

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Conservation of RUK Coastal Ecosystem

**Conservation of Biodiversity through Integrated Collaborative Management in the
Rekawa, Usangoda and Kalametiya Coastal Ecosystems, Sri Lanka**

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Final Report of the Terminal Evaluation Mission

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ACRONYMS AND TERMS

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BTf	Biodiversity Task Force
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCCC	Coastal Collaborative Coordinating Committee
CCD	Coast Conservation Department
CRMP	Coastal Resources Management Project
DLCC	District Level Coordinating Committee
DWC	Department of Wildlife Conservation
ERD	External Resources Department
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GN	Grama Niladhari
GOSL	Government of Sri Lanka
HICZMP	Hambantota Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project
ICDP	Integrated Conservation Development Program
ISB	Industrial Services Bureau
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
IUCN-SL	IUCN – The World Conservation Union, Sri Lanka
LoA	Letter of Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MoFAR	Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
NARA	National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NLCC	National Level Coordinating Committee
NPC	National Project Coordinator
NPD	National Project Director
NPM	National Project Manager
PFO	Project Facilitation Organisation
PIR	Project Implementation Report
PMO	Project Management Office
RDF	Rekawa Development Foundation
RUK	Rekawa, Usangoda and Kalametiya
SAM	Special Area Management
SAMP	Special Area Management Plan
SLR	Sri Lankan Rupee
SM	Social Mobiliser
TCP	Turtle Conservation Project
TCCP	Turtle Conservation Component Project
TET	Terminal Evaluation Team
TOR	Terms of Reference
TPE	Terminal Project Evaluation
TPR	Tri-partite Review
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

KEY POINTS

- The Project is evaluated as Unsatisfactory.
- The implementation of the Project is evaluated as Highly Unsatisfactory.
- The stakeholder participation is evaluated as Marginally Satisfactory.
- Project monitoring and evaluation has been evaluated as Unsatisfactory.
- The sustainability of the Project has been evaluated as Highly Unsatisfactory.
- Key successes – almost none. The revolving fund established to help resource abusers establish alternative livelihoods is operating successfully and 90 loans have been taken up by 86 people; good social mobilization and community involvement with 18 Biodiversity Societies established at village level and a Biodiversity Task Force formed from these, but sadly without them having a recognised role in either planning or enforcement; the Lunama-Kalametiya Wildlife Sanctuary established in 2006 but with very limited resources for enforcement; the Special Area Management Plan developed for the RUK but without proper integration into the wider planning system and without any resources post project for its implementation.
- Key problem areas – appalling implementation with exceptionally long delays at Project start-up resulting in two years lost; unnecessary delays in obtaining a year's extension resulting in only three months of implementation time available to the Project; egos, personal feuds, political interference, hampering project management and implementation at all levels; inadequate Project oversight; woefully inadequate capacity within the Coast Conservation Department to run the Project; prehistoric accounting system; failure to deliver most Project outputs on the ground or, if delivered, all but one in an unsustainable way.

The Terminal Project Evaluation (TPE) was conducted 5th to 20th March 2007 (27-14 work days) by a team of one international and one national consultant. The TPE occurred nine months after the revised termination date of the Project (30th June 2006) because the UNDP oversight officer had been seconded overseas in between and the Project Terminal Report from CCD was not complete – and still is not. The Terminal Evaluation Team's TOR (Annex I) included a series of Project outcomes that would have been achieved – these expectations form the basis of this summary.

Biodiversity status and trends in the project site defined and analysed.

- Status described at time of Biodiversity Assessment fieldwork (2003) and analysed in Environmental Profile produced in July 2004. Trends partially examined by follow-up surveys – terrestrial December 2003–February 2004 (three months) and November 2004–February 2005 (four months); and coral reefs February 2004–May 2004 (four months); and February 2005–April 2005 (three months), but no continuing monitoring.

Coastal Environmental Profile and Special Area Management (SAM) Plan for Rekawa, Ussangoda and Kalametiya prepared.

- Environmental Profile produced by IUCN and published in July 2004. Used to good effect after Tsunami to determine effects. SAM Plan produced and approved by Director CCD (NPM) and two Divisional Secretaries, but no endorsement from National Level Coordinating Committee (Steering Committee) as per the logframe. Parts of the SAMP have been implemented through Project-based activities, but it appears that there will be no implementation beyond the lifespan of the Project because of lack of funding. Crucially, there was no identification of any possible funding sources within SAMP for its implementation. Furthermore, the SAMP does not appear to be fully integrated into the District nor the Divisional land-use development planning system.

Turtle egg collection arrested and an in situ conservation programme for the globally threatened marine turtles, avifauna and other threatened fauna established.

- *Turtle egg collecting and turtle killing almost eradicated from Rekawa Beach. Conservation programme there likely to continue, mainly through efforts of Turtle Conservation Project (NGO). Effectiveness of Department of Wildlife Conservation patrolling and policing difficult to judge but not seen as being as effective as TCP. No conservation efforts aimed specifically at birds beyond habitat protection through designation of Lunama-Kalametiya Wildlife Sanctuary.*

Mangroves are managed and full range of successional stages established.

- *No mangrove planting has taken place under the auspices of this Project. Some areas in/adjacent to the RUK were replanted under several post-tsunami initiatives although the scientific basis of the planting is suspect and its success is low.*

Biodiversity Task Forces established in each GN divisions and status of biodiversity regularly monitored.

- *BTF formed from three members of each of 18 Biodiversity Societies out of 20 possible. BTF has no legal mandate, no enforcement authority, and is not properly integrated into the development planning system. Despite some training apparently being given in biodiversity monitoring, the BTF is not carrying out any monitoring work at all.*

Coastal Education Research and Visitor Centre established.

- *The Coastal Education Research and Visitor Centre has been partially built at Kalametiya but is not complete and is yet to function.*

Livelihoods of the local communities improved through the introduction of nature-based tourism initiatives and other sustainable sources of income.

- *No baseline data and no impact monitoring carried out so no data upon which to base a measurement. Nature-based tourism restricted to three loan-assisted projects – one successful; one bankrupt; one not nature-based. However, unsustainable practices, namely shell-, sand- and coral-mining are said (by BTF) to have substantially decreased. Training given and loans made from revolving fund to resource abusers appear to have been successful and many alternative occupations now established, e.g. chicken farming, clothes retailer, garage mechanic.*

Productivity of the lagoons restored thereby providing improved livelihood to the local community.

- *No information to suggest that this has been achieved. Restocking of Rekawa Lagoon with shrimp larvae failed.*

Policy level coordination enhanced and law enforcement improved.

- *One District and two Divisional Coordinating Committees established. A functional BTF formed which identifies illegal activities and directs abusers to alternative livelihoods, assisting enforcement agencies where necessary to reduce biodiversity loss. Committees committed to reducing certain activities such as coral-, sand-, and shell-mining, but habitat loss continues from inappropriate developments sanctioned by same committees. BTF lacks any enforcement powers and its legal position within the planning system remains unclear. A strategy for turtle conservation in Sri Lanka has been published by IUCN. The RUK beaches have been declared a Wildlife Sanctuary for turtles under Flora & Fauna Ordinance in May 2006, but the new Sanctuary will require much awareness-raising and education activities to reduce illegal activities. DWC has few resources to undertake such activities nor to carry out effective enforcement despite improved designations and policies. Furthermore, the Sanctuary includes private land making enforcement difficult. The DWC is also trying to declare a Ramsar site in the area, but is meeting fierce opposition from local people and other government departments and officials.*

Water quality and industrial effluent monitoring plan for the project developed and executed.

- *Twelve months of water quality monitoring was undertaken by NARA (12/03-11/04) but no interpretation of the data was provided. This water quality data is now out of date and is likely to have been radically altered by the Tsunami. It can no longer be used as a basis upon which to make development planning decisions. No long-term water quality monitoring was established by the Project.*

Recommendations and Lessons Learned are listed on pages 39-40.

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

1. The Terminal Project Evaluation (TPE) was conducted over the period 5th to 20th March 2007 (14 work days) by a Terminal Evaluation Team (TET) comprising one international and one national consultant. It was carried out nine months after the revised termination date of the Project (30th June 2006). It was planned for November 2006 but the UNDP oversight officer was seconded overseas and the Project Terminal Report from CCD was not complete. The latter is still not complete but the TPE has gone ahead without it, although the nine month period has made access to many of the key Project participants difficult and provided many others with a perfect excuse for having selective memories. The approach was determined by the terms of reference (Annex I) which were closely followed, via the itinerary detailed in Annex II. Throughout the evaluation, particular attention was paid to explaining carefully the importance of listening to stakeholders' views and in reassuring staff and stakeholders that the purpose of the evaluation was not to judge performance in order to apportion credit or blame but to learn lessons for the wider GEF context. Given the problems associated with the selective memories of interviewees, the proclivity of all organisations and many people involved to attach blame to others, and the disconcerting inability of those accompanying the TET in the field to be able to show demonstrable project gains, wherever possible, information collected was cross-checked between various sources to ascertain its veracity, but in some cases time limited this.

2. The Mid-term Evaluation (MTE) undertaken in October 2004 was highly critical of the Project performance and made 26 recommendations to rectify problems. Of these only 12 were subsequently implemented in whole or part by the Project's management (details given in Annex VI). Although this TPE has tried to take the MTE as its baseline, in many instances the problems bedevilling the project have their origins prior to the MTE and hence the TET has had to go back to the start of the Project to either provide context or reasons for subsequent shortcomings.

3. The overall scope of the Terminal Evaluation included the following key issues:

- Assess the extent to which the project achieved the global environmental benefits;
- Assess the effectiveness with which the project addressed the root causes and imminent threats identified by the project ;
- Assess the extent to which the planned objectives and outputs of the project were achieved;
- Describe the project's adaptive management processes – how did project activities change in response to new conditions encountered during implementation, and were the changes appropriate?
- Review the clarity of roles and responsibilities of the various institutional arrangements for the project implementation and the level of coordination between relevant players;
- Review any partnership arrangements with other donors and comment on their strengths and weaknesses;
- Assess the level of public involvement and recommend whether public involvement was appropriate to the goals of the project;
- Describe and assess efforts of UNDP, Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MoFAR) and Coast Conservation Department (CCD) in support of the implementation of the project
- Review and evaluate the extent to which the project impacts have reached the intended beneficiaries;
- Assess the likelihood of continuation and sustainability of project outcomes and benefits after completion of the project;
- Describe key factors that will require attention in order to improve prospects for sustainability of project outcomes and the potential for replication of the approach;

- Assess whether the logical framework approach and performance indicators have been used as effective management tools;
 - Review the implementation of the monitoring and evaluation plans;
 - Review the knowledge management processes of the project; and
 - Describe the main lessons that have emerged in terms of:
 - Country ownership/drivenness;
 - Stakeholder participation;
 - Adaptive management processes;
 - Efforts to secure sustainability;
 - Knowledge transfer; and
 - The role of M&E in project implementation.
4. The original Project logical framework has been used by project management throughout the period of implementation, despite a revised one being recommended and produced. However, this revised version was never formally adopted (see paragraph 10). Therefore, the TET has had no option but to evaluate project performance against the original logframe despite its obvious flaws, and has done so according to the latest six-point evaluation criteria provided to it by the GEF. This is reproduced in Table 1 for clarity.

TABLE 1 : CRITERIA USED TO EVALUATE THE RUK PROJECT BY THE TERMINAL EVALUATION TEAM

Highly Satisfactory (HS)	Project is expected to achieve or exceed all its major global environmental objectives, and yield substantial global environmental benefits, without major shortcomings. The project can be presented as “good practice”.
Satisfactory (S)	Project is expected to achieve most of its major global environmental objectives, and yield satisfactory global environmental benefits, with only minor shortcomings.
Marginally Satisfactory (MS)	Project is expected to achieve most of its major relevant objectives but with either significant shortcomings or modest overall relevance. Project is expected not to achieve some of its major global environmental objectives or yield some of the expected global environment benefits.
Marginally Unsatisfactory (MU)	Project is expected to achieve some of its major global environmental objectives with major shortcomings or is expected to achieve only some of its major global environmental objectives.
Unsatisfactory (U)	Project is expected not to achieve most of its major global environment objectives or to yield any satisfactory global environmental benefits.
Highly Unsatisfactory (U)	The project has failed to achieve, and is not expected to achieve, any of its major global environment objectives with no worthwhile benefits.

5. A full presentation was made by the TET to UNDP, Government, and other stakeholders on 20th March (lists of attendees are given in Annex V) and changes made to the draft report in the light of comments received prior to departure.

PROJECT CONCEPT AND DESIGN

6. The original concept for the Project appears to have been developed by the Turtle Conservation Project (TCP)¹ as one focussed solely on the direct conservation of turtles and awareness-raising about them. That concept was taken to the Sri Lankan Country Office of IUCN-The World Conservation Union (IUCN-SL) for further development. In due course, IUCN-SL involved UNDP and the relevant government agencies, particularly the Coast Conservation Department (CCD) and the Department of Wildlife (DWC) since these agencies a) had a recognised legal mandate for much of the activities proposed, and b) GEF-funded projects have to be country-driven and the funds for implementation channelled through government. However, in doing so, the end result was a project aimed at a much wider intervention than one focussed solely on turtles to one encompassing a much wider range of coastal ecosystem functions and human involvements. This end result had two unexpected consequences that came to light only much later – a) TCP felt the project had been corrupted from its original concept so that now turtle conservation was only a small part; and b) the actual design, having evolved by different interested parties “bolting-on” various components without really thinking how all this would work, created a Project whose complexities were masked by a poorly-designed logical framework which confused Outcomes, Outputs and Activities.

7. TCP’s frustrations with the Project became resentments when they found that their involvement in it was to be limited to only a small part. In turn, this caused minor ill-feeling with IUCN-SL who they appear to have thought had somehow hijacked the project from them, and with DWC who seemed to be controlling everything and not crediting their inputs – the start of a deteriorating situation exacerbated by a conflict over contractual payments (see paragraphs 35 and 125). This could have been avoided if the GEF project design process had been better explained to TCP at the outset. The team leader of the TET has come across this type of problem before, and inevitably it arises out of an ignorance of GEF procedures and requirements by locally-based, usually small, NGOs who, being close to the ground come up with good initial ideas upon which to base a project concept, only to find that it is “taken away from them”. GEF should perhaps take some time to look at this in the wider sphere since the information they currently produce for organisations generating project concepts is either inadequate or is not readily available to its audience, despite the web-site. Perhaps the production of leaflets explaining the procedures and requirements and what could be the expectations of a small NGO involved in GEF projects would be useful for distribution by the seven GEF implementing agencies.

The TET recommends that GEF should look at producing information for, and disseminating it more effectively to, NGOs involved in the conceptualisation and design of GEF-funded projects. This information needs to explain what the GEF process involves, what the basic requirements of implementation are, and what the expectations of an NGO can be regarding their involvement.

8. The Mid-term Evaluation (October 2004) made perceptive analyses of the Project Design, particularly those relating to its complexity. In short, the conceptual framework of the RUK Project comprises what the MTE termed “*three pillars*”:

- *Collaborative planning for biodiversity conservation and natural resources management, based on detailed biological and socio-economic assessments and the SAM process*
- *Threat reduction to biodiversity through the development and adoption of alternative livelihood options for resource abusers*
- *Participatory management of local natural resources”.*

¹ The Turtle Conservation Project is a small NGO operating within Sri Lanka focussed on field-based actions to conserve turtles and raise awareness about them. In the context of this GEF-Project, its name has given much cause for confusion since there is a component also termed the Turtle Conservation Project. In an effort to forge clarity, in this report, the Turtle Conservation Project (TCP) refers solely to the NGO, and we have introduced the term Turtle Conservation Component Project (TCCP) for the turtle conservation component with the overall GEF-Project.

While neither the MTE nor the TET disagree with the basic approaches and concepts to the Project, it is clear that, as the MTE states:

“all three approaches pose complex challenges that could easily overwhelm the limited financial and human resources of the RUK Coastal Project. The ... complexity and ambition of the project concept and strategy has indeed contributed to many of the shortcomings of the project In particular, the need to identify, understand and target the various positive and negative linkages between conservation and development objectives requires a substantial commitment and capacity to translate into effective and efficient results on the ground. The mission feels that it would have been more advisable to limit this mid-size project to only one central approach, be it alternative livelihoods or community management, or, alternatively, explore different options by way of smaller-scale pilots or demonstrations.”

The TET finds that the MTE was absolutely correct, and given the extremely limited resource and technical capacities that the Coast Conservation Department could, or at least did, deploy for the implementation of the Project, the design was far too ambitious, undoubtedly becoming overly complex through its “bolt-on” design process outlined above.

9. The basic design of the Project is also flawed in two other ways. Firstly, the division of the main components into assessment/planning, conservation, and alternative livelihoods, means that not only are many of the links between development and conservation that are necessary in an Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP) disrupted, but in this case where one activity tends to follow on from another, that the Project’s progress can be seriously disrupted by the failure or delay of a single component. Indeed, when applying for an extension to the Project, CCD state in their letter dated 28th February 2006 to the External Resources Department that the reason needed for the extension was because of delays to the scientific studies at the start of the Project. While unnecessarily laying the blame wholly upon this aspect of the Project and those involved (see paragraph 123) rather than their own shortcomings in starting the Project, this illustrates clearly the linear nature and vulnerability of the Project to disruption inherent in its design. Secondly, the logical framework is not only weak with regard to its indicators, but hopelessly confused with regard to its outcomes, outputs and activities. The main consequence of this is, as the MTE points out, *“that there are quite a few outcomes “hidden²” in the results framework, which adds to the conceptual complexity and ambition of the RUK Coastal Project. This proliferation of expected outcomes has substantially undermined the ability of the project to carry out an effective project [implementation] strategy”*, and has overwhelmed the conspicuously limited capacities of the CCD. These flaws do not, as the MTE points out, *“represent an automatic failure of the project but requires conscious and deliberate interventions in project implementation to counter these fragmentary and centrifugal tendencies”* – conscious and deliberate interventions which were beyond the understanding and capability of the Project management to apply. Indeed these fragmentary tendencies were exacerbated throughout by the strategy, in part necessitated by CCD’s technical deficiencies, of hiving off parts of the projects as separate entities to specialist individuals or organisations whom paid almost no attention to what was going on in related studies, again in no small part due to the lack of central coordination provided by the CCD, e.g. the baseline studies were carried out in isolation from each other, the eco-tourism study quoting data on wildlife from other outdated studies when simple coordination would have allowed them access to the biodiversity data being collected concurrently by IUCN-SL for the Biodiversity Assessment; the Turtle Conservation Component Project and its associated awareness-raising and

² To again quote the MTE, *“In order to achieve [its] overarching goal, the project aims at five outcomes. ... A closer look at these outcomes or project components reveals that there are actually more than five. The first outcome covers both the creation of a knowledge base on the project area as well as the collaborative planning. The second outcome comprises the development of collaborative management institutions as well as alternative livelihood opportunities. The third outcome is about conservation efforts, of which the establishment of local biodiversity units is just one part of it. The fourth outcome also consists of two very distinct parts: Policy-level coordination and law enforcement. Last but not least, deals with the monitoring of development impacts.”*

ecotourism elements separated completely from the control of the National Project Manager (NPM) and thereby also from the wider ecotourism parts (plan and development of businesses) and from the training and awareness-raising of the Biodiversity Societies and Task Force.

10. The shortcomings of the logframe noted above were actually first recognised by the second Tripartite Review (TPR) held on 7th October 2003. Here, it was noted that the Project's logical framework needed to be revised "*to cater to the changing needs of the project*", a task given to IUCN-SL (the Project Facilitation Organisation, see paragraph 13). IUCN-SL duly provided a revised edition produced in consultation with the Project staff and having paid particular attention to increasing the number and relevance of the indicators. This was sent to CCD for approval and onward adoption by the NLCC. While the minutes of the 6th Meeting of the NLCC record that IUCN had completed the revision, there is no indication that the NLCC was in receipt of the revised logframe and at no time (6th meeting or later) was it ever adopted by the NLCC. In October 2004, the MTE recommended that the logframe (presumably still the original) be revised and but nothing to this effect is recorded in the minutes of the TPR carried out on 6th December 2004. Nonetheless, IUCN-SL subsequently submitted this second revision to CCD but again, there is no record within the NLCC minutes mentioning it and it seems clear that it too was never adopted. As such, the National Project Manager continued to work to the original logframe throughout his tenure.

11. Given this, the following key objectives were formulated in the original logframe and were used throughout to guide the Project:

Rationale/Goal

To ensure the conservation and sustainable use of the Bio Diversity of this globally significant site through the development of a collaborative management system actively involving local communities, NGOs, and Government agencies

Outcome 1

A coastal environmental profile and a replicable special area management (SAM) plan for Rekawa, Ussangoda and Kalametiya prepared

Outcome 2

Participatory mechanism for resource management developed.

Outcome 3

Conservation programmes for the globally significant biodiversity established at the project site and local biodiversity units established to enhance community awareness.

Outcome 4

Efficient policy level coordination and law enforcement established to improve biodiversity conservation.

Outcome 5

An effective monitoring system in place to assess development activities and their impact to biodiversity.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

12. Implementation of the Project has been abject in most areas throughout the project and in some cases markedly unprofessional. Although the project design has been criticised above, the TET is of the view that with sound implementation, many of the design complexities and difficulties could have

been overcome. In the TET's opinion, the failure of the project to deliver most of its major global environment objectives nor to yield any satisfactory global environmental benefit can be laid squarely at the ineptness of the key players involved in the implementation. Although the TET acknowledges that the tsunami of the 26th December 2004 delivered considerable devastation and loss of life to the RUK coastline, and while paying due respect to those who lost relatives, property, and livelihoods, it is clear that in relation to other sections of the Sri Lankan coastline, the RUK escaped fairly lightly. The TET wishes to stress that in no way can the tsunami be used to justify or excuse the failure of any component part of the Project, although significant delays were encountered as a result of the severe disruption to all national and local administrations experienced at the time, and some minor modifications to the Project ensued. The TET was not granted the opportunity to meet with the National Project Director (formerly the Director of the CCD) despite repeated requests directly by UNDP to him during the terminal evaluation mission, and as such is acutely aware that it has not been able to obtain his side of the story. However, the TET has received too many informal comments from a very wide range of stakeholders about ego and power for there not to have been some fire behind the smoke. While undoubtedly he alone is not to blame, the overall responsibility for the delivery of the implementation of the Project lay squarely on his shoulders, and this delivery has not occurred. As a result, the implementation approach is evaluated as **highly unsatisfactory**.

PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

13. The Project has been executed following UNDP requirement for nationally-executed projects (NEX) by the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) through the **Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MoFAR)**³, and implemented by the **Coast Conservation Department (CCD)** which has had overall responsibility for its management. The CCD was assisted by the Sri Lanka country office of **IUCN-The World Conservation Union (IUCN-SL)** which acted as a **Project Facilitation Organisation (PFO)** through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed with CCD on 6th September 2001. This arrangement seems unusual, but was included in the Project Design Brief where it was stated that:

“A Project Facilitation Organisation (PFO) with proven capabilities in implementation of biodiversity conservation projects will be contracted with to source and provide the technical inputs for the project and to oversee implementation activities.”

It goes on to justify this, thus

“The CCD will need the services of a facilitation organisation as its staff resources are limited and insufficient to deploy the required human resources for project implementation.”

In the TET's view, this should have shrieked a warning to all those involved to pay particular attention to the project's implementation and to provide sufficient support where needed, and yet that warning seems to have gone unheeded throughout.

14. A **National Level Coordinating Committee (NLCC)** was established to oversee project implementation and to facilitate implementation through its high level coordination. Overall decision-making for the Project was still held in the hands of the **Tri-partite Review (TPR)** through its once-a-year meetings. The **District Level Coordinating Committee (DLCC)** was used to aid coordination of government line offices of the District (Hambantota) and the Divisional (Ambalantota and Tangalle) Secretariats and to ensure that key beneficiaries of the Project – the local people – were suitably involved. Indeed, at the grassroots level, social mobilisation was good with 18 of the 20 Grama Niladharis⁴ forming Biodiversity Societies under the Project and through these being involved in other aspects of it. However, ultimately these were to prove of modest relevance (see paragraph

³ This is its current name. At the start of the Project it was the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Development (MFARD); then Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Fisheries (MPSF); then Ministry of Fisheries and Ocean Resources (MFOR); then Ministry of Fisheries, Aquatic Resources and Christian Affairs (MFARCA), and finally to MoFAR.

⁴ This division is the smallest unit of local government equating to a village headman unit and usually comprising 1-3 villages, a total of 60-100 households.

116). Uptake of loans through the revolving fund established by the project was also high with 86 persons from the RUK Project taking up a total of 90 loans.

15. Accordingly, the TET evaluates the stakeholder participation as Marginally Satisfactory.

16. Financing contributions have come from GEF (US\$ 0.73 million), Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) (US\$ 0.97 million in-kind), and IUCN-SL (US\$ 0.02 million in-kind) – total US\$ 1.720 million.

NATIONAL LEVEL ARRANGEMENTS

17. It has been extremely difficult for the TET to piece together the arrangements and problems which have bedevilled the implementation of the Project, and reasons for these, not only because many of them relate directly to political interference in appointments and to inter-personnel conflict between people who should have been working together towards the same aims, but also because the TET has not been able to interview the two key players, namely the NPD and Mr. Prenathilake, the first NPC. In addition, nine months on from the end of the Project, people's memories have become highly selective about how things transpired, and the culture of placing the blame on an absent third party, seemingly so prevalent during the project, continues even now. Notwithstanding this, it has been possible to identify the project management in its widest sense as the key factor that crippled the Project.

Project Execution

Project Commencement

18. The Project was due to start in August 2000, but UNDP were able to send documentation to MoFAR in July thereby marking its formal commencement and setting the end-date as June 2005. MoFAR provided its official endorsement on 19th July 2000 before passing the documents to the External Resources Department (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance. Unaccountably nine months transpired before ERD signed their endorsement. No satisfactory explanation for this was obtainable. Initially, when interviewed, ERD were quick to suggest that Project start-up was supposed to be July 2001 and that any delay from 2000 had to be the fault of the external agencies (UNDP or GEF) (the culture of blame permeating all reaches of government), but when pointed out that MoFAR had signed in July 2000, the importance of screening all projects for fit with government priorities and ensuring no overlap with current or forthcoming projects was stressed and this could reasonably be expected to take two to three months. When it was pointed out further that this Project experienced a nine-month delay, no explanation could be given short of a lack of staff. ERD provided its endorsement on 23rd April 2001 and UNDP ten days later on 3rd May 2001. Interestingly, overlapping with all of this, the Secretary of MoFAR had instructed IUCN-SL to conduct an independent study to assess overlap between this Project and others. This study, reported at the second meeting of the National Level Coordinating Committee in November 2001, indicated that there was no significant overlap and the Project was allowed to commence as per the Project Document. Quite why this occurred when ERD were already screening the project for overlap is wholly unclear.

19. While ERD are undoubtedly accountable for this unforced delay, two points are raised by the issue. Firstly, why did UNDP, as the GEF implementing agency, not chase ERD more effectively over this lengthy period to obtain that endorsement. Unfortunately this will never be answered, lost in the mists of time as it is and with a Project Officer previous to the current incumbent. Secondly, and very much more importantly, in attempting to explain the inexplicable ERD raised an important point regarding design of projects. ERD are aware that projects are designed by overseas organisations and their consultants in collaboration with the technical government departments concerned, and although substantive efforts are made by those organisations/consultants to ensure a fit with government policies and plans, and representations are made through the GEF focal point to ensure coordination, the first time ERD and the National Planning Division get to see proposals is when they are presented

with the completed documents and agencies are seeking endorsement. As such, ERD and the National Planning Division have to go through a time-consuming screening process to ensure compliance. Much better, ERD suggest, if they were to be approached by the design team at the beginning of the process and liaised with closely throughout, thereby avoiding delays at a later stage.

Project Extension

20. First extension: Given the almost two-year delay between the official start of the Project (July 2000) and anything meaningful beginning on the ground, it was inevitable that an extension was going to be required. This was first raised in the NLCC meeting of 23rd March 2004 when the NPD indicated that he would make a request for an extension to ERD which in turn to be passed on to UNDP. Such a request could not be made until the MTE had reported which it did in October 2004, duly recognising that a two-year extension would be most appropriate but recommending that one year would probably be sufficient giving the Project four years' implementation in the field. The first opportunity for a formal request to be made to ERD was at the TPR in November 2004 but inexplicably the ERD was absent (ERD had a similarly bad record of attendance at the NLCC meetings – see paragraph 24). Despite UNDP urging CCD repeatedly to apply early because there can be long delays in obtaining authorisation from UNDP for budget revisions, CCD did not make its first formal request until 17th June 2005, but not through MoFAR. “Stories” reaching UNDP indicated that ERD were not happy about granting an extension so UNDP followed up and a meeting was held between ERD, MoFAR, CCD and ERD on 27th August 2005 to discuss the proposed extension. The minutes of the NLCC meeting of 1st September 2005 show that this meeting was reported and the minutes go on to show that the “*Director ERD refused to have further extension because of a new US\$30 million tsunami rehabilitation project in Hambantota District which might overlap with the RUK Project*”. Various other points were raised to argue against the Director ERD's view but again, of note, the ERD representative to the NLCC was absent and no progress could be made on the issue. In the event, ERD faxed UNDP on 28th September giving its agreement to an extension until 31st December 2005. The key point to this background is that the Project had to cease operations between end June 2005 and sometime in October when UNDP were able to released the funds, thus the six month extension effectively translated into two-and-a-bit months of implementation time at most.

21. Second extension: This small amount of implementation time meant that another extension had to be sought. Despite UNDP again urging CCD to apply early, and as if they had learned nothing from the earlier experience, CCD failed to apply for an extension before 31st December 2005 meaning that the Project again had to cease operations. The first record of CCD requesting an extension from ERD is a letter dated 28th February 2006 sent directly to them. ERD responded by a letter dated 6th March 2006 agreeing to this extension but making it clear that no further extensions would be granted. Unfortunately, UNDP had to turn down CCD's work plan proposed for the period since originally it concentrated on trying to pay bills they had forgotten to pay in the past for consultancies and other work rather than focussing on activities to complete the Project. Agreement was not reached until the end of April and the standard administrative process needed to deposit funds with the Treasury and for a cheque to go on to CCD meant that funds were finally released to CCD on 30th May 2006 meaning that of another six month extension, a usable period of only one month was possible – not enough to undertake any meaningful activities. The upshot is again that out of a year's extension requested, at most three-and-a half-months of seriously disrupted time was available for field activities. Not surprisingly, the local beneficiaries pointed out that the biggest problem with the Project was its stop-start nature.

Project Oversight

22. National level oversight was provided by the National Level Coordinating Committee (NLCC) who met for the first time on 29th May 2001. The NLCC was chaired by the Secretary, MoFAR and comprised members drawn from the relevant government departments, the District Secretary from Hambantota, the Project Directors from “neighbouring” projects (Hambantota Integrated Coastal Zone

Management Plan⁵ and the Coastal Resource Management Plan⁶); UNDP and IUCN. In both the first two meetings of the NLCC, direct reference was made to the fact that the NLCC set within its own TOR to meet once every three months and yet this happened only once when an Acting Secretary of MoFAR was filling the post between more permanent incumbents. Instead it met on average every 5.9 months (see Table 2) and not after September 2005 despite extensions being granted to the Project until June 2006.

TABLE 2 : DATES OF MEETINGS OF NATIONAL LEVEL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Nº.	Date of Meeting	Interval	Nº.	Date of Meeting	Interval
1	29 May 2001	–	6	13 Jan 2004	9 months
2	26 Nov. 2001	6 months	7	23 March 2004	2 months
3	6 June 2002	7 months	8	1 Nov. 2004	8 months
4	10 Dec 2002	6 months	9	31 st March 2005	5 months
5	28 April 2003	4 months	10	1 Sept 2005	6 months

23. Despite the major delay in commencing the Project, the NLCC do not appear to have operated with any great urgency during its inception period. For example, at its first meeting it gave instructions to recruit a National Project Manager (NPM) “*immediately*” and at its second, six months later, promised that “*This appointment will be made by the D/CCD within the next two months*”. Yet at the third meeting, another seven months later, the minutes note that a shortlist of seven candidates has been drawn up from 28 applicants but that these have still not been interviewed – 13 months after commencement and that on top of almost a year’s delay on the projected timetable. The minutes also, not surprisingly, note that having no NPM has “*significantly affected field implementation*”. In another example, the TORs for the technical studies appear to have required approval from the NLCC as reported in the minutes of the fifth meeting. Undoubtedly this was a cause of considerable delay. While it is probably right that the NLCC felt it important to keep reasonably tight control over appointments and TOR, it was incumbent upon it to meet its own TOR and meet every three months. The failure to do this rendered it more of a bureaucratic bottleneck and a liability to the Project rather than a body expediting smooth implementation. Finally, in an effort to speed up appointment of the social mobilisers, also way behind time and having a detrimental effect on the Project, a decision was made to appoint staff from those graduates that had been short-listed for other projects but who had failed to be offered posts in them. Not surprisingly, this back-fired, mainly because they were from outside the area and could not empathise with local issues but also, one suspects, that if they were not good enough to be selected for other projects, why would they be thought to be good enough for this?

24. There were clearly problems in coordination in other ways. ERD apparently did not receive progress reports on the Project, or if they did receive them, they did so very late, and as a result they indicated that they had no idea about progress. However, the NPD pointed out in 10th meeting of the NLCC, when discussing the proposed extension to the project, that ERD were absent and that in fact ERD had attended only one of the ten NLCC meetings and that was why ERD was unaware of the progress of the project. Communications from CCD also did not follow Government rules for inter-ministerial dialogue which forbids direct contact between Departments in different Ministries and requires communications to be routed through the concerned Ministries. The Director of CCD (i.e. the National Project Director) continued to send letters directly to ERD throughout the Project, despite ERD requesting him not to do so and to use the official channels of the MoFAR, thereby incurring further delays.

Project Management

25. Overall direction of the project was the responsibility of the **National Project Director (NPD)**, a part-time position attached to the role of Director of the CCD. The TET has been unable to determine the proportion of his time spent on this Project. The position was held by Dr. R.A.D.B.

⁵ Funded bi-laterally by the Norwegian Government.

⁶ Funded by the Asian Development Bank.

Samaranayake throughout the life of the Project. The NPD is responsible for achieving the Project's objectives and is accountable to the GOSL and UNDP for the use of Project resources. The position held the ultimate authority to expend funds from the Project budget. The NPD was assisted by a **National Project Coordinator**, a position held by two persons, thus:

- Mr. B.H.J. Prenathilake – July 2001 to July 2004.
- Mr. Nimal Rajaratne – August 2004 to March 2006.

26. Day-to-day implementation was the responsibility of a Project Management Office (PMO) eventually located in Hathagala, comprising a full-time **National Project Manager** (NPM) and a range of staff. The NPM was a full-time position recruited from outside of CCD solely for the purposes of this Project, responsible for the delivery of the implementation of all Project activities. The position of NPM was held by Mr. H.P. Siripala from August 2002 until December 2005. From late 2004 until the end, he was assisted by Mr. Dinish Gajamange, the Project Ecologist who was “promoted” to assist the NPM with biodiversity issues. He took over the role of NPM in January 2006 but since the Project was stalled at that point because of delays to the second extension (see paragraph 21) this was not really a functioning role. Moreover, he left at the end of May 2006 at the point when the final money was released.

27. Day-to-day coordination of the Project Facilitation Organisation was the responsibility of IUCN-SL's Project Manager. This position was held by three persons, thus:

- Mr. Shamen Vidanage – June 2001 to July 2002
- Mr. Tissa Ariyaratne – August 2002 to July 2003.
- Mrs. Kumudini Ekaratne – August 2003 to June 2005.

Given the problems with the Project's management in so many areas, it is unfortunate that weaknesses were also present within the PFO and that Mr. Tissa Ariyaratne was sacked from IUCN-SL for non-performance. It is to IUCN-SL's credit, however, that they actually took the necessary steps to replace him – something that perhaps CCD should have done with the NPM – see paragraph 29d. The PFO was dispensed with on completion of IUCN-SL's contract at the end of June 2005 (original project end date) so there was no PFO during the Project extension period (see paragraphs 20-21).

28. Management, in the broadest sense, of the Project appears to have been riddled with personality clashes, resentments, power-games, and outright ineptness, and this more than any other factor is, in the TET's view, the primary reason for the failure of the project. The TET repeats here that in dealing with matters of this nature it is almost impossible to derive the exact source of the problems since people refuse to be candid, do not trust the TET not to quote sources, provide selective accounts that show themselves in the best light, or, as in the case of the NPD, refuse point-blank to be interviewed. Nonetheless, the analysis that follows draws the most coherent picture from the evidence garnered from documents and interviews.

Personal or Departmental Clashes

29. One of the roots of the problems appears to have been a clash between the NPD and the Minister or Secretary of MoFAR. This seems to have manifested itself through interference from MoFAR in the appointment of the NPM – in short, the NPM was appointed to the position on the say-so of someone high in MoFAR and over the head of the CCD. Quite how this meshes with the incredibly slow selection process outlined in paragraph 23 is unclear – perhaps the MoFAR simply got tired of the delay and made the appointment; perhaps someone in MoFAR wanted to have “their” man inside the Project. Whatever, this had five major repercussions:

- a) Communication between the NPD and the NPM – effectively this did not happen. At a very early stage, the NPD inserted the NPC between himself and the NPM so that all communication between the two had to be routed through the NPC in both directions. This not only led to great inefficiencies and miscommunications, but there is undoubtedly a good deal of deliberate intrigue involved with the NPM informing the NPC of something and the NPC passing on a

different view of the information. This also appears to have happened in the other direction. In some instances, approvals were routed through the Deputy Director of the CCD as well, thereby increasing the delays. Quite what the role of the NPC in this was or whether he was acting under NPD instructions is not available to the TET. However, the TET interprets it as a deliberate attempt to make the NPM's role untenable and an attempt to make him resign, thereby getting rid of the MoFAR's influence. In this they failed conspicuously, but not without great cost to the Project in the attempt.

- b) Micromanagement of the NPM – by the NPD leading to unnecessary delays and time-consuming bureaucratic struggles. Given the poor office infrastructure (non-functioning computers in the Project Management Office were still highlighted in the MTE) and general difficulties of e-mail making it necessary to send most things to Colombo by road, the need for the NPM to seek approval to spend anything over US\$ 50 was frankly farcical. The MTE recommended that the “*ridiculously low financial authority of the NPM*” be increased to US\$ 100, and while the infrastructure and transportation problems were solved after the MTE, the financial authority was not raised.
- c) Communication between CCD and MoFAR – appears to have been limited. Apart from their role on the NLCC, MoFAR's role in the Project seems to have been peripheral. It is clear that CCD did not send progress reports on a regular basis to the Ministry, or when it did it did so late, since it is apparent that whenever MoFAR received such reports they were forwarded to ERD – who complained they received very little (see paragraph 24). Furthermore, in communicating with ERD, the NPD continued to flout official channels by by-passing the MoFAR and the Ministry of Finance despite repeated requests from ERD that he so refrain.
- d) The NPM was not a capable project manager – and while there is no guarantee that the long drawn out selection process would have found anyone better, the appointment as made delivered the wrong man. Notwithstanding the fact that nine months have elapsed between the end of the Project and the TPE, it was apparent from the TET's interviews with the NPM that he had only a vague grasp of the issues involved in the Project, remembered little of the components, and much more disconcertingly, seemed to have little understanding of basic project management procedures such as the relevance of the logframe in guiding overall implementation strategy, activity monitoring and ensuring proper certification of work. Indeed, IUCN-SL in their role as PFO seriously question whether the NPM and the PMO were even aware of the Project logframe! His management appears to have been “*lackadaisical*” and the adaptive management undertaken more “*creative re-interpretations*” demonstrating a “*lack of consistency and discipline in project implementation*” – all quotes from the MTE. Both IUCN-SL and UNDP complained to CCD about his performance, the former verbally requesting his sacking on several occasions and the latter verbally requesting a review of his performance in 2004. Apparently this review was carried out, but the results were never shown to UNDP and the TET has failed to see a copy despite determined requests. Of key concern was his apparent lack of understanding of the biodiversity issues involved and, perhaps more importantly, his inability to draw the links between the livelihood development components and the biodiversity – a critical weakness in the light of the poor project design (see paragraph 9). This was highlighted by the MTE who recommended recruiting “*a Deputy NPM with conservation/NRM profile and familiarity with the project area*”.
- e) Fragmentation of the Project – occurred deliberately, presumably to lessen the influence and control of the NPM. Of particular note, the activities dealing with turtle conservation were hived off as a separate project (the Turtle Conservation Component Project) to be run by Department of Wildlife Conservation (DWC) which actually set up its own project steering committee. Although this committee included the NPM, he had no direct management responsibility for the TCCP, met with DWC only monthly, and by his own admission took very little part or interest in the TCCP. In addition, the TORs for the technical studies were controlled by the NLCC and the contracts approved by the NPD as separate entities, not requiring any input from the NPM (nor the PFO).

Weak capacity of the CCD

30. The Project Design Brief makes clear reference to the weak capacity of the CCD, so much so that it recommends that IUCN-SL be hired as a Project Facilitation Organisation, which was done. IUCN-SL appear to have performed that role stolidly, if uninspiringly. However, even the presence of IUCN-SL has not been enough to overcome the deficiencies of the CCD and, frankly, the TET wonders why anyone involved in the Project's design thought they could carry out such a project in the first place. But this seems to be a major weakness in the design process – there is no professional assessment of the capacity of a proposed executing agency during the design, and not enough attention paid to other projects either in, or forthcoming, the portfolio of the proposed executing agency within the lifespan project's of the proposed Project.

The TET recommends that GEF consider adding a professional capacity assessment of the proposed executing agency(ies) to the design of all Projects to ensure proficient implementation of the Project on the ground.

The TET recommends that close attention is paid by project design teams to other projects in, or forthcoming to, the portfolio of the proposed executing agency to ensure that there is adequate spare capacity to undertake the proposed project.

31. While the professionalism of the NPD in running this Project is seriously under question, and the NPM's management has been identified as weak, remaining sections of CCD fare no better. The TET has no information on the first NPC, but the second NPC also seems to have had little understanding about nor knowledge of the Project and appears not to have visited the field site more than a couple of times even though he functioned to all intents and purposes as the NPM from January 2006 after Mr. Siripala left. Perhaps this is not to unexpected since Mr. Rajaratne at least held the post in a part-time capacity only, having to still complete his normal job within CCD while spending an additional day per week or per fortnight as the RUK NPC. Nonetheless, the TET was shown a canal built out of project funds that at the very best is marginal to the Project's logframe (see Annex IV) and when questioned as to how the decision had been made, the second NPC appeared to have no idea. Similarly, the TET was attempting to track the whereabouts of monies left over from the ecotourism business component (only three grants had been taken up of ten available) and again the NPC purported to have no idea. And yet when the paperwork was finally traced, it was the NPC's explicit recommendation that the money left over from the ecotourism business component could be re-directed to build the canal.

32. The issue of part-time working and doubling-up of jobs, also raises the more general issue of the validity of "in-kind" contributions by Governments. All too frequently, it seems as if civil servants are asked to undertake project activities as additions to their regular jobs, resulting in stress, poor work, and inadequate time being committed to the job at hand, and as a result the project suffering. "In-kind" contributions are believed to be undertakings by Governments to commit paid staff full time to project activities and for their regular posts to be temporarily filled by other personnel – that cost being born as the contribution. This rarely seems to occur – here is no exception – and no "financial" accounting or auditing of this type of contribution ever seems to be made.

Financial Management

33. What is considerably more troubling is the inadequate financial management of the Project. In the short time available to the TET, and given the magnitude and complexity of some of the other problems besetting the Project, it was not possible to undertake more than a cursory examination of the finances. However, even that was enough to set the alarm bells ringing. The TET paid considerable attention to exploring how the Project knew whether it had sufficient funds under a given component to approve an activity. Apparently it did not. The money was all kept in one large pot and the main ledger comprises only three columns – date, payee, amount. There is no cross-referencing and no details of what the payment was for. Apparently, incredible as it seems, the NPM (and presumably the NPD) had no means of producing basic management accounts to examine the progress

of disbursements against component or against input (e.g. transport). In order to check even basic expenditure against a sub-contract within the Project, each previous receipt had to be found and added before approval for further payments could be made. This had to be repeated for each and every payment. The TET can only guess at the painstaking analysis required each time CCD had to make a Quarterly Report to UNDP.

34. Furthermore, from only the brief scrutiny that the TET was able to give the finances, a number of irregularities showed up. For example, originally there was a budget US\$10,000 earmarked for ten loans of US\$ 1,000 to kick-start ecotourism businesses. In the event, only three loans were made, but these were disbursed from the revolving fund administered by the Batata South Fisheries Cooperative, not from the allocated budget within CCD. Instead, it was discovered that US\$ 8,250 of this money was re-directed and used to get the Department of Drainage and Irrigation to build a 500m canal between a recently completed irrigation project and Muththagaha Tank. Although dressed up originally as having been undertaken to enhance the waterhole for wildlife, subsequently to boost ecotourism, and finally to enhance livelihoods in relation to local wildlife, the paper work clearly shows that the NPM and then the NPC made the recommendation to carry it out at the behest of local people keen to ensure adequate water supplies for their crops in the dry season, and nothing directly to do with the Project.

35. The Project's accounts have been audited annually by the Auditor General (AG). The results of the delayed audit for 2005⁷ arrived towards the end of the TPE and show a number of questionable findings. The TET is a little surprised at how easily the UNDP Country Office seems to be in accepting CCD's explanation of some of the reasons for the AG's findings. There are a number of issues that do not seem consistent, e.g. DWC are delaying payments of US\$ 13,000 to TCP over irregularities in their invoicing (and TCP have continued to carry out their contractual responsibilities as far as they can using their own money) and yet a sum of US\$ 19,500 had paid the Biodiversity Task Forces, AGA Ambalantota and NARA up-front to carry out work which they were then advised to postpone but which they did anyway. More amazing, given the lengths to which ERD went to in screening the Project to prevent overlap with other projects and the fact that the Secretary of MoFAR commissioned a study by IUCN-SL to examine the degree of overlap with other projects, is the fact that the AG found that a sum of US\$ 43,250 was spent by the DCC on preparation of a SAMP for the RUK while the same plan was being funded by another foreign-funded project! CCD's explanation is that *"Auditors were not provided with adequate explanations on how the integrated planning process worked. ADB CRMP prepared a SAMP for Kalametiya. SAMP developed by the project covers the entire stretch of RUK focussing on areas not covered by the CRMP and has ensured minimum overlap of planning."* The TET believe this to be arrant nonsense, since however one views this there is duplication. Either the plans for the Kalametiya area are the same (that produced by the CRMP having been lifted directly into the RUK SAMP where it forms the SAMP for that area of the RUK and hence money from the original design budget would have been saved because the original design did not take the CRMP Kalametiya planning component into account), or they are different in which case the work has been duplicated. And then there are the issues raised about the re-direction of ecotourism funds for construction of a canal (of dubious benefit to the Project's aims) without UNDP authorisation; money given for planting of mangroves when IUCN-SL say no mangrove planting was carried out under the Project; and issues over re-stocking Rekawa Lagoon with shrimp larvae. Given the extremely limited outputs and benefits to conservation that the TET could find on the ground; the primitive way in which the accounts were kept; the number of inconsistencies and financial irregularities that were found on only a cursory examination; the poor state of the files generally with various papers lost (or at least inexplicably missing); and the strong tendency of CCD towards creative reporting, (see paragraph 36), the TET considers that it would not be out of place to have this Project audited externally by UNDP or GEF HQ.

<p>The TET recommends that in the light of a number of inconsistencies, financial irregularities and other factors including very limited visible outputs, consideration should be given to having the RUK</p>

⁷ The 2006 audit was being undertaken at the time of the TPE.

Creative Reporting

36. The Project Implementation Reports submitted to UNDP and forwarded to GEF are largely exercises in self-assessment. The TET has examined these and is concerned that in far too many cases the information given is misleading, describing a level of detail from “project monitoring” that is simply not there, e.g. 2006 PIR; 3rd indicator reads “88% of resource abusers in coral/shell mining and lime production industry within RUK area reduced”, or 10th indicator reads “1,500-2,000 tourists now visit the RUK area per year”, when in fact there is no monitoring system in place that could establish such “facts” to this level of accuracy. Throughout (except for ratings of 2002 progress given in the 2003 PIR), the self-assessment rating has been overly-generous rating progress on outcomes as Satisfactory or even Highly Satisfactory when the reality is very different. As a result the TET wonders what the value of such reports are to GEF HQ since such creative reporting produces a) a picture of project control that is not born out by this evaluation, and b) a picture that purports to show project progress in an optimistic light – either from fear of criticism or from a complacent, rosy view of the world. The consequence is that those who need to know and who could have provided help did not know that help was needed.

Role of the Project Facilitation Organisation

37. The PFO appears to have provided a great deal of much-needed support and guidance to CCD throughout the Project’s lifespan and it is unlikely that the Project would have achieved even the extremely modest gains that it has without them. However, the role still sits uncomfortably with the TET, as it did with the MTE. An organisation which, according to its Memorandum of Understanding with the CCD not only fulfils a number of facilitation tasks (e.g. coordination, reporting, work planning, technical review of proposals) but also provides technical inputs to the project seems to contradict the established principles of separation of powers. The TET stresses that it in no-way finds fault with IUCN-SL in this, but agrees strongly with the MTE that “It would have been more “honest” to make IUCN the implementing agency, if CCD cannot fulfil this role”, which in retrospect it appears not have been able to.

Effects of the Tsunami

38. On 26th December 2004 the Project area, along with the entire east, south and west coast of Sri Lanka was hit by a natural disaster, a series of Tsunami waves. This natural disaster had enormous immediate and lasting impacts on the coastal area’s populations, communities, settlements and ecosystems. However, the impacts on the flora and fauna in the Project area have been limited, patchy and temporary. The majority of the mangrove stands remained intact. Damage was very serious behind areas of coastal modification or where sand dunes had been removed, building constructions made and artificial channels constructed. The socio-economic impacts on the local communities in the RUK area were also relatively limited. Seventeen villages were affected but with relatively low mortality. Damage was restricted to houses and fishing boats and their gear. Impacts at the household level were severe but have not led to major disruptions of village or district level economies. The local fishing industry had been particularly affected through damage and loss to boats, motors, equipment and nets; and consequently there have also been associated economic losses to those reliant on the fisheries, e.g. fish traders and general retailers selling goods to fishermen.

39. From the Project perspective, a range of impacts emerged from the Tsunami and associated relief efforts. Government, NGOs, and relief agencies were extremely active in providing much needed services and infrastructure redevelopment to the area. Through their efforts they also were generating a series of indirect impacts on the social, economic and environmental conditions in the Project area. Since all the stakeholders and management of the Project took part in the Tsunami relief work, Project implementation activities were hampered and retarded. Similar involvement of Government officers beyond the scope of the Project also led to substantial delays in implementing its activities.

40. In February 2005, a UNDP-GEF mission visited the Project and assessed the extent to which it needed to be changed as a result of the Tsunami and subsequent relief activities. This mission determined that the Project goal and outcomes were still valid in the light of the impacts to the RUK Project area from the Tsunami and did not require change. Re-alignment of the project design was, however, necessary to respond to the changed environment, and certain activities needed to be added to each Outcome. Thus, the Outcomes 2, 3 and 4 were re-phrased and a selected number of additional activities were recommended within each of these while emphasising that the revision needed to be undertaken within remaining budget (see Annex VII). However, despite these recommendations, none of these amended RUK Project Activities were ever incorporated into the work plans of the Project for implementation.

Project Progress and Financial Assessment

41. The UNDP-wide change from the input-based Financial Information Management System (FIMS) to the output-based ATLAS accounting system occurred for this Project in 2004. As such it is impossible to track output-based finances for the entirety of this Project. Usually, output-based financial information acts as an excellent surrogate indicator of Project implementation progress. In this case, however, money has been disbursed, suggesting activities have been done, when in fact on-the-ground implementation is incomplete; e.g. payments have been made from CCD to DWC for the TCCP (registering as disbursements made) but have not yet been passed onto TCP because activities are still outstanding. Therefore, although the TET has pursued this line of enquiry, it has found nothing meaningful to report.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Internal Project M&E

42. Project monitoring and evaluation has been evaluated as **Unsatisfactory**. In addition to the Mid-term Evaluation carried out in October 2004, M&E of Project activities have been undertaken at three levels:

- i. Progress monitoring
- ii. Internal activity monitoring
- iii. Impact monitoring

43. Progress monitoring has been made through quarterly and annual reports made by the Project, and drafted by the PFO for CCD. In the absence of a functioning monitoring system run by the PMO, these reports were only qualitative assessments. Where quantitative (target versus achievement) information has been given, it was a best guess made by the PFO at the time – not an actual measurement. These reports have been submitted to UNDP and were supposed to be forwarded by the NPC to the MoFAR and Ministry of Finance (for ERD). Although UNDP received their copies on time, there seem to have been problems with the transmittal to the Ministries, perhaps as a result of the strained relations, and these bodies tended either not to receive them at all or receive them very late.

44. The UNDP Sri Lanka Country Office has no formal quarterly reporting system, which really has not helped things with this particular Project, and just requires a report on what outputs have been delivered and, where these have not been delivered as expected, the status of the relevant activity(ies) that will produce them. The quarterly reports have been sent to UNDP and form the basis for the preparation of the 100-word fixed-format UNDP report forwarded to GEF. UNDP has also monitored the Project through annual field visits in 2002-2005 which are reported in the form of a Field Visit Report for internal UNDP use. An additional joint UNDP-GEF mission visited the Project area in February 2005 to assess the effects of the Tsunami on the Project and make recommendations (see Annex VII). The Annual Progress Reports (APR)/Project Implementation Reports (PIR) sent to GEF through UNDP are compiled by the Project itself with limited inputs from UNDP and no form of verification. Although the Project was community-based and focused on the active participation of

local communities, the APR/PIR were not submitted to the District or Divisional administrations or to any of the communities.

45. Internal activity monitoring was supposed to be undertaken by the Project itself to assess project implementation and accomplishments to serve as guide for the project management team. Four areas of internal activity monitoring were supposed to occur:

- i. Project Management – at which the NPM was to monitor his work plan at the field level and coordinate with the implementation of the decisions taken at the CCCCs, e.g. the livelihood programmes, Biodiversity Task Force (BTF), and the social mobilisation work.
- ii. Other Agencies – some activities were undertaken by agencies other than the Project Management Office, e.g. preparation of the SAM plan,.
- iii. Special Assignments – undertaken with the IUCN-SL in regard to biodiversity survey, biodiversity monitoring, and the work related to training the BTF.
- iv. TCCP – undertaken by the DWC and whose activities were supposed to be monitored through the regional office of the DWC.

However, lack of capacity, lack of understanding, and the fragmentary nature of the Project meant that this did not happen. Basically, it appears that the project team was not aware of the Project logframe, and no proper monitoring tools were provided by the NPM to his staff. The problem was identified and addressed by IUCN-SL in their role as PFO, who supported the NPM to prepare a field monitoring programme with an appropriate data collection and reporting system. In addition, three training sessions were run by the PFO for the PMO demonstrating the necessary formats to be used in activity monitoring. However, these programmes were affected by transport problems, staff transfers, and a lack of interest at the field implementation level. Several meetings were conducted by the PFO with the NPM and NPC and although decisions were reached and communicated to CCD for effective implementation, these were not carried through. This lack of basic activity monitoring combined with a penchant for creative reporting left a Project already floundering in a sea of bureaucratic delay, wallowing without direction.

46. All the special studies contracted to various consultancy organisations fell outside of the reach of the NPM and the PFO and no monitoring as such took place, although the final reports were reviewed by the PFO on the request of the NPC. Implementation of the SAM plan recommendations fell outside of any body's defined mandate and also did not occur.

47. Impact monitoring to assess the impacts of Project activities does not appear to have been undertaken at all. Given that the need for such monitoring is implicit to some of the success criteria in the logframe:

“Rational/goal ... Local communities gain increased income from sustainable livelihood practices through ecotourism and increased production in the lagoon”; and

“Outcome 2 ... Number of sustainable livelihood activities identified and supported; annual socio-economic assessments revealing increased family incomes”

it defies all logic as to how the PMO thought it was going to measure these without undertaking a system of impact monitoring, although perhaps this too fell victim to the PMO's lack of awareness of there being a logframe. This is all the more surprising since in response to a decision taken at the TPR in September 2003 and endorsed by the NLCC to develop a Monitoring and Evaluation Framework and outcome indicators for the Project's Annual Work Plans the PFO, in consultation with the PMO (NPM and Social Mobilisers), established 1) a Management Information System (MIS) functional within the CCD designed to store and update data generated from the field and from other studies on an ongoing sustainable basis; and 2) a Monitoring and Evaluation system operationalised so as to continue after the life of the project including the necessary data collection forms for both long-term, community-based biodiversity monitoring and for project impact monitoring of socio-economic indicators. This was started in May 2004 and completed early in 2005 (a little late to be of very

substantive use given that a database operator was to be hired to input all the data over the ensuing 12 months) and sent to the NPM. The TET understands that this was never used by the Project, although all the baseline data from the six studies under Component 1 and all the data collected from IUCN-SL's biodiversity monitoring surveys was input into the database. The PFO chased the NPM on a monthly basis (or otherwise appropriate interval) for data but never received any such data.

48. Within the TCCP has basic data been recorded, such as the number of turtle nests protected. Simple and verifiable impact indicators, such as gross monthly income of Project beneficiaries, or area of shell mining restored, have not been measured. There has been no attempt to quantify the impacts of training or of education and awareness activities undertaken, it seemingly having been enough to have completed the contractual obligations without too much thought as to determining the activities' success.

Other Monitoring Activities

49. The project has undertaken specific baseline surveys on biodiversity and on various socio-economic aspects. In addition, actual monitoring of biodiversity and other environmental variables has also taken place as a component of the Project. These are described and assessed under Component 5 – see paragraph 105 *et seq.*.

PROJECT RESULTS

SUMMARY EVALUATION

50. Overall, the TET evaluates the Conservation of the RUK Coastal Ecosystem Project to have been unsatisfactory. A summary evaluation by Project Output is given in Table 3 and a more detailed summary of the level of achievements made against the indicators of success contained in the logframe is given in Annex IV. Results are discussed below by Project Output and key sectoral or cross-cutting issues are then discussed in the ensuing section.

TABLE 3 : EVALUATION OF THE EXPECTED END OF PROJECT SITUATION AS PER THE ORIGINAL LOGFRAME⁸

Output		Evaluation*					
		HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Rationale/ Goal	To ensure the conservation and sustainable use of the Biodiversity of this globally significant site through the development of a collaborative management system actively involving local communities, NGOs, and Government agencies.						
Outcome 1:	A coastal environmental profile and a replicable special area management (SAM) plan for Rekawa, Ussangoda and Kalametiya prepared.						
Outcome 2:	Participatory mechanism for resource management developed.						
Outcome 3:	Conservation programmes for the globally significant biodiversity established at the project site and local biodiversity units established to enhance community awareness.						
Outcome 4:	Efficient policy level coordination and law enforcement established to improve biodiversity conservation.						
Outcome 5:	An effective monitoring system in place to assess development activities and their impact to biodiversity.						

Note: * HS = Highly satisfactory; S = Satisfactory; MS = Marginally satisfactory; MU= Marginally unsatisfactory; U = Unsatisfactory; HU = Highly unsatisfactory.

⁸ See paragraph 10.

PROJECT OUTPUTS

Outcome 1: A coastal environmental profile and a replicable special area management (SAM) plan for Rekawa, Ussangoda and Kalametiya prepared

Biodiversity Assessment

51. IUCN was contracted. Two surveys have been carried out aiming in documenting the status of the inland and marine sub-tidal biodiversity in the RUK Project area, from October 2002 – to March 2003 (6 months) and January – March 2006 (4 months). Surveys have enabled to document fauna, flora, associated habitats and ecologically important areas. The surveys also provided information on anthropogenic disturbances that were prevailing. Several threats, which affecting the inland and sub-tidal biodiversity have also been documented. Recommendations have been made on the levels of ecological significance and habitat degradation status of the inland and sub-tidal sites. It has further identified major development initiatives operating in the same area.

52. TET has been informed that the IUCN has recommended the DWC to nominate RUK area as a Ramsar site due to the presence of migratory birds in large numbers and other ecological importance. These recommendations were based on biodiversity and other assessments of the Project area

53. Marine and terrestrial biodiversity surveys have also been done by IUCN, and used to good effect for collaborative planning. TET is very much concerned about the results of the biological resources status as any future monitoring programme can not be based on these reports as it does not provide any quantitative information on inland biodiversity for future monitoring programmes.

Rapid Livelihood Assessment

54. Livelihood Assessment in Rekawa, Usangoda and Kalamtiya (RUK) area has been contracted to Industrial Services Bureau North Western Province (ISB-NWP). ISB-NWP has conducted a survey from September 2003 to January 2004 for a period of five months (5) covering twenty (20) coastal Grama Niladhari (GN) divisions in Hambantota, Tangalle and Ambalanthota Divisional Secretary (DS) areas with the objective of addressing the answers for destructive livelihood practices prevailing in the Project area. The report has also taken into consideration the secondary data available from Hambantota Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project (HICZMP), Coastal Resources Management Project (CRMP,) Other studies of RUK Project and Industrial Service Bureau (ISB-NWP). Study revealed that the Marine fishery and Agriculture are the main livelihood practices encountered. In addition, in certain villages, Lagoon fishery and Inland fishery were also playing significant contributions to livelihood practices. It also revealed that Agriculture including paddy and vegetable were the other major livelihood practices prevailing. Study has identified that the destructive practices carried out on natural resources were coral mining, shell mining, turtle egg poaching, bottom set net using and cutting mangroves for domestic purposes and coral lime kilns. It has recommended the possible alternative livelihood practices should be coupled with core livelihood practices such as fishery and agriculture practices of the area, if long term planning of sustainability is considered. Report has recommended cultivation and processing of Citronella, Nursery Management and Eco-tourism are the most suited potential alternative source of income generating activities for the RUK area.

55. Training needs assessment highlighted a need for a technical training for those who would be engaged in alternative source of income generating activities. It has shown, coastal resource abusers were below the national poverty line and emphasised the need for training in business skills development and finance resources management aspects . It further recommended three principles that should be followed and considered in establishing Revolving Fund loan under RUK project to provide financial support through micro credit scheme. Bata Atha South Fisheries Cooperative Society (BSFCS) (a registered cooperative society) was one of the societies that have been recommended among the institutions located in the area for operating Revolving Fund.

56. TET feels that status of the attitudes of the communities towards bio-diversity conservation has not been properly assessed and documented, though it had been a prime requirement under the survey for planning of Project activities.

Water Quality Study

57. Water quality study programme has been contracted to National Aquatic Resource Agency (NARA) in November 2003. Studies have been carried out for a period of one year starting from December 2003 to November 2004 to assess the processes and categories of development activities that have or were likely to have adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity of the Lagoons. Fourteen sites (14) have been sampled and series of monthly reports on data form have been made available as progress report without any factual comments. The main focus of this water quality studies were on Trace metals, pesticide residuals and agrochemical that have been accumulated in the lagoon water. NARA laboratory was hit by tsunami waves and further laboratory tests were not possible, making sample analysis difficult and impossible. However, no significant differences with standard values of the lagoon water quality were noted.

58. TET notes that the water quality studies have been done without much concerned of its out comes. These reports do not provide any meaningful discussions and factual findings. TET considers proper terms of references have not been drafted with the MOU signed between NARA and CCD for this purpose. Submitting reports on data form were baseless and it should have been reviewed by a technical expert so that it could have been take when management decisions were taken.

Shell Resource Study

59. A study was undertaken by IUCN SL to investigate and asses the nature of seashell mining, and identify the environmental and socio economic problems, and also to provide management guidelines during for the Project. The study was completed in 2003 and final report submitted in December 2003. Literature survey has also been carried out aiming at reviewing the existing materials to document the information on physical, socio-economic, legal and institutional aspects of seashell resources management. It provided the extent of Seashell resources in the area, and identified four categories of Seashell mining: practices: individual permit holders, group permit holders, homestead illegal miners and the state land illegal miners. The report described the distribution of seashell deposits and legal and institutional procedure for law enforcement.

60. TET with the view that that it is difficult to ascertain the present level of exploitation . Some Recommendations given were general statements with a recommendation for a sustainable seashell mining plan.

Coastal Environmental Profile

61. Coastal Environment Profile for the RUK area by the IUCN in 2004 under the assignment awarded to them by CCD, made it available to prepare the SAM plan. This Environment profile provided fundamental steps towards the development of SAM plan for RUK area. It has also provided source of back ground information and base line data of the area in a substantial manner It also described the physical biological, socio-economical institutional and legal aspects in resource management.

62. However, TET feels some of the quantitative information could have been properly provided in respect of information on biological resources.

Special Area Management Plan

63. SAM plan was prepared by IUCN 2005 in line with Environmental profile of the area. An addendum has been incorporated with amended activities after the tsunami in 2005. However, activities of the project have also been identified as some activities of the SAM plan. Thus some of the activities have begun before the SAM plan was made available. However, SAM plan has been

designed for a short period of time and activities have been planned only for a limited period of time. Budgetary allocations were not provided.

64. TET feels that long term activities and budgetary allocations have not been properly incorporated into the activities of the plan. Thus, it needs vigorous revisions in the future.

Postgraduate studies

65. Opportunities were originally identified within the Project to undertake two post-graduate Masters studies for people (CCD officers preferred) to be nominated by the NPD and endorsed by the Secretary and the Minister of MoFAR to pursue higher studies on collaborative management of coastal biodiversity to the benefit of the RUK area in relation to the establishment of a Ramsar site in the area. In the event, one study was undertaken by Mr. Prenathilake for a Diploma in Thailand! UNDP agreed the study on condition that the necessary dissertation was on the RUK area and the report made available to them. UNDP report that this was not carried out in the RUK and that no dissertation was submitted to them. The TET has similarly not been able to access this dissertation.

Outcome.2: Participatory mechanism for resource management developed

Implementation of the SAM Plan

66. Activities of the project have been started before the approval of the SAM plan. However, Project activities had been incorporated into SAM plan. An addendum has also been added with amended activity plans after the tsunami. TET feels that SAM plan prepared for RUK area is not a practical and can not be fully implemented. It deals only with activities during the Project period. Certain activities have not been identified for long term management purposes. However, money that had been allocated in the SAM plan has already been spent on activities not even included in the log frame of the Project document. Eg Eco-tourism fund has been used for a canal construction that carries used water of a irrigation project for a tank adjacent to Usangoda to cultivate vegetable, on the request made by a community. TET feels that it was not an acceptable decision.

Training of Local Communities of Sustainable Biodiversity-Related Handicrafts and Products

67. Training requirements for the exploitation of resources dependent on to eco-friendly products have been identified, and training has been provided to local people under different components of the project to develop collaborative management frame work to minimize and mitigate destructive livelihood practices and encourage them to move forward along sustainable alternatives.. Training programmes have been conducted taking views and information of other studies. 157 individuals trained starting up of alternative livelihood. Among them sixty people were trained in reed handicraft while 20 people have been selected for batik industry. Twenty villagers were trained to obtain driving licence. Twenty members were trained in basic computer skills. Communities were provided with two sewing machines after training. Ten groups were provided with training for starting up ecotourism activities and three people have managed to set up their eco-tourism venture

68. TET feels that the training component was satisfactory and it should have been conducted in different phases so that communities can get maximum benefit from the project.

Revolving Fund for Sustainable Livelihoods

69. The revolving fund, established with the participation of the 18 Biodiversity Societies operating within the area, has been well-managed by the Bata-atha South Fisheries Cooperative⁹. Training programmes have been conducted in two phases and the revolving fund has provided 90 loans to 86 members. The number of small-scale enterprises receiving loans from the fund for developing sustainable livelihood activities continues to increase and the demand for micro-credit in the RUK area was very high. The original seed capital from GEF was approximately US\$ 39,600 made in three

⁹ Now the Idiwara Fisheries Bank.

tranches between June 2004 and December 2005, and despite taking into account the US\$ 3,300 lost in defaulted loans, the current value of the fund is US\$ 40,130. The rate of defaults on loans is low – nine from 90, i.e. 10%; but of these, five were as a direct result of the tsunami. Only in one area has there been a problem and that relates to the loans given to the ecotourism businesses. These were supposed to receive loans of up to US\$ 1,000 from a separate budget within CCD, to be kept wholly separate from the revolving fund. Somehow, the three loans (of the ten budgeted) for ecotourism were made directly from the revolving fund – on whose authority and through what decision-making process the TET has not been able to elucidate; another in the catalogue of weak financial management decisions and records of this Project. The original budget for ecotourism was subsequently redirected to build the Muththagaha Canal without proper authorisation.

Income generating opportunities

70. Livelihood Assessment in Rekawa, Usangoda and Kalamtiya (RUK) area has been contracted to Industrial Services Bureau (ISB) North Western Province. They have conducted survey from September 2003 to January 2004 for a period of (5) five months covering (20) twenty coastal Grama Niladari (GN) divisions in Hambantota, Tagalle and Ambalanthota DS area

71. Marine fishery and Agriculture and Lagoon fishery and inland fishery were the main contribution to livelihood practices in addition to Agriculture including paddy and vegetable within RUK Area. It recommended that livelihood practices should be coupled with existing practices of the area. It further recommended Eco-tourism is the most suited for RUK area.

72. TET revealed that adequate attention has not been paid for monitoring activities of income generating activities implemented by the Project. Some members of the society are defaulted and income has gone down due to non availability of other activities that are linked together. Not availability of Information centre has serious impact on Eco-tourism at community level

Eco-tourism Programme

73. A detailed eco-tourism plan has been prepared in achieving the objectives of the Project, by the Sustainable Development Consultants (Pvt) Ltd during the period in late October 2003 and mid March 2004 .It deals with the community involvements and bringing benefits to local resource abusers through community based tourism activities (Eco-tourism). TET is satisfied with the Eco-tourism development plans produced. It linked with visitor centre and web site to obtain information on Eco-tourism activities and places of interest in RUK are. However, TET was able to assess the application of this plan on the ground during field visit. One person who took a loan was doing his venture in line with basic eco-tourism requirements. The second person who obtained a loan, has put up a room adjacent to his house, away from any sensible area. However TET inspected the site and observed that the facility was not available for tourist activities at present. Third member who took the loan from RLF has failed in his venture as it was not making any profitable income due to non availability of other resources and activities linked with Eco-tourism plan, in the area. He is a debt person and victim of the bad project advices and management.

74. However, TET was very much concern about the failure of the Project management in implementing the eco-tourism plan at ground levels. Other facilities linked with Eco-tourism plan were not available in RUK area. In addition eco-tourism projects supported by the Project were limited to three and those activities were far from the basics, concepts and practices of eco-tourism.

75. A visitor centre and web site promised to provide information on ecotourism activities and places interest etc. have not made available in the area yet due to non availability of funds to complete the task. Visitor centre/ Biodiversity centre has been partially built at Kalametiya and yet to function. TET feels that the Eco-tourism Plan can not be implemented fully as budget allocated for identified eco-tourism ventures has already been used by the CCD for non related project(Canal construction at Usangoda).

Control of Shell- and Coral-mining

76. A large number of awareness programmes have been implemented in the RUK area under the Project for villagers, school children and government officials with the support from law enforcement agencies, BBDTF and BDS with the objectives of reducing and controlling coral mining and shell mining of the RUK area. Cumulative effect of the awareness and training programmes launched and law enforcement and education programmes conducted by DWC and the Project, have also contributed to a significant reduction of these activities within RUK. However, data was not available with DWC or any other government agency or society to support the ground situation. Sign boards and other related information available in the area, made the community aware of the illegal and destructive activities which led to a satisfactory level of reduction. In addition mapping of shell mining areas with recommendation for suitable shell mining areas also made community away from illegal activities within wildlife Reserves.

Development Of Methods Of Backfill And Landscape Recovery

77. TET confirm the necessity of continuing monitoring of the Project activities to ascertain the efficacy of the Project. However TET is not in a position to evaluate the efficacy of one programme on the reduction of coral mining as TET feels it was a cumulative effect.

78. Even though the Project has identified this component as a vital part of the project, TET was unable to locate or see any backfill and landscape recovery area within RUK area.

79. TET express its concern over the important activities that were not got off the ground and Officers of the project was unable to provide any information on this aspect.

Establishment of CBOs

80. To ensure that the local people participate actively in, and manage, the biodiversity conservation of their surroundings within RUK area, the Project has established a Biodiversity Conservation (Societies BDCS) for villagers located within SAM area. A total of 18 BDCS with the participation of villagers and resource abusers have been formed. These committees have built solidarity amongst the community members and formed Biodiversity Task Force (BTF). BTF has three representatives from each of the BDCS. Although frequent orientation, meetings and workshops have been held by the Project to build the capacity of members BTF, their institutional capacity still needs to be improved significantly to establish a systematic operation.

81. The Project has not developed principal operational guideline for the BTF and sustainability of their existence is questionable when the project was over. However they are entitled to obtain loan from revolving fund. However, these DBTF or BDCS lack any legal jurisdiction, e.g. although local people are trying their level best to reduce illegal activities such as shell mining, mangrove cutting and sand mining, because of the lack of alternative for poor villagers as a source of income, the practice continues and the BTF or BDCS are unable to control it.

82. The TET observed that the BTF and BDCS, having been able to earn the trust and respect of a target group, has not become widely accepted and appreciated in its programmes of the DS areas. This trust has enabled the Project to implement all of its components smoothly within the target areas. Communities are now aware about RUK Project interest in biodiversity conservation and endangered species such as Turtles, however most of them remain unaware of, and do not understand, the global importance of these species and their conservation.

Restocking of Rekawa Lagoon

83. NARA has been entrusted with the task of Restocking lagoon for improved fishery programme. Restocking was done at Rekawa lagoon to increase the productivity in terms of shrimp production. 1st batch of shrimp re-stocking had been completed in 2004. Project has spent Rs 2704,000.00 on the programme. However, it has not been a successful event as the community members and outsiders of

the area has harvested shrimp productions prematurely with out any control and monitoring, and became a failure

84. TET notes that it would have been successful activity, if the management interventions were there to control this income generating activity using biological resource. TET stresses the need for regulation and monitoring programmes of the Project activities. TET further note that the loss to the project was mainly due to problem with restocking mechanism.

Outcome 3: Conservation programmes for the globally significant biodiversity established at the project site and local biodiversity units established to enhance community awareness.

Turtle Conservation Component Project¹⁰

85. The RUK Constitute a section of the Sri Lanka coastline that is rich in animals, plants diversity and contains mangroves, lagoons and beach habitats of national and international importance. It is a nesting site for all five species of globally threatened marine turtles. Human activities due to population increase and poverty have created serious threats not only to marine and coastal ecosystems but also to these globally threatened turtle species. The Turtle Conservation Component of the Project proposed a series of activities to conserve dwindling turtle population of the RUK area. With the objectives of monitoring of turtle nesting along the entire coastline covering RUK area to assess potential for establishing an in-situ conservation programme with a strong participation of local communities and conducting research on ecology and biology of turtle. It also proposed to identify the research needs and gaps. Creating awareness programmes and development of an Ecotourism plan were also among the objectives of the Project. The Department of Wildlife Conservation (DWC) was responsible for this component of the Project as they were having the mandate to do so under the Fauna and Flora Protection Ordinance (FFPO). DWC subcontracted following assignments Turtle Conservation Component (TCCP) of the Project to an NGO Turtle Conservation Project (TCP). MOU was signed between DWC and TCP on 07-09-2004 to carryout following assignment by TCP

86. Conduction of community based insitu and ex-situ marine turtle conservation programme, Education and awareness programme, and identification of research gaps and research requirements on marine turtles and their habitats at Rekawa, Kahandamodara and Godawaya in RUK area

Protection of Turtle Nests

87. DWC is legally responsible for this activity under the FFPO. However, DWC signed an MoA with TCP on 7th September 2004 and subcontracted part of the work to them. TCP has started their Turtle Nest Protection activities within three kilometres along the beach, mainly at Rekawa. DWC has also started working in the RUK area operating from Kalametiya as the Range office with sub offices (beats stations) at Rekawa and Godawaya close to the nesting beaches. A total of 8 officers have been placed by DWC in RUK area. TCP also has their field office at Rekawa. Both TCP and DWC have obtained the services of the paid volunteers who had been engaged in Turtle egg poaching activities previously.

88. A total of 539 turtle nests, 15 school and 10 villages based education and awareness programmes have been completed by TCP. In addition, 10 ex-situ nests protection and seven turtles tagging programmes have been completed. DWC has also conducted beach patrolling, education programmes and other related in-situ activities. TCP has planted wooden pegs to indicate the nesting sites (Insitu and Ex-situ) along the beach. DWC has declared part of the RUK area as Lunama -Kalamatiya

¹⁰ There has been much confusion generated by the fact that the component of the RUK Project dealing with turtle has, not surprisingly, been called the Turtle Conservation Project while the NGO implementing part of this is also known as the Turtle Conservation Project. Therefore, to clarify the situation, at least for the purposes of this report, the project component will be termed the Turtle Conservation Component Project (TCCP) and the Turtle Conservation Project will be retained as the name used by the NGO.

Sanctuary in 2006 under FFPO and a few sign boards have been erected to inform the public about the general limits and activities prohibited with RUK area

89. TET is curious about the mechanism of hiring volunteers for the same activity by both parties. However TET is not satisfied with the progress made under this activity as adequate sign boards, leaflets, reading materials and notices were not available to show the commitments of both parties under the RUK project. It was also clear that coordination and communication at the ground level between officers of DWC and TCP officials had not been at satisfactory levels. Training materials and educational materials that had been produced and drafted for the project activities were not available to TET.

Research Gap Analysis

90. Under the MoA signed between DWC and TCP, a literature surveys and field surveys have also been conducted and completed to identify the research gaps and research requirements. Data and other relevant information are with TCP but unable produce the reports or publication due non viability of funds from DWC for the purpose.

91. TET was very much concerned about the non availability of fund to complete the task given as it was a very vital activity of the Project

Turtle Database

92. IUCN has prepared a comprehensive data base on turtles and their ecological aspects. It is now in the hands of the DWC who contracted and obtained the services from IUCN. The TET noted certain delays in handing over the workable data base on turtles to DWC by IUCN due to unavoidable circumstances.

Turtle Ecotourism Plan

93. TET was unable trace the presence of a Turtle Eco tourism plan under the project. It is a vital component in line with alternative sources of income generating activities. TET feels that the turtles were the centre for conservation activities in RUK which has lot of potential for turtle Eco-tourism.

Mangrove Conservation and Rehabilitation

94. Areas for mangrove conservation and rehabilitation have been identified by IUCN based on the biodiversity assessments other surveys conducted in RUK area.. Two and half (2/12) hectares of degraded mangrove areas have been proposed for replanting in Rekawa. This activity was assigned for Rekawa Development Foundation (RDF) .However, Proposals for the work had been sent CCD, but no responses received from CCD. It is said that all identified areas rehabilitated and conserved with fully involvement of the local community. NARA has assisted to the project to rehabilitate the areas with fully involvement of local communities. RDF was unable to comment on the invovemnt of them in task

95. TET was unable inspect any mangrove replanted and rehabilitated areas during their field visit and none of the people whom TET met in the field were unable to locate show on the ground even though repeated request were made.

Declaration of the RUK area as a Ramsar Site

96. Based on the surveys and assessments carried out within the RUK area, IUCN proposed Lunama-Kalametiya as a Ramsar site to DWC in May 2005. However, department of wildlife has failed send nomination to Ramsar Authorities requesting them declare the Area proposed as Ramasr site under the Convention. The TET recommends to take immediate actions to recognize the area as one of the internationally important protected areas which provide high recognition and attention.

Outcome 4: Efficient policy level coordination and law enforcement established to improve biodiversity conservation.

Training Courses and Workshops

97. The Project has implemented effective strategies to train, create awareness and concerns among the local communities and other officials on matters and issues related , ecotourism planning, community involvement, proposal writing, environment and biodiversity conservation, especially among the leaders in the of biodiversity societies. The PMO in the field took the lead in these activities, have achieved considerable success in bringing members of the community together and against the destructive practices which threatens environment and their communities.

98. About 250 key members of CBOs and others have been trained. Eighty biodiversity task force members and more than 300 members community members have been trained in conservation activities alone. Training in capacity-building has been carried out through various advocacy activities such as training among local government officials, leaders, students, and local communities. These training activities and practices have led to formation of societies, preparation of proposals for income generating activities and finally action of BDS society leaders and BDTF members member campaign in preventing mining of sands for Garnets within RUK area.

99. However, no training materials or were made available to TET during the field visits. TET revealed that some of the community members and officers of the responsible agencies , were not aware of the activities and administrative frame work and targets of the Project

Establishment of Biodiversity Task Forces

100. Project has taken initiatives to form Biodiversity Societies (BDS) within RUK area. A total of 18 BDS were form from the members of the each GN division. Biodiversity Task Force (BDTF) was subsequently formed o coordinate work and activities of all of different BDS located in the area. BDTF comprised of three members each BDS . It is headed by the Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary as key office bearers with a financial support (Rs, 200,000.00)for its function from RUK project .

101. TET examine the mandate of the BDS and it does not have any authority on policy and legal matters other facilitating body to convey the issues and problems to divisional level of management.

An assessment of the proposed development planning in Hambantota District

102. This component of the Project has not been undertaken by the Project. However individual assessment has taken information on certain development activities during their surveys and studies. The TET feels that this component is extremely important for the long term viability of the project as some the activities must be in line with development plans of the Hambantota district and is of paramount importance.

Establish a National Level Coordinating Committee

103. The Project has established under the guidance of Implementing agency (Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) a National Level Co-ordinating committee(NLCC), which provided advisory support and linkages relating to national policy needs with representation from the main governmental agencies and resource personss. IUCN was contracted and given role and function as the Secretariat for NLCC with responsibility for its convening, recording the proceeding and timely distribution to the parties identified by the Ministry. Secretary of the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources(MFAR) chaired the NLCC and members were from CCD, DWC, ERD, UNDP, PM, NARA, PM NPD, NPC and FD. Subsequently invited the Department of Custom and IUCN

104. TET observed that this committee failed to perform their function on regular basis and has restarted the progress in achieving the Project Goals and objectives in time. They could have acted in more responsible manner in steering the Project.

Outcome 5: An effective monitoring system in place to assess development activities and their impact to biodiversity.

Biodiversity Monitoring

105. Biodiversity monitoring was given to IUCN-SL as a sole-sourced sub-contract. They undertook two sessions of monitoring each on terrestrial and reef biodiversity, thus:-

- terrestrial December 2003 – February 2004 (three months); and
 November 2004 – February 2005 (four months).
- coral reefs February 2004 – May 2004 (four months); and
 February 2005 – April 2005 (three months).

Both surveys were established by taking the indicator species identified in the Biodiversity Assessment completed as an output under component 1. The methodologies used seemed to be well-grounded conceptually, if a little complex in places. Explanations are not really adequate for the lay person. No maps of the sampling areas or their locations are provided in the terrestrial report, but maps of the reefs are given, even if their clarity could be markedly improved. Quantitative data is provided in the form of compound indices for terrestrial vegetation and for numbers of individual animals within certain taxa, but there is a preponderance towards counting the number of species rather the number of individuals of key indicators, particularly birds. Overall, the exercise seems to have been carried out to a reasonably high professional standard and has documented some of the biological changes associated with the tsunami. The main problem lies with the lack of development of something sustainable – see paragraph 109.

Water Quality Monitoring

106. The water quality monitoring component was sub-contracted by CCD to the National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (NARA) in November 2003. Although the original proposal was for two years work, a period deemed preferable for covering both wet and dry season and getting some idea of quality trends in both seasons, the cost (US\$ 15,000) was deemed prohibitive and 12 monthly samples were agreed upon for US\$ 8,000. The work commenced in December 2003 and ceased in November 2004 – one month before the tsunami wrecked NARA's laboratory. Most of the standard water quality parameters were measured from 14 sites selected jointly by NARA and CCD. Agrochemicals were also measured but costs dictated that three composite samples made up from samples taken at the 14 sites were used to measure these. Trace metals were also to be monitored but after the second survey, the atomic absorption spectrometer broke down and was not repaired – so no further measurements were made on trace metals. It is unclear as to whether the contract was renegotiated so as to save the Project this cost or even if NARA billed invoices less this amount against the original contract.

107. Reports were submitted monthly by NARA but these are very poor giving just the data in the form of graphs – graphed wrongly, in fact, as line graphs linking separate geographic points rather than as bar graphs showing the measurements to be discrete – without tables providing the basic figures. Given that water chemistry is a complex and confusing subject and data requires careful and knowledgeable interpretation, it is surprising that a) NARA submitted its reports without any such interpretation, and b) that CCD (or the PFO if they had any such role) accepted them without any. The TET has not seen the CCD/NARA contract, but perhaps this is again a case of an another contractual agreement drafted inadequately – this time in terms of its technical specification. The TET has been unable to ascertain whether NARA produced a final report drawing together the findings of the year's survey and presenting an overview.

108. As it stands, the TET finds that this exercise has been completely useless and a waste of money. The data were not presented in a way in which the management planners of the SAMP could use them effectively – ultimately the whole point of the exercise; they do not cover a timeframe long enough to draw conclusions as to seasonal trends; and no attempt was made by CCD to get NARA to establish a

long-term, simple monitoring system to be used to guide development planning, even though data has a life-span of only 2-3 years – in the current case completely truncated by the tsunami. In short, there is no indication that any “*ecosystems [have been] preserved through monitoring of water quality*” as per the success criteria of the logframe, and while the TET acknowledges that such a criteria is so vague as to be almost meaningless, the underlying intention is still clear and the water quality monitoring exercise of this Project has failed to get anywhere near helping to meet it.

Community-based Continuous Monitoring Programme

109. Apparently the PMO conducted a community-level biodiversity awareness programme for monitoring the biodiversity of the area, and technical inputs were provided by IUCN-SL. The Project Ecologist/Deputy Project Manager prepared local language materials based on these to encourage communities, especially the BTF, to undertake surveys for monitoring purposes, and selected community members were given additional training on these methods. Although the TET was furnished with a copy of these materials, they were able to find no evidence that anyone locally possessed them, let alone knew how to undertake surveys. It is clear that no basic field level manual of monitoring techniques, requirements, identification, etc. was produced, nor was any basic overall strategy mapped out for establishing a long-term, sustainable, simple, biodiversity monitoring programme using local people. The database established by IUCN-SL was never used for any monitoring data since none were ever sent by the Project.

KEY ISSUES

THE ETHICAL CONTEXT

Duty of Care

110. The TET is particularly concerned about the issue of the duty of care that a GEF Project has to the people whose lives it effects. Perhaps the ethics of a Project are rarely under discussion, but nonetheless it needs raising here with regard to one man in the RUK context. Clearly, the aim of any ICDP is to attempt to bring economic development to the project beneficiaries while building a stronger base for biodiversity conservation, and in the main, beneficiaries do benefit in some way or another. But what if they don't? While a project cannot take responsibility for people who fail within an otherwise successful framework because of their own limitations, what is the duty of care when a person takes part in a project willingly and fully, based on information given by the project which turns out to be totally false? In the RUK Project, Mr. R.T Sarath, a shell-miner, took part in the awareness/education programme, undertook ecotourism business training, and put together a proposal to establish a campsite on the edge of Kalametiya Sanctuary. His business plan was based on the information given by the ecotourism consultant and CCD who promised there would be a Visitor Centre where his campsite could be advertised, a website promoting ecotourism in the area and that the wider attraction of tourists to the area would be part of CCD's wider strategy under the SAMP. So he bought into the Project fully with a loan for US\$ 1,000, established his campsite, and waited for the things he'd been promised to unfold. Nothing did. CCD and the ecotourism consultant can walk away from the debacle of this part of the project. Mr. Sarath cannot. In the last year his gross income has been just US\$ 600 – 25% of what he was making from shell-mining; an activity the Project encouraged him to stop. He has tried to get another loan from the revolving fund but been refused. He is, in his own words “a dead man” – he has even sold his wife's jewellery to maintain his loan repayments but is now on the verge of bankruptcy and “wishes he had never heard of the RUK Project”. So the TET asks again the question – what duty of care does a project have under such circumstances? The TET contains no lawyers and asks the question rhetorically. But basic humanity suggests that at the minimum the CCD should cancel Mr. Sarath's outstanding loan and, better still in the light of their failure to implement the Project effectively, should also reimburse all the payments he has made in servicing the loan from the time it was taken, providing he undertakes not to go back to

unsustainable resource extraction. At least that would enable him to be no worse off than he was at the point of the loan, even if it does not compensate him for the loss of income and stress suffered..

The TET recommends that UNDP and CCD examine the case of Mr. R.T. Sarath the owner of the Kelmatiya Campsite and undertake a proper duty of care given the failure of the Project to deliver on promises upon which he tried to build his business.

THE POLICY CONTEXT

Committees Without a Mandate

111. Although a number of committees have been established under the Project, and although these will nominally continue to function beyond the Project's lifetime bringing some sustainability to biodiversity planning, the TET is surprised that apparently no mandate has been given to these committees by the policy-making agencies. The TET realises that the committees will have to perform their activities under the laws and regulations of the land, but arrangements could have been made to accept the views and active participation in policy-formulation and decision-making at the Divisional/District levels.

No integration of the BTF into the planning and management system

112. The Project was designed to be an ICDP, aiming to achieve its goal by incorporating a wide range of different components executed by a variety of institutions. The BTF was formed as a key part of the present management system of the area, with its membership drawn from and representing the 18 villages. However, it appears to the TET that the BTF is now pretty much isolated from the policy- and decision-making being undertaken at the Divisional level of the RUK area now that the Project has ended. There appears to be no interest at all from those responsible for involving the BTF in, say, the vision for biodiversity conservation of the RUK. The present administrative system does not allow the BTF to become involved in the decision-making process unless those individuals care to consult it and if they have the political blessing to do so. For the Project to have been effective in this regard, the TET is of the view that the BTF should be recognised officially within the administrative structure of the management system of the operational area.

The TET recommends that the BTF should be recognised officially within the administrative structure of the management system of the operational area.

THE PLANNING CONTEXT

Shortcomings of the SAM Plan

113. Although hailed by the project stakeholders as one of the project's successes, the SAM Plan for the RUK area, prepared by IUCN-SL and approved by the CCD (although not endorsed by the National Level Coordinating Committee (Steering Committee) as per the logframe), has two major shortcomings – 1) lack of identified finance and 2) lack of integration into local development plans. With regard to the first, there has been no identification of any possible funding sources within SAMP for its implementation, let alone any attempt to obtain a firm commitment for funding. CCD responded that in previous cases for SAMs they have drawn up the plans and then some time (even years) later they have received funds from foreign agencies with which to implement actions. "This is the way of things in Sri Lanka" illustrates what can only be described as a culture of dependency.

114. With regard to the lack of integration, the SAMP has no useable base maps, land use maps, and nor other such meaningful information. None of the Hambantota District-level development plans

have been incorporated and a regional influence zone has not been identified. The TET believes that this indicates that the SAM plan has not been integrated fully into the development plans of Hambantota District – either because the consultants were not aware of the existence of such plans, or because of oversight. This situation is detrimental to the implementation of the SAM plan, since District-level activities will interfere in achieving its objectives. Observations by the TET of the Tsunami relief village and more importantly the clearing of 200 acres of scrub for a private-sector teak plantation by Kelametiya Lagoon current at the time of the time of the evaluation, strongly support this. The TET expresses concern as to why these development plans were not taken into account when preparing the TOR for the SAM plan, and recommends an early revision to it to collate appropriate information on the development plans and proposed development activities at District- and Divisional-levels. At the same time, firm sources of finance for the SAM Plan activities should be identified.

The TET recommends that the RUK SAM Plan be revised, possibly using any outstanding Project funding, to incorporate and integrate relevant District- and Divisional-level development plans, to ensure its adoption into the local administration's planning system, and to at least identify possible funding sources for its proposed actions.

Sustainability

115. The TET evaluates the likely sustainability of the Project as **Highly Unsatisfactory** based upon the institutional and social situation on the ground and on the almost total lack of identification of future financing sources for project-related activities.

Institutional/Social Sustainability

116. The institutional and social sustainability of the Project appears to be low. Despite good mobilisation of the local communities and the formation of 18 Biodiversity Societies in the village communities, these seem to have served their purpose with regard to the resource abusers and without a role in monitoring (because the Project failed to deliver a community-based system) or outside inputs to stimulate and maintain their interest, it seems unlikely that they will thrive. While the interest of some members seems undoubtedly to have been kindled, to most members the Societies are likely to have been just a passing thing and it would seem that they will wither on the vine.

117. Similarly, the BTF has some enthusiasm, but much of it is derived from having access to cheap money via the revolving fund. The lack of the BTF's proper integration into the planning system and a voice heard only at the whim of the Divisional Secretary means that will slowly dawn on its members that their function is largely irrelevant and members will lose motivation. In addition, without a proper mandate and lacking any authority for enforcement, even those members currently keen on a watchdog function will find that membership of the BTF confers no advantage over the same functions that an ordinary citizen can perform. Without some radical concessions by those with power, and the demonstration of a real commitment to serious community involvement in planning and enforcement, disillusionment can be the only result.

Financial Sustainability

118. The long-term financial sustainability of the revolving fund looks good. It is being well-managed by the Bata-atha South Fisheries Cooperative, and the rate of defaults on loans is low – nine from 90, i.e. 10%; but of these, five were as a direct result of the tsunami. The original seed capital from GEF was approximately US\$ 39,600 made in three tranches between June 2004 and December 2005, and despite taking into account the US\$ 3,300 lost in defaulted loans, the current value of the fund is US\$ 40,130. At the end of the Project, the Trustees of the fund took a decision to continue it for at least another five years until June 2011 – a time at which two of the Trustees (the NPMs of the CRMP and the HICZMP) will no longer be in their post, so the constitution of the Board of Trustees will need attention. Interest is currently charged at an attractive 9% compared to that charged by commercial banks of 16%+.

119. The biggest problem regarding the revolving fund is that the terms for applying for a loan stipulate that the borrower must have been a resource abuser who has undergone the necessary training with regard to undertaking an alternative economic venture. This has not been changed. The fund therefore remains open to only a very narrow segment of society, and while during the period of the Project this was understood and accepted by the other villagers as a means to an end, i.e. to wean resource abusers into other livelihoods, given the apparent success of this, such people are now seen to be the same as all villagers but now with access to loans at preferential rates (see above). This is beginning to cause divisions in society and resentment. The Board of Trustees, perhaps with UNDP input, need to widen the criteria of those eligible to take loans.

The TET recommends that UNDP convene a special meeting of the Board of Trustees to widen the eligibility of those applying for loans such that proposals could include those from people who have not been resource abusers while still tying loans to operations (commercial or otherwise) which benefit coastal biodiversity in some way.

120. Apart from the revolving fund, the financial viability of all aspects of the Project is derisory. No effort has been made by CCD to find ways of ensuring sustainable finance for things such as adequate enforcement of the new Lunama-Kalametiya Wildlife Sanctuary or the RUK SAMP, preferring instead to rely on possible money to be passed through from the central treasury or from the steady supply of foreign-aided projects. The ecotourism component has effectively failed completely with only one entrepreneur able to not only make a profit but to link his business directly to biodiversity. Ironically, he was the person who was the only one turned down for an ecotourism loan because the NPM said he was under-estimating his returns. The Visitor Centre remains incomplete and no significant ecotourism component can be expected to be attracted to the area except through the efforts of the TCP with their focus on turtles. No long-term funding has been identified for the Biodiversity Societies or the much-vaunted Biodiversity Task Force to carry out their basic functions.

THE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT

Country Driven-ness and Coordination

121. There appears to have been very little Country Driven-ness of this Project – CCD appear to have been more interested in the much larger Coastal Resources Management Project occurring in much the same area and the Hambantota Integrated Coastal Zone Management Project nearby, perhaps even viewing the small RUK Project as more bother than it was worth. Whether this arose from the initial project design by TCP and IUCN or whether it was a perfectly understandable reaction from a department whose manpower and other resources were severely stretched, particularly after the Tsunami, is unclear. However, inter-ministry and inter-departmental coordination was sadly lacking throughout for reasons that may be explained through personalities (see paragraph 29) but the poorly-run NLCC did nothing much to alleviate the situation, particularly given their tardy record of meetings.

Project Management

122. The failure of the project's management in its broadest sense to deliver this Project effectively is undoubtedly the biggest key issue under discussion. The reader is directed to paragraph 25 *et seq.* for a full assessment.

Culture of Blame

123. The Project appears to have suffered from a total lack of motivation of its core staff which seems to have emanated from the top management. Field staff suffered from lack of material support for much of the early stages – an NPM not appointed until August 2002, no Project transport until at least May 2003, no field office computer nor motorbikes even by October 2004 when the MTE was undertaken – and this must have inevitably sapped morale. The general level of ineptness of CCD also

appears to have taken its toll and dampened motivation even of committed people in organisations such as IUCN-SL and UNDP. Unfortunately this either created, or at least help to create, a culture of blame which has permeated the Project and remains even to this day. It was reported by various people that if CCD was meeting informally with IUCN then UNDP would be the cause of the problems and when meeting with UNDP, IUCN would be the problem. Even when CCD were writing to ERD to request an extension, the reason given for the need for the extension is the slow implementation of the scientific studies, not the fact that CCD were largely responsible for significant delays in recruiting staff and letting contracts. Within CCD, the problems would always be someone else's fault and are still reported as such. This may be part of a similar culture within wider government, e.g. when interviewing ERD the reason given for the delay in the project inception had to lie with UNDP or GEF rather than itself which took nine months to provide its endorsement signature. Amongst partners, TCP blame late payments from DWC under their contract as the reason why certain activities have yet to be completed but even a cursory look at their invoicing shows irregularities which mean that DWC could not (and cannot still) provide payment against them. IUCN complained to the TET about late payment from DWC of their final invoices (about six weeks) and yet overlook the fact that they took over six months to fix problems with the database as delivered.

Lack of Partnership

124. One of the striking things about this Project is the lack of basic courtesy paid to each other by Project partners. In many cases the basic lack of courteous communication, acknowledging that there may be delays in certain aspects, payments, etc. brought about yet more lengthy delays and often bad feelings between those nominally working together for the same aim. Two examples suffice – 1) IUCN-SL complained to the TET about late payment (about six weeks) of an invoice; DWC indicated to the TET that they had been moving offices and everything had been delayed as a result; and yet a simple phone call or short letter sent to IUCN-SL explaining that would have done wonders. On the other hand, DWC commented on the lengthy delay in IUCN-SL fixing the database (about six months) and again, a simple communication to DWC explaining that the key person was out of the country for a while would have reduced annoyance. 2) TCP complained to the TET about non-payment of invoices by DWC (see paragraphs 35 and 125). DWC indicated that non-payment was because of irregularities – but DWC never sent any communication, verbal or written, to TCP to tell them this – in fact TCP indicated in the final presentation of this report that this was the first they had about it!

Poorly-drafted Contracts

125. A number of instances of tension between the organisations involved can be traced to the very poor drafting of contracts, letters of agreement (LoA), or the like. Too often these concentrate on technical issues and specifications that the more general matters, and ultimately those which focus minds better than anything else, namely money, are overlooked. Clauses on reporting arrangements, how work will be verified, how payments will be made, what happens in the light of a dispute, are all either ambiguous or missing. The major culprit in this Project has been DWC, and the long-running dispute that has poisoned the relations between the TCP and the DWC to the detriment of the TCCP has been the very poorly drafted LoA. Again, two examples from this suffice to illustrate the problem – 1) DWC complained to the TET that there had been no collaboration on the ground between TCP and DWC, and that TCP had been in contact only with Colombo. Instead of initiating local contact themselves, DWC had sat back and complained that TCP should have made the first move since they were the sub-contractor. But as any consultant will tell you, he/she/they deal with the person they set up the contract with unless otherwise instructed – and this DWC failed to do either in the LoA or in any other form. 2) DWC complained about TCP's invoicing (and TET agrees that it is bad) with numerous receipts for tiny individual bills all separate (and not easily cross-referenced), but this in accordance with the contract as TCP reads it since all payments are to be supported with receipts. If the contract was better worded, and allowance made for the fact that a small NGO may not be familiar with the necessary requirements of invoicing a big Government Department, then this (and the late payments and the delays to the work (still outstanding) that have ensued) could have been avoided. Of course had the whole of the TCCP not been hived off and run as a separate project within the RUK Project, then again it may have run more smoothly.

No involvement of the Rekawa Development Foundation

126. It was apparent to the TET that there was a complete absence of links between the Project's management and the Rekawa Development Foundation (RDF), one of the leading NGOs operating in the area. Apart from a successful tender to plant mangroves which was never fulfilled because of the Tsunami, the RDF has not been invited to take part in any of the activities identified for them in the Project design, despite the fact that the RDF was involved in that design process. The NPM and NPC were unable to identify the reasons for this lack of participation by the RDF in RUK Project, and similarly the RDF official interviewed was also not aware of any reason as to why they were not involved. The TET remains concerned about this since it believes that such non-involvement of local NGOs continues a history of mistrust between Government and the local communities which remains harmful to ICDP goals.

THE TECHNICAL CONTEXT

Lack of GEF Identity

127. One significant failure of the RUK Project has been its inability to establish a link between biodiversity conservation, social development, and tourism. Although the Project's design did conceptually map out the means for developing strategic linkages between development and conservation activities in such a way that conservation becomes a source of income and development in its own right, at the end of the Project the development of income-generating activities involving biodiversity conservation as the source of income are very few. The TET wonders whether the basic strategic approach, common in so many GEF projects, of focussing on sustainable community development to meet the demands of local communities, thereby winning trust which can then be used as "capital" to bargain for biodiversity concessions or to make future trades where local communities undertake conservation activities in return for development assistance, is actually the best way to achieve the biodiversity/income-generation link.

128. Within the RUK, there is almost no awareness of the GEF amongst local people. GEF's logo does not appear on any sign or publication. The lack of identity over the fact that it was a GEF project is much more than the TET cheering for GEF. GEF projects are supposed to be special in that the international community is funding the incremental costs associated with the extra efforts needed to manage and conserve globally-important biodiversity. The TET found no evidence that the beneficiaries showed any understanding of this global dimension of the wildlife around them, nor that CCD or IUCN-SL staff had ever raised it with them. In the view of the TET, this represents a major missed opportunity. There is another model, that of working from the opposite point of view by stressing the global importance of species or habitats in an area, in this case marine turtles, and instilling pride in the local communities (villagers, schools, businesses) that they have these species present through focussed Pride campaigns¹¹ and then building social development around this necessary to support the long-term conservation. Imagine what might have been done achieved had the RUK Project adopted marine turtles as the symbol of local pride and then focussed development, particularly ecotourism plans around that, rather than watering them down with all sort of bolt-on activities as occurred. The purer concept as originally outlined by TCP is much more akin to this approach and, if lessons learned are worth a jot, deserves to be given a try by a GEF project somewhere given other organisations are having success with it.

Lack of Project Integration

129. The TET Team Leader once saw a lesson learned that, *"Many conservation projects are now of an 'integrated' nature, aiming to achieve a goal by taking on a wide range of different components executed by a variety of institutions. While such specialized partnerships are a good thing, there is a risk that each institution simply does its own thing. Without regular consultations, a shared vision and clear linkages, the holistic nature of such projects is threatened. This leads to a situation in which*

¹¹ See www.rareconservation.org/programs_pride_inside.htm

individual components may be successful while the overall project objective is not achieved.”¹² This observation bears scrutiny here since most of the organisations involved seem to have been mainly concerned with “*doing its own thing*”; the fulfilment of the contract being the key aim rather than keeping the overall aim of the project in mind. Examples abound – DWC hiving off the whole TCCP because it has the legal mandate for turtle conservation even though working closely within a CCD framework might have achieved more for the turtles; NARA fulfilling the letter of its obligations but failing to provide anything useful to the Project; even IUCN-SL sought to justify themselves during interviews with the TET from mild criticism by taking refuge in the fact that they were not contractually responsible for certain things, or that they had completed their contract fully.

130. There appears to be little interest from those responsible for certain aspects, e.g. DWC, to be involved in say a larger vision for tourism, even though in doing so the long-term future of their charges might be made that bit more secure. This blinkered approach, added to the inherent weaknesses in the Project’s design to promote fragmentation have meant that in the absence of strong leadership – a role that IUCN-SL might have been able to play if they had implemented the Project but one in which they could not achieve simply in the role of PFO – the Project has inevitably crashed. While certain isolated aspects have been successful, in the absence of the realisation of the other components there is little on which to build. Perhaps the best that can be said is that the Project provides a case study in how not to run a project and has highlighted a number of key issues and deficiencies which need to be put right in Sri Lanka before biodiversity conservation, at least on the coast, can flourish.

RECOMMENDATIONS

GENERAL

- GEF should look at producing information for, and disseminating it more effectively to, NGOs involved in the conceptualisation and design of GEF-funded projects. This information needs to explain what the GEF process involves, what the basic requirements of implementation are, and what the expectations of an NGO can be regarding their involvement.
- GEF should consider adding a professional capacity assessment of the proposed executing agency(ies) to the design of all Projects to ensure proficient implementation of the Project on the ground.
- Close attention is paid by project design teams to other projects in, or forthcoming to, the portfolio of the proposed executing agency to ensure that there is adequate spare capacity to undertake the proposed project.

RUK/SRI LANKA SPECIFIC

- In the light of a number of inconsistencies, financial irregularities and other factors including very limited visible outputs, consideration should be given to having the RUK Project audited externally by UNDP or GEF HQ.
- UNDP and CCD should examine the case of Mr. R.T. Sarath the owner of the Kelmatiya Campsite and undertake a proper duty of care given the failure of the Project to deliver on promises upon which he tried to build his business.
- UNDP should convene a special meeting of the Board of Trustees to widen the eligibility of those applying for loans such that proposals could include those from people who have not been resource abusers while still tying loans to operations (commercial or otherwise) which benefit coastal biodiversity in some way.

¹² From the MTE of the UNDP-GEF Upper Mustang Biodiversity Conservation Project (Atlas ID GEF-00013971).

- The RUK SAM Plan should be revised, possibly using any outstanding Project funding, to incorporate and integrate relevant District- and Divisional-level development plans, to ensure its adoption into the local administration's planning system, and to at least identify possible funding sources for its proposed actions
- The BTF should be recognised officially within the administrative structure of the management system of the operational area.

LESSONS LEARNED

GENERAL

- Small (and large?) NGOs involved in developing GEF project concepts and in designing GEF projects need to have their expectations regarding their involvement (both at the design and implementation stages) better based in reality through a process of education and awareness.
- The duty of care a project has to its participants needs to be clarified for projects that fail to deliver on promises thereby causing significant financial loss to its intended beneficiaries.
- The central message of the global importance of wildlife for which GEF biodiversity conservation projects are established, needs to be ensured during their implementation and better still incorporated into their design to give a different approach – that of focussing on the biodiversity and building social development around that rather than doing the development to build “capital” to spend on conservation efforts.
- In-kind contributions from Governments (but much less so with NGOs) are highly suspect and should be discontinued since civil servants are usually asked to double up project activities with their normal jobs to the detriment of the project. Such contributions seem also to be financially unaccountable. The practice needs to be stopped, and Governments asked to contribute the money directly to hire dedicated staff.
- The professional capacity of an executing agency should be evaluated independently during project design and any weaknesses addressed fully as a preparatory activity.
- The number, type, and scale of existing and, crucially, forthcoming projects already in an executing agency's portfolio requires more rigorous examination during project design and their effects in terms of resources and priority to the project under consideration assessed.
- The non-technical clauses of contractual documents written within projects are as important as the technical specifications contained therein and require just as much attention to detail or more since they can lead to just as much dispute and delay. Methods of resolving disputes quickly should be incorporated.
- It is not enough for a Project to create plans on paper and to call that a success. While implementation of such plans may fall beyond the timetable of a given project, such plans need to firmly identify, and if possible obtain firm commitments to, finance the activities. In addition, where such plans have a policy component, this needs to be fully integrated into the appropriate policy and planning framework or else it will fail to deliver the intended results.

SPECIFIC

- Close collaboration with ERD and the National Planning Division during the actual design process of projects for Sri Lanka should lead to the avoidance of delays at project start-up by negating the need for extensive screening.

- Senior Staff involved in implementing projects should make serious commitments towards achieving its objectives. Lack of commitment was very clear at all levels of the management and oversight of the RUK Project from its inception.
- Hiring of a Project Facilitation Organisation is a waste of money, as is running part of the project through another management arrangement requiring a second steering committee. This should not be repeated in any future project. If the capacity of the intended executing agency is so low as to require the services of a Project Facilitation Organisation, then better to execute the project through that organisation directly and ensure close collaboration with the Government agency to expedite the necessary Government inputs.
- Implementation of the activities for livelihood and biodiversity conservation in communities necessitates a well-coordinated effort and a common goal across national, district, divisional, and village levels. In this instance, the lack of such coordination significantly retarded effective implementation of the project and hampered achievement of expected outcomes.
- Training and education in biodiversity conservation and livelihood development is not easy, necessitating a well-tailored plan and careful step-wise implementation so that the project staff know where to begin, what to do next, and where to end. This Project's training activities lacked clear direction to support its goals.

ANNEX I : TERMINAL PROJECT EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Introduction to the project

With financial support from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Coast Conservation Department (CCD) under the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MoFAR), on behalf of the Government of Sri Lanka, has been executing a 5-year project to conserve biodiversity in Rekawa, Ussnagoda and Kalametiya coastal ecosystems in Sri Lanka since March 2000. Support from GEF focuses on ensuring the conservation and sustainable use of the biodiversity of this globally significant site through the development of a collaborative management system, actively involving all stakeholders.

The proposed project covers a coastal reach of 27km from Rekawa to Godawaya on the south coast in the dry zone of Sri Lanka and constitutes 20 coastal Grama Niladhari (GN) Divisions (local level administrative units). It is a section of the coastal fringe that is rich in floral and faunal diversity and contains mangroves, lagoons, and beach habitats of national and international importance. Five of the world's seven species of marine turtles come ashore to nest in Sri Lanka. Kalametiya and Lunama are very important wetlands for both resident and migratory birds as breeding and wintering grounds. Globally vulnerable species including the Slender Loris and Marsh Crocodile are also present in the Kalametiya Sanctuary.

Kalametiya, Lunama and Rekawa are lagoons in this coastal reach, which sustained a rich fishery that provided a livelihood to the local communities. Irrigation practices in the catchment areas has altered the inflow patterns to the lagoons and changed their hydrology, resulting in drastic adverse effects on the lagoon fishery. Attempts made in the past to relieve some of these impacts by cutting canals to bypass the lagoon and discharge water to the sea through what was expected to be outfalls open throughout the year have not been successful. The resultant loss of livelihoods have forced the local communities into harmful livelihood practices such as coral mining and kiln operations, shell mining, exploitation of mangroves, hunting of birds and turtle egg collection. Apart from these activities, inappropriate economic development activities such as conversion of residential plots to tourist facilities, siting of industrial installations, which have been unplanned and inadequately researched and lack of community participation in management resulting in difficulties in enforcing laws and monitoring also threaten the rich coastal and marine biodiversity of these areas. Proposed accelerated development programmes in the Hambantota District such as the establishment of a new harbour, airport and township and industries would also pose serious threats to the ecosystems of the project area unless they are carefully planned and necessary management plans are established.

As indicated above, these coastal communities in Sri Lanka rely heavily on natural resources for their livelihoods. Therefore, the project has incorporated as part of the project design, the socio-economic development component aiming at reducing the human dependency on the declining natural resources while addressing the ecological problems facing the coastal ecosystems. The project will substantially concentrate on the grassroots level activities that address the needs of the local people by promoting biodiversity oriented economic activities and generating their guardianship for the wildlife and their habitat preservation.

1.1 Development Objective / Goal

The overall goal of the project is to ensure conservation and sustainable use of the biodiversity of this globally significant site through the development of a collaborative management system, actively involving local communities, NGOs and government agencies. . The project will achieve this by

promoting biodiversity conservation and providing opportunities for sustainable and better livelihood practices for the local communities.

1.2 Immediate Objectives

In order to meet the goal of the project, five immediate objectives have been identified, focused on:

- Consolidating and strengthening the information available on the ecosystems and species in terms of composition, threats, human impacts, priorities and recommended actions;
- Strengthening and implementing conservation initiatives in order to arrest the ecological degradation and rehabilitate ecosystems;
- Establishing a collaborative management framework to control destructive livelihood practices and encouraging and developing sustainable alternatives;
- Improving inter-agency coordination; and
- Ensuring that infrastructure and economic development is compatible with conservation management goals.

1.3 Results

It is expected that at the end of the project the following outcomes would have been achieved:

- Biodiversity status and trends in the project site defined and analyzed;
- Coastal Environmental Profile and Special Area Management (SAM) Plan for Rekawa, Ussangoda and Kalametiya prepared;
- Turtle egg collection arrested and an *in situ* conservation program for the globally threatened marine turtles, avifauna and other threatened fauna established;
- Mangroves are managed and full range of successional stages established;
- Biodiversity Task Forces established in each GN divisions and status of biodiversity regularly monitored;
- Coastal Education Research and Visitor Centre established;
- Livelihoods of the local communities improved through the introduction of nature based tourism initiatives and other sustainable sources of income;
- Productivity of the lagoons restored thereby providing improved livelihood to the local community;
- Policy level coordination enhanced and law enforcement improved; and
- Water quality and industrial effluent monitoring plan for the project developed and executed.

2. Objectives of the Terminal Evaluation

The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) policy at the project level in UNDP/GEF has four objectives: i) to monitor and evaluate results and impacts; ii) to provide a basis for decision making on necessary amendments and improvements; iii) to promote accountability for resource use; and iv) to document, provide feedback on, and disseminate lessons learned. A mix of tools is used to ensure effective project M&E. These might be applied continuously throughout the lifetime of the project – e.g. periodic monitoring of indicators, or as specific time-bound exercises such as mid-term reviews, audit reports and terminal evaluations.

The GEF Manual on Monitoring and Evaluation Policies and Procedures notes “All GEF regular projects will carry out a terminal evaluation at project completion to assess project achievement of objectives and impacts”. The Terminal Evaluation for the project is based on this directive.

Final evaluations are intended to assess the relevance, performance and success of the project. It looks at early signs of potential impact and sustainability of results, including the contribution to capacity development and the achievement of global environmental goals. It will also identify/document lessons learned and make recommendations that might improve design and implementation of other UNDP/GEF projects.

The overall objective of this Terminal Evaluation is to review progress towards the project's objectives and outcomes, assess the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of how the project has moved towards its objectives and outcomes, identify strengths and weaknesses in project design and implementation, and provide recommendations on design modifications that could have increased the likelihood of success, and on specific actions that might be taken into consideration in designing future projects of a related nature.

In pursuit of the overall objectives, the following key issues will be addressed during the TE of the project:

- Assess the extent to which the project achieved the global environmental benefits
- Assess the effectiveness with which the project addressed the root causes and imminent threats identified by the project
- Assess the extent to which the planned objectives and outputs of the project were achieved
- Describe the project's adaptive management processes – how did project activities change in response to new conditions encountered during implementation, and were the changes appropriate?
- Review the clarity of roles and responsibilities of the various institutional arrangements for the project implementation and the level of coordination between relevant players
- Review any partnership arrangements with other donors and comment on their strengths and weaknesses;
- Assess the level of public involvement and recommend whether public involvement was appropriate to the goals of the project
- Describe and assess efforts of UNDP, Ministry of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (MoFAR) and Coast Conservation Department (CCD) in support of the implementation of the project
- Review and evaluate the extent to which the project impacts have reached the intended beneficiaries
- Assess the likelihood of continuation and sustainability of project outcomes and benefits after completion of the project
- Describe key factors that will require attention in order to improve prospects for sustainability of project outcomes and the potential for replication of the approach
- Assess whether the Logical Framework approach and performance indicators have been used as effective management tools
- Review the implementation of the monitoring and evaluation plans
- Review the knowledge management processes of the project
- Describe the main lessons that have emerged in terms of:
 - Country ownership/drivenness;
 - Stakeholder participation;
 - Adaptive management processes;
 - Efforts to secure sustainability;
 - Knowledge transfer and
 - The role of M&E in project implementation.

In describing all lessons learned, an explicit distinction needs to be made between those lessons applicable only to this project, and lessons that may be of value more broadly to other similar projects

The Report of the TE will be a stand-alone document that substantiates its recommendations and conclusions. The Report will be targeted at meeting the Evaluation needs of all key stakeholders (GEF, UNDP, CCD, MoFAR and stakeholders of Sri Lanka).

3. Scope of the evaluation

Three main elements to be evaluated in the project include Delivery, Implementation and Finances. Each component will be evaluated using three criteria: effectiveness, efficiency and timeliness.

3.1 Project Delivery

The TE will assess to what extent the project has achieved its immediate objectives? It will also identify what outputs have been produced and how they have enabled the achievement of the national and global objectives?

The section will include an assessment of the following priority areas:

Institutional arrangements

- Strategic planning, preparatory work and implementation strategies,
- Consultative processes,
- Technical support,
- Capacity building initiatives,
- Project outputs,
- Assumptions and risks, and
- Project-related complementary activities.

Outcomes

- Efficiency of project activities,
- Progress in the achievement of immediate objectives (level of indicator achievements when available), and
- Quality of project activities

Partnerships

- Assessment of collaboration between government agencies, non-governmental
- Organizations, private sector, etc. and perceptions,
- Assessment of local partnerships, and
- Involvement of other stakeholders

Risk Management

- Were problems / constraints, which impacted on the successful delivery of the project, identified at project design?
- Were there new threats/risks to project success that emerged during project implementation?
- Were both kinds of risk appropriately dealt with?
- Are they likely to be repeated in future phases?

Monitoring and evaluation

- Assess the extent, appropriateness and effectiveness of adaptive management in project implementation
- Has there been a monitoring and evaluation framework for the project?
- Is the reporting framework effective/appropriate?
- Has M&E been used as a management tool in directing project implementation in a timely manner?
- Is this framework suitable for replication/ continuation for any future project support?

3.2 Project Implementation

Review the project's management structure and implementation arrangements at all levels, in order to provide an opinion on its efficiency and cost-effectiveness. This includes:

3.2.1 Processes and administration

- Project-related administration procedures
- Milestones;
- Key decisions and outputs;
- Processes to support national components of the project.

3.2.2 Project oversight

- GEF
- UNDP
- Participating country mechanisms (MoFAR, etc.)

3.2.3 Project execution

- CCD as the Executing Agency (under the UNDP National Execution (NEX) modality)
- Project management team
- National functions

3.2.4 Project implementation

- UNDP as the Implementing Agency

3.2.5 Comparative assessment

- Compare the execution and implementation elements of the project with similar projects in the region. Provide an opinion on the appropriateness and relevance of the structure and recommend alternatives (if required) for future consideration.

3.3 Project Finances

How well and cost-effective did financial arrangements of the project worked? This section will focus on the following three priority areas:

3.3.1 Project disbursements. Specifically

- Provide an overview of actual spending vs. budget expectations
- With appropriate explanation and background provide a breakdown of the ratio of funds spent “directly” in-country against total funds spent

- With appropriate explanation and background provide a breakdown of the ratio of funds spent “indirectly” in-country (i.e. external consultants and regional training) against total funds spent, and
- Critically analyze disbursements to determine if funds have been applied effectively and efficiently.

3.3.2 Budget procedures

- Did the Project Document provide enough guidance on how to allocate the budget?
- Review of audits and any issues raised in audits; and subsequent adjustments to accommodate audit recommendations;
- Review the changes to fund allocations as a result of budget revisions and provide an opinion on the appropriateness and relevance of such revisions, taking into account the increased duration of the project

3.3.3 Coordinating mechanisms

- Evaluate appropriateness and efficiency of coordinating mechanisms between national agencies,
- MoE, FD, UNDP and the GEF.
- Does the project approach represent an effective means of achieving the objective of the project? How can the approach be improved?

4. Methodology

The TE will be undertaken through a combination of processes including desk research, visits to selected participating sites, questionnaires and interviews - involving all stakeholders, including (but not restricted to): UNDP, MoFAR, CCD, NGOs, communities and resource users.

The methodology for the study is envisaged to cover the following areas:

- Desk study review of all relevant Project documentation;
- Consultations with CCD, MoFAR and UNDP;
- Visits to the sites as feasible within budgetary and timeframe constraints, and
- Presentation of the findings to the key stakeholders

5. Products

The main product of the Evaluation will be a Terminal Evaluation Report

The Terminal Evaluation report will include: i) findings and conclusions in relation to the issues to be addressed identified under sections 2 and 3 of this TOR; ii) assessment of gaps and/or additional measures needed that might justify future GEF investment in Sri Lanka, and iii) guidance for future investments (mechanisms, scale, themes, location, etc).

The Evaluation Report will be written in the format outlined in Annex 1. It will be formally presented to UNDP, MoFAR, CCD and ERD by 19 March 2007. It will also be forwarded to the GEF through UNDP-GEF for review and extraction of broadly applicable lessons by the Independent Evaluators. The reviewers will provide UNDP with an electronic copy of the final reports at the time of their submission.

6. Evaluators attributes

Team Leader (international)

- Academic and/or professional background in coastal resource management with a minimum of 10 years relevant experience
- Detailed knowledge of the international sustainable development agenda
- Experience in the evaluation of technical assistance projects, preferably with UNDP or other United Nations development agencies and major donors
- Experience in the evaluation of GEF-funded biodiversity conservation projects, particularly on coastal biodiversity
- Excellent English writing and communication skills
- Demonstrated ability to assess complex situations in order to succinctly and clearly distil critical issues and draw forward looking conclusions
- Experience leading multi-disciplinary, multi-national teams to deliver quality products in short deadline situations;
- Proven capacity in working across the levels of institutions from policy, to legislation, regulation, and organizations
- An ability to assess institutional capacity and incentives, and
- Excellent facilitation skills

Resource Specialist (1) - National

- Academic and professional background in natural resource management, preferably coastal resources
- An understanding of expected impacts in terms of global benefits
- A minimum of 10 years relevant working experience
- Experience in implementation or evaluation of technical assistance projects preferred – e.g. UN system, donor –assisted, etc.
- Skills and experience in community involvement in resource management
- Ability to work within a team
- Excellent English writing and communication skills, and
- Excellent facilitation skills

7. Tentative Schedule

5- 20 March 2007

Annex I

EVALUATION REPORT: SAMPLE OUTLINE

- Executive summary
- Brief description of project
- Context and purpose of the evaluation
- Main conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned
- Introduction
- Purpose of the evaluation
- Key issues addressed
- Methodology of the evaluation
- Structure of the evaluation
- The project and its development context
- Project start and its duration
- Problems that the project seek to address
- Immediate and development objectives of the project
- Main stakeholders
- Results expected
- Findings and Conclusions

- Project formulation
- Implementation
- Stakeholder participation
- Replication approach
- Cost-effectiveness
- UNDP comparative advantage
- Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector
- Indicators
- Implementation
- Delivery
- Financial Management
- Monitoring and evaluation
- Execution and implementation modalities
- Management by the UNDP country office and other partners
- Coordination and operational issues
- Results
- Attainment of objectives
- Sustainability
- Contribution to upgrading skills of the national staff
- Recommendations
- Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation for consideration in future projects
- Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project
- Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives
- Lessons learned
- Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success
- Annexes
- Terms of Reference
- Itinerary
- List of persons interviewed
- Summary of field visits
- List of documents reviewed
- Questionnaire used and summary of results

ANNEX II : ITINERARY OF ACTIVITIES OF THE FINAL PROJECT EVALUATION MISSION

Date		Activities
Mon	5 th March	pm: Evaluation team leader (PE) arrives in Colombo on delayed flight. Initial meeting and briefing by UNDP (KP).
Tues	6 th March	am: Initial meeting and briefing by UNDP (PE). pm: Meeting with Deputy Directors (past & present) CCD and document review (PE).
Wed	7 th March	am: Travel to Preproject field site. pm: Meeting with Divisional Secretary, Ambanaltota. Meeting with Project Leader, Turtle Conservation Project. View Rekawa Beach. Meeting with National Project Manager.
Thurs	8 th March	am: Meeting with Biodiversity Task Force. pm: Looking (unsuccessfully) for restored shell-mining areas. Visits to two eco-tourism projects supported by Project loans.
Fri	9 th March	am: Meeting with Batata South Fisheries Cooperative (Idiwara Fisheries Bank). pm: Visit to Muththagaha Tank. Meeting with DWC local office..
Sat	10 th March	am: Meeting with second NPC. Visit to third ecotourism project supported by Project loan.. pm: Meeting with Rekawa Development Foundation. Travel to Colombo (KP). Document review (PE).
Sun	11 th March	Day off.
Mon	12 th March	am: Travel to Colombo (PE). Obtaining documentation form Govt. depts. (KP). pm: Meeting with IUCN/TCP/CCD. Meeting with NARA. Meeting with UNDP.
Tues	13 th March	am: Meeting with IUCN. pm: Meeting with CCD accounts. Meeting with UNDP.
Wed	14 th March	am: Meeting with Department of Wildlife Conservation. Meeting with External Resources Department. pm: Document review and report Writing.
Thurs	15 th March	All day: Report writing.
Fri	16 th March	All day: Report writing.
Sat	17 th March	All day: Report writing.
Sun	18 th March	Day off. (Part spent report writing)
Mon	19 th March	All day: Report writing.
Tues	20 th March	am: Presentation of TPE Report. pm: Report writing and responding to comments
Wed	5 th March	Departure (PE).

ANNEX III : PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Project Staff

Mr. H.M. Siripala	Former-National Project Manager – RUK Project
Mr W.A.N.S. Rajaratne	Former National Project Coordinator/Planning Officer, Coast Conservation Department
Mr. R.H.S. Rajapakse	Accountant , Coast Conservation Department

Project Facilitation Organisation

Mr. M. Dayananda	Former Head Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, IUCN
Ms Kumi Ekarathne	Senior Programme Officer, IUCN
Mr. Nishan Perera	Senior Programme Officer IUCN
Mr. Shamine Wikkrasinghe	Project Monitoring Officer IUCN

Government

Mr. Anil Premaratne	Deputy Director CCD
Mr. Indra Ranasinghe	Former Deputy Director CCD
Mr. Wasantha Rathnayake	Deputy Director DWC
Mr. S.R.B. Dissanayake	Deputy Director DWC
Ms Sunitha Perera	Deputy Director ERD
Mr. S.D.Ranasinghe	Deputy Director ERD
Mr.Suresh Kumara	Head Environmental Studies Division NARA
Mr. M. Azmy	Research Officer, NARA
Mr. W.P.Ranjith	Game Guard, Kalamatiya, DWC
Mr. S.D.Dodangoda	Game Guard, Kalamatiya, DWC

Local Government

Ms. R.M.V Shanthi Jayasekera	Divisional Secretary/ Ambalanthota
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Non-governmental Organisations

Mr. Thushan Kapurusinghe	Team Leader, TCP, Rekawa
Mr. M.M.Saman	Treasurer, TCP, Rekawa
Mr Lalith Ekanayake	Secretary-TCP
Mr.M.M.Ranjith	President /RDF
Ms.Sureka Pattiyakumbura	Secretary /Community Development Officer/RDF

Biodiversity Task Force of the Biodiversity Societies

Mr Ganhewage Nandasiri	BTF- Chairman
Mr. E.A.K.Sumith Kumarai	BTF-Treasurer
Mr. Sudath Andaraweera	BTF-Member
Mr.R.P.Sarath	BTF-Member
Mr. I.G.Samarasena	BTF-Member
Ms. Malini Weeraratne	BTF- Member
Ms. W.P.Wimalawathii	BTF-Member
Ms. Magrat Ranaweera	BTF Member
Mr.P.P.Chandrarathne	BTF Member
Mr. W.A Pradeep	BTF Member
Mr. E.K.A.Darmasena	Member – BTF
Mr. G.M.Jayasooriya	Member – BTF
Mr. L.M.George Darwin	Member – BTF
Ms.A.P.Ranjanii	Member – BTF

Mr. U.H.Piyasena	Member – BTF
Mr. J.P.Amarasena	Member – BTF
Ms.M.M.Lakni	Member – BTF
Ms.M.M.Nanda Priyanthi	Member – BTF
Ms. P.Nadhisha Dilrukshi	Member – BTF
Ms.L.Krishanthi Paranamana	Member – BTF
Ms. W.B.Karunawathi	Member – BTF
Ms. L.P.Sudantha Namalii	Member – BTF
Ms. P.Siriwardena	Member – BTF
Ms. R.P.Jatanadhii	Member – BTF
Mr.G.K.H.Siripala	Member – BTF
Mr. P.M Premathillake	Member – BTF
Mr. W.S. Premadasa	Member – BTF
Ms. Kanthi Paranamana	Member – BTF
Mr. Ruparansa Gunarathne	Member – BTF
Mr.W.G.Sugathadasa	Member – BTF
Ms. S.H.Nandaseeli	Member – BTF
Ms. E.P. Chandrani	Member – BTF
Mr.J.B.Nimal	Member – BTF
Ms. Kanthi Aparakka	Member – BTF
Mr. Sudath Andarweera	Eco-lodge owner, RUK Project Area
Mr. R.P.Sarath	Eco-Camp site owner, RUK Area Project

Beneficiaries

Mr. R.P.Chandra Kumara	BDC member
Ms. S.H.Ariyawathii	BDC member
Ms. R.Ediriweera	BDC member
Ms.H.M.Weerathne	BDC member
Ms.Mallika Lamabadusooriya	BDC member
Mr. R.P.Chandra Kumara	BDC member
Ms. S.H.Ariyawathii	BDC member
Ms.H.M.Weerathne	BDC member
Mr. Sudath Andarweera	Eco-lodge owner RUK
Mr. R.P. Sarath	Eco-camp site owner RUK
Ms. I. Chandrasekera (Siril Wikkramasooriya)	Wife of Eco-lodge owner

UNDP

Dharshani de Silva	Project Officer UNDP
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ANNEX IV : SUMMARY EVALUATION OF PROJECT ACHIEVEMENTS BY OUTPUTS

During the Project, the logframe was revised twice and the number of indicators increased. However, these revisions were never endorsed by the National Level Coordinating Committee (see paragraph 10) and the original logframe appears to have remained in use to guide the Project throughout. Consequently, the TET has used this for its evaluation.

Output description	Success Criteria [¶]	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation					
				HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Rationale/Goal : To ensure the conservation and sustainable use of the Bio Diversity of this globally significant site through the development of a collaborative management system actively involving local communities, NGOs, and Government agencies	The entirety of Rekawa, Ussanagoda and Kalametiya coastal reach is declared a Special Management Area/Sanctuary.	Lunama-Kalametiya declared a Wildlife Sanctuary in May 2006 which includes the RUK turtle nesting beaches.	Jurisdictional problems prevented inclusion of lands at Usangoda. Perhaps this should have been picked up at the design stage.						
	Local communities gain increased income from sustainable livelihood practices through ecotourism and increased production in the lagoon.	Three loans for ecotourism taken up. Ecotourism plan produced as a project output but not being implemented. Re-stocking of Rekawa Lagoon with shrimp fry in 2004 failed for methodological reasons and local people harvested fry at sub-optimal size.	Ecotourism component produced only one viable nature-based enterprise – others either failing or not being nature-based.						
	Coral-mining and shell-mining reduced/regulated.	Mining regulated within Wildlife Sanctuary area only. Shell and sand extraction greatly reduced through combination of awareness, education, per-pressure (Biodiversity Societies) and provision of low interest loans for alternative livelihoods.	Probably most successful component and result of RUK Project.						
	Economic development in the project area is compatible with conservation management goals.	No information available and no monitoring taking place.	TET viewed the clearance of 200 acres of pristine dry scrubland being actively cleared close to Kalametiya Lagoon for development as a teak plantation. Development objected to by BTF but						

[¶] from Section D of the Project Document

Output description	Success Criteria ¹	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation					
				HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
			not consulted. Large township (152 houses) relocated in similar scrubland in 2005 despite high level objections lodged with Central Government.						
Outcome 1: A coastal environmental profile and a replicable special area management (SAM) plan for Rekawa, Ussangoda and Kalametiya prepared	Coastal Environmental Profile and Special Area Management Plan adopted and approved by [National Level] Coordinating Committee	Profile produced by IUCN in March 2004. Comments May 2004. Printed July 2004. Special Area Management Plan produced in draft April 2005. Meeting of CCD IUCN, GSMB, FD, and academics on 24 th June 2005. Approved by Director CCD and two Divisional Secretaries in July 2005.	Minutes of NLCC meetings do not show any approval or endorsement of the SAMP .. Parts of the SAMP implemented through Project-based activities, but no implementation beyond lifespan of Project because of lack of funding. No identification of possible funding sources within SAMP for its implementation. SAMP does not appear to be fully integrated into the District nor the Divisional land-use development planning system.						
Outcome 2: Participatory mechanism for resource management developed.	Establishment of a management system involving local communities, NGOs, and government agencies.	Two Divisional-level Coastal Collaborative Coordinating Committees (4Cs) formed at start of project (July 2002) and functioning throughout with monthly meetings. Continuing beyond lifespan of the Project.	The mandate of the CCCCs was not clear to the TET who remain concerned about the efficacy of the policy implementation. They also have no legally-enshrined authority. Despite presence of CCCCs, decision-making remains solely in the hands of the Divisional Secretary.						
	Number of sustainable livelihood activities identified and supported; annual socio-economic assessments revealing increased family incomes	90 loans made to 86 RUK members in three batches from revolving fund to provide alternative livelihoods to resource abusers over June 2004 to June 2006. An additional 50 loans made from fund to Batata South members who were not part of the RUK Project.	No socio-economic assessments carried out, although loan records show 9 borrowers known to have defaulted on loans totalling US\$ 3,300. While some late payments have had to be made, most loans successfully repaid. TET met a number of borrowers who said Project had changed their lives for the better.						

Output description	Success Criteria ¹	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation					
				HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
Outcome 3: Conservation programmes for the globally significant biodiversity established at the project site and local biodiversity units established to enhance community awareness.	Turtle nesting sites identified, <i>in situ</i> conservation efforts launched and results documented	<p>RUK beaches declared a Wildlife Sanctuary for turtles under Flora & Fauna Ordinance in May 2006.</p> <p>Turtle conservation activities sub-contracted to DWC. DWC sub-contracted TCP to undertake:-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Community-based marine turtle conservation (nest protection) – successfully carried out with 539 nests protected during March 2005-March 2006 (c.60,000 eggs; c.48,000 hatchlings released) Education and awareness programme on marine turtles – carried out in 15 schools and 10 fishing communities. <p>Identification of research gaps and requirements – study completed but not printed because of disputed payments.</p>	<p>TCP have not been able to provide any means of verification for the work carried out, although it is noted that they were not required to do so under their Letter of Agreement.</p> <p>TCP are continuing to undertake nest protection beyond the lifespan of the Project through separate independent financing.</p>						
		<p>DWC sub-contracted TCP to undertake:-</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Assessment of turtle nesting habitats – completed in July 2006. Technical report submitted to DWC in March 2006. Action Plan for marine turtle conservation – completed March 2006 Best Practice Guidelines – completed April 2006 Website established in January 2006. Capacity assessment Regional database for DWC's use completed in Aug 2006 and training of operator. 							

Output description	Success Criteria ¹	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation					
				HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
		TCP for Rekawa and Godawaya. TCP not enough money to cover Usangoda – DWC not covering gap. vii. Nesting sites identified and conservation efforts running in Rekawa and Godawaya only. Results documented but not reported because of admin problems over payments from DWC.							
	Mangroves are managed and full range of succession stages established at site	IUCN made biodiversity assessment at start of project. IUCN held a workshop on mangrove restoration with local community on 8 th June 2004 and made a request for proposals. NPM received seven proposals for mangrove re-planting – IUCN assessed and made recommendations to accept Rekawa Development Foundation to re-plant a 2 acre plot of Rekawa Lagoon with 16,000 plants. Recommendation made on 20/12/04.	Six days later tsunami – therefore priorities changed and proposal abandoned. No planting has taken place under the auspices of this Project. Some areas in/adjacent to the RUK were replanted under several post-tsunami initiatives although the scientific basis of the planting is suspect and its success is low.						
Outcome 4: Efficient policy level coordination and law enforcement established to improve biodiversity conservation.	Effective policies and legal regulations [<i>introduced and policies revised at the national and local levels</i>] addressing biodiversity loss. <i>Note: that in italics taken from a revised logframe for clarity.</i>	Turtle strategy in SL by IUCN RUK beaches declared a Wildlife Sanctuary for turtles under Flora & Fauna Ordinance in May 2006. IUCN proposed Lunama-Kalametiya as a Ramsar site to DWC in May 2005.	DWC trying to declare site a Ramsar site but are meeting fierce opposition from local people and other government departments and officials. New sanctuary will require much awareness-raising and education activities to reduce illegal activities. DWC has few resources to undertake such activities nor to carry out effective enforcement despite improved designations and policies. Furthermore, Sanctuary includes private land making enforcement difficult.						

Output description	Success Criteria ¹	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation					
				HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
	Development initiatives planned and the appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms established.	Conservation Coordinating Committees (DLCC, CCCCs and BTF) established but no monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are in operation.	Failure of Project and said committees to prevent new townships after tsunami and new teak plantation casts serious doubts over efficacy and integration of committees within planning system. Lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms seriously undermines effectiveness.						
Outcome 5: An effective monitoring system in place to assess development activities and their impact to biodiversity.		Biodiversity monitoring undertaken for 4 months by IUCN:- <ul style="list-style-type: none"> terrestrial December 2003 – February 2004 (three months); and November 2004 – February 2005 (four months). coral reefs February 2004 – May 2004 (four months); and February 2005 – April 2005 (three months). No monitoring after this and nothing continuing at end of project.	Biodiversity assessment and monitoring appear conceptually well-grounded although rather too much emphasis on numbers of species rather on numbers of individuals of certain species.						
		Twelve months of water quality monitoring undertaken by NARA (12/03-11/04) but no interpretation of data provided.	Water quality data now out of date and likely to have been radically altered by tsunami. Can no longer be used to base development planning decisions upon.						
		Monitoring indicators not easy for locals to use and not linked directly to Project initiatives.	No community-based biodiversity monitoring programme developed or operating – no manuals produced and disseminated despite some basic training having been undertaken.						
Activities									
6. Collect data on biodiversity and socio-economic situation through regular rapid	Scale and extent of marine and coastal ecosystems documented and status of the attitudes of the community towards	A single marine and terrestrial biodiversity assessment was carried out by IUCN and used to good effect for collaborative planning. Two monitoring surveys were done in the following two years.	Biodiversity assessment and monitoring reports very short on quantitative data.						

Output description	Success Criteria [†]	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation					
				HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
assessment surveys and targeted research and apply the data generated as an aid for collaborative planning and management.	biodiversity conservation and collaborative management	ISB carried out a five-month survey of the 20 Grama Niladharis covering basic socio-economic information and including all secondary data from associated coastal projects – HICZMP and CRMP – and other studies of the RUK.	ISB survey does not include any work on attitudes to biodiversity conservation or interest in collaborative management.						
7. Develop a collaborative management framework to control destructive livelihood practices and encourage the development of sustainable alternatives	Number of people trained in the production of sustainable biodiversity-related products.	Two batches trained in reed handicrafts – total 60 people. Also 20 people trained in batik-making; 20 trained to obtain driving licence; 40 trained in computer basics; and 40 people in sewing – 2 machines given for centre but unknown what happened to them at end of project	Limited number of people trained in biodiversity-related products, but good training also given to help people with non-destructive alternative livelihoods.						
	Number of small-scale enterprises receiving loans from the revolving fund and developing sustainable livelihood activities.	86 people (see above).							
	Receipts from ecotourism.	No data collected because of delays in Project. Ecotourism loans made only in late 2005.	Only three ecotourism businesses supported by the Project. TET interviewed all three – one making gross income of c. US\$ 2,000/yr; one about US\$ 600/yr (about to go bankrupt; and US\$ 500/yr (not sole income and not nature-based).						
	Control of shell and coral mining	No data, but general agreement from 18 Biodiversity Societies that drastic reduction in destructive activities.	TET could not make an independent assessment. Appears that many people have been weaned off of mining to successful alternative livelihoods. Licensed mining still occurs in area, but no official check at main depots as to source of shell/sand.						
8. Strengthen and implement	Number of turtle nests protected and acreage of	See data above							
		No mangroves planted whatsoever within							

Output description	Success Criteria ¹	Status at Project Completion	Comments	Evaluation					
				HS	S	MS	MU	U	HU
conservation initiatives of coastal biodiversity with the support and participation from local communities through conservation programs for globally threatened marine Turtles and Mangroves and avifauna	mangroves replanted on a yearly basis	auspices of project – see above.							
	Number of local community members trained in biodiversity conservation	Five sets of training totalling 150 people.	TET could not independently verify this figure. Training material produced in local language by IUCN-SL was not able to be produced by any of the trained people or organisations interviewed. No assessment is made accordingly.						
		18 Biodiversity Societies established and a Biodiversity Task Force (BTF) formed from 3 representatives from each. Members trained at a more advanced level.	Again, no assessment can be made since no evidence of this training was able to be produced to the TET by the BTF members.						
9. Establish a committee for enhancement of policy level coordination and a Biodiversity Task Force for improved law enforcement	Agreements between regulatory authorities and local communities on how to jointly address unsustainable practices.	One District and two Divisional Coordinating Committees established. Functional BTF identifying illegal activities and directing abusers to alternative livelihoods, and assisting enforcement agencies where necessary to reduce biodiversity loss. BTF also specially targeting sand-mining for garnets undertaken by private company.	Committees committed to reducing certain activities such as coral-, sand-, and shell-mining, but habitat loss continues from inappropriate developments sanctioned by same committees. BTF lacks any enforcement powers and its legal position within the planning system remains unclear.						
10. Establish a monitoring programme to assess processes and categories of development activities that have, or are likely to have, adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity	Proposals reviewed by Coastal Collaborative Coordinating Committee	Functional CCCC operating and reviewing planning applications and making recommendations to Divisional Secretary according to biodiversity criteria.	TET unable to see any proposals reviewed by CCCC. However, tsunami village and teak plantation (see above) contradict position that biodiversity criteria are included in development planning decisions						
	Ecosystems preserved through monitoring of water quality	Water quality monitoring undertaken by NARA for 12 months 12/03-11/04.	No interpretation given, no further monitoring undertaken, and data now out of date and pre-tsunami. No evidence to suggest that any ecosystem has been preserved or any conservation action has been directly based on this data.						

ANNEX V : LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT DEBRIEFING MEETING

Official de-briefing held on 20th March 2007

Mr. Ganga Jung Thapa,	NPD UMBCP, Director KMTNC
Dr. Siddhartha Bjracharya	Programme Manager, KMTNC
Mr, Madhu Chetri	NPM, UMBCP
Mr. Shyam Bajimaya,	Ecologist, Dept. National Parks and Wildlife Conservation
Mr. Jagadish Chandra Baral,	Ministry of Forestry and Soil Conservation
Mr. Vijaya Singh	Biodiversity Advisor, UNDP
Ms Rupa Basnet	Programme Officer, KMTNC
Dr. Yan Zhaoli	Rangeland Specialist, ICIMOD
Mr. Binod Basnet	Programme Officer, KMTNC
Mr. Naresh Subedi	Officer in Charge, KMTNC , Bardia
Mr. Namindra Dahal	Programme Officer, KMTNC
Mr. Bruce Moore	Field Director AHF
Dr. Ram Prakash Yadav	Asian Development Bank
Prof. Karan Shah	Chief, Natural History Museum
Dr. Phillip Edwards	Team Leader of Terminal Evaluation Team
Mr. Rajendra Suwal	Member of Terminal Evaluation Team
Ms. Neeta Thapa	Member of Terminal Evaluation Team

ANNEX VI : SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE MID-TERM EVALUATION AND THEIR STATUS

MTE Recommendation	Project Response
Adopt a pilot/demonstration strategy, acknowledging that the project does not have the resources for a comprehensive and differentiated coverage of the project area.	Unsure – information confused or not forthcoming.
Conduct an immediate and detailed project review between CCD, IUCN, PMO and UNDP, to sharpen the project focus. After the project review, analyse and consolidate the different studies and assessments and cross-reference them with the documentation of the PMO to provide more user-friendly decision support tools for future interventions and activities.	Maybe. NPM could not remember. TET could find no written record.
Ensure the wide dissemination of the assessments, or at least summaries, to local stakeholders in order to broaden the acceptance and feasibility of the respective findings and recommendations.	Not done – Project did not have enough time.
Finalize RUK SAMP and review with DWC and other stakeholders responsible for biodiversity conservation; disseminate.	SAMP completed. Not reviewed with DWC, Disseminated but not locally; no local language copy.
Fine-tune the Action Plan as part of or following the project review, and juxtapose it with the updated RUK Coastal Project action matrix.	No idea, but seems not.
Explore the integration of the RUK SAMP with the Hambantota District land use plan, and existing and planned site-specific management plans such as Rekawa and Kalametiya.	Not done, no integration attempted. TET could not find out why not.
Ensure and strengthen community participation in plan implementation through NGO/CBO consortia and/or the Biodiversity Task Force.	No implementation plan made – apparently because of lack of time.
Conduct capacity development activities for SAMP implementation, incl. exposure visits to other SAM sites in Sri Lanka, training on landscape-level conservation approaches, etc.	35 members of the BTF were taken to Negambo SAM and Balapitiya/Maduganga SAM.
Re-target main resource abusers for livelihood support according to site-specific threat analysis.	Yes, done.
Amend RLF criteria and/or develop small grants scheme for poor, unskilled to reduce transaction costs.	No small grants. Bata-atha South Fisheries Cooperative did not see a problem and continued as per Coordination Committee required
Introduce environmental screening of eco-tourism proposals for negative and positive impacts.	No screening done. Only three people applied for ecotourism grants anywy.
Work with existing site-specific coordinating committees	Recommendation unclear does not fit body of MTE. Not understood.
Prioritise areas for conservation interventions.	Yes – partially done.
Strengthen Law Enforcement in Specific Areas.	Yes – see three bullet points in MTE; all done.
Remove Invasive Species.	Yes – removal of <i>Prosobis</i> from near sanctuary to help local people activities. But not from within sanctuary.
Develop and Implement Community-based Biodiversity	No. No field manual. Apparently some undertaken through BTF but TTET could not find any evidence

MTE Recommendation	Project Response
Monitoring.	for this.
Involve Local Communities in Turtle Conservation Component.	Only at Rekawa through TCP.
Establish clarity on the role of the BTF as either along the spectrum of awareness creation, monitoring/law enforcement and participatory management; endow it with the necessary authority and resources to implement the chosen mandate.	Not done.
Integrate water quality monitoring in Component 3; and conduct other M&E activities under the respective project components.	Not done.
Delete/ignore component, and transfer any remaining resources to other components.	Yes – but TET could find no record of the amount of money transferred since basic management accounting not possible.
Recruit as urgent priority a Deputy NPM with conservation/NRM profile and familiarity with the project area, to assist the NPM in strengthening the linkages between conservation measures and socio-economic interventions.	Project Ecologist (Dinish Gajamange) “promised” to help NPM with biodiversity. Not really Deputy. Present until around May 2006 of Project . Acted as NPM for last bit of Project – but no money in Project until end May when he had gone. Second NPC acted as NPM for last month.
Identify transitional arrangement for continued SM support for at least one more year and with two SMs. If continuous presence is not possible, intermittent inputs could be an alternative.	Yes. 4 SM recruited from RUK area
Ensure that at CCD, the NPC and administrative support for the RUK Coastal Project spend at least 50 % of their time on RUK.	No. NPC spent usually 1 day per week or 2 days per month on RUK work.
In order to strengthen communications between the project proponents, establish action forum between CCD, IUCN, NPM and UNDP, which would monitor the implementation of the project action matrix (described in an earlier recommendation).	Yes, 2-3 meetings held but no minutes could be tracked down by TET.
Provide the PMO at the earliest with the basic infrastructure to function effectively, and increase the financial authority of the NPM, if possible, to \$ 100.	PMO in Hatagala. Problem with computer solved. Mortorbikes provided for SMs. Financial authority of NPM not increased.
For those project components, where IUCN provides or plans to provide technical services, engage external reviewers (such as Sri Lankan academics or resources from UNDP’s networks).	Carried out through CCD using external Sri Lankan academics.

ANNEX VII : SUMMARY OF POST-TSUNAMI RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DIRECTOR, COASTAL CONSERVATION DEPARTMENT, MINISTRY OF FISHERIES – FEBRUARY 2005¹³

PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Modify project outcomes
2. Review and revise budget accordingly
3. Strengthen field team with wetlands expertise and social mobilizers

ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDED PROJECT AREA ACTIVITIES

4. Provide immediate strategic assistance for livelihoods recovery
5. Provide a bridging loan to the micro-credit scheme
6. Strengthen links between Biodiversity Societies, loans to threat reduction to wetland resources through targeting and biodiversity conservation agreements attached to loans
7. Plan for the continued operation and focus of the Biodiversity Societies after project completion
8. Influence the resettlement site selection and development process to reduce negative impacts on the wetland areas
9. Initiate, support and catalyze mangrove reforestation
10. Consider and resolve conflicts to sustain additional ecological processes required for wetlands conservation, mangrove viability and coastal protection
11. Support the declaration of Rekawa wetland site to be under conservation status

BROADER NATIONAL POLICY LEVEL RECOMMENDATIONS

12. Modify current policy on resettlement and provide environmental guidance on site selection
13. Develop a Green and Blue Belt Fund
14. Gain agreements and facilitate strengthening of government enforcement in the coastal and wetland areas
15. Develop policy and guidance on agricultural irrigation schemes to reduce their negative downstream environmental impact on the hydrology of wetlands in order to maintain viability of mangroves
16. Propose and support the declaration of important wetland sites to be under conservation status
17. Develop and apply ecotourism guidelines for tourism development along the coast
18. Develop guidelines for options and methods for mangrove reforestation

¹³ Andrew Bovarnick New York, GEF and Darshani DaSilva, Colombo, UNDP