

# **GREEN CITIES: INTEGRATED SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT FOR BATUMI AND THE ACHARA REGION (ISTBAR)**

GEF Project ID: 5468

UNDP PIMS ID: 4980

Atlas Project ID: 82231

Project ID: 91251

## **FINAL REPORT**

**Submitted by**

**Ángel Aparicio**

**November 29<sup>th</sup>, 2020**

Fundación Agustín de Betancourt

Universidad Politécnica de Madrid

Avenida profesor Aranguren s/n

28040 MADRID (Spain)

Tel: +34 913 365 235 E-mail: [angel.aparicio@upm.es](mailto:angel.aparicio@upm.es)



## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

Recognition is due to the many people who dedicated their time to meet with the evaluator and share their experiences and knowledge, which served to produce this report. Rusudan Kardava, national consultant for the terminal evaluation, undertook the desk review of project documents and the interviews in Georgian. The UNDP CO in Georgia, and in particular the Project Manager and the Administrative and Financial Officer, attended the requests of the evaluators with diligence and efficiency. The evaluation team is also grateful to John O'Brien and Bahtiyar Kurt, respectively Regional Advisor and Regional Technical Support Specialist at the UNDP Regional Office in Europe and Central Asia.

## **DISCLAIMER**

Due to the travel restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, this report was produced without conducting any field mission. All the relevant stakeholders were interviewed remotely, except those that did not answered to the evaluators' requests.

Once the terminal evaluation started, the project has been granted an additional extension until end of October 2020 in order to complete the construction works for the demonstration corridor in Batumi. The evaluation plan was adjusted in order to cover this extension and to be able to assess the completion of these works.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Acknowledgments .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Acronyms and Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Executive Summary.....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1. Introduction.....</b>	<b>17</b>
1.1. Purpose of the evaluation.....	17
1.2. Scope and methodology .....	17
1.3. Evaluation instruments .....	21
1.4. Structure of the TE report .....	21
<b>2. Project Description and Development Context.....</b>	<b>22</b>
2.1. Project start and duration.....	22
2.2. Problems that the project sought to address .....	22
2.3. Immediate and development objectives of the project .....	23
2.4. Baseline indicators established .....	23
2.5. Main stakeholders.....	25
2.6. Expected results .....	30
<b>3. Findings .....</b>	<b>33</b>
3.1. Project Design .....	33
3.1.1. Analysis of Project Results Framework (project strategy and indicators).....	33
3.1.2. Assumptions and risks .....	36
3.1.3. Lessons from other relevant projects incorporated into project design.....	39
3.1.4. Planned stakeholder participation.....	39
3.1.5. Replication approach .....	40
3.1.6. UNDP comparative advantage.....	40
3.1.7. Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector .....	40
3.1.8. Management arrangements .....	41
3.2. Project Implementation .....	41
3.2.1. Adaptive management .....	41
3.2.2. Partnership arrangements.....	42
3.2.3. Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management .....	43
3.2.4. Project Finance .....	44
3.2.5. Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation .....	46
3.2.6. UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation / execution, coordination, and operational issues .....	48
3.2.7. COVID impact on project implementation .....	49
3.3. Project Results.....	50
3.3.1. Overall results (attainment of objectives) .....	50

3.3.2. Relevance .....	55
3.3.3. Effectiveness .....	56
3.3.4. Efficiency .....	57
3.3.5. Country ownership .....	58
3.3.6. Mainstreaming .....	58
3.3.7. Sustainability .....	59
3.3.8. Impact .....	61
<b>4. Conclusions, Recommendations and Lessons .....</b>	<b>63</b>
4.1. Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project .....	63
4.2. Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project .....	67
4.3. Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives .....	68
4.4. Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success ....	69
<b>Annexes .....</b>	<b>73</b>
Annex 1: Terms of Reference .....	75
Annex 2: Evaluation Question Matrix .....	93
Annex 3: Questionnaire used and summary of results .....	99
Annex 4: Rating Scales .....	101
Annex 5: TE mission itinerary (not implemented) .....	102
Annex 6: List of persons interviewed .....	103
Annex 7: List of documents reviewed .....	105
Annex 8: Signed UNEG Code of Conduct form .....	107
Annex 9: Signed TE report clearance form .....	108
Annex 10: GEF Tracking Tool .....	109
Annex 11: Terminal Evaluation Audit Trail .....	113



## List of Tables

TABLE 1: Rating scales (Source: UNDP, 2012) .....	18
Table 2: General Work Plan to Conduct the Terminal Evaluation.....	20
Table 3: Main activities at each MTR stage .....	20
Table 4: List of stakeholders participating in the project .....	27
Table 5: SMART analysis of project indicators .....	36
Table 6: Project Budget and Expenditure, per Component .....	45
Table 7: Budget share per component .....	45
Table 8: Main project contracts.....	45
Table 9: Co-financing mobilized by the ISTBAR project .....	46
Table 10: Review of M&E Work Plan.....	47
Table 11: Review of key assumptions in the TEEMP model for the demonstration corridor in Batumi.....	51
Table 12: Summary of GHG and energy saving indicators .....	52
Table 13: Achievement of indicators' targets and project's outcomes.....	53

## List of Figures

Figure 1: Relevance, involvement and key relationships among stakeholders .....	29
Figure 2: Project Flowchart (ProDoc) .....	31
Figure 3: Project Flowchart (Inception report).....	31
Figure 4: The project approach and its monitoring by PRF indicators .....	35



## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AWP	Annual work plan
BUDS	Batumi Urban Development Strategy
CNG	Compressed Natural Gas
CO	Country office
CoM	Covenant of Mayors
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EV	Electric vehicle
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, German Cooperation Agency
GoG	Government of Georgia
GUD	Green Urban Development
HEV	Hybrid electric vehicle
ISUTP	Integrated Sustainable Urban Transport Plan (also referred to as Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan, SUMP)
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, German Bank for Reconstruction
MoENRP	Ministry of Environment and National Resources Protection (currently Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture)
MoI	Ministry of Internal Affairs
MoIT	Ministry of Industry and Trade
MoE	Ministry of Energy (currently merged within the Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development)
MoRDI	Ministry of Regional Development and InfrastructuRe
MoESD	Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development
NIM	National implementation modality
NGOs	Non-Government Organizations
NNLE	Batumi Municipal Transport Infrastructure Agency (NNLE)
PIF	Project Identification Form
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PHEV	Plug-in hybrid electric vehicle
PMU	Project Management Unit

ProDoc	UNDP Project Document
PEB	Project Executive Board
GEL	Georgian Lari
SUMP	Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan
SUT	Sustainable urban transport
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
USD	United States Dollar

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Project summary table

Project title:	Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for Batumi and the Achara Region (ISTBAR)		
UNDP Project ID (PIMS #)	4980	PIF Approval Date:	10 - Sep - 2013
GEF Project ID (PMIS #)	5468	CEO Endorsement Date:	18 - Feb - 2015
ATLAS Business Unit, Award # / Proj. ID:	GEO10 82231 / 91251	ProDoc Signature Date (date project began):	18 - Sep - 2015
Country:	(GE) Georgia	Date Project Manager hired:	21 – Aug - 2015 Start date: 1 – Sep - 2015
Region:	Europe and Central Asia	Inception Workshop date:	22 – Dec – 2015
Focal Area:	Climate Change- Mitigation	Midterm Review Completion Date:	30 – Jan - 2018
GEF Focal Area Strategic Objective:	GEF-5/CCM-4: Promote energy efficient, low-carbon transport and urban systems	Planned Operational Closure Date:	17 – Sep – 2019
Trust Fund:	GEF TF	If revised, proposed op. closing date:	31 - Oct - 2020
Implementing Partner (GEF Executing Entity):	Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection (MoENRP)		
Other execution partners:	City of Batumi		
NGOs/CBOs involvement	Through consultation: Civil Society Institute, Institute of Demoracy, Changes for Equal Rights, Black Sea Eco-Academy		
Private sector involvement	Achara Chambe of Commerce and Trade		
Geospatial coordinates of project sites	Batumi public transport corridor: 41.6472, 41.6309 Batumi new parking site: 41.6464, 41.6419		
Financial Information			
PDF/PPG	At approval (US\$)		At PPG completion (US\$)
GEF PPG grants for project preparation	50,000		47,372 (including US\$ 4,750 Agency Fee)
Co-financing for project preparation	0		0
Project Financing	at CEO endorsement (US\$)	at Midterm Review (US\$)	At Terminal Eval. (US\$)
[1] GEF financing:	853,000	317,143	846,004
[2] UNDP contribution:	280,000	121,201	313,000
[3] Government: MOENRP	100,000	0	0
[4] Gov: City of Batumi (*)	10,284,000	3,970,914	12,617,139
[5] Other parties:	0	0	0
[6] Total co-financing [2+3+4+5]	10,664,000	4,092,115	12,930,139)
PROJECT TOTAL COSTS [1+6]	11,517,000	4,409,258	13,776,144

(\*) Only expenditures materialized in SUT-focused activities have been considered. Including municipal agencies “Agency of Urban Infrastructure and Public Works” (NNLE) and Batumi Avtotransport.

### Project description

The Georgia Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for the City of Batumi and the Achara Region (ISTBAR) project is a four-year UNDP-supported GEF-financed project with the objective of promoting

sustainable transport in the City of Batumi and Region of Achara. Its implementing partner (IP) is the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MoENR), and the Responsible Party (RP) is the City of Batumi<sup>1</sup>.

The project objective, as stated in the Project Document (PRF, and par. 38), is *"to promote sustainable urban transport in the City of Batumi and the Region of Achara"*. Together with it, the project supports *the formulation of national and regional policies on sustainable urban transport. Aside from assisting the City of Batumi and other municipalities of the Achara Autonomous Republic, in adoption of a green approach to urban transport development, the Project also aims to directly generate GHG reductions from sustainable urban transport pilot measures in Batumi and indirectly generate GHG reductions from regional and national policies on the urban transport that have been developed through technical support provided by the project"*. The project direct GHG emissions reduction target is 877 tons CO<sub>2eq</sub>, and the estimated indirect<sup>2</sup> emission reductions are 560,000 tons CO<sub>2eq</sub> (top-down) or 2,631 tons CO<sub>2eq</sub> (bottom-up).

The project strategy includes actions structured into four components: (1) Development and adoption of sustainable urban mobility plan (SUMP) for the city of Batumi and for other municipalities of Achara; (2) development of sectoral feasibility studies and functional plans for specific sustainable urban measures for demonstration / pilot measures in Batumi; (3) support of investments in sustainable urban mobility measures in Batumi; (4) support to the development of national policy on sustainable urban transport (SUT).

The project starting date was 18 September 2015, and the inception workshop was held on 22 December 2015. Mid-term evaluation was completed on 30 January 2018. The project planned closing date was 17 February 2019, but it was extended, first until 31 July 2019 and subsequently until 31 July 2020; finally, due to the constraints imposed by the COVID-19 quarantine an additional 3-month project extension, until 31 October 2020, was also granted.

The total original project cost was USD 11,517,000, including a GEF grant of USD 853,000, a UNDP contribution of USD 121,101, USD 100,000 of co-financing from the MoENRP, and USD 10,284,000 co-financed by the City of Batumi. The final project cost has been USD 13,776,144, in which the UNDP contribution has been USD 313,000 and the co-financing from the City of Batumi and its municipal agencies has reached USD 12,617,139. At the time of closures of this TE report, the GEF contribution spent or committed was USD 846,004 or 99.2% of the awarded grant,

The COVID-19 pandemic did not have significant impact on the project pilots thus far, as public works were allowed in spite of the restrictions. However, traffic in Batumi and other cities significantly decreased, as well as public transport and minibus services. There was some evidence of an increase in walking and cycling, but proposals to support these modes were not implemented as, with the exception of the mayor of Tbilisi, Georgian decision makers remained focused on the facilitation of car traffic.

The number of public transport passengers drastically decreased, from 40,000 passengers per day before the pandemic to 23,000 in September 2020, and since September 25, all public transport services in Adjara were cancelled. The financial loss of the municipal bus company will be covered by the municipality, as there have been no measures to provide economic compensations to transport operators. The same applies to the private operators of minibuses.

<sup>1</sup> In this report, the terms City of Batumi and municipality are used interchangeably; references to the "City Council" are specific to the political body of elected officials; references to the "City Hall" are specific to the administrative and technical services of the municipality.

<sup>2</sup> We keep the term "indirect emissions" in this report, to be consistent with the ProDoc. In 2015, GEF introduced the term "consequential emissions" to refer to the indirect emissions: [https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN\\_GEF.C.48.Inf\\_09\\_Guideline\\_on\\_GHG\\_Accounting\\_and\\_Reporting\\_for\\_GEF\\_Projects\\_4.pdf](https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/council-meeting-documents/EN_GEF.C.48.Inf_09_Guideline_on_GHG_Accounting_and_Reporting_for_GEF_Projects_4.pdf) November 2020

### Evaluation Rating Table

Project evaluation results are summarized in the rating table below.

Evaluation ratings	Rating	Comments
<b>Overall Terminal Evaluation Rating</b>	<b>MS</b>	
<b>1. Monitoring and Evaluation: Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S) Moderately Satisfactory (MS), Moderately Unsatisfactory, (MU), Unsatisfactory (U), Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
M&E design at entry	MS(4)	
M&E Plan Implementation	S (5)	
Overall quality of M&E	MS(4)	
<b>2. IA &amp; EA Execution: Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S) Moderately Satisfactory (MS), Moderately Unsatisfactory, (MU), Unsatisfactory (U), Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
Quality of UNDP implementation	S (5)	
Quality of Execution- Executing Agency	U (2)	
Overall quality of implementation/ Execution	MS(4)	
<b>3. Assessment of Outcomes</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
Relevance: relevant (R) or not relevant (NR)	R	
Effectiveness	MU(3)	
Efficiency	MS(4)	
Overall Project Outcome Rating	MS(4)	
<b>4. Sustainability: Likely (L); Moderately Likely (ML); Moderately Unlikely (MU); Unlikely (U)</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
Financial resources	L	
Socio-economic	MU	
Institutional framework and governance	MU	
Environmental	ML	
Overall Likelihood of Sustainability	MU	
<b>5. Impact: Significant (S), Minimal (M), Negligible (N)</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
Environmental status improvement	N	
Environmental stress reduction	M	
Progress against stress/ status change	M	
<b>OVERALL PROJECT RESULTS</b>	<b>MS</b>	

### Summary of conclusions, recommendations and lessons

The following conclusions, can be highlighted:

- Conclusion #1: The project had to cope with a challenging mid-stage crisis, at the time of moving from the delivery of technical studies to the actual implementation of actions on the ground. Within its risk analysis, the ProDoc identified some of the causes which could prevent the implementation of the demonstrations and provided mitigation measures for them. These causes were the lack of the expected co-financing and an uncertain political situation leading to a drop in tourism and in public transport revenues. Although relevant, these risks did not materialize during the project, but the demonstrations were delayed by many months. The ProDoc did not provide much guidance on how the PMU could effectively navigate through this difficult stage.

Three main shortcomings can be identified at the project's pilot stage, in accordance with the interviews and the review of project studies: (1) at the ISUTP level, there was a lack of identification

of uncontroversial measures, which could have been quickly implemented while the pilots were prepared; (2) the feasibility and functional studies focused almost exclusively on technical issues, and did not include the consensus-building process to gain the support among key stakeholders necessary for successful implementation of the proposed measures; (3) detailed implementation responsibilities within the municipality were not properly identified in the feasibility studies or in other documents, making it difficult and time-consuming for the PM to properly monitor the implementation process within the municipality, specially taking into consideration the lack of previous experience among local officials in the implementation of disruptive pilots like the ones included in the project.

It would have been useful to have outlined a Plan B in the event that co-financing fails to materialize that could, for example, envisage the implementation of pilots in other cities (in fact, during the first Project Board Meetings the option of including Kutaisi was proposed by UNDP and dismissed by the implementing partner).

- Conclusion #2. The ProDoc adequately identified four key risks, but it failed to associate them by the subsequent political risk of local decision-makers in Batumi deciding not to implement the pilots. Such risk was firstly identified in PIR-2017 (“local government will not remain committed to implementation of the Project and/or change in government after elections”). PIR-2017 established a sound mitigation strategy for this risk, although it was not successful in getting the pilots launched until well after the new mayor took office. In retrospective, it is easy to say that PIR-2018 was too optimistic in considering that the risk was then at a “non-critical” level, and that it would have been better to have continued the mitigation measures to keep pressure on the local government. This would have been consistent with the UNDP/GEF technical advisor statement in PIR-2018 that “the risk of co-financing failing to materialize is high”.
- Conclusion #3. The project ambioned to intervene at the local, regional and national level. This implied interaction with a large number of stakeholders, the delivery of many technical reports and networking activities and pushing forward many decision-making processes. Whereas the ProDoc defined the local strategy in Batumi in quite concrete terms, it was not providing sufficient indications on what should be done at the regional and national levels. This lack of detail in what should be done at the regional and national level resulted in some shortcomings in the PRF, with clear overlap between outcomes 1 and 4, and indicators with ambiguous definition. Moreover, outside Batumi, the other towns and villages in the Achara region were too small to adequately undertake the innovative mobility measures foreseen in the project. The difficulties encountered to get adequate offers in some of the bidding processes and the need to extend the project well beyond its initial completion date suggest that the scope of the project was too wide compared with the resources available (USD 853,000 from GEF and USD 280,000 from UNDP). Furthermore, all the co-financing mobilized by the project came from the City of Batumi or from UNDP. This suggests that the actual interest and commitment that could be expected from other key partners (national government, regional government and most of the municipalities in the Achara region) could have been overestimated during the project design stage.
- Conclusion #4. In its cooperation with international organizations, the adoption of national strategies and plans by the Government of Georgia has encountered delays and difficulties (e.g. National Energy Efficiency Action Plan, developed in 2015 and not approved until end 2019, V-NAMA not approved); Although this was not included within the risk analysis carried out in the ProDoc (which could have resulted in a more elaborated approach to component #4), it was subsequently addressed by the



UNDP Country Office (including its Resident Representative) through intense lobbying of key national authorities during project implementation. Although not fully effective (the national strategy was not endorsed by any governmental body), this action was useful in bringing urban mobility to the attention of the national government.

- Conclusion #5. The stakeholder analysis did not clearly stress the need to identify those local actors in Batumi that could be reluctant to the implementation of sustainable mobility measures inside or outside the City Hall. Discussions on the selection of the demonstration corridor had already started at the project design stage, providing some early evidence of the different views within the municipality and among key local stakeholders, and notably from the traffic police (reporting to the national government, not to the municipality).
- Conclusion #6. The environmental and social screening procedure (ESSP) did not identify any significant gender and social equity impacts in the project, and the ProDoc did not specifically address these issues. Although this is understandable at the time the project was designed (the potential of transport projects to deliver significant social and gender impacts had not been sufficiently stressed by GEF and within UNDP yet), it resulted in a very poor performance in the gender dimension; the project clearly failed to advance gender and social equity challenges in Batumi related to mobility.
- Conclusion #7. The ProDoc provided excellent guidance and supporting materials (ToR, job descriptions, consultancies...) to facilitate a quick and smooth start of the project. The PMU structure proposed by the project proved to be effective, and the inclusion of an international CTA provided the necessary know-how on international best practice, and the ability to effectively guide the various consultants.
- Conclusion #8. The insufficiency of the stakeholder analysis provided by the ProDoc (see conclusion #5) was not addressed during project implementation by the PMU or the consultants. The consequence is that the project was not able to properly identify the nature of the passive opposition towards the implementation of demonstrations in Batumi, a basis for establishing a winning coalition that could have succeeded in the implementation of the pilots.
- Conclusion #9. The awareness-raising plan designed and implemented by the project failed to build up the support needed to reach the timely implementation of the demonstrations in Batumi. The plan was designed as a tool for the local government, and its actions focused on children and young people- although they were not targeted by the demonstrations in Batumi-, wrongly assuming that local decision makers were fully aligned with the project and that these awareness-raising activity should take an educational character for future generations. As the implementation of the demonstrations started to be delayed, the PMU partly compensated this weakness through intensive communication actions in the local, regional and national media, as an effective way to put some pressure on reluctant local decision makers.
- Conclusion #10. Together with the assumption of the project's mitigation objectives, ownership of project monitoring by the institutional partners (local, regional and national government) is necessary to facilitate the project's sustainability after completion. In this sense, the lack of success of the project in setting up a GHG emission monitoring system within the City Hall is a significant weakness in the likelihood to attain the project's sustainability.
- Conclusion #11. The main key initial benefits from the project, as identified in this report, stem mainly from the first half of the project and include the following: (1) delivery of high-quality medium and

long-term strategic documents to Batumi and other municipalities, the region of Achara and the national government; (2) delivery of concrete proposals- some of them including detailed feasibility studies- for implementation in Batumi, other municipalities, the region of Achara and the country, including critical reforms of the regulatory framework; (3) significant increase in the interest of the media in sustainable urban mobility, thanks to the ubiquitous presence of the project in TV, printed press and social media; (4) development of transport models and other urban transport planning tools to support factual-based decision-making.

- Conclusion #12. The project's main objective is to promote sustainable transport in the City of Batumi and in the Region of Achara (and some municipalities within the region) in Georgia. To attain this, the project developed a threefold strategy (1) establishing consistent integrated policies at local, regional and national level; (2) pilots to reduce CO2 emissions through the improvement of public transport and modal shift from car use; (3) capacity building of local, regional, national governments and regulatory reforms.
- Conclusion #13. The PMU has gathered evidence that the COVID pandemic is seriously impacting the operators of public transport and minibuses in Batumi, and probably also in other Georgian cities; proposals to promote cycling during this period have not been implemented by decision makers, with the exception of Tbilisi, leaving citizens with few options except car use. Whereas this situation calls for undertaking urgent action to recover public transport, it also opens an opportunity to undertake some key public transport reforms, based on the project's SUMPs for Batumi and other jurisdictions.
- Conclusion #14. Although total co-financing from the City of Batumi (including its municipal agencies) reached USD 12,617,139, exceeding by 18% the USD 10,664,000 foreseen in the Project Document, it was not aligned with the project's expectations. 66% of the final co-financing came from the purchase of new CNG and electric buses, and most of the critical co-financing needed for the implementation of the bus corridor and paid parking pilots suffered a significant delay and did not materialize until the second half of 2020. The municipal agency (NNLE Agency of Urban Infrastructure and Public Works), identified as responsible party for the implementation of the bus corridor pilot, did not sign a Letter of Agreement with UNDP until 28 April 2020 as it had to wait for the Mayor's authorization; the LoA was subsequently amended in June 2020 to include the parking pilot. Although the MoENRP and the Regional Government of Achara were included in the ProDoc co-financing table, they did not provide the expected resources.
- Conclusion #15. UNDP was successful in keeping the project moving forward and to attain most of its targets in a high challenging environment. Since the design stage until completion, UNDP had to partner with four different mayors in Batumi, the last three of them during the implementation stage. Such unstable political environment resulted in substantial delays and repeated attempts to water down the measures to be implemented. Although the City of Batumi proved to be an extremely difficult partner, UNDP successfully preserved the partnership and was able to gain the trust of every mayor and get relevant sustainable mobility measures implemented in Batumi.

The following lessons learned deserve to be highlighted from the ISTBAR project:

- Lesson #1. At the performance level, the management scheme put in place in the project was highly effective thanks to (1) a core team limited in size, avoiding the inclusion of too specific positions; (2) permanent external support provided by an experienced international CTA who lives in Georgia, familiar with state-of-the-art international practice in sustainable urban mobility and knowledge of the Georgian context; (3) strong support from UNDP CO executives (including the UNDP Resident

Representative) whenever they were required to lobby for the needed involvement from political leaders at the local, regional and national levels.

- Lesson #2. The effective quality control of the consultants' deliverables provided by the PM and the CTA was decisive to obtain high-quality documents. The excellent technical background and qualifications provided by the PM and the CTA made it possible to provide this detailed quality control.
- Lesson #3. Effective public communication provided mainly by the PM, through a variety of media channels and including visibility at the international level and publication of research papers was effective in keeping the municipality of Batumi and other governments active in the project during the last months, in spite of the limited interest of their political leaders.
- Lesson #4. Project implementation requires a strong stakeholders' analysis consistent with an adequate awareness-raising plan. The project failed to adequately identify some of the stakeholders that could be influential in the implementation of the various feasibility studies and functional plans, and could not establish subsequently adequate strategies to build enough consensus and to cope with hidden or passive opposition.
- Lesson #5. A successful project implementation requires an adequate description and management of complex political risks. The risk of decision-makers changing priorities and stepping back from their commitments was inadequately assessed in the ProDoc and in the annual PIRs. It is well-known that this political risk is the most difficult one to manage in GEF projects, and that it is difficult to provide general advice on how to manage and mitigate it.

As a result of this terminal evaluation, the following recommendations are made:

Rec #	TE Recommendation	Entity Responsible	Time-frame
<b>A</b>	<b>Category one: Recommendations on future project design</b>		
A.1	The Regional Hub is recommended to request from project designers the inclusion of detailed guidance on how to successfully move from the planning stage to the actual implementation of pilots. In particular, this could be done through the identification of some "low-hanging fruit", i.e. uncontroversial short-term low-cost measures that can be quickly implemented and gain the attention and support of the public, the media and decision makers towards sustainable mobility. Furthermore, successful delivery of such outputs would create a more confident environment among stakeholders to subsequently undertake the implementation of more complex key project demonstrations.	Istanbul Regional Hub	6 months
A.2	The Regional Hub is recommended to request, from Country Offices and project designers, basic feasibility studies regarding the prospects for actual implementation of key project outputs, such as pilots and transport plans. Such feasibility studies would facilitate a realistic alignment of the project's scope and ambitions with the resources and political capital actually available, as well as the identification of alternative implementation strategies in case of lack of materialization of critical co-financing or other resources.	Istanbul Regional Hub	1 year

Rec #	TE Recommendation	Entity Responsible	Time-frame
<b>B</b>	<b>Category 2. Project implementation</b>		
B.1	The Regional Hub is recommended to encourage Project Managers to include, within the ToR for the development of sustainable mobility plans and strategies, the identification of short-term low-cost actions for immediate implementation. To provide this, technical consultants can build upon the guidance provided in the project document (see recommendation A.1) and look for actions able to strengthen the confidence of the stakeholders on the project, before undertaking the more ambitious and complex demonstrations foreseen. In the urban transport field, this is particularly relevant for actions to promote public transport and parking management.	Istanbul Regional Hub	1 year
B.2	In the implementation of sustainable mobility projects, the regional hub is recommended to encourage PMU to make sure that consultants are engaging the adequate civil servants at all the governmental levels (those in charge at the local level of public transport management, street design maintenance, traffic control... or at the national level of climate change mitigation, transport service inspection and control...) during the preparation of their technical reports, and to carefully identify the profile of the participants needed at each co-creation workshop, training event and other activities. This is a way to empower them through “hands-on training” to play an active role in the project and to undertake the replication and sustainability of the project.	Istanbul Regional Hub	1 year
B.3	The UNDP CO is recommended to integrate a social and gender perspective within ToR for technical assistance, particularly for those projects that do not include a Gender Action Plan. Although the ISTBAR project adequately identified that the facilitation of public transport would favour female mobility, it failed to undertake a review of its potential to improve living conditions for women and other vulnerable groups (such as access to PT-related jobs, increasing accessibility of socially stressed neighbourhoods with low accessibility, as identified in the household survey or revising security, quality and comfort conditions in PT services).	UNDP	1 year
B.4	The UNDP CO is recommended to encourage PMUs to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of all those stakeholders involved in the implementation of controversial pilots and other measures, with the support of the technical consultants involved. This would facilitate the monitoring of the implementation process.	UNDP CO	6 months
<b>C</b>	<b>Category 3. Implementing partners' and other stakeholders' involvement</b>		
C.1	The UNDP CO executive level is recommended to continue intervening at the proper political level whenever there are signs of insufficient political commitment from national, regional or local governments, and particularly during transitioning periods in political leadership. The ISTBAR project proved that such strong involvement was effective in realigning at least some governmental partners in the attainment of project's objectives.	UNDP CO  Istanbul Regional Hub to instruct other UNDP COs	6 months
C.2	The Project Manager is recommended to provide an assessment of the actual involvement and commitment of key stakeholders- particularly the national government- in the project final report; this assessment could help to update the UNDP strategy for future cooperation with the government.	Project Manager	Immediate

Rec #	TE Recommendation	Entity Responsible	Time-frame
C.3	The Project Manager is recommended to include in the project final report an analysis of the critical co-financing that did not materialize and that has prevented the full implementation of the pilots in Batumi and of the SUMP's in the Achara region.	Project Manager	Immediate
<b>D</b>	<b>Category 4. Strengthening participation and co-creation</b>		
D.1	The regional hub is recommended to encourage setting up permanent participation platforms in the design of future sustainable mobility projects. This would strengthen the role of CSO and NGOs (including those representing women and other vulnerable groups) and facilitate the integration of gender and social dimensions during implementation. This can be an effective way to consolidate the project's profile, to make key stakeholders (and particularly local and national governments) accountable regarding their commitments and to facilitate the replication and sustainability of the project. Setting up such participatory platforms could ideally be considered as a specific output during project design, but could also be integrated within project management in different ways (participation at the Steering Board, advisory or working groups...).	Istanbul regional hub	1 year
<b>E</b>	<b>Category 5. Project Exit Strategy</b>		
E.1	The Project Manager is recommended to produce a final project report, including the following actions to reinforce the positive impacts achieved by the ISTBAR project: (1) A set of final project recommendations addressed by the PMU or by UNDP to the participating local, regional and national governments to facilitate the sustainability of the project, and to be widely disseminated and actively communicated. (2) A final declaration of the participating local, regional and national governments, as well as CSOs and other stakeholders to continue cooperating in the deployment of sustainable mobility policies and actions. (3) A call to consider a formal liaison of the participating Georgian cities with international networks active in sustainable mobility, such as the CIVITAS Forum.	Project Manager	Immediate
E.2	Building upon the project's legacy, the UNDP CO is recommended to further expand sustainable mobility policies in Georgia working with the national government in setting up a permanent Georgian network on sustainable urban mobility, including City Halls, professionals, researchers and NGOs.	UNDP CO	1 year
E.3	Building upon the project's legacy, the UNDP CO is recommended to further expand sustainable mobility policies in Georgia putting in place with the national government a GCF project on sustainable urban mobility, as a follow-up to the ISTBAR project in which, besides the implementation of the actions envisaged in the sustainable mobility plans already produced at the local, regional and national levels, the gender and social dimensions could be properly integrated.	UNDP CO	1 year
E.4	As the demonstration facilities (bus corridor and paid parking lot) will not be completed before the termination of the project, and there is no evidence about their operating conditions, it is recommended to establish an agreement between the City council of Batumi and UNDP CO in order to regularly monitor their operation for at least six months. Furthermore, as no evidence is available on GHG emission savings, it is recommended to make use of the traffic model developed by the project in order to provide an initial estimate of the savings that can be expected.	UNDP CO	Immediate

Rec #	TE Recommendation	Entity Responsible	Time-frame
E.5	The Project Manager is encouraged to contact Batumi and other jurisdictions in order to recall the proposals contained in the SUMP and other studies for public transport reform and improvement, and to encourage these jurisdictions to include these proposals- and the necessary funding within their green post-COVID recovery plans.	Project Manager	Immediate

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Purpose of the evaluation

In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the objectives of this Terminal Evaluation (TE) are "to assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming".

The evaluation is to be undertaken in line with the evaluation policy of UNDP<sup>3</sup>, and the UNDP/GEF<sup>4</sup> evaluation guidance. The UNDP evaluation policy defines evaluation as *"judgment made of the relevance, appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of development efforts, based on agreed criteria and benchmarks among key partners and stakeholders. It involves a rigorous, systematic and objective process in the design, analysis and interpretation of information to answer specific questions. It provides assessments of what works and why, highlights intended and unintended results, and provides strategic lessons to guide decision-makers and inform stakeholders"*.

This Terminal Evaluation is initiated by the UNDP Country Office (CO) in Georgia as the GEF Implementing Agency (IA).

### 1.2. Scope and methodology

The scope of the terminal evaluation includes the whole project cycle from inception to implementation:

- Project strategy (including project inception form and project design.
- Delivery of project's expected results, including assessment of project performance, based against expectations set out in the indicators of the Project Results Framework (PRF), and identifying key barriers and drivers, as well as project's strengths.
- Project implementation and adaptive management, including management arrangements, work planning, project extension, finance and co-finance, monitoring and evaluation systems, stakeholder engagement, reporting, and communications.
- Sustainability of the project results and adequacy of risk management; assessment of financial, socio-economic, institutional and environmental risks to sustainability.
- Conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations.

This evaluation covers the project's activities since the PIF approval date (10 September 2013), and more in detail since the project official start on 18 September 2015, until its termination, now expected on 31 October 2020. Five main stages can be identified within the project's itinerary:

- The formulation stage, concluded on 18 September 2015 with the signature of the project document by the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Protection (MoENRP) of Georgia and the UNDP Resident Representative.

<sup>3</sup> UNDP Evaluation guidelines . Independent Evaluation Office of UNDP, New York, 2019; [http://web.undp.org/evaluation/guideline/documents/PDF/UNDP\\_Evaluation\\_Guidelines.pdf](http://web.undp.org/evaluation/guideline/documents/PDF/UNDP_Evaluation_Guidelines.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-Supported GEF-Financed Projects . UNDP Evaluation Office, New York, 2012; <http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/guidance/GEF/UNDP-GEF-TE-Guide.pdf>  
*Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for Batumi and the Achara Region (ISTBAR)* November 2020

- The inception stage, including the appointment of the project manager (entry on duty 1 September 2015) and other members of the project team, the inception workshop (22 December 2015) and the first project executive board (PEB) meeting on 22 December 2015.
- The strategic stage, which was expected to provide the relevant transport studies and plans necessary for the subsequent implementation of concrete policies and pilots. This strategic phase was mostly completed with the delivery of the Sustainable Urban Mobility Plan for Batumi and its related feasibility studies (final workshop held on 9 June 2017). The Mid-Term Review (MTR) took place at the end of this stage.
- The implementation stage included two main outputs: on the one hand, the implementation of the project pilots; on the other hand, the development of sustainable urban mobility plans or strategies for cities in Achara (besides Batumi) and to the national government.
- As the municipal agencies (NNLE and Batumi Avtotransport) in Batumi are still concluding the implementation of the pilots at the time this TE is delivered, it could be expected that some additional activities will be undertaken in order to establish an exit strategy to facilitate the sustainability of the project.

<b>Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&amp;E, I&amp;E Execution</b>  <b>6: Highly Satisfactory (HS):</b> The project had no shortcomings in the achievement of its objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness, or efficiency <b>5: Satisfactory (S):</b> There were only minor shortcomings <b>4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS):</b> there were moderate shortcomings <b>3. Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU):</b> the project had significant shortcomings <b>2. Unsatisfactory (U):</b> there were major shortcomings in the achievement of project objectives in terms of relevance, effectiveness, or efficiency <b>1. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU):</b> The project had severe shortcomings	<b>Sustainability ratings:</b>  <b>4. Likely (L):</b> negligible risks to sustainability <b>3. Moderately Likely (ML):</b> moderate risks <b>2. Moderately Unlikely (MU):</b> significant risks <b>1. Unlikely (U):</b> severe risks	<b>Relevance ratings:</b>  <b>2. Relevant (R)</b> <b>1. Not relevant (NR)</b>  <b>Impact Ratings:</b>  <b>3. Significant (S)</b> <b>2. Minimal (M)</b> <b>1. Negligible (N)</b>
<i>Additional ratings where relevant:</i> Not Applicable (N/A) Unable to Assess (U/A)		

TABLE 1: Rating scales (Source: UNDP, 2012)



In accordance with the Terms of Reference, the Evaluation Consultant Code of Conduct and the evaluators' experience, several additional methodological principles are applied, such as (i) validation of information: different sources were systematically searched for contrasting and validating the information received; (ii) anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants, (iii) integrity, disclosing the full set of relevant information, and (iv) sensitiveness in the relations with stakeholders.

To address gender and social dimensions, specific questions were included in the evaluation matrix for interviews (Annex 2). Additionally, the review of project's materials took into consideration recent guidance on these dimensions in urban mobility<sup>5</sup>.

The evaluation has been conducted following the steps presented in Table 2, which is adjusted to the milestones established in the UNDP Reimbursable Loan Agreement (RLA) for the TE and two remaining uncertainties: (1) on the feasibility of undertaking the in-filed mission and (2) the date of completion of the works for the implementation of the demonstration corridor in Batumi.

Evaluation Task	Task Completion Date											
	May		June		July		August		Sept.		Oct.	
<b>1. Preparation of the inception report</b> - Review and revision of the PRF - Initial review of project documents - Initial review of AWP, PIRs - Initial review of technical reports - Inception report												
<b>2. Conduction of interviews, desk review of documents</b>												
<b>2.1. Interviews</b> - Map of stakeholders - Phone interviews with project team and Regional Advisor - Phone interviews with international consultants - Phone interviews with national consultants - Phone interviews with local stakeholders												
<b>2.2. Desk review</b> - Review of project documents and management reports - Review of key consultants' deliverables - Review of ToR, budget, contracts - Review of national, regional and local strategies												
<b>3. Draft evaluation report</b> - Additional phone interviews - Additional request of documents - Draft evaluation report circulated among stakeholders												
<b>4. Additional interviews (mission to Georgia was cancelled)</b> - Field visits - Interviews: institutional - Interviews: technical - Interviews: other stakeholders - Debriefing												
<b>Demonstration corridor fully operational<sup>6</sup></b>												*
<b>5. Validation of findings with stakeholders</b>												

<sup>5</sup> Drăguțescu, A. et al (2020). Addressing Gender Equity and Vulnerable Groups in SUMPs. This publication provides an excellent overview of gender challenges in urban mobility planning. Available at [https://www.eltis.org/sites/default/files/sump\\_topic-guide\\_gender-equity\\_vulnerable-groups\\_final.pdf](https://www.eltis.org/sites/default/files/sump_topic-guide_gender-equity_vulnerable-groups_final.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> At the time of delivering this report, it is estimated that the whole demonstration (pilot corridor and paid parking lot) will be operational by mid-December 2020

Evaluation Task	Task Completion Date					
	May	June	July	August	Sept.	Oct.
- Follow up through E-mail or phone calls, as necessary - Reception and review of demonstration results						
<b>6. Submission of Second Draft evaluation report</b>						*
<b>7. Submission of Final Report</b>						*

**Table 2: General Work Plan to Conduct the Terminal Evaluation**

In accordance with the country UNDP office and the UNDP regional hub, it was considered necessary to wait until the demonstration corridor has been fully implemented (which was assumed to happen by the end of September), so that the submission of the final report could be expected by the end of October.

Due to the mobility constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, The TE tasks have been conducted mainly remotely. Furthermore, the request for an additional 3-month project extension in order to allow for the termination of the pilot implementation in Batumi made necessary to extend the TE until the termination of the pilot works. The mission was scheduled for July 2020, at a time where the pilot works were already in progress and a draft TE report had already been circulated. The TE consisted therefore of 3 stages- pre-mission, mission, and post-mission- each one with its particular dynamics and outcomes (**Table 3**).

Pre-mission tasks	Mission Tasks	Post-mission Tasks
Desk review Phone interviews Benchmarking	Interviews On-site data collection and visits Focus group meetings Brain storming with project team	Phone interviews and e-mails Benchmarking

**Table 3: Main activities at each MTR stage**

Pre-mission tasks. These activities usually serve to get a first overview of the project contents and operations and to identify the various professionals involved in its development. They are based on desk review of the project documents and phone interviews with their technical authors and with the key project staff. They are based on the evaluation matrix, and the check-lists or questionnaires for the interviews. The Inception report is presented at the beginning and the draft TE report at the end of this stage. Based on the UNDP CO and Regional Hub feedback on the draft TE report, the mission plan is prepared, including the identification of local stakeholders to interview, the site visit plans, and the focus group meetings.

Mission tasks. Mission tasks were planned to start with a kick-off meeting with project officers and end with a wrap-up meeting, presenting the results of the mission and discussing the path until submission of the final TE Report. The main objective of the mission was to complete the factual information gathered with on-site review of the project activities and face-to-face interaction with local stakeholders, as well as to inspect the demonstration corridor. As a consequence of the COVID pandemic, it was concluded that the mission was not possible. The mission tasks were replaced by additional on-line interviews.

Post-mission tasks. Post mission actions are directed towards the revision, completion and submission of the final TE report, completing the information gaps identified in the previous draft report. At this stage close contact with the project management unit (PMU) and the Regional Technical Advisor (RTA) is vital, in order to make sure that the information has been correctly understood and analyzed and that no relevant elements have been overlooked.

### 1.3. Evaluation instruments

Typically, the quantitative information available at the TE is limited, and the assessment will largely rely on the qualitative information gathered during the interviews. The challenge for the reviewer is to make the most of the interaction with the interviewee (typically one hour at most), and capture the perspective of the interviewees, to put the information gathered in the right context. Herein the importance of preparing in advance the following evaluation instruments:

**Evaluation Matrix:** The evaluation matrix (Annex 2) includes the main evaluation questions, based on the PRF and the contents of the Terms of Reference of the TE. It provides the overall guidance for the process, and serves as a basis for the preparation of the interview guides and the documentation review.

**Documentation Review:** The documents reviewed by the evaluator are listed in Annex 7.

**Phone interviews.** Phone interviews were held by the national or international TE consultants with most of the project consultants and stakeholders. The interview follow the general questionnaire provided in Annex 6, although adapted to the specific areas of involvement of the interviewee in the project.

**Face-to-face interviews:** These interviews are expected to be conducted during the mission in Batumi and Tbilisi, focusing on the main project's stakeholders, the persons involved in the project's implementation and management and the local technical experts. The interviews focused on those additional aspects that were found particularly relevant following the remote interviews and the preparation of the draft report

**Focus group.** The general purpose of focus groups is to analyze the interactions among stakeholders and their relationship vis-à-vis the project's goal and approach. Focus group meetings are expected to be held in Tbilisi (focus on national government) and Batumi (focus on local stakeholders).

### 1.4. Structure of the TE report

This report follows the structure established in Annex F of the ToR for the terminal evaluation. The opening section includes an opening page with basic project information, an executive summary and a list of acronyms and abbreviations. The core report includes an introduction and the following sections:

- Project description and development context.
- TE findings, covering the three dimensions within the scope of the TE: project design, project implementation and project results.
- Conclusions and recommendations.

The annexes gather together the relevant background information for this report: ToR, mission itinerary, list of persons interviewed, summary of filed visits, list of documents reviewed, evaluation matrix, questionnaire used and summary of results (interview guide), and evaluation consultant agreement form.

## 2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

### 2.1. Project start and duration

The official project start date was August 1, 2015<sup>7</sup>. The Project manager was hired on August 21, 2015, and started on September 1, 2015. The inception workshop was held a little more than three months since the project started, on December 22, 2015, and was followed by the first Project Executive Board (PEB), also held on December 22, 2015.

The project initial duration was 48 months, so that its closing date was 31 July 2019. The project requested and obtained from GEF a no-cost extension of 12 months, until 31 July 2020.

Once the TE started, the UNDP CO signed a Letter of Agreement with the Agency of Urban Infrastructure and Public Works (NNLE) of the municipality of Batumi, on April 28<sup>th</sup> 2020, for the implementation of one of the project pilots by NNLE by 20 July 2020. NNLE launched a Request for Quotation (RfQ) for the necessary works and received communications from the offerors stating the impossibility to start works before the constraints imposed by the COVID-19 quarantine had been removed. Accordingly, the UNDP CO requested an additional 3-month project extension until 31 October 2020, which was granted by GEF. The last information provided by NNLE indicates that the bus corridor will be operational by mid-December 2020.

### 2.2. Problems that the project sought to address

The main problem that the project seeks to address is the poor implementation of sustainable urban mobility policies and actions in Georgian cities and mainly in Batumi, a situation that is considered to be rooted in the poor planning practices followed by Governments (at the local, regional and national levels) in this sector. This is stated in the project document (ProDoc, par.12) as follows: *“the root cause for unsustainable urban and transport planning in Batumi as well as Georgia and several other cities of developing countries is the implementation of poor planning practices that emphasize short term benefits and rarely consider long term impacts and benefits”*.

In the case of Batumi, four concrete barriers to the development of sustainable urban transport (SUT) at the local level are identified (ProDoc, par. 15):

- Insufficient local government capacity to undertake holistic approaches to SUT development;
- Insufficient institutional exposure to best international practices to set national standards and regulations for SUT and green urban development (GUD);
- Lack of access to finance for SUT and GUD initiatives;
- Lack of public awareness to support and increase demand for SUT and GUD initiatives being promoted by local government. In Batumi and in the Achara Region there is a general lack of awareness on the benefits of sustainable transport and reduced energy consumption.

The Prodoc (par.29) also provides some examples at the national and local levels in which the necessary holistic approach to urban mobility is not currently possible due to inexistent or inadequate regulatory frameworks: these include the provision of public transport services, road design standards, technical

<sup>7</sup> However, the ProDoc signing start date introduced in PIMS and which usually is considered as the official project start date is September 18, 2015 (probably by mistake).

inspection of vehicles (roadworthiness)<sup>8</sup>, unsafe urban pavement materials for bicycles, on-street parking, and lack of consistent cycling networks.

The ProDoc (par.30) provides particular attention to which will be later proposed as the pilot corridor for the project: *“The Gorgiladze-Baratashvili-Chavachavadze corridor (GBC) which is a main thoroughfare on the perimeter of the old town, frequented by tourists. The City suggested that this corridor could serve as a demonstration or pilot for sustainable transport initiatives to improve traffic flows”*.

The ProDoc points out to existing or under-preparation strategies linked to mitigation of GHG emissions from transport:

- the Sustainable Energy Action Plan (SEAP), adopted by the Batumi City Council in March 2014, following the accession of Batumi to the Covenant of Mayors in 2011. SEAP includes a number of measures on sustainable mobility, such as promoting bicycle and foot travel; smart urban planning, limits to the use of high-emission cars in Batumi. Some concrete measures are also mentioned: improving the infrastructure of public transportation (PT), promoting the use of PT, transition to the energy efficient technologies (CNG and electric vehicles), and the implementation of centralized parking places at the entrance of the city. The ProDoc (Table 4) provides a list of key measures expected to be implemented by 2020, including costs and expected GHG emission savings.
- The Second National Communication of Georgia (submitted in 2009).
- A national policy framework for sustainable transport, a new law on transport and a national transport plan, all of them under development by the Government of Georgia at the time of preparation of the ProDoc. None of these documents have been officially adopted.

### 2.3. Immediate and development objectives of the project

The objective of this Project is “to promote sustainable transport in the City of Batumi and Region of Achara in Georgia”. This objective is formulated in the following way (ProDoc, par.43): *“to address the above barriers, assist Batumi in the accelerated development of sustainable green transport initiatives, and to facilitate replication of green sustainable transport initiatives in other municipalities of the Achara Region”*. This objective is further developed in the ProDoc (par.80), including the project pilot cities and the replication of SUT projects in other cities as the basis for direct GHG emission reductions.

### 2.4. Baseline indicators established

The baseline presented in the ProDoc for Batumi is based on the implementation of the actions already identified in the SEAP: Promotion of active transport modes (walking and cycling), smart urban planning to minimize urban journeys, and limits to the use of high-emission vehicles in Batumi through PT improvements, P+R and transition to energy-efficient technologies (CNG<sup>9</sup> and electricity). The SEAP was officially adopted by the City Council in March 2014.

Additionally, the ProDoc identifies a number of already on-going actions: the development of the Batumi Urban Development Strategy (BUDS, with the support of USAID), the construction of the city bypass highway,

<sup>8</sup> Regulations passed in 2018 require annual technical inspection of private cars in Tbilisi.

<sup>9</sup> Fortunately, CNG buses were finally not implemented; there is wide evidence that their GHG emission levels are similar and even slightly higher than those of diesel buses. For a summary of existing research on this topic, see [https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2020\\_06\\_TE\\_CNG\\_particle\\_report.pdf](https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2020_06_TE_CNG_particle_report.pdf).

the relocation of the railway freight terminal, expanding pedestrian areas in the old city, setup of Batumi Velo (bike rental scheme) in the old city, tendering of a comprehensive urban transport strategy, and construction of a new bridge over the Chorokhi river. There were also other technical assistance initiatives: EC-LEDS program (financed by US-AID), application for an EUROPAID grant to develop biogas for use in urban transport, and an application to INOGATE for hiring qualified transport experts.

Progress in these actions has been limited during the project implementation: the BUDS has not been adopted nor implemented (as there were concerns within the municipality regarding the quality of the document) and the mayor's commitment to develop a Land Use Master Plan has not materialized; the construction of the city bypass started in March 2018, but has not been completed yet, and the relocation of the railway freight terminal remains uncertain. Batumi Velo is operational, but has not been expanded outside the old city, and is used mainly by tourists and for recreational purposes.

For Georgia, the ProDoc's baseline is based on the completion and approval of the various policy documents under preparation by the GoG: national policy framework for sustainable transport, new law on transport, and national transport plan. None of them has been completed or submitted for approval at this time.

The Project Results Framework in the ProDoc included the following indicators<sup>10</sup>:

Indicators related to project objective:

- Cumulative direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions resulting from the GBC demo project and technical assistance to municipalities for SUT functional and detailed engineering plans by EOP, tons CO<sub>2</sub>.
- Cumulative direct energy saving (MJ) from improved traffic efficiency measures for public transit through 2.2 km GBC corridor, and the avoidance of gasoline consumption from cars in the park-and-ride and modal switches to public transport.

Indicators related to Outcome 1: Sustainable transport plans adopted in Batumi and Achara Region:

- Number of versions of the Integrated Sustainable Urban Transport Plans for Batumi prior to adoption by the City by EOP.
- Number of municipalities with adopted ISUTPs by EOP.

Indicators related to Outcome 2: Specific feasibility studies and functional plans developed to lower carbon intensity of urban transport along selected corridors in Batumi.

- Number of feasibility studies for sustainable transport measures in Batumi (there are 4 feasibility studies envisaged by the Prodoc: GBC corridor, CNG buses, parking strategy, hybrid or electric taxi fleets).
- Number of specific functional plans to lower carbon intensity of urban transport along selected corridors in Batumi (there are two functional plans envisaged by the ProDoc: dedicated bus lane and other features along the GBC corridor, and a bicycle network in the old city).

Indicators related to Outcome 3: Sustainable urban transport measures successfully implemented along a selected corridor in the City of Batumi:

- Kilometres of corridor improved with dedicated bus lanes, restricted private car access, synchronized lighting and improved access to bicycles as public transport by Year 3

<sup>10</sup> Some of them were changed following the recommendations of the Mid-Term Review (MTR). These changes are included in Table 13.

- Average number of passengers per bus along improved corridor by EOP
- % increase in average speed of buses through the selected corridor by end of project.
- Average number of cars during Year 4 who are parked in park-and-ride lots and switched to public transit along a SUT-improved corridor.
- Total MJ of energy saved from passengers leaving cars at park-and-ride facilities in favour of public transit by end of project.
- Kilometres of bicycle network improved end of project.

Indicators related to Outcome 4: Sustainable Transport Plans developed and adopted in Batumi and other municipalities in Achara Region and Georgia by end of project:

- Number of institutional mechanisms to support SUT and GUD development in Batumi, the Achara Region and Georgia by end of project.
- Number of feasibility studies and functional plans for SUT in Batumi and other Acharian municipalities by end of project.
- Number of national SUT policies developed for sustainable urban transport by end of project.

The Project inception report states that *“there has been no new updates on the baseline urban transport information provided in the ProDoc. The information in the ProDoc in Paras 24-30 are still relevant to this Project until further information is available. There are provisions in the 2016 work plan for ISTBAR to update the baseline urban transport information, particularly as it pertains to the proposed demonstration SUT corridor referred to as the Gorgiladze-Baratashvili-Chavachavadze or GBC corridor. Furthermore, after the Project recruits International Consultant on Sustainable Transport (ICST) and National Consultant on Sustainable Transport (NCST) a thorough update of the baseline urban transport information compared to ProDoc will be conducted. This might cause need for further update of indicators and targets as described in the Project Results Framework (PRF)”*.

## 2.5. Main stakeholders

The main stakeholders are identified in par.21 and Table 6 of the ProDoc:

- The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection: The MoENRP has competencies, among other, in setting and implementing environmental policies. It was identified as the project implementing partner. This Ministry was merged with the Ministry of Agriculture into the current Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture (MEPA) in December 2017.
- Ministry of Energy: The MoE has the mandate for oversight of the country's supply and quality of primary fuels. While MoE is not directly involved in any climate change mitigation or efficiency-in-transport activities, it is currently negotiating Georgia's membership in European Energy Community (EEC) and the terms of implementing the European Energy Acquis within the Georgian legislative framework. Subsequently, the MoE adopted a *New Energy Policy* in 2015 and has been involved since in the development of a National Energy Efficiency Strategy, although the latter has not been officially adopted yet.
- Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure: MoRDI has the mandate for oversight of modification and modernization of the country's road networks as well as the monitoring of architectural

and construction works in Georgia. MoRDI amongst other functions also sets transport policy for Georgia and has a technical agency that is in charge of organizing technical inspections of motor vehicles, a requirement that was expected to become mandatory for all motor vehicles in 2015, but has not been requested yet.

- Batumi City Hall: Relevant agencies to be involved with a sustainable transport plan in Batumi would include:
  - The Strategic Planning, Investment and Economic Development Department.
  - The Municipal Transport Department.
  - Batumi Autotransport Ltd., the municipal bus company.
  - The Architecture and Urban Planning Services, which at the time of completion of the ProDoc was in charge of the development of the pilot GUD concepts.
- Ministry of Finance and Economy of the Autonomous Republic of Achara: The Transport Department of this Ministry oversees and allocates budget for the development of sustainable transport plans for the City of Batumi and other municipalities in Achara.
- Other Municipalities in Achara: The main municipalities are Keda, Kobuleti, Khelvachauri, Shuakhevi and Khulo, all of them seeking to implement green urban development plans as well as sustainable transport measures. They seek guidance, which will in large part be guided by the demonstrations in Batumi.
- Civil Service Organizations: CSOs have played a prominent role in informing public policy. In particular, the Civil Society Institute is leading the development of Batumi's Urban Development Strategy (BUDS).

The table below summarizes the stakeholders involved in the project and their participation at the inception workshop (IW) and at the Project Steering Committee (PSC) meetings (subsequently referred to as Project Executive Board, PEB) held thus far<sup>11</sup>. It seems from the PEB minutes that the involvement of the GoG, and particularly of the MoENRP, was very low. The participation of the Achara regional government was mainly assured through its International Relations Department. The municipality of Batumi was represented by a City Council member and several City Hall Departments. The Head of the Financial and Economic Service served as National Project Director (NPD), and continued in that position when he moved to serve as Head of the Department of Municipal Companies Coordination; other City Hall units active in the PEB were the Public Transport Division, the municipal bus company (Batumi Avtotransport), the Urban Infrastructure and Public Works Agency (NNLE). The presence of Civil Society Organizations (CSO) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) at PEB meetings was very low.

In accordance with ProDoc, PEB membership was limited to four key stakeholders: MoENRP, Achara regional government, Batumi municipality and UNDP. However, in practice, the operation of the PEB has been very flexible, without establishing a close list of membership. The concrete representatives of these four institutions were not formally communicated, and the PMU has apparently have a lot of freedom to contact and mobilize different departments and units from the various institutions to participate at the meetings.

PEB meeting attendance is summarized in the table below, including the inception workshop (IW). The official members of the PEB identified in the ProDoc are indicated in column M (memberships)

<sup>11</sup> The last PEB meeting was held in March 2019.



Name	Initials	Category	IW	M	1	2	3	4	5	6
Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection	MoENRP	Nat.Gov	0	X			X			0
Ministry of Energy	MoE	Nat.Gov	X							
Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure	MoRDI	Nat.Gov	0							
Batumi. Strategic Planning, Investment and Economic Development Department	B-SP	Local Gov.	X	X						
Batumi City Council	B-CC	Local Gov.	X		X	X	X			
Batumi City Hall. Mayor's Office	B-My	Local Gov.	X							G
Batumi City Hall. Financial-Economic Service/Dpt of Municipal Companies coordination (NPD)	B-FES	Local Gov.	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
Batumi. Public Transport Division	B-PT	Local Gov.	X				X	X	X	X
Batumi. LTD Batumi Avtotransport	B.Avt	Local Gov.	X		X	X		X	X	
Batumi. Architecture and Urban Planning Dpt.	B-AUP	Local Gov.	X							
Batumi. Transport Infrastructure Agency (NNLE)	B-NNLE	Local Gov.	X		X	X	X	X		G
Achara Region. Ministry of Finance and Economy	A-MFE	Reg.Gov.	X	X			X		X	0
Achara Region. International Relations Dpt.	A-IRD	Reg. Gov.	X		X	X	X	X	X	0
Achara Region. Employment Agency	A-EA	Reg.Gov.	X							
Achara Region. Directorate for Environment and Natural Resources	A-ENR	Reg. Gov.	X		X					
Achara Region. Dpt of Administrative Agency Relations	A-AAR	Reg. Gov.							X	X
Batumi. Municipal Policy Department	B-MPD	Local Gov.								G
Keda municipality	KED	Local Gov.	X							
Kobuleti municipality	KOB	Local Gov.	0							
Khelvachauri municipality	KHE	Local Gov.	X							
Shuakhevi municipality	SHU	Local Gov.	X							
Khulo municipality	KHU	Local Gov.	X							
Civil Society Institute	CSI	CSO	X		X				X	
Maritime Transport Agency	MTA	CSO	X							
Institute of Democracy	ID	CSO	X							
Black Sea Eco Academy	BSEA	CSO	X							
Batumi State University	BSU	CSO	X							
Achara Chamber of Commerce	ACC	CSO	X							
UNDP CO		Int. Inst	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UNDP IRH		Int. Inst.				G				G
Energy Efficiency Center of Georgia		CSO	X							
GIZ		Int. Inst	X							

Note: "G" indicates that the participant has been invited as a guest but is not a member of the PEB

**Table 4: List of stakeholders participating in the project**

The Project Inception Report identifies a number of additional local stakeholders along the DBG corridor (DBG-SK), relevant for the successful implementation of this action: marshrutka drivers, residents, retail outlets and shopkeepers, and owners of building and property development projects. The project did not develop a specific strategy to engage these stakeholders, beyond the general awareness raising activities addressed to the general public in Batumi.

Gender or social issues were not explicitly identified in the Project Inception Report, and none of the stakeholders raised any issues on these dimensions, although some of the participating NGOs are active in

this field. Although the Georgian government has been implementing Action Plans on Gender Equality Policies in the last years<sup>12</sup>, the services responsible for these were not approached by the project.

In accordance with the results from the interviews and desk review of the project documents, some additional stakeholders can be identified:

- The patrol police. The patrol police report to the national government, and is responsible for traffic enforcement, including urban areas. The patrol police did not participate in the project's activities but, in accordance with the information received during some interviews, reviewed the changes in traffic conditions studied by the project in Batumi and provided feedback to the Mayor.
- CSO and NGOs: Foundation Partnership for Road Safety; Changes for Equal Rights;
- Achara Regional Government: Spatial Development Department; Ministry of Agriculture.
- Government of Georgia: Ministry of Economy and S.D.
- International Institutions: KfW, EBRD.


Based on this initial review of the stakeholders, some questions can be raised:

- Whether the involvement of stakeholders from the national government in the project was sufficient.
- Whether there were internal coordination procedures within the municipality of Batumi regarding this project (in particular, the technical coordination group included as activity 1.1.1 in the inception report).
- The reasons for the low participation of CSO and NGO in the PEB.

The map of stakeholders below provides a useful support to clarify these questions. It identifies the main stakeholders and facilitates the analysis of their influence in decision-making and their actual involvement in the project. The color code indicates the stakeholder category: national government (orange), local government (yellow), regional government (light yellow), academic and technical institutes and other CSO and NGO (blue), international institutions (green) and other stakeholders (red)

---

<sup>12</sup> For example,  
[http://www.parliament.ge/en/ajax/downloadFile/72000/Gender\\_Equality\\_NAP\\_report\\_2016\\_ENG\\_Edited\\_Final\\_July\\_2017](http://www.parliament.ge/en/ajax/downloadFile/72000/Gender_Equality_NAP_report_2016_ENG_Edited_Final_July_2017)  
 November 2020



**Figure 1: Relevance, involvement and key relationships among stakeholders**

The map of stakeholders facilitates the identification of some key project dynamics related to the stakeholders involved:

- Low involvement of the national government's bodies, which share a common reluctance to get involved in urban mobility. This could suggest that there would be no much need to get these bodies engaged in urban transport policies, but the fact is that their involvement is necessary to change relevant legislation or to provide adequate funding to municipalities.
- Low involvement of the regional government, in spite of its capacity to influence in regional and local mobility policies.
- Strong involvement of international institutions, with a strong capacity to influence in the project through their respective programmes.
- The particular role of the patrol police, with low involvement in the project, but a strong position to influence in key decisions.
- The strong involvement and influence of the Batumi City Council and the various departments within the Batumi City Hall, with some exceptions (Urban Planning Department and Municipal Policy Department). In spite of the large number of local departments involved, decision-making has been highly centralized by the Mayor's Office, in accordance with the information provided in some interviews.
- The strong involvement of most CSO, together with their low capacity to influence the project. Influence in the project has been higher for the few CSO that have also acted as project consultants.
- Low involvement of local stakeholders (such as shop owners and residents) directly affected by the project, in spite of their potential high influence in decision-making. The ISUTP was submitted to a public participation procedure, and the project deployed several awareness raising strategies. The project consultants also included different stakeholder engagement activities. However, it has not been possible to identify formal and regular communication channels between the project and these groups, particularly in what refers to the implementation of the demonstration corridor; in accordance with the interviews, interaction with these groups was mostly left to the Batumi municipality.

## 2.6. Expected results


The Pro-Doc strategy, *“aside from assisting Batumi adopt a green approach to urban development, is to directly generate GHG reductions from sustainable urban transport demonstrations in Batumi and indirectly generate GHG reductions from regional and national policies on the urban transport that have been informed through the demonstration projects in Batumi. The key to meeting this objective for Batumi is to holistically plan and implement a number of sustainable transport measures centred in the old city where there will be higher visibility of such efforts. This heightened visibility will inform other municipalities of the Achara Region as well as other cities of Georgia on how to successfully reduce the carbon intensity of urban transport”*. (Pro-Doc, §38).

In accordance with the identified barriers, the strategy presented in the ProDoc starts by providing integrated sustainable urban transport plans (ISUTP, subsequently also named as sustainable urban mobility plans, SUMP) in Batumi and other municipalities in the Achara region. Based on the Batumi ISUTP, the project provides feasibility studies and functional plans for certain activities, as well as support for direct investments based on some of these studies. Finally, the project provides support for the replication of the demonstrations in Achara region and Georgia. Four outcomes are expected:

- Outcome 1: Development of sustainable urban transport plans in Batumi and the Achara Region.
- Outcome 2: Development of specific feasibility studies and functional plans for low carbon transport in Batumi. The feasibility studies included in this outcome are: (1) actions along the Gorgiladze-Baratashvili-Chavachavadze (GBC) corridor<sup>13</sup>; (2) CNG buses; (3) parking strategy and policy. The functional plans refer to (1) the demonstration corridor; (2) bicycle network in the old city; (3) hybrid or electric taxi fleets.
- Outcome 3: Investments in SUT measures in Batumi. Investments are envisaged in (1) synchronization of lighting along the GBC corridor; (2) new parking lots to compensate parking restrictions along the corridor; (3) implementation of bus lanes along the corridor; (4) real time information screens at bus stops; (5) upgrading of bus stops; (6) new CNG buses; (7) construction or rehabilitation of bus lanes; (8) cycle parking; (9) increased access to bicycle rentals; (10) school cycling campaign; (11) institutional mechanism for monitoring GHG emissions for urban transport in Batumi.
- Outcome 4: Development of sustainable transport plans developed for other municipalities in Achara Region and Georgia.


The project follows a tiered strategy: it provides ISUTP for Batumi (to be delivered by month 6- although subsequently subject to changes), followed by feasibility or functional studies for some key actions (which are assumed to be fully consistent with the ISUTP and delivered by month 14-24), implementation and operation of some of those actions (started in month 15 and completed by month 30), and finally replication in other cities in the region and the country. The figure below summarizes the project flowchart, as presented in the ProDoc.

<sup>13</sup> This includes: (1) dedicated bus lanes; (2) synchronized signalization; (3) consolidation of bus routes; (4) P+R lot at the western edge of the corridor; (5) multi-modal stops for transfers along the corridor; (6) parking restrictions; (7) new CNG buses; (8) enhanced bus stops with real-time waiting time screens; (9) enforcement of parking and bus lanes; (10) consultations with bus and marshrutkas drivers to identify new roles.



**Figure 2: Project Flowchart (ProDoc)**

The project flowchart is significantly revised in the inception report, putting the demonstration corridor as a backbone of the whole project, as shown in the figure below.



**Figure 3: Project Flowchart (Inception report)**

The approach is slightly modified after the Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) is hired. Data collection (including surveys) and traffic modelling are completed in the first place, to serve to the development of the ISUTP and to the corridor study. The corridor study becomes more ambitious, as it compares two corridors (CBG and CA) and includes a review of the bus network for its optimization (based on a similar optimization study completed some years ago).

The detailed sources of GHG emission reductions are not mentioned in this part of the document, they are provided in Annex II of the ProDoc, illustrating how the project intends to achieve its GHG mitigation objective. All direct GHG emission reductions occur on the demonstration corridor and are due to the following (1) the elimination of all the minibuses previously serving the corridor traffic flow (180 minibuses, providing 1928 services per day in both directions); the passengers served (more than 20,000 passengers per day, to be served by regular buses on the corridor, which is assumed to be feasible as buses are running at

less than 50% capacity and carrying close to 58,000 passengers per day) synchronization of lighting and implementation of parking restrictions along selected corridors); (2) the fuel consumption reduction for buses on the corridor due to the improvement in traffic flows provided by the reserved lane and traffic light coordination (providing 25% fuel consumption reduction per bus while running on the corridor, associated to an average commercial speed improvement of 25%), and (3) modal shift from private cars to buses on the corridor, due to the implementation of a P+R system at one of the corridor edges (250 cars parked there). The expected GHG emission reductions (in a lifespan of 10 years after project termination) are 5,636 tons, of which 4,506 tons correspond to the removal of marshrutkas, 127 tons corresponds to improvements in the traffic flow of buses (taking into consideration that the number of buses in the corridor will grow by 1% per year since project completion) and 1,003 tons from modal shift from private car to other modes due to the implementation of P+R facilities for 250 cars. **It is worth noticing that 80% of the direct GHG emission reductions are coming from the removal of marshrutkas on the demonstration corridor.**

### 3. FINDINGS

#### 3.1. Project Design

##### 3.1.1. Analysis of Project Results Framework (project strategy and indicators)

The project document (ProDoc) strategy aims at providing the basis for long-term structural changes in urban transport policy in Georgian cities, through a tiered approach: the project first provides a roadmap for changes in Batumi (the Integrated Sustainable Urban Transport Plan, ISUTP); similar plans are subsequently replicated in other cities in Georgia (in principle within the Achara Region), and finally a national urban transport strategy is presented to the national government for adoption. In order for the Batumi ISUTP to serve as a convincing paradigm for other cities and for the national government, the project provides four feasibility studies of transformative actions and two functional studies (a corridor prioritizing public transport and an expansion of the already existing cycling network in the old town), and supports with USD 270,000 the necessary municipal investment needed to implement these measures (the cycling network, the corridor and the associated public transport improvements) (ProDoc, par.38).

This approach is consistent with the problem analysis presented in the ProDoc, which describes the root cause for the prevalence of unsustainable urban transport policies as follows: *“the implementation of poor planning practices that emphasize short term benefits and rarely consider long term impacts and benefits”* (Prodoc, par.12). It is also consistent with the modest budget of the project and it is well aligned with the 20-year long international experience on Sustainable Urban Mobility Planning<sup>14</sup> regarding (1) the need to establish a widely supported mid- and long-term policy roadmap and (2) the need to undertake immediate transformative measures to convince reluctant stakeholders and the public at large about the feasibility and performance of sustainable mobility approaches.

The ProDoc approach makes the project’s success almost entirely dependent on the reliability of the chosen partner city (Batumi in this case), in order to (1) get the ISUTP adopted by the City Council and (2) complete the implementation of the demonstration measures included in project component #3. This is fully acknowledged by the ProDoc and by the inception report, as it is stated in the latter: *“Without completion of a demonstration SUT corridor, there would be no operational examples in Georgia on SUT. Moreover, the objectives of promoting SUT in Batumi as well as other cities in the Achara Region and Georgia will not be met. ... (S)uccessful implementation of SUT demonstration measures requires unwavering political support as well as major financial input from local government of Batumi”*. In this sense, the flexibility for project management is very limited: if the city council does not provide the expected support, there is no room for exploring alternatives.

In terms of direct GHG emission reduction, the project provides modest savings: just 877 tons CO<sub>2</sub> by end of project and 2,631 tons in ten years after project completion<sup>15</sup>. This is consistent with the limited scope of the demonstrations. It is worth highlighting that the additional GHG emission reduction due to the implementation of policies developed by the project are considered as indirect reductions, although it could be argued that, at least partially, could have been considered as a direct project effect, particularly in what

<sup>14</sup> See for example the second edition of the European SUMP Guidelines: <https://www.eltis.org/mobility-plans/sump-guidelines>.

<sup>15</sup> As presented in ProDoc Table 5, page 35. These values are obtained with the TEEMP-BRT model. Annex II of ProDoc provides more detailed estimates, considering the different sources coming from the demonstrations in Batumi: 975 tons by end of project and 5,636 tons including a 10-year period after completion.

refers to the implementation of the actions included in the ISUTP for Batumi beyond the demonstration corridor.

The PRF indicators provide a good picture of the project's expected outcomes:


- Two indicators referring to the project objective "cumulative direct CO2 emission reductions" and "cumulative direct energy savings". These are compulsory indicators requested by GEF-5 (in GEF-5 the number of project beneficiaries was not monitored).
- Two indicators within outcome 1, "sustainable transport plans adopted in Batumi and Achara Region", referring to the delivery of these plans (the indicators make reference to the delivery of the plans, but not to its adoption).
- Two indicators within outcome 2, "specific feasibility studies and functional plans developed to lower carbon intensity of urban transport along selected corridors in Batumi", with a target to deliver at least 4 feasibility studies and 2 functional plans by the end of project, following the Batumi ISUTP as guidance.
- Six indicators within outcome 3, "sustainable urban transport measures successfully implemented along a selected corridor in the City of Batumi". The indicators refer to the various features of the corridor (bus lane, 2.2 km), P+R occupancy (250 cars) and associated modal shift (in terms of energy saved), the improvement of PT services (increased bus occupancy, increased average bus speed, and bicycle network expansion (6 km).
- Three indicators within outcome 4, "Sustainable Transport Plans developed and adopted in Batumi and other municipalities in Achara Region and Georgia". They refer to "institutional mechanisms to support SUT in Georgia", "SUT roadmaps for other Acharian municipalities", and "national SUT policies developed". The actual content of these indicators is not clear from their description, and the description of outcome 4 partially overlaps with outcome 1.

The MTR identified the shortcomings in the PRF mentioned above: *"Indicators, in part due to aforementioned structural issues, are not always a good fit and not always precise. They neglect the key target of instituting high hourly parking fees, focus on corridors rather than broader SUTP measures at times, imply Achara municipalities will develop SUTPs (despite their scale), exhibit overlap between Batumi indicators and Achara indicators (without clarifying Batumi is not to be included in Achara indicators)".* The MTR proposed the following changes in indicators, which were accepted by the PEB:

- Project objective. Changes in wording to reflect that the emission and energy saving indicators include all the ISUTP measures implemented in Batumi. In particular, the GHG emission reduction target should be recalculated to include parking policy measures.
- Outcome 1. More precise definition of indicator 1.2.
- Outcome 2. More precise definition of indicator 2.3.
- Outcome 3. More precise definition of indicator 3.5. Change in definition of indicator 3.4 (now referring to number of P places with high fees, and not to P+R occupancy).
- Outcome 4. More precise definition of indicator 4.1, now limited to the national level, and indicator 4.3, now covering Acharian municipalities others than Batumi.

Although the ProDoc PRF provides an excellent basis for detailed monitoring (improved by the MTR recommendations), a gap remains between the delivery of technical assistance by the project (outcomes 1 and 2) and the adoption of the necessary decisions by the partner governments (local, regional or national) necessary for the implementation of the actions that are monitored by the indicators for outcomes 3 and 4.





**Figure 4: The project approach and its monitoring by PRF indicators**

The achievement of the project objective (CO<sub>2</sub> emission- and energy- savings) is subject to the adoption of political decisions at the local, regional and national levels. However, the PRF provides limited monitoring capacity for these processes, as the indicators provided identify the completion of the Batumi demonstration and the implementation of institutional supporting mechanisms at the national level. Obviously, the project has no control on the adoption of political decisions, but it can put in place activities to support its adoption. These are not reflected by the PRF.

The PMU was certainly aware of this, and worked intensively in this direction, although the ProDoc was not providing sufficient guidance on how to address this facilitation effort with concrete activities.

The table below summarizes the analysis of the project results framework, in what refers to the characteristics of the indicators: Specific (outcomes must use change language, describing a specific future condition), Measurable (results, whether quantitative or qualitative, must have measurable indicators, making it possible to assess whether they were achieved or not), Achievable: Results must be within the capacity of the partners to achieve, Relevant: Results must make a contribution to selected priorities of the national development framework, Time- bound: Results are never open-ended. There should be an expected date of accomplishment. Further details are provided in section 3.2.5.

Indicator	End-of-Project Target	TE SMART Analysis				
		S	M	A	R	T
Objective level indicators						
Cumulative direct CO2 emission reductions resulting from implementation of the Batumi SUTP by EOP, tons CO2 (at end of project and 10 years afterwards)	<u>Baseline: 0</u> <b>877</b> tonnes CO2 at the end of project and 2,631 tonnes 10 years afterwards	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Indicator	End-of-Project Target	TE SMART Analysis				
		S	M	A	R	T
Cumulative direct energy saving (MJ) from improved traffic efficiency measures for public transit through project corridors, and the avoidance of gasoline consumption from cars in the park-and-ride and modal switches to public transport as well as from other Batumi SUTP measures	Baseline: 0 13.6 million MJ	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Outcome 1: Sustainable transport plans adopted in Batumi and Achara Region</b>						
Number of versions of the Integrated Sustainable Urban Transport Plan for Batumi prior to adoption by the City by EOP	Baseline: 0 2	x	✓	✓	x	✓
Number of municipalities included in Achara inter-municipality sustainable transport plan by EOP	Baseline: 0 3	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Outcome 2: Specific feasibility studies and functional plans developed to lower carbon intensity of urban transport along selected corridors in Batumi</b>						
Number of feasibility studies for sustainable transport measures in Batumi	Baseline: 0 4	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of specific functional plans to lower carbon intensity of urban transport in Batumi	Baseline: 0 2	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Outcome 3: Sustainable urban transport measures successfully implemented along a selected corridor in the City of Batumi</b>						
Kilometers of corridor improved with dedicated bus lanes, restricted private car access, synchronized lighting and improved access to bicycles as public transport by EOP	Baseline: 0 2.2 km	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Average number of passengers per bus along improved corridor by EOP	Baseline: 0 20 passengers/bus	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
% increase in average speed of buses through the selected corridor by EOP	Baseline: 0 25%	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of city parking spaces shifted to high hourly parking fees that are actively implemented	Baseline: 0 500 parking spaces	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Total MJ of energy saved from passengers leaving cars at park-and-ride or at home or hotel (estimated based on increased bus ridership) in favour of public transit by EOP	Baseline: 0 13.6 million MJ	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Kilometers of bicycle network improved by EOP	Baseline: 0 6 km	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Outcome 4: Sustainable Transport Plans developed and adopted by other municipalities in Achara Region and draft national policies on sustainable urban transport</b>						
Number of institutional mechanisms to support SUT in Georgia by EOP	Baseline: 0 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of SUT Roadmaps for other Acharian municipalities by EOP	Baseline: 0 5	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
Number of national SUT policies developed for sustainable urban transport by EOP	Baseline: 0 1	x	✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>Red:</b> Indicator does not comply with requirements <b>Orange:</b> Indicator partially complies with requirements <b>Green:</b> Indicator complies with requirements						

Table 5: SMART analysis of project indicators

### 3.1.2. Assumptions and risks

The assumptions made in the ProDoc are listed below, together with an assessment of its actual completion.

- General: Sufficient resources available to finance SUT projects. Availability of resources has not been mentioned in any of the documents or interviews as an issue for the implementation of the SUT actions planned by the project.

- Outcome 1: Land Use master plan completed in Batumi. The ProDoc stresses the convenience of linking the project in Batumi, and more particularly the ISUTP and the subsequent feasibility studies, functional plans and demonstrations to the Batumi's Urban Development Strategy (under development in 2014, under the leadership of the Civil Society Institute and financed by USAID) and Land Use master plans under preparation by the city. In practice, the involvement of the Architecture and Urban Planning Department in the ISTBAR project has been low, considering the information collected during the interviews and the low participation of such department at the PEB and project activities.
- Outcome 2: ISUTP adopted, and guiding the feasibility studies and functional plans. ISUTP was effectively adopted by the municipality in April 2017, and feasibility studies and functional plans were developed mostly in parallel and by the same Consultant, assuring their consistency.
- Outcome 3: Selection by the city of the GBC corridor for improvements. PPP established to develop and operate P+R lots. The selection of the demonstration corridor has been a permanent source of discussion, as an alternative corridor (Chavchavadze – Abuseridze - Aghmashenebeli, or CAA) had been discussed during the project design stage and was put back on the table during the first PEB meeting. The project included both options in the feasibility study and, based on the conclusions of the study, recommended in 2017 to the municipality to retain the CAA corridor for the demonstration, which was finally approved by the PEB in June 2018. Implementation was not started by the municipality and, in June 2019, the PM was informed by the Mayor of Batumi that the city intended to undertake renovation works on the CAA corridor, and that the demonstration was no longer feasible. In April 2020, the municipality accepted to implement the demonstration in the alternative CBG corridor, although with the bus lane operating only in one direction. These poorly explained delays and changes of criteria from the municipality have been at the source of the poor results achieved by project component 3. The corridor functional plan stated the fact that a good number of parking places would disappear in both corridors, and that there was a need for a new parking strategy to properly address this challenge.
- Outcome 4: successful project demonstration in Batumi. The plans and strategies delivered by the project to the regional government of Achara and to the national government have not been adopted, and there is no institution taking ownership of them. However, two of the five USUTP delivered to 5 small municipalities in Achara has been adopted by the local governments (in Keda and Kobuleti), although its prospects to implementation are uncertain. In short, although the project has delivered the main expected outputs within this component, there is little hope that they will make a real change. The project strategy considered that the successful implementation of the demonstration in Batumi would serve as a catalyst to convince reluctant public authorities to take policy action on urban mobility. This assumption was probably too optimistic, and there seems to be many other barriers in place at the local, regional and national levels.

Four risks are identified and analyzed in the Prodoc (par.54 and Annex I):

- Political risks related to political uncertainty and a drop in tourism: The impact could result in less operating revenue for the City's improved public transport services. In practice, political uncertainty and a drop of tourism have not materialized. However, the project has not been able to cope with a difficult political environment, in which decision makers have pervasively avoided to take decisions at all levels. In contrast, there is wide evidence from the interview of the successful implementation of SUT measures in Tbilisi, under the strong leadership of its Mayor. Such strong leadership was not found within the governmental institutions the project partnered with (municipality of Batumi, regional government of

Achara and national government). Successful experiences around the world<sup>16</sup> show cities compensating such risk-avoidance leadership with the support of strong technical services, which have provided decision-makers with sufficient factual evidence of the advantages of sustainable mobility measures. The project has provided such evidence, but has not found technical partners within these institutions able to take ownership of these reports and tools and efficiently transfer them into the internal decision-making circuits.

- Lack of municipal co-financing to invest in sustainable urban transport. Georgian municipalities are strongly dependent on transfers from the municipal government, as less than 10% of their income is provided by locally-managed taxes. However, there is no evidence of lack of availability of the necessary financial resources in Batumi, as the investment cost for the corridor was low, and was partially financed by the project. Furthermore, the city had already made substantial investments in public transport, financed by a loan from EBRD to modernize its bus fleet, and these investments would greatly benefit from the implementation of the bus lanes in the demonstration corridor.
- Resistance by local residents and tourists<sup>17</sup> to SUT measures perceived as disruptive, such as parking restrictions and limitations to private car mobility. The interviews and desk review have not provided much evidence of significant opposition to the corridor concept. The main one was related to the announced reduction in the number of minibuses in the city, which raised concerns from minibus drivers and owners, although they finally accepted the municipality's approach to progressively reduce the fleet based on the roadworthiness of the vehicles<sup>18</sup>. However, the difficulties to select the corridor and its design, and the delays in implementation could indicate that there was strong opposition from influential stakeholders, even if it was not publicly expressed in the media or during official meetings. These difficulties could also be due to a biased assessment of the local situation by decision makers and not to objective opposition.
- Technical risks related to government officers' capacity to address green urban development and planning issues related to green cities. There is some factual evidence that this risk actually materialized, and that the project was not successful in mitigating it: first, the traffic model transferred to the City Hall has not been used, in spite of several training workshops financed by the project<sup>19</sup>; second, there is no technical unit within the City Hall in charge of the implementation and monitoring of the ISUTP; third, the improved coordination between urban planning and transport within the municipality, advocated by the ProDoc and the Inception Report, has not become a reality. It is also worth mentioning that, in spite of the intensive interaction between the PMU and the City Hall to discuss the implementation of the demonstration difficulties, and the substantial amount of technical considerations provided by the PMU, the municipality never provided any technical reports or memos to assess the project's proposals.

As it could be expected, the risk matrix makes no reference to any health-related risk. As in virtually every country, the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically changed mobility conditions in Georgian cities since February 2020. At that time, the PMU was still struggling to get the Mayor's green light to implement the pilots in

<sup>16</sup> Such as the cities participating in the EU's CIVITAS programme or the WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities.

<sup>17</sup> Although tourists were mentioned in the ProDoc as potentially opposed to SUT measures, the project found not evidence of such opposition. In fact, worldwide evidence show that tourists are one the groups benefited by such measures.

<sup>18</sup> In practice, the municipality has actually increased the number of minibus permits, although the number of minibuses simultaneously operating on certain routes has been reduced to avoid congestion.

<sup>19</sup> None of the local officials receiving 1-week modelling training has made any use of the model delivered by the project.

Batumi. When finally obtained, the pandemic situation in Georgia was not considered to represent a threat beyond some weeks of delay in the implementation of the necessary works.

### **3.1.3. Lessons from other relevant projects incorporated into project design**

No lessons from other relevant projects were explicitly incorporated into project design. However, it is worth noting that the project strategy is similar to other projects in the Region, with the key steps of (1) undertaking a household survey providing the basis to establish a city-wide transport model, (2) completing a sustainable urban transport plan and (3) implementing some demonstrations. This is the case of the UNDP/GEF projects “reducing GHG emissions from road transport in Russia's medium-sized cities” and “City of Almaty Sustainable Transport”, to cite a couple of them.

These projects have consistently faced big challenges to transfer the ownership of the transport model to the city and to move forward the project from the planning stage to the demonstration stage. The actual impact of the sustainable mobility plans provided by these projects has also been uncertain: they have provided the city with a useful list of projects and actions that have facilitated access to international donors, but they have not been able to consolidate the participatory and bottom-up processes that are the substance of sustainable mobility.

### **3.1.4. Planned stakeholder participation**

The ProDoc and the Project Inception Report do not include specific stakeholder participation plans. However, there are indications of stakeholder participation activities in the PEB meeting reports and the annual PIR. It can be concluded that stakeholder participation has taken place along the following guidelines:

- Participation of institutional stakeholders has taken place through the annual PEB meetings. PEB membership has not followed strict rules, so that the PMU has been able to invite all the municipal, regional and national government departments, considered as necessary for taking key project decisions.
- Coordination with the municipality was intended to take place through a technical coordination group (TCG). Setting up such a group is identified as activity 1.1.1 in the Project Inception Report. There are no written records of the TCG activities, but in December 2017, the Mayor of Batumi established a working group on “Development and implementation of sustainable urban transport measures in Batumi”.
- Working group with the national government, related to the national strategy. PIR states at least three meetings of this working group.
- Involvement of CSO, academia and NGO. The participating entities have a strong technical profile, and in fact some of them have supported the project as consultants.
- Awareness-raising activities. The main focus groups for these activities were schoolchildren and students, as they were considered as more likely to change mobility behavior. However, the awareness raising activities also intended to provide information to the majority of the population. In practice, these activities were instrumental in gaining public’s acceptance and support, although they did not intend to encourage active participation, and were undertaken once key project decisions had already been adopted.
- Participatory activities in the framework of some consultancies. The preparation of the ISUTP included, as participatory activities, interviews with municipality officials, NGOs and minibus drivers and owners, a “Great Vision Workshop” at the beginning of the process, an interim workshop (including the corridor and parking studies) in April 2017 and a final workshop in June 2017 (including the corridor and cycling network functional plans and the e-taxi feasibility study).

### 3.1.5. Replication approach

The ProDoc replication approach is based on the endeavor to work with several other municipalities, the regional government of Achara and the national government (Prodoc, par.11). The corridor demonstration in Batumi plays a key role in the replication strategy: *“Implementing a demonstration sustainable transport corridor in Batumi would raise the visibility and profile of sustainable transport in the City and possibly the entire country. Such a demonstration would catalyse public interest and financing towards the replication of more sustainable transport corridors”*.

Project component 4 focuses on replication of the demonstration strategy in Batumi. It includes an “institutional mechanism”, for which the project would contribute by organizing several workshops with the participation of Georgian cities (output 4.1), feasibility studies and functional plans in other Acharan municipalities (output 4.2) and national sustainable urban transport policies (output 4.3). The ProDoc states the interest of the MoENRP in the project outputs and in Batumi demonstrations to *“inform national sustainable transport policies that will guide other cities in Georgia...”* (ProDoc, par. 58).

The lack of municipal resources is identified at the ProDoc as a risk for replication, to be mitigated through the provision of feasibility studies, which should facilitate the access of municipalities to donors and other financing resources.

The ProDoc assumes a replication factor of 3 in GHG emission reduction, meaning that the direct emission reduction effects achieved in Batumi through the demonstration would be also achieved in three replication actions.

The project replication approach is therefore highly dependent on (1) the successful completion of the demonstration and (2) strong support from the regional government and (3) strong commitment at the national level from the MoENRP, necessary to design and undertake national initiatives. In practice, none of these conditions have materialized.

### 3.1.6. UNDP comparative advantage

The ProDoc does not include a specific section on this topic. It does not provide information on previous UNDP activities in the country or in Batumi. From the interviews, it can be concluded that UNDP had wide prior experience in the energy efficiency area, and in working with cities in Georgia, and that this one was the first transport project.

### 3.1.7. Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector

The ProDoc highlights the expected cooperation with various interventions in the sector (ProDoc, par.67 and 68):

- “Enhancing Capacity for Low Emission Development Strategies (EC-LEDS)”, supported by USAID. Its most relevant objective in relation to the ISTBAR project is to support Georgian municipalities in institutionalizing and implementing climate change mitigation measures. Prior to the preparation of the ProDoc, the EC-LEDS Programme had supported Batumi in preparing the SEAP, determining the baseline for urban transport emissions, and finalizing a parking strategy for the City; however, there is no evidence of any further activity of this Programme in Batumi during the implementation of the ISTBAR project.
- The ADB project “Georgian Sustainable Urban Transport Project” that commenced operations in December 2014. This Project aimed at supporting financing of urban infrastructure upgrades and assist

in the formulation of sustainable urban transportation policies in Georgia. ADB has financed the construction of the Batumi bypass, started in 2018, but there is no evidence of any other actions.

- USAID's G3 initiative on "Good Governance in Georgia", that was expected to assist in the dissemination of best practices for implementing sustainable urban transport policies. However, there is no evidence of any follow-up actions of this initiative during the implementation of the ISTBAR project.

The ProDoc also mentions previous EBRD support to the municipality of Batumi for the purchase of buses, and the negotiations then in progress for a new loan. This loan was approved in 2017, during project implementation. It can be concluded that this has been the main cooperation of the ISTBAR project with other interventions in the sector during the implementation period.

### **3.1.8. Management arrangements**

The management arrangements included a National Project Director (NPD), to be designated by MoENRP, a Project Steering Committee (renamed as Project Executive Board) with the participation of the city of Batumi, the region of Achara, MoENRP (chair) and UNDP, and a Project Management Unit (PMU) with a Project Manager (PM) and an Administrative and Financial Officer (AFO).

The project was executed according to UNDP's National Implementation Modality (NIM). A Letter of Agreement was signed between the GoG and UNDP for the provision of support services.

The Management arrangements were significantly modified since the Implementation Workshop: the NPD and PEB chair positions were served by the municipality of Batumi, and the members of the PEB were expanded to cover several departments within the three governments. There is no written evidence of the formal adoption of these changes and the designation of the PEB members, as they were decided by the PMU and accepted *de facto* by all the institutional partners.

## **3.2. Project Implementation**

### **3.2.1. Adaptive management**

The project management has made significant efforts to adapt to a changing context, with different results.

At the Inception Workshop and Project Inception Report: The role of the ISUTP is strengthened and more resources allocated to develop it as a "conceptual master plan". Changes in the demonstration corridor are proposed. The need of the stakeholders' acceptance of the feasibility studies and functional plans in Batumi (mainly in what refers to the demonstration corridor and parking policy) is highlighted. The work plan was modified in accordance with the new ambition of the ISUTP. The ISUTP and the various feasibility and functional studies were grouped into one single contract, to facilitate their coherence.

The project management arrangements were modified along the changed project environment: the number of members of the PEB was informally increased in order to integrate more departments from all the governmental levels; a technical coordination group (TCG) was set up by the municipality and a working group was established with the national government. The TCG was successful in putting in place a space for discussion, although it failed to deliver the key decisions necessary for successful implementation of demonstrations in a timely manner.

The project effectively coordinated with other international institutions, particularly with EBRD (in the context of the new loan for municipal buses), GIZ and KfW (for the future implementation of ISUTP actions).

When the local partner (Batumi municipality) failed to comply with its project-related commitments, the PMU was effective in mobilizing UNDP top management, as well as donors and other influential stakeholders in Georgia in order to avoid the failure of the project demonstration in Batumi.

The limited resources available for awareness-raising and dissemination activities were successfully compensated by an intensive presence of the PM in relevant events, media and social media.

The insufficient involvement or lack of technical capacity of the various technical municipal departments was successfully compensated by the dedication of the CTA and PM, and by the mobilization of consultants when required.

### 3.2.2. Partnership arrangements

During implementation, the project did not sign any formal partnership arrangements. However, there is evidence of sustained cooperation with the following partners:

- EBRD provided loans for bus purchase in Batumi in 2010 and 2018. The ISTBAR project was a good complement to these loans, as it provided the policy dialog necessary to make the most of the new vehicles. It is worth noting that the 2018 EBRD loan targeted electric buses, making superfluous and even counterproductive the purchase of CNG buses originally included as one of the project outputs; this explains why the CNG bus output was removed from the PRF following the recommendations of the MTR<sup>20</sup>. EBRD also provided studies on bus network restructuring in Batumi, useful for the corridor demonstration, although the concept was not implemented, and a service contract between the municipality and its bus company, currently under discussion.
- GIZ participated in some project activities, mainly of a dissemination nature. GIZ had tried to develop and implement a “Vertical Integrated NAMA” in support of Georgia’s INDC, with expert missions in 2015 and 2016 and action in the urban transport sector, but this project was not approved. The results of these activities were shared with the PM, and the ISTBAR project could build upon these initial activities. Currently, GIZ is implementing its *Connective Cities Project* with an open call for cities to propose their ideas. Batumi has been encouraged to submit some proposal, benefiting from the basis and experience provided by the ISTBAR project and its ISUTP; however, it is not clear that Batumi will apply for this. At the time of conclusion of this TE report, GIZ launched *Mobility4Cities*, a three-year mobility project in Georgia focusing on Tbilisi and Batumi. In case of Batumi, technical assistance will be based on the SUMP elaborated by the UNDP/GEF project, providing a follow-up to the UNDP efforts in Batumi, including further training in the use of Batumi Transport Model and the preparation of Cycling and Walking Masterplans based on ISTBAR feasibility studies.
- KfW has been implementing and designing urban projects in Tbilisi and Batumi in the last years, and plans to start one new project at the beginning in 2021. ISTBAR’s ISUTP and feasibility studies have provided a good basis for the identification of possible future actions by KfW. KfW has also shown interest in pushing forward a national urban transport strategy<sup>21</sup>, although unsuccessfully, and could build upon the draft strategy delivered by the ISTBAR project.
- Local academia. The Batumi Navigation University supported the project with mobility data collection activities and participation at technical meetings and workshops, and received traffic modelling training.

<sup>20</sup> It is difficult to understand why such an output was included in the PRF during project design, as CNG buses do not provide any GHG emission savings and their contribution to air quality is also under discussion due to their high emissions of PM2.5 (see, for example, [https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2020\\_06\\_TE\\_CNG\\_particle\\_report.pdf](https://www.transportenvironment.org/sites/te/files/publications/2020_06_TE_CNG_particle_report.pdf))

<sup>21</sup> The national urban transport strategy could also be addressed within the GiZ’s *Mobility4Cities* project



This partnership gave the University access to transport planning tools and the project benefited from the technical expertise of some faculty members.

Partnership arrangements have been effective in strengthening the role of the ISUTP in Batumi as the key conceptual document for action. It has also served to support local expertise on sustainable urban mobility.

Regarding project implementation, the engagement of the stakeholders has been strong during the planning stage, in the design and public presentation of the various plans. However, there is not evidence of wide stakeholder engagement during the preparation of the feasibility and functional studies, which followed a more traditional approach, focusing on the technical aspects of the measures. During the implementation of the pilots, stakeholders' participation was steered by the City of Batumi, and limited to a few local decision makers and civil servants, with the support of the project.

### **3.2.3. Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management**

The following M&E activities have been used for adaptive management:

- As a result of the project inception workshop, the ISUTP gained in relevance, which led to the subsequent revision of relevant aspects of the PRF and a revised work plan. As mentioned above, there were changes made compared to the ProDoc in the composition of the PEB and the appointment of the NPD, although these topics are not reported in the workshop minutes. Considering the subsequent evolution of project implementation, the attending partners did not take adequate ownership of the project, particularly in what refers to the national and regional governments. Furthermore, it does not seem that the roles of the different municipal departments were clearly differentiated.
- The Atlas risk log update was provided to the evaluation team in November 2020. It considers the four risks already included in the ProDoc (all of them assessed at a low risk level) and two additional risks: one referring to the COVID-19 pandemic causing additional project delays, and one considering that local government will not remain committed to implementation of the project and/or change in government after elections. Their risk levels are assessed as “substantial” and “high”, respectively. There are no treatment measures envisaged for any of these risks, which suggests a low use of this tool in project management.
- The updated GEF tracking tool was provided to the evaluation team in November 2020. The information contained in the tracking tool is consistent with the contents of this report with 2 minor differences: (1) the length of the public rapid transit implemented by the project is reported as being 3.4 km instead of the 2.2 km of the pilot corridor; (2) the policy and regulation framework developed by the project is stated as “enforced”, although the evidence collected by the TE team suggests that its implementation by the relevant authorities (Batumi and in other Acharan cities with approved SUMP) remains unclear.
- Project Implementation Reports. PIR do not include input from the GEF Operation Focal Point, the Project Implementing Partner (MoENRP) and other partners (municipality of Batumi, to which the NPD is affiliated). The 3 PIR reviewed (2017, 2018, 2019) provide a clear picture of the project status and the adaptive management undertaken by the PM to address the different project outcomes. 2018 PIR reflects some over-confidence about project implementation, as there are no critical risks identified in spite of the implementation delays the project had already faced. At that time, the PM considered that with the SUMP approved in Batumi in April 2018, the Mayor publicly announcing the implementation of the pilots in 2018-2019 and preparing a Letter of Agreement with UNDP, there was no such critical risk ahead. The experience showed that the Mayor's commitment was not that solid.
- Site visits. The PM was based in Batumi and with direct access to all relevant local stakeholders. This was effective to accomplish the project targets until the official adoption of the ISUTP, and to keep alive the

prospects for the demonstration to be completed. The precise contents of the actions to be implemented during the demonstration have repeatedly been modified, in order to meet the municipality's request, even if the PM and CTA made it clear that they were not sound from a technical point of view.

- The project MTR (completed in January 2018) provided 15 recommendations. They were all focused on achieving results and particularly on the implementation of the demonstration corridor and other measures in Batumi (including a back-up plan in case the most ambitious measures were not backed by the municipality); they also encouraged the PMU to develop a clear written definition of the scope of the regional plan, and to adopt a dual strategy at the national level, consisting of pushing for the adoption of concrete regulatory reforms besides trying to get the national strategy adopted. All these recommendations were implemented by the PMU, although they did not serve to gain the necessary involvement and commitment from the local, regional and national governments to move forward the project's outputs towards implementation- in the case of the pilots in Batumi- or to adoption- in the case of the regional and national mobility strategies (see section 3.2.5 for further details).

#### **3.2.4. Project Finance**

The project budget was USD 1,133,000, of which USD 853,000 were provided by GEF and USD 280,000- dedicated to project management- by UNDP. The UNDP contribution was increased by USD 22,000 in 2019, and by additional USD 11,000 in 2020 to cope with the additional costs generated by the project deadline extension.

The current budget (in accordance with actual expenditure and the 2020 AWP) has only minor changes compared to the initial one. Project management shows the higher variation, with a decrease in the initial budget of USD 66,091.80. Component 3 has a small decrease of USD 8,235.72; the other project components have increased their budget: Component 2 by USD 40,050.45, component 4 by USD 31,560.89 and component 1 by USD 24,716.18. The resources initially assigned to component 4 have been dedicated mainly to the preparation of the various plans, strategies and feasibility studies.

Total project expenditure is 99.4% of the budget, including advanced payments for the implementation of the pilots and other commitments. The assigned resources have been fully spent in components 1 and 2. 98.4% of the component 4 budget has also been spent. For component 3, 19.1% (USD 65,050.30) of the budget has been spent and 6.4% has been committed for final consultancy services and other expenditure; 72.8% (USD 248,244.56) has been transferred to the municipal agency in Batumi in charge of the implementation of the pilots. The agency is expected to submit a final cumulative financial report to UNDP for clearance by 15 December 2020, once the construction works are successfully completed. This would bring the expenditure of component 3 budget to 98.3%. Project management expenditure is slightly over its total assigned budget (100.4%).

	Budget			Expenditure	
	ProDoc	Current	Change	27/11/2020	%
Component 1	192,400	217,116.18	24,716.18	217,187.30	100.0%
Component 2	147,660	187,710.45	40,050.45	187,710.45	100.0%
Component 3	349,180	340,944.28	-8,235.72	335,249.86 <sup>22</sup>	98.3%
Component 4	124,160	155,720.89	31,560.89	153,179.69	98.4%
Project Management	319,600	264,508.20	-55,091.80	265,677.18	100.4%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,133,000.00</b>	<b>1,166,000.00</b>	<b>33,000.00</b>	<b>1,159,005.48</b>	<b>99.4%</b>

Table 6: Project Budget and Expenditure, per Component

In relative terms, the budget changes have resulted in slight variations in the budget share of each component, in accordance with the table below.

	Budget		
	ProDoc	Current	Change
Component 1	17.0%	18.6%	1.6%
Component 2	13.0%	16.1%	3.1%
Component 3	30.8%	29.2%	-1.6%
Component 4	11.0%	13.4%	2.4%
Project Management	28.2%	22.7%	-5.5%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>

Table 7: Budget share per component

The Table below provides information on the main consultancy activities mobilized by the project.

Contractor	Component	Concept	Budget
A+S Consult GmbH	1,2	ISUTP and feasibility studies	149,180.00
A+S Consult GmbH	1	Traffic model and training	32,800.00
CTA- Mr. Michael Saunders	1, 2, 3, 4	CTA	91,000.00
Foundation Partnership for Road Safety	4	National Strategy	49,960.00
A+S Consult GmbH	1	Regional Plan	64,700.00
Black Sea Eco Academy	3	Awareness raising plan and activities	15,000.00
Civil Engineer	3	Detailed corridor design	4,150.00
LTD STS	2	Detailed traffic study	19,950.00
<b>Total</b>			<b>426,740.00</b>

Table 8: Main project contracts

Based on the information collected during interviews, it can be concluded that the financial controls in place allowed the timely flow of funds to consultants and other providers, and that project funds were managed with due diligence. It is fair to add that the quality of the various technical studies provided is high and well above what could be expected considering their contracting costs.

There is no evidence of actual delivery of the in-kind co-financing from MoENRP (USD 100,000) established in the ProDoc. Concerning co-financing from the municipality of Batumi, the co-financing letter provided in 2014 included various municipal investments planned by the city for 2015, with a total USD 10,284,000, of

<sup>22</sup> Including USD 248,244.56 committed to be transferred to the municipal agencies (NNLE “Agency of Urban Infrastructure and Public Works” and Batumi Avtotransport) for the implementation of the pilots.

which USD 7,500,00 dedicated to the rehabilitation and arrangement of roads, streets and pavements. No figures or details were provided in the co-financing letter for the rest of the project lifespan.

At MTR, two co-financing figures were provided for the City of Batumi: USD 3,970,914 considered as “SUT-focused” and USD 19,807,469, adding to the former the municipality’s expenditure in road infrastructure development.

At Terminal Evaluation, three different figures have been provided by the municipality of Batumi:

1. Specific investments linked to the ISUTP. These investments have been done in 2018 and 2019 and amount to USD 8,545,146.99. They include the procurement of diesel and electric buses, renewal and replacement of bus stops, GPS installed in micro-buses, parking delineation and renewal of existing bicycle lanes.
2. Budgetary expenditure in the development of transport system and services for the 2015-2020 period. Considering that the project started in September 2015, the budget for that year is not included. The total expenditure for 2019-2020 is USD 28,794,900.
3. Budgetary expenditure in road development. The total expenditure for 2016-2020 is USD 66,049,377.

It can be concluded that, at a minimum, the municipality of Batumi has contributed to the project with USD 3,970,914 already identified at the MTR until September 2017 plus USD 8,545,147 investments implemented in 2018 and 2019. Most of the 2018-2019 investment corresponds to the procurement of diesel (USD 3,642,024) and electric (USD 4,702,564) buses. The co-financing of the municipality has therefore been at least USD 12,516,061. Additionally, two municipal agencies, NNLE (Infrastrcutre Agency) and Batumi Avtotransport (bus operator) have contributed in 2020 USD 29,852 and USD 71,226 in additional works linked to the implementation of the demonstrations. Co-financing is summarized in the table below.

Sources of co-financing	Name of co-financier	Type of co-financing	Investment mobilized	Amount (USD)
GEF Agency	UNDP	Grant	Investment mobilized	313,000
Beneficiaries	Batumi Municipality	Other	Investment mobilized	12,516,061
Beneficiaries	Ibid. NNLE	Other	Investment mobilized	29,852
Beneficiaries	Ibid. Batumi Avtotr.	Other	Investment mobilized	71,226
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>12,930,139</b>

**Table 9: Co-financing mobilized by the ISTBAR project**

The total co-financing mobilized by the project has been USD 12,919,139 or 21.1% higher than envisaged in the ProDoc. However, it is worth noting that the number of contributors identified at the ProDoc was very low and that one of the three initial contributors (MoENRP) has not provided any co-financing.

### **3.2.5. Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation**

The overall rating of project monitoring and evaluation is moderately satisfactory (MS). M&E design at entry is rated as satisfactory (S), and M&E implementation is rated as moderately satisfactory (MS).

The monitoring of the project (regarding GHG emission reduction impact) was initially envisaged to be undertaken through the previous development of a monitoring mechanism in Batumi within output 3.4: “institutional mechanism for monitoring carbon reductions from SUT measures in Batumi and to raise public awareness of SUT”. However, this output has not been delivered.

Monitoring and evaluation followed the framework plan provided in the ProDoc, (Monitoring Framework And Evaluation section, p.50-53) and the PRF already reviewed in section 2.4 of this report. The M&E section identified the following M&E tools: inception workshop and report, project implementation reviews, quarterly and annual review reports, independent mid-term evaluation, and independent final evaluation. The indicative cost of the M&E workplan was USD 115,000 (approximately 5% of the budget), and their contents, and actual implementation are presented in the Table below,

Type of M&E activity	Time frame	Actual implementation
Inception Workshop and Report	Within first four months of project start up	Timely completed
Measurement of Means of verification of project results	Start, mid and end of project (during evaluation cycle) and annually when required.	Timely completed
Measurement of Means of Verification for Project Progress on output and implementation	Annually prior to ARR/PIR and to the definition of annual work plans	Timely completed
ARR/PIR	Annually by July	Timely completed
Project Board meetings	Following IW and annually thereafter.	Timely completed
Periodic status/ progress reports	Quarterly	The PMU did not prepare quarterly reports, but progress reports submitted at each Project Board Meeting
Mid-term Evaluation	At the mid-point of project implementation.	Timely completed (Aug. 2017 - Jan. 2018)
Final Evaluation	At least three months before the end of project implementation	Under completion
Project Terminal Report	At least three months before the end of the project	No evidence of Project Terminal Report
Audit	Yearly	No evidence of annual audits
Scheduled audits and spot check	To be decided based on risk assessment from the micro-assessments	No evidence of audits and spot checks
Visits to field sites	Yearly	Regular visits completed

**Table 10: Review of M&E Work Plan**

The M&E design at entry was comprehensive and provided a sound framework to follow the project's progress and support adaptive management. It can be rated as satisfactory, in spite of a number of shortcomings referring to the PRF (see section 3.1.1); some of them (referring to indicators for outcome 3) were already pointed out and corrected at the MTR report, whereas others stayed unchanged:

- Some indicators include concepts that are sufficiently defined: e.g. the difference among “institutional mechanisms”, “roadmap” and “policies” is not fully clear; also, “feasibility studies” vs. “functional plans”.
- The indicators chosen for outcome 1 do not fully fit with the outcome (adoption of plans in Batumi and in Achara region): indicator 1.1 refers to the “number of versions” of the Batumi plan, which does not seem to be able to provide an adequate monitoring of the adoption process, and indicator 1.2 refers to the “number of municipalities” included in the regional plan, which again is not fully related to the adoption process of the regional plan.

M&E at implementation closely followed the work plan and framework provided by the ProDoc. Most of the M&E activities were timely conducted, and they facilitated the adaptation of the project management to the unexpected circumstances it had to face, and most notably the insufficient commitment of the institutional stakeholders- local, regional and national governments. However, there were a number of shortcomings in M&E implementation, which could jeopardize the adoption of early correction measures; this justifies its rating as moderately satisfactory:

- Although both were included in the M&E work plan, quarterly reports were replaced by periodic reports submitted to each PEB meeting, and annual audits were not conducted.
- The PMU has confirmed that a Project Terminal Report, will be prepared before the end of the project.
- The envisaged GHG monitoring system was never implemented in Batumi City Hall, and there was no clear responsibility within the City Hall to undertake the implementation and monitoring of the SUMP.
- The monitoring of development progress provided in the annual PIR provides an over-optimistic assessment on the achievement of the project objectives (GHG emission reduction and energy saving) that is increasingly inconsistent with evidence: even if the pilots were implemented, their ambition had been reduced and the time left for operation until project termination made it all but impossible to reach the end-of-project targets.
- PIR submitted in July 2018 (for the July 2017-June 2018 period) and July 2019 (for the July 2018-June 2019) period kept using all the original indicators, instead of replacing those that had been changed as a result of the MTR (final report provided in January 2018).
- None of the PIR include input from the Executing Agency (MoENRP) or from the National Project Director.
- There is some “double counting” in the assessment of indicators in the annual PIR: this is the case for the Batumi SUMP (included in indicators 1.1 and 1.2) and for the delivery of the National Sustainable Urban Transport Strategy (included in indicators 4.1 and 4.2).
- The GEF tracking tool was completed at MTR and at the end of the Terminal Evaluation. The reason for this delay was to wait for assurance that the pilots were being implemented in Batumi. As stated in section 3.2.3, its contents are consistent with this report with only minor differences.

### **3.2.6. UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation / execution, coordination, and operational issues**

The rating of the overall quality of implementation and execution is moderately satisfactory (MS). Whereas the implementation on UNDP was satisfactory, that of the executing agency (MoENRP) was unsatisfactory (U). MoENRP was poorly involved in the project, even failing to participate in most project board meetings. MoENRP argued that, considering the contents of the project, it was more appropriate to consider the City of Batumi as *de facto* executing agency, but- besides not being consistent with the formal administrative arrangements- this reasoning forgets that the project intended to reach an impact also at the regional and national levels.

The Implementing Partner for this project is the MoENRP. Project execution followed the UNDP’s National Implementation Modality (NIM). A Letter of Agreement was signed between the GoG and UNDP for the provision of support services for a total value of USD 12,975. While it was initially expected that the Deputy Minister of MoENRP would act as NPD, the MoENRP decided that this position should rather be served by

one official from the municipality of Batumi, and subsequently, the involvement of MoENRP in the project was quite limited, as shown by the absence of MoENRP representatives to most PEB meetings or by its representation by junior or mid-level specialists, when attending.

There is no evidence of formal and regular coordination meetings between UNDP and MoENRP for this project. Sustained efforts from UNDP to increase the involvement of the MoENRP, particularly in what referred to the national strategy, were unsuccessful.

It can be concluded that the interest of MoENRP on this particular project substantially decreased once the Minister was replaced in December 2015, and this situation remained when the new Minister took office in September 2016 and when the MoENRP was abolished and merged with the Ministry of Agriculture in December 2017.

The City of Batumi (City Council and City Hall) was a crucial partner for project implementation, at most of the project budget was dedicated to the completion of studies and implementation of pilots in the city. Whereas the project was successful in delivering the former, it was not able to properly reach the latter. In fact, this is a challenge faced by most sustainable urban mobility projects and the challenges of measure implementation has been profusely discussed<sup>23</sup>. In this case, four major barriers can be identified, in accordance with the interviews and the review of project studies: (1) at the ISUTP level there was a lack of identification of uncontroversial measures, which could have been quickly implemented while the pilots were prepared; (2) the feasibility and functional studies focused almost exclusively on technical issues, and did not included the consensus-building process to gain the support among key stakeholders necessary for successful implementation; (3) detailed implementation responsibilities within the municipality were not properly identified in the feasibility studies or in other documents, making it difficult and time-consuming for the PM to properly monitor the implementation process within the municipality, specially taking into consideration the lack of previous experience among local officials in the implementation of disruptive pilots like the ones included in the project.

### **3.2.7. COVID impact on project implementation**

Georgia confirmed its first COVID-19 case on 26 February 2020. Schools were closed down during 2-4 March, and special measures were announced on 16 March, banning entrance to the country for any foreign nationals. A curfew was established between 21 March and 22 May and Batumi, together with other cities were closed between 15 April and 5 May. Between 17 April and 27 April, all urban public transport services were banned, as well as general traffic.

As an effect of these restrictions, traffic in Batumi significantly decreased, as well as public transport services (including minibuses). There was some evidence of an increase in walking and cycling in the city, and- probably for the first time for many skeptical decision makers- biking was seen as an efficient and attractive urban transport mode. There was one report prepared to expand biking lanes in Batumi, but its proposals were not implemented as, with the exception of the mayor of Tbilisi, Georgian decision makers remain focusing on the facilitation of car traffic. The decrease in Summer tourism was also quite relevant, as international visitors all but disappear.

<sup>23</sup> See e.g. Hrelja, R., Isaksson, K., & Richardson, T. (2013). Choosing conflict on the road to sustainable mobility: A risky strategy for breaking path dependency in urban policy making” *Transportation Research Part A*, 49, 195–205. Also Gillingham, K. and J. Sweeney (2012) Barriers to Implementing Low Carbon Technologies. *Climate Change Economics*, 3, 1-25.

As mobility restrictions were implemented, teleworking was officially instituted by many companies and organizations, including public agencies and international institutions like UNDP, with most staff (except high-level officials and essential workers) working from home. Even once the restrictions were removed, teleworking remained in place on a flexible basis in many organizations. Now that the restrictions have been reintroduced in September 2020, teleworking has expanded again. Schooling moved to on-line lessons at the beginning of March until Summer, and keeps being the rule in the Adjara Region for this new course.

On-line shopping was already well expanded in Georgia before the pandemic, but now has significantly grown for groceries and food. These deliveries have mainly increased moped traffic, as the use of bicycles for urban deliveries remains marginal.

Since September 25, all public transport services in Adjara have been cancelled. Prior to that, the authorities (a National Commission was established) issued instructions to reduce capacity, use masks and undertake regular disinfection. The number of public transport passengers drastically decreased: from 40,000 passengers per day before the pandemic to 23,000 in September 2020. The financial loss of the municipal bus company will be covered by the municipality, as there have been no measures to provide economic compensations to transport operators. The same applies to the private operators of minibuses.

The COVID-19 pandemic has not had significant impact on the project thus far, as public works were allowed in spite of the restrictions. The works for the implementation of the bus corridor and the parking lot have continued, with minor delays due to other circumstances, such as difficulties for the procurement of the parking machines or the introduction of the vertical signals.

### **3.3. Project Results**

#### **3.3.1. Overall results (attainment of objectives)**

This section provides a review of the attainment of the targets set for all the PRF indicators. It subsequently provides an overall assessment of the project's objectives.

A review of the PRF indicators shows that most of the project expected outcomes have been achieved, as shown in the table below (the letter in brackets refers to the last column in Table 13):

- (a) CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction were reported at the end of the terminal evaluation, in November 2020. Due to the late completion of the demonstration, there has not been regular monitoring of the corridor conditions, and the project team cannot provide any figures on actual or estimated emissions savings. As the project produced a traffic model for the city, the terminal evaluation team has recommended to undertake a modelling exercise in order to estimate the impact of the demonstration by comparing the results of the model prepared in 2017 with the results of the model under the modified traffic conditions implemented in the demonstration, and to include this study in the Final Project Report.

As a way to at least provide a proxy of the project impact for this indicator, the TE team has reviewed the results of the TEEMP model prepared at the project design stage and compared its assumptions and results with the actual conditions of the corridor expected to become operational by mid-December 2020. As the corridor design criteria under implementation are closely following the Prodoc, it is considered that the TEEMP model assumptions and results remain valid, as stated in Table 11. The estimate of the number of passengers coming from the various transport modes already includes the



expected effects of the measures restricting the circulation of minibuses and introducing P+R and paid parking<sup>24</sup>.

Design Parameter (Assumptions)	Prodoc	Terminal evaluation	Comments
Number of passengers per day using improved bus service on the corridor (2021)	30,952	30,952	2021 (0.5% annual growth)
Number of bus passengers previously using cars	929	929	3% of users of new bus services
Number of bus passengers previously using marshrutkas	20,119	20,119	65% of users of new bus services
Number of bus passengers previously using buses	9,905	9,905	32% of users of new bus services
Average speed, private car (km/h)	28.8	28.8	2021, without project implementation
Average speed, marshrutkas (km/h)	27.9	27.9	2021, without project implementation
Average speed, standard buses (km/h)	14.4	14.4	2021, without project implementation
Average speed, new bus services (km/h)	18.8	18.8	After project implementation

**Table 11: Review of key assumptions in the TEEMP model for the demonstration corridor in Batumi**

In accordance with the TEEMP model, once the 2.2-km DBG demonstration corridor becomes operational, an annual direct reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of some 431 tons can be expected in 2021, and roughly similar savings would be delivered in the subsequent years<sup>25</sup>. At project design, it was considered that the demonstration in Batumi would be running for 2 whole years, providing savings of 877 t CO<sub>2</sub>. In fact, the demonstration will not be operational before the end of the project, and therefore there will be no direct emissions saved.

However, it can be said that the project is on track of providing the expected savings after its completion. In a 10-year period after project completion, the GEF TEEMP model estimates GHG emission savings of 4,219 tons, close to the 4,282 tons presented in the ProDoc; the slight difference is due to the different periods considered (2019-2028 in ProDoc and 2021-2030 at the terminal evaluation).

In what refers to consequential GHG emission savings (referred to in the ProDoc and in this report as indirect emissions)<sup>26</sup>, the assumptions made at project design cannot be sustained. It was assumed that the introduction of sustainable urban mobility measures in other cities in Georgia, and the implementation of a national urban mobility strategy and policy would deliver savings at least equal to three times the direct savings. As discussed in section 3.3.7 (Sustainability), the prospects for project's sustainability are moderately unlikely, particularly in what refers to replication in other cities or at the

<sup>24</sup> Although public transport has been discontinued for some periods in 2020 due to COVID-19 restrictions, it is assumed that the service will be fully re-established in 2021 with no permanent negative impact in terms of bus patronage.

<sup>25</sup> The TEEMP model estimates, for each year, the daily emissions avoided by the passengers that move from car use, marshrutkas and standard buses to the improved bus services. It takes also into account a 1% annual decrease in average speed for all modes without project implementation and 1% annual gain in fuel efficiency for all vehicles. IN 2021 the daily CO<sub>2</sub> emissions avoided are 308 kg for gasoline cars, 45 kg for diesel cars, 62 kg for gasoline marshrutkas, 1,027 kg for diesel marshrutkas, 30 kg for gasoline buses and 222 kg for diesel buses. The daily emissions of the new bus services are 465 kg; total savings are 1198 kg CO<sub>2</sub> per day or 431 t CO<sub>2</sub> per year.

<sup>26</sup> Consequential GHG emission reductions are those projected emissions that could result from a broader adoption of the outcomes of a GEF project plus longer-term emission reductions from behavioral change. Broader adoption of a GEF project proceeds through several processes including sustaining, mainstreaming, replication, scaling-up and market change. Consequential emission reductions are typically achieved after GEF project closure and occur outside of the project logical framework (logframe). (Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Accounting and Reporting for GEF Projects - Findings and Recommendations of GEF Working Groups, May 07, 2015)

national level. It could be assumed that the two cities in which the City Council has approved the SUMP provided by the project will be successful in providing some savings, but no savings can be expected from the three Acharan cities that have not approved the SUMP or at the national level, as the national government has no intention to adopt and implement the national strategy delivered by the project. The joint population of the two municipalities in Achara that have adopted SUMP is half the population of the five municipalities originally targeted, so that at best it could be assumed that at best half the expected bottom-up indirect emission savings could materialize on a 10-year period, i.e. some 1,316 tons instead of 2,631 tons.

Among the assumptions presented above to actually achieved the savings presented above, the removal of minibuses from the corridor is the one with higher uncertainty. Most of the riders of the future bus services (65%) are expected to be former minibus users. However, the limitations implemented thus far to the circulation of these vehicles do not seem sufficient to attain such ambitious modal change, and none of the interviewees has mentioned any additional measures to be adopted soon. The current situation is that minibuses will only be forbidden to drive on the corridor in one direction and will run on a parallel street, making modal change unlikely.

As there is a direct correspondence between GHG emission savings and energy savings, the comments above also apply in what refers to this indicator. Target values are summarized in the table below.

Indicator	Prodoc target	Terminal evaluation
Tons GHG direct emissions saved, by end of project	877	0
Tons GHG direct emissions saved, 10 years since end of project	4282	4239
Tons GHG indirect emissions saved (bottom-up), 10 years since end of project	2,631	1316
Million MJ direct energy saved, by end of project	13.6	0
Million MJ direct energy saved, 10 years since end of project	66.4	65.7
Million MJ indirect energy saved, by end of project	40.8	0
Million MJ indirect energy saved, 10 years since end of project	199.2	32.9

**Table 12: Summary of GHG and energy saving indicators**

- (b) This target is on track of being achieved by project termination, although the corridor design is significantly different of what was envisaged in the ProDoc, in the ISUTP and in the functional studies, as there are no cycling lanes, car parking is maintained and general traffic becomes unidirectional, increasing the capacity of the street and inducing further car use.
- (c) This target is unlikely of being achieved by project termination, even if the demonstration corridor is implemented. The reason is that there will be no time for potential bus users to react to the service improvements and to transfer to bus services from minibuses and cars. Furthermore, the plans to reduce the number of minibuses on the corridor are not bold enough to force any significant modal change.
- (d) The target for the average bus speed on the demonstration corridor is on track to be achieved, if the construction works conclude, as expected, by the end of the project.

Outcome	Indicator	Baseline	Target	MTR	TE
Project objective	Cumulative direct CO2 emission reductions (resulting from implementation of the Batumi SUTP by EOP, tons CO2 (at end of project and 10 years afterwards) (tons)	0	877/ 2,631		(a)
Project objective	Cumulative direct energy saving (MJ) from improved traffic efficiency measures for public transit through project corridors, and the avoidance of gasoline consumption from cars in the park-and-ride and modal switches to public transport as well as from other Batumi SUTP measures	0	13.6 million		(a)
Outcome 1: Sustainable transport plans adopted in Batumi and Achara Region	Number of versions of the Integrated Sustainable Urban Transport Plan for Batumi prior to adoption by the City by EOP	0	2	3	3
Outcome 1	Number of municipalities included in Achara inter-municipality sustainable transport plan by EOP	0	3		? <sup>27</sup>
Outcome 2: Specific feasibility studies and functional plans developed to lower carbon intensity of urban transport along selected corridors in Batumi	Number of feasibility studies for sustainable transport measures in Batumi	0	4	4	5
Outcome 2	Number of specific functional plans to lower carbon intensity of urban transport in Batumi	0	2	2	2
Outcome 3: Sustainable urban transport measures successfully implemented along a selected corridor in the City of Batumi	Kilometers of corridor improved with dedicated bus lanes, restricted private car access, synchronized lighting and improved access to bicycles as public transport by EOP	0	2.2	0	(b)
Outcome 3	Average number of passengers per bus along improved corridor by EOP	12	20	12	(c)
Outcome 3	% increase in average speed of buses through the selected corridor by EOP	0	25	0	(d)
Outcome 3	Number of city parking spaces shifted to high hourly parking fees that are actively implemented	0	500	0	(e)
Outcome 3	Total MJ of energy saved from passengers leaving cars at park-and-ride or at home or hotel (estimated based on increased bus ridership) in favour of public transit by EOP	0	13.6 million	0	(f)
Outcome 3	Kilometers of bicycle network improved by EOP	0	6	0	(g)
Outcome 4: Sustainable Transport Plans developed and adopted in Batumi and other municipalities in Achara Region and Georgia	Number of institutional mechanisms to support SUT in Georgia by EOP	0	1	0	(h)
Outcome 4	Number of SUT Roadmaps for other Acharian municipalities by EOP	0	5	0	5
Outcome 4	Number of national SUT policies developed for sustainable urban transport by EOP	0	1	0	1

**Table 13: Achievement of indicators' targets and project's outcomes**

(e) This target is unlikely to be achieved. Although there are indications in PIR-2019 that paid parking has already been implemented in Tbilisi square and could be implemented in the center of Batumi, the information gathered during the interviews indicates that parking is not paid by the hour, but for longer

<sup>27</sup> It does not seem possible to provide a figure for this indicator. The original indicator referred to the number of municipalities in the Region adopting SUMP (currently two, Keda and Kobuleti, - on top of Batumi, already included in another indicator- have adopted their SUMP), but it was changed following the MTR to "number of municipalities included in Achara inter-municipality sustainable transport plan by EOP"; as the regional plan provided by the project includes Batumi and other 5 municipalities in the region, so that this target would have been achieved. However, the plan has not been adopted by the regional government; so the understanding of the TE team is that this target has been achieved only partially, as there is no "Achara intermunicipality sustainable transport plan" in place, which is an interpretation consistent with the description of outcome 1 as "plans adopted".

periods (day, week, month...) and that, although the project lobbied for a substantial increase in parking fares, these remain far away from discouraging car use. During the final extension of the project, the parking lot at Tbilisi square was equipped with a system allowing parking metering, to be managed by Batumi Avtotransport, but the number of parking places in the facility is far below the 500 target.

- (f) Energy saved due to modal change from car to other modes is unlikely to be achieved, due to the lack of implementation of the parking strategy developed by the project.
- (g) At PIR-2019 it was indicated the commitment of the municipality of Batumi to rehabilitate 6 km of cycling lanes, there is no evidence of the completion of this commitment. The information on co-financing indicates investment in repainting of cycling lanes in 2019, and there is verbal notice of further repainting in 2020. At any rate, the intended rehabilitation was limited to repainting the cycling lanes, which cannot be considered as a significant improvement.
- (h) As mentioned in the MTR, it remains unclear what is meant by an “institutional mechanism”. This could be the case of the working group established with the GoG, but this working group has been discontinued. It could also refer to the Regional Transport Plan for Achara, which was delivered to the regional government, but this regional plan has not received any official endorsement, which makes it difficult to consider it as an institutional mechanism. It could also refer to the National Transport Strategy, but this is already covered by another indicator; furthermore, as this Strategy has not received any official endorsement, it is difficult to consider it as an institutional mechanism.

The project *“intended to address the above barriers, assist Batumi in the accelerated development of sustainable green transport initiatives, and to facilitate replication of green sustainable transport initiatives in other municipalities of the Achara Region”* (ProDoc, par.43). The attainment of these objectives are discussed one by one below.

Addressing key barriers, as identified in Prodoc (par.15):

(1) Insufficient local government capacity to undertake holistic approaches to SUT development. The project’s effectiveness in addressing the first barrier has been low, as it is evidenced by three facts: (a) the inability to successfully transfer the traffic model to the municipality; (b) the low influence of the project in the design of the demonstration corridor (the municipality did not take into consideration the technical evidence provided by the project for the design of the demonstration corridor and decided to choose an alternative corridor in spite of the project’s warnings about its extremely dubious basis and poor performance); (c) the lack of clear ownership of the ISUTP within the municipality; although during the interviews it was mentioned that the Municipal Policy Department was responsible for ISUTP implementation, monitoring and evaluation, there was no evidence of these activities being undertaken by this Department, or staff and resources having been assigned for these tasks.

(2) Insufficient institutional exposure to best international practices to set national standards and regulations for SUT and GUD. The project’s effectiveness in addressing the second barrier has been low. There is no evidence of an increase in the institutional exposure of the relevant GoGE’s departments to best international practices, and national standards and regulations have not been set up as a consequence of the project. This is consistent with the limited if not passive involvement of the GoGE in the project.

(3) lack of access to finance for SUT and GUD initiatives. In what regards SUT, the project’s effectiveness in addressing the third barrier has been very high. The project provided the municipality of Batumi with the ISUTP, which is considered by donors and financial institutions as a key policy document for financing concrete actions in the city. There is evidence of the influence of the project in this regard from GIZ, EBRD

and KfW. In what refers to financing GUD initiatives, the project's effectiveness to address this barrier has been low, mainly due to the fact that the actual involvement of the Municipal Urban Planning Department in the project has been very limited, in spite of the repeated attempts of the PMU to give a focal role to this department.

(4) lack of public awareness to support and increase demand for SUT and GUD initiatives being promoted by local government. The project's effectiveness in addressing the fourth barrier has been very high. There is overwhelming evidence of the sustained effort made by PMU to raise public awareness at the local, regional and national levels, particularly through social media channels.

Assisting Batumi in the accelerated development of sustainable green transport initiatives. The PMU has provided high-quality assistance to Batumi during the whole project life, and well beyond the project's initial commitments and available resources. However, the implementation performance of the municipality has been disappointingly poor.

Facilitating replication of green sustainable transport initiatives in other municipalities of the Achara Region. The PMU has provided assistance to facilitate replication in other Acharan municipalities; however, the small size of semi-rural characteristics of these municipalities made them unsuitable for replication.

### **3.3.2. Relevance**

The project is rated as relevant. The project objectives are fully consistent with the beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donor's policies.

Regarding the beneficiaries' requirements, the project fully addressed the ambitions of the municipality of Batumi to foster a "green tourism destination" profile, and offered continued support to the city in order to meet its commitments with the Covenant of Mayors and, in particular, to the implementation of the SEAP. It was also consistent with the national government's interest in promoting the involvement of Georgian municipalities in the Covenant of Mayors, with the national strategies and policies on climate change mitigation, and with the more recent national policies on the empowerment of regional and local governments and decentralization.

Georgian cities, like many others in the region, are struggling with a quick expansion of private car use and the difficulties to transition from poorly regulated minibuses services to integrated public transport systems able to provide a reasonable quality level. International best practice shows the need to develop integrated strategies to cope with these challenges, and the project consistently addresses this.

GEF-5 included a specific objective on climate change mitigation addressing urban transport (CCM-4): "promote energy efficient, low-carbon transport and urban systems". The project included all the 3 outcomes expected for CCM-4: (a) sustainable transport and urban policy and regulatory frameworks adopted and implemented; (b) increased investment in less-GHG intensive transport and urban systems; (c) GHG emissions avoided; it successfully delivered results for (a) and (b) and, at the time of submission of this TE report, it is still expected that some minor contribution can still be provided for (c).

In 2017, the GoG declared all seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) as national priorities. Although designed prior to the adoption of the SDGs by the UN General Assembly, the project was fully aligned with SDG-11 "sustainable cities and communities", particularly through its expected contribution to reduced adverse environmental impacts in Batumi and other cities. The expected completion of the pilot measures in Batumi is a relevant contributor to this goal.

The project was full aligned with the UNDP Strategic Plans in place at the time of design and implementation (2014-2017 and 2018-2021). The UNDP Strategic plan 2014-2017 called i.a. for a focus on cities and on new technologies; it also called for strengthening institutions to progressively deliver universal access to basic services and for planning at sub-national levels to help connect national priorities with action on the ground, including on urban areas. Actions were expected to help with integrating low-emission, climate-resilient objectives into national and sectoral development plans and identifying priority mitigation and/or adaptation measures. They should promote policies and capacities to foster more accountable and open governance in state institutions and in society and systematic outreach, consultation and hearings to tap technical expertise and hear citizen perspectives. All these aspects were addressed within the design and implementation of the ISTBAR project.

The UNDP Strategic Plan 2018-2021 focuses on the support to the implementation of the 2030 agenda. One of the key development challenges identified in the strategy is to achieve structural transformations for sustainable development, inter alia, transitioning to zero-carbon development and building more effective governance systems that can respond to megatrends such as globalization, urbanization and technological and demographic changes. This was the backbone of the ISTBAR project from design to implementation.

The project has also been consistent with other donors' and international partners' policies. In particular, the ISUTP delivered by the project in Batumi has facilitated investment projects financed by EBRD, GIZ and KfW.

Some key political circumstances changed since the project was designed. Changes in the political leadership at the municipality and at the MoERNP and MoRDI resulted in weakened support to project implementation of two critical actions: the demonstration corridor and parking policy in Batumi and the adoption of a national strategy on sustainable urban mobility at the national level.

### **3.3.3. Effectiveness**

The extent to which the development the project's objectives have been achieved is moderately unsatisfactory.

The project has been extremely successful in developing high-quality tools and documents on sustainable urban mobility to the relevant authorities: the municipal of Batumi, the regional government of Achara and the national government.

The ownership and practical use of the project's outputs by the recipient authorities has been unsatisfactory. All the recipient authorities have actively participated in the development of the project's strategies and actions and have praised the project's deliverables, but their level of implementation has been close to zero. The regional and national governments have made no steps towards the adoption and implementation of the strategies and concrete actions proposed by the project. The municipality of Batumi formally adopted the ISUTP in April 2018, but the steps made to implement its recommendations have been unsuccessful and, in fact, key mayoral decisions on parking and on the design of the demonstration corridor are inconsistent with the project's recommendations and with sound sustainable urban mobility practices. Furthermore, the technical tools and capacity building activities provided by the project have not resulted in any visible changes in daily practices within the targeted administrations.

The project's risk mitigation management has been successful in keeping the recipient administrations participating in the project and finding alternative commitments once it became obvious that they would not implement the project's strategies and recommended actions. However, risk management failed to properly identify the complex political and cultural risks the project was facing since it was launched; this refers to a

conservative and risk-avoidance attitude from the side of decision makers and bureaucrats, which on the one hand become hostile to innovative approaches and technical tools they cannot control and that reduces their influence and power, and on the other hand gives priority to short-term tactics over long-term transformative strategies.

In this complex context it is fair to say that the project delivered as much as (and even more than) it could; it wisely combined strong lobbying on governments with successful awareness raising activities and high media coverage, so that governments were successfully pushed forward to keep exploring options for action, remained formally committed with the sustainable mobility paradigm and felt sustained pressure to undertake reforms in urban mobility.

### **3.3.4. Efficiency**

The efficiency of the project in converting its resources into results is moderately satisfactory. The project has carefully managed its limited resources, undertaking key contracts and mobilizing resources at the right time in order to achieve the expected results. In particular:

- The structure of the PMU, consisting of a PM and an AFO, supported by an international CTA, has been efficient for managing the project. The UNDP's additional contribution have allowed for the 13-month extension of the project.
- The contracts awarded to A+S Consult have provided value for money on traffic modelling, Batumi ISUTP and the Regional Mobility Plan. However, it is a fact that implementation and beneficiary's ownership of these products have been quite limited. Whereas this is mostly due to lack of sufficient support from the relevant decision-makers, experience in similar projects in other cities show that ownership can also be created through more extensive involvement of local officials during the development of the technical assistance. During the preparation of the ToR, this option could have been included as an explicit request to the consultant's approach.
- The contracts awarded to Foundation Partnership for Road Safety have provided reasonable value for money for the preparation of a national strategy. It provides comprehensive information on the urban transport sector in Georgia, its legal framework and best international practice. However, ownership of the national strategy remains unclear, and the consultants do not propose a clear roadmap for implementation of the necessary legal and institutional changes. Regrettably, the project was not successful to build up a consistent institutional process engaging the national government to establish a focal point for urban transport and to take ownership of the documents provided by the consultants, and the consultants were unable to provide documents well suited to raise the interest of the national government.
- The consultant LTD STS provided different traffic modelling studies for the implementation of the demonstration corridor in 2020. Apparently, these studies were unable to convince the municipality about the ineffectiveness of its proposal and the need to implement any of the alternatives developed by the project.
- Resources earmarked for the implementation of the demonstration corridor were put on hold until the municipality formally agreed to implement it. This has blocked 36% of the project budget. The demonstration corridor design finally agreed with the municipality in April 2020 is very unlikely to meet the project's objectives, and it may even further encourage private car use as a result of short-term improvements in general traffic flows. This does not seem as an efficient use of these resources, but it is

fair to acknowledge the few options the PMU had at this stage: with no alternative demonstrations of the table, the PMU tried to negotiate a corridor scheme in which, at least, public transport could gain some advantages, and the ISUTP could be kept alive for future developments.

### **3.3.5. Country ownership**

The project is highly relevant for the implementation of the national agenda and climate change and energy efficiency: The Third National Communication (TNC) of Georgia, the Energy Strategy, the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, and the “Vertical-NAMA” project identify urban mobility as a key area for action. However, although drafted, the Energy Strategy, the INDC and the V-NAMA had not been adopted by the government at the time the project was launched, suggesting insufficient political to speed up action on climate change and energy efficiency.

The project has faced this same lack of commitment at all governmental levels at the time of implementation. Whereas local, regional and national authorities seemed genuinely interested in engaging in the development of the various strategies, they subsequently adopted a passive role and failed to take ownership of the various project outputs.

### **3.3.6. Mainstreaming**

Mainstreaming of the project with other UNDP priorities focused on improved governance. This is the first transport-related project executed by UNDP in Georgia, and UNDP management put a lot of effort and pressure on the governmental project partners to achieve the endorsement of the various plans and strategies provided by the project and to implement the demonstration in Batumi. Key governance considerations mainstreamed in the project refer to public participation (particularly for the official adoption of the ISUTP in Batumi), multilevel governance (at the basis of the regional and national urban transport strategies provided by the project), and capacity building of technical municipal services (through transfer of the traffic model and other tools for sustainable mobility planning). The contributions of the project on urban transport provided a useful input to the national government’s decentralization strategy (to undertake a more efficient distribution of competences and resources among national, regional and local government levels on urban mobility), and UNDP CO management tried to strengthen this link with the national government, although with limited results.

In accordance with good international practice on sustainable urban mobility, there could have been some potential to mainstream within the ISTBAR project considerations such as job creation potential in public transport, with better job conditions than current minibuses services, or the emergence of job opportunities in the area of transport planning and urban mobility. Concerning the former, the project supported the municipality of Batumi in the design of an optimized bus transport network and a transitional plan to reduce the number of minibuses, transferring some workers to the municipal bus company; however, these actions have not been implemented. Concerning the latter, the project has been successful in raising the demand of Batumi and other municipalities (most notably Tbilisi) for professional technical assistance on sustainable urban mobility; this comes at an appropriate time, as at least one university (SDSU Georgia) is now offering training on urban transport planning within its B.S. degree in Engineering. It has also been a starting point for UNDP CO to expand its activities at the municipal level.

From a gender and vulnerable groups perspective, the performance of the project was disappointing. Through the ISUTP for Batumi, the project provided relevant information on some social and gender issues related to urban mobility, based on the results from the household mobility survey and the transport model



in Batumi; both tools provided factual evidence on the mobility gaps in terms of social equity and gender in what refers to accessibility and to mobility behavior and patterns of different social groups. However, this factual information was not subsequently used to mainstream social and gender issues within the preparation of the ISUTP in Batumi: none of the actions and recommendation in the plan refer to gender or to vulnerable groups' issues. This is in sharp contrast with the relevance than gender and social inclusion issues in urban mobility have gained in the last years. There is now widespread consensus among urban mobility planners about the insufficiency of just expecting that (as it is mentioned in several PIR) the improvement of transport (and particularly of public transport) will have a trickle down positive impact on women and other vulnerable groups. This has raised strong concerns among planners about the need to explicitly analyze and address challenges such as the following ones in sustainable mobility plans and policies: the usually low number of women in decision making positions and their low share in the staff force; short distance trips (particularly those below 15 minutes) rather than over-focusing on long distance motorized trips; adequate staff relation with customers; personal security and harassment; and the design of targeted participatory activities with women and other vulnerable groups with many "time-poor" individuals, which have difficulties to engage in conventional participatory events<sup>28</sup>.

### **3.3.7. Sustainability**

#### **3.3.7.1. General**

The following project outcomes can be expected to be continued after project completion:

- Implementation of ISUTP in Batumi.
- Adoption and implementation of ISUTP developed for five additional municipalities in Achara (Keda, Shuakhevi, Khulo, Kobuleti and Khelvachauri). Adoption has been achieved in two of them, Keda and Kobuleti, but the other municipalities argue that they do not have resources to implement the plans, and therefore do not intend to implement them.
- Adoption and implementation of the regional mobility masterplan in Achara. In particular, setting up a Regional Transport Authority. The masterplan proposes a unified passenger transport route network, integrated timetables and ticketing as well as the introduction of regional regulations. Furthermore, the project proposed the implementation of an institutional and organizational model for a passenger transport authority in Achara.
- Adoption and implementation of national transport strategy in Georgia. In particular, establishing a focal point on urban mobility within the GoGE, and implementing a financing mechanism to support municipalities in their sustainable urban mobility policies.
- Implementation of the feasibility studies and functional plans developed for Batumi.

In general terms, the ownership and willingness for implementation has been low for all the institutional partners involved, so that the prospects for project's sustainability are moderately unlikely (MU). Risks are further analyzed in the sections below.

---

<sup>28</sup> Drăguțescu, A. et al (2020). Addressing Gender Equity and Vulnerable Groups in SUMPs. This publication provides an excellent overview of gender challenges in urban mobility planning. Available at [https://www.eltis.org/sites/default/files/sump\\_topic-guide\\_gender-equity\\_vulnerable-groups\\_final.pdf](https://www.eltis.org/sites/default/files/sump_topic-guide_gender-equity_vulnerable-groups_final.pdf)  
*Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for Batumi and the Achara Region (ISTBAR)* November 2020

### 3.3.7.2. Financial risks to sustainability

The outcomes provided by the project recommend low to medium cost measures, which should not be difficult to undertake by the municipalities, the regional and the national governments. Furthermore, the strategies and plans provided by the project should facilitate the access of these governments to grants and loans from international institutions.

However, the fact is that the financial autonomy of municipalities is very low, as 90% of their resources come from the national government. Therefore, without the availability of additional resources from the national government, it will be difficult for the municipalities to carry out all the recommendations made by the project. The financial sustainability of the project is therefore rated as likely (L).

### 3.3.7.3. Socio-economic risks to sustainability

Socio-economic risks are mainly related to the lack of acceptance by the public of SUT actions. International experience shows that there is a tendency to overestimate the opposition of the public, particularly when measures have been carefully designed and appropriately communicated. Furthermore, there is also a risk for low ownership of the actions, and of the project as a whole, by some key stakeholders. This risk can be associated to the involvement of a reduced number of local stakeholders and could be managed through more intense relationships with these stakeholders (traffic police, city planning departments, environment departments, public transport operators...) in the future.

The substantial delay in the implementation of the demonstration corridor in Batumi and the technically unjustified revision of the design imposed by the municipality, as well as the poor performance in the implementation of other feasibility studies in the city (e.g. those referring to cycling<sup>29</sup> infrastructure, bus network optimization, parking) are strong evidences of fierce local opposition to the project proposals. Several interviewees referred to concerns from decision makers about the actual acceptance of the innovative bus corridor and parking concepts by the public, but did not identify particular social groups or actors. This opposition, that probably came from influential stakeholders such as the traffic police, shop owners and minibus operators, was coupled with a pervasive technical culture of facilitating private car use through convenient on-street parking and increased capacity of the street network, still prevailing within the City Hall and reluctance to innovation, in accordance with the statements provided by some interviewees.

The project has addressed this opposition through extensive dissemination and awareness-raising activities and events, particularly in 2017 (the year the awareness raising plan was prepared and 5 specific events were organized by the consultant) and 2018. The total reported number of communication activities is 161, including participation at 58 TV events, 11 appearances in the printed press and 43 references in online media and official web pages. The total number of events reported is 43, of which 23 of a local level and 13 of a regional level. The former includes 5 technical workshops.

Whereas these events have been influential in raising awareness among the general public, they probably failed to target the influential stakeholders opposed to the implementation of the measures. The awareness-raising plan did not address this issue, and failed to properly identify these influential groups and to recommend specific measures. The socio-economic sustainability of the project is therefore rated as moderately unlikely (MU).

---

<sup>29</sup> Some interviewees referred to the scepticism from key local decision makers towards cycling in Batumi as a reason for lack of implementation.

#### 3.3.7.4. Institutional framework and governance risks to sustainability

Current local institutional and governance structures still consider traffic congestion as the main problem they are facing. The project has made a significant effort in fighting this view and showing that so-called traffic congestion solutions would merely result in making car use even more attractive compared to alternative modes of transport, and would reduce the street space available for these modes. The project has provided an array of materials, international best practice and technical evidence to change this narrow view of the transport problem, so popular within local institutions and decision makers, but the difficulties to get the proposals implemented in Batumi show that further effort will still be needed.

Furthermore, transport governance responsibilities are highly fragmented within the municipality of Batumi, and the lack of officials specialized in urban transport gives a central role to the traffic police, which reports to the national government and not to the municipality or the regional government. This fragmentation makes it difficult to adopt the holistic "corridor" actions suggested by the UNDP project. The delivery of plans and strategies to Batumi and other municipalities, and to the regional government, has not been accompanied by the setting up of any "transport cell" within each institution, which would have provided the necessary day-to-day support to the adoption and subsequent implementation of these documents.

Therefore, the sustainability of the project from the perspective of the institutional framework and governance is rated as moderately unlikely.

#### 3.3.7.5. Environmental risks to sustainability

The project has enabled progress toward reduced environmental stress from urban mobility. For more than 4 years, the project has familiarized governmental officials and decision makers with sustainable mobility practices and provided them with well-developed proposals for implementation. Ironically, more progress has achieved in Tbilisi- with tangible results in terms of air quality and noise reduction- where the project did not implement any actions, than in Batumi. This is an evidence of the feasibility of implementing sustainable mobility measures in Georgian cities, and of the importance of a strong and committed political leadership at the local level.

The sustainability of the project from an environmental perspective is rated as moderately likely.

#### **3.3.8. Impact**

The impact of the project is rated as minimal. Although the implementation of the project has resulted in significant progress in capacity building and sustainable mobility planning, this progress has not yielded the expected GHG emission reductions and energy savings, due to the delayed and downsized implementation of the pilots envisaged in component 3; the adoption of local SUMP in Batumi, Keda and Kobuleti has not been followed by the dedication of the necessary resources to the implementation of the actions included in the plan, and the regional plan for Adjara and National Strategy for the country have not been adopted.

In spite of these shortcomings, there are valuable impacts achieved by the project:

- Professionals and decision-makers in Batumi, Achara and at the national level have first-hand contact with the principles and practice of sustainable urban mobility, through their involvement in the design and approval process of the plans provided by the project.
- Decision-makers in Batumi, Achara and at the national level have been provided with a portfolio of studies and sustainable mobility actions ready for implementation.

- Valuable technical tools, including transport models, have been developed and handed over to the relevant institutions, to facilitate the assessment of urban mobility actions following international best practice.
- The general public in Batumi, and particularly children and youngsters, have become familiar with the principles of sustainable mobility and the importance of making personal sustainable mobility choices.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS

### 4.1. Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project

The following conclusions, recommendations and lessons can be highlighted for the design of future projects focusing on sustainable urban mobility:

- **Conclusion #1:** UNDP has now substantial experience in the implementation of sustainable urban mobility projects in the region as well as globally. In line with this experience and international best practice, this project was based on three pillars: the preparation of a SUMP, the implementation of some flagship demonstrations consistent with the SUMP, and the delivery of technical tools and training to local technicians and stakeholders. This approach is consistent and has proven to deliver in terms of achievement of the project's objectives and facilitation of its sustainability beyond project completion. However, in this case- as in others-, the project had to cope with a challenging mid-stage crisis, at the time of moving from the delivery of technical studies to the actual implementation of actions on the ground. It is at this moment that many decision makers hesitate to take action, some stakeholders actively or passively oppose the foreseen innovations and the PMU and UNDP CO have to fight an uphill battle against time and resources. In fact, within its risk analysis, the ProDoc identified some of the causes which could prevent the implementation of the demonstrations and provided mitigation measures for them. These causes were the lack of the expected co-financing and an uncertain political situation leading to a drop in tourism and in public transport revenues. Although relevant, these risks did not materialize during the project, but the demonstrations were well delayed, with project activities slowed-down during many months. The ProDoc did not provide much guidance on how the PMU could effectively navigate through this difficult stage.

Three main shortcomings can be identified at the project's pilot stage, in accordance with the interviews and the review of project studies: (1) at the ISUTP level, there was a lack of identification of uncontroversial measures, which could have been quickly implemented while the pilots were prepared; (2) the feasibility and functional studies focused almost exclusively on technical issues, and did not include the consensus-building process to gain the support among key stakeholders necessary for successful implementation of the proposed measures; (3) detailed implementation responsibilities within the municipality were not properly identified in the feasibility studies or in other documents, making it difficult and time-consuming for the PM to properly monitor the implementation process within the municipality, specially taking into consideration the lack of previous experience among local officials in the implementation of disruptive pilots like the ones included in the project.

It would have been useful to have outlined a Plan B in the event that co-financing fails to materialize that could, for example, envisage the implementation of pilots in other cities (in fact, during the first Project Board Meetings, the option of including Kutaisi was proposed by UNDP and dismissed by the implementing partner).

**Conclusion #2.** The ProDoc adequately identified four key risks, but it failed to associate them by the subsequent political risk of local decision-makers in Batumi deciding not to implement the pilots. Such risk was firstly identified in PIR-2017 ("local government will not remain committed to implementation of the Project and/or change in government after elections"). PIR-2017 established a sound mitigation strategy for this risk, although it was not successful in getting the pilots launched until well after the new mayor took office. In retrospective, it is easy to say that PIR-2018 was too optimistic in considering that the risk was then at a "non-critical" level, and that it would have been better to have continued the

mitigation measures to keep pressure on the local government. This would have been consistent with the UNDP/GEF technical advisor statement in PIR-2018 that “the risk of co-financing failing to materialize is high”.

Recommendation A.1. The Regional Hub is recommended to request from project designers the inclusion of detailed guidance on how to successfully move from the planning stage to the actual implementation of pilots. In particular, this could be done through the identification of some “low-hanging fruit”, i.e. uncontroversial short-term low-cost measures that can be quickly implemented and gain the attention and support of the public, the media and decision makers towards sustainable mobility. Furthermore, successful delivery of such outputs would create a more confident environment among stakeholders to subsequently undertake the implementation of more complex key project demonstrations.

- Conclusion #3. The project ambitioned to intervene at the local, regional and national level. This implied interaction with a large number of stakeholders, the delivery of many technical reports and networking activities and pushing forward many decision-making processes. Apparently, the availability of resources has not been an issue in this project, as more than one third of the budget remained unspent at the time the TE was started. However, all these resources were earmarked to the demonstration corridor and could not be spent in other activities. The project intended to carry out activities at the local, regional and national levels. Whereas the ProDoc defined the local strategy in Batumi in quite concrete terms, it was not providing sufficient indications on what should be done at the regional and national levels. In fact, it was not even obvious that the SUMP concept could be applied to any other municipalities in Achara due to their small size. This lack of detail in what should be done at the regional and national level resulted in some shortcomings in the PRF, with clear overlap between outcomes 1 and 4, and indicators with ambiguous definition. The difficulties encountered to get adequate offers in some of the bidding processes and the need to extend the project well beyond its initial completion date suggest that the scope of the project was too wide compared with the resources available (USD 853,000 from GEF and USD 280,000 from UNDP). Furthermore, all the co-financing mobilized by the project came from the City of Batumi or from UNDP. This suggests that the actual interest and commitment that could be expected from other key partners (national government, regional government and most of the municipalities in the Achara region) could have been overestimated during the project design stage.
- Conclusion #4. In its cooperation with international organizations, the adoption of national strategies and plans by the Government of Georgia has encountered delays and difficulties (e.g. National Energy Efficiency Action Plan, developed in 2015 and not approved until end 2019, V-NAMA not approved); Although this was not included within the risk analysis carried out in the ProDoc (which could have resulted in a more elaborated approach to component #4), it was subsequently addressed by the UNDP Country Office (including its Resident Representative) through intense lobbying of key national authorities during project implementation. Although not fully effective (the national strategy was not endorsed by any governmental body), this action was useful in bringing urban mobility to the attention of the national government.
- Recommendation A.2. The Regional Hub is recommended to request, from Country Offices and project designers, basic feasibility studies regarding the prospects for actual implementation of key project outputs, such as pilots and transport plans. Such feasibility studies would facilitate a realistic alignment of the project’s scope and ambitions with the resources and political capital actually available, as well as the identification of alternative implementation strategies in case of lack of materialization of critical co-financing or other resources.

- Recommendation C.1. The UNDP CO executive level is recommended to intervene at the proper political level whenever there are signs of insufficient political commitment from national, regional or local governments, and particularly during transitioning periods in political leadership. The ISTBAR project proved that such strong involvement was effective in realigning at least some governmental partners in the attainment of project's objectives
- Conclusion #5. The stakeholder analysis did not clearly stress the need to identify those local actors in Batumi that could be reluctant to the implementation of sustainable mobility measures inside or outside the City Hall. Discussions on the selection of the demonstration corridor had already started at the project design stage, providing some early evidence of the different views within the municipality and among key local stakeholders, and notably from the traffic police (reporting to the national government, not to the municipality).
- Conclusion #6. The environmental and social screening procedure (ESSP) did not identify any significant gender and social equity impacts in the project, and the ProDoc did not specifically address these issues. Although this is understandable at the time the project was designed, as the potential of transport projects to deliver significant social and gender impacts had not been sufficiently stressed by GEF and within UNDP, it resulted in a very poor performance in the gender dimension; the project clearly failed to advance gender and social equity challenges in Batumi related to mobility.

The following conclusions and lessons can be highlighted regarding project implementation:

- Conclusion #7. The ProDoc provided excellent guidance and supporting materials (ToR, job descriptions, consultancies...) to facilitate a quick and smooth start of the project. The PMU structure proposed by the project proved to be effective, and the inclusion of an international CTA provided the necessary know-how on international best practice, and the ability to effectively guide the various consultants.
- Conclusion #8. The insufficiency of the stakeholder analysis provided by the ProDoc (see conclusion #6) was not addressed during project implementation by the PMU or the consultants. The consequence is that the project was not able to properly identify the nature of the passive opposition towards the implementation of demonstrations in Batumi, a basis for establishing a winning coalition that could have succeeded in the implementation of the project's pilots.
- Conclusion #9. The awareness-raising plan designed and implemented by the project failed to build up the support needed to reach the timely implementation of the demonstrations in Batumi. The plan was designed as a tool for the local government, and its actions focused on children and young people—although they were not targeted by the demonstrations in Batumi, wrongly assuming that local decision makers were fully aligned with the project and that these awareness-raising activity should take an educational character for future generations. As the implementation of the demonstrations started to be delayed, the PMU partly compensated this weakness through intensive communication actions in the local, regional and national media, as an effective way to put some pressure on reluctant local decision makers.
- Recommendation B.1. The Regional Hub is recommended to encourage Project Managers to include, within the ToR for the development of sustainable mobility plans and strategies, the identification of short-term low-cost actions for immediate implementation. To provide this, technical consultants can build upon the guidance provided in the project document (see recommendation A.1) and look for actions able to strengthen the confidence of the stakeholders on the project, before undertaking the

more ambitious and complex demonstrations foreseen. In the urban transport field, this is particularly relevant for actions to promote public transport and parking management.

- Recommendation C.2. The Project Manager is recommended to provide an assessment of the actual involvement and commitment of key stakeholders- particularly the national government- in the project final report; this assessment could help to update the UNDP strategy for future cooperation with the government. In this project, the early disengagement of the national government (MoENRC), evidenced by the transfer of the NPD role to the municipality of Batumi, the lack of regular communication and the lack of materialization of the expected co-financing, should have been considered as a serious threat for the project's ambition to develop a national strategy and to achieve replication of the Batumi experience to other cities in the country.
- Recommendation B.2. In the implementation of sustainable mobility projects, the regional hub is recommended to encourage PMU to make sure that consultants are engaging the adequate civil servants at all the governmental levels (those in charge at the local level of public transport management, street design maintenance, traffic control... or at the national level of climate change mitigation, transport service inspection and control...) during the preparation of their technical reports, and to carefully identify the profile of the participants needed at each co-creation workshop, training event and other activities. This is a way to empower them through "hands-on training" to play an active role in the project and to undertake the replication and sustainability of the project.
- Recommendation D.1. The regional hub is recommended to encourage setting up permanent participation platforms in the design of future sustainable mobility projects. This would strengthen the role of CSO and NGOs (including those representing women and other vulnerable groups) and facilitate the integration of gender and social dimensions during implementation. This can be an effective way to consolidate the project's profile, to make key stakeholders (and particularly local and national governments) accountable regarding their commitments and to facilitate the replication and sustainability of the project. Setting up such participatory platforms could ideally be considered as a specific output during project design, but could also be integrated within project management in different ways (participation at the Steering Board, advisory or working groups...).
- Recommendation B.3. The UNDP CO is recommended to integrate a social and gender perspective within ToR for technical assistance, particularly for those projects that do not include a Gender Action Plan. Although the ISTBAR project adequately identified that the facilitation of public transport would favor female mobility, it failed to undertake a review of its potential to improve living conditions for women and other vulnerable groups (such as access to PT-related jobs, increasing accessibility of socially stressed neighborhoods with low accessibility, as identified in the household survey or revising security, quality and comfort conditions in PT services).

The following conclusions and lessons can be highlighted regarding project monitoring and evaluation:

- Recommendation B.4. The regional hub is recommended to encourage PMUs to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of all those stakeholders involved in the implementation of controversial pilots and other measures, with the support of the technical consultants involved. This would facilitate the monitoring of the implementation process.
- Conclusion #10. Together with the assumption of the project's mitigation objectives, ownership of project monitoring by the institutional partners (local, regional and national government) is necessary to facilitate the project's sustainability after completion. In this sense, the lack of success of the project in



setting up a GHG emission monitoring system within the City Hall is a significant weakness in the likelihood to attain the project's sustainability.

#### **4.2. Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project**

Conclusion #11. The main key initial benefits from the project, as identified in this report, include the following:

- Delivery of high-quality medium and long-term strategic documents to Batumi and other municipalities, the region of Achara and the national government. International institutions such as GIZ, KfW and EBRD are developing new sustainable transport projects in Georgia, for which these strategic ISTBAR documents provide an excellent framework. Regrettably, there is little if any evidence from the targeted governments (local, regional or national) making any follow-up to these strategic documents in terms of implementation of actions and regular public reporting of progress made.
- Delivery of concrete proposals- some of them including detailed feasibility studies- for implementation in Batumi, other municipalities, the region of Achara and the country, including critical reforms of the regulatory framework.
- The interest of the media in sustainable urban mobility has significantly increased, thanks to the ubiquitous presence of the PM in TV, printed press and social media.
- Development of transport models and other urban transport planning tools to support factual-based decision-making.

Recommendation E.1 In accordance with the M&E work plan, the Project Manager is recommended to produce a final project report, including the following contents to reinforce the positive impacts achieved by the ISTBAR project:

- Initial results obtained from pilots (bus corridor and paid parking), including an estimate of actual GHG emissions saved.
- Guidelines to continue the implementation of the SUMP in Batumi by the City Hall, including an implementation timeline, identification of the municipal services in charge of the different actions, and regular monitoring of the transport system (including responsibilities for data collection and reporting)
- Guidelines for follow up of sustainable mobility policies in Achara Region and at the national level.
- A set of final project recommendations addressed by the PMU or by UNDP to the participating local, regional and national governments to facilitate the sustainability of the project, and to be widely disseminated and actively communicated.
- A final declaration of the participating local, regional and national governments, as well as CSOs and other stakeholders to continue cooperating in the deployment of sustainable mobility policies and actions.
- A call to consider a formal liaison of the participating Georgian cities with international networks active in sustainable mobility, such as the CIVITAS Forum<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> This requires signing the CIVITAS' declaration:

[https://civitas.eu/sites/default/files/civitas\\_forum\\_network\\_declaration\\_en\\_0.doc](https://civitas.eu/sites/default/files/civitas_forum_network_declaration_en_0.doc)

*Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for Batumi and the Achara Region (ISTBAR)*

### 4.3. Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives

Conclusion #12. The project's main objective is to promote sustainable transport in the City of Batumi and in the Region of Achara (and some municipalities within the region) in Georgia. To attain this, the project developed a threefold strategy:

- Establishing consistent integrated policies at local, regional and national level.
- Pilots to reduce CO2 emissions through the improvement of public transport and modal shift from car use.
- Capacity building of local, regional, national governments and regulatory reforms.

Recommendation E.2 Building upon the project's legacy, the UNDP CO is recommended to further expand sustainable mobility policies in Georgia working along with the national government in setting up a permanent Georgian network on sustainable urban mobility, including City Halls, researchers, professionals and NGOs. This would be justified by the fact that other international institutions are continuing action in this field in Georgia. The basic secretarial support to the network could be provided by one municipality or by any of these institutions. The network would provide a platform for exchange of best practices and lobbying for necessary regulatory and institutional reforms, as well as to keep alive the media interest in sustainable urban mobility, and could provide regular reports on the climate change impacts of urban transport in the country.

Recommendation E.3. Building upon the project's legacy, the UNDP CO is also recommended to further expand sustainable mobility policies in Georgia putting in place with the national government a GCF project on sustainable urban mobility, with a gender and social focus. The GCF project could provide the necessary funding for accelerating the transition and integration of the public transport system and the deployment of sustainable parking management. It could also envisage the deployment of e-mobility.

Recommendation E.4. As the demonstration facilities (bus corridor and paid parking lot) will not be completed before the termination of the project, and there is no evidence about their operating conditions, it is recommended to establish an agreement between the City council of Batumi and UNDP CO in order to regularly monitor their operation for at least six months. Furthermore, as no evidence is available on GHG emission savings, it is recommended to make use of the traffic model developed by the project in order to provide an initial estimate of the savings that can be expected. This information would feed the final project report included in recommendation E.1.

Conclusion #13. The PMU has gathered evidence that the COVID pandemic is seriously impacting the operators of public transport and minibuses in Batumi, and probably also in other Georgian cities; proposals to promote cycling during this period have not been implemented by decision makers, with the exception of Tbilisi, leaving citizens with few options except car use. Whereas this situation calls for undertaking urgent action to recover public transport, it also opens an opportunity to undertake some key public transport reforms, based on the project's SUMP for Batumi and other jurisdictions. In particular, the implementation of the bus network proposed by the project and the integration of minibus services as bus feeders, would significantly reduce operating cost, open better job opportunities to minibus employees and attract new users.

Recommendation E5. The Project Manager is encouraged to contact Batumi and other jurisdictions in order to recall the proposals contained in the SUMP and other studies for public transport reform and

improvement, and to encourage these jurisdictions to include these proposals- and the necessary funding within their green post-COVID recovery plans.

Conclusion #14. Although total co-financing from the City of Batumi (including its municipal agencies) reached USD 12,617,139, exceeding by 18% the USD 10,664,000 foreseen in the Project Document, it was not aligned with the project's expectations. 66% of the final co-financing came from the purchase of new CNG and electric buses, and most of the critical co-financing needed for the implementation of the bus corridor and paid parking pilots suffered a significant delay and did not materialize until the second half of 2020. The municipal agency (NNLE Agency of Urban Infrastructure and Public Works), identified as responsible party for the implementation of the bus corridor pilot, did not sign a Letter of Agreement with UNDP until 28 April 2020 as it had to wait for the Mayor's authorization; the LoA was subsequently amended in June 2020 to include the parking pilot and vertical signalization. The total actual co-financing contribution to the bus corridor pilot has been USD 169,652i, instead of USD 819,000 budgeted in the ProDoc, and the investment in parking and cycling facilities has been USD 131,986, instead of USD 7,500,000 budgeted in the ProDoc. Although the MoENRP and the Regional Government of Achara were included in the ProDoc co-financing table, they did not provide the expected in-kind resources (USD 100,000 in the first case and an unspecified contribution in the second case).

Recommendation C3. The Project Manager is recommended to include in the project final report an analysis of the critical co-financing that did not materialize and that has prevented the full implementation of the pilots in Batumi and of the SUMP in the Achara region.

Conclusion #15. UNDP was successful in keeping the project moving forward and to attain most of its targets in a high challenging environment. Since the design stage until completion, UNDP had to partner with four different mayors in Batumi, the last three of them during the implementation stage. Such unstable political environment resulted in substantial delays and repeated attempts to water down the measures to be implemented. Although the City of Batumi proved to be an extremely difficult partner, UNDP successfully preserved the partnership and was able to gain the trust of every mayor and get relevant sustainable mobility measures implemented in Batumi

#### **4.4. Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success**

The following best practices deserve to be highlighted from the ISTBAR project:

- Lesson #1. At the performance level, the excellent effectiveness of the management scheme put in place, with the following characteristics: (1) a core team limited in size, avoiding the inclusion of too specific positions; (2) permanent external support provided by an experienced international CTA, familiar with state-of-the-art international practice in sustainable urban mobility and knowledge of the Georgian context; (3) strong support from UNDP CO executives (including the UNDP Resident Representative) whenever they were required to lobby for the needed involvement from political leaders at the local, regional and national levels.
- Lesson #2. The value of conducting effective quality control of the consultants' deliverables, which was provided by the PM and the CTA, and was confirmed by the reviewing notes and by many consultants during the evaluation interviews. The technical qualifications provided by the PM and the CTA made it possible to provide this detailed quality control.
- Lesson #3. Effective public communication provided mainly by the PM, through a variety of media channels and including visibility at the international level and publication of research papers. The high

project visibility has probably been influential in keeping the municipality of Batumi and other governments active in the project during the last months, in spite of the limited interest of their political leaders.

Some project practices may have been influential in not achieving all the expected results:


- **Lesson #4.** Insufficient stakeholders' analysis and inadequate awareness-raising plan. The project failed to adequately identify the various stakeholders that could be influential in the implementation of the various feasibility studies and functional plans, and could not establish subsequently adequate strategies to build enough consensus and to cope with hidden or passive resistance. In fact, during this evaluation it has not been possible to obtain from the stakeholders interviewed a consistent explanation for the changes in the pilots and the continuous delays in their implementation made by the Mayor of Batumi and the stakeholders and advisors supporting and recommending such changes and delays.
- **Lesson #5.** Need for an adequate description and management of complex political risks. The risk of decision-makers changing priorities and stepping back from their commitments was inadequately assessed in the ProDoc and in the annual PIRs. It is well-known that this political risk is the most difficult one to manage in GEF projects, and that it is difficult to provide general advice on how to manage and mitigate it. However, there is wide evidence of the high political risk of sustainable urban mobility projects and the usual mitigation measures include (1) the interaction of political leaders with their pairs in other cities, regions and countries, who can provide first-hand evidence of their positive experiences in dealing with controversial SUT measures; this interaction is now facilitated by international networks of cities and international organizations; (2) working closely with the political leaders' advisors and technical staff in the development of documents and proposals, in order to increase ownership and to build stronger technical capacities. In fact, the PM attempted both approaches, proposing a study visit to European cities successful in implementing ambitious sustainable mobility policies (Bremen, Leipzig, Ljubljana) and holding numerous meetings with the Mayor's office; the former initiative was rejected by the Mayor and the latter did not succeed in providing a sustained and confident cooperation framework.

The table below provides ratings for the various aspects addressed in this Terminal Evaluation.

<b>Evaluation ratings</b>	<b>Rating</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>1. Monitoring and Evaluation: Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S) Moderately Satisfactory (MS), Moderately Unsatisfactory, (MU), Unsatisfactory (U), Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
M&E design at entry	MS(4)	
M&E Plan Implementation	S (5)	
Overall quality of M&E	MS(4)	
<b>2. IA &amp; EA Execution: Highly Satisfactory (HS), Satisfactory (S) Moderately Satisfactory (MS), Moderately Unsatisfactory, (MU), Unsatisfactory (U), Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
Quality of UNDP implementation	S (5)	
Quality of Execution- Executing Agency	U (2)	
Overall quality of implementation/ Execution	MS(4)	
<b>3. Assessment of Outcomes</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
Relevance: relevant (R) or not relevant (NR)	R	
Effectiveness	MU(3)	
Efficiency	MS(4)	
<b>4. Sustainability: Likely (L); Moderately Likely (ML); Moderately Unlikely (MU); Unlikely (U).</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
Financial resources	L	
Socio-economic	MU	

Institutional framework and governance	MU	
Environmental	ML	
<b>5. Impact: Significant (S), Minimal (M), Negligible (N)</b>	<b>Rating</b>	
Environmental status improvement	N	
Environmental stress reduction	M	
Progress against stress/ status change	M	

Madrid, November 29<sup>th</sup>, 2020



Ángel Aparicio



## **ANNEXES**

Annex 1. Terms of Reference

Annex 2: Evaluation Question Matrix

Annex 3: Questionnaire used and summary of results

Annex 4: Rating Scales

Annex 5: TE mission itinerary

Annex 6: List of persons interviewed

Annex 7: List of documents reviewed

Annex 8: Signed UNEG Code of Conduct form

Annex 9: Signed MTR final report clearance form

Annex 10: GEF Tracking Tool

Annex 11: Terminal Evaluation Audit Trail





## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

### TERMINAL EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

<b>Reference</b>	PIMS #4980
<b>Country</b>	Georgia
<b>Description of the Assignment:</b>	International Consultant for Terminal Evaluation of UNDP-GEF Project “Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for Batumi and the Achara Region (ISTBAR)”
<b>Project:</b>	“Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for Batumi and the Achara Region (ISTBAR)”
<b>Period of Assignment/Services:</b>	25 working days over four months between April 2020 to July 2020
<b>Duty Station:</b>	Home Based with up to two missions (of estimated 10 working days (app. 5 days in Batumi, 5 days in Tbilisi) in Georgia

### INTRODUCTION

In accordance with UNDP and GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full and medium-sized UNDP supported GEF financed projects are required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation. These terms of reference (TOR) sets out the expectations for a Terminal Evaluation (TE) of the medium-sized project titled “Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for Batumi and the Achara Region (ISTBAR)” (PIMS # 4980).

The essentials of the project to be evaluated are as follows:

### PROJECT SUMMARY TABLE

<b>Project Title:</b>	Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for Batumi and the Achara Region			
GEF Project ID:	4980		<u>at endorsement (US\$)</u>	<u>at completion (US\$)</u>
UNDP Project ID:	00082231	GEF financing:	853,000	tbd
Country:	Georgia	IA/EA own:	280,000	tbd
Region:	Europe and Central Asia	Government:	10,384,000	tbd
Focal Area:	Climate Change Mitigation	Other:		tbd
FA Objectives, (OP/SP):	3.1 Sustainable transport and urban policy and regulatory frameworks adopted and implemented 3.2 Increased investment in less-GHG intensive transport and urban systems 3.3 GHG emissions avoided	Total co-financing:	10,384,000	tbd

Executing Agency:	Ministry of Environment Protection and Agriculture; Municipality of Batumi	Total Project Cost:	11,517,000	tbd
Other Partners involved:		ProDoc Signature (date project began):	18 September 2015	
		(Operational) Closing Date:	Proposed: 31 July 2020	Actual: 31 July 2019

## OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

The **objective of Green Cities: ISTBAR Project** is to promote sustainable urban transport in the City of Batumi and the Region of Achara and support the formulation of national and regional policies on sustainable urban transport. Aside from assisting the City of Batumi and other municipalities of the Achara Autonomous Republic, in adoption of a green approach to urban transport development, the Project also aims to directly generate GHG reductions from sustainable urban transport pilot measures in Batumi and indirectly generate GHG reductions from regional and national policies on the urban transport that have been developed through technical support provided by the Green Cities: ISTBAR project.

To achieve the Project objective, the Project's interventions has been organized into 4 components:

- **Outcome 1:** Development and adoption of sustainable urban mobility plan (SUMP) for the city of Batumi and for other municipalities of Achara
- **Outcome 2:** Development of sectoral feasibility studies and functional plans for specific sustainable urban measures for demonstration / pilot measures in Batumi
- **Outcome 3:** Support of investments in sustainable urban mobility measures in Batumi
- **Outcome 4:** Support to the development of national policy on sustainable urban transport (SUT)

During the first two years, the project developed a detailed SUMP for Batumi and: several key outputs : (1) Household mobility survey in Batumi; (2) a transport demand model for Batumi; (3) a parking strategy for Batumi; (4) plans for optimization of the whole public transport network; (5) plans for two demonstration corridors with rapid bus lanes with bike lanes, and smart traffic lights to favor the buses, including conceptual drawings; (6) a plan for increased bicycling, including drawings of expanded bike trails in city areas; and (7) plans for adoption of electric taxis and (8) sustainable urban mobility awareness raising plan for Batumi and implementation of several public events.

The Green Cities: ISTBAR project has also supported development of Georgia's National Strategy and Policy Frameworks on Sustainable Urban Transport.

Under Achara regional component the project supported development of sustainable and resilient urban transport plans on municipal and regional levels, as a replication component : (1) Sustainable and resilient urban mobility plans for five municipalities in Achara (Keda, Shuakhevi, Khulo, Kobuleti and Khelvachauri) were developed; and as a scale-up (2) Low-carbon regional passenger transportation masterplan for the Achara Autonomous Republic; (3) Institutional / Organizational framework for regional transportation authority for Achara Autonomous Republic.

The project was planned as a four-year project – thus, the projected end of project (EOP) date was 31 July 2019. However, following the decision by Project Executive Board and Letter of Batumi Mayor the project requested 12 months "no -cost" extension and the final end date was changed to 31 July 2020.

The TE will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP and GEF as reflected in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF Financed Projects.

The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming.

## EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHOD

An overall approach and method<sup>1</sup> for conducting project terminal evaluations of UNDP supported GEF financed projects has developed over time. The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact**, as defined and explained in the [UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects](#). A set of questions covering each of these criteria have been drafted and are included with this TOR ([Annex C](#)). The evaluator is expected to amend, complete and submit this matrix as part of an evaluation inception report, and shall include it as an annex to the final report.

The evaluation must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts, in particular the GEF operational focal point, UNDP Country Office, project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders. The evaluator is expected to conduct a field mission to Achara Region and Tbilisi, including the following project sites: City of Batumi, other Acharian municipalities (Kobuleti, Keda, Shuakhevi, Khulo and Khelvachauri) and Tbilisi. Interviews will be held with the following organizations and individuals at a minimum:

### *Achara Autonomous Republic*

- Batumi City Hall
- Batumi City Council
- Batumi Municipal Bus Company
- Ministry of Finance and Economy of Achara A.R.
- Local administrations of five municipalities (Keda, Shuakhevi, Khulo, Kobuleti and Khelvachauri) of Achara A.R.
- NNLE Agency of Urban Infrastructure and Public Works
- Non-governmental and civil society organizations in Batumi

### *Tbilisi*

- Ministry of Environment Protection and Agriculture of Georgia
- GEF Operational Focal Point (Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection)
- UNDP Country Office (E&E Team Leader, DRR/RR)
- Key National Contractors (Foundation Partnership for Road Safety, Black Sea Eco-Academy, City Institute of Georgia)
- International Chief Technical Adviser (Michael Saunders – Project CTA)

### *Skype Interviews:*

<sup>1</sup> For additional information on methods, see the [Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results](#), Chapter 7, pg. 163

- Key international consultants (A+S Consult GmbH)
- Istanbul Regional Hub (IRH) - GEF Regional Technical Adviser

The evaluator will review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – including Annual APR/PIR, project budget revisions, midterm review, progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluator for review is included in [Annex B](#) of this Terms of Reference.

### EVALUATION CRITERIA & RATINGS

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework (see [Annex A](#)), which provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact**. Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary. The obligatory rating scales are included in [Annex D](#).

Evaluation Ratings:			
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	rating	2. IA& EA Execution	rating
M&E design at entry		Quality of UNDP Implementation	
M&E Plan Implementation		Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	
Overall quality of M&E		Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	
3. Assessment of Outcomes	rating	4. Sustainability	rating
Relevance		Financial resources:	
Effectiveness		Socio-political:	
Efficiency		Institutional framework and governance:	
Overall Project Outcome Rating		Environmental :	
		Overall likelihood of sustainability:	

### PROJECT FINANCE / COFINANCE

The Evaluation will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. Results from recent financial audits, as available, should be taken into consideration. The evaluator(s) will receive assistance from the Country Office (CO) and Project Team to obtain financial data in order to complete the co-financing table below, which will be included in the terminal evaluation report.

Co-financing (type/source)	UNDP own financing (mill. US\$)		Government (mill. US\$)		Partner Agency (mill. US\$)		Total (mill. US\$)	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Actual	Actual
Grants								
Loans/Concessions								
• In-kind support								
• Other								

Totals								
--------	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

### MAINSTREAMING

UNDP supported GEF financed projects are key components in UNDP country programming, as well as regional and global programmes. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project was successfully mainstreamed with other UNDP priorities, including poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender.

### IMPACT

The evaluators will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings that should be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a) verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.<sup>2</sup>

### CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & LESSONS

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of **conclusions, recommendations** and **lessons**.

### IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP CO in Georgia. The UNDP CO will contract the evaluators and ensure the timely provision of per diems and travel arrangements within the country for the evaluation team. The Project Team will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluators team to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits, coordinate with the Government etc.

### EVALUATION TIMEFRAME

The total duration of the evaluation will be 25 days according to the following plan:

Activity	Timing	Completion Date
<b>Preparation</b>	3 days	6 April 2020
<b>Evaluation Mission</b>	10 days	20 April 2020
<b>Draft Evaluation Report</b>	9 days	11 May 2020
<b>Final Report</b>	3 days	20 July 2020

### EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The evaluation team is expected to deliver the following:

Deliverable	Content	Timing	Responsibilities
<b>Inception Report</b>	Evaluator provides clarifications on timing and method	No later than 2 weeks before the evaluation mission.	Evaluator submits to UNDP CO

<sup>2</sup> A useful tool for gauging progress to impact is the Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROTI) method developed by the GEF Evaluation Office: [ROTI Handbook 2009](#)



<b>Presentation</b>	Initial Findings	End of evaluation mission	To project management, UNDP CO and MoEPA
<b>Draft Final Report</b>	Full report, (per annexed template) with annexes	Within 3 weeks of the evaluation mission	Sent to CO, reviewed by RTA, PCU, GEF OFPs, Project Implementing Partners
<b>Final Report*</b>	Revised report	Within 2 weeks of receiving UNDP and other stakeholder comments on draft	Sent to CO for uploading to UNDP ERC.

\*When submitting the final evaluation report, the evaluator is required also to provide an 'audit trail', detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report.

## TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team will be composed of 1 international evaluator (team leader) and 1 national evaluator. The consultants shall have prior experience in evaluating similar projects. Experience with GEF financed projects is an advantage. The evaluators selected should not have participated in the project preparation and/or implementation and should not have conflict of interest with project related activities.

The international evaluator (team leader) must present the following qualifications:

- Master's or equivalent degree in urban transport, urban studies, civil engineering, environment or related field
- Minimum 10 years of progressive experience in urban transport and mobility planning and development, urban planning and development, environment and in addition experience related to climate change mitigation projects
- Knowledge of UNDP and GEF evaluation procedures
- Previous experience with results-based monitoring and evaluation methodologies
- At least 5 similar evaluation/review tasks in urban transport projects completed
- Excellent English is required

Assets would include:

- Experience of implementing GEF funded or relevant/ similar donor funded transport projects
- Experience in the CIS region and ideally in Georgia (relevant to Team Leader only)
- Experience in transport demand modelling

Corporate competencies:

- Demonstrates integrity by modeling the UN's values and ethical standards
- Promotes the vision, mission, and strategic goals of UNDP
- Displays cultural, gender, religion, race, nationality and age sensitivity and adaptability

Functional competencies:

- Strong interpersonal skills, communication skills and ability to work in a team
- Ability to plan and organize work, efficiency in meeting commitments, observing deadlines and achieving results
- Openness to change and ability to receive/integrate feedback

- Ability to work under pressure and stressful situations
- Strong analytical, research, reporting and writing abilities

#### EVALUATOR ETHICS

Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a Code of Conduct (Annex E) upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the [UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'](#)

#### PAYMENT MODALITIES AND SPECIFICATIONS

%	Milestone
10%	After clearance of Inception report by UNDP CO
40%	Following submission and approval of the draft terminal evaluation report
50%	Following submission and approval (UNDP-CO and UNDP RTA) of the final terminal evaluation report

#### APPLICATION PROCESS

---

Applicants are requested to apply online <http://www.ge.undp.org/content/georgia/en/home/operations/jobs.html> by 26.12.2019. Individual consultants are invited to submit applications together with their CV for these positions. The application should contain a current and complete C.V. in English with indication of the e-mail and phone contact. Shortlisted candidates will be requested to submit an Offeror's Letter indicating the total cost of the assignment (including daily fee, per diem and travel costs).

UNDP applies a fair and transparent selection process that will take into account the competencies/skills of the applicants as well as their financial proposals. Qualified women and members of social minorities are encouraged to apply.



## ANNEX A: PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Outcomes	Indicator	Baseline	Targets End of Project (EOP)	Source of verification	Risks and Assumptions
<b>Project Objective:</b> <sup>3</sup> To promote sustainable transport in the City of Batumi and Region of Achara	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cumulative direct CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions resulting from implementation of the Batumi SUTP by EOP, tons CO<sub>2</sub></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>877<sup>4</sup> by EOP</li> <li>2,631<sup>5</sup> in ten years after</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project final report as well as annual surveys of energy consumption &amp; reductions from the GBC demo corridor</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Insufficient capital is available for financing SUT projects.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cumulative direct energy saving (MJ) from improved traffic efficiency measures for public transit through project corridors, and the avoidance of gasoline consumption from cars in the park-and-ride and modal switches to public transport as well as from other Batumi SUTP measures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>13.6 million</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Surveys of park-and-ride usage to estimate the number of modal switches from private cars to public transit</li> </ul>	
<b>Outcome 1:</b> <sup>6</sup> Sustainable transport plans adopted in Batumi and Achara Region	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of versions of the Integrated Sustainable Urban Transport Plan for Batumi prior to adoption by the City by EOP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2<sup>7</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Official documentation of various drafts of the ISUTP by Batumi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Land use master plan is completed by the City. This will improve the quality of the sustainable transport plan since the location and quantity of urban transport demand will be better defined</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of municipalities included in Adjara inter-municipality sustainable transport plan by EOP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Official documentation on the adoption of the ISUTP by Batumi City Hall</li> </ul>	

<sup>3</sup> Objective (Atlas output) monitored quarterly ERBM and annually in APR/PIR

<sup>4</sup> This is the direct emission reduction during the course of the 4-year Project.

<sup>5</sup> These are indirect bottom-up GHG ERs accumulated over the 10-year period after the EOP. These ERs can be estimated from SUT Projects in other Adjarian municipalities and in Batumi that receive technical assistance from Project during Year 4 (Output 4.2)

<sup>6</sup> All outcomes monitored annually in the APR/PIR.

<sup>7</sup> Integrated sustainable urban transport plan (ISUTP) for Batumi will be based on new land uses suggested in the new Batumi Urban Development Strategy (BUDS)

Outcomes	Indicator	Baseline	Targets End of Project (EOP)	Source of verification	Risks and Assumptions
<b>Outcome 2:</b> Specific feasibility studies and functional plans developed to lower carbon intensity of urban transport along selected corridors in Batumi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number feasibility studies for sustainable transport measures in Batumi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4<sup>8</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completed feasibility studies and functional plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completion of various drafts and adoption of the ISUTP for Batumi to guide the feasibility studies and functional plans</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Number of specific functional plans to lower carbon intensity of urban transport in Batumi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2<sup>9</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Municipal budget lines on capital costs for functional plan</li> <li>Financing agreement for capital purchases of equipment and CNG buses from OEM</li> </ul>	
<b>Outcome 3:</b> Sustainable urban transport measures successfully implemented along a selected corridor in the City of Batumi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kilometres of corridor improved with dedicated bus lanes, restricted private car access, synchronized lighting and improved access to bicycles as public transport by EOP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2.2<sup>12</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Municipal permits to construct sustainable transport measures or use of equipment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assumed that the City undertakes Gorgiladze-Baratashvili-Chavachavadze corridor for traffic improvements</li> <li>A private company forms a public-private partnership for developing and operating park-and-ride lots strategically located around Batumi</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Average number of passengers per bus along improved corridor by EOP<sup>10</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>12</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>20</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>M&amp;E reports and surveys on baseline and post-project reductions on energy consumption and carbon after sustainable transport measures implemented as prepared by monitoring unit of Batumi City Hall</li> </ul>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% increase in average speed of buses through the selected corridor by EOP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>25<sup>13</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Campaign assessments and feedback from participants</li> </ul>	

<sup>8</sup> Refers to feasibility studies as detailed in Outputs 2.1, 2.3, 2.5 and 2.6

<sup>9</sup> Refers to functional plans as detailed in Outputs 2.2 and 2.4

<sup>10</sup> This only includes the 20 to 40-seat buses and does not include marshrutkas

<sup>12</sup> Assumes the Gorgiladze-Baratashvili-Chavachavadze (GBC) corridor

<sup>13</sup> Assumes decreased journey times resulting from traffic efficiency measures along GBC demo route (i.e. synchronized lighting, restrictions on street parking, dedicated bus lane, and consolidation of bus routes)

Outcomes	Indicator	Baseline	Targets End of Project (EOP)	Source of verification	Risks and Assumptions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><sup>11</sup>Number of city parking spaces shifted to high hourly parking fees that are actively implemented</li> <li>Total MJ of energy saved from passengers leaving cars at park-and-ride or at home or hotel (estimated based on increased bus ridership) in favour of public transit by EOP</li> <li>Kilometres of bicycle network improved by EOP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> <li>0</li> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>500</li> <li>13.6 million</li> <li>6<sup>14</sup></li> </ul>		
	<b>Outcome 4:</b> Sustainable Transport Plans developed and adopted in Batumi and other municipalities in Achara Region and Georgia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0</li> <li>0</li> <li>0</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1</li> <li>5</li> <li>1</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Report on lessons learned from Batumi Sustainable Transport projects</li> <li>Sustainable transport workshop proceedings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Successfully implemented demonstration project from Outcome 3.</li> </ul>

<sup>11</sup> Passenger surveys are required at the commencement of the operation of the park-and-ride lots until the EOP to estimate the daily modal switch from private cars to public transit. Survey will need to know the passenger's mode of travel was public transit instead of the private car as well as the intended distances to be travelled (that would have otherwise been done with a private car)

<sup>14</sup> This can include the rehabilitation of the existing bicycle network near City Hall which needs to be better integrated with the cycle network along the coastal areas of Batumi.

## ANNEX B: LIST OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVIEWED BY THE EVALUATORS

1. PIF
  2. UNDP Project Document
  3. UNDP Environmental and Social Screening results
  4. Project Inception Report
  5. All Project Implementation Reports (PIRs)
  6. Quarterly progress reports and work plans of the various implementation task teams
  7. Audit reports
  8. Finalized GEF focal area Tracking Tools at CEO endorsement, midterm and terminal - METT
  9. Oversight mission reports
  10. All CTA mission reports
  11. All monitoring reports prepared by the project
  12. Financial and Administration guidelines used by Project Team
  13. Mid-term Evaluation report
- The following documents will also be available:
14. Project operational guidelines, manuals and systems
  15. UNDP country/countries programme document(s)
  16. Minutes of the Board Meetings and other meetings (i.e. Project Appraisal Committee meetings)
  17. Project site location maps
  18. All contractor and consultant reports
  19. All published materials

## ANNEX C: EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Evaluative Criteria Questions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
<b>Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?</b>			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
<b>Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?</b>			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
<b>Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards?</b>			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
<b>Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?</b>			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
<b>Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?</b>			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•

## ANNEX D: RATING SCALES

<b><i>Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&amp;E, I&amp;E Execution</i></b> 6: Highly Satisfactory (HS): no shortcomings 5: Satisfactory (S): minor shortcomings 4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS) 3: Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): significant shortcomings 2: Unsatisfactory (U): major problems 1: Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe problems	<b><i>Sustainability ratings:</i></b> 4. Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability 3. Moderately Likely (ML): moderate risks 2. Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks 1. Unlikely (U): severe risks	<b><i>Relevance ratings</i></b> 2. Relevant (R) 1.. Not relevant (NR)  <b><i>Impact Ratings:</i></b> 3. Significant (S) 2. Minimal (M) 1. Negligible (N)
<b><i>Additional ratings where relevant:</i></b> Not Applicable (N/A) Unable to Assess (U/A)		

## ANNEX E: EVALUATION CONSULTANT CODE OF CONDUCT AND AGREEMENT FORM

### Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study limitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

### Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form<sup>15</sup>

#### Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: \_\_\_\_\_

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): \_\_\_\_\_

**I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.**

Signed at *place* on *date*

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>15</sup>[www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct](http://www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct)

## ANNEX F: EVALUATION REPORT OUTLINE<sup>16</sup>

- i. Opening page:
  - Title of UNDP supported GEF financed project
  - UNDP and GEF project ID#s.
  - Evaluation time frame and date of evaluation report
  - Region and countries included in the project
  - GEF Operational Program/Strategic Program
  - Implementing Partner and other project partners
  - Evaluation team members
  - Acknowledgements
- ii. Executive Summary
  - Project Summary Table
  - Project Description (brief)
  - Evaluation Rating Table
  - Summary of conclusions, recommendations and lessons
- iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations  
(See: UNDP Editorial Manual<sup>17</sup>)
1. Introduction
  - Purpose of the evaluation
  - Scope & Methodology
  - Structure of the evaluation report
2. Project description and development context
  - Project start and duration
  - Problems that the project sought to address
  - Immediate and development objectives of the project
  - Baseline Indicators established
  - Main stakeholders
  - Expected Results
3. Findings  
(In addition to a descriptive assessment, all criteria marked with (\*) must be rated<sup>18</sup>)
- 3.1 Project Design / Formulation
  - Analysis of LFA/Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)
  - Assumptions and Risks
  - Lessons from other relevant projects (e.g., same focal area) incorporated into project design
  - Planned stakeholder participation
  - Replication approach
  - UNDP comparative advantage
  - Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector
  - Management arrangements
- 3.2 Project Implementation
  - Adaptive management (changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation)
  - Partnership arrangements (with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region)

<sup>16</sup>The Report length should not exceed 40 pages in total (not including annexes).

<sup>17</sup> UNDP Style Manual, Office of Communications, Partnerships Bureau, updated November 2008

<sup>18</sup> Using a six-point rating scale: 6: Highly Satisfactory, 5: Satisfactory, 4: Marginally Satisfactory, 3: Marginally Unsatisfactory, 2: Unsatisfactory and 1: Highly Unsatisfactory, see section 3.5, page 37 for ratings explanations.



- Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management
  - Project Finance:
  - Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation (\*)
  - UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation / execution (\*) coordination, and operational issues
- 3.3 Project Results
- Overall results (attainment of objectives) (\*)
  - Relevance(\*)
  - Effectiveness & Efficiency (\*)
  - Country ownership
  - Mainstreaming
  - Sustainability (\*)
  - Impact
4. Conclusions, Recommendations & Lessons
- Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project
  - Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project
  - Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives
  - Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success
5. Annexes
- ToR
  - Itinerary
  - List of persons interviewed
  - Summary of field visits
  - List of documents reviewed
  - Evaluation Question Matrix
  - Questionnaire used and summary of results
  - Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form

**ANNEX G: EVALUATION REPORT CLEARANCE FORM**

*(to be completed by CO and UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and included in the final document)*

Evaluation Report Reviewed and Cleared by	
UNDP Country Office	
Name: _____	
Signature: _____	Date: _____
UNDP GEF RTA	
Name: _____	
Signature: _____	Date: _____

## Annex 2: Evaluation Question Matrix

Evaluative criteria	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?			
GEF focal area objectives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SUT policies and regulations adopted by cities</li> <li>- SUT investments</li> <li>- GHG emission and energy savings</li> </ul>	GHG emissions Energy savings Project investment Cofinancing investment	GEF, TT, PRF, Annual PR, Project team interview. Cities: SUT investments GHG estimates, if available (GHG expert) PM, local, regional and national governments Review of project indicators	Desk review, interviews
Local objectives. Batumi: SEAP 2014-2020 (GHG reduction 20% of 2012 baseline) Batumi: Green tourism objectives, strategic local plan Commitments linked to the Covenant of Mayors	GHG reduction in Batumi Tourism statistics	PM Batumi municipality Batumi Urban Development Plan Batumi reports to Covenant of Mayors	Interview on Urban Strategic Plan to local officials Interview to PM
Regional objectives: There are no documents reflecting regional objectives.	Statistics on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- GHG reduction objectives in Achara</li> <li>- Tourism development objectives in Achara</li> <li>- Transport objectives in Achara</li> </ul>	PM Urban Planning (or Regional Planning) Department Achara. Transport Department Achara Tourism and Resorts Department Achara NNLE Agency of Urban Infrastructure and Public Works	Desk review, interviews
National objectives -3 <sup>rd</sup> National Comm to UNFCCC 2015 (and 2006-11 GHG inventory) <sup>31</sup> - First INDC <sup>32</sup> : (2015).	LEDS adopted? Transport NAMA drafted, approved, implemented? NDC monitoring KPI?	PM Ministry of Economy and SD (Transport Dep) Assessment reports on NDC, NEEAP, LEDS, SUTR. Progress reports of the various national strategies.	Desk review, interviews

<sup>31</sup> It includes references to: . (1) Future GHG emission scenarios to be prepared for transport sector. Improvement of GHG inventory for transport and other sectors. Low-Emission Development Strategy (LEDS) to be prepared (USAIDS support), including transport sector. NAMAs to be prepared (including transport, and in particular transit. WITH GIZ, ADA). See p.107, #38. Three scenarios: -15%, -20% (transport -15%), -25% reduction in 3rd Communication.

<sup>32</sup> Based on interim LEDS results. Reference year 2013; -15% (unconditional) and -25% reduction compared to baseline (unspecified role for transport sector). Key messages in INDC: "It is envisaged that the most intensive pre-2020 mitigation action in Georgia should be the voluntary reduction of GHG emissions committed by thirteen self-governing cities and municipalities joining the EU initiative "Covenant of Mayors" (CoM). Further facilitation of this initiative will significantly

Evaluative criteria	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP 2017-2020)<sup>33</sup>.</li> <li>- Low Emission Development Strategy (draft)<sup>34</sup></li> <li>- V-NAMA Transport<sup>35</sup></li> <li>- National Transport Strategy: <a href="#">ADB Assessment</a> (2014) (road infrastructure focus).</li> <li>- ADB Georgia Sustainable Urban Transport Roadmap (2010).</li> <li>- Convergence with transport and energy efficiency EU regulations (within the EU-GE Association Agreement)</li> <li>- Regional Development <a href="#">Programme</a> (RDP) of Georgia 2018-2021 (Measure 1.9 “integrated urban transport systems”)</li> </ul>	<p>GE SUTR monitoring?</p> <p>Any key EU transport directives integrated in Georgian Legislation?</p> <p>RDP: Number of new buses; PT share.</p>	<p>MESD. Head of Transport Department; head of energy department</p> <p>MRDI.</p> <p>MRDI. Regional Development Department (focus on RDP Measure 1.9).</p> <p>MENRP. Climate change department.</p>	
<p>UNDP Country objectives:</p> <p>Democratic governance (capacity building at the local level).</p> <p>Improved livelihood (improved mobility conditions in Batumi; improved working conditions in the urban transport sector)</p>	<p>Local officials receiving training.</p> <p>Technical tools successfully transferred.</p> <p>PT quality improvement strategy developed.</p> <p>PT working conditions analysed</p>	<p>UNDP CO</p> <p>PM</p>	Interviews
Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?			
Project objective (CO2 reduction, TT)	Direct CO2 emission reductions/ direct energy savings	PM, PIR, TT	Verification of estimates
Outcome 1.	Versions of ISUTP Batumi # municipalities in Achara STP	PIR, PM Batumi and 5 municipalities City Councils	Interviews

contribute to post -2020 implementation processes.” Three NAMAs to be implemented by 2020, including one “Vertically Integrated NAMA (V-NAMA) for the Urban Transport Sector.”. Climate Action Plan 2021-2030 not adopted (although apparently some consultancy was working on this [in 2018](#)).

<sup>33</sup> Not legally binding. 7%-10% savings in transport sector in cities signatories of the Covenant of Mayors

<sup>34</sup> Draft Sept 2017 includes transport working group with targets (20% GHG reduction in cities) aligned with SEAPs; measures in p.68. It also includes NDC.

<sup>35</sup> Vertically Integrated NAMA (V-NAMA) for the Urban Transport Sector (Georgia). Feasibility study developed by GIZ in 2016. No follow-up.

Evaluative criteria	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Outcome 2	Number of feasibility studies completed in Batumi Number of specific functional plans in Batumi	PM, Batumi City Hall Copies of feasibility studies Municipal budget including functional plans Municipal decisions to purchase relevant SUT equipment (e.g. buses)	Desk review Interviews.
Outcome 3	Km of improved corridor Number of passengers along improved corridor % Increase in average bus speed #City parking spaces shifted to high fees Energy savings from car-to-bus modal change Km of cycling lanes improved	PM, Batumi City Hall, Batumi bus company. LoA UNDP/City Hall for implementation of corridor. Municipal budget. Corridor improvement project Batumi bus company records (passengers, average speed).	Desk review Interviews. Focus group workshop
Outcome 4	Institutional mechanisms to support SUP SUT roadmaps for other municipalities Number of national SUT policies developed	PM City Halls from Achara municipalities MESD (Transport Dep)	Desk review Interviews. Focus group workshop
Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards?			
Budget compliance	% of budget compliance, per year and per outcome	UNDP CO, Project Finance and Administrative Assistant Review of annual statements of expenditure.	Desk review Interviews
Adaptive management	Identification of key changes in project workplan Delays in contract signature. Delays in contractors' deliveries	PM, NPD, Batumi City Hall (main beneficiary) ProDoc PSB minutes MTE PIR	Desk review Interviews

Evaluative criteria	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Clear norms and standards identified	Availability of norms and standards	PM, Project Finance and Administrative Assistant UNDP CO EE head UNDP CO project management norms and standards	Desk review Interviews
Decision-making & direction	Delays in key project implementation decisions Quality of strategic direction (NPD, PSB)	UNDP CO management PM, Batumi City Hall, NPD PSB minutes, PIR	Interviews PIR Focus group workshop
Partnerships with key partners	Cofinancing Satisfaction of partners covering 3 dimensions: (1) clear identification of shared objectives; (2) dedication of resources; (3) achievement of expectations.	PM UNDP CO management Batumi City Hall Achara Government NPD Other key project partners (as identified by PM)	Interviews On-line survey Focus group workshop
<b>Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?</b>			
ProDoc risks: Political (uncertainty and tourism drop)	For each risk: Actual materialization of risk. Actual impact on project	PM, PIR UNDP CO management NPD Achara Reg. Gov. Batumi City Hall	Interviews, desk review
Municipal co-financing risk	Id.	Id.	Interviews, desk review
Users' resistance to change	Id.	Id.	Interviews, desk review
Technical capacity (government)	Id.	Id.	Interviews, desk review
<b>Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress or improved governance?</b>			
Environment: Enabling progress to climate change mitigation	National GHG inventory	UNDP country office Project stakeholders	Interviews
Environment: Enabling progress to air quality	Air quality in Batumi	UNDP country office Project stakeholders	Interviews
Gender: Women's mobility; access to jobs; safety and security...	Qualitative assessment	UNDP country office Project stakeholders	Interviews

Evaluative criteria	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Governance: More participatory, fact-based decision making	Qualitative assessment	UNDP country office Project stakeholders	Interviews
Urban mobility: quality, affordability, social inclusion	Qualitative assessment	UNDP country office Project stakeholders	Interviews
Technical capacities: PT operators, government officials, academia...	Qualitative assessment	UNDP country office Project stakeholders	Interviews
Cultural: Individual mobility behaviour, car-dependence	Qualitative assessment	UNDP country office Project stakeholders	Interviews
Any other relevant impacts?	Qualitative assessment	UNDP country office Project stakeholders	Interviews





### ***Annex 3: Questionnaire used and summary of results***

**0. Tell us your story (10 minutes max).** Describe your personal experience with this project: which are the key events you went through, the main stakeholders you worked with, the main challenges and successes. If you were not personally involved at some of these stages, just state what you consider that happened there, based on what your colleagues or stakeholders told you, or just move to the next stage.

- The project design stage (until GEF approval, end 2014).
- The project kick-off stage (2015).
- The project consolidation stage (Since Jan 2016 until MTR, July 2017)
- The MTR process and recommendations. Did you participate in any MTR activities?
- The project final stage (August 2018-March 2019).
- The project extension stage (April 2019- now). Focus on recent developments, particularly those not documented (i.e. since last Board Meeting and last PIR).

#### ***1. Relevance. Which policy objectives do you think the ISTBAR project has contributed to, and how?***

GEF objectives (to increase SUT policies and investments, and to decrease GHG emissions from UT):

UNDP Georgia action plan objectives: (e.g. improving local governance and improving livelihoods)

Local (Batumi) objectives: (e.g. the “green tourism vision, SEAP, urban planning vision...).

Regional (Achara) objectives: (any?)

National objectives (urban transport, urban development, climate change, others)

#### ***2. Efficiency. Review of project management and governance***

Project Management and decision-making. How efficient has the project been in terms of resources and time in these areas?

- PMU internal activities.
- PMU: contracting and supervision of consultants and contractors.
- PMU: follow-up and mobilisation of project-cofinancing
- PEBoard: Decision-making, strategic guidance, liaison with local, regional and national governments.
- National Project Director: decision-making, strategic guidance, liaison with local, regional and national governments.
- Key stakeholders' contributions (co-financing, information provision, decision-making)

Project risk matrix review. The risks identified in the Prodoc are: political uncertainty, lack of municipal co-financing, resistance by local residents and users to car restrictions, insufficient technical capacities in government.

- Identify the main risks the project has successfully dealt with (and the key actions undertaken to mitigate these risks)
- Identify the main risks the project could not successfully deal with. Could anything have been done differently to mitigate these risks?

#### ***3. Effectiveness. Review of project outcomes and outputs based on PRF***

Which project outputs were you involved in?

For each output (or the main ones) you were involved in:

- Review the achievement of the relevant indicators' targets for each output.
- How effective has been the project in the delivery of each output?
- How would you define the quality of the deliverables within each output?

#### **4. Sustainability:** Sustainability and replication issues.

Which are the stronger project outputs, likely to be sustained? Which outputs are likely to be replicated? (Consider the local, regional, and national levels).

What has the project done to facilitate replication?

Which stakeholders (technical, political, economic, social) may become champions to sustain and replicate the project legacy?

Which are the main barriers for project sustainability and replication?

#### **5. Project impacts**

Relevant project impacts beyond PRF, e.g.:

- Environment: Enabling progress to climate change mitigation.
- Environment: Enabling progress to air quality.
- Gender: Women's mobility; access to jobs; safety and security.
- Governance: More participatory, fact-based decision making.
- Urban mobility: quality, affordability, social inclusion.
- Technical capacities: PT operators, government officials, academia...
- Cultural: Individual mobility behaviour, car-dependence.
- Any other relevant impacts?

## Annex 4: Rating Scales

Ratings for Progress Towards Results: (one rating for each outcome and for the objective)		
6	Highly Satisfactory (HS)	The objective/outcome is expected to achieve or exceed all its end-of-project targets, without major shortcomings. The progress towards the objective/outcome can be presented as “good practice”.
5	Satisfactory (S)	The objective/outcome is expected to achieve most of its end-of-project targets, with only minor shortcomings.
4	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	The objective/outcome is expected to achieve most of its end-of-project targets but with significant shortcomings.
3	Moderately Unsatisfactory (HU)	The objective/outcome is expected to achieve its end-of-project targets with major shortcomings.
2	Unsatisfactory (U)	The objective/outcome is expected not to achieve most of its end-of-project targets.
1	Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)	The objective/outcome has failed to achieve its midterm targets, and is not expected to achieve any of its end-of-project targets.

Ratings for Project Implementation & Adaptive Management: (one overall rating)		
6	Highly Satisfactory (HS)	Implementation of all seven components – management arrangements, work planning, finance and co-finance, project-level monitoring and evaluation systems, stakeholder engagement, reporting, and communications – is leading to efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive management. The project can be presented as “good practice”.
5	Satisfactory (S)	Implementation of most of the seven components is leading to efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive management except for only few that are subject to remedial action.
4	Moderately Satisfactory (MS)	Implementation of some of the seven components is leading to efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive management, with some components requiring remedial action.
3	Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU)	Implementation of some of the seven components is not leading to efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive, with most components requiring remedial action.
2	Unsatisfactory (U)	Implementation of most of the seven components is not leading to efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive management.
1	Highly Unsatisfactory (HU)	Implementation of none of the seven components is leading to efficient and effective project implementation and adaptive management.

Ratings for Sustainability: (one overall rating)		
4	Likely (L)	Negligible risks to sustainability, with key outcomes on track to be achieved by the project’s closure and expected to continue into the foreseeable future
3	Moderately Likely (ML)	Moderate risks, but expectations that at least some outcomes will be sustained due to the progress towards results on outcomes at the Midterm Review
2	Moderately Unlikely (MU)	Significant risk that key outcomes will not carry on after project closure, although some outputs and activities should carry on
1	Unlikely (U)	Severe risks that project outcomes as well as key outputs will not be sustained

## Annex 5: TE mission itinerary (not implemented)

The mission itinerary presented here could not be implemented, due to the travel restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, all terminal evaluation activities were conducted remotely, and were limited to on-line interviews and desk review of project documents and other materials.

Time	Meeting	Place
	Travel Madrid-Tbilisi	
<b>Day one (Monday)</b>		
	Debriefing. Review of mission agenda	UNDP CO, Tbilisi
	Review of draft TE report with UNDP CO management and PMY	UNDP CO, Tbilisi
	Focus group 1: national government	UNDP CO, Tbilisi
<b>Day two (Tuesday)</b>		
	Interview. MoENRP. GEF focal point	MoENRP, Tbilisi
	Interview. MoENRP. Head of climate change unit	MoENRP, Tbilisi
	Interview. MoRDI. Head of regional development unit	MoRDI, Tbilisi
	Focus group 2: international organizations (EBRD, GIZ, KfW)	UNDP CO, Tbilisi
	Travel to Batumi	
<b>Day three (Wednesday)</b>		
	Interview. Mayor and mayor's office	Batumi
	Interview. Infrastructure Agency	Batumi
	Interview. Traffic Police	Batumi
	Interview. Municipal bus company	Batumi
	Interview. Head of Transport Department	Batumi
	Field visit to the demonstration corridor, cycling lanes and parking	Batumi
<b>Day four (Thursday)</b>		
	Interview. Regional government. Environment department	Batumi
	Interview. Regional government. Local government department	Batumi
	Focus group 3: Project's local sustainability and future prospects	Batumi
	Travel to Tbilisi	
<b>Day five (Friday)</b>		
	Final debriefing with UNDP CO management and PMU	Tbilisi
	Return to Madrid	

## Annex 6: List of persons interviewed

(NC: interview made by national consultant; IC: interview made by international consultant; NA: interviewee not responded to the invitation or declined to be interviewed).

#	Interviewee	Date	Comments
1	UNDP CO RR	29/04/2020	IC+NC
2	UNDP CO Deputy RR	29/04/2020	IC+NC
3	UNDP. E&E Programme Manager	01/05/2020	IC+NC
4	UNDP. Project Manager	27/04/2020	IC+NC
5	UNDP. Project AFO	01/05/2020	IC+NC
6	UNDP Regional Office. RTA	July 2020	IC
7	Chief Technical Advisor	27/04/2020	IC+NC
8	A+S Consult GmbH (Team leader)	12/05/2020	IC. Technical studies
9	Move mobility	29/05/2020	IC. National strategy
10	BSEA+CIG	12/05/2020	IC. Awareness-raising plan
11	Foundation Partnership for Road Safety	15/5/2020	NC
12	City Institute of Georgia	11/05/2020	NC
13	Giorgi Kokochashvili	11/05/2020	IC
14	LTD STS. Zura Beradze	15/05/2020	IC
15	Batumi municipality. Mayor	NA	Resigned in July 2020
	Batumi municipality. New acting mayor since 7/2020	NA	
16	Batumi municipality. Deputy Mayor	4/06/2020	IC+NC
17	Batumi municipality. Head Urban Transport Dep.	3/06/2020	NC
18	Batumi municip. Head Urban Planning Dep	NA	
19	Batumi municip. Head of Urban Infrastr. and Public Works Agency (NNLE)	July 2020	IC+NC
20	Batumi. Head of Municipal Bus Company LTD	Oct 2020	NC
21	Batumi municip. Officials receiving TDM training	Oct 2020	NC <sup>36</sup>
22	Head of Batumi Patrol Police.	NA	
23	Achara Reg. Gov. Head of tourism and resorts Dep. Regional Ministry of Finance and Economy	NA	
24	Achara Reg. Gov. Head of Administrative Agency Relations Dep.	3/06/2020	NC
25	Achara Reg. Gov. Head of Spatial Developm Dep	3/06/2020	NC
26	Achara. Keda municipality. Project Focal contact	Oct 2020	NC
27	Achara. Khelvachauri municipality. Project Focal contact	NA	
28	Achara. Khulo municipality. Project Focal contact	Oct 2020	NC
29	Achara. Kobuleti municip. Project Focal contact	Oct 2020	NC
30	Achara. Shakhevi municip. Project Focal contact	NA	
31	Batumi Municipal. National Project Director	08/05/2020	IC+NC
32	GoGE. MEPA. Head of Climate Change Office	11/05/2020	NC
33	GoGE. MEPA. GEF Operational Focal Point	08/05/2020	NC
34	GoGE. MESD. Transport Department		Not engaged in project

<sup>36</sup> Besides the Head of the Urban Transport Department, three local officials which received TDM training were invited for the interviewed; two of them accepted, and one declined.

#	Interviewee	Date	Comments
35	GoGE. MESD. Energy Department		Not engaged in project
36	GoGE. MESD. Strategic Development Department		Not engaged in project
37	GoGE. MRDI. Regional Development Dep.		Not engaged in project
38	NGO Civil Society Institute. Batumi Branch	Oct 2020	NC
39	NGO Institute for Democracy. Batumi Branch	Oct 2020	NC
40	NGO Changes for Equal Rights	Oct 2020	NC
41	Black Sea Eco Academy	See (10)	IC
42	Achara Chamber of Commerce and Trade	Oct 2020	NC
43	Batumi representative of private minibus companies	NA	
44	International organizations. GIZ	11/05/2020	IC
45	International organizations. EBRD	08/05/2020	IC
46	International organizations. KfW	25/05/2020	IC
47	Project document design. International consultant	18/05/2020	IC
44	Mid-Term Review. International consultant	17/05/2020	IC
45	Giga Gigauri, national transport expert,	19/05/2020	IC, Batumi SUMP
46	Gogi Abasidze, City Institute Georgia (See (10))	18/05/2020	IC, awareness raising plan, 5 municipal transport plans
47	Tite Aroshidze, Minister of Agriculture of Achara	NA	
48	Tengiz Apkhazava, Batumi City Council	9/06/2020	NC
49	Ketevan Goletiani, Dean of Transport and Logistics Department/ Faculty at Batumi Navigation University	8/06/2020	NC

## Annex 7: List of documents reviewed

Document Name	Availability	Comments
1. PIF	X	
2. UNDP Project Document	X	
3. CEO Endorsement Document and Annexes	X	
4. Project Inception Report	X	
5. Project Implementation Reports (PIRs)	X	2017, 2018, 2019
6. Quarterly progress reports	0	
7. Audit reports		This project was not audited
8. Finalized GEF focal area Tracking Tools at CEO endorsement, midterm and terminal-METT	+	Lacking TT at terminal-METT (waiting for pilot implementation)
9. Oversight mission reports	0	There are no oversight mission reports
10. All CTA mission reports	X	13 mission reports (last 19.12.2019) + 4 notes (city selection, financing, lessons, emissions)
11. All monitoring reports prepared by the project	0	No additional monitoring reports were prepared, apart from PIR
12. Operational financial and Administration guidelines used by Project Team	0	No specific guidelines developed for this project
13. Mid-term Evaluation report	X	
14. MTE: Management's response	X	
15. UNDP country/countries programme document(s)	X	Downloaded from UNDP website
16. Minutes of the Board Meetings and other meetings	X	OK. No other meetings, apart from Board meetings
17. Project site location maps	X	OK (included in feasibility studies)
18. All contractor and consultant reports	X	1. A+S Consult for Batumi, Acharian Municipalities and Achara Region 2. NGO Road Safety Partnership and Move Mobility for National SUT Framework 3. Black Sea Eco Academy for Awareness Raising Action Plan for Batumi 4. Chief Technical Adviser 5. Civil Engineer, Giorgi Kokochashvili
18.1. Achara regional transport masterplan	X	A+S consult. 2018-2019. 1 doc in English (Baseline), 2 docs in EN and GE (Masterplan, PTA model) and 2 letters in English
18.2 Batumi Pilot measures modelling	X	#2_MacroModelling: VISUM Modelling by STS (2020) based on previous 2016 model. Includes a "proposed scenario" with one-way roads and some bus lanes (used also by bikes). #3_Report...: 3 streets with VISSIM (traffic lights, turns...) 6 files with figures and tables from model One dwg file. 2 video simulations. Vissim files.
18.3.1. Batumi Household survey 18.3.2. Batumi HH mobility questionnaire	X	1 Excel file. 3 weeks October 2016. 1550 households

Document Name	Availability	Comments
		Questionnaire in EN (twice) and GE
18.3.3. Batumi SUMP	X	Includes feasibility studies A+S. 7 files (EN and GE) (Data-model; PT, Parking, Corridors, Bikes, <b>SUMP</b> , E-taxi)
18.3.4. Conceptual drawings	X	2 Bus terminals N&S, 2 corridors, 6 intersections, 2 P+R, base PT network, optimised PT network, id with city hall adjustments (networks in EN and GE)
18.3.5. Initial stakeholder meetings	X	14 interviews October 2016
18.3.6. Progress reports (A+S)	X	2 A+S progress reports (EN &GE versions each): Interim report 2017 (Daniel Wolf, A+S leader) Final report 2017 (id.).
18.3.7 Video simulations of pilot corridor	X	
18.4. Photos from workshops and other activities	X	9 events in total: 16/11.2018; 21.12.2017; (other dates missing)
18.5. Awareness raising events	X	5 events, 2 brochures, one SUMP video, one quiz results, 1 awareness-raising plan (BSEA+CIG, 2018)+ 8 deliverables with results
18.8. SUT National strategy	X	1 report (EN and GE) and 5 preparatory documents (1. Inception report 2. Stakeholder Analysis. 3. Analysis of current status of transport systems in Georgia 4. Legal and regulatory analysis 5. Best international practices and lessons learnt for Georgia). 9/2017
18.12. SUMP for Achara municipalities	X	5 SUMP plus inception document. A+S, 2018
19. All published materials	X	List of dissemination materials and activities provided by PM
20. List of contracts, budgetary expenses	X	
21. Budgetary expenses	X	Summary provided
22. National strategies.	+	INDC, Climate Change and Energy Efficiency Strategies or Action Plans, Regional Development Programme
23. Research papers	X	Saunders, M, L. Nakashidze (2020). A New Low-Cost Transport Planning Method for Small and Medium-Sized Cities in Developing Countries. <i>Transportation Research Record (forecoming)</i> Nakashidze, L. (2016). Green Cities Project Case Study. École Polytechnique Fédérale De Lausanne. Not published.
24. Reports on urban mobility	X	<a href="https://iglus.org/how-undp-supports-the-city-of-batum-in-greening-urban-transport-via-sustainable-public-transit/">https://iglus.org/how-undp-supports-the-city-of-batum-in-greening-urban-transport-via-sustainable-public-transit/</a> <a href="https://www.eurasia.undp.org/content/rbec/en/home/blog/2017/7/20/Designing-a-city-for-people-not-cars-.html">https://www.eurasia.undp.org/content/rbec/en/home/blog/2017/7/20/Designing-a-city-for-people-not-cars-.html</a> Nakashidze, L. (2020). Green Cities Project Case Study. <i>100 Climate Actions for Asian Cities</i> . Asian Development Bank (to be published)
25. South-South cooperation activities	X	Workshops with similar GEF projects (Kazakhstan, Moldova and Belarus). Participation in GIZ programme “Connective cities”.



## Annex 8: Signed UNEG Code of Conduct form

### Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders' dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

### Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form<sup>37</sup>

#### Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: Ángel Aparicio

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant): Fundación Agustín de Betancourt

**I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.**

Signed at Madrid on April 22, 2020

Signature:  \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>37</sup> [www.unevaluation.org/uneqcodeofconduct](http://www.unevaluation.org/uneqcodeofconduct)

## ***Annex 9: Signed TE report clearance form***

*(To be completed by the Commissioning Unit and UNDP-GEF RTA)*

<b>Midterm Review Report Reviewed and Cleared By:</b>	
<b>Commissioning Unit</b>	
Name: _____	
Signature: _____	Date: _____
<b>UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Advisor</b>	
Name: _____	
Signature: _____	Date: _____

## Annex 10: GEF Tracking Tool



### Tracking Tool for Climate Change Mitigation Projects (For Terminal Evaluation)

<b>Special Notes: reporting on lifetime emissions avoided</b>
<b>Lifetime direct GHG emissions avoided:</b> Lifetime direct GHG emissions avoided are the emissions reductions attributable to the investments made during the project's supervised implementation period, totaled over the respective lifetime of the investments.
<b>Lifetime direct post-project emissions avoided:</b> Lifetime direct post-project emissions avoided are the emissions reductions attributable to the investments made outside the project's supervised implementation period, but supported by financial facilities put in place by the GEF project, totaled over the respective lifetime of the investments. These financial facilities will still be operational after the project ends, such as partial credit guarantee facilities, risk mitigation facilities, or revolving funds.
<b>Lifetime indirect GHG emissions avoided (top-down and bottom-up):</b> Indirect emissions reductions are those attributable to the long-term outcomes of the GEF activities that remove barriers, such as capacity building, innovation, catalytic action for replication. Please refer to the Manual for Calculating GHG Benefits of GEF Projects.
<a href="#">Manual for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Projects</a>
<a href="#">Manual for Transportation Projects</a>
For LULUCF projects, the definitions of "lifetime direct and indirect" apply. Lifetime length is defined to be 20 years, unless a different number of years is deemed appropriate. For emission or removal factors (tonnes of CO <sub>2</sub> eq per hectare per year), use IPCC defaults or country specific factors.

General Data	Results at Terminal Evaluation	Notes
Project Title	Georgia: Green Cities: Integrated Sustainable Transport for the City of Batumi and the Adjara Region	
GEF ID	5488	
Agency Project ID	4980	
Country	Georgia	
Region	ECA	
GEF Agency	UNDP	
Date of Council/CEO Approval	October 3, 2014	Month DD, YYYY (e.g., May 12, 2010)
GEF Grant (US\$)	853,000	
Date of submission of the tracking tool	November 28, 2020	Month DD, YYYY (e.g., May 12, 2010)
Is the project consistent with the priorities identified in National Communications, Technology Needs Assessment, or other Enabling Activities under the UNFCCC?	1	Yes = 1, No = 0
Is the project linked to carbon finance?	0	Yes = 1, No = 0
Cumulative cofinancing realized (US\$)	12,930,139.00	
Cumulative additional resources mobilized (US\$)	2,266,139.00	additional resources means beyond the cofinancing committed at CEO endorsement

Objective 1: Transfer of Innovative Technologies		
Please specify the type of enabling environment created for technology transfer through this project		
National innovation and technology transfer policy		Yes = 1, No = 0
Innovation and technology centre and network		Yes = 1, No = 0
Applied R&D support		Yes = 1, No = 0
South-South technology cooperation		Yes = 1, No = 0
North-South technology cooperation		Yes = 1, No = 0
Intellectual property rights (IPR)		Yes = 1, No = 0
Information dissemination		Yes = 1, No = 0
Institutional and technical capacity building		Yes = 1, No = 0
Other (please specify)		
Number of innovative technologies demonstrated or deployed		
Please specify three key technologies for demonstration or deployment		
Area of technology 1		
Type of technology 1		specify type of technology
Area of technology 2		
Type of technology 2		specify type of technology
Area of technology 3		
Type of technology 3		specify type of technology
Status of technology demonstration/deployment		0: no suitable technologies are in place 1: technologies have been identified and assessed 2: technologies have been demonstrated on a pilot basis 3: technologies have been deployed 4: technologies have been diffused widely with investments 5: technologies have reached market potential
Lifetime direct GHG emissions avoided		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime direct post-project GHG emissions avoided		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect GHG emissions avoided (bottom-up)		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect GHG emissions avoided (top-down)		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)

Objective 2: Energy Efficiency		
Please specify if the project targets any of the following areas		
Lighting		Yes = 1, No = 0
Appliances (white goods)		Yes = 1, No = 0
Equipment		Yes = 1, No = 0
Cook stoves		Yes = 1, No = 0
Existing building		Yes = 1, No = 0
New building		Yes = 1, No = 0
Industrial processes		Yes = 1, No = 0
Synergy with phase-out of ozone depleting substances		Yes = 1, No = 0
Other (please specify)		
Policy and regulatory framework		0: not an objective/component 1: no policy/regulation/strategy in place 2: policy/regulation/strategy discussed and proposed 3: policy/regulation/strategy proposed but not adopted 4: policy/regulation/strategy adopted but not enforced 5: policy/regulation/strategy enforced
Establishment of financial facilities (e.g., credit lines, risk guarantees, revolving funds)		0: not an objective/component 1: no facility in place 2: facilities discussed and proposed 3: facilities proposed but not operationalized/funded 4: facilities operationalized/funded but have no demand 5: facilities operationalized/funded and have sufficient demand
Capacity building		0: not an objective/component 1: no capacity built 2: information disseminated/awareness raised 3: training delivered 4: institutional/human capacity strengthened 5: institutional/human capacity utilized and sustained
Lifetime energy saved		MJ (Million Joule, IEA unit converter: <a href="http://www.iea.org/stats/unit.asp">http://www.iea.org/stats/unit.asp</a> ) Fuel savings should be converted to energy savings by using the net calorific value of the specific fuel. End-use electricity savings should be converted to energy savings by using the conversion factor for the specific supply and distribution system. These energy savings are then totaled over the respective lifetime of the investments
Lifetime direct GHG emissions avoided		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime direct post-project GHG emissions avoided		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect GHG emissions avoided (bottom-up)		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect GHG emissions avoided (top-down)		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)

Objective 3: Renewable Energy		
Please specify if the project includes any of the following areas		
Heat/thermal energy production		Yes = 1, No = 0
On-grid electricity production		Yes = 1, No = 0
Off-grid electricity production		Yes = 1, No = 0
Policy and regulatory framework		0: not an objective/component 1: no policy/regulation/strategy in place 2: policy/regulation/strategy discussed and proposed 3: policy/regulation/strategy proposed but not adopted 4: policy/regulation/strategy adopted but not enforced 5: policy/regulation/strategy enforced
Establishment of financial facilities (e.g., credit lines, risk guarantees, revolving funds)		0: not an objective/component 1: no facility in place 2: facilities discussed and proposed 3: facilities proposed but not operationalized/funded 4: facilities operationalized/funded but have no demand 5: facilities operationalized/funded and have sufficient demand
Capacity building		0: not an objective/component 1: no capacity built 2: information disseminated/awareness raised 3: training delivered 4: institutional/human capacity strengthened 5: institutional/human capacity utilized and sustained
Installed capacity per technology directly resulting from the project		
Wind		MW
Biomass		MW el (for electricity production)
Biomass		MW th (for thermal energy production)
Geothermal		MW el (for electricity production)
Geothermal		MW th (for thermal energy production)
Hydro		MW
Photovoltaic (solar lighting included)		MW
Solar thermal heat (heating, water, cooling, process)		MW th (for thermal energy production, 1m <sup>2</sup> = 0.7kW)
Solar thermal power		MW el (for electricity production)
Marine power (wave, tidal, marine current, osmotic, ocean thermal)		MW
Lifetime energy production per technology directly resulting from the project (IEA unit converter: <a href="http://www.iea.org/stats/unit.asp">http://www.iea.org/stats/unit.asp</a> )		
Wind		MWh
Biomass		MWh el (for electricity production)
Biomass		MWh th (for thermal energy production)
Geothermal		MWh el (for electricity production)
Geothermal		MWh th (for thermal energy production)
Hydro		MWh
Photovoltaic (solar lighting included)		MWh
Solar thermal heat (heating, water, cooling, process)		MWh th (for thermal energy production)
Solar thermal power		MWh el (for electricity production)
Marine energy (wave, tidal, marine current, osmotic, ocean thermal)		MWh
Lifetime direct GHG emissions avoided		tonnes CO <sub>2</sub> eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime direct post-project GHG emissions avoided		tonnes CO <sub>2</sub> eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect GHG emissions avoided (bottom-up)		tonnes CO <sub>2</sub> eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect GHG emissions avoided (top-down)		tonnes CO <sub>2</sub> eq (see Special Notes above)

Objective 4: Transport and Urban Systems		
Please specify if the project targets any of the following areas		
Bus rapid transit	1	Yes = 1, No = 0
Other mass transit (e.g., light rail, heavy rail, water or other mass transit, excluding regular bus or minibus)	0	Yes = 1, No = 0
Logistics management	0	Yes = 1, No = 0
Transport efficiency (e.g., vehicle, fuel, network efficiency)	1	Yes = 1, No = 0
Non-motorized transport (NMT)	1	Yes = 1, No = 0
Travel demand management	1	Yes = 1, No = 0
Comprehensive transport initiatives (involving the coordination of multiple strategies from different transportation sub-sectors)	1	Yes = 1, No = 0
Sustainable urban initiatives	1	Yes = 1, No = 0
Policy and regulatory framework	5	0: not an objective/component 1: no policy/regulation/strategy in place 2: policy/regulation/strategy discussed and proposed 3: policy/regulation/strategy proposed but not adopted 4: policy/regulation/strategy adopted but not enforced 5: policy/regulation/strategy enforced
Establishment of financial facilities (e.g., credit lines, risk guarantees, revolving funds)	0	0: not an objective/component 1: no facility in place 2: facilities discussed and proposed 3: facilities proposed but not operationalized/funded 4: facilities operationalized/funded but have no demand 5: facilities operationalized/funded and have sufficient demand
Capacity building	3	0: not an objective/component 1: no capacity built 2: information disseminated/awareness raised 3: training delivered 4: institutional/human capacity strengthened 5: institutional/human capacity utilized and sustained
Length of public rapid transit (PRT)	3.4	km
Length of non-motorized transport (NMT)		km
Number of lower GHG emission vehicles	48	
Number of people benefiting from the improved transport and urban systems		
Lifetime direct GHG emissions avoided	-	tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime direct post-project GHG emissions avoided	4,219	tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect GHG emissions avoided (bottom-up)	1,316	tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect GHG emissions avoided (top-down)	-	tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Objective 5: LULUCF		
Area of activity directly resulting from the project		
Conservation and enhancement of carbon in forests, including agroforestry		ha
Conservation and enhancement of carbon in nonforest lands, including peat land		ha
Avoided deforestation and forest degradation		ha
Afforestation/reforestation		ha
Good management practices developed and adopted		0: not an objective/component 1: no action 2: developing prescriptions for sustainable management 3: development of national standards for certification 4: some of area in project certified 5: over 80% of area in project certified
Carbon stock monitoring system established		0: not an objective/component 1: no action 2: mapping of forests and other land areas 3: compilation and analysis of carbon stock information 4: implementation of science based inventory/monitoring system 5: monitoring information database publicly available
Lifetime direct GHG emission avoided		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect GHG emission avoided		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime direct carbon sequestration		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Lifetime indirect carbon sequestration		tonnes CO2eq (see Special Notes above)
Objective 6: Enabling Activities		
Please specify the number of Enabling Activities for the project (for a multiple country project, please put the number of countries/assessments)		
National Communication		
Technology Needs Assessment		
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions		
Other	1	Climate Strategy and Action Plan of Georgia/NDC of Georgia
Does the project include Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) activities?		Yes = 1, No = 0

## Annex 11: Terminal Evaluation Audit Trail

#	Author	Location	Comment /Feedback	TE team response
1	BK, JO	Cover	Add logos from implementing partners	Done by CO
2	JO	General	One issue which does not come through so clearly in this report is how the project did a very good job over the first half of the project when it came to plans and studies but struggled over the second half when it came to investment and implementation of pilot projects.	More details are provided now; there was not a clear roadmap for the SUMP to implementation due to (1) lack of uncontroversial measures which could be quickly implemented; (2) feasibility and functional studies addressing only technical issues, and not the consensus-building process necessary for successful implementation; (3) detailed implementation responsibilities not properly identified in the feasibility studies or in other documents.
3	BK, JO	Ex.Sum. Project summary table	We have 2 tables here. We need to provide Angel only one table. Please check the “new” TE guidance, page 34 for a format	One table provided, following the TE Guidance template
4	GK	Ex.Sum. Project summary table	Update budget figures	Figures updated to cover also November 2020
5	GK	Ex.Sum. Project summary table	313,000 including additional 11 K added in 2020	Figures updated to cover also November 2020
6	GK	Ex.Sum. Project summary table	12,919,139 including additional co-financing of NNLE “Batumi Agency of Urban Infrastructure and Public Works” and Municipal Ltd “Batumi Avtotransport”	Figures updated
7	JO	Project description	The project description is too short. Where are all the key dates? Date of Prodoc signature, inception workshop, mid-term review, original end date, revised end date	Project description is expanded
8	JO	Project description	Needs to describe the co-financing that was envisaged too	Project description is expanded
9	BK, JO	Evaluation rating table	“Overall Quality of Project Outcomes” row is missing	Added
10	BK, JO	Evaluation rating table	We are missing one row: Overall likelihood of Sustainability	Added
11	BK, JO	Evaluation rating table	A final rating on “Overall Project results” is missing	Added
12	JO	Ex.Sum. Conclusions	There is no specific mentioning of the amount of co-financing failing to materialize. From whom and how much?	Figures added in new conclusion #14 Conclusion #14 and recommendation C3 added regarding co-financing

#	Author	Location	Comment /Feedback	TE team response
13	NA	ExSummary Recommendations	As noted during our recent call, there are no major comments on recommendation; the only suggestions is to consider revising too make it clear who will be owner of the recommendation. UNDP will need to prepare management response and more clear and specific recs will be useful	Text revised and presented in standard table format
14	BK, JO	ExSummary Recommendations	Although Angel has not used the new TE guidance format (and he doesn't have to), a new guidance has a very cool format for recommendations to be presented as a table in the executive summary section. Pasted below.	Done
15	BK, JO	ExSummary Recommendations	Several recommendations need rewording. Add recommendation on gender	Done
16	JO	Acronyms	This should not go on page 12 but on page 2 or 3.	Moved (ToR indicated to put this section after the Executive Summary)
18	BK	ExSummary Recommendations	Angel, you have suggested preparation of a final project report. How about adding this as a recommendation. If you agree, you may also list what should be covered in the report such as: Results from corridors, GHG calculations and data collection protocols, who shall collect and report the transport data in the future etc., lessons learnt etc.	Included now as recommendation E.1.
19	BK	ExSummary Recommendations	What about COVID and future of transport, potential role of green transport applications to the Green recovery efforts. Any insights on them as conclusion/recommendation remarks. Your view/experience on that would be valuable.	Conclusion #13 and recommendation E.4 have been added. As it was stated that Batumi had not considered to promote biking during the pandemic, the recommendation focuses on recovering PT, based on the SUMP (in particular, redesigning the bus network).
20	BK	Ex. Summary	There is no mention of Covid pandemic in the executive summary section. 1.How did it affect the project; 2. how it can affect sustainable transport in Georgia and Batumi, 3. are there any opportunities rising for transport sector (green recovery etc).	Paragraph added in the project description subsection and new conclusion #13.
21	JO	ExSummary Conclusion #1	Projects need a Plan B when co-financing fails to materialize. This project only had Plan A, Plan A, and Plan A. When at one Project Board meeting we suggested to develop and implement activities in Kutaisi, the City of Batumi officials were against this idea.	Text added in conclusion #1 to reflect this



#	Author	Location	Comment /Feedback	TE team response
22	LN, JO	ExSummary Conclusion #2	<p>LN: Actually risk of political will to implement pilot measures, were discussed and highlighted in 2017 PIR (when it emerged do to local elections) and in 2019 when it remerged after considering it mitigated in 2018.</p> <p>JO: I recall writing that co-financing failing to materialize is a significant risk in PIRs. So how was it not mentioned? You could say this risk was underestimated but how was it not mentioned.</p>	That's correct. This paragraph was confusing, in mixing consideration about the ProDoc and PIRs. It has been revised.
23	JO	ExSummary Conclusion #3	At the regional level the towns and villages were...	Sentence added: "Moreover, outside Batumi, the other towns and villages in the Achara region were too small to adequately undertake the innovative mobility measures foreseen in the project".
24	LN, NA	ExSummary Conclusion #4	<p>LN: This might have been true during project design. If that's the case, then no comment. However as of today, Georgian government got more serious about such policy documents and currently all major policy documents are adopted and approved. For example, INCD, and now update of INDC is being finalized and will be approved. Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy lays and action plans are as of now approved and adopted etc.</p> <p>NA: Agree, on climate related strategies the Government is much more active than it was in the past; as mentioned by Lasha, NDC was approved and submitted on time, now updated NDC is being discussed with Government and be adopted in coming month or so; national Renewable Energy Action Plan and National Energy Efficiency Action Plan were also adopted by the Government and in addition new Energy Efficiency Law was adopted by the Parliament. Georgia is member of Energy Community which sets certain obligations as well as EU Association Agreement. So, would suggest to revise this conclusion to reflect reality</p>	The paragraph is revised.

#	Author	Location	Comment /Feedback	TE team response
25	BK	ExSummary Conclusion #6	What about “how the project has performed in terms of Gender” despite having no gender plan at the beginning. Can we share main findings on gender in the executive summary section? Similarly, is there any recommendation on including gender aspects into transport projects in the future	This is expanded now in section 3.3.6 (mainstreaming). In terms of gender, the performance of the project is very poor; the root cause of this is probably the weakness of the Batumi SUMP in terms of gender and vulnerable groups: SUMP provides some gendered data, but fails to take it forward to the scenarios and to the actions to be done. Conclusion #6 is revised accordingly. As for recommendations, gender is mentioned now in recommendations B.3, D.1 and E.3.
26	BK	1.2. Scope and methodology	Were any gender-responsive tools and methodologies used for this TE?	Text added: "To address gender and social dimensions, specific questions were included in the evaluation matrix for interviews (Annex 2). Additionally, the review of project's materials took into consideration recent guidance on these dimensions in urban mobility".
27	BK	2. Project description...	Shall we call this “Project Description and Development Context” to be in line with the template?	OK
28	JO	2.2. Problems that the project sought to address	Mainly in Batumi, rather than all of Georgia.	Changed to "in Georgian cities and mainly in Batumi". This is consistent with the ProDoc quote below in the same paragraph.
29	BK	2.5 Main stakeholders	Any gender related findings in terms of stakeholder engagement?	Participating NGOs did not raise gender issues, and national government services active on gender policies were not approached. This is added now to this section
30	BK	3.1.1, table 5	We might think of explaining the colour codes.	Done
31	BK	3.2.2 Partnership arrangements	We may also touch base to stakeholder engagement in terms of “implementation perspective”.	One paragraph added discussing stakeholders' engagement in implementation

#	Author	Location	Comment /Feedback	TE team response
32	LN	3.2.2 Partnership arrangements ; EBRD	<p>I guess, some interview person provided mistaken information. EBRD has not supported Energy Efficiency Plan. Rather EBRD supported development of Green Cities Action Plan with various sectors including energy efficiency and transport. It was adopted by city council on October 16th 2020. And transport plan of EBRD Green City Action Plan is based on SUMP of Batumi by UNDP</p> <p>On the contrary, its KfW, who supported feasibility study of Energy Efficiency in Municipal Buildings and now provided grant to refurbish all kindergartens in Batumi to make them energy efficient.</p>	OK. Correction made: the last sentence is deleted.
33	LN	3.2.2 Partnership arrangements ; GiZ	<p>In addition to Connective Cities Project, and more importantly, GIZ has recently launched a three year mobility project Mobility4Cities in Georgia focusing on Tbilisi and Batumi. In case of Batumi their technical assistance will be based on SUMP elaborated by our project. We were more than intensely involved in defining their scope and intervention areas to fill in gaps which we missed and also to have a logical continuation of UNDP efforts in Batumi.</p> <p>Memorandum of Understanding between GIZ and Batumi City Hall explicitly mentions that this project will support Batumi in implementing SUMP elaborated by UNDP.</p> <p>In addition: they will provide deep training in the use of Batumi Transport Model; They have ongoing tender on Cycling Masterplan and Walkability Masterplan for Batumi based on our feasibility study for cycling.</p>	<p>This information is new. A new sentence is included on this.</p> <p>Is that Mobility4Cities project actually approved or is it still under preparation? We could not find anything on the GiZ website about it.</p>
34	LN	3.2.2 Partnership arrangements ; KfW	<p>KfW did not participate in preparation of ISUTP. Rather, when they started prefeasibility study on ITS in Batumi (already conducted) they did so based on our SUMP and feasibility studies. Now KfW considers to extend 35 mln EURO to Batumi to implement measures identified in SUMP, specifically: Park and Rides; Passenger Transfer Terminals; Traffic Light Synchronisation and Bus Priority Signalling for Bus Lanes; Traffic Control Centre; Car Free Old City; ITS Infrastructure and Cycling Infrastructure.</p>	<p>Sentence modified accordingly.</p> <p>No need to provide in this TE report details on future actions that are only under consideration, pending final commitment.</p>

#	Author	Location	Comment /Feedback	TE team response
35	LN	3.2.2 Partnership arrangements ; KfW	This will be done by GIZ under Mobility4Cities project As I know from Team Leader, Jan Rickmayer	But KfW showed this interest during the interview and we need to reflect this. We add a footnote saying that GIZ could develop this under Mobility4Cities project
36	LN	3.2.3. Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management Risk log update and GEF TT	Will be provided now	Received in November 2020. Section 3.2.3 of the TE report updated accordingly. Concerning the TT, there are some discrepancies with the TE report, stated as follows: "• The updated GEF tracking tool was provided to the evaluation team in November 2020. The information contained in the tracking tool is consistent with the contents of this report with 2 minor differences: (1) the length of the public rapid transit implemented by the project is reported as being 3.4 km instead of the 2.2 km of the pilot corridor; (2) the policy and regulation framework developed by the project is stated as "enforced", although the evidence collected in but the TE team is that the implementation of those documents that have been adopted by the relevant authorities (SUMP in Batumi and in other Acharan cities) remains unclear".
37	BK	3.2.3. Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management. PIR	Do we mean reviewed?	Yes. Modified
38	BK	3.2.4. Project finance	The following are typical questions we may receive for this section: -are there any observations from financial audits? -were strong financial controls in place to allow for the timely flow of funds? -was there due diligence in the management of funds?	There were no audits. One paragraph is added based on the interviews with CO and consultants
39	GK	3.2.4. Project finance	Additionally, in 2020 contribution was increased by 11,000	OK. Modified
40	GK	3.2.4. Project finance	Changes in table 9, cofinancing	OK. Modified
41	GK	3.2.4. Project finance	Changes in table 9, cofinancing	OK. Modified

#	Author	Location	Comment /Feedback	TE team response
42	BK	3.2.5. Monitoring and evaluation at entry and implementation	As far as I see, there is no mention of Tracking tools in this section. Can you ensure we refer to TT?	This has been included in section 3.2.3, once the TT were delivered. A reference is also made in section 3.2.5
43	LN	3.2.5. Table 10	[On the absence of quarterly reports] Indeed there were no quarterly reports. Rather we were preparing progress reports encompassing periods from one PEB meeting to next PEB meeting	Text modified accordingly: "The PMU did not prepare quarterly reports, but progress reports submitted at each Project Board Meeting".
44	LN /NA		[On the absence of audits] Audits were not conducted. Perhaps we should explain for evaluators why audits were not conducted?	Text modified accordingly. No input has been received from CO on why audits were not conducted
45	NA	3.2.5	[On project final report] It will be prepared before end of the project	Text modified accordingly
46	NA	3.2.6. UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation	In majority of cases MoEPA reps were junior or mid level specialists from Climate Change Division	Added to the text
47	BK	3.3.1. Overall results	Is there any effect of COVID to the numbers in bus passengers? Current and future expected?	There is not sufficiently detailed information on the COVID impact in the number of bus passengers. Estimates are based on the transport system coming back to usual in 2021. One footnote is included to clarify this issue.
48	BK	3.3.1. Overall results	Can we indicate what is it included in this calculation? 1-2 sentence in the footnote would suffice. Not all readers can access to the TEEMP model and the Prodoc annex.	Sentence included. There was a minor typo here: emission savings in 2021 are 431 tons and not 434 tons.
49	BK	3.3.1. Overall results	[Refer to indirect emissions as consequential emissions] This is the new terminology replacing the indirect emissions. We may indicate this with a sentence. The definition is in the next comment box.	There is already footnote 2 at the beginning of the report explaining this; although redundant, another footnote is included here.
50	BK	3.3.1. Overall results	There might be a problem here. Indirect savings do come after the project by its definition: Consequential GHG emission reductions are those projected emissions that could result from a broader adoption of the outcomes of a GEF project plus longer-term emission reductions from behavioral change. Broader adoption of a GEF project proceeds through several processes including sustaining, mainstreaming, replication, scaling-up and market change. Consequential emission reductions are typically achieved after GEF project closure and occur outside of the project logical framework (logframe).	This has been revised accordingly

#	Author	Location	Comment /Feedback	TE team response
51	BK	3.3.1. Overall results	The prodoc logic in indirect bottom up emissions reductions was to multiply the direct emissions target of 877 with multiplying factor of 3. I don't see where the 12,847 is coming from. Can you elaborate on this?	That's correct. This was a mistake. We estimate 5'0% of the indirect bottom-up emissions to materialize, i.e. 1316 instead of 2631 tons.
52	BK	3.3.1. Table 12	This should be "During 10 years period, after the end of the project". Next row: I am confused here. The project defines its bottom up indirect target as 2631 tonnes...	Yes. In fact the first row is deleted, and the following one is revised in accordance with these comments
53	LN	3.3.1. Table 13 (indicators). Outcome 1 indicator	I would speculate here that the fact that we developed two reports for inter municipal transport encompassing all 6 municipalities of Achara, should be counted as exceeding the target. We intentionally dropped the word "adoption" during the MTR review, because we understood that it would be tricky in terms of procedures, because it deals on the one hand with regional government and on the other hand with six municipalities, and regional government does not have any leverages to impose transport related policy to municipalities by adopting it, because according to Georgian Law on Local Authorities, public transportation and traffic organization is an exclusive right of local authority. The main idea of developing Intermunicipal passenger transport masterplan and institutional model was to guide Adjara municipalities and regional government together through necessary steps and reforms to establish such system including legal amendments.	Besides not being adopted, there is no evidence of the reports delivered by the project receiving any kind of endorsement (or follow-up) from the regional government. It is difficult to see how such reports can be considered as "plans". This certainly is not because of lack of delivery from the PMU but for lack of commitment from the governments. In this sense, as the project has delivered what was needed for such institutional mechanisms, it is fair to turn this one orange
54	LN	3.3.1. Table 13 (indicators). Outcome 3 indicator	It also depends on how we look at this indicator. If we evaluate it without interpretation, just as plain as it is, then in my view, repainting bus lanes can be counted as "improvement".	Usually, repainting is just considered as regular maintenance any infrastructure owner should take care of.

#	Author	Location	Comment /Feedback	TE team response
55	LN	3.3.1. Table 13 (indicators). Outcome 4 indicator	My interpretation is that project exceeded this target by developing institutional mechanism for national level and for regional level. Project was not required to have officially adopted such mechanisms or endorsed. While it might have been implied by someone who designed the project, it is not explicitly mentioned. So I think all such cases which leave space for interpretation or doubt should be resolved in favour of the project as in court cases J any doubt ought to be resolved in favour of the accused subject J	We should avoid any double counting with indicators in other components. The issue here is what is to be considered as an "institutional mechanism" at the national or regional levels; my understanding is that these are institutional arrangements of any sort aiming at facilitating the implementation of the plans developed by the project or the actual adoption of additional plans (e.g. the regional or national plans). None of these have happened, certainly not because lack of delivery from the PMU but for lack of commitment from the governments. In this sense, as the project has delivered what was needed for such institutional mechanisms, it is fair to turn this one orange.
56	LN	3.3.1. Key barriers	There is explicitly appointed department for ISUTP implementation coordination – Municipal Policy Department	Text revised accordingly. However, there has been no monitoring made by this department, and no clear SUMP responsibilities assigned to anyone within that Department
57	BK	3.3.2. Relevance	Can we also add few sentence on SDGs in terms of relevance?	Text added.
58	BK	Annexes	We need to add 2 more annexes: - Tracking tool - TE Audit Trail	Annexes added