Number of National or Provincial relevant plans and/or policy documents that integrate climate change flood and drought risks	3.2 Currently, no plans and policies that explicitly integrate climate change flood and drought risks are in place.	*(not set or not applicable)*	3.2 By the end of the project CC flood and drought risk/vulnerability are integrated into at least one National and one Provincial disaster preparedness and management Plans.	The preparation of documents supported by the project team integrate Flood and Drought Risk Vulnerability: • The Interim Report on [Nationally Determined Contribution] NDC submitted to UNFCCC on 30th May 2021 • The First National Voluntary Report on SDGs progress in Angola that provides information on SDG-13 on climate action and disaster risk reduction. Also: • Local DRR groups trained • Under preparation: 20 Local DRR plans prepared by SPCB of Cunene.	***Target surpassed***	From all accounts, the target has been achieved and surpassed, if the indicator is narrowly considered. The target implied the integration of CC flood and drought risk, as well as vulnerability, into disaster preparedness plans: at least 1 national plan and 1 provincial plan – assuming that the latter would be in Cunene province. The 2021 PIR mentions that the project supported the update of the NDC in 2021, and made contributions to SDG reporting, which is a broader reporting framework at the national level. It is not a national plan for disaster preparedness, which the indicator calls for. In addition, the TE checked the 2021 NDC for Angola[37] and noted that 'Cuvelai River Basin' is only mentioned once in it, and that the knowledge generated through studies prepared with the project's support were not necessarily reflected in the NDC, which is no not a national plan for disaster preparedness. In turn, there was important progress with not disaster preparedness planning at the local level – and not necessarily provincial. The 2021 PIR mentions some 20 Local DRR plans being prepared.

[36] See e.g.: https://mcta.gov.ao/ao/ (accessed on 05-Nov-2021). To be followed up through: https://governo.gov.ao/ao/ministerios-2/.
[37] See e.g. https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/Angola%20First/NDC%20Angola.pdf (accessed on 05-Nov-2021).

Heading | Description of Indicator	Baseline Level (2021 PIR)	Midterm target level (2021 PIR)	End of project target level	Cumulative progress since project start – as of 2021 PIR | This is a summary	Progress / Achievement

Comments by the TE
IMPORTANT
While the intention behind the indicator may not have been maintained, the focus on the local level development of plans to face disaster is commendable and constitutes an important achievement, assuming that the plans will be concluded by project end.

Concerning some **caveats** that are visible in Table 18 (above) with respect to ratings and the progress reporting assessment:

Component 1: Progress is ***on track*** and results are **MU**. Most results arrive late in the project's lifetime, and it is doubtful whether too much more progress can still be achieved with the few months left of project implementation.

Component 2: Progress is ***off track*** and results are **MU**. There are important achievements in terms of increasing resilience of assets and populations at the local level. The shortcomings reported under Outcome 2 relate to the fact that, according to the indicators, progress would be tied to gender differentiated income and the fact the apparent lack of a coordinated approach. Activities implemented followed mostly an 'opportunistic approach' to site level work, as discussed further up.

Component 3: Progress is ***on track*** and results are **MS**. There are important achievements by project end, but many of the most important expected results are not consolidated. They have to do with (1) the establishment of a Climate Change Environmental Information System (CC- ENISA) at the national level; and (2) the integration of CC flood and drought risk/vulnerability into national and provincial disaster preparedness and management plans. Because these results depend on consultancies, and some of them have been engaged, it may be possible to achieve goals under Component 3, is there is a significant acceleration in the consultancies and equipment purchase in the next few months.

RELEVANCE (*)

CRITERION	RATING
Relevance	**Relevant (R)**

In terms of **Relevance**, the interventions proposed by the project remain highly valid and relevant. Adaptation in drylands in Angola (Cuvelai basin is within the Miombo Drylands area) remains highly relevant and needed. National institutions have limited capacity for building hydro-meteorological observations.

FFEWS are a novelty in Angola—at least in terms of systems that integrate water and climate. Systems, protocols and institutional collaboration frameworks needed to be developed almost from scratch.

Developing such systems were and continue to be an adaptation priority for Angola, as per national frameworks such as the NAPA and the Updated NDC

The project was slated address two NAPA priorities, namely to: 1) Develop an early warning system for flooding and storms, and 2) Develop a climate monitoring and data management system in Angola's Cuvelai River Basin.

In the 2021 Updated NDC, the following is stated:

> *"Although Angola is making a notable effort in terms of adapting to climate change, namely through the adaptation project in the Cuvelai Basin, there is a need to deepen the knowledge and information related to water resources."*[38]

Disaster risk preparedness is a national priority – and above all, a local necessity in the Cuvelai Basin. The project has addressed this. One of the most remarkable results under Component 3 have been the support provided for the development of 20 Local DRR plans prepared by SPCB of Cunene.

UN Strategic Frameworks prioritize adaptation in Angola, especially in the South, where drylands predominate. In this context, the interventions proposed by the project remain highly relevant.

The rating for 'relevance' criteria is therefore Satisfactory (S).

EFFECTIVENESS (*) & EFFICIENCY (*)

CRITERIA	RATING
Effectiveness	**Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**
Efficiency	**Unsatisfactory (U)**

The project is now at its tail end, but it is still ongoing and spending funds. Efficiency and Effectiveness are aspects that go hand-in-hand, but show different nuances in project performance, delivery and progress.

Much of the analysis that underpins the effectiveness of project outcomes and results has been covered in a previous section -- namely PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVE AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES. The key evaluation question is: *'To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?*'

At this point in time, the situation presents itself as ambiguous concerning the **Effectiveness** of implementation and requires pondering. Yet, overall, the rating is similar to the overall performance, i.e. **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**. More specifically, there were numerous positive developments, but also several shortcomings that cannot be ignored.

[38] *Ibid.*

As positive results, we stress in particular the implementation of a suite of vulnerability reduction activities in local communities, piloted by NGOs and government institutions is commendable. Such activities included at least three important adaptation domains: (i) 'Agriculture Resilience & Livelihoods'; (ii) 'WASH Resilience'[39]; and (iii) 'DRR preparedness'[40]. The reporting on those activities is rich in detail and reached a high number of beneficiaries, although it is difficult to quantify them or to properly disaggregate them by gender.

NGOs such as DW had reported to benefit as many as 22,000 people in different localities, while the World Lutheran Federation mentions 23,000 people and ADPP mentions some 33,600 reached out to through awareness raising.

Government institutions built their capacity by being engaged in the project, including INAMET, IDA, IIA, SPCB and possibly CETAC and CFR-UAN. Capacity was also built at INRH and GABHIC, which are institution with more previous experience with large projects than the others. The TE highlights the preparation of 20 local level development of plans to face disaster is also commendable, and an important project achievement under Component 3, assuming that the plans will be concluded by project end in February 2022.

Other concrete and important results are the irrigation schemes in the communities, the development of radio communication system in local languages for early warning, as well as various successful training exercises that reached out to a large number of people, among others. Some of the first comprehensive climate vulnerability studies in Angola were conducted with the help of the project. A Spanish consortium was contracted in the beginning of 2021 to conduct the Climate Vulnerability and Risk mapping in the Cuvelai River Basin, with some results already delivered.

However, there were also important shortcomings including key results (equipment, essential tools for resilience) coming too late or not at all in the project's lifecycle. Other crucial developments such as the agronomic characterization and selection of drought-resilient seeds that did happen to date. These and other shortcomings were mostly due to poor planning, unhelpful management arrangements within the project and a very weak *de facto role* of the PMU.

Other reasons included unfeasible timeline for certain activities (e.g. hydro-meteorological equipment installation and operationalization) and overall delays in project implementation caused mostly by factors external to the project (political changes, government restructuring, covid-19). Keeping in mind the above, the rating for the effectiveness criteria needs be set as **Moderately unsatisfactory (MU)**.

As for the **Efficiency** of the outcomes' implementation, it is overall **Unsatisfactory (U).** The project's efficiency assessment needs to look at a number of different parameters, including the gap between planned and executed, which, in the case of this project, has been glaring.

The total LDCF grant is $8.2M. The cumulative disbursement on this grant by 04-Nov-2021 reached 79% of the total LDCF amount. The comparison of cumulative disbursements against the grant with what had been foreseen in the PRODOC is shown in Figure 13.

For most of its implementation, the project struggled to coordinate activities and to spend financial resources. This is concluded based on the analysis of the Audit Report (2019), but in particular by the analysis of financial delivery conducted by the TE.

[39] WAHS stands for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (domains covered together in development programs).
[40] DRR stands for Disaster Risk Reduction.

Figure 13. Cumulative disbursements compared: as designed in PRODOC and actual ($K)



We also refer to Table 4, in the beginning of this report, which consistently shows low delivery rates over the years. The average *End-of-year "delivery" based on revised budgets* in Table 4 is 50.2% between 2016 and 2020. Only in 2019 did the project exceed the executed amount against what had been planned.

When taking the *End-of-year execution in relation the original annual work plan (AWP)* in Table 4, this ratio was 47% by September 2021. By 30-November-2021, when the table was last updated, it reached 49%, which is a slight improvement.[41]

The same figures from Table 4 have been plotted into Figure 14. The figure which also includes, for comparison purposes, what had been planned in the PRODOC. It is visible that the PRODOC's budget assumed—quite unrealistically—that the project should last 4 years only, and that it would deliver strongly during this period (as shown in Figure 13).

Figure 14. Gaps between amounts originally planned and end-of-year delivery



The project is bound to reach operational closure in February 2022, and it will likely have to return funds to the GEF, assuming that no addition milestone extension will be accorded to the project, beyond the two that have

[41] The 30-November-2021 updates are based on data from https://open.undp.org/projects/00081003. The remainder data is from Atlas Combined Delivery Reports (CDRs). Refer to Table 4 for all sources.

already been approved by UNDP GEF (now rebranded NCE Group – standing for Nature Climate and Energy Group within UNDP).

The project can still execute planned activities, including until February 2022, but there a chance that it will have to send a reasonable amount of funds back to the GEF. An initial projection by the UNDP CO, as communicated to the TE around September 2021, foresaw that the project would execute by the expected closure date up to 91% of the total LDCF amount (and hence return only 9% of these funds to the GEF).

By 30-November-2021, when the TE is delivering its main report, 81% of total LDCF resources have been cumulatively consumed by the project (meaning 19% of a $8.2M budget remaining to be spent). Compared to the same analysis conducted in September 2021, there are indeed improvements in delivery, which seems to be accelerating. At the same time, financial delivery in 2021 is still low (57% against the planned).[42]

Based on current data (last updated in on 31-Nov-2021), we still find this projection optimistic (as opposed to realistic). Yet, without insight into the 2022 budget and workplan, it is difficult to estimate the final ratio of GEF funds consumption. The 19% of unspent LDCF resources corresponds to $1.1M, and this is significant.

Although it is difficult to assess exactly how much the project may need to send back to the GEF, based on the current pace of expenditure, the TE had initially foreseen this amount at approximately $1.0M or more. Currently (by 30-November 2021), these projections point out now to some $0.7M, maximum $0.9M.

However, the point is that in an ideal situation, the project would not need to send funds back to the GEF. The GEF grant from SCCF could (and *should*) have been spent on implementing of a comprehensive Flood Forecasting & EWS that is useful to communities in the Cuvelai River basin, or in strengthening the dissemination of the resilience of the same communities, and perhaps in completing the development of a comprehensive CC-Environmental Information System of Angola (CC-ENISA) – an output that remains incomplete.

There is some improvement in the speed of delivery in 2021, but at the current rate of expenditure, the amount expected to be returned to the GEF will likely be significant ($0.7M, maybe up to $0.9M). See Figure 14, updated on 30-November-2021.

The analysis above points to the limited absorptive capacity of national counterparts, in particular the Implementing Partner, and within an arrangement where UNDP not only plays an important operational role, but where it also acts as 'project manager', in the lack of a properly constituted project management unit (PMU).

RECOMMENDATION: Carefully monitor budgets and plan realistically. Conduct budget revisions to recuperate the budget balance on the GEF grant and spend it wisely for the remaining of the project's duration.

The project's remaining balance could (and *should*) have been spent on implementing of a comprehensive Flood Forecasting & EWS that is useful to communities in the Cuvelai River basin, or in strengthening the dissemination of the resilience of the same communities, and perhaps in completing the development of a comprehensive CC-Environmental Information System of Angola (CC-ENISA) – an output that remains incomplete.
Amounts that will likely end up being returned to the GEF should be spent in consolidating project results to ensure a stronger sustainability. With strict limitations imposed on project duration and the number of milestone extensions, it will be difficult to consume the remaining LDCF budget until February 2022.

RECOMMENDATION: If possible, extend the project duration till mid-2022 to allow for the proper the conclusion of important project activities.

[42] Based on data from https://open.undp.org/projects/00081003 retrieved on 30-Nov-2021, and which showed expenditure at $2,087,628 against a budget of $3,659,515 (all SCCF resources) – hence 57% delivery.

OVERALL PROJECT OUTCOME (*)

CRITERION	RATING
Overall results (Attainment of Objective and Outcomes)	**Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**

The Overall Project Outcome rating is **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)** – with reference to **Criteria 3 (Assessment of Outcomes)** in Table 6. The MU rating reflects the fact that the progress towards the project objective was off track, not just in the last Project Implementation Report (PIR), but also in previous years. At the same time, progress towards two of the project's three outcomes shows mixed results, the PIR marking some key indicator as on track and others as off track.[43] Most importantly, the project will not be able to use all GEF.

Evidence on relevance, effectiveness and efficiency had been considered in building up the overall outcome rating for this TE. Delivery of results weighed the most.

For a thorough presentation of Results, refer to Section PROGRESS TOWARDS OBJECTIVE AND EXPECTED OUTCOMES.

SUSTAINABILITY: FINANCIAL (*), SOCIO-POLITICAL (*), INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND GOVERNANCE (*), ENVIRONMENTAL (*), OVERALL LIKELIHOOD OF SUSTAINABILITY (*)

CRITERIA	RATING
Financial sustainability	**MU – Moderately Unlikely**
Socio-political sustainability	**MU – Moderately Unlikely**
Institutional framework and governance sustainability	**U - Unlikely**
Environmental sustainability	**ML - Moderately Likely**
Overall Likelihood of Sustainability	**MU - Moderately Unlikely**

The overall sustainability of the project is assessed as Moderately Unlikely (MU). The Evaluator believes that the sustainability of the project is at risk due to 1) ineffective management arrangement during project implementation, 2) gaps in the repository of technical reports that threatens project's legacy, 3) high likelihood of socio-political issues arising after project closure and lack of evidence on the application of otherwise simple project management methodologies and tools during the implementation to face challenges. Behind the limited prospects for sustainability, there are a number of issues that accumulated and that will curtail the project's potential impact. From this situation, it is possible to extract several lessons, which the TE will help curate together with project stakeholders, always in the positive spirit of learning and improving capacity and skills.

The financial sustainability of project outcomes beyond project duration shows limited prospects as well. It is Moderately Unlikely (MU) that the project's achievements can be sustained with current means available to government and responsible parties. The equipment purchased by the project constituted a significant investment that needs further maintenance. It's not clear whether INAMET will be able to secure the necessary budget and human resource for this purpose.

The socio-political sustainability of the project is at this stage considered Moderately Unlikely (MU). The project generally struggled to perform in face of restructuring the engagement of different entities in the government, civil society and academia. Changes in ministries and high turnover of personnel were not just a risk but an actual threat to sustainability. These changes are likely going to continue (or repeat themselves in different settings), while not enough tools were developed to safeguard the project sustainability against such risks. Local communities lose the most. The project is slated to generate a suite of adaptation benefits and fell short on several fronts.

[43] The analysis of results – including results against project indicators -- is still preliminary.

The institutional frameworks and governance sustainability in rather unlikely (U). As pointed out further up, the project developed an unsustainable management arrangement, as the Evaluator believe, in response to difficulties in managing the project among many various parties. The institutions involved in managing the project are multiple and, in most cases, not used to working together. It is unclear what safeguards were put in place by the project to ensure that these institutional frameworks remain beyond project duration. The Evaluator believes that given the difficulties related to institutional frameworks and governance experienced during project implementation it is likely that after project closure the problem will remain.

The environmental sustainability of the project is Moderately Likely (ML). The project was designed to ensure environmental sustainability through sustainable use of natural resources and e.g. with relation to water resources and through adaptation measures. The project implemented several important activities related to environmental sustainability e.g. activities aimed at conservation of water resources such as water harvesting and boreholes improvement, even though those results are mostly localized. At the same time, other activities that could contribute more to sustainable use of natural resources were not implemented e.g. the research on drought-resistant crop varieties and potential follow-on activities.

In Box 4, the TE included a few **SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS** concerning the different sustainability aspects (financial, socio-political, institutional/governance, and environmental), and noting that these aspects tend to be interlinked.

Box 4. Specific Recommendations on interlinked facets of Sustainability

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON SUSTAINABILITY [R-Sust-#]
➔ **Sustainability of results linked to hydromet equipment purchased by the project (addressed to INAMET, INRH, GABHIC and others)** **[R-Sust-1]** Consistently follow standard managerial practices that optimize the operations and management of technical equipment, including asset registration, functional checks, servicing, repairing or replacing of necessary parts, etc. At the local level, where equipment is installed, delegate responsibility to duly empowered custodians. Adopt cost-effective practices to keep equipment operational. Replace asp in case of failure. Upgrade when needed.
➔ **Sustainability of results linked to CC-ENISA (addressed to MCTA)** **[R-Sust-2]** **Adopt a suite of good practices for the development of environmental monitoring systems:** ○ Scope, design and plan the development of the system with the help of working group of relevant stakeholder, which knowledge and interest in the topic (regardless of whether a service provider had been engaged to deliver the system); ○ Emulate existing successful models, rather than "reinvent the wheel", but ensure ownership by the working group; ○ Ensure data infrastructure and data security, pondering what is best (server storage on site or off site?) and optimizing decisions; ○ Develop the protocols for data collection, handling of metadata and data consistency – and follow the protocols; ○ Adopt open data approaches, since CC-ENISA should be a public service; ○ Consider crowd sourcing of new data; ○ Promote integration with other environmentally inclined systems at the ○ Exchange data with global data bearers – and use their data where useful; ○ Seek partnerships with (and consider the takeover by…) a higher level academic or research institution for sustainability and expansion; ○ Ensure a regular supply of funds for the maintenance of the system – it is not expensive.
➔ **Sustainability of results linked to improved water access at the level of localities (addressed to INRH and provincial water services)** **[R-Sust-3]** **In rural settings where water is scarce and people are vulnerable, income poor and deprived, certain approaches are recommended. Humanitarian and local development oriented NGOs seem to master a number of WASH best practices that can be replicated:**

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON SUSTAINABILITY [R-Sust-#]	
	(1) Consider gender in each and every activity, promoting gender equality and women's empowerment; (2) Foster community ownership and participation in WASH activities, which includes adopting a demand-responsive approach that emphasizes community participation in planning, design, and implementation, leading to community ownership and, in some cases, management of services to enhance sustainable operations and management (O&M) of equipment; (3) Promote the creation of water users' associations, relying e.g. on the 'Community Action Groups', the WASH Groups or other similar in the models pursued by ADPP, DW and other. (4) INGR and provincial services to ensure the reserve funds for sustainable O&M.
➔ **Sustainability of results linked to civil protection actions / locally driven disaster risk reduction**	
[R-Sust-4]	**For DRR at the local level, adopt a variety of gender-sensitive approaches that will strengthen as much as possible community self-help, skills development, participation and empowerment by adhering to few useful principles:** ○ Be gender-sensitive. ○ Consider diversity and promote 'togetherness'. ○ Foster endogenous approaches to DRR – i.e. those based on traditional knowledge and other local practices). At the same time, embrace innovation and promote it. Those include participatory video and community radio shows to share successful community-based adaptation approaches for FFEWS, but equally the use of mobile technology and applications. ○ Consider that most barriers linked to effective DRR at the local level are linked to 'skills'. Hence strengthen skills development of local duty bearers as much as possible, empowering people to act and to support each other. ○ Do not underestimate the impacts of disaster-driven trauma in people's psyche. Create the means within the community for people to process trauma in their own terms. ○ Do not wait for disaster to strike. Strengthen resilience before it does. ○ Learn from past mistakes.

Specific recommendations for ensuring sustainability are mentioned in a summarized manner in Table 5 and in section 5.4.

COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

The project design and objectives were relevant to the national priorities and needs. Various government institutions worked in partnership and collaboration in project implementation.

The project involved a wide range of national stakeholders. This was at the same time an advantage – because the processes were participatory, and a challenge – because several governmental reforms occurred during project implementation and because the coordination of such a variety of involved parties caused issues.

The TE concluded that the level of ownership of the project among national entities varied. A desired situation where most stakeholders are engaged in the project with more or less equal levels of dedication is something that wasn't fully achieved due to various factors, including the inefficient coordination arrangements. Those were described in lengths throughout this document.

The TE advises that projects with an elaborate stakeholder setup should pay special attention to ensuring that the PMU is strong and address any issues related to project coordination early on during the lifetime of the project.

GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT

The TE's overall assessment of the level of gender equality and women's empowerment principles mainstreaming into the project is that it was and is satisfactory. This rating is also applicable in terms of inclusion of marginalized groups, as women and youth are often marginalized and suffer from poverty.

The entire project targeted the area of the country that is rural, highly vulnerable to food insecurity and poverty and subjected to marginalization, with most activities aimed at alleviating the burden on those groups being successful.

Refer to section titled: *Results disaggregated by gender* for more details.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

According to the TE Guidance document:

> *"TE reports must, therefore, assess how projects are successfully mainstreaming other UNDP priorities, including but not limited to: poverty alleviation, improved governance, climate change mitigation and adaptation, disaster prevention and recovery, human rights, and capacity development, South-South cooperation, knowledge management, volunteerism, etc., as applicable, and how projects incorporated the UNDP commitment to rights-based approaches in their design".*

The TE assessed that the project successfully mainstreams most of the principles mentioned above, both at design and implementation stage. Detailed information regarding that is given in various places of this report, but to give some examples: (1) **poverty alleviation** was the target of most on the ground activities in Cunene province, (2) **disaster prevention and recovery** activities were implemented in the communities and included e.g., radio warnings, equipment installation and training, (3) **capacity development** was implemented through the overarching capacity building component of the project, that was assessed as very successful, etc.

For more details, refer to Project Design / Formulation and Project Implementation chapters, as well as the first four subchapters of Project Results and Impacts.

GEF ADDITIONALITY

Applicable Evaluation Criteria Questions [Q-#] – answered in the narrative.
[Q-1] Are the outcomes related to the [additionality] reasoning? *[Q-2] Are there quality quantitative and verifiable data demonstrating the [additional adaptation] benefits?* *[Q-3] Do self-evaluations provide evidence of the outcomes achieved in creating a more supportive environment as envisaged at the endorsement stage?* *[Q-4] Can the outcomes be attributed to the GEF contribution as originally anticipated?* *[Q-5] Are the outcomes sustainable?* *[Q-6] Is there evidence that project outcomes, both environmental and otherwise, are likely to be sustained beyond the project end? (The TE report can refer to the Sustainability section)* *[Q-7] If broader impact was anticipated, is there evidence at the completion stage that such a broadening is beginning to occur, or actions towards the broadening have been taken?*

For a good measure of the GEF additionality, refer to the Tracking Tool for GEF indicators and their readings. See in addition in the Project Information Table > GEF Strategy Linkages and Table 11, for a reference on which GEF related adaptation outcomes and outputs that relate to the project, as well as:
Figure 3. Focal Area Objectives: nominal break down of LDCF funding per objective.

The analysis of the project outcomes and the logframe at the design stage is presented in Analysis of Results Framework (Project logic / strategy; Indicators) chapter. The information about implementation is included in several subchapters of 4.3) Project Results and Impacts.

According to the above mentioned analytical frameworks, **resilience building**, **disaster prevention and recovery** activities have been very much on focus in the project. As for the evaluation questions, the next paragraphs put them into perspective.

The project's incremental reasoning would be clearer if the baseline had been more appropriately set. [Q-1], but as observed by the TE in other sections, there were visible issues with establishing a vulnerability baseline through a VRA. The contextual analysis had also demonstrated that this human vulnerability is pervasive in the Cuvelai basin, which appears to be heading towards a serious humanitarian crisis in 2021, as gathered through recent articles in the media (see footnote 20). In such settings, it makes less sense to focus too much on additionality [Q-2]. Rather, approaches should become more needs-based or rights-based, and adaptation more strongly mainstreamed into regular development work. With the impacts of the covid-19 pandemic, this mainstreaming becomes even more important. The project had demonstrated how this can be done through their work on 'Agriculture Resilience & Livelihoods'; 'WASH Resilience'; and 'DRR preparedness'.

Nevertheless, through thorough commented analysis of project results in Table 18, which provides the summary of results delivered according to 2021 PIR and level of achievement per Outcome, the TE has demonstrated that resilience, additionality and the climate angle are stressed in many of the details in the reporting provided by NGOs and government entities implementing activities. More specifically, they differentiate activities implemented with project funds from others that could be characterized as 'mainstream development work' or 'humanitarian assistance'. So, self-evaluations do indeed provide evidence of the outcomes achieved in creating a more supportive environment [Q-3] and outcomes can be attributed to the GEF contribution [Q-4].

The level to which the project managed to produce reliable data to inform the progress towards the outcomes including self-assessment information (in this case coming from VRA assessments) is discussed in Progress Towards Objective and Expected Outcomes chapter. The sustainability of outcomes is analyzed in the chapter titled: "Sustainability: financial (*), socio-political (*), institutional framework and governance (*), environmental (*), overall likelihood of sustainability (*)" – the latter with reference answers to [Q-5] and [Q-6].

Regarding scaling out of the project impact, several activities [Q-7] are and will be further replicated by other initiatives. This is briefly discussed in the next chapter.

CATALYTIC/REPLICATION EFFECT

The following questions were posed to investigate the replication effect of project results:

Applicable Evaluation Criteria Questions [Q-#] – answered below
[Q-1] How were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated in the project design?
(Q-2] What are project lessons learned, failures/lost opportunities to date? What might have been done better or differently?

[Q1]: Refer to Lessons from other relevant projects incorporated into project design.

[Q2]: According to the TE, the major lost opportunity for impact relates to the delays that the project faced throughout its lifetime. This issue is thoroughly described in Project Implementation sub-chapters and other places of this report. However, the TE acknowledges recent improvements in the quality of project implementation, which is reflected in MS rating for this component.

Lessons learned from this project are covered throughout this report. For a summary refer to Table 5. Recommendations and Lessons derived from issues pointed out in the TE. The TE also took note of certain project interventions being replicated by other initiatives. Those include small-scale irrigation system and the

community-based management of water holes. It was also noted that this project served as a catalyzer of at least one other project proposal.

Refer to section titled: *Replication Approach* for more details on the topic of replication.

PROGRESS TO IMPACT

The project's most significant impact is the improved resilience of communities in Cunene Province.

The project has implemented the majority of its activities that contributed to the achievement of the objective. The project has achieved the some of its outcomes and outputs as stipulated with shortfalls. Whether project impact will be lasting will depend on conditions for sustainability, which currently tend to be at risk.

The project has resulted in a lot of benefits, and it will rely on other projects to replicate and further upscale to a more significant level. A follow-up intervention is recommended to further secure the investment made by the GEF/LDCF, the government and UNDP.

A **RECOMMENDATION** is made: Consider one or more follow-up interventions. It is commendable that government proceeds with its plans to carry out a follow-up intervention, especially in the wake of COP26.

Such an intervention should first create a bridge between the Cuvelai Project and the next intervention in the form of a sustainability plan (Exit Strategy) – even though the development of such strategy should have been done earlier. The next adaptation intervention for the Cuvelai River Basin should focus on bringing civil society actions on adaptation to scale, side by side with government. The new project should embrace and integrated approach to resilience building and strengthen not just the local disaster risk response but also local adaptation planning. It may choose to focus on sectors and geographical areas where achievements were partially accomplished and also on addressing emerging adaptation issues – including local finance for adaptation and ecosystem based adaptation, e.g. regenerative agriculture. The issue of private sector engagement and the role of women in farming and local rural development should also be addressed.

5) MAIN FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, LESSONS LEARNED

The TE's main conclusion and FINDINGS can be thus summarized: The TE generally concludes that: the project had an **Overall Satisfactory Performance (S), all criteria considered, and considering that delivering results is the most important evaluation criterion**.

The main conclusion on the TE is that the Cuvelai Basin Adaptation project is a worthwhile project, but which faced many difficulties, including long delays before it could be 'internalized' in UNDP and MINAMB (now MCTA), inadequate management arrangements and low delivery. It is generally rated as **Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)**: somewhat below expectations and/or significant shortcomings.

Some of the project's shortcomings could perhaps have been avoided, if a strong PMU had been set up in MINAMB/MCTA. The fact that UNDP and the implementing partner sustained a weak and understaffed PMU for the entire project duration is undermined project performance in many different way. It was the project's highest risk, which remained unflagged and unaddressed throughout implementation.

It is worth noting that the project involves a large number of partners, including national institutions and NGOs, and it draws on the capacities of private sector entities, as well as south-south and foreign cooperation for delivering technically complex information and systems, and for building national capacities.

For managing complex processes, a strong, multi-disciplinary, capable and adequately staffed PMU would have been needed. The project never counted on one. Instead, the project struggled, and the sustainability of its results are now at risk. The TE believes that this can still be addressed with the few months of implementation remaining.

The project did deliver a number of interesting results, which should be capitalized upon and sustained, while there is still time.

Slated to close in February 2022, the project will likely need to return unused funds to the LDCF (possibly $0.8M to $1M, judging from the current pace of delivery). Such situations must be avoided in the future.

Lessons and recommendations follow in the next section.

There are **9 CORE RECOMMENDATIONS** made by the TE, described with caveats in the sections that follow and according to a specific classification (as per TE guidance document). Recommendations are classified according to the following headings: Corrective actions for the design, implementation and M&E (section 5.1), actions to reinforce the project's benefits (section 5.2), proposals for future directions, moving forward (or beyond) from the project's objective (section 5.3).

A few lessons and best practices are

For the complete list of TE RECOMMENDATIONS sorted by order or appearance refer to:

Table 5. Recommendations and Lessons derived from issues pointed out in the TE

5.1) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR THE DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE PROJECT

There are a couple of **IMMEDIATE ACTIONS** required by the project and that should be effected, while the project is still under implementation, and if there is time:

> **[RECOMMENDATION 1]: Carefully monitor budgets and plan realistically.**
> Low delivery, as demonstrated in the TE Table 4. Execution and cumulative delivery on the LDCF Grant and on UNDP Core Resources and in other passages the cover the financial analysis in this report. Execution and cumulative delivery on the LDCF Grant and on UNDP Core Resources show weaknesses. It is important and highly recommended to conduct thorough and timely budget revisions, including to recuperate the budget balance on the GEF grant and spend it wisely for the remaining of the project's duration. There are indications from the financial amounts published in the Open UNDP (and which come from Atlas) that the bulk of the budget balance stayed trapped in previous years as 'approved budgets'. See e.g. the section 'Financials' in the beginning of this document.

> **[RECOMMENDATION 3]: Project duration**
> If possible, extend the project duration till mid-2022 to allow for the proper the conclusion of important project activities.

5.2) ACTIONS TO FOLLOW UP OR REINFORCE INITIAL BENEFITS FROM THE PROJECT

Recommendation #3 further up is among those that would also reinforce the project's benefit. Furthermore there are additionally other **RECOMMENDATIONS** that would be important in that regard as well.

> *Some background on the recommendation*: There are apparently plans to conduct, at project end, a more comprehensive VRA study, but its scope and usefulness are not known by the TE. To date, a VRA using the same methodology as the one conducted by DW in 2018/9 had not been replicated across project localities in the Cuvelai River Basin, not conducted again in the same localities.
>
> **[RECOMMENDATION 2]: If there is still time, engage NGOs to replicate the VRA methodology applied by DW in 2018 in more localities across the Cuvelai River Basin.**
> The aim would be to produce a participatory end-of-project assessment of local vulnerability. This would be useful in terms of comparison, the data produced would also be useful as baseline for new adaptation interventions.

> *Some background on the recommendation*: More than a risk that was apparently not flagged and not adequately acted upon, a weak PMU ended up being a burden on those who were expected to oversee the project (officials in UNDP and MINAMB/MCTA), and to the extent that they stepped in to fulfil project management functions where there was a void. This situation created distortions in what would the ideal functions of different project players and it fueled the likelihood of conflicts of interest. (Accumulating roles in implementation and oversight is considered a conflict of interests.).
>
> **[RECOMMENDATION 8]: If there is still time, and especially if UNDP and MCTA can link the remaining work under the project with new interventions, recruit a person with senior project manager profile and a small technical team until project end.**
> This will also help with delivery and sustainability.

> *Some background on the recommendation*: The project has resulted in a lot of benefits, and it will rely on other projects to replicate and further upscale to a more significant level. A follow-up intervention is recommended to further secure the investment made by the GEF/LDCF, the government and UNDP.
>
> **[RECOMMENDATION 9]: Consider one or more follow-up interventions. It is commendable that government proceeds with its plans to carry out a follow-up intervention, especially in the wake of COP26.**
> Such an intervention should first create a bridge between the Cuvelai Project and the next intervention in the form of a sustainability plan (Exit Strategy) – even though the development of such strategy should have been done earlier. The next adaptation intervention for the Cuvelai River Basin should focus on bringing civil society actions on adaptation to scale, side by side with government. The new project should embrace and integrated approach to resilience building and strengthen not just the local disaster risk response but also local adaptation planning. It may choose to focus on sectors and geographical areas where achievements were partially accomplished and also on addressing emerging adaptation issues – including local finance for adaptation and ecosystem based adaptation, e.g. regenerative agriculture. The issue of private sector engagement and the role of women in farming and local rural development should also be addressed.

If considered feasible and useful to UNDP and MCTA, Recommendation #8 above would belong under the tag 'corrective actions' in section 5.1, and namely one for immediate action.

5.3) PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE DIRECTIONS UNDERLINING MAIN OBJECTIVES

As for specific and analytical **RECOMMENDATIONS** resulting from the TE, and concerning future projects, the following four are especially relevant.

Some background on the recommendation: Although a 4-year duration tends to be the norm in several UNDP GEF projects, a duration this short for a project implemented in Angola, of the complexity of that of Cuvelai Project, and with a budget of $8.2M, is clearly too short. The limited absorptive capacity of government's implementing partner and responsible parties plays also a role in the delays, as attested by several of the stakeholders interviewed, including UNDP. However, even in countries with stronger implementation capacity, the project's complexity and budget size alone would warrant a longer duration, possibly of 5 to 6 years.

[RECOMMENDATION 4]: Scope project duration according to much more realistic expectations.
In the future, projects with a large budget, involving complex procurement and requiring the gradual development of technical capacity of national institutions, should definitely be scoped to last longer than just 4 years.

Some background on the recommendation: Although 18 months is currently the maximum time allowed by UNDP NCE in terms cumulative milestone extensions, it is not enough to compensate for the time loss in the beginning of the project, for the impacts of covid-19 on the project, and for the fact that the project's original scoping of a 4-year duration had grossly overestimated the national absorptive capacity.

[RECOMMENDATION 5]: Address the real reason behind requests for project Milestone Adjustments
In the future, more attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project's methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments. Some of the shortcomings observed seem the affect the UNDP-GEF portfolio more broadly. Efforts should instead go towards addressing the causes of delays, and also towards a realistic analysis of context and circumstances, improved planning and time scoping across the board. Efforts must also go towards improving the collaboration between UNDP and Implementing Partner for ensuring a swifter, more efficient and more effective project mobilization and Inception Phase.

Some background on the recommendation: The TE analyzed the 'smartness' of project indicators in Section 3.4 (refer to Table 11). Several indicators and end-of-project targets are not specific enough to be easily measurable. This reflected negatively in the quality of reporting through the PIRs. If the VRA baseline VRA had been conducted during the PPG, it would be less of a problem, but this was not the case. the baseline only established very late and only in part.

[RECOMMENDATION 6]: In the future, the project's Results Framework should not be built around indicators that require expensive, demanding, complex and time consuming household surveys, such as the VRA.
This recommendations applies in particular if the project targets a large area with the population spread across several villages with difficult access, which is the case for the Cunene Basin.

Some background on the recommendation: From the point of view of adaptative management, the misalignment between project duration and expectations is shortcoming that could have been addressed in a timely manner, but was not.

[RECOMMENDATION 7]: More attention should be given to shortcomings in the UNDP GEF project's methodologies and practices for project scoping, planning, risk management and stakeholder capacity assessments.
This recommendations is broad and generic, but adaptive management has not been actively applied in the project, especially for what the need for a strong PMU has been concerned.

5.4) BEST AND WORST PRACTICES IN ADDRESSING ISSUES RELATING TO RELEVANCE, PERFORMANCE AND SUCCESS

Worse practices have been thoroughly pointed out in this report, the most critical one boiling down to delays and the lack of a strong PMU with several ramifications. We will not repeat this content here.
Instead we mention herein two of the better practices or **LESSONS** to be learned and applied:

Cross reference for this lesson: Reference to Section 2.7) Limitations to the Evaluation Methodology.

[LESSON 1]: There are pros and cons in conducting evaluations remotely.
It is likely that not as many individual stakeholders would have been contacted and interviewed by the TE, if the assignment included a mission to Angola, which tends to be a rushed process. Interacting with 24 unique individual representing 14 different entities was only possible because of the remote nature of the TE. At the same time, it was not possible to directly interact with beneficiaries in the field and hear their perspective.

Cross reference for this lesson: Refer to Section 4.1, and under it 'Lessons from other relevant projects incorporated into project design'

[LESSON 2]: The development of FFEWS needs to be approached through the step-by-step creation of pre-conditions.
First, it is important to generate hydroclimatic data and then generate analysis and develop Early Warning Systems -- or 'Services'. And in order to generate hydroclimatic data, measurement instruments must be installed early in the project's lifetime.

Finally, the TE makes reference to Box 4. Specific Recommendations on interlinked facets of Sustainability, within the following topics: **Sustainability of the results linked to** …

[1] Hydromet equipment purchased by the project;
[2] CC-ENISA;
[3] Improved water access at the level of localities; and
[4] Civil protection actions / locally-driven disaster risk reduction.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON SUSTAINABILITY [R-Sust 1 through 4]
[R-Sust-1] Consistently follow standard managerial practices that optimize the operations and management of technical equipment. [R-Sust-2] Adopt a suite of good practices for the development, data enrichment and maintenance of environmental monitoring systems. [R-Sust-3]

In rural settings where water is scarce and people are vulnerable, income poor and deprived, certain approaches are recommended. Humanitarian and local development oriented NGOs seem to master a number of WASH best practices that should be replicated.

[R-Sust-4]
For DRR at the local level, For DRR at the local level, adopt a variety of gender-sensitive approaches that will strengthen as much as possible community self-help, skills development, participation and empowerment by adhering to few useful principles.

Refer to Box 4. Specific Recommendations on interlinked facets of Sustainability for details.

-oOo-

6) ANNEXES

ANNEX I) TOR

[Inserted at the end of the PDF file]

ANNEX II) TERMINAL EVALUATION (TE) TIMEFRAME

Jul 2021	Aug 2021	Sep/Oct 2021	Nov 2021
Inception	Inception Report followed by review	Preparing DEL2 Inception Report, version 2 + Debriefing + PSC meeting	Prepared and delivered DEL3; review by stakeholders. Prepared and delivered DEL4. End the assignment.

ANNEX III) LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Table 19. Complete log of stakeholders interviewed in connection with the TE

Kick Off Call #1) UNDP CO Angola on 04-Aug-2021
Mr. Janeiro Avelino Janeiro, UNDP CO Angola, Environment Program Officer Mr. Mamisoa Rangers, UNDP CO Angola, Deputy Resident Representative
Interview #2) MCTA – Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment and Project Team (PA) on 04-Aug-2021
Mr. Ana (Teresa) Cilanio, MCTA - Cuvelai Project, Project Administrative Assistant Mr. Giza Martins, MCTA – Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment | Ministério da Cultura, Turismo e Ambiente, Director Nacional do Ambiente e Acção Climática
Interview #3) Cuvelai Project on 11-Aug-2021
Mr. José Bonifácio Kaupu, Cuvelai Project, Project coordinator
Interview #4) UNDP CO Angola on 17-Aug-2021
Mr. Janeiro Avelino Janeiro, UNDP CO Angola, Environment Program Officer
Interview #5) Ex-UNDP CO Angola on 01-Sep-2021
Mr. Goetz Schroder, Ex-UNDP CO Angola, Former Env PO
Interview #6) UNDP CO Angola on 07-Sep-2021
Mr. Maria Candaia, UNDP CO Angola, Former CTA in the project
Interview #7) INRH - National Institute for Water Resouces | Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hídricos on 07-Sep-2021
Mr. Manuel Quintino (on leave; delegated to Narciso Ambrósio), INRH - National Institute for Water Resouces | Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hídricos, INRH Director Mr. Narciso Ambrôsio, INRH - National Institute for Water Resouces | Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hídricos, INRH Focal Point
Interview #8) INAMET - National Institute for Meteorology | Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia on 21-Sep-2021
Mr. Bernardo Ebo, INAMET - National Institute for Meteorology | Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia, INAMET Technician Mr. Domingos Nascimentos, INAMET - National Institute for Meteorology | Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia, INAMET Director Mr. Juliana Muhongo, INAMET - National Institute for Meteorology | Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia, INAMET Focal Point Mr. Juliana Paixão, INAMET - National Institute for Meteorology | Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia, [not informed] Mr. Osvaldo José, INAMET - National Institute for Meteorology | Instituto Nacional de Meteorologia, Telemetry
Interview #9) UAN - Agostinho Neto University | Universidade Agostinho Neto on 22-Sep-2021
Mr. José Pedro, UAN - Agostinho Neto University | Universidade Agostinho Neto, CRF Focal Point Mr. Pedro Moçambique, UAN - Agostinho Neto University | Universidade Agostinho Neto, CRF Director

Interview #10) GABHIC - Cabinet for River Basin Management of Cunene, Cubango and Cuvelai rivers | Gabinete para Administração das Bacias Hidrográficas do Cunene, Cubango e Cuvelai on 23-Sep-2021

Mr. Carlos Andrade, GABHIC - Cabinet for River Basin Management of Cunene, Cubango and Cuvelai rivers | Gabinete para Administração das Bacias Hidrográficas do Cunene, Cubango e Cuvelai , GABHIC Focal Point
Mr. Carolino Mendes, GABHIC - Cabinet for River Basin Management of Cunene, Cubango and Cuvelai rivers | Gabinete para Administração das Bacias Hidrográficas do Cunene, Cubango e Cuvelai , GABHIC Director

Interview #11) UNDP Regional on 27-Sep-2021

Mr. Adnan Kareem, UNDP Regional, RTA

Interview #12) DW - "Development Workshop" (NGO) on 27-Sep-2021

Mr. Adelino Soares Nasso, DW - "Development Workshop" (NGO), Responsible Party
Mr. Allan Cain, DW - "Development Workshop" (NGO), DW Director
Mr. Amilcar Salumbo, DW - "Development Workshop" (NGO), Responsible Party
Mr. Cupi Batista, DW - "Development Workshop" (NGO), DW Focal Point

Interview #13) IDA - Institute for Agrarian Development | Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário, under the MENADERP - Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries | Ministério da Agricultural Desenvolvimento Rural e Pescas on 28-Sep-2021

Mr. Feslimino Da Costa, IDA - Institute for Agrarian Development | Instituto de Desenvolvimento Agrário, under the MENADERP - Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries | Ministério da Agricultura Desenvolvimento Rural e Pescas, IDA Director Adjunto

Interview #13) MINAGRI, IDA on 28-Sep-2021

Mr. Anita Esperança, MINAGRI, IDA, GSA
Mr. António Alfredo, MINAGRI, IDA, IDA Ponto focal [excused]
Mr. David Tunga, MINAGRI, IDA, IDA Director
Mr. Ermelinda Caliengue, MINAGRI, IDA, GSA [excused]

Interview #14) ADPP - Acção de Povo para Povo | Action from People to People (NGO) on 28-Sep-2021

Mr. Evaristo Waya, ADPP - Acção de Povo para Povo | Action from People to People (NGO) , Oficial Sénior de Parcerias & Desenvolvimento Comunitário
Mr. Rikke Viholm, ADPP - Acção de Povo para Povo | Action from People to People (NGO) , Director

Interview #15) WLF - World Lutheran Foundation (NGO) on 28-Sep-2021

Mr. Abrão Mushivi, WLF - World Lutheran Foundation (NGO), Federação Luterana - Director

Interview #16) MCTA – Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment | Ministério da Cultura, Turismo e Ambiente on 08-Oct-2021

Mr. Giza Martins, MCTA – Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment | Ministério da Cultura, Turismo e Ambiente, Director Nacional do Ambiente e Acção Climática

Interview #16) UNDP CO Angola on 08-Oct-2021

Mr. Claudia Fernandes, UNDP CO Angola, M&E Officer
Mr. Janeiro Avelino Janeiro, UNDP CO Angola, Environment Program Officer
Mr. Mamisoa Rangers, UNDP CO Angola, Deputy Resident Representative

Interview #16) UNDP Regional on 08-Oct-2021

Mr. Adnan Kareem, UNDP Regional, RTA

Interview #17) Provincial Services for Civil Protection, Cunene on 01-Oct-2021

Mr. Com. Paulo Calunga, Provincial Services for Civil Protection, Cunene, 0

Interview #18) UNDP CO Angola on 20-Oct-2021

Mr. Claudia Fernandes, UNDP CO Angola, M&E Officer

Interview #19) INRH - National Institute for Water Resources | Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hídricos on 21-Oct-2021

Mr. Narciso Ambrôsio, INRH - National Institute for Water Resouces | Instituto Nacional de Recursos Hídricos,

Interview #19) MCTA – Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment | Ministério da Cultura, Turismo e Ambiente on 21-Oct-2021

Mr. Giza Martins, MCTA – Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment | Ministério da Cultura, Turismo e Ambiente,

Preparatory & Debriefing Meeting #19) UNDP CO Angola on 21-Oct-2021

Mr. Claudia Fernandes, UNDP CO Angola,
Mr. Janeiro Avelino Janeiro, UNDP CO Angola,
Mr. Mamisoa Rangers, UNDP CO Angola,

Event #19) Special Session of the Project steering Committee - Meeting on 21-Oct-2021

From the Zoom Call Report, we counted 28 participants entries, which after close analysis can be thus described: The meeting was attended by 23 participants, representing 13 entities (some with 2 or 3 representatives present), in addition to 3 members of the core project team, who attend the meetings regularly, and the two TE consultants.

ANNEX IV) LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED



ANNEX V) EVALUATION QUESTION MATRIX

A set of questions referring have been drafted for guiding the evaluation. They are included below in a matrix with the aim of showing they relate to the standard TE criteria: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Sustainability and Impact (Table 20).

Table 20. Evaluation Questions

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF Focal area, and to the environment and development priorities a the local, regional and national level?			
Alignment with national priorities: • Extent to which the project's objectives were in line with the national development priorities • *Extent to which the project was appropriately responsive to political, legal, economic, institutional, etc., changes in the country*	Partial Rating (using the 6 point scale) for composing the overall Relevance rating under criterion 3 (Assessment of Outcome)	PRODOC, NAPA, NCD MTR Report Key informant interview	Cross-verification Validation of views through key informant interview
Alignment with UNDP and GEF strategic priorities: • *Extent to which the project was formulated according to national and local strategies to advance gender equality* • *Extent to which the project was in line with the UNDP Strategic Plan, CPD, UNDAF, United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF), SDGs and GEF strategic programming* • *Extent to which the project contributed to the Theory of Change for the relevant country program outcome(s)*	*(same as above)*	PRODOC cover page and other content UN strategies mentioned Plano de Desenvolvimento Nacional (PND) 2013-2017 and 2018-2022	Cross-verification Validation of views through key informant interview
Stakeholder engagement: • *Extent to which relevant stakeholders participated in the project* • *Extent to which the project was formulated according to the needs and interests of all targeted and/or relevant stakeholder groups* • *Extent to which the intervention is informed by needs and interests of diverse groups of stakeholders through in-depth consultation*	*(same as above)*	PPG Reports, if available MTR Report Key informant interview	Cross-verification Validation of views through key informant interview
Relevance to and complementarity with other initiatives: • *Extent to which lessons learned from other relevant projects were considered in the project's design*	*(same as above)*	PRODOC RTA and Country Office focused interview	Cross-verification Validation of views through key informant interview
Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?			
Target achievement: • *Extent to which the project's actual outcomes/outputs were commensurate with what was planned* • *Areas in which the project had the greatest and fewest achievements; and the contributing factors* • *Extent to which the intervention achieved, or expects to achieve, results (outputs, outcomes and impacts, including global environmental benefits) taking into account the key factors that influenced the results*	Partial Ratings (using the 6 point scale) for composing the overall Effectiveness rating under criterion 3 (Assessment of Outcomes)	PRODOC PIRs Technical Reports from the project MTR Report Tracking Tool Key informant interview Any other relevant source	Cross-verification with project beneficiaries, if possible Validation of views through key informant interview
Contribution to higher level goals: • Extent to which the project contributed to the country program outcomes and outputs, the SDGs, the UNDP Strategic Plan, GEF strategic priorities, and national development priorities; and factors that contributed to the achieving or not achieving intended outcomes and outputs	*(same as above, but weighing less in the overall rating)*	*(same as above)*	*(same as above)*
Considerations: • *Constraining factors, such as socio-economic, political and environmental risks; cultural and religious festivals, etc. and how they were overcome* • *Any alternative strategies that would have been more effective in achieving the project's objectives* • *Gender o Extent to which the project contributed to gender equality, the empowerment of women and a human rights-based approach?* • *Extent to which a gender responsive and human rights-based approach were incorporated in the design and implementation of the intervention*	NA (Qualitative assessments that will fit in the description will be sufficient)	*(same as above)*	*(same as above)*

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in line with international and national norms andstandards?			
Resource allocation and cost effectiveness: • *Extent to which there was an efficient and economical use of financial and human resources and strategic allocation of resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) to achieve outcomes* • *Extent to which there was an efficient and economical use of financial and human resources and strategic allocation of resources (funds, human resources, time, expertise, etc.) to achieve outcomes* • *Whether the project completed the planned activities and met or exceeded the expected outcomes in terms of achievement of global environmental and development objectives according to schedule, and as cost-effective as initially planned*	Partial Ratings (using the 6 point scale) for composing the overall Efficiency rating under criterion 3 (Assessment of Outcomes)	PRODOC PIRs Technical Reports from the project MTR Report Analysis of finance (CDRs) Audit reports – REQUESTED AVAILED PLS Any other relevant source (e.g. d-portal)	Financial analysis in Excel, including comparison of the project cost and time versus output/outcomes equation to that of similar projects Cross-verification including with project beneficiaries, if possible Validation of views through key informant interview
Project management and timeliness: • *Extent to which a project extension could have been avoided (for cases where an extension was approved)* • *Extent to which the project management structure as outlined in the project document was efficient in generating the expected results* • *Extent to which project funds and activities were delivered in a timely manner* • *Extent to which M&E systems ensured effective and efficient project management.*	Partial Ratings (using the 6 point scale) for composing the overall Efficiency rating under criterion 3 (Assessment of Outcomes)	*(same as above)* *Plus:* RTA and Country Office focused interview	Timeline analysis Cross-verification Validation of views through key informant interview
Considerations: • *Verify provision of adequate resources for integrating gender equality and human rights in the project as an investment in short-term, medium-term and long-term benefits* • *Extent to which the allocation of resources to targeted groups takes into account the need to prioritize those most marginalized*	NA (Qualitative assessments that will provide elements for the description of the element/criteria will be sufficient)	*(same as above)*	Cross-verification including with project beneficiaries, if possible Validation of views through key informant interview
Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, socio-political, and/or environmentalrisks to sustaining long-term project results?			
Financial sustainability:			
KEY QUESTION: What is the likelihood that financial resources will be available once the GEF assistance ends to support the continuation of benefits (income generating activities, and trends that may indicate that it is likely that there will be adequate financial resources for sustaining project outcomes)? OTHER USEFUL QUESTIONS: What opportunities for financial sustainability exist? What additional factors are needed to create an enabling environment for continued financing?	Rating (using the risk likelihood scale) Qualitative assessments that will provide elements for the description would be enough for additional factors. Those may influence the unified rating.	PRODOC PIRs Technical Reports from the project MTR Report Financial management information (same as for effectiveness and efficiency further up) Key informant interview Any other relevant source	Cross-verification including with project beneficiaries, if possible Validation of views through key informant interview
Socio-political sustainability:			
KEY QUESTION: Are there any social or political risks that can undermine the longevity of project outcomes? OTHER USEFUL QUESTIONS: Are the project's successful aspects being transferred to appropriate parties, potential future beneficiaries, and others who could learn from the project and potentially replicate and/or scale it in the future? What is the risk that the level of stakeholder ownership (including ownership by governments and other key stakeholders) will	Rating (using the risk likelihood scale)	PRODOC PIRs Technical Reports from the project MTR Report Financial management information (same as for effectiveness and efficiency further up) Key informant interview	Cross-verification including with project beneficiaries, if possible Validation of views through key informant interview

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
be insufficient to allow for the project outcomes/benefits to be sustained? Is there sufficient public/ stakeholder awareness in support of the long-term objectives of the project? Are lessons learned being documented by the Project Team on a continual basis?		Any other relevant source	
Gender considerations: Indicate whether the gender results achieved are short-term or long term.	Considerations added to the unified rating for this criteria	Gender action plan in the PRODOC, if prepared MRT Report PIRs Any other relevant source (project reports, workshop reports, media pieces, etc) Tracking Tool	Cross-verification including with project beneficiaries, if possible Validation of views through key informant interview
Institutional framework and governance sustainability			
KEY QUESTION: How has the project developed appropriate institutional capacity (systems, structures, staff, expertise, etc.) that will be self-sufficient after the project closure date? Conversely, do the legal frameworks, policies, governance structures and processes pose any threat to the continuation of project benefits? ANCILLARY QUESTIONS (if applicable): • *Has the project put in place frameworks, policies, governance structures and processes that will create mechanisms for accountability, transparency, and technical knowledge transfer after the project's closure?* • *How has the project identified and involved champions (i.e. individuals in government and civil society) who can promote sustainability of project outcomes?* • *Has the project achieved stakeholders' (including government stakeholders') consensus regarding courses of action on project activities after the project's closure date?* • *Does the project leadership have the ability to respond to future institutional and governance changes (i.e. foreseeable changes to local or national political leadership)?* • *Can the project strategies effectively be incorporated/mainstreamed into future planning?*	Rating (using the risk likelihood scale)	Key informant interview MRT Report PIRs Any other relevant source	
Gender considerations: Is the institutional change conducive to systematically addressing gender equality and human rights concerns?	Considerations added to the unified rating for this criteria	Gender action plan in the PRODOC, if prepared MRT Report PIRs Any other relevant source Tracking Tool	Cross-verification including with project beneficiaries, if possible Validation of views through key informant interview
Impact, Additionality and Environmental sustainability [add adaptation angle, when applying]			
KEY QUESTION: Do monitoring and evaluation documents provide evidence of the causality between the rationale for GEF involvement and the incremental environmental and other benefits directly associated with the GEF-supported project? OTHER USEFUL QUESTIONS: Are the outcomes related to the incremental reasoning? Are there quality quantitative and verifiable data demonstrating the incremental environmental benefits? Can the outcomes be attributed to the GEF contribution as originally anticipated?	Rating (using the risk likelihood scale)	TE will not include a mission, so there could be constraints in collecting data here.	Key informant interview, but difficult to say if we will be able to answer the questions.

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Are the outcomes sustainable? TWO ADDITIONAL KEY QUESTIONS: (1) Are there environmental factors that could undermine the future flow of project environmental benefits? (2) Will certain activities in the project area pose a threat to the sustainability of project outcomes? Is there evidence that project outcomes, both environmental and otherwise, are likely to be sustained beyond the project end? (The TE report can refer to the Sustainability section) If broader impact was anticipated, is there evidence at the completion stage that such a broadening is beginning to occur, or actions towards the broadening have been taken? Does the project contribute to changes in policy/legal/regulatory frameworks, including observed changes in capacities (awareness, knowledge, skills, infrastructure, monitoring systems, etc.) and governance architecture, including access to and use of information Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?			
Gender equality and women's empowerment: How did the project contribute to gender equality and women's empowerment?			
KEY QUESTIONS: • *How were gender considerations integrated in the project's design, including through a gender analysis with the specific context of the project for advancing gender equality and women's empowerment and a gender action plan with a specific implementation plan for the delivery of gender activities, with indicators, targets, budget, timeframe and responsible party?* • *How appropriate and adaptive was the gender action plan in facilitating gender mainstreaming objectives.* • *How were gender issues integrated in the project's strategy, rationale and theory of change, including how advancing gender equality and women's empowerment will advance the project's environmental outcomes?* • During implementation what systematic and appropriate efforts were made to include diverse groups of stakeholders (e.g. women's groups)?	NA – qualitative	PRODOC Gender-dedicated stakeholder survey (tentative) Key informant interview PPG Reports, if available RTA / CO interview PIRs Technical Reports	Survey Analysis, if possible to apply it. Identify any gaps in integrating or addressing gender issues through the proposed questions. Cross-verification
How was the UNDP Gender Marker rating assigned to the project document realistic and backed by the findings of the gender analysis?	Yes / No, plus qualitative assessment		
Monitoring & Evaluation (1) design and (2) implementation)			
Was the M&E plan well-conceived, practical and sufficient at the point of CEO Endorsement?	Yes/no – Summarizing analysis from the elements below to for a rating.	PRODOC PIR Tracking Tool MRT Report Project Technical Reports Any other relevant source	Cross verification Validation of views through key informant
Did the M&E plan include a baseline, SMART34 indicators and data analysis systems, and evaluation studies at specific times to assess results?	Yes/no		
Were baseline conditions, methodology, logistics, time frames, and roles and responsibilities well-articulated?	Yes/no		
Was data on specified indicators, relevant GEF/LDCF/SCCF Tracking Tools/Core Indicators gathered in a systematic manner?	Yes/no		
Extent of compliance with progress and financial reporting requirements, including quality and timeliness of reports;	NA - qualitiative		
Extent to which information provided by the M&E system was used to improve and adapt project performance	NA - qualitiative		
Risk Management			
KEY QUESTIONS:	NA - qualitiative	PRODOC	Cross verification

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
(1) How did project risks affect project implementation? (2) What systems and tools were used to identify, prioritize, monitor and manage project risks? (3) Were any risks overlooked and what were the consequences of that? ANCILLARY QUESTIONS: • *Were new risks or changes to existing risks reported on in the annual PIRs and/or MTR (if applicable)?* • *Was the project's risk register properly maintained during implementation?* • *Did the Project Team keep the Project Board informed of new risks, changes to existing risks and the escalation of risks?* • *Were action plans developed and followed? Was escalation necessary?*		PIR UNDP Risk log Any other relevant source	Validation of views through key informant
Social and Environmental Safeguards			
KEY QUESTION: Were social and environmental safeguards effectively designed and implemented? ANCILLARY QUESTIONS: • *Were existing risks' ratings (Low, Moderate, Substantial and High) changed; how?* • *Were the revisions appropriate given the context of the project at the time? Were they done in a timely manner?* • *How were management measures adjusted, if at all?*	NA - qualitiative	PRODOC PIR Tracking Tool MRT Report Project Technical Reports Any other relevant source	Cross verification Validation of views through key informant
UNDP oversight/implementation			
(M&E) Extent to which UNDP delivered effectively on activities related to project identification, concept preparation, appraisal, preparation of detailed proposal, approval and start-up, oversight, supervision, completion and evaluation. This includes but is not limited to: 1) Adequacy, quality and timeliness of UNDP support to the Implementing Partner and Project Team 2) Candor and realism in annual reporting 3) Quality of risk management o Responsiveness to significant implementation problems (if any) 4) Adequate oversight of the management of environmental and social risks as identified through the UNDP SESP.	Rating according to 6-point scale	PRODOC, formal and de facto management arrangements RTA / CO interview Implementing Partner interview Any ither source	Cross-verification Validation of views through key informant interview
Implementing Partner Execution			
(M&E) Extent to which the Implementing Partner effectively managed and administered the project's day-to-day activities under the overall oversight and supervision of UNDP. This includes but is not limited to the following: • *Whether there was an appropriate focus on results and timeliness* • *Appropriate use of funds, procurement and contracting of goods and services* • *Quality of risk management* • *Candor and realism in annual reporting* • *Adequate management of environmental and social risks as identified through the UNDP SESP and implementation of associated safeguards requirements (assessments, management plans; if any).* ANCILLARY QUESTIONS ON COUNTRY OWNERSHIP: • *Did the project concept have its origin within the national sectoral and development plans?* • *Have outcomes (or potential outcomes) from the project have been incorporated into the national sectoral and development plans?* • *Are relevant country representatives (e.g., governmental official, civil society, etc.) actively involved in project identification, planning and/or implementation?* • *Has the recipient government maintained financial commitment to the project?* • *Has the government approved policies and/or modified regulatory frameworks in line with the project's objectives?*	Rating according to 6-point scale	PRODOC, formal and de facto management arrangements RTA / CO interview Implementing Partner interview Any ither source	Cross-verification including with project beneficiaries, if possible Validation of views through key informant interview

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
• *Were the relevant country representatives from government and civil society involved in project implementation, including as part of the Project Board?* • *Was an intergovernmental committee given responsibility to liaise with the Project Team, recognizing that more than one ministry should be involved?*			
Cross-cutting issues			
Project overall management and Adaptive Management -changes in project design during implementation			
SOME USEFUL QUESTIONS: • *What caused the changes in project management arrangements vis-à-vis project design?* • *To what extent the recommendations from MTR were followed?* • *If the changes were extensive, how did they materially change the expected project outcomes?* • *Were the project changes articulated* in writing and then considered and approved by the Project Board?	NA – Qualitative	PRODOC PIRs Technical Reports from the project MTR Report Financial management information Key informant interview Any other relevant source	Cross-verification Validation of views through key informant interview
Replication			
How were lessons from other relevant projects properly incorporated in the project design? What are project lessons learned, failures/lost opportunities to date? What might have been done better or differently?	NA - Qualitative	PRODOC PIRs Technical Reports from the project MTR Report Key informant interview Any other relevant source	Cross-verification Validation of views through key informant interview
GEF Additionality			
• *Are the outcomes related to the incremental reasoning?* • *Are there quality quantitative and verifiable data demonstrating the incremental environmental benefits?* • *Do self-evaluations provide evidence of the outcomes achieved in creating a more supportive environment as envisaged at the endorsement stage?* • *Can the outcomes be attributed to the GEF contribution as originally anticipated?* • *Do monitoring and evaluation documents provide evidence of the causality between the rationale for GEF involvement and the incremental environmental and other benefits directly associated with the GEF-supported project?* • *Are the outcomes sustainable?* • *Is there evidence that project outcomes, both environmental and otherwise, are likely to be sustained beyond the project end? (The TE report can refer to the Sustainability section)* • *If broader impact was anticipated, is there evidence at the completion stage that such a broadening is beginning to occur, or actions towards the broadening have been taken?*	High level project indicators and those in the Tracking Tool	PRODOC PIRs Technical Reports from the project MTR Report Tracking Tool Key informant interview Any other relevant source	Cross-verification Validation of views through key informant interview

ANNEX VI) QUESTIONNAIRE USED AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS

/ Refer to Executive Summary for the Summary of Results. /

Note: No fixed stakeholder questionnaire was used. Rather, the TE consultant adapted the Evaluation Questions (above) to the different interview situations.

ANNEX VII) EVALUATION CONSULTANT AGREEMENT FORM

[From TOR's Annex E x 2]

ANNEX E: EVALUATION CONSULTANT CODE OF CONDUCT AND AGREEMENT FORM

Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form[6]

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: Fabiana Issler

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): UNPD Angola

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at *place* on *date* Rio de Janeiro,07 November 2021

Signature: 

[6]www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct

ANNEX E: EVALUATION CONSULTANT CODE OF CONDUCT AND AGREEMENT FORM

Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
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3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form[6]

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: Alicja Biesmer

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): UNPD Angola

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at *place* on *date* Katovice ,07 November 2021

Signature: Alicja Biesmer

[6] www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct

ANNEXED IN A SEPARATE FILE: TE AUDIT TRAIL

[included as a separate file}

ANNEXED IN A SEPARATE FILE: TERMINAL GEF TRACKING TOOL

The full set of TTs including the end-of-project AMAT were availed to the TE and analyzed on 22-Nov-2021.

OTHER ANNEXURES FOR INFORMATION AND REFERENCE

ANNEXURE A) MUNICIPALITIES AND COMMUNES IN CUVELAI PROVINCE (FROM 2014 CENSUS)



Número de municípios, comunas e localidades do Cunene, 2014

Municípios	Comunas	Localidades		
		Urbana	Rural	Total
Cunene	20	46	804	850
Kuanhama	5	15	177	192
Ombandja	5	15	195	210
Kuvelai	4	4	99	103
Curoca (EX Oncocua)	2	0	86	86
Namacunde	2	8	156	164

Source: INE - National Institute for Statistics (2014)
Resultados Definitvos, Recesseamento Geral da População e da Habitação de Angola 2014, Provícia do Cunene

Note: The tabulation of localities is still ongoing. There is no consolidated list.

ANNEXURE B) TABULATED LIST OF COMMUNES IN CUNENE PROVINCE (AS STANDARDIZED IN 2016)

PAÍS	PROVÍNCIA			MUNICÍPIO		COMUNA		DISTRITO URBANO		CÓDIGO ALFA NUMÉRICO
COD	CÓDIGO		NOME	CÓDIGO	NOME	CÓDIGO	NOME	CÓDIGO	DISTRITO URBANO	
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	01	Ombandja	01	Humbe			AOCNE170101
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	01	Ombandja	02	Mucope			AOCNE170102
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	01	Ombandja	03	Naulila			AOCNE170103
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	01	Ombandja	04	Ombala yo Mungu			AOCNE170104
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	01	Ombandja	05	Xangongo			AOCNE170105
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	02	Cuanhama	01	Ondjiva			AOCNE170201
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	02	Cuanhama	02	Nehone Cafima			AOCNE170202
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	02	Cuanhama	03	Evale			AOCNE170203
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	02	Cuanhama	04	Tchomporo Oximolo			AOCNE170204
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	02	Cuanhama	05	Môngwa			AOCNE170205
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	03	Curoca	01	Oncócua			AOCNE170301
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	03	Curoca	02	Chitado			AOCNE170302
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	04	Cahama	01	Cahama			AOCNE170401
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	04	Cahama	02	Otchinjau			AOCNE170402
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	05	Cuvelai	01	Mupa			AOCNE170501
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	05	Cuvelai	02	Mukolongodjo			AOCNE170502
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	05	Cuvelai	03	Cassueca			AOCNE170503
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	05	Cuvelai	04	Calonga			AOCNE170504
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	06	Namacunde	01	Namacunde			AOCNE170601
AO	CNE	17	Cunene	06	Namacunde	02	Chiede			AOCNE170602

Source: Diário da República, I Série, Nº 97, Quarta-feira, 15 de Junho de 2016
LEI N.º 8_16_ CODIFICAÇÃO DAS CIRCUNSCRIÇÕES TERRITORIAIS

Terminal Evaluation for UNDP-GEF supported project [CUVELAI PROJECT]

Background

1. Introduction

In accordance with UNDP and GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full- and medium-sized UNDP-supported GEF-financed projects are required to undergo a Terminal Evaluation (TE) at the end of the project. This Terms of Reference (ToR) sets out the expectations for the TE of the *full-sized* project titled **Promoting climate-resilient development and enhanced adaptive capacity to withstand disaster risks in Angolan's Cuvelai River Basin** (PIMS# 5166) implemented through the *Executing Agency: UNDP / Implementing Partner: Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment (MCTA) in Angola via its National Directorate for Environment and Climate Action (DNAAC)*.

The Cuvelai Project started on the *Feb 11th, 2016* and is in its *6th* year of implementation after getting a non-cost extension of eighteen months. The TE process must follow the guidance outlined in the document 'Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-Supported, GEF-Financed Projects' Guidance for Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported GEF-financed Projects

2. Project Description

The **Cuvelai Project** aims to remove several barriers that exist at the county level to establish an effective Flood Forecasting Early Warning System (FFEWS) in the Province of Cunene and promote climate-resilient development to enhance adaptive capacity of Cuvelai River Basin Communities in Cunene to withstand disaster risks. The **main barriers** to overcome include: i) limited knowledge and capacity to fully assess risks posed by climate change to disaster risks in the Province of Cunene; ii) lack of capacity of the extension network to enhance responsiveness and adaptability of subsistence agriculture in the Province of Cunene; and iii) poor inter-sectorial coordination and weak policy framework to respond to change risks. Other obstacles in the path include obsolete and inadequate weather and climate monitoring infrastructure, which limits data collection, analysis and provision of meteorological and hydrological services and the absence of an operational Climate Change Environmental Information System in Angola to allow systematic storage and mainstreaming of digital information to support decision making in sector planning.
The **key objectives** of the full-sized LDCF-financed project, implemented by the MCTA, will: i) enhance the capacity of national and local hydro-meteorological services, civil authorities and environmental institutions to monitor extreme weather and climate change in the Province of Cunene; ii) increase the resilience of smallholder farmer communities in the Basin to climate-induced risks and variabilities via access to locally-appropriate climate data and germplasm resources; iii) strengthen local institutional capacities for coordinated, climate-resilient planning; and iv) improve the capacity for effective community-based climate change adaptation (including traditional knowledge practices) at local level. The project was designed to have three components for activity implementation and one component for project management. 2 will be operationally closed on Aug 11th, 2021. Most of the Activities were implemented in the Province of Cunene and in Luanda. In addition, since March 2020 the project faced difficulties and

1

Summary of Comments on TOR_Dummy.pdf

Page: 1

Number: 1 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 05:19:38 PM

The evaluation timeline goes beyond this date. What can I expect as a consultant in terms of receiving feedback and having my products commented upon and approved?

Number: 2 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 05:18:37 PM

constrains related to the Covid-19 Pandemic and the Angolan Government restructuring process due to the economic and financial crisis facing the country.

The TE will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP and GEF as reflected in the [1]NDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF Financed Projects. The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the achievement of project results, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming in Angola.

As of 19 April 2021, Angola reported a total 24,300 of confirmed COVID, of which 22,576 are fully recovered. The registered 561 deaths due to COVID. The country is exercising smart sanitary fencing in areas where there is increased number of reported cases (particularly for the capital city – Luanda). Travelers moving from Luanda to the provinces are required to undergo mandatory COVID testing. The flights are open for few airline companies with limited weekly flights. The pandemic affected negatively some of the above described project activities as a result of limited travels in-country and internationally.

3. TE Purpose

The TE report will assess the achievement of the project results supported by UNDP against what was expected to be achieved, and draw lessons that can improve the sustainability of benefits from the project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming and Angolan Government GEF project implementation. The TE report promotes accountability and transparency, and assesses the extent of projects accomplishments.

The TE is also intended to draw lesson learnt from the project experiences in developing conducive climate change policies and capacity building activities to enhance knowledge and technical capacity at the country level.

4. TE Approach & Methodology

The TE must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful.

The TE consultant will review all relevant sources of information including documents prepared during the preparation phase (i.e. PIF, UNDP Initiation Plan, UNDP Social and Environmental Screening Procedure/SESP) the Project Document, project reports including annual PIRs, project budget revisions, lesson learned reports, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based evaluation. The TE consultant will review the baseline and midterm GEF focal area Core Indicators/Tracking Tools submitted to the GEF at the CEO endorsement and midterm stages and the terminal Core Indicators/Tracking Tools that must be completed before the TE evaluation begins.

The TE consultant is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with the UNDP & MCTA Project Team, the GEF Operational Focal Point in the country, other government counterparts, Implementing Partner, the UNDP Country Office(s), the Regional Technical Advisors, direct beneficiaries and other stakeholders.

Engagement of stakeholders is vital to a successful TE. Stakeholder involvement should include interviews with stakeholders who have project responsibilities, including but not limited to:

- Ministry of Energy and Water (MINEA), particularly INAMET, INRH and GABHIC.

Number: 1 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 05:20:15 PM

- Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MINAGRIP), particularly DA, IIA, CRF and Department of Food Security (GSA)
- Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Environment (MCTA), particularly CETAC
- Ministry of Interior (MININT), Particularly PCB in Cunene
- Provincial Governments in Cunene
- Experts from NGOs such as: Development Workshop (DW), ADPP, Lutheran World Federation
- Experts from Private Sector Consultancy firms such as: GeoGestão, Get2C, Ambimetric, Coba, Adasa, Incatema, Rescue-3 and Cicci.
- Community Beneficiaries in Cunene where activities were implemented.

As of 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a global pandemic as the new coronavirus rapidly spread to all regions of the world. Travel to the country has been restricted since 25 March and travel in the country is also limited. If it is not possible to travel to or within the country for the TE mission then the TE consultant should develop a methodology that takes this into account the conduct of the TE virtually and remotely, including the use of remote interview methods and extended desk reviews, data analysis, surveys and evaluation questionnaires. This should be detailed in the TE Inception Report and should be clearly outlined in the inception report and be fully discussed and agreed between UNDP, MCTA, stakeholders and the TE consultant.

If all or part of the TE is to be carried out virtually then consideration should be taken for stakeholder availability, ability or willingness to be interviewed remotely. In addition, their accessibility to the internet/computer may be an issue as many government and national counterparts may be working from home. These limitations must be reflected in the final TE report.

If a data collection/field mission is not possible then remote interviews may be undertaken through telephone or online (skype, zoom etc.).

The specific design and methodology for the TE should emerge from consultations between the TE consultant and the above-mentioned parties regarding what is appropriate and feasible for meeting the TE purpose and objectives and answering the evaluation questions, given limitations of budget, time, data and possible travel restrictions due to Covid-19 pandemic.
The TE consultant must use gender-responsive methodologies and tools and ensure that gender equality and women's empowerment, youth sensitive as well as other cross-cutting issues and SDGs are incorporated into the TE report.
The final TE report should describe the full TE approach taken and the rationale for the approach making explicit the underlying assumptions, challenges, strengths and weaknesses about the methods and approach of the evaluation.

Detailed Scope of the TE

The TE will assess project performance against expectations set out in the project Logical Framework/Results Framework (https://www.thegef.org/project/promoting-climate-resilient-development-and-enhanced-adaptive-capacity-withstand-disaster; https://www.thegef.org/project/addressing-urgent-coastal-adaptation-needs-and-capacity-gaps-angola). The TE will assess results according to the criteria outlined in the Guidance for TEs of

Page: 2

Number: 1 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 05:41:21 PM
Some of the acronyms need to written outright.

Number: 2 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 05:40:17 PM

Number: 3 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 05:48:12 PM
What is SPCB? Serviço de Protecção Civil e Bombeiros?

Number: 4 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 05:41:37 PM

Number: 5 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 05:50:53 PM
I suggest FAO, since the agency will be soon implementing a landscape MFA project in the Cunene basin.

Number: 6 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 05:55:09 PM
This is not too much a problem, given that I can call officials on the their cell phones at low cost to me and zero cost to them. However, the pace of interviewing will likely be longer than in a normal TE, due to the time zone difference between Brazil and Angola.

Number: 7 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 05:54:24 PM

Number: 8 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 05:56:37 PM
It will be very important to be guided by the project manager on who to interview. I would hold planning teleconferences with the project team to establish a list and have the full contacts.

Number: 9 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 05:57:20 PM

Number: 10 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 05:57:52 PM
I will propose semi-structured interviews based on a short-list of stakeholders.

Number: 11 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 05:58:38 PM

Number: 12 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 05:58:23 PM

UNDP-supported GEF-financed Projects (Guidance for Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported GEF-financed Projects)

The Findings section of the TE report will cover the topics listed below.
A full outline of the TE report's content is provided in ToR Annex C.
The asterisk "(*)" indicates criteria for which a rating is required.

Findings:

Project Design/Formulation

- National priorities and country driven-ness
- Theory of Change
- Gender equality and women's empowerment
- Social and Environmental Safeguards
- Analysis of Results Framework: project logic and strategy, indicators
- Assumptions and Risks
- Lessons from other relevant projects (e.g. same focal area) incorporated into project design
- Planned stakeholder participation
- Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector
- Management arrangements

Project Implementation:

- Adaptive management (changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation)
- Actual stakeholder participation and partnership arrangements
- Project Finance and Co-finance
- Monitoring & Evaluation: design at entry (*), implementation (*), and overall assessment of M&E (*)
- Implementing Agency (UNDP) (*) and Executing Agency (MCTA) (*), overall project oversight/implementation and execution (*)
- Risk Management, including Social and Environmental Standards

Project Results

- Assess the achievement of outcomes against indicators by reporting on the level of progress for each objective and outcome indicator at the time of the TE and noting final achievements
- Relevance (*), Effectiveness (*), Efficiency (*) and overall project outcome (*)
- Sustainability: financial (*) , socio-political (*), institutional framework and governance (*), environmental (*), overall likelihood of sustainability (*)
- Country ownership
- Gender equality and women's empowerment
- Cross-cutting issues (poverty alleviation, improved governance, climate change mitigation and adaptation, disaster prevention and recovery, human rights, capacity development, South-South cooperation, knowledge management, Youth participation and promotion, Extension Services, etc., as relevant)
- GEF Additionality
- Catalytic Role / Replication Effect
- Progress to impact

Main Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons Learned:

- The TE consultant will include a summary of the main findings of the TE report. Findings should be presented as statements of fact that are based on analysis of the data.
- The section on conclusions will be written in light of the findings. Conclusions should be comprehensive and balanced statements that are well substantiated by evidence and logically connected to the TE findings. They should highlight the strengths, weaknesses and results of the project, respond to key evaluation questions and provide insights into the identification of and/or solutions to important problems or issues pertinent to project beneficiaries, UNDP and the GEF, including issues in relation to youth and gender equality and women's empowerment.
- Recommendations should provide concrete, practical, feasible and targeted recommendations directed to the intended users of the evaluation about what actions to take and decisions to make. The recommendations should be specifically supported by the evidence and linked to the findings and conclusions around key questions addressed by the evaluation.
- The TE report should also include lessons that can be taken from the evaluation, including best practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success that can provide knowledge gained from the particular circumstance (programmatic and evaluation methods used, partnerships, financial leveraging, etc.) that are applicable to other GEF and UNDP interventions. When possible, the TE consultant should include examples of good practices in project design, management and implementation.
- It is important for the conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned of the TE report to include results related to youth and gender equality and empowerment.

The TE report will include an Evaluation Ratings Table.

Expected Outputs and Deliverables

The TE consultant shall prepare and submit:

- TE Inception Report: TE consultant clarifies objectives and methods of the TE no later than *2 weeks* before starting the TE desk work and mission. TE consultant submits the Inception Report to the Commissioning Unit and project management. Approximate due date: 30 *July 2021*
- Presentation: TE consultant presents initial findings to project management and the Commissioning Unit at the end of the TE work and mission. Approximate due date: 40 *August 2021*
- Draft TE Report: TE consultant submits full draft report with annexes *within 3 weeks* of the end of the TE mission. Approximate due date: 73 *September 2021*
- Final TE Report* and Audit Trail: TE consultant submits revised report, with Audit Trail detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final TE report, to the Commissioning Unit *within 1-2 week* of receiving UNDP comments on draft. Approximate due date: 90 *September 2021*

*The final TE report must be in English. If applicable, the Commissioning Unit may choose to arrange for a translation of the report into a language more widely shared by national stakeholders.

The TE consultant must have proficiency (read and speak) in Portuguese language.

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Number: 1 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:14:09 PM

Number: 2 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:16:50 PM

This is contradictory. There will be no mission -- i.e. field mission. Yet, if "mission" here is a synonymous with "assignment", then it should read 2 weeks after the assignment start. The start date should be stated in the contract. Also, whether this date can feasibly be "30 July 2021" will depend on the date of contracting. The comment on the viability of dates applies to all dates mentioned herein.

Number: 3 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:13:44 PM

Number: 4 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:16:22 PM

Number: 5 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:17:38 PM

This is a very tight timeline.

Number: 6 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:17:09 PM

Number: 7 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:16:55 PM

Number: 8 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:19:23 PM

QUERRY: How will this activity taking place in September 2021 be possible if the project will operationally close in August?

Number: 9 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:16:24 PM

Number: 10 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:18:10 PM

Not a problem.

All final TE reports will be quality assessed by the UNDP Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). Details of the IEO's quality assessment of decentralized evaluations can be found in Section 6 of the UNDP Evaluation Guidelines.[1]

TE Arrangements

1 NDP Project Manager will support the implementation of remote/ virtual meetings. An updated stakeholder list with contact details (phone and email) will be provided by the Country office to the evaluation Consultant. 2

The Project Manager will arrange introductory virtual meetings within the CO and the DRR, also to establish initial contacts with partners and project staff. The consultant will take responsibility for setting up meetings and conducting the evaluation, subject to advanced approval of the methodology submitted in the inception report.
The CO Project Manager will develop a management response to the evaluation within two weeks of report finalization. Also, will convene an Advisory Panel comprising of technical experts to enhance the quality of the evaluation.
The Project Manager will provide support to provide all relevant documents, assisting in setting virtual interviews with senior government officials and to arrange most interviews with project beneficiaries.

TE Evaluator Requirements

An *independent evaluator* (home based) will conduct the TE. The candidate should be an expert *with* 3 *experience and exposure to projects and evaluations of Climate Change Adaptation, preferably in Southern Africa region. Experience in* 4 *daptation projects at river basin level will be desirable.* 6 *he Evaluator is encouraged to seek support from a local consultant from Angola if justifiable to facility his/her work with institutions in country*. 5 The TE consultant will be fully accountable for all evaluation process and submissions 7 case s/he engages a local expert (with contractual arrangements to be made by the TE consultant). 8 ~~herefore, the evaluator will be responsible for *the overall design and writing of the TE report, assess emerging trends with respect to regulatory frameworks, budget allocations, capacity building, work with the Project Team in developing the TE itinerary, etc.*~~ 9

The evaluator cannot have participated in the project preparation, formulation and/or implementation (including the writing of the project document), must not have conducted this project Mid-Term Review and should not have a conflict of interest with the project's related activities.

Duration of the Work

The total duration of the TE will be approximately *35 working days)* over a time period of *(15 weeks)* 10 ween 15 July *2021* and 30 September 2021. The expected start date of contract is *15 July 2021.*

12 proposed 13 eframe is as follows: 11

- *30 June 2021:* Closing date for proposals submission
- *09 July 2021:* Selection of TE Consultant
- *20 July 2021:* 3 Days Prep the TE Consultant (handover of project documents)
- *27 July 2021: 3* days (recommended 2-4): Document review and preparing TE Inception Report

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Number: 1 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:19:49 PM

Number: 2 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:20:08 PM
Yes. In line with my comment further up.

Number: 3 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:21:23 PM

Number: 4 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:21:29 PM

Number: 5 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:27:07 PM
I really need the commissioning unit to confirm (1) if this will be needed, (2) who would be contracting the national consultant. If my company needs to engage this consultant, this will affect the price. If I need to be fully accountable for the work of a national consultant, the person would need to be subcontracted by us.

Number: 6 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:21:44 PM

Number: 7 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:26:15 PM

Number: 8 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Cross-Out Date: 22-Jun-21 06:34:46 PM

Number: 9 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:37:33 PM
This phrase seems to want to 'reinforce the obvious', which is to say that the evaluator is responsible for its reports. Yet, it is not very clear and its content seems to propose that the TE should cover a number of diverse issues that are way beyond its scope.

Assess "emerging trends in regulatory frameworks" e.g. is not necessarily part of the TE. This would be a study on its own. The TE should be concerned with its own findings, and to the extent that they underpins an independent opinion of the evaluator on the project.

IMPORANT: I would like to suggest that the phrase cross out here is eliminated from the TOR. In addition, it has nothing to do with TE requirements.

Number: 10 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Inserted Text Date: 22-Jun-21 06:48:27 PM
Indicatively...

Number: 11 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:48:15 PM
IMPORTANT: I would like to propose that the timeline is approached as indicative and flexible. This should be explicit in the TOR. In our experience, if remote interviewing is to take place instead of a field mission, the time needed will need to follow what is possible, in light of (1) difficulties connecting with people; (2) time difference between Brazil and Angola.

Also, I would like to ask again how this timeline is possible if the project will be operationally closed in Aug 2021.

Number: 12 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:38:34 PM

Number: 13 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Inserted Text Date: 22-Jun-21 06:48:48 PM
indicative

- *03 August 2021: 2* days: Finalization and Validation of TE Inception Report- latest start of TE mission
- *03 August - 17 August: Field Mission (Preparation & Execution) – Not applicable*
- *28 August 2021:* Preparation of draft TE report
- *03 September 2021:* Circulation of draft TE report for comments
- *17 September 2021:* Incorporation of comments on draft TE report into Audit Trail & finalization of TE report
- *24 September 2021:* Preparation & Issue of Management Response
- *30 September 2021:* Expected date of full TE completion

Duty Station
Travel: Not applicable

Competencies

Required Qualifications
The selection of evaluator will be aimed at maximizing the overall "expert" qualities in the following areas:
Education

- At least a Master's Degree in *(Climate Change Adaptation)* or other closely related field; 1

Experience

- Relevant experience with results-based management evaluation methodologies;
- Experience applying SMART indicators and reconstructing or validating baseline scenarios;
- Competence in adaptive management, as applied to Focal Area *(*Climate Change - Adaptation*);*
- Experience in evaluating projects;
- Experience working in *(Lusophony African Countries);*
- Experience in relevant technical areas for at least *10 years;* 20+ years 2
- Demonstrated understanding of issues related to gender, youth and *(*Climate Change - Adaptation*);* experience in gender and youth responsive evaluation and analysis;
- Excellent communication skills;
- Demonstrable analytical skills;
- Project evaluation/review experience within United Nations system will be considered an asset.
- Experience with implementing evaluations remotely will be considered an asset.

Language

- Fluency in written and spoken English.
- Fluency in reading, speaking and understanding Portuguese.

English as native Portuguese is the native language. 3

Required Skills and Experience

Evaluator Ethics

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Number: 1 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Pencil Date: 22-Jun-21 06:44:00 PM

Number: 2 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Text Box Date: 22-Jun-21 06:44:22 PM

20+ years

Number: 3 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Text Box Date: 22-Jun-21 06:45:25 PM

English as native
Portuguese is the native language.

not a problem. 1

The TE consultant will be held to the highest ethical standards and is required to sign a code of conduct upon acceptance of the assignment. This evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation'. The evaluator must safeguard the rights and confidentiality of information providers, interviewees and stakeholders through measures to ensure compliance with legal and other relevant codes governing collection of data and reporting on data. The evaluator must also ensure security of collected information before and after the evaluation and protocols to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of sources of information where that is expected. The information knowledge and data gathered in the evaluation process must also be solely used for the evaluation and not for other uses without the express authorization of UNDP and partners. 2

Payment Schedule

- 20% payment upon satisfactory delivery of the final TE Inception Report and approval by the Commissioning Unit
- 40% payment upon satisfactory delivery of the draft TE report to the Commissioning Unit 3
- 40% payment upon satisfactory delivery of the final TE report and approval by the Commissioning Unit and RTA (via signatures on the TE Report Clearance Form) and delivery of completed TE Audit Trail

Criteria for issuing the final payment of 40%

- 5 he final TE report includes all requirements outlined in the TE TOR and is in accordance with the TE guidance. 4
- The final TE report is clearly written, logically organized, and is specific for this project (i.e. text has not been cut & pasted from other MTR reports). 6
- The Audit Trail includes responses to and justification for each comment listed.

In line with the UNDP's financial regulations, 7 hen determined by the Commissioning Unit and/or the consultant that a deliverable or service cannot be satisfactorily completed due to the impact of COVID-19 and limitations to the TE, that deliverable or service will not be paid. 8

APPLICATION PROCESS

Selected consultants from the Evaluations vetted roster will be contacted to submit their technical and financial proposals after shortlisting of illegible experts based on their language proficiency and regional expertise.

Scope of Price Proposal and Schedule of Payments

Financial Proposal:

- Financial proposals must be "all inclusive" and expressed in a lump-sum for the total duration of the contract. The term "all inclusive" implies all cost (professional fees, travel costs, living allowances etc.);
- For duty travels (when applicable), the UN's Daily Subsistence Allowance (DSA) rates are for Luanda and Cunene, which should provide indication of the cost of living in a duty station/destination *(Note: Individuals on this contract are not UN staff and are therefore not entitled to DSAs. All living allowances required to perform the demands of the ToR must be incorporated in the*

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Number: 1 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Text Box Date: 22-Jun-21 06:45:53 PM
not a problem.

Number: 2 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Pencil Date: 22-Jun-21 06:45:31 PM

Number: 3 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Pencil Date: 22-Jun-21 06:45:56 PM

Number: 4 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:49:47 PM
In the section called "Requirements", there is a phrase that I have suggested removed from the TOR. Everything else is fine.

Number: 5 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:46:07 PM

Number: 6 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Pencil Date: 22-Jun-21 06:49:55 PM

Number: 7 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 06:50:51 PM

Number: 8 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 06:59:22 PM
I am a little bit concerned about this clause. It seems to transfer the burden of covid-19 impact 100% to the consultant, which is not fair. We will need to come to terms on what is reasonable here.

financial proposal, whether the fees are expressed as daily fees or lump sum amount.)

- The lump sum is fixed regardless of changes in the cost components.

Recommended Presentation of Proposal

1. **Letter of Confirmation of Interest and Availability** using the template provided by UNDP;
2. **CV** and a **Personal History Form** (P11 form);
3. **Brief description of approach to work/technical proposal** of why the individual considers him/herself as the most suitable for the assignment, and a proposed methodology on how they will approach and complete the assignment; (max 1 page)
4. **Financial Proposal** that indicates the all-inclusive fixed total contract price and all other travel related costs (such as flight ticket, per diem, etc.), supported by a breakdown of costs, as per template attached to the Letter of Confirmation of Interest template. If an applicant is employed by an organization/company/institution, and he/she expects his/her employer to charge a management fee in the process of releasing him/her to UNDP under Reimbursable Loan Agreement (RLA), the applicant must indicate at this point, and ensure that all such costs are duly incorporated in the financial proposal submitted to UNDP.

All application materials should be submitted to by email at the following address ONLY: *(insert email address)* by *(30th of June 2021)*. Incomplete applications will be excluded from further consideration.

Criteria for Selection of the Best Offer

Only those applications which are responsive and compliant will be evaluated. Offers will be evaluated according to the Combined Scoring method – where the educational background and experience on similar assignments will be weighted at 70% and the price proposal will weigh as 30% of the total scoring. The applicant receiving the Highest Combined Score that has also accepted UNDP's General Terms and Conditions will be awarded the contract.

Annexes to the TE ToR

Annexes to the TE ToR will be shared only with the shortlisted candidates. These includes:

- ToR Annex A: Project Logical/Results Framework
- ToR Annex B: Project Information Package to be reviewed by TE consultant
- ToR Annex C: Content of the TE report
- ToR Annex D: Evaluation Criteria Matrix template
- ToR Annex E: UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluators
- ToR Annex F: TE Rating Scales and TE Ratings Table
- ToR Annex G: TE Report Clearance Form
- ToR Annex H: TE Audit Trail template

ToR Annex C: Content of the TE report

Title page

- Tile of UNDP-supported GEF-financed project
- UNDP PIMS ID and GEF ID

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Number: 1 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Highlight Date: 22-Jun-21 07:00:48 PM

Number: 2 Author: TE.Cons Subject: Sticky Note Date: 22-Jun-21 07:01:36 PM

For the PROPOSAL stage, it will be brief. The comments to the TOR here are part and parcel of the mentioned proposal.

- TE timeframe and date of final TE report
- Region and countries included in the project
- GEF Focal Area/Strategic Program
- Executing Agency, Implementing partner and other project partners
- TE Consultant

Acknowledgements
Table of Contents
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Executive Summary (3-4 pages)

- Project Information Table
- Project Description (brief)
- Evaluation Ratings Table
- Concise summary of findings, conclusions and lessons learned
- Recommendations summary table

Introduction (2-3 pages)

- Purpose and objective of the TE
- Scope
- Methodology
- Data Collection & Analysis
- Ethics
- Limitations to the evaluation
- Structure of the TE report

Project Description (3-5 pages)

- Project start and duration, including milestones
- Development context: environmental, socio-economic, institutional, and policy factors relevant to the project objective and scope
- Problems that the project sought to address: threats and barriers targeted
- Immediate and development objectives of the project
- Expected results
- Main stakeholders: summary list
- Theory of Change

Findings
(in addition to a descriptive assessment, all criteria marked with (*) must be given a rating)

Project Design/Formulation

- Analysis of Results Framework: project logic and strategy, indicators
- Assumptions and Risks
- Lessons from other relevant projects (e.g. same focal area) incorporated into project design
- Planned stakeholder participation
- Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector

Project Implementation

- Adaptive management (changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation)
- Actual stakeholder participation and partnership arrangements
- Project Finance and Co-finance

- Monitoring & Evaluation: design at entry (*), implementation (*), and overall assessment of M&E (*)
- UNDP implementation/oversight (*) and Implementing Partner execution (*), overall project implementation/execution (*), coordination, and operational issues
- Risk Management incl. Social and Environmental Standards (Safeguards)

Project Results

- Progress towards objective and expected outcomes (*)
- Relevance (*)
- Effectiveness (*)
- Efficiency (*)
- Overall Outcome (*)
- Country ownership
- Gender & Youth
- Other Cross-cutting Issues
- Sustainability: financial (*), socio-economic (*), institutional framework and governance (*), environmental (*), and overall likelihood (*)
- Country Ownership
- Gender equality and women's empowerment
- Cross-cutting Issues
- GEF Additionality
- Catalytic Role / Replication Effect
- Progress to Impact

Main Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations & Lessons

- Main Findings
- Conclusions
- Recommendations
- Lessons Learned

Annexes

- TE ToR (excluding ToR annexes)
- TE Mission itinerary
- List of persons interviewed
- List of documents reviewed
- Summary of field visits
- Evaluation Question Matrix (evaluation criteria with key questions, indicators, sources of data, and methodology)
- Questionnaire used and summary of results
- Co-financing tables (if not include in body of report)
- TE Rating scales
- Signed Evaluation Consultant Agreement form
- Signed UNEG Code of Conduct form
- Signed TE Report Clearance form
- *Annexed in a separate file*: TE Audit Trail
- *Annexed in a separate file:* relevant terminal GEF/LDCF/SCCF Core Indicators or Tracking Tools, as applicable

ToR Annex E: UNEG Code of Conduct for Evaluators

Independence entails the ability to evaluate without undue influence or pressure by any party (including the hiring unit) and providing evaluators with free access to information on the evaluation subject. Independence provides legitimacy to and ensures an objective perspective on evaluations. An independent evaluation reduces the potential for conflicts of interest which might arise with self-reported ratings by those involved in the management of the project being evaluated. Independence is one of ten general principles for evaluations (together with internationally agreed principles, goals and targets: utility, credibility, impartiality, ethics, transparency, human rights and gender equality, national evaluation capacities, and professionalism).

Evaluators/Consultants:
Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.

- Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
- Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
- Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
- Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
- Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
- Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.
- Must ensure that independence of judgement is maintained, and that evaluation findings and recommendations are independently presented.
- Must confirm that they have not been involved in designing, executing or advising on the project being evaluated and did not carry out the project's Mid-Term Review.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System:

Name of Evaluator: _____

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant):

_____

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at _____ (Place) on _____ (Date)

Signature: _____

-○◯○-