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CONSERVATION OF GLOBALLY SIGNIFICANT FOREST ECOSYSTEMS IN SURINAME'S GUYANA SHIELD BIO-REGION



TERMINAL EVALUATION REPORT

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To Jeff Harbers,
philanthropist and former Microsoft executive, who died in a plane crash on 24 June 2006.
In 1998, his generous gifts to Conservation International accounted for a large part of that NGO's financial contribution to help create the Suriname Conservation Foundation trust fund and formally secure the Central Suriname Nature Reserve (CSNR).

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Title page photo: Coppename River near Raleighvallen, Central Suriname Nature Reserve (D. Kloss)

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ATM	Ministry of Labour, Technological Development and Environment
BOSNAS	Forest and Nature Conservation Authority Suriname
CI / CIS	Conservation International / Conservation International-Suriname
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
CSNR	Central Suriname Nature Reserve
EIA / ESIA	Environmental Impact Assessment / Env. and Social Impact Assessment
EU	European Union
FEV	Final evaluation
FFEM	Fonds Français pour l'Environnement Mondial
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GoS	Government of Suriname
IDB / IDB-MIF	Inter-American Development Bank / IDB-Multilateral Investment Fund
JSOOC	Jan Starke Opleidings- en Ontspanningscentrum (Jan Starke Training and Recreation Center)
LBB	Suriname Forest Service
LPO	Local Partner Organisation
MP	Management Plan for a protected area
MTE	Mid Term Evaluation
NCD	Nature Conservation Division or Natuurbeheer (currently in LBB)
NIMOS	National Institute for Environment and Development in Suriname
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OC	Oversight Committee (of the SCF Capacity Building Support project)
OP	Operational Plan (for implementing a protected area management plan)
PAs	Protected areas
PC	Project Coordinator
PCC	Project Co-ordinating Committee
PIR	Project implementation report (a GEF requirement mostly identical with the Annual Project Report)
PLOS	Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation
RedLAC	Network of Latin American and Caribbean environmental funds
RGB	Ministry of Physical Planning, Land and Forest Management
SBB	Stichting voor Bosbeheer en Bostoezicht (Foundation for Forest Management and Production Control)
SCF	Suriname Conservation Foundation
SGP	GEF-UNDP Small Grants Programme
SNR	Sipaliwini Nature Reserve
SSB	Salomon Smith Barney
STINASU	Foundation for Nature Preservation in Suriname
TEAM	Tropical Environment Assessment and Monitoring project, CI
TPR	Tri-Partite Review
TRAC	Target for Resource Assignment from the Core (UNDP)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNF	United Nations Foundation
UNFIP	United Nations Fund for International Partnerships
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	US Agency for International Development
VIDS	Association of Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature (World Wildlife Fund)

Figure 1 Suriname orientation map and Map of Protected Areas in Suriname



1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 Brief description of the Project

1. The Project¹ aimed at protecting the rich biodiversity of Suriname's tropical forests. Started in September 2000 for 5 years (extended to 6), it set out to establish a management regime and a sustainable source of future finance for two globally important and representative sites: the 1998 created Central Suriname Nature Reserve (CSNR), the single largest tropical forest reserve in the Guiana Shield covering almost 10% of the country, and the 1972 created Sipaliwini Nature Reserve (SNR) in south Suriname. The US\$18 million² Project was funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) with \$9.2m, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) \$0.25m, UN Foundation \$2.3m, Conservation International \$2.5m, and \$3.6m to be raised from other sources³. The main component was to create and capitalize the Suriname Conservation Foundation (SCF) with a \$15m endowment. The remaining \$3m were to be used for two other sub-components: preparation of management plans for the two reserves, and strengthening of Suriname's legislative and institutional framework for protected area management.

2. Using only its annual interest revenues, the SCF was designed to perpetually provide funding for conservation operations in the two reserves, including for infrastructure and staffing, capacity strengthening, biological and social assessment activities, conservation awareness and education, and targeted support for the development of ecotourism as a conservation-enabling form of livelihood. To improve the institutional environment for its success, the Project would support management planning for the reserves, strengthen the cadre of conservation professionals by providing training, strengthen controls over the wildlife trade, and promote progressive policy development. These interventions were to be spearheaded through the creation of new conservation partnerships between the government and non-government sectors and local communities.

1.2 Context and purpose of the evaluation

3. This independent Terminal Evaluation is a standard requirement at the completion of a UNDP/GEF project. The overall objective is to assess the relevance, performance, and success of the project, and the sustainability of its outcomes. The two Evaluators came to Suriname for two weeks in November/December 2006, visited the CSNR and two bufferzone sites, and held extensive interviews with all parties involved in the Project. The Evaluators are individually and structurally independent from UNDP as well as any of the institutions reviewed, and followed the evaluation procedures established by UNDP and the GEF (see [Annex 8](#)). The findings were presented at the end of the visit, and a draft of this report was sent to all Project partners and major stakeholders for comments and corrections, which were used

¹ Referred to in this document with a capital P, the Project's title for GEF/UNDP is "Conservation of Globally Significant Forest Ecosystems in Suriname's Guyana Shield Bio-region" and for the UNF "Conservation of Central Suriname Nature Reserve".

² In this document unless otherwise noted \$ stands for US\$ (United States Dollar); m stands for million.

³ The co-financing eventually came from the Government of Suriname, using the last remaining funds available through its 1975 independence treaty with the Government of the Netherlands (hereinafter referred to as Dutch Treaty funds).

to update this final version. Any unresolved differences of opinions expressed by any of the parties are set out in [Annex 9](#) of this report.

4. Due to the fact that part of the Project fund capitalization was only possible through the creation in 2004 of a separate 6-year Dutch funded project “Capacity building support to the Suriname Conservation Foundation (SCF)” – implemented by UNDP – in which several original Project activities would now be undertaken, this terminal evaluation reviews the main Project and the proposed activities and implementation arrangements of the SCF Capacity Building Support project. That project in effect extended the timeframe for essential Project outputs to be achieved by another 4 years. This is an unusual setting for a Terminal Evaluation, which can now also be read as an evaluation near the mid-point of a ten year process. It opens the opportunity to not merely measure the achievements or shortfalls at the end of the Project and its provisions for a more or less unknown sustainability of impacts, but to influence and advise on the way this ‘sub’-project is being implemented.

5. UNDP was mandated to assess whether the prerequisites to release the second tranche of GEF funding (\$3.4m) into the SCF endowment were fulfilled or were likely to be fulfilled (Project document UNDP 2000: § 73). Project partners worked closely together to seek the GoS’s agreement to use \$3.6m of Dutch Treaty Funds as the counterpart funding that could secure the GEF’s second contribution to the SCF endowment. Since Dutch fiscal rules prohibit payments into an endowment fund the money was used to create the SCF Capacity Building Support project which pays for 6 years annual operation and grant expenditures, thus letting the investment returns of the endowment accumulate without withdrawal until 2010 to hopefully reach the target volume of at least \$15m. UNDP accepted this as the required co-financing in 2004 and the second GEF tranche was released. In designing the SCF Capacity Building project, the partners acknowledged the need for continuation of support in several project segments where few results had been achieved yet, as well as support to institutions crucial for strengthening Suriname’s long term environmental management capacity. It can be welcomed as a tacit recognition that in this particular situation a 10-year period might be a more adequate timeframe to design and implement the Project, and as an example of successful adaptive management. UNDP prepared a Revision Note in mid-2006 describing factors that modified the Project and providing guidance for a revision of the SCF Capacity Building Support project logframe (see paragraph 65).

6. To capture the full impact of this unique project arrangement **the Evaluators enhanced one dimension of the rating of project outputs⁴**. The assessment of Project outcomes is rated and presented separately for (a) the actual achievements (or shortfalls) during the life of the Project and (b) the sustainability of outcomes or the likelihood that they will be achieved in subsequent years as a consequence of the peculiar transfer of Project activities into the SCF Capacity Building Support project which continues until 2010. These sustainability or ‘future’ ratings are presented as a second column in the output ratings table (see paragraph 113 below).

⁴ This enhanced methodology has been presented to and welcomed by UNDP.

1.3 Main conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

7. The Project addressed the right problems, came at the right time and in principle with the right interventions to safeguard globally valuable biodiversity in Suriname: Accelerating timber extraction, mining, uncontrolled hunting, intensive gathering and trading of plants and animals (both live and as meat), and growing tourism on the one side met with ineffective systems and institutions for conservation outside and inside of protected areas. The Evaluators commend the Project initiators on the timely and swift fashion in which they contributed and responded to the creation of the CSNR, and undertook to create or strengthen the necessary conservation agencies.

8. The other key problem the Project addressed in an exemplary way is the worldwide difficulty to safeguard the financial sustainability of adequate conservation management once protected areas are declared on paper – particularly in a developing country like Suriname with its lack of financial resources and its priorities in human and economic development. The capitalisation and operationalisation of the Suriname Conservation Foundation (SCF) is the central element and single largest achievement of the Project. By implementing the lessons learned from the GEF-evaluation of the first generation of environmental trust funds (GEF 1998), the design of the Suriname Conservation Foundation also addressed a number of the problems that had plagued earlier funds in other countries: The endowment is large enough to cover the financial needs for the target areas, funds were transferred in instalments conditional on foundation registration and co-financing targets, the predominantly non-governmental management structure represents the key stakeholders in this diverse society, and the Project supports the enabling institutional environment necessary for the successful use of the grant mechanism created.

9. The Evaluators strongly feel it is important to stress these **successful fundamentals**. These could otherwise be overlooked in an evaluation which by design must also analyse all the weaknesses, and will have to rate the Project by the attainment of all objectives and outcomes. Given the sometimes overwhelming preoccupation with general success ratings, the innovative and successful components of the Project must not fall by the wayside. This introduction should help to avoid the danger that a critical rating might discourage Project partners from continuing and redoubling their efforts, or that the funding and implementing agencies could try to dissociate themselves from what may on the surface in part appear as a failure. It is not unusual that such complex projects in countries with limited capacity simply need more time to unfold than the 5-year project periods often mandated by donor agencies. By acknowledging the successful fundamentals of the Project and the adaptive action that was taken, the project can be rated overall as *moderately satisfactory* – while the attainment of the Project objectives and outcomes until the end of Project (December 2006) could have only been rated *moderately unsatisfactory*. Moreover, by putting the Project in the context of the achievements that can be projected with the continuing SCF Capacity Building Support project – a positive example of adaptive management –, the likelihood that the overall project outcomes can be achieved in the future and sustained can be rated *satisfactory*, but for that to happen key recommendations of this evaluation need to be addressed and successfully implemented.

10. The Project had **no measurable impact on the three indicators** set in the Project logframe to determine whether it contributed to the **goal** of biodiversity protection. Species and biological integrity were neither positively nor negatively affected because the Project did nothing that could have affected them: no conservation activity on the ground, and no policy or institutional changes that translated into measurable management change on the ground. This is to some extent a weakness in the goal indicators, which cannot measure the contribution made by creating the trust fund which will secure biodiversity in the future.

Given the overall just moderately satisfactory rating up to now it may be of little consolation for those who worked hard to create and implement the Project, that some of the underlying reasons for the limited progress that was made in certain areas to date were design flaws:

11. In principle, the Project was **well conceived** and developed, following extensive consultations with a lot of support from stakeholders (Government, non-profit organization, private sector representatives, indigenous and maroon groups, and academic institutions). The **main shortcomings** were with the **baseline assumptions**, the **logical framework**, and some of the Project **risk assessment**.

12. Several important **baseline assumptions** regarding other agencies' investment in the conservation sector were either wrong to start with, or failed to materialise later. Consequently, even though well written, the **Project intervention strategy was too modest** and did not sufficiently provide solutions and support required for effective conservation of the CSNR and SNR priority forest protected areas.

13. The **timeline** for accomplishing many of the output indicators was **too ambitious**. To accommodate a 5-year timeframe, not enough time was allowed for the Project to start and gain momentum, to capacitate its counterparts, and to do the complex research.

14. Efforts to **support an enabling environment**, the first component of the Project, were **too weak** to guarantee the success of the larger conservation investment. The Project design placed insufficient emphasis on the needs of the two principal wildlife institutions, Nature Conservation Division (NCD) and STINASU, and the need for institutional reform and support and underestimated the scale of the necessary legislative reforms that are required. Most of the enabling activities did not achieve the desired impacts. The actual (baseline) investments made by other donors and the Government during the period of Project implementation were considerably below what was described in the Project document. This explains why the modest programme of institutional support measures in the Project document had very little impact on the capacity of the agencies currently in the sector, aggravated by ongoing intra-governmental restructuring of environmental departments and agencies.

15. **Management planning** was dramatically delayed, to some extent also by this lack of institutional capacity and cooperation. The plans were found well written but general, hard to operationalise, and included management structures antagonising the government. Instead of one year the process took over 3 years, and one of the two operations plans was still pending approval by the end of the Project. Since Management Plans were the minimum requirement

before any conservation activity would be financed by the Project, no implementation was started, and the staffing and organisational framework is not in place.

16. **Asset management** is now excellent but failed on two levels for the first half of the Project. The biggest omission in the design of the Project was to make provisions for the basic fact that the world's capital markets fall, as well as rise. Though capitalizing SCF's endowment was by far the largest component of the Project budget, none of the major Project risks that were identified sufficiently addressed the issue of Trust Fund assets performance in difficult market conditions, and no abatement measures were proposed. As a combination of market fluctuations and poor asset management between 2001 and 2003 the SCF lost almost \$2m from its initial \$8m endowment. With the recovery of markets after mid-2003 and the change to a better investment strategy at a more responsive asset management firm the funds recovered. The Evaluators are pleased with the diligence and success with which SCF and its new asset manager since 2004 constantly monitor and adjust the investment portfolio when necessary.

17. **Resource mobilisation** was the other big hold-up for the Project on multiple levels. All players involved knew before the start of the Project that they had to raise another \$3.6m from other sources within three years to meet the conditions for the release of the second GEF tranche of \$3.4m. Yet progress was slow during that period, as efforts focussed on Dutch Treaty funds which were perceived as the only source which could practically be expected to contribute this amount in due time. This existential issue turned much needed attention away from other Project implementation quality problems, *e.g.* institutional and policy support, and paralysed the Foundation: not only was there no investment surplus to be spent for grants, the principal even kept shrinking year by year. Also, too little was done to find alternative funds, even after a consultant mission on resource mobilisation for SCF came (rather late) in year 3. Nonetheless, all parties involved deserve credit for the innovative way in which a solution was found by using Dutch Treaty counterpart funds in late 2004 to create the SCF Capacity Building Support project which will continue until 2010.

18. No parts of the Project funds were foreseen to start financing the first few years of **SCF grant-making** in case of temporarily insufficient investment income. And as the SCF was not spending anything, no money was available to finance the main purpose of the Project: the work on CSNR and SNR which is largely to be coordinated by the conservation agencies NCD and STINASU. Nor was much attention given to preparing the potential beneficiaries to write and implement acceptable projects.

19. Observers described a lack of strong guidance and the absence of long-term technical advisors as indicative of indistinct **Project management** and indecisive control mechanisms.

- In the supervision of the large contracts signed with CI and WWF – which are excellent partners for this project – it should have been noticed and acted upon that the technical support to the SCF was too weak not only in critical situations, that the management plans were started late and with limited practical usefulness, or that the training manuals for park staff were not put to use. It seems that CI, while on the one hand earning criticism for its dominant presentation, on the other hand provided less day-to-day

guidance than necessary for the young foundation to deal with the asset management and fund raising challenges.

- It also is disappointing that the 2 long- and medium term advisors on conservation policy and bioprospecting were not hired early on, who could have dramatically increased the momentum in institutional development.

20. The **Project Coordinator** had strong positive impact throughout the Project, in terms of good documentation, generally well informed counterpart institutions and individuals, inclusion of several important local players and additional local and international consultant expertise not clearly identified in the Project Document, a well-prepared yet difficult construction with Dutch funding and formulation of the SCF Capacity Building Support project, *etc.* Yet all that might have likely been more effective, had there been a PC independently from UNDP placed within the key institution(s) combined with a small team of conservation expert and legal advisor, with additional support from the UNDP sub-office Suriname. Also, an early and consistent involvement of an accountant and business coach for STINASU (and NDC) would have been an excellent complement to that team.

21. The recommendations summarised below are naturally interconnected, yet for presentation purposes they are here organised in three segments: recommendations to SCF, recommendations to the 'Capacity Building Support to SCF' project, and recommendations to direct conservation management. The first recommendation however transcends all of them:

- (1) Reinforce implementation of some of the still unfulfilled mid-term recommendations.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SCF CAPACITY BUILDING SUPPORT PROJECT

- (2) Undertake a management support mission for the SCF Capacity Building Support project now.
- (3) Review the project document and logframe.
- (4) Support institutional reform and conservation capacity building as the highest priority.
- (5) Strengthen the project coordinator.
- (6) Establish and monitor individual workplans for local partner organisations.
- (7) Safeguard sustainability of core staff financing, avoid salary dependence on grant projects.
- (8) Ensure that STINASU makes profit to help pay for conservation.
- (9) Demonstrate to government and citizens measurable success (income) from protected areas.
- (10) Implement the recommendations for resource mobilisation strategy made 3 years ago.
- (11) Undertake a financial project audit at the beginning of 2008.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SCF

- (12) Promote SCF's image, independent identity, and its conservation programme; implement the new vision.
- (13) 'Revive' the Operations Manual as a living document.
- (14) Develop solid grantsmanship and improve the quality of submissions by SCF's potential grantees.
- (15) Strengthen the implementation capacity of local partners (NGOs, CBOs).
- (16) Proactively influence the institutional environment and adjust SCF programs to fit.
- (17) Help projects supported by SCF grants to develop sustainable income prospects of their own.
- (18) Shift grant priorities over time from institutional to reserve management.
- (19) Develop and coordinate a pipeline of projects that effectively contribute to the creation of a sustainable management of the CSNR and SNR.
- (20) Publicise grant opportunities and proposal training in multiple media, newspapers and radio.
- (21) Professionalise preparation and implementation of a public relations strategy.
- (22) Raise the capacity of board members, and retain a good balance of those well trained, critical and constructive members on the board.
- (23) Avoid divisive debate and monitor undue political alliances in board voting, *e.g.* on matters affecting minority groups, and promote pragmatic conservation approaches.
- (24) Add a youth representative, an international fundraiser and another conservation organisation to the SCF Board.

C. RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTED AREA MANAGEMENT AND POLICIES

- (25) Support institutional reform and conservation capacity building.
- (26) Enable NCD to implement in good quality and cooperation the Management and Operational Plans for CSNR and SNR.
- (27) Make the CSNR project with NCD a success. This is the most important SCF project.
- (28) Redefine stakeholder/'rightholder' roles in conservation in a constructive spirit.
- (29) Empower communities in reserve management.
- (30) Integrate bio-genetic resources issues into the Nature Conservation Act during its 2007 revision.

D. LESSONS LEARNED ON PROJECT MANAGEMENT

- (1) Commencing a project with an Inception Workshop would have provided the stakeholders with an opportunity to identify themselves with the Project and to clarify roles.
- (2) A well functioning project coordination committee with quarterly meetings is essential.
- (3) A well-integrated full-time project coordinator can increase the success chances of a project.
- (4) Adequate supervision and quality-adjustment of sub-contracts are hard to manage from afar, require close cooperation with local coordinator, and ideally staff continuity.

E. LESSONS LEARNED ON FOUNDATION AND ASSET MANAGEMENT

- (5) Fluctuating money markets are a foreseeable risk for which the project design must plan provisions.
- (6) Capacity to monitor and information sharing on asset management must be with the entire board.
- (7) Alternative spending and fundraising scenarios can help trust fund projects deal with income fluctuations.
- (8) Young boards need constant qualified advice.
- (9) The failure of baseline investments to materialize must be assumed as a risk.
- (10) A project must adapt or be revised instantly when changed baselines cause failure.
- (11) Projects should monitor and report on anticipated baseline investments.
- (12) A project should use several avenues to deal with public sector inefficiencies.

E. LESSONS LEARNED ON CONSERVATION

- (13) Best practices can also be formulated and shared on the stakeholder participation in the formulation of the management plans.
- (14) More lessons can be obtained from the consultations with the local communities, to better understand their perception of management and co-management.

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 Purpose of the evaluation

22. The overall objective of this independent Terminal Evaluation is to review the achievements made by the Project to deliver the specified objectives and outcomes. The Evaluation has been commissioned by UNDP/UNOPS from Project funds and was conducted according to guidance, rules and procedures for such evaluations established by UNDP and the Global Environment Facility. This Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) policy has four objectives at the project level: (i) to monitor and evaluate results and impacts; (ii) to provide a basis for decision making; (iii) to promote accountability for resource use; and (iv) to document, provide feedback on, and disseminate lessons learned.

23. All regular projects supported by the GEF must undergo a final evaluation upon completion of implementation. In accordance with UNDP Evaluation Policy the evaluators are independent from both the policy-making process and the delivery and management of assistance, as well as from operational management and decision-making functions in the organization. Although the final report must be cleared and accepted by UNDP before being made public, the evaluation team was free from undue influence and has full authority to submit reports directly to appropriate levels of decision-making. UNDP management does not impose restrictions on the scope, content, comments and recommendations of evaluation reports. Any unresolved difference of opinions between any of the parties are set out in [Annex 9](#) of this report.

24. This report establishes the relevance, performance and success of the Project, including the sustainability of results and impacts. With regard to the latter it also identifies existing weaknesses and challenges, and it gives recommendations on how to address these, in particular with the objective to strengthen the SCF and improve the implementation and effectiveness of the SCF Capacity Building Support project. It also identifies specific lessons pertaining to the strategies and implementation arrangements, which may be of relevance to other projects that provide for the establishment of environment trust funds.

2.2 Key issues addressed

25. In line with GEF M&E guidance the focus is on the following priority issues:

- Assessing Project achievements and shortcomings at the outcome level,
- Sustainability, in terms of financial resources, stakeholder ownership, and institutional framework and governance, including appropriateness of systems for accountability and transparency and the required technical know-how,
- The effectiveness of the Project's M&E system, including the use of the logical framework for implementation management, the use of measurable targets to guide progress, and the measurement of progress towards targets.

2.3 Methodology of the evaluation

26. The mission and this report followed the outline of the evaluation approach set out in the terms of reference (see [Annex 8](#)) which were reviewed and deemed appropriate by the Evaluators, with one addition⁵: To capture the full impact of the Project and the continuation of support under the SCF Capacity Building Support project until 2010, the evaluators enhanced the rating of Project outputs by presenting sustainability or 'future' ratings as a second column in the output ratings table (see paragraph 113). The methodology refined by the Evaluators was simple and reiterative, and can be summarised in these seven components:

- Document review (see the list in [Annex 5](#)): mostly provided before the country visit, supplemented by additional documents researched over the internet, provided by UNDP and others in the course of the mission, and by examining the files at UNOPS in Lima, Peru.
- Formal Interviews with Project staff, officials in government, Project partners and NGOs in the course of over 40 separate meetings with more than 50 people during 12 days in Suriname (see [Annex 1](#) and [Annex 2](#)).
- Field visits to the CSNR site Raleighvallen (both Evaluators 2 days), and to the CSNR bufferzone at Kalebaskreek and the Boven Coesewijne Nature Reserve (1 Evaluator per area 1 day) accompanied by senior staff from NCD, STINASU, WWF, PLOS and CI (see summaries in [Annex 3](#)), which provided additional opportunities for informal interviews with these agencies, their local staff, partners, and Project beneficiaries in the field.
- Continuous informal dialogue with Project staff, electronic communication, and more than 10 telephone interviews during and after the mission.
- For the semi-structured interviews the team developed an outline, attached in [Annex 6](#), which was also used as a framework for informal contacts.
- A debriefing with the main observations and intermediary recommendations presented by the Evaluators on the last day of their mission to representatives from all relevant Project implementation partners, and solicited feedback and additional inputs.

27. Detailed written notes of each meeting were kept, collated, and re-analyzed in Suriname and afterwards, followed by fact checking and additional document review.

2.4 Structure of the evaluation

28. This report follows exactly the format proposed by the UNDP-GEF M&E group. The summary and introduction are provided in Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 presents the Project and its development context, objectives and problems it addressed, and explains its stakeholders and planned results. Chapter 4 offers the evaluators' findings and conclusions in 3 sub-chapters: a detailed analysis of Project formulation, Project implementation, and Project results. The performance of the Project on implementation and quality and attainment of results in these last two sub-chapters is rated on a scale between highly satisfactory and highly unsatisfactory. Chapters 5 and 6 present the recommendations and lessons learned. An extensive annex provides further details on interviews, documents, and terms of reference.

3. THE PROJECT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

3.1 Project start and its duration

29. The Project started in September 2000⁶ for a 5 year period. In 2005 the original Project finalization date was modified, first to May 2006, then to December 2006. Due to the fact that part of the Project fund capitalization was only possible through the creation in 2004 of a follow-on 6-year counter-part funding project “Capacity Building Support to the SCF” in which several original Project activities would now be undertaken, this terminal evaluation reviews the main Project and the proposed activities and implementation arrangements of the SCF Capacity Building Support project. Delays are documented in the Annual Project Reports (APR/PIR) and the Mid-Term Evaluation (2004). A revision note in the APR/PIR 2006 specifies that outputs and indicators from the Project will be completed by the 2004-2010 SCF Capacity Building Support project (see paragraph 65).

3.2 Problems that the Project sought to address

30. While Suriname is still largely covered by its original vegetation, mostly forests, with its biodiversity overall remaining intact, this is due mostly to low population density and the inaccessibility of much of the interior region. **Threats to biodiversity**, particularly in the CSNR and SNR are presently still limited, although a number of threats at a national level appear to have **accelerated** over recent decades, and are predictably higher now than at the time the Project was designed. Timber extraction, mining, uncontrolled hunting, intensive gathering and trading of plants and animals (both live and as meat), and growing tourism on the one side meet with ineffective systems and institutions for conservation outside and inside of protected areas. The Evaluators commend the Project initiators on the timely and swift fashion in which they prepared the Project, contributed to the creation of the CSNR, and undertook to strengthen the necessary conservation agencies.

31. The other key problem the Project addressed in an exemplary way is the difficulty worldwide to safeguard the **financial sustainability** of adequate conservation management once protected areas are declared on paper, particularly in a developing country like Suriname with its lack of financial resources and priorities in human and economic development. Since the early 1990s the GEF had become a world leader in spearheading the creation and permanent endowment of environmental trust funds in biodiversity-rich countries. By covering a large part of their annual expenditures from investment profits without drawing down their endowments many of these funds became the most effective and sustainable source of funding for biodiversity conservation, and particularly those that are well managed quickly attracted substantial additional financial assistance from other donors impressed by their success (Kloss 2001). And by implementing the lessons learned from the Evaluation of the first generation of trust funds (GEF 1998), the design of the Suriname Conservation Foundation also addressed a

⁵ This enhanced methodology has been presented and agreed to by UNDP.

⁶ The project document was approved by the GEF council on 7 May 1999, signed by GoS and UNDP in April 2000 for a start in May 2000; UNOPS signed in July; and UNFIP on 28 August 2000. The effective starting date was September 2000.

number of the problems that had plagued some of the early funds in other countries. To name just a few: creation of an endowment large enough to cover the financial needs for the target areas, transfer of funds in two instalments conditional on the satisfaction of foundation registration and co-financing targets, and supporting the enabling institutional environment necessary for the successful use of the grant mechanism created.

32. With regard to the environmental problems, the Project arrived just in time. Timber extraction, for which Suriname had originally allocated about 15% of the country as concessions, had begun to extend beyond the coastal and savanna belts. Even though three Asian timber companies that would have opened up an additional 25% of Suriname's forests to logging were rebuked in 1993, the country has continued to grant smaller timber concessions of 150,000 ha or less, more than half of which apparently to Asian companies. Current policy is to allocate at least one-third of the country's 15 million ha of forest to commercial harvesting. Small-scale timber extraction using portable sawmills also poses a potential threat to biodiversity in small and barely controlled areas.

33. Mineral Extraction continues to dominate Suriname's economy, mostly in the form of bauxite alumina, which currently accounts for more than 15% of GDP and 50% of total exports (down from 70% five years ago). As traditional eastern and coastal reserves dwindle, preparations to open the newly explored Bakhuis **mines** in a large concession right on the western side of the CSNR are progressing swiftly with estimated reserves of 300-400 metric tons. Other reserves, sufficient to last until 2045, exist in the east, west, and north of the country. Long hampered by severe shortage of affordable energy sources (smelting has long since moved outside the country), any expansion of operations to mining and refining of reserves from West Suriname will depend on Suriname expanding its energy generating sources. With its current output at 12,700 barrels a day, reserves at 107 million barrels, and regional geology suggesting potential of up to 15 billion barrels in the Guyana Plateau, **oil** is currently the most promising sector in Suriname. Bidding by Multinationals on three new blocks offshore was completed in July 2006. Staatsolie, the state-owned oil company, has not yet announced its decision, and is also seeking to expand its onshore activities. The company recently started exploration projects seeking oil in other areas of the country (USDos 2006). These trends suggest potentially **growing pressures on nature reserves**, and several interviewees indicated to the Evaluators that the finding of a major oil or other resource of national importance would likely overrule the current conservation status of any reserve. **Gold** exploration and production, though at a much lower volume, also appears to continue its expansion, with both large-scale as well as small artisanal mining impacting on biodiversity through land clearing, water, air and soil contamination and natural habitat disruption. While this so far does not seem to have affected the PAs targeted with this Project, incursion attempts by sizeable unregulated gold mining seem to have increased, with a major incident just prior to this mission.

34. Uncontrolled **hunting** and intensive gathering and trade of plants and animals appears to be the most virulent of the threats. This is not only a problem in forest areas accessible by road any more; the domestic trade in live fauna as pets and live flora as decorative plants is widespread, and the steady flow of trade extends across the largely

uncontrolled borders to Brazil and the neighbouring Guianas. Though it seems to occur on a small scale and focused on a few groups of species, reports indicate that for example certain birds are already rare and hunting noticeably less productive in certain areas. Studies before and in the first year of the Project, combined with ongoing anecdotal observations, confirm that the domestic trade in game meat is the most significant domestic threat to Suriname's fauna. **Bushmeat** continues to be the main source of dietary protein in the interior and a significant source of protein in towns, including the capital Paramaribo, whose markets continue to receive large quantities of bushmeat deliveries despite closed seasons and other legal restrictions. There also appears to be a steady flow of wild game meat to markets in neighbouring French Guiana. Although the trade in CITES and non-CITES species does not yet seriously threaten the ecological integrity of the CSNR and SNR, it is as important as before the Project started to establish the necessary regulatory controls as the various export trades expand.

35. While it is difficult to confirm in the absence of reliable monitoring, the threat to biodiversity is equal or higher than before the Project, and the conservation institutions remain weak⁷. The same factors as stated before the Project continue to erode the potential contribution of reserves toward conservation objectives: *"These include: 1] Lack of capacity within the government to enforce protected area status, manage existing protected areas, or provide necessary PA infrastructure on the scale needed to contain potential threats. 2] Dependence of the economy on natural resource extraction, causing Suriname to actively seek foreign investment in the mining and forest sectors. 3] The relatively small national conservation community, such as NGOs or community groups dedicated to conservation and able to promote conservation compatible development alternatives. 4] Lack of capacity to integrate conservation objectives into development planning. 5] Inadequate legislation and operational capacity to regulate the domestic/trans-border wildlife trade. 6] Weak capacity of communities to adapt customary hunting management paradigms to changing socio-economic circumstances and to mesh them with scientific management principles."* (Project Document, UNDP 2000) Since the start of the Project, there were some improvements on 4] and 5] *i.e.* with regard to the capacity to integrate conservation issues into national planning and with regard to legislation.

3.3 Goal, Objective and Outcomes of the project

36. The goal of the Project was to engender sustainable conservation of the globally significant Guyana Shield tropical forest wilderness biota. The Project was to take an adaptive management approach that would be responsive to emergent threats and would gear conservation operations towards threat mitigation based on the precautionary principle. This goal was to be accomplished through two main sets of interventions. Component A consisted of a bundle of one-time enabling investments designed to: foster a supportive policy and institutional environment for protected area management; and, undertake management planning operations in the CSNR and SNR. Component B was aimed at creating the Suriname Conservation Foundation (SCF), an environmental fund (endowment) with an initial capitalization target of \$15m that was to be established to provide sustainable financing for

⁷ This is aggravated by postponement of the Public Sector Reform; low salary levels for qualified staff; and lack of students interested in Forestry as a result of the internal war in the nineties, making it difficult to find qualified candidates for vacant positions.

conservation. The Foundation would finance Protected Area operations and community-based conservation management, creation of conservation awareness, strengthening of biological inventories, targeted research and monitoring functions, and promotion and management of ecotourism through barrier removal activities. The SCF would focus initially on the CSNR and the SNR and would secure global conservation benefits by comprehensively addressing present and future threats to biodiversity.

3.4 Main stakeholders

37. The main stakeholders to the Project were the Government, non-profit organizations, private sector representatives, indigenous and maroon groups, and academic institutions. The main Governmental agencies and parastatal organisations that shared responsibilities for biodiversity conservation were: the Nature Conservation Department (NCD) in the Ministry of Physical Planning, Land and Forest Management (RGB; initially part of the Ministry of Natural Resources); National Institute for Environment and Development (NIMOS) in the Ministry of Labour, Technological Development and Environment (ATM); the Foundation for Nature Preservation in Suriname (STINASU); the University of Suriname; the National Herbarium; the National Zoological Collection; and the Jan Starke Training and Recreation Centre (JSOOC). Main non-governmental organisations involved in the Project were CI Suriname, CI and WWF. On the Project area level the key communities are Amerindian groups around the Sipaliwini Nature Reserve (SNR) and the southern part of the Central Suriname Nature Reserve (CSNR), as well as Maroon communities along the northern border of the CSNR⁸.

3.5 Results expected

38. The results expected from *Component A* were as follows (see logframe in [Annex 7](#)):

- Policy development functions, capacities, and management controls relating to biodiversity conservation strengthened at a national level.
- A framework for management of the Central Suriname Nature Reserve and the Sipaliwini Nature Reserve established.

The results expected from *Component B* were:

- The Suriname Conservation Foundation established and its long-term governance capacity developed.
- The CSNR and SNR are effectively managed using participatory methods and management operationalised in other priority sites as the SCF is further endowed.
- Ecological surveys, research and monitoring adaptive PA management.
- Conservation awareness and environmental educational efforts are building national constituencies for biodiversity conservation.
- The ecotourism sector developed and managed as an environmentally compatible economic alternative in target PAs.

⁸ Originally the Maroon villages of Kalebaskreek and Kaaimanston were not considered CSNR buffer villages. Kaaimanston, an out-post of Witagron, was added since it is located near the northern border of the CSNR. Though Kalebaskreek is not near the border of the CSNR - it is located several hours (by boat) north - it can act as a buffer for legal and illegal river traffic to and from the PA.

4. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 Project formulation

4.1.1 Conceptualization / Design

39. The Project was well conceived with a lot of support from the Government and other stakeholders. It was developed following extensive consultations with stakeholders (Government, non-profit organization, private sector representatives, indigenous and maroon groups, and academic institutions), undertaken during implementation of the GEF Pre-Investment Facility, and during the design process of the SCF by Conservation International. The GEF project preparation exercise of an amount of \$0.3m was executed by UNDP between 1995 and 1998. It undertook background studies related to a range of issues in the biodiversity sector, including management needs in protected areas and institutional strengthening needs. To support the creation of the CSNR, CI had already, by June 1998, agreed in a memorandum of understanding with the Government that it would design and establish the SCF. Both the GEF/UNDP and CI support created a good foundation for the Project formulation process.

40. The Project preparation process was initially in the hands of Surinamese agencies. This was driven forward by staff of UNDP-GEF in New York and CI in Washington. The advantage of this approach was the high-level support it received from the President of Suriname and the GEF in Washington. There was a broad sense of agreement at that stage (at the most senior levels) about the design of the Project and the process that led to it. However, the downside of this high-level approach was that the government and parastatal agencies responsible for nature conservation (in particular the NCD and STINASU) felt marginalized in the process (Cobb 1994, Mid-term Evaluation). Nevertheless, for this multi-million dollar Project to be approved and signed within the relatively short time-frame that was used (1999 – early 2000), it needed the high-level attention and support it received.

41. In general terms it can be concluded that the Project document was well written: it gives a good description of the background and context, the problems to be addressed, and the alternative course of action. It is necessary, however, to make some critical notes regarding the baseline assumptions, the logical framework (chapter 4.1.2), and the Project risk assessment:

42. The problem conceptualization was well formulated as part of the Project design, but some of the baseline assumptions that were made were too optimistic, which resulted in the formulation of an intervention strategy that was too modest and did not sufficiently provide solutions required for effective conservation of priority forest protected areas, and particularly the CSNR and SNR. The actual (baseline) investments made by other donors and the Government during the period of Project implementation were considerably below what was described in the Project document. This explains why the modest programme of institutional support measures in the Project document had very little impact on the capacity of the agencies currently in the sector. Another baseline assumption that was overrated was the growth rate of the tourism sector. The baseline description of the tourism sector did not make any differentiation between 'genuine/new tourists' and Surinamese people that visit Suriname and live abroad. Many people that belong to this latter group come to Suriname to visit their

relatives during the holiday season and not so much to explore the country and its interior. By assuming a high increase in the number of tourists per annum, the Project overlooked a potential barrier for the promotion and growth of eco-tourism in the country.

43. Developing sustainable funding sources was designed as the major part of the Project. To this effect, one of the two Project components, Component B, was aimed at the establishment of the Suriname Conservation Foundation and its endowment. This responded appropriately to the contextual setting in Suriname, where governmental support to biodiversity conservation – apart from the creation of “paper parks” – is minimal and regularly falls behind competing needs from other ministries. Capitalizing SCF’s endowment was by far the largest component of the Project budget (\$15m of a total of \$18.06m). Besides that, it was the recipient of a fair share of the technical assistance budget, allocated for the start-up of the Foundation.

44. The biggest omission in the design of the Project was the acknowledgement that the world’s capital markets fall, as well as rise. None of the major Project risks that were identified sufficiently addressed the issue of Trust Fund assets performance or managing assets in difficult market conditions. Subsequently, no abatement measures were proposed.

45. The baseline assumed that the Jan Starke Training and Recreation Centre (JSOOC) would receive \$4.15m from Dutch aid, with which it could strengthen its capacity to organise and provide training. In reality, the amount JSOOC could have mobilised from the Dutch Embassy was closer to \$700,000, but due to the JSOOC’s inability to formulate an acceptable proposal and budget, they never received even this funding.

46. The formulation of a framework for the management of the CSNR and SNR was to be done through a four-stage process, including the preparation of management plans, a biological and social rapid assessment, management scoping and the preparation of operational plans. No clear explanation was provided on the preparation of an umbrella 10-year plan, and a more detailed 5-year plan, with clear implementation targets and verifiable indicators. This kind of detail was only provided in the sub-contract that was prepared for Conservation International.

47. Sub-Outputs A to D of Output 3 were all based on the assumption that the SCF would have the capacity and funds to perform these activities as part of its long-term programme of investment (see page 29 of the Project document). This was already identified as a Project risk, because there was no assurance that the SCF was going to be able to deliver the outputs identified within the timeframe of the Project. Another risk related to Output A, identified by the Evaluators, is the risk of non-availability of counterpart financing during the implementation of the Management Plans, with funding of the SCF (see paragraph 70 below).

48. One-time capacity building support for achieving long term PA management objectives was identified to guarantee the institutional sustainability of the Project, only when the expected baseline support that would be provided by other donors would materialise concurrently. This remains a weak area, because most of the baseline institutional

strengthening support did not materialise, and the impact of the Project's investments was distorted as a result. The SCF Capacity Building Support project is now addressing several of these baseline support areas.

4.1.2 Logical Framework Targets

49. Most of the targets and indicators for guiding implementation on output level were well formulated, measurable, suitable in relation to the output they referred to, could be affected by the proposed activity, and had a clear deadline. This was a little less so with the indicators on the Project goal and purpose level, particularly where they referred to biological conditions affected by processes outside of the timeframe of a 5-year project. Furthermore, many of the indicators also on output level proposed unrealistic, overly ambitious timeframes, especially when taking into account the institutional weaknesses at the time of Project commencement and considering the fact that the SCF had to be set up from scratch. For example, the exclusive reliance on investment income for any conservation activity in the field set the Project up for failure, when a potentially long delay cannot be caught up within a 5-year project horizon. There is no indication that the risk that financial markets can go down for several years was seriously considered. The assumption 'fund income is sufficient ...' turned out to be the killer assumption: no SCF activity was dared for almost 4 years. This could have been mitigated had a portion of the Project funds been earmarked to pay for the grants in the first two years if necessary. By accepting the non-execution of Outputs 3A to 3D just because the SCF did not have any money for grants, and by simply moving them into the new SCF Capacity Building Support project, UNDP, UNOPS, the GoS, and the Project were not sufficiently held accountable. The Project partners, through the TPR, should have immediately revised this design flaw in 2001. These were the main outputs for concrete conservation action on the ground – the only activities which had concrete impact on the Project goal indicators. A couple of other indicators were poorly formulated, for example the important Output 3A-indicator 4.5 "Common understanding of co-management principles by Government and communities by 2004". The terms 'common understanding' and 'co-management principles' are rather unspecific and leave too much room for interpretation.

50. Extension of the management model to at least 1 other protected area by 2004 was one of the indicators to measure the improvement of the integrity of Suriname's priority Guiana Shield ecosystems. It is not sure whether the management models used for CSNR and SNR could work for other PAs in Suriname, because every area has its own specifics and requires its own solutions. To date implementation in the CSNR and SNR has not yet commenced, therefore it is too early to draw any final conclusion.

51. Lessons learned from the GEF Evaluation of Conservation Trust Funds (1998) were fully incorporated into the Project targets, and have contributed to the creation of a sound foundation and broad based national support for the SCF.

4.1.3 Country-ownership/Drivenness

52. The origins of the Project idea and its conceptualisation can be traced back to national, sectoral and development plans and focused on national environment and development interest, as the examples below show. Therefore, it can be concluded that there was considerable commitment and country ownership during the process that led to the development of the Project and in the Project development process.

53. In 1990 a Conservation Action Plan for Suriname was published. The Plan was complemented by the publication of the report: "Priority Conservation Activities for Suriname" in 1994. One of the priority initiatives that was outlined was the preparation and implementation of management plans for protected areas, training of conservation managers, nature conservation education, research on threatened species and enforcement of conservation legislation. In the mid-nineties the country prepared its National Strategy for Sustainable Use and Conservation of Biodiversity with targets for effective biodiversity management and in 1996 the draft National Environment Action Plan.

54. National political commitment for protected area management was also demonstrated by the creation of the CSNR in 1998, and, following that decision, the agreement between the Government and CI to design and establish the Suriname Conservation Foundation. The Project preparation process received high-level support from the President of Suriname. Additionally, there was broad support (at the most senior levels) within the Government about the design of the Project and the process that led to it. In July of 1999 the Government submitted the CSNR for inclusion on the UNESCO World Heritage List.

55. Despite the strong national commitment for protected area management during the nineties, the Government has not shown sufficient commitment, since the commencement of the Project, for the strengthening of environmental agencies. One key indicator of inadequate resource allocation is the low level of human resource capacity building efforts for environmental management within the country. The scarcity of personnel with adequate forestry training is dramatic (see also footnote 7). Another indicator relates to the inadequacy of efficient working environments. Examination of the physical infrastructure for offices of some historically important departments such as the Nature Conservation Division bears further evidence of low prioritization for providing environmental agencies with sufficient financial resources. Even the ATM which has been given the important mandate for environmental management since 2000 is still under-financed in terms of human and infrastructural budgetary assignments. One example is the state of forestry training and qualifications at both first degree and post-graduate levels. For example, since the retirement of the previous director there is no trained forester in the Nature Conservation Division and there are only 5 students in the forestry training programme at the University, some of which might not stay in Suriname after graduation. This is a serious constraint since the Division is responsible for managing most of the protected areas of Suriname, and this will not improve greatly after the prospective merger with SBB (see paragraph 58), which also only has a couple of graduated foresters in leadership functions.

4.1.4 Replication approach

56. To date no lessons and experiences coming out of the Project have been replicated or scaled up in the design and implementation of other projects. There is huge potential to share lessons learned, especially with regard to the establishment and functioning of the SCF and its endowment, and, in the near future, on the implementation of the CSNR and SNR management plans. This potential is explained in more detail in the Recommendations and Lessons Learned sections.

4.1.5 UNDP comparative advantage as IA for this Project

57. While GEF funds could only be accessed through UNDP, World Bank and UNEP at the time of Project formulation, none of these except the office of the UNDP was available in Suriname at that time. UNDP had already supported several other initiatives in the field of environment, amongst others on Biodiversity Conservation, and was also the implementing agency for the GEF Project preparation phase from 1995 to 1998. It has proven advantageous for the Government of Suriname in particular because UNDP had already a good relation with the environmental agencies, donor community and NGOs in the country, and it facilitated communication with UNOPS and GEF much easier in terms of financing arrangements and technical assistance. UNDP has a long background in establishing successful Conservation Trust funds, such as in Bhutan in 1991, which was one of the first with GEF contributions, and which is highly regarded. Size of the country and other similarities make it a useful learning example for the SCF. UNDP has considerable technical know-how and experienced conservation finance teams on global and regional level. By contrast, UNDP's ability to mobilize or leverage additional funding for the endowment appeared inferior to development banks active in the region which often provide more accompanying sector (credit) support and can more easily attract the interest of other organisations to co-finance their projects.

4.1.6 Consideration of linkages between projects and other sector interventions

58. At its design stage, the Project did take into account linkages with other projects and other sector interventions. In fact, it was too optimistic about the parallel activities (and funding that would come along with it) that Government, donors and NGOs would undertake or support. A sector intervention that was not foreseen during the Project design was the intended merger between NCD and STINASU. The planned target date for completion of this merger was 31 October 2004. In fact, the merger did not take place. The Minister of Natural Resources has decided to establish a new forest authority – called BOSNAS – for the conservation of forest and nature needs to be put in place. It is expected that this authority will be formed in 2007, through a merger between NCD and SBB, while STINASU will remain on its own⁹.

⁹ The Evaluators cannot say with certainty whether the Government's decision to establish BOSNAS will be implemented in 2007. Similarly, UNDP missions and PIRs assumed for several years NCD and STINASU to merge in 2004, which never happened.

4.1.7 Definition of clear and appropriate management arrangements at the design stage

59. Overall the project management structure is sound and involves the right players. Yet the management arrangements described in the Project document were not explicit enough to provide the guidance required for implementation of the Project. At the outset, the UN partners had intended to define a responsibility matrix. A detailed and thorough discussion paper on roles and responsibilities was prepared for the first TPR meeting. It was very unfortunate that this paper was never adopted. Furthermore, at the start of the Project, it was proposed by UNDP (Letter of Neil Pierre, Officer In Charge, UNDP Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, dated 7 July 2000) and agreed by UNOPS to hold an inception workshop, though this activity was not included in the Project document. This workshop could have clarified the roles and responsibilities identified in the Project document, but was never held.

60. Overall, the Evaluators are of the opinion that the close involvement of UNDP in the Project process was essential to ensure a good implementation of Project activities and (albeit with difficulty) to improve functioning of the PCC. The Project document was not very explicit about the position of the Project Coordinator (PC). From the TOR it can be derived that the position would be under the dual authority of UNDP Suriname *and* the GoS Ministry of Natural Resources, adding to complication when it talks of “reporting to the Director, Ministry of Natural Resources and through the Assistant Resident Representative, United Nations Development Programme, Suriname Sub Office, to UNOPS.” The fact that the PC was placed as UNDP staff inside the UNDP office was certainly easier. However, a full-time PC, who would have shared his/her office with the Project’s (not hired) Conservation Specialist in the Ministry of Natural Resources (and later RGB), and who would have regular rapport with the Minister, might have created more Government ownership and would have been more independent from UNDP. Certainly, such an arrangement would have benefited the relationship with the counterparts and the transfer of know-how, accounting, and management skills. It would have still allowed UNDP to guide the process – and sometimes back it up with more authority –, while leaving the day-to-day management to the project manager who could have created a closer technical support function to the weak institutions, which were going through several years of institutional reorganisation and insecurity.

4.2 Project Implementation

4.2.1 Implementation Approach

Moderately Satisfactory

61. The logical framework was well used in the Annual Project Reporting. It provided a good input for the TPR meetings that were held in 2002, 2003 and 2004. No changes were made to the logical framework during Project implementation. This was unfortunate because some activities that didn't seem to be feasible during implementation, such as the development of bioprospecting policies and the conservation policy support, could have been replaced by other emerging priorities, and subsequently the funds could have been allocated for the new activities identified. The Project did not make use of this possibility. Eventually it was decided by the TPR of 2004 to accept the MTE's recommendation to use the remaining financial resources for institutional change. In spite of that decision, \$150,000, two-thirds of the total UNDP TRAC budget, remain unused. Its main purpose was to fund the Conservation Policy Specialist (UNOPS 2007). The Evaluators feel that no sufficient efforts have been made to use these funds productively.

62. Many recommendations and observations made in the evaluation reports prepared by Niño-Moreno/Tjon A Joe in December 2002 and by Spergel in June 2003 were well addressed and appropriate action was taken by the subsequent TPRs; several important recommendations, however, were accepted only much later, after they were reiterated in the MTE report by Cobb/Healy in June 2004).

63. Multi-year work plans for the Project, with a general description of the Project activities, were prepared and annually updated. In addition to these general work plans the Project should have worked with comprehensive annual work plans, providing full detail on the planned activities and their duration, as well as implementation responsibilities. The Project inception workshop (see paragraph 59 above) would have been a good venue to review and improve the multi-year work plan with all key stakeholders and implementing partners. A key output of this workshop could have been a detailed work plan for the first Project year, with clearly identified activities and responsibilities. In 2004 UNDP and UNOPS introduced the ATLAS project management system for their operations. Annual work plans for project financial management were prepared in the new system, but did not contain sufficient information for effective project management. Separate annual reports to UNF/UNFIP were also prepared in 2004 and 2005 for the activities identified for funding by UNF.

64. The diffuse nature of the Project, the lack of clarity about some responsibilities, the absence of a strong commitment to stick to the agreed timetables, the delay in transfer of Project funds, as well as the lag in the endorsement of the TOR of the PCC that slowed its establishment, have contributed to the many delays in Project implementation. Overall, the performance in delivering anticipated Project outputs to a timetable has been disappointing and has not improved since the outspoken critique raised in the MTE report issued 2 ½ years ago.

65. A Project Revision Note was prepared in the second quarter of 2006. The objectives of this Note were to offer a succinct description of the circumstances and factors that modified

the Project and the Project context, and to provide guidance for the revision of the SCF Capacity Building Support project logframe to ensure that it is a robust management tool for monitoring execution of activities originally programmed under this Project. Considering that the Project was close to its ending date, the Note was not so much a '*revision note*' for the Project itself, but more a summary of events and factors that modified the Project, and a '*guiding note*' for the SCF Capacity Building Support project.

66. The Project made good use of electronic information technologies to support implementation, participation and monitoring activities. Most Project documentation was available in electronic version and was made available to the Evaluators upon request. The office of the SCF was equipped with good electronic information technologies, which are used for its day-to-day operations. It also has a well developed and attractive web site, but for it to be user-friendly and engender transparency it requires more frequent updating (*e.g.* section on projects approved and proposals, but also amendments to the bylaws). The CITES Workstation has been put in place at the NCD and people have been trained on its use. The preparation of annual plans, budgets and expenditure overviews was carried out by UNDP and UNOPS using their electronic financial accounting and project management system ATLAS.

67. The Project worked with the right institutions for its objectives, and the general operational relationships between the institutions were good. Things went somewhat awry when the government changed responsibility for nature conservation and environment from one ministry to two others, and the institutional reshuffling is still ongoing. A major damper on inter-organisational relations at the design stage and inception of the Project was a universal perception that CI had been too dominant in the creation of the CSNR, and that SCF was somewhat seen as a part of CI rather than an independent Suriname foundation.

CI initiated and played a very important role in the creation of the reserve and the foundation, initial fundraising, patient guiding and training of stakeholders (many of whom learned all these aspects for the first time), resolving of conflicts with various agencies, *etc.* And it did so very well. CI had the multiple role of proponent of, donor to, partner in and contractor to the Project; and at a later stage as SCF Board Member and its Chair. Yet this created a conflict of interest and at times made its role diffuse, slowing the development of SCF's image as a fully independent Surinamese institution. Though CI expressed to the Evaluators that it was aware of this difficulty and worked to deflect the associated concerns, more could have been done in this regard. For example, by strengthening the SCF image as an independent organisation through a vigorous awareness campaign.

68. TPR meetings were very well attended. An all-inclusive approach was adopted, and meetings were attended by 15 to 19 people on the three different occasions, involving 8 institutions the first time, 10 the second time, and 6 the third time. The PCC was only established after the Project had been running for 2 ½ years, while the first TPR meeting was held after 16 months. It was very unfortunate that UNDP, who was responsible for the smooth functioning of the PCC, did not manage to get the PCC off the ground soon after the inception of the Project, because it would have provided more guidance and support to the Project

implementation¹⁰. During the Evaluation mission several PCC members expressed that for a long time they had felt left in the dark with regard to what was happening with the Project. To avoid this the PCC meetings should have been convened quarterly to ensure its effectiveness and to create more engagement of the different institutions in the Project.

69. In many cases, the technical capacities of the Governmental institutions associated with the Project, Ministries of ATM, NR and RGB, PLOS, NIMOS, NCD, STINASU was weak. At the Project design stage some of these weaknesses had already been recognised, but during the Project's implementation, as a result of several institutional changes, the situation worsened. The Project design foresaw only the most modest of institutional strengthening activities.

70. Had the capacity of the key institutions been stronger during Project implementation their contributions towards achieving Project outputs would have been more significant. A concrete example of this is the limited capacity to draft quality project proposals. In August 2006 the NCD submitted a project proposal for the "Effective Management of the CSNR" to the SCF for funding. This proposal (with a budget of \$1,377,000) appears to be meagre and its description of intended activities is poor. It doesn't do justice to the CSNR Management Plan (MP) and Operational Plan (OP), because a lot of detail is lacking and it cannot be assumed that the information missing in the proposal is easily identifiable in the MP or OP, because no references are made. The clarification of activities is crucial, because this project intends to cover only a part of the required interventions for effective management of the CSNR, proposed in the MP and OP. Furthermore, the proposal lacks a clear description of roles and responsibilities. With regard to the expected contributions from entry fees the Evaluators feel that the predictions for Raleighvallen are not realistic. Since a substantial part of the budget will come from entry fees the presumably *unrealistic estimations*¹¹ entail an important risk to the success of the project. The Evaluators suggest a critical review and reformulation of the proposal before SCF funds will be provided for its implementation. This must happen swiftly to avoid further delay. Additionally, it is important to note that for the long term effective management of the PA the strengthening of NCD's and STINASU's institutional capacity is a prerequisite. The SCF Capacity Building Support project should therefore adopt this as a priority objective and provide sufficient support to both institutions using core project funds, based on clear commitment and effective collaboration by NCD and STINASU.

¹⁰ The first TOR for the PCC was presented by UNDP at the first TPR but was not accepted by the meeting. After lengthy discussions, the PCC was established by the Minister of Natural Resources, to be chaired by the Head of NCD, in an advisory capacity to the TPR. This was agreed, although several suggestions were made with regard to broadening its responsibilities on decision making.

¹¹ The income estimates from entry fees are based on the projected earnings of the CSNR Management Plan. They would be more realistic if key infrastructure at Raleighvallen and management capacity within NCD and STINASU had already been in place.

4.2.2 Monitoring and evaluation

Moderately Unsatisfactory

71. The formal criteria for monitoring and evaluation in the Project seem satisfactory: the annual APRs/PIRs are on time and contain a good amount of detail and also highlight critical issues, the early implementation monitoring and support mission (Niño-Moreno 12/2002), CI SCF monitoring mission (Famolare/Dresser 9/2002), Trust Fund Monitoring (Spergel 3 times 2003/2004), UNDP support mission (Alers /Pedersen 11/2003) and the MTE (5/2004) provide a regular framework of observations, feedbacks and thus opportunities for Project corrections. However, as discussed in more detail on the topic of insufficiently consistent asset management (see paragraph 111 and 147 below) and foundation building support, it took until 2004 before some crucial recommendations were implemented.

72. The APRs are positive in their regularity, amount of information and willingness to name critical delays and problems. For example, already the first report in 2001 highlights the bad asset performance (losses of over \$0.7m in the first few months) and warns of delays with SCF grant making. However, the APRs overall demonstrate a problematic reluctance to draw conclusions and formulate action items for Project activities even if these are significantly delayed or clearly do not go as planned. This reluctance is often softly worded and the tone suggests that little initiative was taken to remedy the problem, be it a fault in Project design, failure of baseline investments, governmental restructuring, or institutional weakness/lack of willingness by counterparts. For example an APR as late in the Project as 2004 (p. 7) lists a Project comment on rating of objective 1: “Most of the measurement instruments (means of verification) as indicated in the Project document, will only be developed within the planned implementation of the management plans. Since the preparation and the approval has been seriously delayed¹², measurement of the status of most of the objectives, using the indicators as developed, especially indicators 1 and 2, will not be possible before 2006.” To continuously delay the decision about the likelihood that this objective will be reached to the end of the Project deprives the agency and partners of the opportunity to take timely corrective action.

73. The Project document and UNDP staff referred to the PCC and TPR process as very important, but as described in paragraph 68 above these were not effectively coordinated with and functionally distinguished from one another. Already the MTE highlighted that with only two instead of 4 TPR meetings in the first four years these did not happen frequently enough to deal with the real issues confronting the Project. The direct feedback from the PC in the UNDP Suriname sub-office, the quarterly reports, and definitely the first annual report (APR) in December 2001 should have alerted all involved levels in UNDP, UNOPS, UNF and CI headquarters that there were considerable problems with the Project. Yet except for the Niño-Moreno mission in late 2002 to evaluate the SCF as required by the Project document before GEF would release its second tranche to the endowment, the first UNDP back-stopping support mission did not take place until October 2003, at least a year later than it should have come. Since it came so late, it commented on many activities at least a year after their original deadline for completion, providing both, critical evaluation and support. The Mid-Term

¹² “The Draft CSNR Management Plan was submitted to Government in 2002. In 2003 no visible progress had been made with regard to its approval. It was presented in 2004, with a changed management structure and some added operational details.”

evaluators report that UN staff on all levels involved with the Project freely conceded in interviews that their project management systems were not tight enough.

74. The MTE took place in late April 2004, 48 months after Project inception and 18 months before its anticipated (1 year extended) closure. The MTE played an important role, *e.g.* in waking SCF up to its mandate of giving grants and increasing visibility, the asset management was drastically improved, and the SCF board was made more effective. We can therefore assume that the MTE would have influenced the Project outcomes more effectively if it had been undertaken a year earlier. The SCF Capacity Building Support project document, developed by the PC in mid 2004, recognised the need for incorporating some of the Project's activities in the new project.

75. A Project financial audit was not undertaken during the life of the Project. This was a serious omission, because a project of this size and with so many different funding contributors should have had at least one financial project audit. Such an audit would have created an opportunity to assess the sound use of funds and allowed for corrective actions if needed.

76. Audits of the financial statements of the Suriname Conservation Foundation were carried out annually, starting in 2001. These audits were conducted in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, with good results.

4.2.3 Stakeholder participation

Moderately Unsatisfactory

77. The Project was developed following extensive consultations with stakeholders (see paragraphs 37 and 39 above) in the course of several years, a positive learning process for all parties involved, which continued with the consultations for the management plans. The participation of the stakeholders during the Projects design, inception and implementation was important to create ownership; ensure quality consultation; use skill, knowledge and experience of NGOs, communities and local groups, the private sector and others; and to ensure the establishment of partnerships and the achievement of adequate results. Once approved and ready for implementation, the Project should have commenced with an **inception meeting or workshop**, to inform key stakeholders and Project implementing partners at the start of the Project about the objectives, intended outputs, activities, and roles and responsibilities, and, additionally, to get a good understanding of peoples expectations. This did not happen, which was an unfortunate omission for a project of this size and such a diversity of stakeholders.

78. The PCC did not contribute effectively enough to the implementation of the Project. One of the key responsibilities of the PCC identified in its TOR was to serve in an advisory capacity to the TPR partners to support the effective coordination of the two Project Components A and B. Furthermore, its role was to contribute to ensuring co-ordination with other conservation initiatives in-country, reviewing Project progress on policy development, documenting lessons learned from Project implementation, ensuring that baseline initiatives were fully integrated into the Project framework, monitoring training and Project activities, and

reviewing annual work plans, budgets and reports. It was expected to contribute to effective information exchange between the Project partners and other stakeholders. However, according to reports made available to the Evaluators, it only met 6 times during the life of the Project: 3 times in 2003 and once in 2004, 2005 and 2006. This was clearly insufficient for the effective coordination of the Project components. It was the responsibility of the PCC Chair (Director of the LBB/NCD) and UNDP (responsible for the smooth functioning of the PCC), to ensure that the PCC meetings were held on quarterly basis, especially after initial problems related to the approval of the PCC's TOR were resolved in 2003. Important to mention here is that most of the PCC members are also member of the Oversight Committee (OC) of the SCF Capacity Building Support project. OC meetings have been taking place frequently since early 2005, exchanging information and deciding on biodiversity activities in general and in particular with regard to SCF activities (Component B of the Project).

79. In the drafting process of the CSNR and SNR management plans and operational plans a number of public consultations were held. The draft biological and social assessments were discussed with stakeholders and communities, and stakeholder workshops were conducted during the various stages of the formulation process of the MPs and OPs for the CSNR and SNR. Several stakeholders interviewed by the Evaluators confirmed that the consultative meetings held during the preparation process of the MPs were well attended and that they covered a wide range of stakeholders. Four stakeholder meetings were held for the CSNR MP, with each 80 to 100 participants, and several open discussions were held with relevant tribal communities. The SNR MP was developed in close collaboration with the local Tareno community. It must be taken into consideration, however, that the chief author for the update of the draft SNR OP voiced concern that the local population still is culturally unfamiliar with the concept of a plan and the binding character of written agreements, which will certainly pose more challenges and need for more regularly renewal of a common understanding of co-management and conservation agreements.

80. The SCF Board decided in 2004 to modify the concept of the General Assembly called for under Outcome 3 in the Project document as "a non-voting General Assembly, to ensure open communications between the SCF Board and a broad range of stakeholders" and has now included an advisory body to the SCF board (see UNDP 2006a: §I.8). Former SCF board members, who represent stakeholders, can become members of this Advisory Board. Open communication between SCF Board and stakeholders takes place in occasional stakeholders meetings and workshops. In January 2006 a stakeholders' workshop discussed the update and refining of the Vision and Mission of SCF, an activity financed from the counterpart funds project. Due to the small scale of the Surinamese Society and the difference in cultures and educational level, particularly between the Project development team and the stakeholders in the protected areas the SCF board and management felt that there would not be adequate representatives available as board members, stakeholders, and beneficiaries for SCF funds to form a meaningful general assembly, with sufficient capacity to act in respect to the preparations of the management plan and the foundation and its activities. It was felt that this difference was underestimated in the development of the Project (UNDP 2006a). While the field

visits and wide-ranging interviews helped the Evaluators to appreciate these cultural, educational, and geographical difficulties, we feel still that SCF and the Project did not undertake enough, if anything, to inform and capacitate a wider public to take interest and active part in the decisions and future directions of the SCF. As highlighted in the MTE, without a dramatic increase in such capacity building, ideally together with other donors and NGO support organisations, it will remain very difficult for the SCF to receive project proposals from community organizations and NGOs in the target areas that meet the minimum criteria for approval. The Evaluators are doubtful – but it requires more intensive analysis to determine – whether the capacity building and institutional development planned under the SCF Capacity Building Support project is sufficient to meet these needs.

81. Local resource users and NGOs participation in Project implementation and decision making has been limited. The first group was mainly involved in the preparation of the management plans for CSNR and SNR, while the latter's participation was mostly limited to the involvement of CI Suriname and WWF. Therefore, we cannot conclude that many NGOs have been involved in the implementation of the Project and have benefited from the Project. This situation for both the local resource users and the NGOs could have been very different if the SCF had provided more support to both groups that would have enabled them to generate more quality project proposals (See also paragraph [145 below](#)).

82. The Maroon and Amerindian communities, local resource users, are both represented on the SCF Board which allows them to influence the decisions of the Board and to look after the interests of their constituency. It has to be mentioned, however, that their presence doesn't guarantee that their interests are well served, because they form a minority on the Board and will need the support of other Board members to have certain decisions work in their favour.

83. Local workshops in project proposal writing and project implementation have not been undertaken by the SCF. Without such action SCF will not be able to sufficiently support high quality and carefully targeted conservation projects with clearly defined and sustainable management impacts. As mentioned in the Project document, effective public involvement will be crucial to the success of the SCF, and is necessary to ensure transparency within its institutional framework.

84. With regard to the SCF Board it is important to note that even though it is composed of a diverse group of stakeholders, this fact does not prevent that alliances, *e.g.* along bigger political issues, can influence the decision making process within the Board. This observation received by the Evaluators differs from the risk assessment in the Project document (p. 30), which stated that "the SCF will have a majority non-government board, thus providing a bulwark against political intervention". One unfortunate case is for example a year-long dispute within the board which led to the withdrawal of the indigenous representative for VIDS (Association of Indigenous Village Leaders) from the board in January 2007. Currently, the Suriname government and indigenous groups are debating on the highest political level about the extent to which formal indigenous landrights will be established. UNDP is providing

support to the process in other programmes. This is a highly charged debate, ranging from the most extreme indigenous demands for a majority of the country as indigenously owned territory, to a number of more moderate proposals. VIDS apparently insisted on including the wider political goal of indigenous groups in the SCF statutes and felt the board majority was just paying lip-service to an inclusive indigenous policy. The evaluators strongly recommend the SCF and VIDS to re-engage in a constructive and pragmatic dialogue concentrating on safeguarding the environmental patrimony. Mature and patient moderation should be provided by CI, UNDP, WWF and others involved. Where board votes are concerned it will be difficult to avoid such interference, because it can be hard to identify and prove, or because principles and emotions run high. This should be examined closely and considered to voluntarily, case by case, or permanently adjust the voting requirements to qualifying majority (two thirds) or consensus on such critical matters. It is advisable that the appointment of Board Members does not go beyond two consecutive terms of three years and that a wider stakeholder assembly is formed to which the board must regularly report on these and other issues.

85. The establishment of partnerships and collaborative relationships developed by the Project with national and international entities have positively contributed to the Project's implementation. The collaboration with CI, CI Suriname, and WWF in the Project implementation was fruitful and created possibilities for the Project to benefit from their experience, know-how and networks.

86. The membership of the SCF in RedLAC was another most useful partnership established within the subcontract of CI, financed by the Project. The exchange of experience with other Latin American environmental trust funds and the hands-on learning opportunities are valuable for the development of SCF and its ability to draw on first-hand expertise to adapt to new challenges in the future.

87. Project partners worked closely together in 2003 and 2004 to seek the GoS's agreement to use \$3.6m of Dutch Treaty Funds as the counterpart funding that could secure the GEF's second contribution to the SCF endowment. The outcome of this collaboration was the approval of the second tranche of GEF funding (\$3.4m) for the endowment fund in 2004 and the formulation of the SCF Capacity Building Support project, funded with the Dutch Treaty Funds. Several project activities from the "Conservation of Globally Significant Forest Ecosystems" were transferred to the new project. The Project stakeholders no longer felt encouraged to effectively use the remaining resources of the original Project, which was largely a result of the difficulties the stakeholders experienced in obtaining information from UNOPS on the remaining project funds¹³. As a result of this the focus of the stakeholders shifted rapidly to the new project, and remaining funds were not used (see also paragraph 90).

88. The **ownership of the Project displayed by the Government** has been somewhat weak. This may partly be a result of the ongoing institutional restructuring that took place at

¹³ Ownership of the SCF Capacity Building Support project, a NEX project financed by the GoS from its Dutch Treaty Funds, appears stronger than was the case with the original Project executed by UNOPS (see also paragraph 100).

the time of the Project¹⁴, and that is still ongoing, but other aspects such as low Government salaries, and low motivation have likely contributed to the low profile of the Government in the implementation of some of the Project components. Had this been different, the NIMOS probably would have been in a better position to facilitate the recruitment of the Conservation Policy Expert and the Legal Expert on Bio-prospecting; legislation on bio-prospecting would have been developed¹⁵; NCD and STINASU might have undertaken staff training on conservation issues; and the use of the CITES Workstation would have been fully integrated in NCD staff's daily work. To date these Project outputs have not been consolidated.

89. With regard to the Government's commitment towards sustainable PA management it is disappointing that over the past years not more has been done by the GoS to improve the performance of STINASU¹⁶. This foundation/parastatal plays a very important role in the promotion of eco-tourism and the management of several reserves in the country. STINASU's decision-making capacity has withered in the past four years; it has not had an active, appointed director since 2003 and lacks well qualified employees with good general operational management skills or ecotourism knowledge. As a result STINASU underperformed and has neither been able to be self-sustaining nor to significantly contribute to conservation.

4.2.4 Financial Management

90. All project funds were managed by UNOPS. For monitoring and reporting purposes three budgets were used, namely: a UNDP TRAC, a GEF and a UNF budget. Based on annual financial reports and an overall financial report provided by UNOPS the Evaluators conclude that from the original budget of \$11,765,479 an amount of approximately \$11,605,000 was used. The UNDP TRAC funding of an amount of \$250,479 has a remaining balance of \$148,559. All funds from the GEF budget were used. Of the pledged \$2,275,000 UNF provided \$84,524 to UNDP for administrative costs and \$2,190,476 to UNOPS, with a small balance of \$11,880.

91. UNDP received \$253,830 from the Project to cover the costs of the support it provided to the Project. UNOPS received \$228,049. The total of direct expenses paid for administrative support was \$481,879 or 4.2%. Other administrative expenses made during Project implementation are less easily identifiable: *e.g.* those related to the operation of the Project vehicle, administration fees charged by sub-contractors, and miscellaneous expenses.

¹⁴ This resulted, amongst others, in the transfer of responsibilities for policy issues from NIMOS to ATM.

¹⁵ This was postponed and it is expected that it will be included in the update of the Nature Conservation Act in 2007.

¹⁶ Since 1997 CI and CI-Suriname invested over \$350,000 to help build STINASU's operational and financial management expertise and skills, and its tourism vision. Activities kept STINASU informed of new developments in conservation tourism and ecotourism lodges (*e.g.* workshops and field visits to successful sites), to help the organisation become more business-minded or set up a professional ecotourism business that could generate funds for their operations. The parallel IDB-MIF project being implemented and co-financed by CI-Suriname has set aside funds for STINASU to collaborate with and increase private business involvement in the CSNR, primarily through leasing (parts of) the tourism business there. The idea was that STINASU could earn **more** and learn from its lessees, and apply this to its own operations at Brownsberg and other reserves. The Evaluation saw no sign that this support was sufficient to reverse the continuing decline in STINASU's effectiveness and to convince the government of the advantages of committing to a strong STINASU overseeing and benefiting from profitable private ecotourism businesses. CIS indicates that in a meeting scheduled for early 2007 IDB might decide to cancel the MIF project if the government does not privatize tourism activities.

92. The use of funds for achieving Project outputs has been largely cost-effective. The establishment of the SCF and its endowment has created the foundation for a sustainable financing mechanism for the management of the protected areas in Suriname. Despite the starting problems the SCF faced, this is seen as money well invested. The same can be said of the funds used for the development of the MPs and OPs.

93. Generally speaking the financial management performed by UNDP and UNOPS was reasonably good. Delays in disbursement of funds could have been avoided through better coordination and tighter budget management and control. Furthermore, the initial asset management of the SCF should have been handled with much more care and professionalism.

94. GEF provided its \$8.1m for the endowment fund in two instalments. The Project initiators had successfully acquired the necessary co-financing for the first GEF tranche, including \$1.5m from UNF. The Project document identified CI, WWF, bilateral agencies and private (US) sources to potentially provide \$5.6m (section 4.1 of the Incremental Cost Analysis). WWF used its funds listed in the Project document as co-financing to directly provide capacity building support to Government agencies and stakeholders, *e.g.* in its regional wildlife trade programme. As a result it did not contribute to the endowment or the Project budget. GEF had learned from earlier projects and wisely made the second tranche of its endowment capital contingent on the acquisition of additional matching funds. This became a crucial motivation for all partners, yet the securing of new co-financing was neither sufficiently prepared in the design phase nor vigorously enough pursued during implementation. CI had a contractual obligation to support the Foundation's fund raising efforts in reaching the agreed matching finance targets for the second GEF tranche, but for a long time all partners were unsuccessful in securing the required funds, to such an extent that the Project delayed implementation and nearly lost its second GEF contribution for the SCF endowment. [Annex 4](#) provides a detailed table of the financial planning, co-financing, and leveraged, and parallel funding associated with the Project.

4.2.5 Sustainability

95. The Project meant to address sustainability at two levels. The most important achievement, and the biggest share of the Project investment, is the financial sustainability ensured by SCF investment income. The Project is currently designed to provide financing for the CSNR and the SNR, and the average annual income from the targeted endowment of \$15m will be sufficient to cover the basic recurrent costs of management at these two reserves. After initial difficulties the asset management is now on the right track and, if the investment strategy is properly adjusted and implemented, the amount should be reached and supplemented with some additional safety buffer within the next two years. The Evaluators are confident that the current asset management and the diligence of the SCF finance committee have brought the SCF into the best possible shape to successfully deal with the unavoidable vagaries the financial market will continue to present them with.

96. The Project was also designed to ensure institutional sustainability by systematically building capacities. Training was provided to board members and technical staff of the SCF, which brought governance capacities to a level that can be sustained independently of external agency support. However, this is still a rather small number of qualified board members, and while it was a good decision to follow the MTE advice to increase the term of board members to 3 years, losing them and the know-how built through training will still pose a significant loss at that time, particularly if several members' terms end at the same time. Terms should be adjusted so that in any given year at most one third expire. Yet, to avoid entrenched alliances, membership should not go beyond two consecutive terms of three (3) years; later re-election is possible. A good move was the creation of an Advisory Board, where previous Board members and other eminent capacities can continue to assist the SCF management team. Still, the Evaluators feel that more should be done to increase the capacity of board members.

97. The SCF itself was planned to increase sustainability of its projects and its project pipeline by financing training for protected area managers and rangers, training for grantees in proposal writing and project administration, capacitation of awareness and environmental education activities, and training in research/monitoring methods and ecotourism management. SCF could have invited training institutes to submit plans and financed them with grants; funds were available at least since 2005. SCF could have also received Project funds for providing its own grantee training from the GEF budget, *e.g.* budget lines 21 (SCF Operations) or 23 (Country Training Workshops), by submitting adequate training plans to UNDP/UNOPS. Unfortunately, almost none of these training activities happened in the past 6 years.

98. As explained elsewhere, the additional one-time capacity building investments to expand the available skill-sets beyond the delivery capacity of the SCF were designed too small. The experience showed that, as expected, this would have clearly been essential for sustaining achievement of long term PA management objectives.

99. Finally, it was intended to guarantee the sustainability of the Project by its enhancement of policy operations, legislation, and by sensitizing decision-makers to biodiversity management requirements. These planned activities and spending on long-term experts did not materialise, which had a substantial impact on the level of sustainability of project interventions to date ¹⁷.

100. Whether or not the SCF Capacity Building Support project with its considerably larger institutional strengthening budget can achieve those targets not met by the end of the main Project depends on a stronger engagement and follow-through on the part of PLOS (the Execution Agency) and UNDP, and the commitment and consistency of the responsible partners, particularly NDC and STINASU. In fact, the Evaluators have already observed that the engagement with the SCF Capacity Building Support project, its Oversight Committee (OC) being chaired by PLOS, is much stronger, and that the OC meetings have a much higher frequency and commitment from partners.

¹⁷ Progress was made on the preparation and approval of the Biodiversity Strategy, financed from counterparts, not by the Project. Biodiversity issues were also incorporated in the Government's Multipurpose Development Plan 2006-2011 (See also paragraph 120).

4.2.6 Execution and implementation modalities

101. The division of directly involved administrative, technical, and supervisory tasks within UNDP was geographically and hierarchically spread across New York, Mexico City, Panama, Port of Spain, Trinidad and Paramaribo, Suriname. UNOPS managed financial, contractual and some administrative aspects of the Project, initially from New York, then Geneva, and for the past 1.5 years from Peru. Two of the main donors, the GEF and CI, were based in Washington, and the UN Foundation, whose sub-project progress and expenses have to be reported separately, was headquartered in New York.

102. UNOPS' role and active involvement in the Project until 2004 is generally described as good. However, after 2004 there was a marked drop in attention and responsiveness to Project needs: SCF, NCD, and UNDP describe difficulties obtaining information from UNOPS on remaining Project funds, so that Project stakeholders could not access or no longer felt encouraged to effectively use the remaining resources of the original Project (see also paragraphs 87 and 210). During discussions with the Evaluators the UNOPS official responsible for the Project since 2004 conceded that the responsiveness to several UNDP requests had been low and that this had affected the relationship with UNDP. The Project transfer from the old to the new UNOPS portfolio coordinator in 2004 appears to have not been done appropriately: The new coordinator was under the impression that the Project was about to be closed, which was not the case. This might have contributed to the weakened support from UNOPS after 2004.

One example for low UNOPS responsiveness was the SCF Board's Request for Payment of the second GEF tranche. UNDP had requested to give high priority to this fund disbursement because the pending co-financing from the Dutch Government could not be released before the disbursement of the second GEF tranche. The letter was faxed to UNOPS on 15 October 2004, again emailed to the portfolio coordinator on 18 October, and a hardcopy was received on 25 October. UNOPS took until the beginning of November to request banking details for the payment. It made the first payment attempt on 1 December; six weeks after receiving the faxed request. This transfer was cancelled in the ATLAS system because the banking details were incorrect. After asking for corrected data a second transfer on 8 December was successful. This Evaluation observes that UNOPS could have been more proactive by making the necessary preparations the moment it received SCF's fax, and by processing the payment shortly after receiving the first bank details. Another example of low responsiveness relates to several email requests made by UNDP in the first half of 2006 regarding the 2005 disbursements and 2006 budget. Many of these requests were left unanswered. Budget and expenditure related problems were not dealt with in a timely and appropriate manner.

Overall, the Evaluators note that UNOPS should have demonstrated a stronger commitment towards supporting the Project during its last two years. Ensuring a better communication between UNOPS and UNDP would have also helped.

103. The general complexity of Project partners might have been difficult to transcend for the local counterparts, especially when dealing with representatives of the different levels, and it might have contributed to the delays in monitoring and execution. Examples are the still unexplained 6 month delay until the first tranche of \$6m arrived in SCF's account, the repeated

postponement of the MTE, the low involvement of UNOPS in Project implementation after 2004, the inconsistent guidance to a short-term consultant hired to prepare the placement of the long-term conservation policy advisor, the fact that neither this 2-year policy advisor nor the 7-month bioresources consultant were hired and deployed, to name a few.

104. The Conservation Policy Expert who was planned for 2 years starting in year 3 would have been responsible for providing technical assistance to NIMOS to co-ordinate conservation and development activities in the landscapes buffering protected areas. The consultant was to work with the SCF, the Nature Conservation Division NCD, STINASU, conservation NGOs, government ministries and parastatals engaged in managing the natural resource sectors. The Legal Expert for Bioresources Prospecting and Scientific Research would have been responsible for assisting the Government of Suriname during 7 months – probably spread over a longer period – in reviewing existing and developing new legislation to protect intellectual property rights pertaining to the collection of biological samples for commercial purposes and in ensuring the equitable sharing of benefits derived from access. A good preparatory study for the bioresources consultant was done by Goel (2003). The expert was to work closely with NIMOS, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the University of Suriname, and other concerned authorities in executing his/her duties, and would have co-ordinated activities with the Wildlife Trade component of the Project. The analysis of outputs, *e.g.* in paragraph 131 below, explains more of the impact this had on the Project's achievements.

105. The failure to hire these two important experts had repercussions not only for the outputs and partners that depended on their input, but they could have also created the **critical mass of technical expertise and personal attention** to follow-up that lacked in the sometimes indistinct Project management and occasionally indecisive control mechanisms mentioned above. For example there appears to have been **insufficient capacity** to ensure the timely delivery and technical quality of the sub-contracts. Already the first external support mission (which was not quite so external, as the mission leader Niño-Moreno was a senior UNDP representative contracted as independent consultant on a special leave arrangement) at the end of 2002 recommended that UNDP's active involvement in support of SCF's activities should be strengthened, including UNDP office premises/facilities. UNDP did provide considerable support to SCF, such as almost daily contact between the PC and SCF, two additional short term consultants (a resource mobilisation specialist and an asset management specialist), and the PC developed the SCF Capacity Building Support project to successfully negotiate counterpart funding and ensure the continuation of the Project while at the same time strengthening SCF. International support from the Project was provided to ATM (through UNDP-SURF and an international consultant) to assist the Ministry to strengthen the Environment section to implement the tasks as given by law. Further support was provided from the Project in the establishment of BOSNAS and the functioning of NCD in this new institute. One way of increasing such excellent inputs could have been, that a manager with a specific technical expertise and full-time responsibility of day-to-day Project operations might have been an even stronger asset to move things forward, ensure that the other contract partners are fulfilling their technical and managerial advisory role better, and creating more

consistent dynamics (see also paragraph 60 above). UNDP as the office responsible for administrative support and oversight would have complemented the institutional authority and additional support, where required.

106. **WWF** was sub-contracted to provide technical assistance for the Wildlife Trade Management and In-Country Training Components. Both were successfully produced on paper, but remain on the shelf due to weak capacity of the implementing partners, which is described in more detail in chapter 4.3.2 below. The **NCD** and **STINASU** were responsible for implementing protected area management and **STINASU** for ecotourism promotion and management. Implementation responsibilities for other activities supported by the Foundation, including awareness raising, and monitoring, were to be determined by the **SCF's Board**, based on an assessment of technical and administrative capacities and experience performed by the management unit. **NCD**, **STINASU** and other qualified government, non-government and community organizations were defined as the implementing agents for these SCF grant-funded activities. The quality of their commitment and their technical weaknesses are described in chapter 4.2.3 above.

107. **Conservation International's** contract for the preparation of **Management plans** and Operational Plans, including social and biological assessments *etc.*, was completed late and with a number of concerns regarding technical quality and usefulness which were already raised in the MTE and are evaluated at more detail in chapter 4.3.3 below. This is not to underestimate the positive impact now that these MPs and OPs exist, and that they were designed in part by renowned international experts. Yet their difficult history and variable quality delayed the Project and could have been improved on by closer quality control and coordination. SCF financing for conservation action on the ground was not only held up by the absence of operationally useful and government approved management and operations plans, but also by insufficient assistance resulting in failures in asset management and the sense that this did not leave them any money for grants, or even for preparation of future grant recipients.

108. The SCF was designed and created with CI's own funding and technical assistance. Governmental registration of the foundation was a GEF precondition for Project effectiveness. Once the Project started in September 2000 (see footnote 6 on page 11), **CI was contracted to provide SCF capacity building** for the Board and staff in management principles and governance; in grant-making, fund-raising and monitoring & evaluation; and to train the staff in grant award and administration. The CI contract also contained the Foundation's operating costs for the first two years.

109. This Evaluation agrees with the assessment by the MTE, echoing concerns already raised by the 2002 Niño-Moreno mission, that CI's support role, particularly in the early stages of the existence of the Foundation, did not include as much hands-on professional support as it should have, regarding SCF board and operations, as well as asset management. For example, independent professional advisers should have participated in Board meetings and provided extensive written advice to facilitate decision-making in the first two-three years. Though good training/exposure was provided to management and board in study tours to other countries

and on site, too much of the knowledge transfer into SCF operations appears to have been left to trial-and-error by the management and to a Board chairman with excellent commitment and charisma but limited experience in the technical details of environmental trust funds.

110. The evaluation and technical support missions for asset management by one of the leading experts on environmental trust funds (Spergel 2003, 2004) made it even more obvious than the earlier missions that SCF did not receive adequately careful and experienced hands-on assistance throughout its vulnerable early years. Rather than choosing an independent motivated financial adviser who would have constantly helped SCF adjust the asset management to market conditions, select the best portfolio of investment managers, and critically scrutinize their performance and change them if necessary, SCF selected one manager with a limited range of investment options. When – with a still unexplained delay of some six month – the first instalment of \$6m GEF and other assets arrived on the SCF account in June 2001, equity markets were entering the second of a 3-year correction that started in early 2000. The asset management strategy did not take that sufficiently into consideration, keeping a very high percentage (70%) of assets in equities, mainly US based, which continued their decline. Management made the terror attacks of September 2001 responsible for the high losses the endowment incurred in its first two years, though the trend was already obvious earlier.

111. Even a conservation finance monitoring mission by Famolare/Dresser from CI Washington in September 2002, which was paid for by the Project, did not seem to have questioned the asset manager performance and strategy. Furthermore, it is concerning that despite the very alarming consultant reports by Niño-Moreno and Spergel about the performance and attitude of the asset manager, it took another year, several other missions (including the MTE) confirming the same recommendations, and apparently also performance pressure from the UNDP/GEF and the Dutch government until the SCF chose to follow the advice and change the asset manager. Constant advice and reminders should have been able to bring about that understanding quicker. For at least two years the Project in general, UNDP as the implementer, the GEF, UNF and CI as principal donors to the endowment, and CI as capacity-builders all seem to have left SCF struggle through some problems of these first years without consistent and adequate support.

112. The new **asset portfolio manager** (John Adams) in another office of the same firm (SmithBarney CitiGroup) provides all the services mentioned as important above, implemented the suggested diversified investment policy, and was willing to closely support the SCF's finance committee's learning curve. In monthly phone meetings, quarterly reallocation discussions, and an annual Suriname visit by the investment consultant a better allocation of asset classes across a more diversified portfolio was chosen and a disciplined review process enforced. This, together with a turn-around in the financial markets since early 2003 has retuned the portfolio to its original level, and meanwhile to a path of asset increase in line with the reaching of the \$15m target within the next 3 years. For a further discussion about achievements, current risks and asset management strategy see also paragraph 147 below.

4.3 Project Results

4.3.1 Attainment of Outcomes / Achievement of objectives

Moderately Satisfactory

113. The capitalisation and operationalisation of the Suriname Conservation Foundation (SCF) is the central element and largest achievement of the Project. It addresses in perpetuity in an exemplary way the key difficulty of safeguarding the financial sustainability of adequate conservation management once protected areas are declared on paper. By overweighting this output in the overall rating¹⁸ and by acknowledging the successful fundamentals of the Project (addressed the right biodiversity threats, at the right time, and in principle with the right interventions), the project can be rated overall as *moderately satisfactory* – while the attainment of the Project objectives and outcomes until the end of Project (December 2006) could have only been rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

114. Moreover, by putting the Project in the context of the achievements that can be projected with the continuing SCF Capacity Building Support project – a positive example of adaptive management –, the future achievement and sustainability of the overall project outcomes can be rated *satisfactory*, but for that to happen key recommendations of this evaluation need to be addressed and successfully implemented. The following table provides an overview of the ratings presented in the following chapters, based on the evidence and observations gathered by the Evaluation. To capture the achievements on these different levels the evaluation team feels strongly that the assessment of Project outcomes must be rated both for (a) the actual achievements or shortfalls during the life of the Project and (b) the sustainability of outcomes or the likelihood that they will be achieved in the subsequent years as a consequence of Project impacts¹⁹.

115. These sustainability or 'future' ratings are presented as a second column in the output ratings table below. Further, in its first row the Evaluators have included the overall rating for attainment of outcomes and achievement of objectives. Without this overall rating there is a possibility that readers of this report might look to the rating of the Project goal as the indicator for the success or failure of the Project. This would not do justice to the actual Project achievements, because the original 3 goal indicators cannot measure some key contributions made by the Project towards the protection of globally significant biodiversity in Suriname: e.g. the establishment of the Suriname Conservation Foundation and its endowment, the preparation of the CSNR and SNR management and operational plans, and the amendment of the Suriname Game Law.

¹⁸ This evaluation uses a six values rating system (Highly Satisfactory - HS, Satisfactory - S, Moderately Satisfactory - MS, Moderately Unsatisfactory - MU, Unsatisfactory - U, Highly Unsatisfactory - HU) as per the 2004 amendments to the guidelines by the GEF Independent Evaluation Unit, adopted as Monitoring and Evaluation policy at the project level for UNDP/GEF.

¹⁹ This enhanced methodology has been presented and agreed to by UNDP.

Figure 2 Ratings of Attainment of Outcomes / Achievement of objectives

Objectives / Outcomes	Rating	
	In-project	Sustainability
Overall - Attainment of outcomes / achievement of objectives	MS	S
Goal: To protect globally significant biodiversity in Suriname.	MU	S
Purpose: Government agencies, non-governmental entities, and local communities are maintaining and improving the integrity and viability of Suriname's priority Guiana Shield ecosystems.	MU	MS
Output 1: Policy development functions, capacities, and management controls relating to biodiversity conservation are strengthened at a national level.	MU	MS
Output 2: Management plans are framed and endorsed for the CSNR and the SNR following rapid biological assessments, social assessments, and extensive public consultation.	MS	S
Output 3: The Suriname Conservation Foundation (an endowment) is established and its long-term governance capacity is developed.	S	HS
Output 3A: CSNR and SNR are effectively managed using participatory methods, and management is being operationalised in other protected areas as the SCF is further endowed.	U	MU
Output 3B: Ecological surveys, research and monitoring promote adaptive management in target PAs.	U	MS
Output 3C: Conservation awareness and environmental education efforts are building national constituencies for biodiversity conservation.	MU	S
Output 3D: The ecotourism sector is developed and managed as an environmentally compatible economic alternative in target PAs.	U	MS

116. If measured only by the goal indicators set in the Project document, the evaluation could see no contributions the Project made to date to its stated **goal** “to protect globally significant biodiversity in Suriname”²⁰ (see Annex 7). As discussed earlier, the goal indicators set biological targets to be reached by 2006 on which the Project could have had an impact only if it had effected any conservation activity in the two target reserves. Yet the Project had no measurable impact on the three goal indicators: **Indicator species** living in the reserves and the **population of rare and endangered fauna and flora** probably continued their trends along the same rate as without the Project, and even though there was **no biological monitoring in the reserves in 2006** (nor was there systematic monitoring in any other Project year as required by the means of verification) it is probably safe to say that given their continued remoteness the **integrity of the reserves** has not changed significantly, yet. This ineffectiveness is due mostly to the fact that no conservation activity in the two target reserves was executed, the institutional support to the agencies lacked substance and critical mass, and the few projects financed by the SCF were small, in other areas, and commenced at least 4 years later than planned.

²⁰ All *italics* in this chapter indicated direct quotations from the logframe, all **bold** face identifies indicators

117. That said, however, the success of creating a sustainable financing and selectively supporting foundation whose mid- and long-term goals are squarely those of the Project can offset these early unsatisfactory ratings. The fact that the foundation was created and is now – late but steadily – on its way to reach the targeted function within the next three years, creates a strong likelihood that the Project biodiversity goal will be achieved, and, most importantly, that it will be sustained far beyond the life of the Project.

118. So while the Project in its duration is rated only *moderately unsatisfactory* in its attainment of its **overall goal**, this evaluation team is *satisfied* (optimistic) that the future impetus of the SCF created by the Project will make a strong and sustainable contribution to this goal. That optimism regarding the effectiveness of the SCF is based on the fact that its grant-making function is finally coming into its own: some 20 small projects were implemented or completed over the past year, and *the big one* which SCF was created for – funding the responsible agencies in establishing effective conservation in the CSNR – has just this month been approved by the board in principle. Whether or not this will then accomplish the conservation goal depends not only on a smart and engaging work of the foundation, but mainly on the effectiveness and decisiveness of the support to strengthening the institutions which have to implement the conservation activities (see outputs 3A and D).

119. During the 5-year term (extended to 6 ¼ years) the Project remained stunted in its intended **purpose** of getting “Government agencies, non-governmental entities, and local communities [to maintain and improve] the integrity and viability of Suriname’s priority Guiana Shield ecosystems”. This is why the evaluation team rates the attainment of the overall Project purpose *moderately unsatisfactory*. And this is precisely what the follow-up to this Project must effectively change. Were the often self-absorbed and ineffective conservation agencies to remain impenetrable by efforts at strengthening their capabilities and delivery of conservation services, the SCF itself would remain unable to produce change. The supporting activities of the Project have been much too weak especially in the absence of the hoped-for baseline activities by other agencies. This evaluation is only *moderately satisfied* (not fully convinced) that the institutional support packaged into the follow-up project is sufficient to decisively address the lack of capacity of the existing governmental institutions responsible for biodiversity and conservation, and the wary relations between government and the financially most engaged international NGO, CI.

120. In the face of the delays and weaknesses, it was fortunate that the remote location protected the reserves, so that three of the four **indicators for the Project purpose** remained stable without Project intervention: (i) *No illegal new settlement occurred within CSNR/ SNR beyond the 1998 baseline*, (ii) not “no” but at least only limited²¹ *illegal resource extraction occurred in CSNR/SNR after June 2003*, (iii) and *national policies in 2006 reflect biodiversity conservation as a priority*, as exemplified by the draft environmental law and the Multipurpose Development Plan 2006-2011 of the Government of the Republic of Suriname published in mid-2006, both of which *reflect consideration of ecologically sustainable development options*.

121. What clearly did not happen (and was probably somewhat naïvely worded in the logframe) was that “*government decision-making is transparent*”. The same applies for the fourth indicator (iv): since no *management model* was yet created in the two target reserves there was nothing to be *extended to at least 1 other protected area*. It was positive that no energy was wasted to deflect the focus to other PAs as long as these two were not sufficiently addressed. In time, SCF’s financial and technical capacity must be developed so that it can reach out to the remaining and new areas, once these two reserves are well managed.

122. The following sub-chapters for each of the intended outputs will explain in more detail where the Project succeeded or fell short of its plans to improve the enabling environment through effective policies, institutional capacity building, increased public awareness, appropriate stakeholder involvement, promoting conservation and sustainable use research, leveraging resources and providing incentives for conservation.

4.3.2 **Output 1: Policy development and capacity strengthening**

123. This is the first part of *Component A*, One-time Project Investments
Log Frame Objective: Policy development functions, capacities, and management controls relating to biodiversity conservation are strengthened at a national level.
The attainment of this objective has been measured using the four indicators that are described in the logframe and is rated *moderately unsatisfactory*. The achievements by indicator are as follows:

124. New **training curricula** and materials on biodiversity conservation for the training of mid-level technical staff of STINASU and NCD were developed in 2003 (a year later than planned). The work was successfully undertaken by the WWF Guianas programme. An institutional assessment of the NCD and STINASU was carried out with the assistance of KPMG Consulting. The assessment report guided the development of the training module and curriculum. Two *pilot* training workshops, testing two of the nine training modules, were organized for the training of trainers and the training of the Nature Conservation Division’s and STINASU’s staff. The actual training to increase knowledge on conservation issues among the staff of the NCD and STINASU, and possibly other agencies involved in conservation, was never held. It is disappointing to see that very little use has been made of the training modules, and that hardly any effort was made to train NCD and STINASU staff. During Project design it was assumed that institutional strengthening, capacity building and training would be financed from the baseline support provided by other donors, which did not materialise. The Evaluators were informed that the JSOOC training centre did not manage to formulate a business plan and project proposal that could have secured funding of an amount of approximately \$700,000 from the Dutch Government. Institutional strengthening and capacity building will

²¹ Incidents of illegal fishing, hunting, and trade in wild animals were described to the evaluators by local experts interviewed, including CI, WWF, local consultants, participants in management plan surveys, NCD staff, and community members in Witagron.

now be covered by the SCF Capacity Building Support project, and training will be undertaken as part of the implementation of the CSNR and SNR management plans, for which a (first phase) project proposal has been submitted to the SCF for financing.

125. The Suriname **Game Law** was amended in December 2002 as planned. A review and assessment of the legal and administrative framework and system for the management of wildlife was undertaken. Technical reports on "Evaluation of the animal plant trade in the Guianas preliminary findings" and "Assessment of traded wildlife species" were completed in 2001. A CITES Workstation was developed and NCD staff was trained on its use. National and regional workshops and dialogues on wildlife trade management were held. Much effort has gone into the production of booklets (*e.g.* an identification pocketbook for wildlife trade monitoring and enforcement officers) and posters (on biodiversity and species of the protected areas).
126. Capacity within NCD, the statutory body responsible for controlling wildlife, has not significantly been increased with the support from the Project. Planned activities were completed more-or-less as planned: contributions were made to improved wildlife trade controls and knowledge, amongst others through the development of the "CITES workstation", and increased public awareness on wildlife trade through the dissemination of Wildlife Species Identification Manuals and children colouring books. There is still much work to be done to match the realities of data collection, staff capacity and the computerised database, and to weave these into the regular working programme of the staff of NCD. Capacity strengthening of enforcement and inspection officers also needs to take place, especially through training on wildlife legislation and regulations, and conservation strategies. A revision of penalties and fines structures was undertaken and shared with the authorities, but no specific action was taken. In general, the outputs of the work undertaken by WWF were easy to understand, but the impacts were not very clear.
127. **Biodiversity prospecting** policies were not developed. In April 2004 a legal advisor was contracted to assess the institutional capacity in Suriname for the formulation of a national bioprospecting framework. The consultant recommended legislative reform alongside multi-stakeholder dialogue and creation of a legal and institutional framework on bioprospecting. No additional work on the subject was undertaken by the Project. Interviews with NIMOS and UNDP, and Project reports revealed that no additional activities on biodiversity prospecting were undertaken because of changed priorities. The report of the 2006 APR stated the following: "... the newly developed National Forest Policy (2005) was considered adequately incorporating biodiversity prospecting concerns into the policy framework. Specifically for protected areas, the SCF Capacity Building Support project has scheduled the update of the Nature Conservation Act for 2007." This statement appears inappropriate, because the strategic action item in the Forest Policy identified exactly what the Project had intended to do, namely: design a protocol for bioprospecting with the

- objective to promote this activity and to acquire a fair share from (future) proceeds. As a result of the lower priority attached by government (and confirmed by the MTE), the establishment of a National Biodiversity Prospecting Committee, the main counterpart, was also not achieved. The Evaluators are of the opinion that the Project has failed to deliver on this issue and that it is still an important one for the country.
128. Based on the annual work plans and expenditure overviews of the GEF contribution, we can conclude that there was a significant amount of Project funds unspent at the time the TPR made the decision to use the remaining resources for institutional strengthening. The main part of the budget for 2004 was the contribution to the endowment (\$3.4m), salary for the UNDP Project Coordinator, and UNOPS administration costs. The balance that was available for 2005 and 2006 totalled an amount of \$354,000, of which \$25,000 had already been committed for the final payment of a contractual service. (see also paragraphs 90 and 91 above).
129. The Project did, to a limited extent, contribute to the **integration of conservation values into Natural Resources Sector policies and legislation**. Its main contribution in this area was the support it provided for the establishment of BOSNAS, which is expected to strengthen the Government's capacities to manage the Non-Urban Environment (NUM), in particular where it concerns sustainable forest management and nature conservation (see paragraph 133 below). A report for the Establishment and Operationalisation of BOSNAS was prepared with funds from the UNDP TRAC budget. No specific action was undertaken to strengthen the integration of conservation objectives into environmental management strategies for buffer areas surrounding PAs. However, the Government has incorporated conservation objectives of the National Biodiversity Strategy, which was updated with funds of the SCF Capacity Building Support project, in its Multi Annual Development Plan 2006-2011. The Plan refers to the National Forest Policy and the need for supporting the populations living in and around forests: *"Increase of the minimum level of existence of the population in general and in particular of those living in and around the forests and who are directly dependent on them for their livelihoods, such as the indigenous people and Maroon communities."* The issue of buffer areas is not addressed in the draft Environment Act, which is expected to be approved by the GoS in 2007.²²
130. The Government of Suriname has prepared a draft Environment Act and a Draft Environmental Agency Act, both expected to be approved in 2007. The Environmental Act will be concerned with regulations for sustainable environmental management: it puts in place the legal framework for national environmental planning; the management of development projects and their impact on the environment; pollution control; and penalty clauses. The Environmental Agency Act will

²² Reference should also be made to Article 4 of the Nature Preservation Law of 1954 which was amended in a State Decree of 1986 recognising the traditional rights of the tribal communities living close to the nature reserves, permitting them to continue traditional sustenance activities within the limits of the reserves. The Presidential Decree of 1998 establishing the Central Suriname Nature

provide the legal framework for the establishment of the Environmental Agency ('Milieu Autoriteit'). Article 19 of the Act states that once this Agency has been established, the management and staff of the National Institute for Environment and Development in Suriname Foundation (Stichting Nationaal Instituut voor Milieu en Ontwikkeling in Suriname, NIMOS) shall be absorbed by that agency and be given comparable positions. The Evaluators are of the opinion that the approval of both Acts is very important for obtaining the national conservation objectives and strengthening environmental management in Suriname. It will give the old NIMOS its full mandate for putting in place effective environmental management and strengthen the currently weak environmental policy coordination and the national environmental legislation (see also paragraphs 69 and 88).

131. The Aide-Memoire of Alers and Pederson (January 2004) explained that the recruitment of a Conservation Policy Expert had been delayed and that it was the result of institutional reorganization of NIMOS. They recommended quick action to proceed with the recruitment and deployment of the Conservation Policy Expert and the Bio-prospecting Legal Expert. They were of the opinion that the Project could have still achieved its objectives in this area within the planned implementation period. Another short-term consultancy was undertaken by James (May 2004) to assist the Project in deciding on the most appropriate institutional placement for the anticipated long-term technical assistance to policy strengthening. Its very detailed recommendations and work plans were neither acted upon by NIMOS nor by the Project, nor were they adjusted by UNDP to make use of the financial and technical resources available through such an input. Again, the 2-year technical advisor was not hired, which was an opportunity not taken.
132. James (2004: 13) recommended in her report²³ that the current NIMOS should be the designated agency for counter-parting the biodiversity policy component of the Project. NIMOS not only had the professional capacity, but in it also resides the institutional memory of its work under the National Environment Action Plan (NEAP) and the National Biodiversity Action Plan (NBAP) supported over the years by various donors. However, NIMOS did not have the mandate for coordinating biodiversity policy at the time and will continue to focus on implementation. Its superordinate ministry, ATM, was in charge of coordinating environmental policy, including biodiversity. Therefore, UNDP decided that more assistance to NIMOS on this issue would not have been possible. Nevertheless, the Evaluators feel that more effective support could have been given to ATM, and in light of NIMOS becoming the Environment Authority in the near future, the Project could have provided more assistance to the organisation in preparation of its future role.

Reserve is based on the same law. According to this decree, traditional rights of tribal communities within the limits of the CSNR will be respected, unless they interfere with the goal for which the nature reserve was established.

²³ The report was only a first draft. It was not completed because of non response from the consultant after receiving UNDP's recommendations and observations.

133. **The planned establishment of BOSNAS²⁴ is regarded by the Evaluators** as a good strategy for protected area conservation, providing the new institution with sufficient flexibility to fund-raise and manage its own funds without relying on the central government (Symbiont 2005). However, in merging NCD and SBB care has to be taken to identify what roles NCD currently implements that should be retained within the framework of government, for example the issuances of licenses and permits for the wildlife trade, hunting *etc.* (see James 2004: 14) to ensure adequate compliance and to facilitate efficient enforcement. NCD receives ongoing assistance for this reorganisation from the SCF Capacity Building Support project.

4.3.3 **Output 2: Management plans**

134. This is the second part of *Component A*, One-time Project Investments

Log Frame Objective: Management plans are framed and endorsed for the CSNR and the SNR following rapid biological assessments, social assessments and extensive public consultation.

The attainment of this objective has been measured using the four indicators described in the log frame and was rated *moderately satisfactory*. The sustainability or likelihood for obtaining the desired results in subsequent years is rated *satisfactory*, and only when assuming that serious progress will be made on the implementation of the final and approved management plans and that the BOSNAS will increase institutional effectiveness and delivery. The achievements by indicator are as follows:

135. **Rapid biological and social assessments** were completed in 2002. The rapid social assessments were prepared with assistance and inputs of the neighbouring communities of the CSNR and SNR. They give a colourful snapshot of the general situation in these areas, but have yet to be utilized or followed-up on by more specific assessment and action plans. These important steps for future use and reference seem not to be well documented. When the Evaluators requested copies of the reports, digital originals could not be found, only hard copies of an English draft version. Biological assessments were undertaken, but their information trail has been hard to follow.
136. **CSNR Management Plan** was developed and written in Dutch and English (though 1 ½ years late). The draft management plan was submitted to the Government for approval in early 2003 and it took a year until it was eventually approved in April 2004 (UNDP and others tried to speed up this process, see footnote 28). In the approved plan the government removed the proposal for the creation of an autonomous CSNR Management Authority. Instead, it followed the provisions of the existing law of 1954 and subsequent decree, through which management responsibility for nature reserves is vested in the Forest Service (LBB) and its Nature

²⁴ This process was undertaken with support from the Project and will continue to receive funding support from the SCF Capacity Building Project.

Conservation Division; and in STINASU, for the management of ecotourism and research²⁵.

137. The plan is well structured and easy to follow, without going into too much detail. The description of each of the 20 Strategic Areas presented in the document consists of an introduction, the strategic goal(s), objectives, and key actions. Their orderly presentation makes it easy to select priority areas for implementation. Seven different types of management zones have been identified in the MP. A preliminary zoning map of the CSNR is included in the annex of the plan. What is lacking though is a clear description of the findings of the rapid biological and social assessment. In addition, the design of the MP does not have a long-term view to predict budget needs and develop long-term protection strategies. The GEF Council had specifically requested for the production of 5- and 10-year MPs²⁶. The Evaluators agree with the MTE that the revenue plan looks over-optimistic in terms of revenue growth.
138. **SNR Management Plan** was developed and written (albeit 2 ½ years late). Approval of the Management Plan and Operational Plan by Government are still pending. The structure and organisation of the report is similar to that of the CSNR. The plan contains a good baseline description of the natural environment. An added value would have been if the summaries of the biological and social assessments were included in the annex. Four management zones have been proposed in the plan. A preliminary zoning map and a budget for the priority activities to be implemented in the first 5 years have also been included.
139. **Public consultations** were held as part of the formulation process of both management plans and operational plans. The draft biological and social assessments were discussed with stakeholders and communities. Several stakeholder workshops were conducted during the various stages of the formulation process of the management plans and the operational plans for the CSNR and SNR. Four stakeholder meetings for the CSNR Management Plan were held between 2000 and 2003 and a series of open discussions on the Plan were held with relevant tribal communities in 2002. The draft SNR Management Plan was formulated in close collaboration with the local communities. The Plan was circulated among stakeholders and discussed at a stakeholder workshop in 2003 and in 2006.

²⁵ The Government's position was that it is not possible to approve a management structure that is not in accordance with the law.

²⁶ [http://www.gefweb.org/Documents/Project Proposals for Endorsement/Suriname_Final_PAD.doc](http://www.gefweb.org/Documents/Project%20Proposals%20for%20Endorsement/Suriname_Final_PAD.doc)

4.3.4 **Output 3: Suriname Conservation Foundation established and capacity developed**

140. The Output 3 objective *"The Suriname Conservation Foundation (an endowment) is established and its long-term governance capacity is developed"* has been achieved, and is rated **satisfactory**. Implementation has been slower than planned, though by 2006 – with partly substantial delays – all but one of the indicators in the Project document logframe for this output have been attained. Most delays were explained by management with the lack of spending capital while the endowment fund investment remained below targets following the 2001 stock market slump, and with organisational insecurity as the second GEF tranche remained pending two years longer than planned until the requisite counterpart funding was finally obtained from GoS with Dutch Treaty funds in 2004. Several missions since 2002, including the Mid-Term Review, urged SCF to continue its foreseen development, which finally caught on as late as 2004, as a review of the 11 indicators shows:

141. **Bylaws** were completed and fund registered before Project commencement, asset managers and auditing established (2001, 1 year delay).
142. Initial **staff** hiring completed in 2000, though the important project monitoring position was filled more than 4 years later. SCF's position was that it would not be efficient to hire the monitoring/evaluation officer with the small amount of projects that were ongoing. Using the expert to prepare and train the potential grant applicants does not seem to have been enough considered.
143. **Operations manuals and training programs** were drafted by the end of 2000 (6 month delay). However, despite several recommendations by CI and by the MTE the operations manual has not been updated and made a more active, living tool, yet. The training programs seem to have been drafted and amended in a more flexible and thus appropriate fashion over several years.
144. A **General Assembly** was not put in place; the stakeholder meetings and the creation of an Advisory Board of former Board members after 2006 are a late and not entirely sufficient effort to balance this lack of stakeholder feedback and input (see chapter 4.2.3 above).
145. The quantitative target of **20 properly submitted and processed applications** by 2005 was low and, despite virtually no activity during the first 4 years, was easily achieved once a serious call for proposal and support to proposing organisations was put in place after 2004. However, the quality of project proposals in terms of relevance and effectiveness for the conservation of the target reserves, was, and still is, low. Until the end of 2006, active conservation of CSNR and SNR is not addressed in the 15 approved projects (see paragraph 156 below). The time during which no proposals were solicited could have at least been used to address the most significant bottleneck – the shortage of sufficiently capable NGOs and acceptable proposals, particularly around the targeted reserves – but no notable training and support to local NGOs/CBOs was provided. Already the Mid-term Evaluation (see also the

Project Revision Note UNDP 2006a: 37) invested an entire annex on the recommendation that the SCF must undertake special efforts to enable the community to develop and implement good projects: “These problems are not only the result of low capacity. Cultural influences also play a central role. Village leaders and entrepreneurs have a difficult time transcending family ties and responsibilities. The social system of kin ordered societies does not accommodate very well the individualistic style of the western entrepreneur. (...) *Under the current circumstances it will be very difficult for the Suriname Conservation Foundation (SCF) to obtain project proposals from interior organizations that meet the minimum criteria for approval*” (Cobb/Healy 2004: annex 7., original emphasis). Despite these inputs, little has been done to address this.

146. Consequently, the target of **\$500,000 in grants** allocated by 2003 was not reached until the end of 2006. A total of approximately \$250,000 had been granted by November 2006. The SCF Board approved in principle a project for the effective management of the CSNR in December 2006, with a SCF contribution of \$824,193 spread over three annual instalments, but the proposal is weak and incomplete (see paragraph 70 above).
147. The 11th indicator gave a timeline for the **fundraising to complete the SCF endowment**. As mentioned in the introductory paragraph 140, this remained highly insecure: no donor was found to pay directly into the endowment until a compromise arrangement was reached in 2004. The Netherlands' Government and the GOS agreed that \$3.6m counterpart funding would be provided from Dutch Treaty funds. Since Dutch fiscal rules prohibit payments into an endowment fund the money was used to create the SCF Capacity Building Support project which pays for 6 years annual operation and grant expenditures, thus letting the investment returns of the endowment accumulate without withdrawal until 2010 to reach the target volume of \$15m. UNDP, who had the mandate to assess whether the prerequisites for payment of the second GEF tranche GEF were met, accepted the Dutch Treaty funds as the required counterpart funding, which released the GEF's \$3.4m for the SCF endowment.
- All parties involved deserve credit for this somewhat innovative solution – albeit at a cost of considerable insecurity and delay of SCF's grant making operations – and consider this indicator as achieved. However, there always remains the risk that financial markets prevent or dramatically delay the endowment to grow from its current \$13.5m to the target of at least \$15m. In fact, in order to be sure that after the end of the Dutch Treaty-funded project the targeted \$750,000 can be disbursed reliably every year, it is advisable that the SCF board and its asset manager work towards growing the endowment capital at least \$5 to 7 million higher. Given that financial markets routinely go through long cycles of rise and relative decline, the SCF needs to have a safety buffer enabling it to endure at least 5 years of smaller returns or even sinking assets. In an extensive interview with this Evaluator the asset manager indicated that he expects the current cycle to turn downward before the end

of this decade – barely enough time for the endowment to reach a safe level above \$15m.

148. It was noted in all reviews and financial support missions since the 2002 progress consultancy by Niño-Moreno that the Project failed to foresee a remedy for a **risk** that is not adequately expressed in the logframe: that **financial markets** not only grow but also, sometimes for long periods, decline. The one assumption that deals with this simply demands that fund income must be sufficient to maintain needed operations levels. Given that this is common knowledge, not only the Project design but also all subsequently responsible parties failed to address the issue until it was too late. However, after that painful experience and the plain-spoken advice from three subsequent missions by an international conservation finance advisor, a Mid-Term Review and a UNDP support missions the SCF, its management, its board, and the TPR drew the right lessons and finally took decisive action. The overdue switch to a responsive, pro-active, and motivated asset manager coincided with an upturn in the financial market. The manager not only reports and suggests alternatives on a monthly basis, he spends ample time to inform/train those involved in an annual personal visit to Suriname. The Evaluators are pleased to highlight the diligence and commitment with which the SCF financial committee now monitors and monthly discusses the asset allocation by phone with the asset manager. The ability to rebalance the portfolio monthly if necessary can increase average return of the portfolio by another half percent.
- The Evaluators found the improved **asset distribution** of US equities 28%, international equities 41%, and fixed income 31%, while holding 60% of all this in non-dollar currencies, the most important improvement. It not only provided greater asset security in diversity, but also allowed the endowment to benefit additionally from a sustained currency appreciation of the non-Dollar denominated investments, 17% alone in the past year. Given the rigorous monitoring and change out of underperforming investment funds, the current asset allocation of up to 69% equity is acceptable for a defined period of time during which the focus is on growing the endowment. Once the desired minimum level of \$15m is achieved, or earlier if the investment climate changes, the allocation must return to a more conservative share of less than 40-50% equity and a focus on asset preservation and stable income.

4.3.5 **Output 3A: CSNR and SNR effectively managed and management operationalised in other protected areas**

149. The objective *"CSNR and SNR are effectively managed using participatory methods, and management is being operationalised in other protected areas as the SCF is further endowed"* has not been achieved, leading to the **unsatisfactory** rating for this output. Only in late 2006, with the approval of the CSNR Operational Plan by GoS, started the operationalisation of the management of CSNR – almost 4 years later than originally planned. No significant results have been achieved other than the formulation of the OPs (detailed 5 year plans). A project proposal for the management of the CSNR has been prepared by NCD and was submitted to the SCF in August 2006. Approval of the SNR Operational Plan by the Government is still pending.

150. The OPs, called for by the 1st and 7th indicator of this output, were initiated only when the management plans were found to be too general; following a recommendation of the MTE a decision was made at the TPR of July 2004 to produce **multi-year operational plans for CSNR and SNR**. The CSNR Operational Plan was prepared and submitted to the Government in December 2005, it was approved in 2006. The SNR Operational Plan has also been prepared and was submitted to Government for approval, towards the end of 2006.

151. The OPs for CSNR and SNR are based on the management plans of the respective reserves that were drafted and reviewed with local and stakeholder participation.

152. To date SCF has not supported the development of **basic infrastructure** in CSNR and SNR, because until recently no proposal had been formulated and submitted to the Foundation for the implementation of the operational plans. However, it is important to mention that basic infrastructure was constructed and renovated with the support of other, parallel initiatives, amongst others a CI project that has funded the first phase of the construction of the pavilion at Raleighvallen²⁷.

153. With regard to other indicators, such as: the **recruitment** of incremental park staff; the active **participation of communities** in conservation functions; the creation of a common understanding on **co-management** systems principles; and the adjustment of **traditional resource management** systems, no progress has been made since the commencement of the Project. If the operational plans for CSNR and SNR would have been developed and approved early in the Project, significant progress on these issues could have been made. The Project made some attempts to speed up the approval of the Management Plans²⁸, but that was not sufficient to ensure quicker effectiveness of OPs and a timely start of activities.

²⁷ CI is financing a construction project in the Raleighvallen area with over \$1m (see Annex 4). It includes: the installation of a solar power system and upgrading of safe (potable) water supply system; the renovation of the NB building; the renovation of the Tamanua (group accommodation) building; the re-structuring the Gonini building into 10 individual rooms; the construction of two new forest bungalows; the construction of a pavilion for all general activities (reception, restaurant, bar, gift shop and office). CI declares that "many of the planned activities have already been accomplished. The pavilion will be completed by June 2007 when the project ends." The Evaluators welcome but question the quality and sustainability of these investments (see paragraph 169 below).

²⁸ For example, in early 2004 UNDP wrote a formal letter to the Minister of Natural Resources to offer technical assistance to review the draft CSNR Management Plan in order to speed up the decision making process. This offer was not accepted.

154. In its most recent project selection and approval meeting (December 2006) the SCF Board in principle approved a 3-year, \$830,000 project submitted by NCD for the effective management of the CSNR. The project is designed to implement parts of the CSNR Operational Plan. The proposal was approved by the SCF Board in December 2006, but is considered weak by the Evaluators. No guidance is provided regarding why and which elements of the 5-year OP were selected, and how the other elements will be achieved within a period of three years (see paragraph 70 above).
155. The capitalization of the SCF has not yet led to mayor contributions by the Foundation for the effective management of the CSNR and SNR. It is therefore too early to be able to talk of spin-off effects and lessons learned from CSNR and SNR participatory methods and management practices that can benefit other protected areas. In fact, it is also too early for the SCF to invest much in other protected areas. Therefore, as much as small projects in other protected areas – like the one in Bigi Poika – have environmental merits and are useful for the development of capacities with the weak conservation NGO-sector, SCF's focus for the foreseeable future must be on the CSNR and SNR.

4.3.6 Output 3B: Ecological surveys, research and monitoring adaptive management in target PAs

156. To date the SCF has funded nine projects, of which some are still on-going, with budgets ranging between \$1,500 and \$65,000. In addition to these nine projects, it has funded six request for the participation of specialists in international meetings and conferences. Only two of the nine projects have the potential to contribute to adaptive management through recurrent surveys and applied research, which is an *unsatisfactory* outcome. These two projects are targeted to ecological surveys, research and monitoring adaptive management in CSNR and SNR²⁹. The two indicators of this output were formulated as follows:

- A database with biodiversity information was supposed to be updated, maintained and made accessible by 2003.
- An appropriate network of field research monitoring facilities was supposed to be established and maintained by 2005.

157. Both indicators have not been achieved and were included in the Dutch-funded SCF counterpart project. The biodiversity databank is expected to be in place by 2009. The work plan of the SCF Capacity Building Support project document indicates that biodiversity monitoring will be done using GIS, but no specific activity for this output has been described (pages 18 and 25 of the Project document).

²⁹ CI is implementing a project on the monitoring of long-term trends in biodiversity through an international network of tropical field stations, providing an early warning system on the status of biodiversity that can effectively guide conservation action. In Suriname, the project started in July 2005 and is coordinated by CELOS-University of Suriname. The research station for the Tropical Ecology, Assessment, and Monitoring (TEAM) Network has been built across from Foengoe Island. An international scientist has been recruited to help CELOS and will take office in February 2007. CI has also implemented a 3-week Aqua RAP (rapid assessment) of the Coppename River (in 2005), to gain baseline data of water quality and organisms. The RAP used a joint international-national team and was coordinated in Suriname by the University. Results are published in the first quarter of 2007.

4.3.7 **Output 3C: Conservation awareness and environmental educational efforts to build national constituencies for biodiversity conservation**

158. Progress in this area was made, but the contribution of the Project was very small. The attainment of this objective has therefore been rated *moderately unsatisfactory*.

159. **Environmental curriculum development** has been supported by CI and has not received direct support from the Project or SCF. CI will continue to support activities in this area.

160. A **public awareness campaign** has not been developed. The SCF Capacity Building Support project will support an information campaign to improve SCF's identity and create awareness on its purpose as a fully independent Surinamese institution that has a attractive mandate directly linked to livelihood improvement through conservation. Outreach activities will include: news paper publications, radio and TV programmes, and field visits to communities. Symbiont Consulting has been hired in November 2006 to provide support to the SCF in this area.

161. The funding SCF has provided for awareness building projects aimed at **strengthening the conservation constituency** and enhancing the long-term social and political foundations for conservation work has been limited to date. No project brochures or any public information material has been published since Project inception over 6 years ago. The Foundation has funded the development of two video documentaries on the CSNR and SNR. Funding was approved by the Board in 2002 and work commenced during that same year, but the final products are still to be finalised. Furthermore, SCF has funded a book festival for children that is aimed at strengthening the youths interest in environmental issues, such as water and forest.

162. Specialists that attend international meetings or conferences with the support of SCF are required to make a presentation for the SCF and other interested parties. This arrangement is recommendable, because it supports the sharing of information and promotes scientific discussions within and between disciplines.

163. There has been increased **debate on conservation issues** in the local media. However, the Evaluators did not find any indications that the SCF provided a major contribution to encourage public debate. Most probably this was the result of the low profile that the SCF kept during the first four years of the Project, as long as its endowment produced no revenue to be spent on grants. It was unfortunate that SCF felt not ready to market itself and get into position for better times.

4.3.8 Output 3D: Ecotourism

164. The objective *"The ecotourism sector is developed and managed as an environmentally compatible economic alternative in target PAs"* has not been achieved so far, and is therefore rated **unsatisfactory**. The evaluation team has seen partial progress only on 2 of the 6 indicators. This should now improve (to **MS**) with the start of management following our recommendations.
165. The stakeholder consultations for the MPs were the main vehicle with which the Project contributed to a **community consensus on ecotourism development and management objectives**. While some of the communities may have discussed and agreed with elements presented in such meetings, there is little systematic nor regular contact with most of these communities. That, however, is a prerequisite to reach *and maintain* a consensus with communities that rely on oral tradition and immediate livelihood considerations. As mentioned earlier, the culture of some of these communities is not familiar with the concept of a multi-year plan or abstract agreements put in writing. If written agreements regarding such a consensus exist (we have not seen any) they might not mean much unless these are regularly discussed and confirmed with community leaders and members.
166. Consequently, no **recreational guidelines for CSNR and SNR** were developed, and there was little community participation in the few decisions taken, with or without the Project, about recreation in these sites. The guiding principle is that recreational activities are regulated by NCD and STINASU, and are subject to limitations based on laws for infrastructure development (including tourism) and intensity of activities in a pristine nature reserve. Rules are mainly directed to tourism operators who bring tourists to Raleighvallen, and find most practical limitation in the number of overnight accommodation constructed at the sites. In the case of Raleighvallen, the only community involvement of any notable impact is the understanding with the downstream village of Witagron, that they would be in charge of transporting tourists 3 hours by boat between the park and the Paramaribo road at Witagron. Tourists used to either fly in or out of Raleighvallen and do the other leg of their journey by river and road³⁰.
167. No **ecotourism plans** for Raleighvallen, Tafelberg and Eilerts de Haan within CSNR nor for SNR were developed. Some **local community members** from Witagron were **trained as guides** for tours around Raleighvallen, mainly for orientation, they cannot provide scientific guidance on the ecology. None were professionally trained as operators. The above-mentioned boat shuttle service and some employment as guides and maintenance staff are the only sources of income from park recreation for the local population at the CSNR. These arrangements started long before the Project, when Raleighvallen was already a

³⁰ CIS is implementing an IDB-MIF co-funded project which is aimed at supporting communities to develop enterprises and providing training and guidance for entrepreneurs. Within the framework of the project, villagers of Witagron have discussed and identified activities that can be carried out to strengthen and establish enterprises. Ideas that have been proposed are: river transportation between the coastal village of Boskamp and Raleighvallen; the supply of fish, fruits and vegetables to Raleighvallen;

National Park before the CSNR. The boat traffic has almost ceased since the bad road conditions caused operators to fly the tourist in and out of Raleighvallen.

168. No **promotional materials** were prepared for CSNR and SNR. Two promotional videos have been worked on for several years but are still to complete final editing (see paragraph 161 above).
169. The **pricing formula and feasibility analysis for capturing tourism revenues** for SCF have not advanced much beyond what was already sketched out before the Project started. The management plan for CSNR uses some entry prices and projections of visitor numbers, but their basis and feasibility are not substantiated. And the sustainability notion in this 6th logframe indicator – that any of the potential revenues would go to SCF (supposedly for re-investment in other conservation needs) – has not been addressed at all. There was good material available before the Project, such as the tourism annex in the Project document, and the suggestions for business plans and site improvements sketched out in a colourful brochure from a 2000 IDB/CI-organised national tourism development workshop. However, Raleighvallen is still the only site in the two reserves which has (already since before the Project) tourism accommodations. The photos in [Annex 3](#) show that the facilities were substantially improved with CI funds independent from the Project (see footnote 27), yet the completion of the works, the maintenance of these expensive investments, and the day-to-day management of the site remain wanting (see Summary of field visits in [Annex 3 below](#)). The expensive upgrades were financed by CI and done together with STINASU without ensuring a proper institutional and managerial structure³¹. A capable, permanent on-site manager with sufficient resources, probably the only way to eventually establish a standard of aesthetics and cleanliness, bookkeeping, staff training and tourist-interaction, has not been put in place. Privatisation of parts of the site has been recognised as the best way toward profitable operations; however this has been thwarted by years of inconclusive discussions without a sufficiently concrete basis like business plan, realistic financial projections, and professional structuring of the necessary components. Recuperation of investments and saving for future infrastructure improvements seem elusive. Six years after the beginning of this Project, this prime site of Suriname's ecotourism potential appeared to the evaluators as far away as ever from creating net-income for itself, not to mention the cross-financing it should be able to provide for other conservation needs in the reserve itself and other, less marketable regions of the Suriname protected area system³².

the professional operationalisation of the eco-lodge at Witagron; and tour guiding and 'adventure trips' in the CSNR. Most of these activities require a decision by the GoS on how the private sector and communities will be involved in the management of the CSNR.

³¹ The IDB-MIF/CIS project was set up to attain the goal of more professional tourism management on the site. According to consultations with CIS, the decision to implement the construction project was taken because the organisation did not want to delay progress by waiting for a decision on the Management Plan and a possible new management structure for the site.

³² The IDB-MIF/CIS project has started with the development of interpretive material, which will include plans for new trails, brochures, awareness material on flagship species such as cock of the rock and river otter. The project is aimed at supporting privatisation of tourism activities and development of micro-businesses by the Kwinti people.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

170. These recommendations are naturally interconnected, yet for presentation purposes they are here organised in three segments: recommendations to SCF, recommendations to the 'Capacity Building Support to SCF' project, and recommendations to direct conservation management. The first recommendation however transcends all of them:

171. **Reinforce implementation of the mid-term recommendations:** 30 months ago the Mid-term Evaluation made 17 very detailed recommendations, all of which are strongly endorsed and reiterated by this terminal evaluation. Most of them have been accepted and acted upon in part, yet it is strongly recommended to revisit and implement them. Go back and look at each one again. Several reappear in these recommendations (marked MTE and the original recommendation number): we have deliberately "quoted" some of them unchanged, others are updated.

5.1 Recommendations to the SCF capacity building support project

172. **Undertake a management support mission for the SCF Capacity Building Support project now:** The unique opportunity of this final report is to give these recommendations on how the continuing SCF Capacity Building Support project can be strengthened, and by doing so complete and enhance the results intended with the Project reviewed here. Despite the many preparations made during the Project and the good motivation taken from the clarified vision of the new project's implementation document, a kind of delay similar to those in this first Project are emerging. The SCF Capacity Building Support project has learned from the past, but also seems already about 1 year behind schedule on several of the key activities planned for the first 2 years. In addition, the project document appears to be weak in certain areas (*e.g.* support for institutional capacity building does not seem to be sufficient). This calls for a management support mission, which should include a candid assessment whether the enabling environment is properly assessed and sufficiently supported. It should be the task of the support mission to identify and facilitate the inputs and changes that are required to establish a sound enabling environment.

173. **Review the project document and logframe:** The SCF Capacity Building Support project document, including the logframe, needs to be reviewed and revised to ensure that the logframe indicators, targets and timeframes are suitable. Funds available for the implementation of SCF projects should not be reallocated for other priority areas, but should be strictly used for grants. With regard to institutional strengthening activities, strong emphasis should be laid on the building of qualified cadre in SCF, NCD, STINASU, NIMOS, ATM, PLOS, RGB/LBB and in the future BOSNAS.

174. **Support institutional reform and conservation capacity building.** The highest priority in the project should be given to helping the transition of NCD into BOSNAS, the new Forest and Nature Conservation Authority Suriname, building its conservation capabilities to

make it a strong, active arm of conservation policy in Suriname (MTE R1). There are excellent individuals available in NCD, work with and motivate them.

175. **Strengthen the project coordinator:** The project design foresees that UNDP will provide full execution support while building capacity to go to a full National Execution Modality (NEX). The project document does not provide a timeline for this transition, nor benchmarks and procedures. These might be in the letter of agreement between the GOS and UNDP and in separate service agreements which were not among the documents the Evaluators were asked to review. While it is in principle desirable to strengthen and rely on local partner organisations (LPOs) for the execution, UNDP should assign a strong technical and managerial coordinator to actively support the project. The experience of the first Project has shown that a full-time, technically and managerially outstanding coordinator is crucial until the LPOs have reached a sustainable level of capacity, motivation, and success. It is often necessary to personally and reiteratively assist partners to avoid delays. The fact that neither such a coordinator nor a long-term advisor appear to be foreseen for the project is a weakness. Since it is not provided for in another budget line, the Evaluators propose that a full-time coordinator be financed by UNDP (*e.g.* from the unspent TRAC funds of approximately \$150,000; see paragraphs 61 and 91). This should be effected quickly, and job descriptions drafted. Also job descriptions of the planned short-term consultants should be included (MTE R11).

176. **Establish and monitor individual workplans for local partner organisations.** Some of the delays in the first Project could have been overcome if clear agreements and workplans existed in a cascading structure with LPOs and with individuals in the LPOs about their responsibilities and delivery timeframes. Clarifying exactly what every person has to do improves the sense of responsibility, ownership, and commitment to success. It also helps each LPO and each individual to request the specific resources and support from their organisation required to achieve their part. Bottlenecks can quickly be pinpointed and immediate support allocated. These are practical elements of good leadership which the project can spearhead. It would support the oversight and guidance function of the OC and makes the deployment of individual support through or by the PC more efficient. (MTE R11).

177. **NIMOS should become a member of the project OC** once it has been transformed to become the national environmental protection agency.

178. **Safeguard sustainability of core staff financing.** It is planned that the SCF Capacity Building Support project will be paying for salaries of some Government employees, such as park rangers, through SCF projects. Important here is the sustainability of these positions after the completion of the projects. SCF could in principle continue to fund incremental positions in the future through new projects, but this does not guarantee continuity. Key Government staff involved in the long-term management of the PAs should get on Government pay-roll by the end of the project. Stakeholders should address this issues in the early stages of the SCF Capacity Building Support project.

179. **Ensure that STINASU makes profit to pay for conservation.** STINASU holds the key to one of the largest income potentials in Suriname: it is in charge to manage and profit

from ecotourism. STINASU has an important public education and conservation mission, which includes to use its potentially considerable income to finance conservation management. So far, this potential has been squandered and mismanaged. We urgently recommend to

- fill the vacant director position and refocus the vision (already planned),
- make a sound business plan (and separate business plans for every protected area),
- ensure that enough business expertise is hired and staff trained,
- motivate and train staff, develop job description and a satisfying work environment, including personal career development and adequate salaries,
- clean up accounting and make sure good accounting skills are used in every unit,
- pursue immediately with more seriousness the opportunities to privatise ecotourism operations: privatise large, viable parts or complete sites (and make good income from it),
- learn and introduce professional international standards in site management (especially but not only where international tourists should be attracted),
- hire responsible managers on site who know what western tourists look for in a quality destination,
- train more local people from remote areas and improve the training to reach a higher retention of qualified staff (it is ok if some leave for better jobs; train more, motivate better, pay adequately!).

180. **Reform STINASU's organisational set-up.** To meet modern standards and be more effective it should (at a minimum) better separate two organisational units: a Business Unit and a Nature Reserve Unit (in charge of scientific research, education, and nature tourism).

181. **Stimulate private sector investment in ecotourism.** NCD should now create opportunities for the private sector to become a partner in the management of Raleighvallen and other tourist destinations in the protected areas. The collaboration can bring in more expertise from the private sector, which can lift the attractiveness and standards of these potential key destinations for high-value eco-tourism to higher levels.

182. **Demonstrate measurable success (income) from protected areas.** The Government (and the citizens) must be able to see the real advantages in supporting conservation, for example in tax revenue, employment creation (social development of remote and urban beneficiaries), and better, well-run institutions. Once started, this is a self-reinforcing process. Measurable benefits from protected areas are important for public relations, marketing of the country overseas, attracting more high-paying tourists, and attracting more international NGOs and donors.

183. **Implement the recommendations for the resource mobilisation strategy.** Three years ago a consultant mission made valuable suggestions to increase fundraising, visibility, and stability. The mission and the SCF Capacity Building Support project document made it clear that more funding is needed to reach SCF's mission and to stabilize its own future. The Project scheduled to contract an international expert for refining the resource mobilization

strategy in its first year 2004/2005 and to apply and further refine it continuously thereafter. SCF has made important first steps, *e.g.* redefined its vision and mission, but unfortunately little has happened beyond that yet. We strongly reiterate the urgency and key recommendations from the report (Torres 2004):

- Broad public interest and public opinion will be key to ensure sustained government support and will be essential for SCF's sustainability in the long-term. Apart from own interest in environmental quality and value the main economic argument is to ensure that Suriname capitalizes on the investment made in long-term conservation while foregoing short-term revenues from mining and timber. SCF should be the name-brand foundation associated with this value. The Surinamese public should realise and feel that they have a big stake in SCF's success or failure. Hence, brand identification should be one of the central preoccupations of SCF's leadership and a key consideration in its fundraising strategy.
- SCF should seek a higher public profile and gain name recognition both in Suriname – becoming familiar to the communities around the park and to the public at large – as well as in the international conservation community.
- In partnership with the University of Suriname and a research institution or university with experience on tropical forest valuation a research project on economic valuation of the Central Suriname Natural Reserve could be sponsored.
- Support the development and implementation of a strong portfolio of projects.
- Develop a targeted resource mobilization strategy for bilateral and multilateral donors (*e.g.* EU, IDB, Netherlands) and follow the Action Plan for Fundraising (Torres 2004, p. 10) which foresaw to raise initially \$1m in cofinancing by 2005, and up to \$5m by 2007.
- SCF's long-term financial goal should be to secure the additional capital needed to build the endowment to a level that enables sustainable and expanding operations. In the initial of the fundraising strategy phase emphasis should be placed on visibility. The organization's quest for a sound diversified fundraising program requires investment and mobilizing development staff and years to effectuate. The end product, however, is stability.

184. **A financial project audit of the SCF Capacity Building Support project should be undertaken at the beginning of 2008.** This can be paid for by using a proportion of the balance of the UNDP TRAC funds allocated for the Project.

5.2 Recommendations to the SCF

185. **Promote SCF image:** The Foundation must promote its image, its independent identity and its large conservation programme to potential grantees and to the wider public, both in Suriname and abroad. A new vision and mission has been defined with good coaching; it must now be vigorously implemented.

186. **'Revive' the Operations Manual:** "The Operations Manual should become a living document and be produced in loose-leaf form, modifications be submitted to the Board for approval at regular intervals, and substitute pages be inserted accordingly. This should start with the insertion of the adopted Asset Management guidelines." (MTE R8)

187. **Develop solid grantsmanship:** "SCF should seek out a partner, probably but not necessarily an NGO, with specialist skills in grantsmanship (writing grant proposals, reporting on grants, both technically and financially), and contract them to run training events to improve the quality of submissions by SCF's potential grantees." (MTE R5)

188. **Strengthen the implementation capacity of local partners (NGOs, CBOs).** Lessons learned from the GEF Evaluation of Conservation Trust Funds (1998) were fully incorporated into the Project targets, and have contributed to the creation of a sound foundation and broad based national support for the SCF. The main component that has not sufficiently been addressed to date is the strengthening of the capacity of the client community of SCF. SCF should make this a priority issue, because no significant impact can be made without capacity to carry out biodiversity conservation activities.

189. A consistent share of all funds per year should be disbursed to invest in NGO capacity building. As recommended by Cobb/Healy (2004: annex 7): "Under the current circumstances it will be very difficult for the Suriname Conservation Foundation (SCF) to obtain project proposals from interior organizations that meet the minimum criteria for approval. Initial assistance to local communities must provide the tools that will help them incorporate introduced (western) institutions into their customary cultural repertoire. An assistance program for capacity building for the interior communities and organizations should be developed."

190. The SCF should formulate and implement a plan for the training of potential beneficiaries in **project preparation, implementation and monitoring**. Training should start with the training of stakeholders that are potential contributors to the strengthening of conservation and protected area management related to CSNR and SNR. The training should be aimed at teaching the participants how to draft quality project proposals. The training should be for several days over (for example) a one month-period, during which the participants will draft their own project proposal, receive supervision, do research, and undertake consultations, *etcetera*. If possible, the training should be undertaken in small groups of not more than 15 people.

191. Implement the two recommendations from the 1998 GEF Trust Fund Evaluation that were not yet applied by SCF:

- A successful trust fund needs to **proactively influence its environment and adjust its programs** to fit. This requires more than financial management and accounting systems and skills. A fund must be able to monitor the performance of its interventions; to feed back experience into strategic plans, program improvements and broader policy discussions; and to work closely with recipients and other organisations to ensure a quality portfolio that complements other activities in their areas of focus.
- **Projects supported by 'grants' funds should have prospects for their own sustainability** and/or achieving their objectives in a reasonable period of time with no need for continuing funding. Establishing a conservation trust fund that is itself financially viable does not guarantee the financial sustainability of the activities it supports. Even if a fund has an assured, long-term source of funding, it is important that its resources be used in strategic and catalytic ways, filling gaps and leveraging other contributions through the choice of activities it supports. (GEF 1998: p. 46)
In this context SCF should explore options to support community driven eco-tourism enterprises with **soft loans**, unlocking the entrepreneurial spirit and ownership in the communities (see Summary of field visits, paragraph 229 in [Annex 3 below](#)).

192. Phase grants from institutional to reserve management. "Granting priority should be towards institutional reform and strengthening in the first years, gradually shifting towards the end of the six year period to priority for reserve management and other grants, including those for community-based activities." (MTE R14).

193. Pro-actively develop projects and local partners: SCF must adopt a much more proactive attitude towards strengthening the capacities of the resource users to enable them to play a greater role in the management of PAs and their buffer-zones. To that effect the Evaluators propose that the SCF Project Development Specialist and the Project Monitoring Specialist spend at least 40% of their time in the field to develop and coordinate a pipeline of projects that effectively contribute to the creation of a sustainable management of the CSNR and SNR.

194. Publicise grant opportunities: SCF should make all calls for project proposals publicly, using multiple media, including adverts in the national newspapers and radio broadcasting.

195. Leverage the SCF-grants better: It is commendable that SCF requires **specialists** who receive support to attend international meetings or conferences **to present results** to the SCF and other interested parties. These presentations could be marketed to a much wider audience to support the sharing of information between disciplines and agencies, and to give SCF more public visibility. SCF could also require each specialist to draft an article on the conference or meeting upon their return, which the SCF can publish in the national newspapers, and by doing so strengthen the awareness on environmental issues among the general public.

196. **Professionalise public relations:** It is advisable that the SCF recruits a full time public relations specialist who can, with initial consultant input funded by the SCF Capacity Building Support project, develop and implement the SCF information campaign, both domestically and internationally. This should be well-planned and strategic, in line with the work on resource mobilisation. Elements to be coordinated include up-dating the web-site, overseeing the development of promotional products and activities, informing the general public on the projects funded and the achievements made, publishing articles in the national newspapers and orchestrate well-prepared appearances in broadcast media on the projects that it funds, *etc.* This is an area for a specialist and should not be undertaken by the current motivated, but differently qualified SCF staff. The appointment of this specialist will free the Project Development Specialist and the Project Monitoring Specialist of these duties.

197. **Increase training of board members.** More should be done to raise the capacity of board members, and to retain a good balance of those well trained, critical and constructive members on the board. Terms of current members should be adjusted so that in any given year at most one third of the terms expire. Having new members join at different moments can guarantee continuity and keep institutional memory within the Board to be transferred to new members. The SCF should continue using a maximum of two terms of three years for its members. A maximum duration of 6 years for members is healthy and avoids that coalitions made between members of the Board will have a lasting impact, irrespective of who benefits from these impacts. The recently introduced advisory board is an excellent forum to retain the expertise of experienced former board members for future reference.

198. **Avoid undue influence and promote pragmatic conservation approaches.** The board structure is wisely balanced to prevent dominance of one particular group. Still, to avoid concern that other, *e.g.* political, alliances dominate the board's voting patterns, which can disadvantage minority groups, this should be examined closely and it should be considered to voluntarily, case by case, or permanently adjust the voting requirements to qualifying majority (two thirds) or consensus on such critical matters. Regarding the debate on indigenous landrights, the SCF and VIDS should re-engage in a constructive and pragmatic dialogue concentrating on safeguarding the environmental patrimony.

199. **Add a youth representative, an International fundraiser and another conservation organisation to the SCF Board:** The youth holds the future and should be in a position to influence the decision making process where it has an impact on their future. UNDP's membership on the Board should be replaced by a representative from a donor organisation, ideally from the conservation sector, preferably an NGO. This could lighten the responsibility of the Chair of the Board, who is currently the only conservation expert on the Board and increase access to international funding. Also, "the Board should use its powers under Article 19.1, to increase the size of the Board to enable the recruitment of one independent person who is in a position to improve the international fund-raising performance of the Foundation." (MTE R6)

5.3 Recommendations for protected area management practice and policies

200. **Support institutional reform and conservation capacity building** (we only repeat this recommendation here as it has highest priority, see paragraph 174 above for details).

201. **Implement Management and Operational Plans.** In the context of this project, the most important element of the institutional support is to enable NCD to finally implement in good quality and cooperation with other agencies the Management and Operational Plans for CSNR and SNR. Make sure their priorities are updated during implementation, broadly published, and publicly discussed.

202. **Make the CSNR project with NCD a success.** This is the most important SCF project, in a way the reason for its existence. The NCD project proposal for the 'Effective Management of the CSNR', which was in principle approved in December 2006, should be reviewed and improved without delay before the SCF releases grants for this project. The current proposal is very weak, not well linked to the CSNR Management Plan and Operational Plan, and not transparent as to what activities will be undertaken by whom. The logframe has to be improved significantly, with clear and measurable indicators. Contribution from the Government – entree fees – need to be reviewed; currently the assumptions do not seem to be realistic within the set timeframe of 3 years.

203. **Redefine stakeholder/'rightholder' roles in conservation:** The Government, through its conservation agencies, should redefine their role and that of the stakeholders in protected areas management to allow more flexibility in the management modalities. The review of the Nature Conservation Act, which is expected to be undertaken in 2007, will provide a good opportunity to look into this. One of the issues of importance during that revision process should be the requirements for the creation of partnerships in the management of protected areas. This is crucial, because many communities in principle support the establishment of nature reserves, their expectations on the future benefits are high³³, but the current reality is that they find themselves excluded from the discussions and decision-making processes on management of the PAs once they have been established. The current debate over indigenous "rightholders" versus "stakeholders" should be given careful attention as well, yet with a focus on pragmatic conservation solutions. Clarification of these issues should facilitate the identification, establishment and sustainable use of buffer zones (and corridors) adjacent to PAs. With local people whose culture is oral and based on day-to-day survival the information and consensus obtained in earlier social assessments has to be regularly reconfirmed.

204. **Empower communities in reserve management.** NCD, STINASU and SCF should develop or encourage strategies that can strengthen the involvement of communities in the management of protected areas. For example through the training of community members to become guides or park wardens. Nobody knows the environment in and around protected areas better than the communities. The low education levels within communities should not deter from developing this capacity. In many communities there are young and reasonably

³³ This was one of the findings of the social assessments undertaken for the CSNR and CNR.

well educated community members, of which some have studied in Paramaribo. These youngsters can be an excellent focus group.

205. **Bio-genetic resources issues** should be integrated into the Nature Conservation Act during its revision in 2007. This is not much work. International blueprints stand in NIMOS' library and Surinamese institutes, companies and CI have detailed experience with this (see *e.g.* Kloss 2001b). It will have an important immediate effect on morale and a long-term impact on rights and – possibly – income.

206. **Biodiversity Action Plan.** The SCF Capacity Building Support project has identified several activities to strengthen the Biological Focal Point at the Ministry of ATM. One key area of support that should be included additionally is the formulation of the Biodiversity Action Plan. Without an action plan in place the activities undertaken in the area of biodiversity conservation and sustainable use are likely to be disjointed and to have limited impact.

6. LESSONS LEARNED

PROJECT MANAGEMENT

207. The Project should have commenced with an **Inception Workshop** to provide the stakeholders with an opportunity to familiarize and identify themselves with the Project and to clarify roles and responsibilities.

208. **Quarterly oversight meetings are essential.** A project can not function properly without a regular project coordinating (or oversight) committee, and an infrequent tri-partite review (TPR) should not replace the function of a PCC. TPRs are meant for making project policy level decisions and not for operational matters. The Project has shown that the non-existence or malfunctioning of a PCC creates lack of ownership and involvement of project stakeholders. The MTE (10) already recommended (in vain) for the first Project: "The Project Coordinating Committee should establish a quarterly meeting schedule, and stick to it; its Chair and the UNDP Project Coordinator should meet in advance, to plan the business that needs to be transacted; membership should be extended to all those stakeholders with a legitimate interest in the Project; meetings should work to an Agenda and a timetable, and stick to these rigorously; the terms of reference should be reaffirmed." The OC of the new project seems to have learned from the past and works better.

209. **A well-integrated full-time project coordinator can increase the success chances of a project.** The Project was fortunate to have found a well-trained, former senior ministerial director with excellent people's skills to coordinate the first years through often difficult inter-institutional situations. The Project might have been more effective, had there been a PC

independently from UNDP placed within the key institution(s), combined with a small team of conservation expert and legal advisor. Also, some occasional but consistent involvement of an accountant and business coach for STINASU (and NCD) would have been an excellent complement to that team.

210. **Sub-contracts are hard to manage from afar.** To strengthen the coordination of Project activities and the quality of Project outputs UNOPS and UNDP should have set up a better coordination mechanism for the overseeing of activities undertaken by the sub-contractors: CI Suriname and WWF. Contracts were issued by UNOPS and correspondence from the sub-contractors in the first years was mainly directed to UNOPS with a copy to UNDP Trinidad and Tobago, products were only submitted after they were printed which (at times) did not allow the Project Coordinator to sufficiently monitor Project activities, involve independent peer reviewers, and report on progress in implementation.

211. Part of a clear and effective public image and campaign is a consistent representation of Project contributions, including by subcontractors. Clear guidelines must be prepared for the use of logos, attributions (to UNDP, GEF, the GoS, *etc.*), strategy, and quality in publications and other media. Every publication in its final printing layout (proof) must be approved in writing by the PC before printing.

FOUNDATION AND ASSET MANAGEMENT

212. There is strong potential to share lessons learned, especially with regard to the establishment and functioning of the **SCF and its endowment**, and, in the near future, on the implementation of the **CSNR and SNR management plans**. With regard to the endowment lessons can be shared on how to strengthen the asset management, specifically related to how financial losses can be avoided. Another areas that can be used for sharing of lessons learned is on the Board composition and the balancing of the different interests and backgrounds. Best practices should also be formulated and shared on the stakeholder participation in the formulation of the MPs. More lessons can be obtained from the consultations with the local communities, to better understand their perception of management and co-management.

213. **Fluctuating money markets are a foreseeable risk.** The assumptions with regard to the Endowment Fund income from the international capital market should include a possible decrease in income and capital. Assuming/Implying an almost guaranteed regular capital market income of 5% per year was not realistic. The Project should have identified possible decrease of income as a risk and provided a more thorough capacity assessment and monitoring, particularly with regard to asset management and the international capital market.

214. **Capacity to monitor asset management must be with the entire board.** Inexperience harms not only the endowment, but can unnecessarily paralyse an entirely sound organisation. Even well-designed investment guidelines don't help if the board does not enforce them.

215. **Alternative spending scenarios can help trust fund projects** deal with income fluctuations. Stunted by a sagging endowment, no SCF activity was dared for almost 4 years. This could have been mitigated had a portion of the Project funds been earmarked to pay for the grants in the first two years if necessary. Instead of accepting the non-execution of key environmental outputs just because the foundation earned no money for grants, the Project partners UNOPS/GoS/UNFIP/UNDP – had they been alerted by UNDP reporting and requested by the TPR – should have immediately revised this design flaw in 2001 or latest by 2002.

216. **Young boards need constant qualified advice.** Capacity assessment at an early stage, and very close ‘hand-holding’ by an expert with financial and foundation development expertise would have been required, especially for a totally innovative Project for Suriname. Launching an innovative Project with a new financial instrument – an endowment fund with overseas asset management to be monitored by a new organization – required much more capacity and attentive oversight than was foreseen.

217. **The failure of baseline investments to materialize must be assumed as a risk.** Particularly in countries with such risks the project design must include specific risk monitoring and reporting. Since the assumed but not implemented baseline investments were mainly in the area of strengthening of the institutions on which this Project relied, the impact on its implementation was significant.

218. **A project must adapt or be revised instantly when changed baselines cause failure:** To avoid unpleasant (but predictable) failures, a project document must make realistic assumptions and rather err on the conservative side. Yet it is not etched in stone: if the world changes, the project must change, too. Drastic changes and calls for help are better than holding on to a failing strategy.

219. **Projects should monitor and report on anticipated baseline investments.** Earlier and more specific outside monitoring might be helpful, especially as it regards building of capacity required to implement the project activities. Monitoring and reporting on planned baseline investment should be a requirement in the PIR. Though space is available in all monitoring documents to report unexpected events.

220. **Public sector reform is necessary. Yet a project cannot rely on a soon to come public sector reform.** Hope is an important motivation for all parties to join a project, but such reforms are typically slow and late. An agency like UNDP is in a position to support or at least engage the government to speed up the process. Yet sinking salaries of Government staff, further deteriorated by inflation, are no exception. A project better foresee measures to deal with the impacts on number and quality of staff as well as their sagging motivation. A project has several options for interim motivations until other income improvements, particularly in parastatal agencies such as NCD and STINASU, allow to pay better, or to reorganise toward a leaner, more efficiently working implementation partner.



7. Annexes

Annex 1 Itinerary

MISSION ITINERARY Monday 27 November 2006 – Friday 8 December 2006			
Date	Time	Activity	Venue
Monday 27 November	2.10 a.m.	Meet at the Airport with driver shuttle bus - transportation to hotel	Eco Resort Inn
	13.00	Meeting at UNDP with Ms. Christine de Rooij (Project Coordinator)	UNDP sub-office
Tuesday 28 November	9.00	Courtesy call Director Ministry of Physical Planning Land and Forest management	Ministry of RGB
	9.15	Meeting with Head Nature Conservation Department, Mr. B. Drakenstein and STINASU	NCD
	12.00	Meeting with Director Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Mr. Inder Rambharse	Ministry of PLOS
	14.00	Meeting with Director NIMOS, Ms. Sylvia Ang	NIMOS
	16.30	Meeting with Chris Healy, anthropologist, independent consultant	Eco Resort Inn
Wednesday 29 November	9.00	Meeting with Chair of the Board of the Jan Starke Training and Recreation Center, Mr. Carlo Julen	UNDP
	11.30	Meeting with Director CI, Chair Board SCF, Amb. W. Udenhout	CI
	14.00	Meeting with SCF Director, Mr. Leonard Johanns, and SCF office staff	SCF office
Thursday 30 November	9.00	Meeting with staff member Mining Division, Ms. Emanuels	GMD office
	11.30	Meeting with National Coordinator GEF/SGP, Mr. Raymond Landveld	UNDP
	12.30	Lunch with Minister of ATM	Jawa restaurant
	14.30	Meeting with Director of NV Mets-ecotourism, Mr. Bagwandas	NV Mets
	16.15	Meeting with Director RGB, Mr. Kasanteroen	Ministry RGB
Friday 1 December	12.00	Meeting with Ms. Sheila Bhairo from Dutch Embassy	Dutch Embassy
	14.00	Meeting with CI Director of Operations, Ms. Tjon Sie Fat on Curriculum development, ecotourism, IDB/ MIF project	CI office
	17.00	Follow-up meeting with Ms. Christine de Rooij	UNDP
Saturday 2 December	8.00	Departure from Hotel to Airport	Zorg and Hoop Airport
	9.00	Field trip - Departure to Raleigh Falls	
Sunday 3 December	7.00	Departure Raleigh Falls to Witagron (by boat)	Witagron
	11.00	Meeting with the village Heads and population	
	15.00	Departure to Paramaribo (by bus)	

Monday 4 December	11.00	Meeting with NIMOS staff, Ms N. del Prado on legal framework and bioprospecting	NIMOS
	13.30	SCF documentation on projects and asset management	SCF
Tuesday 5 December	9.30	Director Bauxite Institute, Ms. Rita Vaseur	BIS
	10.45	Director WWF Guiana's, Mr. Dominiek Plouvier	WWF office
	12.30	University: SNR MP, Ms. G. Wesenhagen	University CELOS research center
	14.30	Director CELOS, Dr. R. van Kantén	
	14.30	SCF (follow-up)	SCF
	17.15	Director Symbiont Consulting, Ms J. Den Hartog, Consultant SCF, NCD-BOSNAS	Paloeloestraat 3
Wednesday 6 December	8.00	Meeting with Acting Director STINASU, Ms. M. Djosetro	STINASU
	9.30	Meeting with Environment Section of the Ministry of Labor, Technological Development and Environment	Ministry ATM Office of the Environment Section SBB
	11.00	Acting Director Foundation for Forest Management, Mr. Somopawiro	
	13.30	Finance Committee SCF	SCF
	15.30	Mr. B. Chin Ten Fung, Representative private sector timber/biodiversity	Office Chin Ten Fung
	18.00	Meeting with Pieter Teunissen, Bart De Dijn - Independent consultants	Eco Resort Inn
Thursday 7 December	6.00	Mr. Edwin Mitchell - Field Visit to Kalebaskreek (7.00 at Coppename Punt)	Kalebaskreek
	8.00	Mr. Dirk Kloss - Field Visit to Coesewijne Nature Reserve, village of Bigi Poika	Bigi Poika
Friday 8 December	9.00	Telecon with Mr. Claudio Providas	UNDP Trinidad - Tobago
	10.00	Meeting with SCF Board members	SCF
	12.00	Debriefing PCC/OC, Director PLOS	PLOS
	14.00	Video Documentary CSNR (SCF project)	Media Vision
	17.00	Meeting with Osian Jones, UNDP programme Director	UNDP
	18.00	Meeting with Board Member SCF, Ms. J. Jubitana (VIDS Representative)	Eco Resort Inn

Annex 2 List of persons interviewed

Person interviewed	Title	Organisation
Drs. Joyce D. Amarello - Williams	Minister	Ministry of ATM
Drs. Sylvia S.H. Ang	Acting General Director	NIMOS
Ms. Carmen Arias	Portfolio Manager	UNOPS, Peru
Mr. Armand Bhagwandass	Managing Director	METS (Eco-Tourism Operator)
Ms. Sheila Bhairo	Environmental Officer	Dutch Embassy
Mr. Henk I. Brandon	Project Development Specialist	Suriname Conservation Foundation
Mr. Benito Chin Ten Fung	CEO	Caribbean Parquet Flooring
Ms. Shirly Defares	Director Labor, Technological Development and Environment	Ministry of ATM
Mr. Bart de Dijn	Biodiversity, Conservation and EIA Advisor	ESS Environment
Ms. Marie Djosetro	Deputy Director Forestry Department, and Acting Director, STINASU	Ministry of RGB
Mr. Bryan Drakenstein	Acting Head of the NCD	NCD
Ms. Nathalie D. Emanuels	Acting Chief Environmental Section	Ministry of Natural Resources Geological and Mining Service
Ir. Janine den Hartog-Parisius	Director	Symbiont Consulting
Mr. Chris Healy	Anthropologist	Independent consultant
Mr. Harry Hunfeld	Architect	STINASU
Mr. D. Hewitt	Interim Director and Head of Education	Jan Starke Training and Recreation Center
Mr. Leonard C. Johanns	Executive Director	Suriname Conservation Foundation
Ms. Jacqueline Mariëlle Jubithana	Coordinator of the Legal Program (Member, SCF Board of Directors)	Association of Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname (VIDS)
Drs. Carlo R. Julen	Consultant (environment, forest, education)	CVJ Consultancy, and chair of JSOOC
Dr. Rudolf F. van Kanten	Director	Centrum voor Landbouwkundig Onderzoek in Suriname (CELOS)
Mr. Frans T. Kasantaroeno	Permanent Secretary	Ministry of Physical Planning, Land and Forest Management
Mr. Raymond Landveld	National Coordinator	GEF Small Grants Programme
Ms. N. Louisville	Ecotourism staff	STINASU
Mr. Stanley A.J. Malone	Monitoring Specialist	Suriname Conservation Foundation
Mr. Kris Mohadin	Advisor to the Director	STINASU
Mr. Cedric Nelom	(Member PCC/OC)	NIMOS
Ms. Minu Parahoe	Researcher, (Agro)Biodiversity	CELOS
Mr. Dominiek Plouvier	Regional Representative	WWF Guianas
Ms. Nancy del Prado	Director Legal Office	NIMOS

Person interviewed	Title	Organisation
Drs. Inderdjiet Rambharse	Director (Member, SCF Board of Directors)	Ministry of PLOS
Mr. Sami Amat Roesijat	Site Manager Brownsberg, Bigi Poika	STINASU
Ms. Christine de Rooij	Program Coordinator	UNDP
Mr. Dennis Rusland	Program Coordinator	Conservation International - Suriname
Drs. Iris S. Sandel	Acting Deputy Director	Ministry of PLOS
Ms. Shelley R. Soetosenojo	Environmental Officer	Ministry of ATM
Mr. René A. Somopawiro	Planning and Development Manager	SBB - Stichting voor Bosbeheer en Bostoezicht
Mr. Rudi Strijk	Member, SCF Board of Directors	Sipaliwini District Commissioner
Mr. Pieter A. Teunissen	Senior Environmental Consultant	Independent Consultant
Orlando Tjin A Lim	Manager, Production Control	SBB
Ms. Annette L. Tjon Sie Fat	Director of Operations	Conservation International - Suriname
Amb. Wim Udenhout	Executive Director (President, SCF Board of Directors)	Conservation International - Suriname
Drs. Rita Vaseur-Madhoeban	Director	Bauxite Institute Suriname
Dr. Gerda Wesenhagen	Professor	Anton de Kom Universiteit, Faculty of Technological Sciences
Mrs. Natasha L. Wong A Ton	(Treasurer, Finance Committee; Private Sector Member, SCF Board of Directors)	CFO, Newmont Gold Mine
Mr. Gerold Zondervan	Regional Forest Officer	WWF Guianas
Telephone Interviews		
John S. Adams	Senior Portfolio Manager, Senior Investment Management Consultant	Smith Barney Citigroup - The Donnelly-Adams Group, Seattle, WA
Paula Caballero	RCU for LAC and the Caribbean	UNDP Panama
Lisa Famolare	Vice President, Guianas Regional Program	Conservation International, Arlington, VA
William Kennedy	Programme Officer for Environment	United Nations Fund for International Partnerships
Alex Nitorreda	Financial Analyst	UNDP / UNFIP
Claudio Providas	Deputy Resident Representative	UNDP Trinidad -Tobago Country Office
Barry Spergel	Conservation Finance Consultant	Independent
Trip Switzer	Fund Raiser	Conservation International, Seattle, WA
Yoko Watanabe	Biodiversity Specialist	GEF Secretariat

Annex 3 Summary of field visits

FIELD VISIT TO RALEIGHVALLEN

221. A field visit to 'Raleighvallen' was undertaken by the Evaluators and several members of the PCC on 2 and 3 December 2006. The objective of the visit was to familiarise the Evaluators with the Raleighvallen site and its surroundings, and provide them with an opportunity to better understand the issues that need to be addressed in order to create a successful management of this part of the area of the CSNR. The participants included the Director of the NCD, the Director of SCF, and representatives of STINASU, PLOS, CI and WWF.

222. The Raleigh "falls" are often referred to as "the gateway to the CSNR", and comprise the former Raleighvallen Nature Reserve. The site is managed by STINASU as a tourist location and it can accommodate over 60 visitors (using all available rooms and a hammock camp). It is reached either by air (40 minutes flight from Paramaribo) or by road to Witagron (approx. 200 km. from Paramaribo) and then by boat up the Coppename River (3 hours). The area has beautiful scenery, rapids and pristine wildlife. Miami University researchers led by Dr Boinsky are studying primates in the area and have their own camp near Raleighvallen. Furthermore, the CI-initiated TEAM project (Tropical Environment Assessment and Monitoring project) is constructing a permanent biodiversity and climate change adaptation research station near Raleighvallen.

223. A quick assessment of the Raleighvallen area was made by the Evaluators and the PCC members. They visited the different tourist sites: accommodation facilities at Raleighvallen and Lolopasi: the pavilion and the employees' quarters, and held several meetings to discuss experiences related to the management of Raleighvallen and other tourist sites in the protected areas in the country. Based on this assessment they came to the following conclusions:

- The current condition of Raleighvallen is below international standards for ensuring a quality stay by tourists: the general site management is lacking; staff working at the site have insufficient skills and experience required for hosting tourists and managing the site; and, the quality of the facilities is not (yet) at the level where it should be for a comfortable stay and a quality tourism experience.
- A lot of investments still need to be made to finish the accommodation and restaurant facilities: the roof and frame for the very large pavilion has been constructed, but all the internal components such as the walls, floor levels, wiring, plumbing, entrance, stairways, a balustrade, a bar, furniture, *etcetera*, are still lacking. The guest accommodation is basic and needs some quality interior designing to lift it to international standards for the targeted high value tourism. The pavilion was constructed over a period of two years with the support of CI and pro-bono US timber construction specialists, but little or no progress was made since the end of 2005. More support is

expected to come from CI, but to date that has not materialized. Construction appeared now at a stand still.

- A well thought through plan on how to develop and remodel the site seems to be lacking. A hammock camp for budget travellers is planned right next to the main accommodation facility for high-paying visitors, which in the perception of the Evaluators would reduce the attractiveness for wealthy visitors. A simple and natural solution would be to fully utilize the variety of existing building sites by leaving adequate distance between the accommodations for travellers with different willingness to pay and probably also different social habits regarding noise and interaction. Relocating the sometimes rather lively staff accommodation from its current prime spot between the river, the pavilion and the tourism camp to an area that is less exposed to the eye and ear of the visitor, and using the old site, which is not located next to the main accommodation facility, for the development of a hammock camp would be a better option. Or it could be moved across the river next to the existing lower-priced 5-room accommodation building at Lolopasi.
- The absence of a site manager is clearly visible: small forest huts that have only recently been constructed for visitors urgently need maintenance; new mattresses inside the huts are getting spoiled as a result of leakage from a damaged roof; rooms are not sufficiently cleaned before the arrival of visitors. Site staff are not instructed about adjusting their personal behaviour to maintain the naturally quiet jungle experience visitors come for: for example avoiding loud music at night and unnecessary noise when leaving with their motor boats in the early morning.
- With the launching of the Project a lot of expectations were created among the local communities which are discouraged by the current situation. They had expected that the Project would create jobs and opportunities for small scale enterprise development, but up to this point in time the benefits have been very limited. Furthermore, it seems that at times the progress in the Project has been slow because the public consultations required a lot of time and peoples' capacity to comprehend and process all the information that they received in workshops and meetings was limited.

224. An official visit was made to Witagron, a Maroon village of the "Kwinti" tribe, located where a bailey bridge in the road to West Suriname crosses the Coppename River. Together with the hamlet of "Kaaimanston", 15 minutes upstream, these are the only settlements bordering the CSNR. The two villages together have approximately 100 inhabitants.

225. The "*krutu*" (meeting) was attended by the village captain, *basja's* (assistants or spokespersons of the village chief) and about 30 villagers. The meeting lasted about 2 ½ hours and was very turbulent. At the start of the meeting people expressed their dissatisfaction about the support that they have been receiving from different organizations and the promises that had been made to them in the past, and that were never fulfilled. This set a tense atmosphere, which continued throughout the meeting.

226. Five mayor complaints from the villagers were expressed:

- The creation of the CSNR extended the border of the protected area from the old border of Raleighvallen at Kwama Kreek further north to the Kwinti Kreek. As a result the border is now approx. 15 km south of Witagron. The people feel that they are limited in their subsistence hunting and other activities such as fishing, and want the Government to reinstate the old border.
- In collaboration with STINASU the Kwinti used to bring tourists by boat to and from Raleighvallen, earning an income from the transport. When fuel prices went up the Kwinti wanted to raise the transport fees for tourists, but instead of discussing this first with STINASU they decided not to transport visitors who had already arrived in their village and needed transport to Raleighvallen. This dynamic, and the fact that the road condition from Paramaribo to Witagron has deteriorated dramatically, prompted STINASU and the private operators to no longer use Kwinti boat services and fly most tourist in and out of Raleighvallen. As a result, the Kwinti lost an important source of income. In response to the comments made by the villagers, Ms. N. Louisville of STINASU explained that the current situation could have been avoided if the community had first talked to STINASU, instead of talking drastic action without any dialogue. The community also recognized this fact and agreed that STINASU and the community restore their collaboration.
- It has happened a few times that the Nature Conservation Division confiscated game the villagers had shot, outside of the reserve, and wanted to sell in Paramaribo. They exceeded the new bag limits and seasons provided in the new Hunting Law. The villagers are very upset with the restrictions that are imposed on them: they can no longer hunt freely on any animal they want and there are seasonal restrictions. They claim that their traditional rights are affected.
- There are very few job opportunities available in the area and people expressed frustration with the promises made by Government, NGOs and others, without seeing any progress. This together with the observation of affluent tourist passing through by air and paying what for locals are big amounts of money directly to operators and STINASU but very little money locally has created considerable mistrust.
- They repeated that they have not been adequately consulted in the process of the CSNR establishment and the border extension. For this reason they don't support it.

227. Locals as well as the government and NGO representatives confirmed to the Evaluators that many of the expectations were created by three or more decades of government subsidy to the infrastructure, schools, and other services to these remote indigenous, maroon and Creole settlements. In addition, Witagron had suffered particularly high loss of life and economic stability during the civil strife. While government support was by far not enough to create wealthy-looking villages, it did add to a sense of 'receiver mentality' which seems to have stifled own initiative and local efforts.

228. A small example is the absence of a boat dock on the riverside. Tourists and villagers alike arrive or leave from Witagron village by scrambling a steep and muddy riverbank and

balancing in and out of the shaking, narrow longboats. While it would seem rather simple to construct a boat landing with local materials and available labour, some villagers explained they rather wait for an outside institutions to build it.

Another example is the development of ways for the villagers to benefit from tourism. Despite thirty or more years of increasingly stable tourist flow through Witagron the villagers have developed essentially no handicrafts or other products and services which they could sell, there are no shops or vending stalls, no restaurant, or – until recently – any accommodation. About 2 years ago, with the financial support from the GEF Small Grants Programme, the villagers constructed three rudimentary and unappealing guesthouses/cabins, which essentially from day one started to fall into disrepair. The GEF-SGP is said to provide new funds for the rehabilitation of the facilities, while an IDB-MIF supported Ecotourism project, implemented by CI since March 2005, is scheduled to train villagers and develop self-sustaining SME opportunities (river transportation, food and beverage services, craft/gift retail sales, provision of goods and services (such as foodstuffs, building materials) by neighbouring communities, lodge management, and river/adventure tour operating. Unfortunately, similar to other efforts which probably have been made here before over the past decades, this does not appear to happen in a well structured, locally owned and engagingly facilitated initiative, nor did the Evaluators see any progress. The problem lies not only in the lack of local interest. If it is any indicator of management quality, the young coordinator of that project, albeit well educated and with strong family relations in the current government, had never visited Witagron before this trip, more than half-way through the 30-month project.

229. At the end of the meeting the Evaluators explained to the community of Witagron that they would share the concerns raised and criticism expressed with key stakeholders of the Project by incorporating these issues in their final report. Overall, the field visit was very enlightening; it helped the Evaluators appreciate the progress made to date, and to get a better understanding of the main challenges and concerns. On the return trip ideas to overcome the obstacles created by both villagers and outsiders were discussed with the government and NGO members who joined the Evaluators. Apart from a better on-site presence and cooperative management of project field interventions it was also discussed how SCF support in the form of conditional grants and 'soft loans' could introduce small-scale entrepreneurial mechanisms and incentives to break the circle of 'receiver mentality' and government inertia.



Figure 3 Guesthouse accommodation at Raleighvallen, CSNR



Figure 4 Uncompleted Pavilion next to unsightly staff housing foundations at Raleighvallen, CSNR



Figure 5 Maintenance status of new tourist cabins at Raleighvallen, CSNR

FIELD VISIT TO KALEBASKREEK

230. On the 7th of December Mr. Mitchell, Evaluation Team Member, undertook a field visit to Kalebaskreek (gateway to the CSNR and Peruvia) where he joined an expedition of the project field team of the SCF-financed “VIDS-Rainforest Conservation and Indigenous Rights” project. The Association of Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname (VIDS) is receiving funding of \$17,890 to assist four indigenous (Carib and Arawak) communities in the Wayambo region (Central Suriname) with the production of a map indicating the areas they traditionally occupy and use. The maps will be used to assert their ownership and other rights.

231. The primary goal of the project is to allow the communities to continue to develop their traditional livelihoods based on sustainable resource use and to protect the area against increasing threats from unsustainable logging and mining, hunting and fishing. Project activities include training of village members in map reading, compass and GPS use; mapping indigenous occupation and use of the Wayambo region; presenting the map to the Government and generating publicity for the map and the goal of the project; supporting legal challenges to unsustainable resource exploitation in the region and formulating follow-up measures to ensure project sustainability.

232. The main results will be a map indicating the areas occupied and used by the Caribs and Arowaks of Kalebaskreek, Corneliskondre, Donderkamp and Tapuripa, to be used in legal claims in asserting ownership and other rights to the area. At a later stage the map may also be used for land and resource management planning by the communities. During the field visit, the Evaluator, together with the SCF Monitoring Specialist, joined the VIDS project team during the assessment of sites of cultural and religious significance in Kalebaskreek. Meetings with (elder) village members were held to obtain information on the history of the village.

233. A meeting between the Village Head (the Kapitein), a representative of the VIDS secretariat, the Evaluator, and the SCF Monitoring Specialist took place in the afternoon. The Village Head expressed that many communities feel expelled from their ancestral lands as a result of the establishment of protected areas. In most cases they don't benefit from the establishment of an area, especially if they are not involved in its management. The SCF Monitoring Specialist then explained the importance of good management of traditional lands and natural resources, and how land mapping can contribute to sustainable management of the natural resources by the communities. This was followed by a discussion on the development of initiatives to establish eco-tourism and other sustainable economic activities in the buffer-zones of protected areas.

234. From the discussion and the participation in the field work, it became very clear that the communities involved in this project are just at the beginning stage of a long process that eventually should ensure the long term sustainable use and management of their land and natural resources. After the mission, the Evaluator was informed by UNDP that the village used a planning grant from the GEF-SGP to convene a *krutu* for the identification of a community biodiversity project, and the development of the project proposal.

FIELD VISIT TO BOVEN COESEWIJNE NATURE RESERVE, VILLAGE BIGI POIKA

235. On the same day, 7 December, the Lead Evaluator, Mr. Dirk Kloss, joined the head of the Forest Service who currently also acts as director of STINASU on her quarterly trip to Boven Coesewijne Nature Reserve, a 1986 created 27,000 ha protected area half-way (2½ hours) between Paramaribo and the CSNR border-village of Witagron. The reserve (IUCN category IV) represents unbleached brown sand savannas and mixed mesophytic forests. The river in the reserve is habitat for manatees, giant otters, and spectacled caimans. The trip was accompanied by the coordinator of the WWF/SCF co-financed project for ecotourism development in Boven Coesewijne, an experienced STINASU site manager who previously and now again manages the profitable Brownsberg park, and LBB's human resources director; it also met NCD staff giving a two-week training to villagers on conservation and forestry management. The visit was timed to coincide with the monthly meeting the project holds with representatives of the village of Bigi Poika. These have been elected by the villagers to coordinate their activities and represent their interests in specific areas, such as a women's group, handicrafts development, hunting, tourist guide training, *etc.* The two-hour meeting had a well-defined agenda and worked its way through the dozen topics in an efficiency and spirit that confirmed the sense of a well established collaboration of all stakeholders.

236. The field visit's main objective was to witness the way this project was implemented, ranging from the project participation and ownership of the community, the management style of the project team, the appropriateness, quality of construction, and maintenance of the tourism infrastructure, and to draw comparisons with the design and site activities of the much larger Project under review.

237. A short walk through the village and informal conversations with inhabitants provided a first-hand impression of the acceptance of conservation in the village, its resource use limitations as well as its income generating potential from tourism. The Carib village culture – in its house construction as well as the appearance of maintenance of village roads, boat dock, and individual living standards – reflected a more 'settled' and established picture as compared to the Maroon village of Witagron. Bigi Poika struggles with the same issues of remoteness, shortness of wage income opportunities, outdated and insufficiently government-fuelled electricity generator, basic primary and school infrastructure, *etc.* However, the WWF-SCF funded project seems to be more successful at establishing a good rapport with the community, and constructed, for example, simple, low-cost, yet attractive local accommodation and a tourist boat-dock in the reserve. It also has set up an appealing visitor centre in the village right at the turnoff to the reserve. Apart from reserve and village information, the centre provides information on guided trips, and displays handicrafts produced in the village with guidance from the project. Unfortunately, there seems to be a delay in starting to use the facilities, which are beginning to show signs of decay.

238. Nonetheless, given the limited investment in time and money to date, this project showed promising elements of how a tourism scheme can be successfully developed with the support of the WWF, the NCD/STINASU, and with recent co-financing by the SCF and SGP.

Annex 4 Financial Planning – Co-financing

Co financing (Type/Source)	IA own Financing (mill US\$)		Government (mill US\$)		Other* (mill US\$)		Total (mill US\$)		Total Disbursement (mill US\$)	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
- Grants										
GEF	9,240,000	9,240,000					9,240,000	9,240,000	9,240,000	9,240,000
GEF (project preparation)	300,000	300,000					300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000
UNF	2,275,000	2,275,000					2,275,000	2,275,000	2,275,000	2,263,120
UNDP	250,479	250,479					250,479	250,479	250,479	101,920
WWF					245,000	0	245,000	0	245,000	101,920
Conservation International					2,345,000	2,345,000	2,345,000	2,345,000	2,345,000	2,345,000
Other donors			-	3,600,000	3,600,000	0	3,600,000	3,600,000	3,600,000	348,537
- Loans/Concessional							-	-	-	-
- Credits							-	-	-	-
- Equity investments (SCF endowment fund)					1,571,477	2,100,000	1,571,477	2,100,000	-	-
- In-kind support										
Conservation International					100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000	100,000
- Other (*)										
CI (Project preparation)					150,000	150,000	150,000	150,000	150,000	150,000
Sub Total Project funds	12,065,479	12,065,479	-	3,600,000	8,011,477	4,695,000	20,076,956	20,360,479	18,505,479	14,950,497
- Leveraged resources:										
Conservation International					-	780,000	-	780,000	-	780,000
WWF					-	77,335	-	77,335	-	65,877
Sub Total Leveraged funds	-	-	-	-	-	857,335	-	857,335	-	845,877
- Expected Baseline Investments:										
WWF - Sustainable Forest Management & Gold Mining					260,000	836,886	260,000	836,886	520,000	666,935
Univ. of Suriname - Centre f. Biodiversity & Environment					2,400,000	0	2,400,000	0	4,800,000	0
Jan Starke Training Institute (JSOOC)					4,150,000	0	4,150,000	0	8,300,000	0
Baseline Investment - NCD Institutional Strengthening					1,400,000	0	1,400,000	0	2,800,000	0
Sub Total expected baseline	-	-	-	-	8,210,000	836,886	8,210,000	836,886	16,420,000	666,935
- Parallel Funding**:										
CI parallel interventions					-	4,481,248	-	4,481,248	-	4,481,248
WWF parallel interventions					-	1,464,614	-	1,464,614	-	1,464,614
Sub Total Parallel funds	-	-	-	-	-	5,945,862	-	5,945,862	-	5,945,862
Totals	12,065,479	12,065,479	-	3,600,000	16,221,477	12,335,083	28,286,956	28,000,562	34,925,479	22,409,171

* Other refers to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

** Parallel funding refers to contributions that have supported biodiversity protection and conservation, but were not leveraged by the project and were not part of the expected baseline investments. The existence and participation of CI/WWF in the Project may have helped in fundraising for such parallel funding, but without direct leveraging negotiations.

Leveraged Resources

Leveraged resources are additional resources - beyond those committed to the project itself at the time of approval - which were mobilized later as a direct result of the project. The leveraged resources identified by the Evaluators were (financial) contributions to the projects ultimate objective made by CI, CI Suriname, WWF, and Goldman Funds.

Resources the project has leveraged since its inception:

CI/CI Suriname provided more technical expertise, training and capacity building, legal advice, and other technical support towards the development of the CSNR and SCF than was foreseen at the start of the Project. In addition, a Rapid Biological Assessment of the Aquatic Ecosystems of the Coppename River Basin was undertaken. The objective of this aqua rap survey was to quickly assess the aquatic biodiversity of the Coppename River and its major tributaries which had never been surveyed systematically. The richness of fishes, plants, crustaceans, benthic invertebrates, and water quality were assessed.

WWF provided additional support within the framework of sustainable forest management and protected area management. The activities that it has funded were: community development, strengthening capacity to control wildlife trade, and environmental monitoring. The beneficiaries of these activities were: NB, SCF, and the Community of Kwamalasamutu.

The resources that were mobilised and used by CI/CI Suriname and WWF for the activities described above have contributed to the Project's ultimate objective: "To protect globally significant biodiversity in Suriname". When looking at the nature of the activities we can assume that the majority of these investments would have not been made without the Project.

Parallel funding

Parallel funding refers to investments contributing to biodiversity protection and conservation which were not leveraged by the project and were not part of the expected baseline investments.

CI/CI Suriname: CI is implementing a tourism project in Suriname with own funding and funding from IDB-MIF, foundations, and individual donors. The objective of the project is to expand opportunities for the tourism industry, especially targeting private sector and community-based participation that will have positive impacts for the Surinamese economy. The project is aimed at increasing and improving the products and services offered by the tourism sector through better design and planning, business training and marketing. CI has also developed the Initial Biodiversity Action Plan and Rapid Biological Assessment for proposed BHP Billion's mining sites in Suriname.

Furthermore, CI is implementing the Tropical Ecology Assessment and Monitoring Development of Research Facilities and Monitoring Program in the CSNR. This initiative was developed to monitor long-term trends in biodiversity through out a network of tropical field stations, providing early warning system on the status of biodiversity that can effectively guide conservation action. In Suriname, Team working with CELOS has developed a research station in the Raleighvallen region of the CSNR. Besides these major initiatives, CI Suriname has funded initiatives on ecotourism and curriculum development (see also footnote 16 on page 29 and footnote 27 on page 48 of the report).

WWF: Support was provided to the effective management of Brownsberg Nature Park and other nature reserves. WWF also co-financed an assessment of economic value of the Bigi Pan MUMA; a forest certification workshop; a preliminary assessment of plant diversity of the Lely Mountains; statistical analysis of forest research data; training on reduced impact logging; support to STINASU's institutional assessment; and provided small grants for other conservation and biodiversity related activities.

Annex 5 List of documents and websites reviewed

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Websites:

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CI – 2005 article on CSNR New Ecotourism Facilities	http://www.conservation.org/xp/frontlines/people/11160504.xml
Citigroup Smith Barney - The Donnelly-Adams Group	http://fa.smithbarney.com/thedonnelyadamsgrpsb/
GEF projects data base: Suriname - Conservation of Globally Significant Forest Ecosystems in Suriname's Guayana Shield	http://www.gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=661
IDB-MIF Sustainable Tourism Development	http://www.iadb.org/projects/Project.cfm?project=TC0209005&Language=English
Scoop New Zealand/ Aziz Choudry October 10, 2003: Tarzan, Indiana Jones and Conservation International's Global Greenwash Machine	http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0310/S00154.htm
STINASU	http://www.STINASU.com
Suriname Conservation Foundation	http://www.scf.sr.org
Unesco Suriname - Natural Heritage In Suriname	http://www.unesco-suriname.org/natural%20heritage%20in%20suriname.htm
United Nations Environment Programme, World Conservation Monitoring Centre: World Heritage Sites entry on Suriname	http://www.unep-wcmc.org/sites/wh/suriname.html
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USDoS (United States Department of State) Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, October 2006	Background Note: Suriname http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1893.htm

Annex 6 Questionnaire-outline used in semi-structured interviews

The following interview guide was prepared by the Evaluation Team for guiding the interviews/meetings that were held during the mission in Suriname. Depending on the interviewee, the role his/her organisation played in the project formulation and implementation, his/her background and field of work the Evaluators would follow the general topics and questions from this interview guide during the discussions. In all cases the Evaluators would add additional questions or topics to obtain a better understanding of specific issues. Toward the end of each interview/meeting each interviewee was given the opportunity to discuss or bring to the table issues that were not or not sufficiently addressed.

General introduction:

1. Introduction by Evaluation Team Leader or Team Member explaining the purpose of the Evaluation Mission.
2. If required, provide the background and objectives of the project.
3. Introduction of interviewee(s)

Interview topics and questions:

- 1. On the involvement of the interviewee or his/her organisation in the project?**
 - Inception of the project
 - Implementation of project activities
 - Membership of PCC or other committees
 - Involvement in review meetings, workshops or other meetings
 - Participation in APRs or TPRs
 - SCF board member, project proponent or other interaction with the SCF
 - Involvement in SCF Capacity Building project
- 2. Project formulation and inception and role of key stakeholders in the process**
 - Was the project well designed?
 - What were its strengths and weaknesses?
 - Who where consulted in the design process?
 - Was there enough consultation?
 - Was there clarity of roles and responsibilities at the project inception stage?
- 3. On the implementation of project activities**
 - What were the kind of project activities undertaken by the interviewee or his/her organisation?
 - Was there a formal arrangement or contract signed with the project? With whom?
 - When were the activities expected to be undertaken, when did they start and when were they completed?
 - Who were the main partners and participators in the process?

- What were the main outcomes and achievements?
 - How did the achievements contribute to PA management and conservation?
- 4. On the development of the CSNR and SNR Management Plans and Operational Plans**
- What was the involvement of the interviewee in the development process of the MPs and Ops?
 - How did stakeholders, such as the Government and communities, participate in the process?
 - What are the strengths and weaknesses of the MPs and OPs that have been drafted?
 - What could be main limitations for the implementation of the plans?
- 5. On the establishment of the SCF**
- What impression does the interviewee have of the SCF?
 - Has the SCF been successful to date? Why or why not?
 - Were its activities visible? Ask for examples?
 - Will it be able to fulfil its role in the near future?
 - What needs to be done to improve its performance?
- 6. Strengthening of institutional capacity necessary for sustainable PA management**
- What is the capacity of the key Governmental institutions and other institutions relevant for sustainable PA management?
 - What institutional and legislative reform is required?
 - What is the Government of Suriname undertaking to strengthen the capacity of its environmental institutions?
 - What are the views and opinions with regard to institutional and legislative reform (BOSNAS, ATM, NIMOS)?
 - What are the strengths and weaknesses of the reform process?
 - What are donors and NGOs undertaking to support the efforts of the GOS?
- 7. Needs in the field of conservation and protected area management**
- What are the most urgent needs?
 - What is the capacity of the University, research institutions, NGOs and CBOs?
 - What expectations do communities have with regard to protected area management?
 - How do they see their role?
 - What capacity do the communities have?
 - Who are the communities main counterparts?
 - What is the Governments viewpoint with regard to communities participation in PA management?
- 8. What are the current main threats to the PAs?**
- Mining
 - Logging
 - Hunting
 - Capacity issues

- Financing issues
- Ownership issues
- Other ...

9. Project implementation

- How was the performance of UNDP as Coordinator of the Project?
- How was the performance of UNOPS?
- How was the performance of the Government?
- How was the collaboration with NGOs?
- How was the participation of communities in the implementation process?

10. Financial resources and contracts

- Were the resources available for the project and its activities sufficient? Why, or why not?
- Was the disbursement of funds timely?
- Was the disbursement of funds transparent?
- How was the relationship with UNOPS?

11. Monitoring and evaluation

- How effective was the PCC?
- Was the PCC well composed?
- How often did the PCC meet?
- How often was the interviewee invited to meetings and how often did he/she participate?
- Were minutes, agenda and other documents timely prepared and circulated?
- Where decision made well followed up?

12. Has the project been a success?

- What were its main successes and failures?

13. Is there anything we have not touched on the interviewee would like to bring to the table?

Annex 7 Logframe of the Project

(from Project Document, UNDP 2000, p. 19, includes original inconsistent numbering)

Objectives	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions & Risks
Goal: To protect globally significant biodiversity in Suriname.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Populations of indicator species native to CSNR and SNR remain at viable levels (Black Spider Monkey, Black Curassow, White-Lipped Peccary, Collared Peccary, Piping-Guan, Great Tinamou). 2. Populations of rare and endangered fauna and flora of CSNR and SNR remain at current levels (Blue Frog, Jaguar, Guianan Cock-of-the-Rock, Harpy Eagle, Giant Otter). 3. Biological monitoring in 2006 indicates that the integrity of CSNR/SNR remains secure with no significant change in habitat block size. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Biennial biological surveys. 2. Biennial biological surveys. 3. Monitoring records and Terminal Evaluation. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cross-section of Suriname's ecosystems currently exists within Protected Area System (PAS) and protected areas (PAs) are of sufficient size to maintain long-term ecological processes.
Purpose: Government agencies, non-governmental entities, and local communities are maintaining and improving the integrity and viability of Suriname's priority Guayana Shield ecosystems.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No illegal new settlement occurs within CSNR/ SNR beyond 1998 baseline. 2. No illegal resource extraction occurs in CSNR/SNR after June 2003. 3. National policies in 2006 reflect biodiversity conservation as a priority (i.e. Government decision-making is transparent and reflects consideration of ecologically sustainable development options. 4. Management model extended to at least 1 other PA by 2004. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Annual monitoring records. 2. Annual monitoring records. 3. Biennial policy review. 4. SCF records. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Impact of resource extraction and development in the interior remains limited. 2. Exogenous and endogenous population growth in the interior remains limited. 3. Biodiversity conservation continues to be a high government priority.
Component A: One-time Project Investments			
Output 1: Policy development functions, capacities, and management controls relating to biodiversity conservation are strengthened at a national level.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1 New training curricula and materials prepared by year 2002; 1.2 Game Law amended by 2003. 1.3 Biodiversity prospecting policies developed by 2005. 1.4 Natural Resource Sector policies and legislation reflect conservation values (2004), and conservation objectives integrated into environmental management in buffer areas surrounding PAs (2005). 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1 Executing Agency reports. 1.2 Gazettes and magistrate reports. 1.3 Gazette. 1.4 Gazette, biennial policy review, field monitoring records. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Government continues to finance at the highest possible level the recurrent costs of umbrella conservation management functions.

Objectives	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions & Risks
Output 2: Management plans are framed and endorsed for the CSNR and the SNR following rapid biological assessments, social assessments, and extensive public consultation.	3.1 Rapid biological and social assessments completed by 4Q 2000. 3.2 Management plans developed, written, and submitted for approval by 2Q 2001. 3.3 Public consultation process completed by May 2001. 3.4 Management plans approved by Government by 3Q 2001.	3.1 Project reports. 3.2 Management plans. 3.3 Project records. 3.4 Gazette.	9. Multi-stakeholder willingness to collaborate in planning. 10. Agreement can be reached between local communities, government, NGOs and other stakeholders on planning needs. 11. Technical assistance available to ensure high quality planning inputs.
Component B: Suriname Conservation Foundation			
Output 3: The Suriname Conservation Foundation (an endowment) is established and its long-term governance capacity is developed.	2.1 Bylaws of fund completed & Fund is registered as a Foundation in Suriname by project commencement. Asset managers and auditing procedures are in place and auditor has been retained by 2Q 2000. 2.2 Administrative staff (by 3Q 2000) are selected and technical advisors are in place. 2.3 Operations manuals are drafted by 2Q 2000. 2.4 Training programs are in place by 2Q 2000. 2.6 General Assembly is in place by 4Q 2001. 2.7 Project selection criteria drafted by 3Q 2000. 2.8 Grant guidelines and application procedures are released to the public by 3Q 2000. 2.9 At least 20 applications are being submitted and processed properly and transparently by 2005. 2.10 At least \$500,000 in grants allocated by 2003. 2.11 SCF endowment ensured with co-financing of US\$ 3.5 m raised by 1Q, 2000; US\$ 1.5 m raised by 2Q 2001, and US\$ 3.5 m by 1Q 2004.	2.1 Deed, registration, and bylaws. 2.2 Staff list. 2.3 Operations manuals, rules of procedures, and contracts with staff signed. 2.4 Annual budget and financial records. 2.5 Operations manual. 2.6 Annual training report. 2.7 Project selection operations manual. 2.8 Grant allocation manual. 2.9 Registry of grant requests. 2.10 Annual budget and financial reports. 2.11 Annual budget and financial reports.	1. Technical support is available (locally or internationally) to help establish operations manuals, rules of procedure, auditing procedures, conduct training programs, etc. 2. There are qualified candidates for board representation and staff. 3. Multi-stakeholder agreement can be reached on SCF's operations. 4. Absorptive capacity exists to manage the fund and implement sub-projects. 5. Technical support available (locally or internationally) to conduct M&E. 6. Fund raising targets can be realized to ensure a minimum of 1:1 matching between GEF and non-GEF sources. 7. Fund income is sufficient to maintain level of operations

Objectives	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions & Risks
			needed to secure global environmental benefits at CSNR and SNR. 8. Majority non-government board established.
Output 3A: CSNR and SNR are effectively managed using participatory methods, and management is being operationalized in other protected areas as the SCF is further endowed.	4.1 Operational plan for year 1 activities prepared before end of 2Q 2000. 4.2 Basic infrastructure in NRs built and equipment supplied by 4Q 2005. 4.3 Incremental park staff recruited by 4Q 2003 and operations costs covered at adequate level. 4.4 Local communities actively participating in implementation of conservation functions, including policing and monitoring by 2003. 4.5 Common understanding of co-management principles by Government and communities by 2004. 4.6 Traditional resource management systems at community-level accommodate scientific principles by 2005. 4.7 Operational plans for reserves are being drafted and reviewed with local and stakeholder participation.	4.1 Operational plans. 4.2 Annual PAS status report. 4.3 Annual PAS status report. 4.4 Annual PAS status report, independent evaluation. 4.5 Structured questionnaires. 4.6 Annual PAS status report, independent evaluation, field monitoring data. 4.7 Operational plans available with evidence of adaptive management strategies.	12. Government continues to show interest in working with non-governmental organizations in the conservation arena and to apply best co-management principles. 13. Populations of indicator, rare and endangered species of CSNR and SNR are not in irreversible decline. 14. There are individuals seeking to build careers in Suriname's conservation sector.
Output 3B: Ecological surveys, research and monitoring promote adaptive management in target PAs.	5.1 Database with biodiversity information updated, maintained and made accessible by 2003. 5.2 Appropriate network of field research monitoring facilities established and maintained by 2005.	5.1 Annual review of database. 5.2 Annual assessment of research facilities.	15. Technical capacities for monitoring and targeted research in CSNR and SCF can be built to levels that enable sustainability without external assistance by 2006. 16. No further deterioration in technical capacities of national scientific institutions. 17. Local communities share information regarding resource use practices.

Objectives	Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions & Risks
Output 3C: Conservation awareness and environmental education efforts are building national constituencies for biodiversity conservation.	6.1 Environmental curriculum for schools developed by 2006. 6.2 Public awareness campaign involving multi-media designed and implemented by 2003. 6.3 Increased debate on conservation issues in evidence (letters to local newspapers) by 2003.	6.1 Annual review of school curricula. 6.2 Annual public awareness survey and analysis. 6.3 News reports.	18. Environmental awareness and education programs can be integrated into existing curricula. 19. Popular media are willing and able to implement a media campaign.
Output 3D: The ecotourism sector is developed and managed as an environmental y compatible economic alternative in target PAs.	7.1 Community consensus achieved on ecotourism development and management objectives by 4Q 2002 7.2 Recreational guidelines for CSNR and SNR are developed by 4Q 2003 with community participation. 7.3 Ecotourism plans for Raleighvallen, Tafelberg and Eilerts de Haan within CSNR and SNR are developed by 2Q 2004. 7.4 Local community members are trained as tour operators/ guides by 4Q 2004. 7.5 Promotional materials prepared for CSNR and SNR by 4Q 2004 7.6 Pricing formula developed and feasibility analysis of capturing tourism revenues for SCF completed by 4Q 2004.	7.1 Guidelines available. 7.2 Plans available. 7.3 Training workshop report. 7.4 Capacity assessment. 7.5 Promotional materials/ promotional strategies. 7.6 SCF records.	20. Baseline activities remove structural barriers to tourism development. 21. Benefit sharing arrangements ensure high comparative return to local communities from controlled ecotourism. 22. Safeguards are developed to strictly protect fragile social and ecological landscape.

Activities	Implementing Agent
Output 1 1.1 Conduct integrated program to train Surinamese conservation trainers 1.11 Perform assessment of training needs in STINASU and NCD 1.12 Identify and agree on curriculum content using needs assessment results 1.13 Develop training curricula, materials and tools to address assessed capacity needs 1.14 Conduct training workshops for trainers at the Jan Starke Opleidings <i>en Ontspannings</i> - centrum (JSOOC) 1.15 Evaluate workshop effectiveness and adapt training strategy as necessary 1.16 Identify and forge linkages with innovative conservation programs in the Latin American and Caribbean Region 1.17 Coordinate study tours to conservation programs	Ministry of Natural Resources; training support will be contracted to WWF
1.2 Assist GOS to strengthen controls over the wildlife trade 1.21 Provide legal assistance to draft proposed amendments to Game Law and Game Resolution 1.22 Strengthen trade database by computerizing permit issuance and enhancing data assessment capacity	Ministry of Natural Resources; Nature Conservation Division; technical assistance will be contracted to WWF

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<p>Output 3</p> <p>3.1 Complete commencement phase operations</p> <p>3.11 Evaluate SCF design elements (asset management arrangements, accounting, grant making, monitoring & evaluation, administration support, and fundraising procedures.)</p> <p>3.12 Negotiate grant agreement with SCF for use of GEF funds</p> <p>3.2 Support first cycle operations</p> <p>3.2.1 Release UNF contribution [US\$ 1 m] and first tranche of GEF funding [US\$ 4.5 m] into corpus</p> <p>3.22 Establish office</p> <p>3.23 Hire staff including a fund Executive Director</p> <p>3.24 Train board and staff</p> <p>3.25 Provide training in proposal writing and project administration</p> <p>3.26 Support SCF operations (grant making, monitoring and evaluation, outreach, training etc)</p> <p>3.27 Perform independent evaluation of first cycle operations</p> <p>3.28 Release second tranche of GEF funding [US\$ 3.4 m] into the endowment</p> <p>3.29 Support SCF operations (grant making, monitoring and evaluation, outreach, training etc)</p> <p>3.30 Perform terminal evaluation</p>	<p>Suriname Conservation Foundation: Operations support services would be contracted to Conservation International</p>
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Annex 8 Terms of Reference

Project Terminal Evaluation

Project: *Conservation of Globally Significant Forest Ecosystems
in Suriname's Guyana Shield Bio-region*

UNDP Project Number: SUR/99/009
UNFIP Project Number: UDP-SUR-99-104
GEF Project Number: SUR/99/ G31; PIMS 1343



1. Introduction:

1.A: Standard UNDP-GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Requirements

The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) policy applied by UNDP-GEF at the project level has four objectives: i) to monitor and evaluate results and impacts; ii) to provide a basis for decision making; iii) to promote accountability for resource use; and iv) to document, provide feedback on, and disseminate lessons learned. In accordance with UNDP/GEF M&E policies and procedures, all regular projects supported by the GEF must undergo a final evaluation upon completion of implementation.

Final evaluations are intended to assess the relevance, performance and success of the project.

1.B. Background/Rationale for the Project

Suriname harbors some of the world's last pristine tropical forest wilderness areas, most of which are not yet seriously threatened by population expansion and extractive industries. The project, a four year initiative with funding from GEF/UNDP amounting to \$9,240,000, had two main objectives: to strengthen capacity and management in 2 globally important and representative protected areas, namely the Central Suriname Nature Reserve (CSNR), the single largest tropical forest reserve in the Guyana Shield, and the Sipaliwini Nature Reserve (SNR) in south Suriname; and to create and capitalize the Suriname Conservation Foundation (SCF), enabling it to reach an initial endowment target of US\$ 15 million. The SCF will provide funding for conservation operations in the two reserves, including for infrastructure and staffing, capacity strengthening, biological and social assessment activities, conservation awareness and education, and targeted support for the development of ecotourism as a conservation-enabling form of livelihood.

The Project was nationally executed by the Nature Conservation Division of the Ministry of Physical Planning Land and Forest management (previously the Ministry of Natural Resources).

2. OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION

The Evaluation has been commissioned by UNDP and will be conducted according to guidance, rules and procedures for such evaluations established by UNDP and the Global Environment Facility. The overall objective the Terminal Evaluation is to review the achievements made by the project to deliver the specified objectives and outcomes. It will establish the relevance, performance and success of the project, including the sustainability of results. The evaluation team should identify specific lessons pertaining to the strategies employed, and implementation arrangements, which may be of relevance to other projects that provide for establishment of environment trust funds. In-line with GEF M&E guidance (see Annexes X and X) this evaluation will focus on the following priority issues:

1. Assessing project achievements and shortcomings at the outcome level

2. Sustainability, in terms of:

- Financial resources. What is the likelihood that financial and economic resources will be available so that the project outcomes/benefits will be sustained once the GEF assistance ends?
- Stakeholder ownership. Do the various key stakeholders perceive a continued flow of benefits to be in their interest?
- Institutional framework and governance. Are the legal frameworks, policies and governance and public administration structures and processes in place to support the objectives of the project and the continued flow of benefits? While responding to this question the evaluators should consider if the required systems for accountability and transparency and the required technical know-how are in place.

3. The effectiveness of the project's M&E system, including the use of the logical framework for implementation management, the use of measurable targets to guide progress, and the measurement of progress towards targets

3. PRODUCTS EXPECTED FROM THE EVALUATION

The final product of the evaluation will be the Terminal Evaluation Report.

3.1. Indicative Outline of the Terminal report:

The evaluation report outline should be structured along the following general lines:

1. Executive summary

- 1.1. Brief description of the project
- 1.2. Context and purpose of the evaluation
- 1.3. Main conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

2. Introduction

- 2.1. Purpose of the evaluation
- 2.2. Key issues addressed
- 2.3. Methodology of the evaluation
- 2.4. Structure of the evaluation

3. The project and its development context

- 3.1. Project start and its duration
- 3.2. Problems that the project seeks to address
- 3.3. Goal, Objective and Outcomes of the project
- 3.4. Main stakeholders
- 3.5. Results expected

4. Findings and Conclusions

- 4.1. Project formulation
- 4.2. Project Implementation
- 4.3. Project Results

5. Recommendations

6. Lessons learned

7. Annexes

- 7.1. Itinerary
- 7.2. List of persons interviewed
- 7.3. Summary of field visits
- 7.4. List of documents reviewed
- 7.5. Questionnaire used and summary of results
- 7.6. Comments by stakeholders

More detailed break down of the evaluation report into sections and ratings is given in Section 7.

The Evaluation will evaluate the project's achievements according to the following Project Review criteria (an explanation of the terminology employed is provided in Annex 1.)

3.2. Additional notes on the Terminal report

Formatting:	Times New Roman – Font 11; single spacing; paragraph numbering and table of contents (automatic); page numbers (centred); graphs and tables and photographs (where relevant) are encouraged.
Length:	maximum 50 pages in total excluding annexes
Timeframe of submission:	first draft within 2 weeks of completion of the country mission
Should be submitted to:	UNDP Country Office- Suriname
Should be circulated for comments to:	all key stakeholders and participants of the project including governmental agencies involved in the project implementation, UNDP country office, project team and other partners.

If there are discrepancies between the impressions and findings of the evaluation team and the aforementioned parties these should be explained in an annex attached to the final report.

4. METHODOLOGY OR EVALUATION APPROACH

An outline of the evaluation approach is provided below. However, it should be made clear that the evaluation team is responsible for revising the approach as necessary. Any changes should be in line with international criteria and professional norms and standards as adopted by the UN Evaluation Group³⁴). They must also be cleared by UNDP before being applied by the evaluation team.

- (i) **Documentation review** (desk study): the list of documentation is included in Annex 2. All the documents will be provided in advance by the Project Implementation Unit and by the UNDP CO. It will be provided with an annotated cover note describing the relative importance of each document, key sections and issues to be brought to the evaluators' attention. . The evaluator should consult all relevant sources of information, including but not limited to the following list of documentation: the project document, project reports, PSC minutes and decisions, project budgets, project work plans, progress reports, PIRs, project files, UNDP guiding documents, national legislation relevant to the project and any other material that they may consider useful. The Project Manager will also provide a report of the project's accomplishments and lessons.

³⁴ www.uneval.org

- (ii) **Interviews** will be held with the following organizations and persons as a minimum:
 - UNDP CO – Trinidad and Tobago: Resident Representative and Deputy Resident Representative
 - UNDP CO – Suriname: Programme Director and Officer in Charge; Environment Programme Manager and Project Coordinator
 - UNDP/GEF: Regional Technical Advisor for Biodiversity
 - Ministry of Physical Planning Land and Forest Management
 - Other organizations : Suriname Conservation Foundation, Ministry of Labour, Technological Development and Environment, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, NIMOS, Conservation International Suriname, World Wild Life Fund Guianas, STINASU
 - Project Steering Committee
- (iii) **Field Visits** should be made to CSNR: Raileighfalls
- (iv) **Semi-structured interviews** – the team should develop a process for semi-structured interviews to ensure that different aspects are covered. Focus group discussions with project beneficiaries will be held as deemed necessary by the evaluation team. Please add if you want specific discussions with local communities.
- (v) **Questionnaires**
- (vi) **Participatory Techniques and other approaches for the gather and analysis of data**

Although the evaluator should feel free to discuss with the authorities concerned all matters relevant to his/her assignment, they are not authorized to make any commitment on behalf of UNDP or GEF or the project management.

5. COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION MISSION

The evaluation will be performed by a two-person team. The team will comprise two international consultants, one with expertise in biodiversity management and another with expertise in environmental economic instruments. The team will have a wide range of skills, including prior evaluation experience, expertise in biodiversity conservation and related activities, and experience with economic and social development issues.

The equivalent of one international evaluator and one national evaluator has been budgeted for this evaluation team.

Team Qualities:

- Recent experience with result-based management evaluation methodologies
- Experience applying participatory monitoring approaches
- Recent knowledge of the GEF Monitoring and Evaluation Policy
- Recent knowledge of UNDP's results-based evaluation policies and procedures
- Knowledge of logical framework methodology
- Experience in monitoring and evaluation of projects in forest ecosystems
- Recognised experience with Environmental Funds and management of financial assets
- Knowledge of the administrative and reporting systems of projects similar in focus, area, scope and complexity
- Competence in Adaptive Management, as applied to conservation or natural resource management projects

- Recognized expertise in the management and sustainable use of natural resources in South America
- Experience working in countries with small economies, and in particular, knowledge of Suriname and its political, social and economic context
- Familiarity with protected area policies and management structures in South America, and in particular, in the Guyana Shield region
- Demonstrable analytical skills

The consultants will be responsible for preparing the terminal evaluation report and its completion in accordance with UNDP Monitoring and Evaluation guidelines. UNDP – Suriname will appoint one Team Leader. The Team Leader will have overall responsibility for the delivery and quality of the evaluation products. Team roles and responsibilities will be reflected in the individual contracts. If a proposal is accepted from a consulting firm, the firm will be held responsible for the delivery and quality of the evaluation products and therefore has responsibility for team management arrangements.

The evaluators must be independent from both the policy-making process and the delivery and management of assistance. Therefore applications will not be considered from evaluators who have had any direct involvement with the design or implementation of the project. This may apply equally to evaluators who are associated with organizations, universities or entities that are, or have been, involved in the project. Any previous association with the project, the relevant government counterparts, UNDP-Suriname or other partners/stakeholders must be disclosed in the application. This applies equally to firms submitting proposals as it does to individual evaluators.

If selected, failure to make the above disclosures will be considered just grounds for immediate contract termination, without recompense. In such circumstances, all notes, reports and other documentation produced by the evaluator will be retained by UNDP.

6. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

6.1. Management arrangements

The evaluation is being solicited by UNDP, led by the UNDP Country Office in Suriname as project executing agency. The UNDP-Suriname has overall responsibility for the coordination and logistical arrangements of the evaluation as well as day-to-day support to the evaluation team (travel, accommodation, office space, communications, etc) and timely provision of per diems and contractual payments. UNDP-Suriname will also organise the site missions (travel arrangements, meetings with key stakeholders and beneficiaries, interviews, field trips). The evaluation team will be briefed by the UNDP Country Team, upon the commencement of the assignment, and will also provide a terminal briefing. Other briefing sessions may be scheduled, if deemed necessary.

The evaluators will be contracted directly from the project budget. The quality of the evaluators' work will be assessed by UNDP-Suriname in consultation with UNDP Trinidad and Tobago and UNDP-GEF. If the quality does not meet standard UNDP expectations or UNDP-GEF requirements, the evaluators will be required to re-do or revise (as appropriate) the work before being paid final instalments. The evaluation team is ultimately responsible for the quality of the evaluation report. The evaluator must clear input from other contributors before final payment is given.

These Terms of Reference follow the UNDP GEF policies and procedures, and together with the final agenda will be agreed upon by the UNDP-GEF Regional Coordinating Unit, UNDP Country Office and

the Government. These three parties will receive a draft of the final evaluation report and provide comments on it prior to its completion.

Although the final report must be cleared and accepted by UNDP before being made public, the UNDP Evaluation Policy underlines that the evaluation function should be structurally independent from operational management and decision-making functions in the organization. The evaluation team will be free from undue influence and has full authority to submit reports directly to appropriate levels of decision-making. UNDP management will not impose restrictions on the scope, content, comments and recommendations of evaluation reports. In the case of unresolved difference of opinions between any of the parties, UNDP may request the evaluation team to set out the differences in an annex to the final report.

6.2. Timeframe, resources, logistical support and deadlines

The total duration of the evaluation will be 25 days according to the following plan:

Preparation before field work: (6days)

- Acquaintance with the project document and other relevant materials with information about the project (PIRs, TPR reports, Mid term Evaluation report and other evaluation report, etc);
- Familiarization with overall development situation of Suriname (based on reading of CCA and other agency reports on the country).
- Detailed mission programme preparation in cooperation with the UNDP Country office and the Project team.
- Initial telephone discussion with UNDP-GEF Regional Technical Advisor for Biodiversity for Caribbean

Field mission:

Paramaribo (5 days)

- Meeting with UNDP Country office team;
- Meetings with other relevant national GoU partners and stakeholders in Paramaribo (as detailed in Section 4)
- Joint review of all available materials with focused attention to project outcomes and outputs

Project site – Raleighfalls (3 days)

- Observation and review of completed and ongoing field activities,(capacity development, awareness /education, sustainable use demonstration activities, community development, etc)
- Interviews with key beneficiaries and stakeholders, including representatives of local authorities, local environmental protection authorities, local community stakeholders, *etc*.

Draft report (6 days): To be provided within two of mission completion

- Final interviews / cross checking with UNDP CO, Executing agency and Project staff.
- Drafting of report in proposed format
- Telephone review of major findings with UNDP CO and UNDP-GEF Regional Biodiversity Coordinator
- Completing of the draft report and presentation of draft report for comments and suggestions
- Comments will be provided within 10 working days. These comments will focus on providing any requisite factual corrections but will not question the Evaluation Team's findings.

Final Report (5 days)

- Presentation of final evaluation report

VII. SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION – SPECIFIC ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED

This section describes the categories that the evaluation will look into in line with the evaluation report outline included in section III. It also highlights specific issues to be addressed under each broad category. These categories are the minimum required by UNDP and GEF. In addition to a descriptive assessment, all criteria marked with (R) should be rated in conformity with the GEF guidelines for final evaluations³⁵.

1. Executive summary

- Brief description of project
- Context and purpose of the evaluation
- Main conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

2. Introduction

- Purpose of the evaluation
- Key issues addressed
- Methodology of the evaluation
- Structure of the evaluation

3. The project(s) and its development context

- Project start and its duration
- Problems that the project seek to address
- Immediate and development objectives of the project
- Main stakeholders
- Results expected

4. Findings and Conclusions

4.1. Project Formulation (approx 3 pages)

- Conceptualization/Design. This should assess the approach used in design and an appreciation of the appropriateness of problem conceptualization and whether the selected intervention strategy addressed the root causes and principal threats in the project area. It should also include an assessment of the logical framework and whether the different project components and activities proposed to achieve the objective were appropriate, viable and responded to contextual institutional, legal and regulatory settings of the project.
- Logical Framework Targets. It should assess the indicators defined for guiding implementation and measurement of achievement and whether lessons from other relevant projects (e.g., same focal area) were incorporated into targets.
- Country-ownership/Drivenness. Assess the extent to which the project idea/conceptualization had its origin within national, sectoral and development plans and focuses on national environment and development interests.
- Replication approach. Determine the ways in which lessons and experiences coming out of the project were/are to be replicated or scaled up in the design and implementation of other projects (this also related to actual practices undertaken during implementation).

³⁵ Evaluation should use a six values rating system (Highly Satisfactory-HS, Satisfactory-S, Moderately Satisfactory -MS, Moderately Unsatisfactory-MS, Unsatisfactory-U, Highly Unsatisfactory-HU). The benefit of a six value system is that it allows for a more balanced set of options (three options on the satisfactory side and three options on the unsatisfactory side) while at the same time allowing for a category that while not quite satisfactory is not low enough to be unsatisfactory.

- Other aspects to assess in the review of Project formulation approaches would be UNDP comparative advantage as IA for this project; the consideration of linkages between projects and other interventions within the sector and the definition of clear and appropriate management arrangements at the design stage.

4.2. Project Implementation

- Implementation Approach (R). This should include assessments of the following aspects:
 - (i) The use of the logical framework as a management tool during implementation and any changes made to this as a response to changing conditions and/or feedback from M and E activities if required.
 - (ii) Other elements that indicate adaptive management such as comprehensive and realistic work plans routinely developed that reflect adaptive management and/or; changes in management arrangements to enhance implementation.
 - (iii) The project's use/establishment of electronic information technologies to support implementation, participation and monitoring, as well as other project activities.
 - (iv) The general operational relationships between the institutions involved and others and how these relationships have contributed to effective implementation and achievement of project objectives.
 - (v) Technical capacities associated with the project and their role in project development, management and achievements.
- Monitoring and evaluation (R). Including an assessment as to whether there has been adequate periodic oversight of activities during implementation to establish the extent to which inputs, work schedules, other required actions and outputs are proceeding according to plan; whether formal evaluations have been held and whether action has been taken on the results of this monitoring oversight and evaluation reports.
- Stakeholder participation (R). This should include assessments of the mechanisms for information dissemination in project implementation and the extent of stakeholder participation in management, emphasizing the following:
 - (i) The production and dissemination of information generated by the project.
 - (ii) Local resource users and NGOs participation in project implementation and decision making and an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach adopted by the project in this arena.
 - (iii) The establishment of partnerships and collaborative relationships developed by the project with local, national and international entities and the effects they have had on project implementation.
 - (iv) Involvement of governmental institutions in project implementation, the extent of governmental support of the project.
- Financial Planning: Including an assessment of:
 - (i) The actual project cost by objectives, outputs, activities
 - (ii) The cost-effectiveness of achievements
 - (iii) Financial management (including disbursement issues)

(iv) Co-financing ³⁶

-
- Sustainability. Extent to which the benefits of the project will continue, within or outside the project domain, after it has come to an end. Relevant factors include for example: development of a sustainability strategy, establishment of financial and economic instruments and mechanisms, mainstreaming project objectives into the economy or community production activities.
-
- Execution and implementation modalities. This should consider the effectiveness of the UNDP counterpart and Project Co-ordination Unit participation in selection, recruitment, assignment of experts, consultants and national counterpart staff members and in the definition of tasks and responsibilities; quantity, quality and timeliness of inputs for the project with respect to execution responsibilities, enactment of necessary legislation and budgetary provisions and extent to which these may have affected implementation and sustainability of the Project; quality and timeliness of inputs by UNDP and GoS and other parties responsible for providing inputs to the project, and the extent to which this may have affected the smooth implementation of the project.

4.3. Results

- Attainment of Outcomes/ Achievement of objectives (R): Including a description *and rating* of the extent to which the project's objectives (environmental and developmental) were achieved using Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, and Unsatisfactory ratings. If the project did not establish a baseline (initial conditions), the evaluators should seek to determine it through the use of special methodologies so that achievements, results and impacts can be properly established.
- This section should also include reviews of the following:
- Sustainability: Including an appreciation of the extent to which benefits continue, within or outside the project domain after GEF assistance/external assistance in this phase has come to an end.
- Has the project contributed to improve the enabling environment through effective policies, institutional capacity building, increased public awareness, appropriate stakeholder involvement, promoting conservation and sustainable use research, leveraging resources and providing incentives for conservation? Explain.
- Contribution to upgrading skills of the national staff

5. Recommendations

Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project
Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project
Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives

6. Lessons learned

This should highlight the best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success.

• ³⁶ Please see guidelines at the end of Annex 1 of these TORs for reporting of co-financing

7. Evaluation Report Annexes

- Evaluation TORs
- Itinerary
- List of persons interviewed
- Summary of field visits
- List of documents reviewed
- Questionnaire used and summary of results
- Comments by stakeholders (only in case of discrepancies with evaluation findings and conclusions)

VIII. TOR ANNEXES

TOR Annex 1. List of Documents to be reviewed by the evaluators

TOR Annex 2. GEF Guidelines for Final Evaluations

TOR Annex 3. Explanation on Terminology

TOR Annex 4. Financial Planning – Co-financing

TOR Annex 5. Transitional Modifications

TOR Annex 6. Questions for Evaluators to Consider

TOR Annex 1. List of Documents to be reviewed by the evaluators

Project Documentation

Alers, M., and Leif Pedersen (January 2004). *Aide-Memoire: Suriname Guayana Shield Conservation Project Implementation support mission.*

GEF/UNDP (2000). *SCF Grant Agreement.*

Spergel, B. (June 2003a). *Evaluation of the Asset Management Strategy of the Suriname Conservation Foundation.*

Spergel, B. (October 2003b). *Report of a consultancy to revisit and support the asset management strategy of the Suriname Conservation Foundation.*

Torres, E. (January 2004). *Towards a Resource Mobilization Strategy for the Suriname Conservation Foundation.*

UNDP (2000). *Project document: Conservation of Globally Significant Forest Ecosystems in Suriname's Guyana Shield Bio-region.*

UNDP (2001). *Annual Project Report – September 2000-September 2001, December, 2001: Conservation of Globally Significant Forest Ecosystems in Suriname's Guyana Shield Bio-region.*

UNDP (2002/3). *Minutes of the Tripartite Meetings – January 2002 and June 2003: Conservation of Globally Significant Forest Ecosystems in Suriname's Guyana Shield Bio-region.*

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TOR Annex 2. GEF Guidelines for Final Evaluations

Important note- Recent modifications (March 4th, 2005).

The new GEF Office of M&E is currently working on new guidelines, which are expected to be finalized within the next three to five months. In the mean time, we have been already requested to comply with a number of modifications in relation to the evaluation focus and the rating system. These modifications are included in Annex 5 and should be observed effective immediately.

Terminal evaluations of projects by Implementing and Executing Agencies under expanded opportunities (IAs/EAs) represent one of the modalities under the GEF M&E evaluation program. All regular and medium sized projects supported by the GEF are required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation.

The present document describes the minimum requirements for terminal evaluations of a GEF supported project, which are considered complementary to those required by a IAs/EAs. The guidelines comprise first the principles to conduct terminal evaluations and subsequently the scope of these evaluations. A terminal evaluation reviews the implementation experience and achievement of results of the project in question against the project objectives endorsed by GEF, including changes agreed during implementation.

GEF Principles for conducting terminal evaluations

- The IAs/EAs responsible for the project will arrange for the terminal evaluation;
- A team of independent consultants will conduct the evaluation. These consultants should not have participated substantively during project preparation and/or implementation and should have no conflict of interest with any proposed follow-up phases. It would also be advisable for the team to be comprised of professionals with a wide range of skills – strong analytical and evaluation experience, expertise in technical aspects of the project, global environmental issues, and experience with economic and social development issues.
- The duration and scope of the evaluation depends on the complexity of each project and should be reflected in the TORs.
- The evaluation should be completed within 6 months of closing of all project activities.
- Major project stakeholders at the national and local levels should be involved.
- If the project did not establish a baseline (initial conditions), the evaluator should seek to determine it through the use of special methodologies so that achievements, results and impacts can be properly established.
- It would be advisable to take advantage of the project M&E components and the log frame of the project design (the M&E components should also be evaluated).
- Evaluators should have an updated knowledge of GEF policies and strategies. A brief presentation of specific GEF terminology is provided in Annex 3.

Scope

The scope of the terminal evaluation will depend upon type of project, size, focal area, and country context. However, the following issues should be covered:

- An analysis of the attainment of global environmental objectives³⁷, outcomes/impacts³⁸, project objectives³⁹, and delivery and completion of project outputs/activities⁴⁰ (based on indicators).

³⁷ This should be the highest level in the project's logical framework, which is often labeled the "goal" to which the project contributes. Different implementing agencies are using different terms for this level. The World Bank often refers to this level as the "global objective". UNEP uses "overall project objective" to describe this level, while UNDP has used "development objective".

³⁸ Proposed changes to and effects on the environment and society to be caused by the project.

- Evaluation of project achievements according to GEF Project Review Criteria⁴¹:
 - Implementation approach
 - Country ownership/Drivenness
 - Stakeholder participation/ Public Involvement
 - Sustainability
 - Replication approach
 - Financial planning
 - Cost-effectiveness
 - Monitoring and evaluation

Each terminal evaluation will include **ratings** on the following criteria: (a) Outcomes/ Achievement of objectives (the extent to which the project's environmental and development objectives were achieved); (b) Implementation Approach; (c) Stakeholder Participation/Public Involvement; (d) Sustainability; and (e) Monitoring & Evaluation. The ratings will be: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Marginally Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, and N/A. This system will allow consistency across all IAs/EAs.

Terminal evaluations should present and analyze main findings and key lessons, including examples of best practices for future projects in the country, region and GEF (technical, political, managerial, etc.). Evaluations should also have an annex explaining any differences or disagreements between the findings of the evaluation team, the IA/EA or the GEF recipient organization.

A terminal evaluation is not an appraisal of a follow-up phase.⁴²

Communications with GEF M&E

Each IA/EA should confirm by May 15, the terminal evaluation schedule presented with the PIR. This information will include the approximate timing of the completion report. The final evaluation reports will be sent to the GEF M&E unit no later than 4 weeks after the final version is completed.

Role of GEF M&E

The GEF M&E unit will review the final document of all terminal evaluations to identify issues and lessons to complement the annual Project Performance Review (PPR) and to improve the scope and content of future terminal evaluations. The results of the review will be incorporated in the annual PPR to complement findings of other M&E exercises. For a few selected evaluations, which have great learning potential, the GEF unit will participate after agreement with the IA/EA.

Completing a terminal evaluation does not preclude the project from being selected for one of the GEF M&E initiated thematic reviews and evaluations.

³⁹ "Project objective" are the second highest level of objectives in the logical framework. This are referred to by the World Bank as development objectives, by UNDP as project objectives and by UNEP as "objectives".

⁴⁰ This refers to outputs, activities or components as described in the Project Document that will contribute to the attainment of the objectives.

⁴¹ Most of this discussion is based on the GEF Council paper: GEF Project Cycle (GEF/C.16/Inf.7)

⁴² Under special circumstances some projects may require a follow-up phase, even if this was not envisaged initially. In these cases, IA/EA would have to provide substantial justification for the additional GEF funding. Project proposals requesting support for follow-up phases should be accompanied by an independent terminal evaluation of the earlier phase when the project concept is reviewed for pipeline entry. If the current phase of the project is still under implementation, an interim evaluation should be proposed following the GEF Guidelines for Terminal Evaluations. This interim evaluation should be carried out by persons independent from those responsible for the design and implementation of the new phase. The TORs of the interim evaluation should be reviewed and approved by GEF M&E. Furthermore, in these cases, the project concept will be admitted into the GEF pipeline (and any associated PDF-B reviewed and approved if necessary), with the following binding conditions: (i) a terminal evaluation of the project should be submitted along with the project proposal for work program entry; and (ii) the proposal will reflect the experience and lessons of the earlier phase. If either of the above conditions are not met, the project will not be recommended for entry into the work program.

TOR Annex 3. Explanation on Terminology

Implementation Approach includes an analysis of the project's logical framework, adaptation to changing conditions (adaptive management), partnerships in implementation arrangements, changes in project design, and overall project management.

Some elements of an effective implementation approach may include:

- The logical framework used during implementation as a management and M&E tool
- Effective partnerships arrangements established for implementation of the project with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region
- Lessons from other relevant projects (e.g., same focal area) incorporated into project implementation
- Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management.

Country Ownership/Drivenness is the relevance of the project to national development and environmental agendas, recipient country commitment, and regional and international agreements where applicable.

Some elements of effective country ownership/drivenness may include:

- Project Concept has its origin within the national sectoral and development plans
- Outcomes (or potential outcomes) from the project have been incorporated into the national sectoral and development plans
- Relevant country representatives (e.g., governmental official, civil society, etc.) are actively involved in project identification, planning and/or implementation
- The recipient government has maintained financial commitment to the project
- The government has approved policies and/or modified regulatory frameworks in line with the project's objectives

For projects whose main focus and actors are in the private-sector rather than public-sector (e.g., IFC projects), elements of effective country ownership/drivenness that demonstrate the interest and commitment of the local private sector to the project may include:

- The number of companies that participated in the project by: receiving technical assistance, applying for financing, attending dissemination events, adopting environmental standards promoted by the project, etc.
- Amount contributed by participating companies to achieve the environmental benefits promoted by the project, including: equity invested, guarantees provided, co-funding of project activities, in-kind contributions, etc.
- Project's collaboration with industry associations

Stakeholder Participation/Public Involvement consist of three related, and often overlapping processes: information dissemination, consultation, and "stakeholder" participation. Stakeholders are the individuals, groups, institutions, or other bodies that have an interest or stake in the outcome of the GEF-financed project. The term also applies to those potentially adversely affected by a project.

Examples of effective public involvement include:

- Information dissemination
- Implementation of appropriate outreach/public awareness campaigns
- Consultation and stakeholder participation

- Consulting and making use of the skills, experiences and knowledge of NGOs, community and local groups, the private and public sectors, and academic institutions in the design, implementation, and evaluation of project activities
- Stakeholder participation
- Project institutional networks well placed within the overall national or community organizational structures, for example, by building on the local decision making structures, incorporating local knowledge, and devolving project management responsibilities to the local organizations or communities as the project approaches closure
- Building partnerships among different project stakeholders
- Fulfillment of commitments to local stakeholders and stakeholders considered to be adequately involved.

Sustainability measures the extent to which benefits continue, within or outside the project domain, from a particular project or program after GEF assistance/external assistance has come to an end. Relevant factors to improve the sustainability of project outcomes include:

-
- Development and implementation of a sustainability strategy
- Establishment of the financial and economic instruments and mechanisms to ensure the ongoing flow of benefits once the GEF assistance ends (from the public and private sectors, income generating activities, and market transformations to promote the project's objectives).
- Development of suitable organizational arrangements by public and/or private sector
- Development of policy and regulatory frameworks that further the project objectives
- Incorporation of environmental and ecological factors affecting future flow of benefits.
- Development of appropriate institutional capacity (systems, structures, staff, expertise, etc.)
- Identification and involvement of champions (i.e. individuals in government and civil society who can promote sustainability of project outcomes)
- Achieving social sustainability, for example, by mainstreaming project activities into the economy or community production activities
- Achieving stakeholders consensus regarding courses of action on project activities.

Replication approach, in the context of GEF projects, is defined as lessons and experiences coming out of the project that are replicated or scaled up in the design and implementation of other projects. Replication can have two aspects, replication proper (lessons and experiences are replicated in different geographic area) or scaling up (lessons and experiences are replicated within the same geographic area but funded by other sources). Examples of replication approaches include:

- Knowledge transfer (i.e., dissemination of lessons through project result documents, training workshops, information exchange, a national and regional forum, etc).
- Expansion of demonstration projects.
- Capacity building and training of individuals, and institutions to expand the project's achievements in the country or other regions.
- Use of project-trained individuals, institutions or companies to replicate the project's outcomes in other regions.

Financial Planning includes actual project cost by activity, financial management (including disbursement issues), and co-financing. If a financial audit has been conducted the major findings should be presented in the TE.

Effective financial plans include:

- Strong financial controls, including reporting, and planning that allow the project management to make informed decisions regarding the budget at any time, allows for a proper and timely flow of funds, and for the payment of satisfactory project deliverables
- Due diligence due diligence in the management of funds and financial audits.

Cost-effectiveness assesses the achievement of the environmental and developmental objectives as well as the project's outputs in relation to the inputs, costs, and implementing time. It also examines the project's compliance with the application of the incremental cost concept. Cost-effective factors include:

- Compliance with the incremental cost criteria (e.g. GEF funds are used to finance a component of a project that would not have taken place without GEF funding.) and securing co-funding and associated funding.
- The project completed the planned activities and met or exceeded the expected outcomes in terms of achievement of Global Environmental and Development Objectives according to schedule, and as cost-effective as initially planned.
- The project used either a benchmark approach or a comparison approach (did not exceed the costs levels of similar projects in similar contexts). A benchmark approach in climate change and ozone projects measures cost-effectiveness using internationally accepted threshold such as 10\$/ton of carbon equivalent reduced, and thresholds for the phase out of specific ozone depleting substances measured in terms of dollars spent per kg (\$/kg) of each type of ODS reduced.

Monitoring & Evaluation. Monitoring is the periodic oversight of a process, or the implementation of an activity, which seeks to establish the extent to which inputs, work schedules, other required actions and outputs are proceeding according to plan, so that timely action can be taken to correct the deficiencies detected. Evaluation is a process by which program inputs, activities and results are analyzed and judged explicitly against benchmarks or baseline conditions using performance indicators. This will allow project managers and planners to make decisions based on the evidence of information on the project implementation stage, performance indicators, level of funding still available, etc, building on the project's logical framework.

Monitoring and Evaluation includes activities to measure the project's achievements such as identification of performance indicators, measurement procedures, and determination of baseline conditions. Projects are required to implement plans for monitoring and evaluation with adequate funding and appropriate staff and include activities such as description of data sources and methods for data collection, collection of baseline data, and stakeholder participation. Given the long-term nature of many GEF projects, projects are also encouraged to include long-term monitoring plans that are sustainable after project completion.

Leveraged Resources

Leveraged resources are additional resources—beyond those committed to the project itself at the time of approval—that are mobilized later as a direct result of the project. Leveraged resources can be financial or in-kind and they may be from other donors, NGO's, foundations, governments, communities or the private sector. Please briefly describe the resources the project has leveraged since inception and indicate how these resources are contributing to the project's ultimate objective.

TOR Annex 4. Financial Planning – Co-financing

Co financing (Type/Source)	IA own Financing (mill US\$)		Government (mill US\$)		Other* (mill US\$)		Total (mill US\$)		Total Disbursement (mill US\$)	
	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>	<i>Planned</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Grants										
Loans/Concessional (compared to market rate)										
Credits										
Equity investments										
In-kind support										
Other (*)										
Totals										

* Other is referred to contributions mobilized for the project from other multilateral agencies, bilateral development cooperation agencies, NGOs, the private sector and beneficiaries.

TOR Annex 5. Transitional Modifications

In general the new GEF office of M&E would like you to ask the evaluators to concentrate on assessing the project's achievements and shortcomings regarding outcomes and two of the GEF Project Review Criteria: sustainability and project M&E systems, and to provide ratings for these three areas. Furthermore, we request that the evaluators incorporate the following four considerations in the terminal evaluations:

1. When assessing project outcomes the evaluators should consider the focal area questions presented in the **Annex 6**, which draw heavily on the program indicators developed by the GEF task force for the biodiversity. In the case of Biodiversity projects we encourage evaluators to also use the tracking tools developed by the taskforce.
2. When assessing sustainability, terminal evaluations should identify and assess the key conditions or factors that are likely to contribute or detract to the persistence of benefits after project ends. Some of these factors might be outcomes of the project, i.e. stronger institutional capacities, legal frameworks, socio-economic incentives /or public awareness. Nevertheless sustainability assessment should explain how the outcomes of some project components enhance the likelihood that overall project benefits will continue. The sustainability assessment should also explain how other important contextual factors that are not outcomes of the project will affect sustainability. We propose that the evaluators in their analysis of sustainability address at least the following three aspects of sustainability:
 - Financial resources. What is the likelihood that financial and economic resources will be available so that the project outcomes/benefits will be sustained once the GEF assistance ends?
 - Stakeholder ownership. Do the various key stakeholders perceive a continued flow of benefits to be in their interest?

- Institutional framework and governance. Are the legal frameworks, policies and governance and public administration structures and processes in place to support the objectives of the project and the continued flow of benefits? While responding to this question the evaluators should consider if the required systems for accountability and transparency and the required technical know how are in place.
3. When assessing project M&E systems we propose that the evaluators use the following criteria. Whether an appropriate M&E system for the project was put in place and whether this allows for tracking of progress towards projects objectives. M & E tools might include a baseline, clear and practical indicators and data analysis systems, or studies to assess results planned and carried out at specific times in the project. Whether the capacity and resources to implement the M&E system were in place. Whether the M&E system was used for project management.
 4. We propose that, instead of the instructions provided in paragraph number 4 of the May 2003 Guidelines, as of this year the evaluators use a six values rating system (Highly Satisfactory-HS, Satisfactory-S, Moderately Satisfactory MS, Moderately Unsatisfactory-MS, Unsatisfactory U, Highly Unsatisfactory HU). The benefit of a six value system is that it will allow for a more balanced set of options (three options on the satisfactory side and three options on the unsatisfactory side) while at the same time allowing for a category that while not quite satisfactory is not low enough to be unsatisfactory. This is an improvement on a four values rating system in as far as a four value systems would either have three values on the satisfactory (HS, S and MS) and one on the unsatisfactory side (U) and thus would be unbalanced, or when being balanced (HS, S, MU and U) would not allow for a value that is not good enough to be fully satisfactory but is not low enough to be rated as unsatisfactory.

TOR Annex 6. Questions for Evaluators to Consider

The following questions are based on the GEF program indicators and will be used to guide the assessment of project outcomes and objectives in the focal area of biodiversity. In addition, the project's contribution to replication or scaling up of innovative practices or mechanisms that support the project objectives will also be assessed as part of the outcomes.

Biodiversity⁴³

1. How has the project contributed to conserve and ensure sustainable use of biological resources in the production environment (landscapes and seascapes)?
2. Has the project contributed to improve the enabling environment through effective policies, institutional capacity building, increased public awareness, appropriate stakeholder involvement, promoting conservation and sustainable use research, leveraging resources and providing incentives for conservation? Explain.
3. How has the project facilitated fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources?
4. What is the project contribution to replication or scaling up of innovative practices or mechanisms that support the project objectives?

⁴³ Based on indicators of "Measuring results of the GEF biodiversity program. Monitoring and Evaluation Working Paper 12." August 2003

Annex 9 Comments by stakeholders to the draft report

239. A draft Terminal Evaluation report was sent for comments and factual corrections to UNDP and after inclusion of those it was circulated for feedback as per the ToR “to all key stakeholders and participants of the project including governmental agencies involved in the project implementation, UNDP country office, project team and other partners”. As per the ToR comments were requested within 10 working days (the last comments were accepted 7 weeks later at the end of February, some financial data in March) and were to focus on providing any requisite factual corrections but not question the Evaluation Team’s findings.

All factual corrections and additional information were integrated into this final report. Also initial disagreements raised by SCF were resolved in this final version. The additional information and clarification did in some cases result in better ratings for certain outputs. Several comments also addressed the findings, recommendations, and the overall report, which were generally characterised as frank, clear, realistic, honest, sometimes painful, but balanced and constructive.

The following list shows recipients and whether/how detailed comments were received.

Organisation	Person	Comments received
UNDP-Suriname	Christine de Rooij	Extensive +edit suggestions
UNDP Regional Coord. Unit	Paula Caballero	Extensive +edit suggestions
UNDP Trinidad -Tobago	Claudio Providas	Extensive
UNOPS, Peru	Ms. Carmen Arias, Portfolio Manager	-
Association of Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname (VIDS)	Ms. Jacqueline Mariëlle Jubithana, Legal Program, (Member, SCF Board of Directors)	Specific topics
Centrum voor Landbouwkundig Onderzoek in Suriname (CELOS)	Dr. Rudolf F. van Kanten, Director	-
Conservation International, Arlington, VA	Lisa Famolare, Vice President, Guianas Regional Program	General
Conservation International - Suriname	Amb. Wim Udenhout, Executive Director (President, SCF Board of Directors)	(Comment received as part of SCF Board feedback)
Conservation International - Suriname	Ms. Annette L. Tjon Sie Fat, Director of Operations	Extensive
Forest Service, Ministry of RGB	Ms. Marie Djosetro, Acting Director	-
Ministry of ATM	Ms. Henna Uiterloo	-
Ministry of PLOS	Drs. Inderdijet Rambharse, Director (Member, SCF Board of Directors)	(Comment received as part of SCF Board feedback)
NCD	Mr. Bryan Drakenstein, Acting Head of the NCD	Specific topics +edit suggestions
NIMOS	Drs. Sylvia S.H. Ang, Acting General Director	-
NIMOS	Ms. Nancy del Prado, Director Legal Office	-
STINASU	Ms. Marie Djosetro, Acting Director Mr. Kris Mohadin, Advisor to the Director	-
Suriname Conservation Foundation	Mr. Leonard C. Johanns, Executive Director	Extensive individual and SCF Board feedback
Suriname Conservation Foundation	Mr. Stanley A.J. Malone, Monitoring Specialist	Extensive +edit suggestions
WWF Guianas	Mr. Gerold Zondervan, Regional Forest Officer	General